Note 49 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

Diog. vii. 127: τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ, ἀναπόβλητον, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. The latter view was that of the Cynics. Although departed from by Chrysippus, it belongs to those points in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cynicism was weakened by him. Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in the spirit of Cleanthes, says that he considered a candidate of the first class secure against relapses. On the other hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, α, β (Schol. in Arist. 86, a, 48; b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ἐν καιροῖς (the reading κάροις is better) καὶ μελαγχολίαις, virtue, together with the whole rational life (λογικὴ ἕξις), is lost, and succeeded, not indeed by vice, but by a ἕξις μέση. A similar question is, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in the negative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will act virtuously when in a frenzy. ↑