Note 84 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115; Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with Stobæus seems to point to a common source of information directly or indirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati. If they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐῤῥυηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιῤῥωμένη καθ’ ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι (Stob. translations of the definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inhærens atque insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of womankind, hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which prevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of the soul are called ἀῤῥωστήματα, ægrotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among ἀῤῥωστήματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are certain predispositions (ἐνεμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. Diog., Stob., Cic. 12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by inconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota vita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well as ἀῤῥωστήματα and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἕξεις (Stob. ii. 100, on the difference between ἕξις and διάθεσις, see 102, 1); and, accordingly, Heine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from emotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen, l.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest to us. ↑