Part 2 — CHAPTER X. ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.
Oswald J. (Oswald Joseph) Reichel translation
Proceeding to group the materials in such a way as to give the clearest insight into the peculiarities and connection of the Stoic principles, the first distinction to be made will be one between morality in general and particular points in morality. In considering morality in general, those statements which give the abstract theory of morals will be distinguished from those which modify it with a view to meet practical wants. The former again may be grouped round three points:—the enquiry into the highest good, that into the nature of virtue, and that relating to the wise man.
In this picture of the wise man, the moral idealism of the Stoic system attained its zenith. A virtuous will appears here so completely sundered from all outward conditions of life, so wholly free from all the trammels of natural existence, and the individual has become so completely the organ of universal law, that it may be asked, What right has such a being to call himself a person? How can such a being be imagined as a man living among fellow-men? Nor was this question unknown to the Stoics themselves. Unless they are willing to allow that their theory was practically impossible, and their ideal scientifically untenable, how could they escape the necessity of showing that it might be reconciled with the wants of human life and the conditions of reality? Let the attempt be once made, however, and withal they would be forced to look for some means of adapting it to those very feelings and opinions towards which their animosity had formerly been so great. Nor could the attempt be long delayed. Daily a greater value was attached to the practical working of their system, and to its agreement with general opinion. The original direction of Stoic morality aimed at the absolute and unconditional submission of the individual to the law of the universe, yet, in developing that theory, the rights of the individual asserted themselves unmistakably. From this confluence of opposite currents arose a deviation from the rigid type of the Stoic system, some varieties of which, in the direction of the ordinary view of life, deserve now further consideration.
Notes in this chapter
Note 1 · The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶNote 2 · Stob. Ecl. ii. 138: τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν, οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα. ↑Note 3 · Diog. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 5; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly from thNote 4 · Diog. vii 85: τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὑτῶ [αὑτῷ] τῆς φύσεως ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ ΧρύσιππNote 5 · Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17; 6, 20. ↑Note 6 · The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the hair-splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (Stob. Ecl. ii. 136) threNote 7 · Stob. ii. 134 and 138; Diog. vii. 88; 94; Plut. C. Not. 27, 9; Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3; conf. Ep. 118, 8; Sext. PyrNote 8 · Diog. vii. 88: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῇν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγοNote 9 · Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158): διττῶς θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῷοις. Diog. 86: Plants are moNote 10 · Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni suæ conciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo conciliari hominem Note 11 · According to Stob. ii. 132, Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express their tNote 12 · Diog. vii. 30; 94; 101; Stob. ii. 200; 138; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 184; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 61; Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i. 10; ParadNote 13 · Stob. ii. 78; 94; Diog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes reconcNote 14 · Sext. l.c. Stob. ii. 188: μηδένα φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κNote 15 · M. Aurel. ix. 16. ↑Note 16 · See Diog. 94; Stob. ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 22; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 55; Sen. Ep. 66, 5. Good is here defined Note 17 · Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id quod esset natura absolutum [αὐτοτελὲς] … hoc autem ipsum bonum non acNote 18 · Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum nisi honestum. Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: ἡ μὲν ἀρετή τε καὶ ἡ κακίαNote 19 · Sext. Math. xi. 61, after giving two irrelevant definitions of ἀδιάφορον: κατὰ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς Note 20 · Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted: Nullum malum gNote 21 · Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, 4): All virtue is done away with, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν Note 22 · Sext. Math. xi. 61. See above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103: The good can only do good, and never do harm; οὐ μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος κNote 23 · This view is compared with the Academician in Cic. Tusc. v. 13, 39; 18, 51; Sen. Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the notionNote 24 · Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in Cic. Fin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2: [Virtus] non est virtus si sequiNote 25 · Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1, quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 4Note 26 · M. Aurel. vi. 15: ὁ μὲν φιλόδοξος ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος ἰδίαν πεῖσιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἰδίαν πρᾶξιν. CoNote 27 · Sen. Ep. 92, 6–10; Vit. Beat. 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in Sen. Ep. 92, 10. ↑Note 28 · Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by ἡδονὴ an emotiNote 29 · Sen. Ep. 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; Vit. Be. 3, 4; 4, 4; De Ira, ii. 6, 2. ↑Note 30 · Diog. 94: Virtue is a good; ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 3: It is a question utrum Note 31 · Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and 10–12; M. Aurel. viii. 10. Among the Stoic arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may beNote 32 · Diog. 85: ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῷοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν, ἡδNote 33 · Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted sense, they reject ἡδονή, understanding thereby a particular emotion. See p. 236Note 34 · Sext. Math. xi. 73: τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησιν· ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν ‘μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην’ (Antisthenes) κακόν· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Note 35 · Accordingly, it is also defined to be τέχνη εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. ↑Note 36 · Diog. 89: τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν δι’ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ Note 37 · Diog. vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Cic. Parad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se feNote 38 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is charged with at one time denying that happiness is augmented by length of time, and atNote 39 · This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found subsequently. Note 40 · Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14, 42. ↑Note 41 · Parad. 2. ↑Note 42 · De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando fæce in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis erroNote 43 · Ep. 29, 12: Quid ergo … philosophia præstabit? Scilicet ut malis tibi placere, quam populo, … ut sine metu Deorum hominumque vivas, ut aut vNote 44 · See Krische, Forschungen, 368 and 475. ↑Note 45 · See p. 148, 2. ↑Note 46 · νόμος, according to the Stoic definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190, 204; Floril. 44, 12, and in the fragment of Chrysippus quoted by Marcian in DiNote 47 · Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11. ↑Note 48 · Or as Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον is φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει. ↑Note 49 · This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam rNote 50 · The good alone, or virtue, is αἱρετόν; evil is φευκτόν. See p. 229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 202. αἱρετὸν is, however, Ibid. 126, 132, Note 51 · ὁρμὴ is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι· ἀφορμὴ, which is contrasted therewith in Epict. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2, 22, Note 52 · Stob. ii. 116, similarly 108: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸ [l. τὸν] τῶν ἡμιαμβειαίων λόγον ἔχειν κNote 53 · The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by nature good aNote 54 · Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368 Kühn): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς Note 55 · The term emotion is used to express πάθος, although the terms of modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient ideas,Note 56 · Diog. vii. 110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The same definitions are found iNote 57 · Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes [πάθη] antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatNote 58 · See p. 215, 3; 242, 2. ↑Note 59 · Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476, and above, p. 215, 3. ↑Note 60 · Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 (the first part of this passage has been already quoted, p. 215, 3, the continuation being) λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμοNote 61 · See p. 242, 2. ↑Note 62 · Diog. vii. 111: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441: τὸ πάθος εἶναι λNote 63 · Diog. l.c. ↑Note 64 · Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 26; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7, p. 416): Chrysippus defined apprehension (ἄση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίNote 65 · See p. 242, 1. ↑Note 66 · Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verumNote 67 · De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη,Note 68 · Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p. 245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus, ChryNote 69 · Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would suppose τὸNote 70 · Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv. 3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12. ↑Note 71 · This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero already quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do nothingNote 72 · See p. 179, 3, 4. ↑Note 73 · See p. 88, 1. ↑Note 74 · Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut inNote 75 · Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam (ἀκράτεια), quæ est a tota mente et a recta ratione defectiNote 76 · Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar remarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ πολλάκιςNote 77 · See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms αἱρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p. 229, 1, Note 78 · Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii. 10, 35. ↑Note 79 · According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the treatise περὶ παθῶν. ↑Note 80 · In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being πρὸς ὅλον τὸ τετράχορδον, ἡδονὴν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως καὶ μάχης. ↑Note 81 · The definition of λύπη or ἄση (Cicero ægritudo) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in CiNote 82 · Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii 174. Both include under λύπη subdivisions as ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπNote 83 · Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The Stoics aNote 84 · On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115; Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with Stobæus seNote 85 · Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi [superiores] ex homine non tollerent … sed eam contraherent in angustumque deducerentNote 86 · Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37. ↑Note 87 · Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid. iv. 17,Note 88 · Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf. Ep. 85, 10. ↑Note 89 · Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26; Off. i. 25, 88; Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of anger.Note 90 · In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the assertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam virtus vitio aNote 91 · Diog. vii. 117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον (faultless) εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence of feeling Note 92 · Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85, 29; CiNote 93 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen. De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec injuriaNote 94 · See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19. ↑Note 95 · Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123. ↑Note 96 · Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog. l.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4. ↑Note 97 · Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ. ↑Note 98 · See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): τήν τ’ ἀρNote 99 · Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others) non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut Note 100 · Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodaNote 101 · The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic definitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6 and Diog. vNote 102 · Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 144. ↑Note 103 · See p. 260, 3. ↑Note 104 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595. ↑Note 105 · See p. 56. ↑Note 106 · See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: Ἥριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῇν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐNote 107 · Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When τόνος, on which see p. 128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος· ἡ Note 108 · Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c. Nos sNote 109 · This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow. ↑Note 110 · See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2. ↑Note 111 · See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble soul, adds: Talis animus virtus est. ↑Note 112 · Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3, and CNote 113 · Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium virtutum est illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim, quam GrNote 114 · ἀρεταὶ πρῶται. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than four—virtues,Note 115 · The scheme was in vogue before Zeno’s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3. ↑Note 116 · ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, or ἑκάστων ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. Stobæus adds, that the definition Note 117 · ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (Stob. 104); ἐπιστήμη ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (Diog.); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ θαῤῥεNote 118 · ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. The definition of φρόνησις in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p. 258, 1; that Note 119 · ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, in Stob. Id. p. 104, further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues: intelligenNote 120 · Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία, ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἄγνοια ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐNote 121 · This follows from the fact that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the basis in all. See p. 258, 1. ↑Note 122 · Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ’ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ’ ὑπομενεNote 123 · Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ συνῆθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης, μεγαλότηNote 124 · Stob. 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία, ἀγχίνοια, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης, αἰδημοσύνη, ἐNote 125 · Diog. 93; Stob. 104. ↑Note 126 · Sto. Rep. 7. ↑Note 127 · Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τι διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡςNote 128 · Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσινNote 129 · See p. 260, 3. ↑Note 130 · Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποιὸν, to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρός τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo maintainedNote 131 · Galenus l.c. continues: ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρός τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς οἰNote 132 · Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος,Note 133 · Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit; nihil demi, Note 134 · Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον προηγNote 135 · Stob. 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1, conf. AlexNote 136 · Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut superiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se esse pNote 137 · Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium accepit, reddidit—which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum omnia aNote 138 · Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19: ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.Note 139 · On the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγόρευμNote 140 · It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which will be Note 141 · See p. 263, 2. ↑Note 142 · In Simpl. Categ. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics say: τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπNote 143 · Diog. vii. 127: ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπήNote 144 · The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101 and 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen. Ep. Note 145 · Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: ναὶ, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας πεντακοσNote 146 · Stob. ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ δὲ τῶν Note 147 · Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀμαθῆ, πNote 148 · Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125; Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef. iv. 2Note 149 · Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and unwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169. ↑Note 150 · Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος. ↑Note 151 · Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170. ↑Note 152 · Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28; Sext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79. ↑Note 153 · Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1. ↑Note 154 · Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125. ↑Note 155 · Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all the points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An. 12,Note 156 · Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf. Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143. ↑Note 157 · Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that the wiNote 158 · Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118. ↑Note 159 · Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and above, p. 230, 1. ↑Note 160 · Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 1, 4. ↑Note 161 · Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii. 198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid. 6, Note 162 · See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent … diutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo. TantNote 163 · πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii. 124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43. ↑Note 164 · The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Præp. Ev. vi. 8, 10): πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι δοκεῖ κατNote 165 · Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα χρόNote 166 · This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare at present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε Note 167 · Benef. i. 10, 1–3. ↑Note 168 · De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3. ↑Note 169 · De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3. ↑Note 170 · Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4. ↑Note 171 · See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: … certatur ingenti quidem Note 172 · Diog. vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ ΣNote 173 · See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything else thNote 174 · Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265, 2. ↑Note 175 · Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui justitia nomeNote 176 · Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8. ↑Note 177 · Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly, poor, vNote 178 · See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p. 269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8. ↑Note 179 · Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινομένης πολλάκις οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ’ αὐτὸν ὅτι Note 180 · A. The highest good. (1) Nature of the highest good. The enquiry into the destiny and end of man turns, with the Stoics, as it did with all Note 181 · (2) The good and evil. The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction, sanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of pNote 182 · The Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked by the Stoics for including among goods external things which are dependent Note 183 · (3) Pleasure and the good. Least of all, can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and higheNote 184 · Nor may pleasure be placed side by side with virtue, as a part of the highest good, or be declared to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure aNote 185 · (4) Negative character of happiness. The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a very marked feature in Stoicism—is thus more negative tNote 186 · (5) The highest good as law. The Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the world, to which the individual is subordinNote 187 · B. Emotions and virtue. (1) The emotions. (a) Their nature. However simple this state of things may be to a purely rational being, it must bNote 188 · (b) Varieties of emotion. Emotions being called forth by imagination, their character depends on the kind of imagination which produces themNote 189 · In treating the subject of emotions in general, far less importance was attached by the Stoics to psychological accuracy than to consideratiNote 190 · (2) Idea of virtue. (a) Positive and negative aspects. Virtue is thus negatively defined as the being exempt from emotions, as apathy.97 TheNote 191 · However closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is based on knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, they are noNote 192 · (b) The virtues severally. But how are we to reconcile with this view the Stoic teaching of a plurality of virtues and their mutual relationNote 193 · (c) Mutual relation of the several virtues. The importance attaching to this division of virtues, the ultimate basis on which it rests, and Note 194 · All virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and convictionNote 195 · (d) Unity of virtue. Such a character, the Stoics held, must either exist altogether, or not at all; for virtue is an indivisible whole, whiNote 196 · C. The wise man. (1) Wisdom and folly. From what has been said, it follows that there can be but one thoroughgoing moral distinction for allNote 197 · The Stoics delight in insisting upon the perfection of the wise man, and contrasting with it the absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in Note 198 · (2) Universal depravity. This assertion is all the more trenchant because the Stoics recognised neither virtue nor wisdom outside their own Note 199 · No one probably has expressed this opinion more frequently or more strongly than Seneca. We are wicked, he says; we have been wicked; we shaNote 200 · No doubt the age in which Seneca lived afforded ample occasion for such effusions, but his predecessors must have found similar occasions inNote 201 · (3) Conversion. The two moral states being thus at opposite poles, a gradual transition from one to the other is, of course, out of the quesNote 202 · See p. 230, 3. ↑Note 203 · Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects of natural self-love are the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν; and self-love consists mainlNote 204 · Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone: neNote 205 · Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [οἰκείωσις] hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit intelligentiam vel nNote 206 · Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89. ↑Note 207 · Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum,Note 208 · Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’ ἑαυτὸNote 209 · Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105. ↑Note 210 · See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτὸν … καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος. ↑Note 211 · Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· (On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς στοχNote 212 · Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes plane pNote 213 · Diog. l.c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῇν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα ἀλλ’ Note 214 · Diog. vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα.Note 215 · Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτNote 216 · Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62. ↑Note 217 · Diog. xii. 106; Stob. ii. 142; Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51; Sext. l.c.; Plut. Sto. Rep. 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether faNote 218 · Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232, 3 and 283, 2. ↑Note 219 · Sen. Ep. 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere [δεῖσθαι], et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse [χρῆναι]. ↑Note 220 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 4: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τἀναντNote 221 · Sen. Ep. 95, 5: Antipater quoque inter magnos sectæ hujus auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis (namely for the perfection of the highNote 222 · De Vit. Bea. 21. ↑Note 223 · Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money, knowingly to Note 224 · According to Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable. ↑Note 225 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2. ↑Note 226 · Ibid. 5. ↑Note 227 · According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, Diog. vii. 188, Stob. ii. 224, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, admit three ways ofNote 228 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and 3. Com. Not. 12, 4: λυσιτελεῖ ζῇν ἄφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν; or, as it is expressed, 1Note 229 · καθῆκον, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to Diog. 108. ↑Note 230 · See p. 265. ↑Note 231 · Diog. 107: καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ (the same in Cicero), ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυNote 232 · Diog. vii. 109: τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῇν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾷν τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαNote 233 · Stob. 160. Diog. l.c.: τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰNote 234 · Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2, Diog. 108: τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τNote 235 · In the latter sense καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα have been already discussed, p. 264. ↑Note 236 · Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything revolting, non … tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet levemNote 237 · Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2: Hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos (Stilpo anNote 238 · Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2–4, particularly the quotation in Gell. from Epictetus: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences, paulisperNote 239 · Diog. vii. 115: εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν· καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ οὖσαν εὔλογονNote 240 · Besides the quotations, p. 271, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5: καὶ μὴν οὔθ’ αὑτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ γνωρίμων Note 241 · Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis quærimus? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam? HujusNote 242 · Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 274, 2. ↑Note 243 · Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further particulars Note 244 · Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these wise men of the old world Posidonius traced back all kinds of useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably meant by tNote 245 · Sen. l.c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri … ignorantia rerum innocentes erant … virtus non contingit animo nisi instituto eNote 246 · Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίNote 247 · Stob. Serm. 7, 21: ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει· τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον Note 248 · See pp. 239, 1; 271, 7. ↑Note 249 · Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi, affectus nNote 250 · Diog. vii. 127: τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ, ἀναπόβλητον,Note 251 · A. Things to be preferred and eschewed. The Stoic theory of Ethics is entirely rooted in the proposition, that only virtue is a good and onlNote 252 · (1) Secondary goods. Still, there remains the question, How can this be possible? and this is no easy one to answer. The contemporary opponeNote 253 · (2) Classes of things indifferent. Nor were the Stoics minded to follow the contemporary philosopher, Aristo of Chios (who in this point, toNote 254 · B. Perfect and intermediate duties. By means of this doctrine of things to be preferred and things to be eschewed, a further addition was maNote 255 · Some confusion is introduced into this teaching by the fact that in setting up the standard for distinguishing perfect from imperfect dutiesNote 256 · C. Emotions. (1) Permitted affections. In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic system sought in another respect to meet facts and praNote 257 · (2) Modification of apathy. This danger appears more imminent when we observe the perplexity in which the Stoics were placed when asked to pNote 258 · (3) The state of progress. It was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithstanding their own maxims, found themselves compelled to recogniNote 259 · All that has hitherto been stated has regard to the general principles only of the Stoics touching the end and the conditions of moral actioNote 260 · In this extension of the moral theory, besides the desire for scientific completeness, the endeavour may also be observed to subordinate allNote 261 · The order and division which the Stoics adopted for discussing details in the hortatory part of moral science are not known to us; nor, indeNote 262 · A. The individual. (1) Importance attached to the individual. It was in keeping with the whole tone of the Stoic system to devote, in ethicsNote 263 · Confining our attention to the two first books of Cicero’s work, De Officiis, to form some idea of the treatise of Panætius on duties, we fiNote 264 · In the second book of his work, Cicero considers the relation of interest to duty; and having proved, at length,18 that most that is advantaNote 265 · (2) Cynicism of the Stoics. (a) Connection of Stoics with Cynics. More peculiar, and at the same time more startling, is another feature aboNote 266 · (b) Instances of Cynicism. Bearing, as the Stoics did, this close relationship to the Cynics, it cannot astonish us to find amongst them manNote 267 · (c) Cynicism a theoretical consequence of Stoic principles. It would, however, be doing the Stoics a great injustice to take these statement