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The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics

Part 4 — CHAPTER XXII. PYRRHO.

Oswald J. (Oswald Joseph) Reichel translation

A. Historical position of Scepticism. Stoicism and Epicureanism are alike in one respect: they commence the pursuit of happiness with definite dogmatic statements. The Sceptic Schools, however, attempt to reach the same end by denying every dogmatic position. Varied as the paths may be, the result is in all cases the same; happiness is made to consist in the exaltation of the mind above all external objects, in the withdrawal of man within his own thinking self. Moving in the same sphere

(1) Its relation to cotemporary dogmatic systems. as the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aristotelian Scepticism takes a practical view of the business of philosophy, and estimates the value of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state and happiness of man. It moreover agrees with cotemporary systems in its ethical view of life; the object at which it aims is the same as that at which those systems aim, viz. repose of mind, and imperturbability. It differs from them, none the less; for the Epicureans and Stoics made mental repose to depend on a knowledge of the world and its laws, whereas the Sceptics are of opinion that it can only be obtained by despairing of all knowledge. Hence, with the former morality depends on a positive conviction as to the highest Good; with the latter, morality consists in indifference to all that appears as Good to men. Important as this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that Scepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and Epicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to knowledge, and all interest in the external world, it is only pushing to extremes that withdrawal of man into himself which we have seen to be the common feature of these Schools. Not only, therefore, do these three lines of thought belong to one and the same epoch, but such is their internal connection that they may be regarded as three branches of a common stock.

The important back-influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism upon Scepticism may be best gathered from the fact that Scepticism only attained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis in the New Academy after the appearance of those systems. Before that time its leading features had been indeed laid down by Pyrrho, but they had never been developed into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor given rise to an expanded theory of doubt.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl. in Eus.Note 2 · Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information respecting Pyrrho. BeNote 3 · Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in ‘Socrates and the Socratic Schools,’ p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition). Either PyrrNote 4 · Diog. ix. 61; Aristocl. l.c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them that Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas, Πύῤῥων, only copies the presenNote 5 · Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is little known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus which Sextus,Note 6 · Diog. ix. 64; 109. ↑Note 7 · According to Diog. 64, they made him head-priest, and, on his account, allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation. According to Diocles Note 8 · Diog. 66; 62. ↑Note 9 · Examples in Diog. 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and doubts were expressed by Ænesidemus whether his indifference ever went to tNote 10 · All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his death nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived afterNote 11 · Diog. Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are better authorities than Sext. Math. i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. i. 10, p. 331.Note 12 · Timon (see Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, 1859) was a native of Phlius (Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer at first (Diog. 109; AristoNote 13 · Diog. 67–69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as his pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping his temNote 14 · According to Diog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the latter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon left no suNote 15 · In Diog. 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on the authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If Ptolemæus was the next one who is sNote 16 · Diog. 114. ↑Note 17 · Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2: ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν ὁπNote 18 · Aristocl. l.c.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν (Pyrrho) ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο [τὸ] μήτε τὰς αἰNote 19 · See the above-quoted passage of Aristocles and Diog. ix. 114. ↑Note 20 · Timon, in Diog. ix. 105: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι· τὸ δ’ ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ. ↑Note 21 · Diog. ix. 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶNote 22 · In this sense the words of Ænesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106, must be understood: οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν. Note 23 · Diog. ix. 114, on Timon: συνεχές τε ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθει πρὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ’ ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας· συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε κNote 24 · Diog. ix. 79 refers these τρόποι to Pyrrho, but inasmuch as he was there describing Sceptic views, the author of which to his mind was PyrrhNote 25 · Sext. Math. vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against the reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in his confNote 26 · Aristocl. l.c. 18, 3: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου λέγονταNote 27 · Ænesidem. in Diog. ix. 106: οὐδὲν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. Timon. Ibid. 105. See pNote 28 · Diog. ix. 103: περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν … περὶ δὲ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ φάμενοι κατειλῆφθαι ἐπέχομεν πNote 29 · Diog. l.c.: περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδής ἐστιν ὁ κόσμοςNote 30 · Diog. ix. 61 and 107; Aristocl. l.c. The expressions ἀφασία, ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχὴ, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use instead ofNote 31 · Πυῤῥώνειοι, σκεπτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ, ἐφεκτικοὶ, ζητητικοί. Conf. Diog. 69. ↑Note 32 · Aristocl. l.c. 2: τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν ἔπειτα δ’ ἀταραξίαν. Diog. 107: τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτιNote 33 · Timon, in Aristocl. l.c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:— ἀλλ’ οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ’ ἀδάμαστον πᾶσιν, ὅσοις δάμνανται ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοNote 34 · Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Quæ (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime ægrotare nNote 35 · Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho … qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii. 4, 12. ↑Note 36 · See p. 521, 3; 525, 3. ↑Note 37 · Diog. 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν Πύῤῥωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον παντὶ Note 38 · See p. 524, 1, 2. ↑Note 39 · Sext. Math. xi. 20: κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς ἰνNote 40 · According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus (Aristocl. l.c. 18, 19; Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised for being agitated by sNote 41 · (2) Causes producing it. More than one point of departure was offered to Scepticism by the earlier philosophy. The Megarian criticism and thNote 42 · (3) Pyrrho and his followers. Pyrrho was a native of Elis,2 and may therefore have early made the acquaintance of the Elean and Megarian criNote 43 · B. Teaching of Pyrrho. (1) Impossibility of knowledge. The little which is known of Pyrrho’s teaching may be summed up in the three followinNote 44 · (2) Withholding of judgment. Thus, if knowledge of things proves to be a failure, there only remains as possible an attitude of pure ScepticNote 45 · (3) Mental imperturbability. From this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to the third question, argues that mental imperturbability or ἀτ
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