Note 66 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν Στωϊκῶν) οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ [should perhaps be struck out], τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δείξεις [both for δείξεις, and for λήξεις in the passage about to be quoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests δέσεις· δήξεις is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero’s morsus doloris] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰς λήξεις [δήξεις] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni (or mali) præsentis, πρόσφατον being κινητικὸν συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπάρσεως. ↑