Note 1 — Chapter XXII · PYRRHO.

Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid. 1088, A, although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic, notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of Democritus (Plut. in Eus. l.c. i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 928; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19). Scepticism appears to have passed from him to Pyrrho, Anaxarchus being the middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith may be connected the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nansiphanes, it might be supposed that before Pyrrho’s time a doctrine not unlike that of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We have seen that the doubts of Democritus extended only to sense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the senses: greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must therefore take the statement ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶν ὃ ἄν τις νοήσαι subject to this limitation. Anaxarchus is said (Sext. Math. vii. 87) to have compared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from Democritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from Pyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and esteemed. ↑