Note 37 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

Diog. vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Cic. Parad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se felix est. This αὐτάρκεια is even asserted of individual virtues, by virtue of the connection between them all. Of φρόνησις, for instance, in Sen. Ep. 85, 2. it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui temperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus est. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est. Similarly in respect of bravery (ibid. 24). This αὐτάρκεια of virtue was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed by Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (προηγμένα), nor, on the other hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as only negative conditions (ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ). See Plut. C. Not. 4, and 11, 1. ↑