Note 25 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1, quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 4: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et longissime ab illa resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1: Pars honesti non potest esse nisi honestum, nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to Plut. 15, 3; 13, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance with another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be declared to be a good, but not the highest good, justice (the Peripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in comparison with pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher good. Still, this was only a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of harmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the difference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other things into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6), with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes impossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? Evidently the zeal of controversy has here carried away the philosopher beyond the point at which his own principles would bear him out. ↑