Note 16 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

Confining our attention to the two first books of Cicero’s work, De Officiis, to form some idea of the treatise of Panætius on duties, we find, after a few introductory remarks, morality as such (honestum) described, according to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues (i. 5–42). In discussing the first of these, intelligence, love of research is recommended, and useless subtlety is deprecated. Justice and injustice are next discussed, in all their various forms, due regard being had to the cases of ordinary occurrence in life. Liberality, kindness, and benevolence are treated as subdivisions of justice; and this leads to a consideration of human society in all its various forms (c. 16–18, 60). Turning next to bravery (18, 61), the philosopher draws attention to the fact that bravery is inseparably connected with justice. He then describes it partly as it appears in the forms of magnanimity and endurance, regardless of external circumstances, partly in the form of energetic courage; and, in so doing, he discusses various questions which suggest themselves, such as the nature of true and false courage, military and civil courage, and the exclusion of anger from valour. Lastly, the object of the fourth chief virtue (c. 27) is described, in general terms, as what is proper (decorum, πρέπον), and the corresponding state as propriety, both in controlling the impulses of the senses, in jest and play, and in the whole personal bearing. The peculiar demands made by individual nature, by time of life, by civil position, are discussed. Even outward proprieties—of speech and conversation, of domestic arrangement, tact in behaviour,16 honourable and dishonourable modes of life—do not escape attention.17