Note 89 — Chapter VI · THE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.

Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): γίνεται γὰρ αὐτή πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. C. Not. 14, 1: As in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole, οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστιν. Similarly M. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii. 1, 2: (Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala: nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu (Heraclitus’ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον) consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not know what justice and valour are. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would be impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066). ↑