Note 1 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. καὶ οὕτω δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιττιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. There may be doubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of the first sentence; but the form of expression seems to imply that the five first portions contain main divisions, and the six following subdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would therefore fall into the following main divisions: περὶ ὁρμῆς, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ παθῶν; but it would be hard to assign to these divisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of Epictetus, Diss. iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in his introduction to virtue three τόποι: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, called also ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον; and, lastly, ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. The first of these divisions would correspond with the third of Diogenes, the second with his first; but the division περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν does not harmonise with the third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather refers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially mentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first division treating of ὀρέξεις and ἐκκλίσεις. Stobæus again differs from either. In his survey of the Stoic ethics (Ecl. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of the end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the καθῆκον, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (πάθη, as being one kind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on friendship; and concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long treatise on ἐνεργήματα (κατορθώματα, ἁμαρτήματα, οὐδέτερα), the greater portion of which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that not only præceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and, moreover, causarum inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been called etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but ætiologia) and ethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14, the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the first determining the value of things, the second treating de actionibus, the third de impetu, περὶ ὁρμῆς. Two of these parts coincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with the third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes (περὶ τῶν πράξεων); and even Seneca’s first part more nearly agrees with one of these (περὶ τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας). Unfortunately, Seneca does not mention his authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division is a genuine Stoic division. A similar division will be subsequently met with in the eclectic Academician Eudorus (living under Augustus). None of the divisions quoted agree with the three problems proposed by Cic. Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by Epict. Enchir. c. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises Seneca’s three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such contending authorities, it seems impossible to establish the main division of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were themselves not agreed on the subject. Petersen’s attempt, l.c. p. 258, appears to me a failure. ↑