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The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics

Part 2 — CHAPTER VI. THE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.

Oswald J. (Oswald Joseph) Reichel translation

The present chapter will be devoted to considering the first of these groups—the fundamental positions held by the Stoics in regard to nature; among which three specially deserve notice—their Materialism; their Dynamical view of the world; and their Pantheism.

(2) Causes which produced the Stoic materialism. The question next before us is: What led the Stoics to this materialism? It might be supposed that their peculiar theory of knowledge based on sensation was the cause; but this theory did not preclude the possibility of advancing from the sensible to the super-sensible. It might quite as well be said that their theory of knowledge was a consequence of their materialism, and that they referred all knowledge to sensation, because they could allow no real being to anything which is not material. The probability therefore remains that their theory of knowledge and their materialistic view of nature both indicate one and the same habit of mind, and that both are due to the action of the same causes.

(a) The Stoic materialism not an expansion of Peripatetic views. Nor will it do to seek for these causes in the influence exercised by the Peripatetic or pre-Socratic philosophy on the Stoic School. At first sight, indeed, it might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from Heraclitus their materialism, together with their other views on nature; or else their materialism might seem to be an expansion of the metaphysical notions of Plato and Aristotle. For if Aristotle denied Plato’s distinction of form and matter to such an extent that he would hardly allow form to exist at all except in union with matter, might it not appear to others more logical to do away with the distinction between them in thought, thus reducing both to a property of matter? Were there not difficulties in the doctrine of a God external to the world, of a passionless Reason? Were there not even difficulties in the antithesis of form and matter, which Aristotle’s system was powerless to overcome? And had not Aristoxenus and Dicæarchus before the time of Zeno, and Strato immediately after his time, been led from the ground occupied by the Peripatetics to materialistic views? And yet we must pause before accepting this explanation. The founder of Stoicism appears, from what is recorded of his intellectual growth, to have been repelled by the Peripatetic School more than by any other; nor is there the least indication in the records of the Stoic teaching that that teaching resulted from a criticism of the Aristotelian and Platonic views of a double origin of things. Far from it, the proposition that everything capable of acting or being acted upon must be material, appears with the Stoics as an independent axiom needing no further proof.

(b) The Stoic materialism not due to Heraclitus. The supposed connection between the Stoics and Heraclitus, so far from explaining their materialistic views, already presumes their existence. Yet long before Zeno’s time the philosophy of Heraclitus as a living tradition had become extinct. No historical connection therefore, or relation of original dependence, can possibly exist between the two, but at most a subsequent perception of relationship can have directed Zeno to Heraclitus. Zeno’s own view of the world was not a consequence, but the cause, of his sympathy with Heraclitus. In short, neither the Peripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first impulse to Zeno’s materialism, although they may have helped in many ways to strengthen his views on that subject, when already formed.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Soph. 247, D. ↑Note 2 · Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. Plac. i. 11, 4: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰNote 3 · As do Ritter, iii. 577, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos. 129. ↑Note 4 · Diog. vii. 135: σῶμα δ’ ἐστὶ (φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ) τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν, κ.τ.λ. ↑Note 5 · See p. 98. The corporeal nature of deity and the soul will be subsequently discussed. ↑Note 6 · See p. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the difference of ἡνωμένα· (see p. 103, 1): nullum bonum putamus esse, quod ex distantNote 7 · Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. p. 298, D (the same in the spurious treatise De Mundo, p. 1154, E): ἡ δὲ [ἕξις = ποιότης] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀντιστρέφον ἐNote 8 · Plut. Com. Not. 45. See p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2: Placet nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit: quidquid facit Note 9 · This is the conception of τόνος, upon which the strength of the soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Cleanthes, in Plut. Sto. Note 10 · Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria sunt coNote 11 · Sext. Math. vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τἀληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους … οὐσία μὲν παρ’ ὅσοNote 12 · Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ φανταNote 13 · See p. 92, 2, the extract from Sen. Ep. 117. ↑Note 14 · Plut. Com. Not. 45, 5, p. 1084: Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἑNote 15 · Diog. 151: χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἄερα κατεψυγμένον διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἀέρος κατὰ τὴν πρὸNote 16 · Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Ecl. i. 392; Sext. Math. x. 218 and 237; viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. ii. 81; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2. ↑Note 17 · See p. 94, 1. ↑Note 18 · See p. 66, 1. ↑Note 19 · See p. 93; 132, 1. ↑Note 20 · See p. 84, 4. ↑Note 21 · See p. 105, 3. ↑Note 22 · Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded with anotheNote 23 · Diog. vii. 151: καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καNote 24 · Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. Note 25 · According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by Chrysippus:—(1) The argument from κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι—our notion of κρᾶσις is difNote 26 · See p. 95, 2; 126, 1. ↑Note 27 · On ἄποιος ὕλη, as the universal ὑποκείμενον or οὐσία κοινὴ, see p. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν ὅλων Note 28 · See p. 141, 2. ↑Note 29 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. See p. 105, 1. ↑Note 30 · See p. 105, 1 and 2; 127, 5; 128, 2. ↑Note 31 · Simpl. Cat. 67, ε (Schol. 74, a, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν. διὸ Note 32 · Simpl. Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω· καὶNote 33 · Diog. vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲNote 34 · Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: εἰ αἴτιόν ἐστινNote 35 · Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between συνεκτικὰ, συναίτια, and σύνεργα αἴτια, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι’ ὃ, whNote 36 · Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba causarumNote 37 · Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων), continues: Hæc ita fierNote 38 · According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof. ↑Note 39 · Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf. iii. 14, 35), gives it apparently as the view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All living things, plNote 40 · On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Plut. Sto. Rep. 38. 3; Com. Not. 32, 1; Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5; Seneca, Benef. iv. 4; Sext. Math.Note 41 · Sext. Math. ix. 75. ↑Note 42 · Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22: Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius.Note 43 · Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur Note 44 · Diog. 143: ἔμψυχον δὲ [τὸν κόσμον], ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Sext. Math. ix. 101: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἀπὸ Note 45 · Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine. HomoNote 46 · Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the existence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he employs Note 47 · See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math. ix. 88–91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes foNote 48 · See p. 143, 2; 144, 1–4; 145, 1 and 2. ↑Note 49 · Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno’s argument given, p. 145, 2: πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονNote 50 · Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis æther videtur summus Deus, mente præditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14, 36: (ZenNote 51 · Cic. Acad. l.c.: Cleanthes … solem dominari et rerum potiri = κρατεῖν τῶν ὄντων putat. He speaks with less accuracy (Krische, Forsch. 428) iNote 52 · Stob. l.c.: Ἀρχίδαμος (leg. with Cod. A Ἀρχέδημος) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο: the same statement without mentioning Note 53 · See p. 141, 2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14: στοιχεῖον εἶναί φασι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος, τούτου δ’Note 54 · Fuller particulars p. 144, 1; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. Hær. i. 21: Chrysippus and Zeno suppose ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώNote 55 · Stob. Ecl. i. 58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to Chrysippus and Posidonius): τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν … εNote 56 · According to Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the argument as to God’s providential care of the world into three parts. The first pNote 57 · Stob. Ecl. i. 58: Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεὸν λέγουσι] … Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον Note 58 · Stob. Ecl. i. 374: Chrysippus teaches εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμNote 59 · Stob. Ecl. i. 538, on the authority of Zeno; Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in this: ONote 60 · Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2: God may also be called fatum: nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omniuNote 61 · Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): Ποσειδώνιος [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν,Note 62 · According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius. With him Zeus stands for the original force, φύσις for its first, and εἱμαNote 63 · Plut. l.c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: [Jupiter] resoluto mundo et Diis in unum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suNote 64 · Compare, besides what has been already quoted, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Diog. vii. 156: δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτNote 65 · See p. 143. ↑Note 66 · Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quaNote 67 · Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorpoNote 68 · Cic. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We shall come back presentNote 69 · Krische, Forsch. i. 365. ↑Note 70 · See pp. 153, 2; 153, 4. ↑Note 71 · Chrysippus. See p. 152, note 1. ↑Note 72 · Aristocles. See p. 147, note 3. ↑Note 73 · Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. See p. 148, 1. ↑Note 74 · Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. 497, A: Στωϊκῶν θεὸν φθαρτὸν εἰσαγόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων σῶμα τρεπτὸν διόλου καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβNote 75 · Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153, 2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβNote 76 · Stob. Ecl. i. 444: κόσμον δ’ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημαNote 77 · See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13, says God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe itseNote 78 · The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is κρᾶσιNote 79 · Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο. ↑Note 80 · Diog. 143: Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The words of Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ Note 81 · Diog. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· which must be understood in the same sense as the corresponding Note 82 · (δ) Wide extension of material. Moreover, these materials produce the phenomena of life. Hence, not content with calling them bodies, the StNote 83 · (b) The incorporeal or non-material. In carrying out this theory, they could not, as might be expected, wholly succeed. Hence a Stoic could Note 84 · (c) Practical turn of the Stoic philosophy the cause. The real causes for these views must therefore be sought elsewhere, and will be found Note 85 · (3) Consequences of the Stoic materialism. Herefrom it would appear to follow that only individual perceptions are true, and that all generaNote 86 · (b) Theory of universal intermingling. The materialism of the Stoics likewise led to some remarkable assertions in the province of natural sNote 87 · B. Dynamical theory of nature. (1) Matter and force. Although the stamp of materialism was sharply cut, and its application fearlessly made Note 88 · (2) The nature of force. (a) Force limited to the notion of efficient cause. The Stoics, however, would not agree with Plato and Aristotle sNote 89 · (b) Character of this efficient cause. In attempting to form a more accurate notion of this efficient cause, the first point which deserves Note 90 · This power must be further defined to be the soul of the world, the highest reason, a kind, beneficent, and philanthropic being; in short, dNote 91 · (3) Deity. (a) The conception of Deity more accurately defined. The language used by the Stoics in reference to the Deity at one time gives Note 92 · As used in the Stoic system, these expressions generally mean one and the same thing. It is an unimportant difference whether the original cNote 93 · Upon closer examination, even the difference between the materialistic and idealistic description of God vanishes. God, according to Stoic pNote 94 · (b) God original matter. The more the two sides of the conception of God—the material and the ideal—are compared, the clearer it becomes thaNote 95 · C. Pantheism. (1) God identical with the world. From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted no essential difference between Note 96 · (2) Difference between God and the world only relative. Still this distinction does not depend only upon our way of looking at things, but iNote 97 · (3) Boëthus dissents from the pantheism of the Stoics. Boëthus alone dissented from the pantheism of the Stoics by making a real distinctionNote 98 · Diog. vii. 136: κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα πεNote 99 · Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth. ↑Note 100 · Stob. l.c.: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. τοNote 101 · There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from whNote 102 · Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶNote 103 · Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικὰNote 104 · The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is apparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not κόσμος,Note 105 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, αὔξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γNote 106 · Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίσNote 107 · This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned to Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in the rNote 108 · See p. 147, 1. ↑Note 109 · Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι [leg. -ειν] πάντα ἑNote 110 · It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf. Sen.Note 111 · Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶNote 112 · The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The belief, hNote 113 · Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ [del.] πᾶσιν οἷόν τε γινέσθNote 114 · According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and Panætius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Boëthus asseNote 115 · The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 27–30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to contribNote 116 · For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus tells, for the latter that of Seneca. ↑Note 117 · Diog. vii. 149: καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσNote 118 · Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήνNote 119 · Hence Chrysippus’ definition (Plut. and Stob.): εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος (Plut. νόμος) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένωNote 120 · It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into one another. ↑Note 121 · Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: εἰ δὲ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν, κ.τ.λ. Note 122 · See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148; 145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 28;Note 123 · See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut. Athenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσNote 124 · As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p. 161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the σπέρμα in the seedNote 125 · σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg itself. Thus, in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as λόγος ἐNote 126 · See p. 101, 2. ↑Note 127 · This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements. ↑Note 128 · Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29. ↑Note 129 · Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἱμαρμένη, πεπρωμέNote 130 · Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus. l.c. 8, 1. ↑Note 131 · See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76. ↑Note 132 · The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on p. 145, 4. ↑Note 133 · See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought differently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, β. ↑Note 134 · Cic. De Fato, 10, 20. ↑Note 135 · Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὔλογον εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι … καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι’Note 136 · Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous exposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1): Chrysippus pNote 137 · Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένNote 138 · Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασι καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. ↑Note 139 · Alex. l.c. p. 70: φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ἕνα ὄντα … καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίNote 140 · In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et provideNote 141 · Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim et causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant, parNote 142 · Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they mustNote 143 · As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes. ↑Note 144 · The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3) were Note 145 · See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αNote 146 · Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο φασὶ μηδὲNote 147 · Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and above, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39, p. 14Note 148 · See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and Alex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the latter, he feNote 149 · See above, p. 171, 3. ↑Note 150 · Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112. ↑Note 151 · Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140. Alex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument, concluding withNote 152 · Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ adjNote 153 · Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c. ↑Note 154 · Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται, τὰ δὲNote 155 · Alex. c. 26, p. 82. ↑Note 156 · Alex. c. 32, p. 102. ↑Note 157 · The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus. ↑Note 158 · Alex. c. 35: λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· (It never happens that there is a εἱμαρμένη but not a πεπNote 159 · Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκώλυτος καNote 160 · Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16); Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation of destNote 161 · Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epictet. Man. 52) Ep. 107, 11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21, hNote 162 · After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation. Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity of Note 163 · Sext. Math. ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων … ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡνωNote 164 · M. Aurel. vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία (the matter of the world) εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τNote 165 · Diog. 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας. ↑Note 166 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 3, p. 1044: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι … φιλοκαλεῖν … τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κακὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· γέNote 167 · M. Aurel. iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν … σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οNote 168 · Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes this variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with admiraNote 169 · Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων ποικιNote 170 · See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D. ii. 32. ↑Note 171 · Plut. (in Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 32): ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο νὴ Δία τοῦ Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν ἐποιήσαντο, ἡμῶNote 172 · Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ. N. D. iNote 173 · Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful fowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog fNote 174 · See p. 186, 1. ↑Note 175 · Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam particula perfecNote 176 · We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic theory of the moral government of the world. Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p. 1051Note 177 · See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6): τέλεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχεNote 178 · Gell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus in his treatise περὶ προνοίας, discussed, amongst other things, the question, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατNote 179 · Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura bona, si vitio male utentium nocent.… Si beneficia naturæ utentium pravitate peNote 180 · Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us good service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us not to Note 181 · A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously uses against the Stoics. ↑Note 182 · Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17 (see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2: Chrysippus affirms, ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ εὔλογόν ἐσNote 183 · Chrysippus felt this. Hence he says (in Gell.): It has been also decreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong. ↑Note 184 · Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 36, 1: κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. Id. (in Gell. vii. 1, 10): As diseasNote 185 · Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): γίνεται γὰρ αὐτή πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ ἀχρήστωNote 186 · Cleanthes, Hymn. 18: ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖκαι καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν· ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα Note 187 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν … ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοNote 188 · Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says: πότερον ἀNote 189 · M. Aurel. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεNote 190 · M. Aurel. viii. 35: ὃν τρόπον ἐκείνη [ἡ φύσις] πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ μέρος ἑNote 191 · Seneca’s treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding this thought. In it, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of good meNote 192 · Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, col. 8, Vol. Herc. vi. 53: ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων πιέζωνται, τότNote 193 · A. The general course of the universe. (1) Origin of the world. By virtue of a law inherent in nature, Primary Being passes over into particNote 194 · (2) End of the world. As the distinction between matter and force has its origin in time, so it will also have an end in time.8 Matter whichNote 195 · (3) Cycles in the world’s course. No sooner, however, will everything have returned to its original unity,14 and the course of the world havNote 196 · B. Government of the world. (1) Nature of Destiny. (a) Destiny as Providence. One point established by the generation and destruction of theNote 197 · (2) Arguments in favour of Providence. All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmistakeably to the conclusion, not only that the world as a wNote 198 · (d) Argument from foreknowledge of God. The same process of reasoning, transferred from the outer world to the inner world of mind, underlieNote 199 · (e) Argument from the existence of divination. To this argument may be added a further one to which the Stoics attached great importance—theNote 200 · (3) The idea of Providence determined. (a) Providence as necessity. But the real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is expressed in the maxim, thaNote 201 · (b) Providence directed immediately to the universe, indirectly to individuals. Divine Providence, therefore, does not extend to individual Note 202 · (c) Difficulties connected with the theory of necessity. (α) Statement of several difficulties. The Stoics were thus involved in a difficultNote 203 · (β) Moral responsibility vindicated. In reference to human actions, the Stoics did not allow the freedom of the will, in the proper sense ofNote 204 · From these observations, it appears that the Stoics never intended to allow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from thaNote 205 · C. Nature of the world. Everything in the world being produced by one and the same divine power, the world, as regards its structure, is an Note 206 · The other line of argument is followed not so much in individual expressions. But owing no doubt to the pre-eminently practical character ofNote 207 · (2) Moral theory of the world. The greater the importance attached by the Stoics to the perfection of the world, the less were they able to Note 208 · (a) Existence of physical evil. The existence of physical evil gave the Stoics little trouble, since they refused to regard it as an evil atNote 209 · (b) Existence of moral evil Greater difficulty was found by the Stoics to beset the attempt to justify the existence of moral evil, and the Note 210 · (c) Connection between virtue and happiness. The third point in their moral theory of the world, the connection between moral worth and happNote 211 · The whole investigation is one involving much doubt and inconsistency. Natural considerations frequently intertwine with considerations baseNote 212 · See above, p. 126; 101, 2; Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 410. ↑Note 213 · Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλου τὴν ὕλην. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 101, Note 214 · They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by κίνησις every form of change. ↑Note 215 · Stob. Ecl. i. 404, 408, gives definitions of κίνησις, of φορά, and of μονή, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110, β (SchNote 216 · Simpl. Phys. 310, b: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἔλεγον ὑπεῖναι τὴν τοπικὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέγαλα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ ὑφισταμNote 217 · Simpl. Categ. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 23): Plotinus and others introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ποιεῖν καNote 218 · Simpl. l.c. 77, β; Schol. 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself contradicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by Aristotle. ↑Note 219 · Simpl. l.c. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 28): The Stoics who, according to p. 84, ε, Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories, made theNote 220 · See page 135. ↑Note 221 · Stob. Ecl. i. 382: Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον (conf. Themist. Phys. 40, b; Plut. PlaNote 222 · The Stoic idea of space is so understood by Themist. Phys. 38, b; Simpl. Phys. 133, a. ↑Note 223 · See previous note and in Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of ἀσώματον δὲ, we should read κενὸν δὲ) definitions of κενόν. ↑Note 224 · Stob. Ecl. i. 392, quoting Chrysippus. ↑Note 225 · See p. 131, 2. ↑Note 226 · Simpl. Categ. 88, ζ. Schol. 80, a, 6: τῶν δὲ Στωϊκῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἁπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπε (conf. Plut. Plat. Quæst. viii.Note 227 · Sext. Math. x. 142; Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081; Stob. i. 260. ↑Note 228 · For the conception of στοιχεῖον, which is also that of Aristotle (Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of ἀρχὴ, see Diog. Note 229 · Lassalle, Heraclitus, ii. 84. ↑Note 230 · See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into water δι’ ἀέρος (i.e. after first going over into air, not passing throughNote 231 · Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 312: πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτNote 232 · Diog. 137: εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν, τόν τ’ ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, p. 1053. TNote 233 · Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the region of fire and the stars (Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is the warmest, the dNote 234 · Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314: λέγεσθαι δὲ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά. Thus Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, E, who iNote 235 · Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151, 1; 163, 2. ↑Note 236 · This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move altogethNote 237 · Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ … φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα τNote 238 · Diog. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων. μεθ’ Note 239 · Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 (totum hoc cœlum, quod igneus æther, mundi summa pars, claudit), and p. 198, 3, where the same thing is called πῦρ bNote 240 · In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines οὐρανὸς as αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσχατον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφανῶς. Similarly Diog. 138; Cleomed. Met. pNote 241 · See p. 146, 4. ↑Note 242 · Stob. i. 346: τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ’ αἰθέριον περιφερῶς κινεῖται. See p. 202, 3. It is only of terrestrial fire that Zeno Note 243 · They denied it, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with foNote 244 · The spherical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is mentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag. 126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3. Cleom. MetNote 245 · Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and Diog. 145, also affirm that the earth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by StobNote 246 · Stob. Ecl. i. 446: τοῦ δὲ … κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον, τὶ δ’ ὑπομένον, περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον δὲ τὴν γNote 247 · Stob. i. 356; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; Diog. 140; Cleomed. Met. pp. 39 and 46; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Ibid. on the perfection ofNote 248 · Stob. i. 392; Simpl. Phys. iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150. ↑Note 249 · Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; Sext. Math. vii. 214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14, p. 58; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21. SeNote 250 · See p. 168, 1; Cleomed. Met. 2 and 5. ↑Note 251 · Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is unlimited. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς, οἷόν ἐσNote 252 · Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob. i. 408. According to Stob. i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, p. 1073, Plac. ii. 1, Note 253 · Diog. 145; Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516; 540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D. Compare the reference to Cleanthes on p. 201, 4, wNote 254 · According to Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Ecl. i. 314; 519; 538; 554; 565, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac. ii. 2Note 255 · Diog. 145; Stob. i. 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. De Is. 41, p. 367; Sto. Rep. 39, 1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac. ii. 17, 2; 20, 3Note 256 · Stob. i. 532; Cic. l.c.; Macrob. Sat. i. 23, quoting Cleanthes and Macrobius; Plut. Plac. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already expreNote 257 · Stob. i. 554 (Plut. Pl. ii. 26, 1). This statement, however, appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by Diog. 1Note 258 · Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. Sto. Rep 39, 1; 41, 2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20, 3; Diog. 145; Phædr. NNote 259 · Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the quotations on p. 144, 1, from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on p. 151, 1, from DioNote 260 · Diog. vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called μετεωρολογικὴ or μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις; also, vii. 135, a treatise περὶ μετεώNote 261 · On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle, looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stob. i. 576; Plut. Plac. iiiNote 262 · Thus colours are explained as πρῶτοι σχηματισμοὶ τῆς ὕλης (Stob. i. 364; Plac. i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the airNote 263 · Conf. Bake, Posidonii Rhod. Reliquiæ, pp. 87–184; Müller, Fragm. Hist. Græc. iii. 245. ↑Note 264 · Sext. Math. ix. 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων (on ἕνωσις see p. 103, 1) σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ Note 265 · The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the arteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1), which was shared by the Peripatetics, desNote 266 · Turning from the questions which have hitherto engaged our attention to natural science in the stricter sense of the term, we must first touNote 267 · Of a more peculiar character are the views of the Stoics as to the intermingling of substances, to which reference has already been made.10 Note 268 · B. Elements. In expanding their views on the origin of the world, the Stoics begin with the doctrine of the four elements,18 a doctrine whicNote 269 · The relative density of the elements also determines their place in the universe. Fire and air are light; water and earth are heavy. Fire anNote 270 · C. The universe. Holding this view of the elements, the Stoics, it will be seen, did not deviate to any very great extent, in their ideas ofNote 271 · (1) Stars. The stars are spherical masses,43 consisting of fire; but the fire is not in all cases equally pure,44 and is sustained, as HeracNote 272 · (2) Meteorology. Most thoroughly, however, did the Stoics—and, in particular, Posidonius50—devote themselves to investigating those problemsNote 273 · (3) Plants and animals. Little attention was devoted by the Stoics to the world of plants and animals. About this fact there can be no doubtNote 274 · Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5: οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· συμπάσχει δNote 275 · Diog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36. ↑Note 276 · Zeno, in Tertull. l.c., and very nearly the same in Chalcid. in Tim. p. 306 Meurs.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu digrNote 277 · Cleanthes, in Nemes. l.c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διNote 278 · Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον. Zeno. Macrob. SomnNote 279 · Chrysippus. See previous note. This diffusion is further explained by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f. 68, a. PlotiNote 280 · Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3; M.Note 281 · Zeno described the seed as πνεῦμα μεθ’ ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα … μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1Note 282 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8, p. 1052; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. De Primo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι Note 283 · On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of the sNote 284 · Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason. ↑Note 285 · Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, c. 21: The Stoics consider the ἡγεμονικὸν to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the φαντασίαι, συγκαταθέNote 286 · See p. 73, 2. ↑Note 287 · Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4: ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν ἰῆς μίμημα λαχόντες μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν.Note 288 · See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, l.c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p. 211, 5: ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένον [ων] μορίῳ, τNote 289 · Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσεNote 290 · Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215): οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὑτοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀποφαίνεσθαιNote 291 · Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: αἱ ψυχαὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Id. ii. 8, 11. M. AurelNote 292 · In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus, magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans. ↑Note 293 · Further particulars, p. 174, 180, 189. ↑Note 294 · See p. 179. ↑Note 295 · See p. 88, 1. ↑Note 296 · Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107; Plac. iv. 7, 2; Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26, 7; Note 297 · The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging to the Stoics—animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et sNote 298 · Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus, in Hilgenfeld’s Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 221. ↑Note 299 · Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis reddam … per haNote 300 · Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit … ipse quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sNote 301 · In Consol. ad Marc. 26, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the addition:Note 302 · Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies … quo, remotis strophis ac fucis, de me judNote 303 · Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life) nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos rerum Note 304 · Ep. 36, 10: Mors … intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceretNote 305 · Besides the definitions of αἴσθησις in Diog. 52, and the remark that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of feeliNote 306 · Page 77. ↑Note 307 · A. The soul. (1) Materialistic nature of the soul. The Stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting, when it treats of Man; and the line itNote 308 · The same hypothesis was also used to explain the origin of the soul. One part of the soul was believed to be transmitted to the young in theNote 309 · (2) Divisions of the soul. Nor is this hypothesis out of harmony with the notions otherwise entertained by the Stoics as to the nature of maNote 310 · B. The individual soul and the soul of the universe. The individual soul bears the same relation to the soul of the universe that a part doeNote 311 · C. Freedom and immortality. The effects of the Stoic principles appear unmistakeably in the above statements. They, however, pervade the whoNote 312 · Excepting the two points which have been discussed at an earlier time,34 and one other point relating to the origin of ideas and emotions, wNote 313 · Whatever attention the Stoics paid to the study of nature and to logic, the real kernel of their system lies, as has been already observed,
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