Note 92 — Chapter VI · THE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.

Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says: πότερον ἀμελουμένων τινῶν καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; Similarly the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 66: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt,—hardly satisfactory explanations for any theory of necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca (Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by Chrysippus (in Plut.)—πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι—does not quite harmonise with Plut. C. Not. 34, 2: οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχεν. Just as little does Seneca’s—Non potest artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9)—agree with his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For, according to the Stoics, matter is ultimately identical with reason and deity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt expressed by Heine, Stoic. de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not speaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See p. 190, 1, 2. ↑