Note 54 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368 Kühn): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί τινα καὶ ἀπό τινων (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that Chrysippus’ definition of ὁρμὴ (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood (as in Baumhauer’s Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else λόγος must be taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses are based on judgments, see p. 242, 2; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 23 (‘as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so ὁρμὴ is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of use’), that ὁρμὴ is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational by the direction given to it by man. ↑