Part 3 — CHAPTER XXI. THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE; ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.

A. Inner connection of the Epicurean teaching. It has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is deficient both in coherence and consistency. Nor is this objection without foundation. If we come to the study of it, looking for a complete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical development, we shall certainly be disappointed. It is not difficult to show in what contradictions Epicurus was involved; in professing to trust the senses wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the hidden causes of things; in despising logical forms and laws, and at the same time building up his whole system on deductions; in holding that all sensations are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the realities which they represent as belonging to things is only relative. Nor were these the only inconsistencies. At one time only natural causes and laws are acknowledged, and any such thing as free will and imagination is ignored; at another, by the doctrine of the swerving aside of atoms and of the human will, unexplained caprice is elevated to the rank of law. Pleasures and pains are all referred to bodily sensations, and yet mental states are called higher and more important; nay, more, even from a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of humanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and devotion are deduced. It ought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics, to whom the claim of clear and consistent thought cannot be denied, were involved in similar difficulties. They, like the Epicureans, built up a rational system on a basis of the senses. They, too, constructed an ideal theory of morals on a material groundwork of metaphysics. They, too, declared that universal law is the only active power, whilst they maintained that reality belongs only to the world of matter. They, too, deduced a strict theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation; not to mention the inconsistent attitude which they assumed towards the popular religion. To deny to the Stoics a unity and connectedness of system, because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies, would be felt to be doing them an injustice. And can Epicureanism be fairly condemned, when its faults are essentially of the same kind (though a little more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single extenuating circumstance which can be urged on its behalf?

It is hardly necessary to notice here how the distinctive features of the Epicurean morals were developed out of their theory of happiness, in contrast to the Stoic teaching. The happiness of Epicurus, however, does not depend upon sensual gratification as such, but upon repose of mind and cheerfulness of disposition. His theory of morals, therefore, notwithstanding its foundation in pleasure, bears a nobler character, which is seen in its language as to the wise man’s relations to the pains and passions of the body, to poverty and riches, to life and death, quite as much as in the mild humanity and the warm and hearty appreciation of friendship by the Epicurean School. The rationalising spirit of that School was undoubtedly opposed to any religious belief which supposed an intervention of God in the course of the world, or the world’s influence on man for weal or woe; but its appeal to the senses without criticism placed no objection in the way of admitting divine beings, from whom no such intervention need be feared. Nay, more, this belief seemed the most natural ground for explaining the popular belief in Gods. It satisfied an inborn and apparently keenly felt want by supplying an appropriate object of devotion, and a standard by which to test the accuracy of moral ideas. Hence, notwithstanding scientific defects and contradictions, the whole system of Epicurus bears a definite stamp. All the essential parts of that system are subservient to one and the same end. The consistent working out of a scientific view of nature is looked for in vain; but there is no lack of consistency arising from an undeniable reference of the individual to a definite and practical standard.

B. Historical position of Epicureanism. (1) Relation to Stoicism. Looking to the wider historical relations of the Epicurean system, the first point which calls for remark is the relation of that system to Stoicism. The contrast between the two Schools is obvious; attention having been already drawn to it on all the more important points. It is likewise well known that a constant rivalry existed between the two Schools during their whole careers, that the Stoics looked down on the Epicureans, and circulated many calumnies with respect to their morals. For these statements proofs may be found in the preceding pages. Nevertheless, the two Schools are related in so many respects, that they can only be regarded as parallel links connected in one chain, their differences being varieties where the same main tendency

(b) Points of difference. In the unfolding and detailed exposition of their materialistic views the systems diverge, more widely, perhaps, than the philosophers themselves, whose leading they professed to follow. These divergencies appear particularly on the subject of nature, the Stoics regarding nature as a system of design, the Epicureans explaining it as a mechanical product. Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw God everywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms, and the theory of necessity. Whilst the Stoics were speculatively orthodox, the Epicureans were irreligious freethinkers. Both meet again in that branch of natural science which is most important in respect of morals—the part dealing with man. Both hold that the soul is a fiery atmospheric substance. Even the proof for this view, derived from the mutual influence of body and soul, is common to both. Both distinguish between the higher and the lower parts of the soul, and thus even the Epicureans in their psychology allow a belief in the superiority of reason to the senses, and in the divine origin of the soul.

The arena of the warmest dispute between the two Schools is, however, ethics. Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than appears at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than that between the Epicurean theory of pleasure and the Stoic theory of virtue; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same end—the happiness of mankind—but the conditions of happiness are also laid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue, according to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good; but the former in making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal from the senses or insensibility; the latter in seeking pleasure in repose of mind or imperturbability, are expressing the same belief. Man can only find unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when by means of knowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest with itself, and also to an independence of external attractions and misfortunes. The same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of both systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form—that of the ideal wise man—for the most part with the same features. The wise man of Epicurus is, as we have seen, superior to pain and want; he enjoys an excellence which cannot be lost; and he lives among men a very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into details, the difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate happiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean separate virtue from happiness.

But, whilst recommending a living for society, both systems take no real interest in social life. The recognition of a natural society amongst mankind, of certain positive relations to state and family, above all, a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world, characterise the Stoics. The pursuit of friendship, and the gentle humanity of their ethics, characterise the Epicureans. Together with these peculiarities one common feature cannot be ignored. Both have renounced the political character of the old propriety of conduct, and diverting their attention from public life, seek to find a basis for universal morality in the simple relation of man to man.

(c) The relationship greater than the difference. The united weight of all these points of resemblance is sufficient to warrant the assertion that, notwithstanding their differences, the Stoics and Epicureans stand on the same footing, and that the sharpness of the contrast between them is owing to their laying hold of opposite sides of one and the same principle. Abstract personality, and self-consciousness developed into a generic idea, is for both the highest aim. Compared with it not only the state of the senses, but the scientific knowledge of things, and the realisation of moral ideas in a commonwealth, are of minor importance. In this self-consciousness happiness consists. To implant it in man is the object of philosophy, and knowledge is only of value when and in as far as it ministers to this end. The point of difference between the two Schools is their view of the conditions under which that certainty of consciousness is attained. The Stoics hope to attain it by the entire subordination of the individual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are of opinion that man can only then be content in himself when he is restrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of happiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence on others, and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make virtue, the latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived as of a purely negative character, as being freedom from pain, and is referred to the whole of human life. Hence it is always made to depend on the moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, and the state of the senses, on intelligence and actions conformable with intelligence, in short, on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the Epicureans arrive by a roundabout course at the same result as the Stoics—the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of those who are altogether independent of external things, and enjoy perfect inward harmony.

(3) Relation to Democritus. Epicurus, therefore, not only differed from Aristippus with regard to feelings, by referring all feelings to impressions from without, of which he considered them true representations, but he felt himself called upon to oppose the Cyrenaic contempt for theories of nature, just as the Stoics had opposed the Cynic contempt for science. To the physics of Democritus he looked for a scientific basis for his ethics, just as they had looked to the system of Heraclitus. But the closer he clung to Democritus, owing to the weakness of his own interest in nature, the more it becomes apparent that his whole study of nature was subservient to a moral purpose, and hence of a purely relative value. Accordingly, he had not the least hesitation in setting consistency at defiance, by assuming the swerving aside of atoms and the freedom of the will. It is not only altogether improbable that Epicurus was but a second edition of Democritus—for history knows of no such repetitions—but as a matter of fact it is false. Closer observation proves that even when the two philosophers agree in individual statements, the meaning which they attach to these assertions and the whole spirit of their systems are widely divergent. Democritus aims at explaining natural phenomena by natural causes. He wishes, in short, for a science of nature purely for its own sake. Epicurus wishes for a view of nature which shall be able to avert disturbing influences from man’s inner life. Natural science stands with him entirely in the service of ethics. If in point of substance his system is borrowed from another system, yet its whole position and treatment supposes an entirely new view of things. The Socratic introspection, and the Sophistic resolution of natural philosophy into personal rationalising, are its historical antecedents; and it owes its existence to that general dislike for pure theory, which constitutes the common peculiarity of all the post-Aristotelian systems.

(4) Relation to Aristotle and Plato. Excepting the systems named, Epicureanism, so far as is known, is connected with no other previous system. Even its attack upon those systems appears to have consisted of general dogmatic and superficial statements. Still it must not be forgotten that Epicureanism presupposes the line of thought originated by Socrates, not only as found in the collateral Cyrenaic branch, but as found in the main line of regular development by Plato and Aristotle. The view of Plato and Aristotle, which distinguishes the immaterial essence from the sensible appearance of things, and attributes reality only to the former, is undoubtedly attacked by Epicurus as by Zeno, on metaphysical grounds. Practically, however, he approaches very much nearer to this view in all those points in which his teaching deviates from the Cyrenaic and resembles that of the Stoics.