The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics

Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY: ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.

Oswald J. (Oswald Joseph) Reichel translation

Previous chapter ←Part 2 — Chapter III · HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.Next chapter →Part 2 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

All chapters and sections (19)

(2) Use to be made of authorities. The path is thus marked out, which must be followed in giving an exposition of the Stoic philosophy. If full information were forthcoming respecting the rise of the Stoic system and the form it assumed under each one of its representatives, it would be most natural to begin by reviewing the motives which led Zeno to his peculiar teaching, and by describing the system as it grew up. Next it would be right to trace step by step the changes and expansions which it received at the hands of each succeeding teacher. In default of the necessary information for such a treatment of the subject, it will be better to pursue another course. The Stoic teaching will have to be treated as a whole, in which the contributions of individuals can no longer be distinguished. It will have to be set forth in the form which it assumed after the time of Chrysippus. The share of individuals in constructing the system, and their deviations from the general type, cannot be considered, except in cases where they are placed beyond doubt by the statements of the ancients, or by well-founded historical surmises. Stoicism will have to be described in the first place as it is traditionally known, without having its principles explained or resolved into their component factors; without even considering how they grew out of previous systems. Not till this has been done will it be possible to analyse the purport and structure of the system, so as to fathom its leading motives, to understand the connection of its various parts, and thus to ascertain its true position in history.

B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy. Proceeding next to ask in what form the problem of philosophy presented itself to the Stoics, three points deserve to be specially noticed. 1. In the first place, philosophy was determined practically by an end in view. 2. The character of this end was decided by the idea of conformity with reason; and 3, this view was substantiated by intellectual proof.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Plut. Plac. Pro. 2: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν, τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην· τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν τέχνης ἐπιτ Note 2 · See Diog. vii. 46: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετὰς, κ.τ.λ. ↑Note 3 · Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 6: δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις [sc. τοῖς φυσικοῖς] συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμε Note 4 · Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 3, 2: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρ Note 5 · 1 Already Simpl. in Cat. Schol. in Arist. 49, a, 16, says: παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς, ὧν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων Note 6 · Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo disse Note 7 · Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine philosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, 8: We all lie in the slumber of error: sola aute Note 8 · Lact. Inst. vii. 7: Ad virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston disseruit. See Stob. Ecl. 4, 111. ↑Note 9 · Plut. De Audiendo, c. 8, p. 42: οὔτε γὰρ βαλανείου, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οὔτε λόγου μὴ καθαίροντος ὄφελός ἐστιν. ↑Note 10 · Stob. Floril. 82, 15. Diog. vii. 161. ↑Note 11 · Stob. Floril. 82, 11. ↑Note 12 · Ibid. 7. ↑Note 13 · Diog. vii. 162: μάλιστα δὲ προσεῖχε Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σόφον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι. ↑Note 14 · See Diog. vii. 163. ↑Note 15 · Aristo (in the Ὁμοιώματα) in Stob. Floril. 82, 16: ὁ ἐλλέβορος ὁλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθαίρει, εἰς δὲ πάνυ σμικρὰ τριφθεὶς πνίγει· οὕτω Note 16 · Stob. l.c. 4, 110. ↑Note 17 · See following note and Cic. Acad. ii. 39, 123: Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum (sc. physicorum) sciri putat posse. ↑Note 18 · Diog. vii. 160: τόν σε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει, λέγων τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἠθικὸν εἶνα Note 19 · Sext. Math. vii. 13: καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὥς φασι, παρῃτεῖτο τήν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ το Note 20 · Seneca, § 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be necessary—for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who has them not?Note 21 · Diog. vii. 39. ↑Note 22 · Logical treatises, those περὶ λέξεων, λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι, περὶ λόγου—and if there were a rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the τέχνη—physical treatise Note 23 · Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 2: ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. That he occasion Note 24 · See above p. 36. ↑Note 25 · According to Diog. 32, he declared at the beginning of his Polity the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία to be useless—a testimony worth very little; for it Note 26 · Proofs will be given later. ↑Note 27 · The Catalogue in Diog. 174, περὶ λόγου 3 B. (Mohnike Cleanth. 102, believes this work was a treatise on life according to reason. The title Note 28 · Diog. 41. ↑Note 29 · Diog. vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: περὶ τῶν Ἐρετρικῶν φιλοσόφων, περὶ ὁμοίων, περὶ ὅρων, περὶ ἕξεως, περὶ τῶν ἀντ Note 30 · Chrys. in the 3rd B., περὶ θεῶν (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4); οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Δ Note 31 · Sext. Math. vii. 17; Diog. 40. ↑Note 32 · The chief divisions of the logic of the Stoics (Diog. 42, 46) are considered important for special purposes. The doctrine περὶ κανόνων καὶ κ Note 33 · This may be seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134–203, 229; Math. viii. 300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in Diogenes.Note 34 · The only part which is censured by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved: τοῖς Note 35 · Cic. Parad. Proœm.: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus … in ea est hæresi, quæ nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argume Note 36 · In Sextus Empiricus, Διαλεκτικοὶ is their ordinary name. It is also found in Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. Cic. Top. 2, 6; Fin. iv. 3, 6 Note 37 · After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit of putting their arguments in the form of questions. Hence the terms λόγον Note 38 · See p. 48, 1. ↑Note 39 · Called μέρη, according to Diog. 39 also τόποι, εἴδη, γένη. ↑Note 40 · Diog. 39: τριμερῆ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖ Note 41 · According to Diog. 40, the first place was assigned to Logic, the second to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedemus, E Note 42 · In Diog. 39; Sext. Math. vii. 17; Philo, Mut. Nom. p. 1055, E. Hösch. (589 M); De Agricul. 189, D (302), philosophy is compared to an orchar Note 43 · See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 13. ↑Note 44 · (2) Necessity for intellectual knowledge. This view of the problem of philosophy is more precisely defined by the Stoic doctrine of virtue. Note 45 · (3) Position towards logic and natural science. (a) Aristo’s views. These remarks prove the need for the Stoics of that kind of scientific k Note 46 · (b) Views of Zeno and Cleanthes. These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo, and as points in which he differed from the rest of his Sc Note 47 · Less obvious is the connection between logic and the ultimate aim of all philosophical enquiries. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the she Note 48 · C. Divisions of philosophy. The foregoing remarks have already established the three main divisions of philosophy41 which were universally a Note 49 · A. General remarks. (1) Field of logic. Under the head of Logic, in the Stoic use of the term after the time of Chrysippus, a number of inte