Note 83 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

In treating the subject of emotions in general, far less importance was attached by the Stoics to psychological accuracy than to considerations of moral worth. That the result could not be very satisfactory, follows from what has been already stated.83 Emotions are impulses, overstepping natural limits, upsetting the proper balance of the soul’s powers, contradicting reason—in a word, they are failures, disturbances of mental health, and, if indulged in, become chronic diseases of the soul.84 Hence a Stoic demands their entire suppression: true virtue can only exist where this process has succeeded. As being contrary to nature and symptoms of disease, the wise man must be wholly free from them.85 When we have once learnt to value things according to their real worth, and to discover everywhere nature’s unchanging law, nothing will induce us to yield to emotion.86 Hence the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, requiring emotions to be regulated, but not uprooted, was attacked in the most vigorous manner by these philosophers. A moderate evil, they say, always remains an evil. What is faulty and opposed to reason, ought never to be tolerated, not even in the smallest degree.87 On the other hand, when an emotion is regulated by and subordinated to reason, it ceases to be an emotion, the term emotion only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed to reason.88 The statement of the Peripatetics, that certain emotions are not only admissible, but are useful and necessary, appears of course to the Stoics altogether wrong.89 To them, only what is morally good appears to be useful: emotions are, under all circumstances, faults; and were an emotion to be useful, virtue would be advanced by means of what is wrong.90 The right relation, therefore, towards emotions—indeed, the only one morally tenable—is an attitude of absolute hostility. The wise man must be emotionless.91 Pain he may feel, but, not regarding it as an evil, he will suffer no affliction, and know no fear.92 He may be slandered and ill-treated, but he cannot be injured or degraded.93 Being untouched by honour and dishonour, he has no vanity. To anger94 he never yields, nor needs this irrational impulse, not even for valour and the championship of right. But he also feels no pity,95 and exercises no indulgence.96 For how can he pity others for what he would not himself consider an evil? How can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake of others, which he would not tolerate for his own sake? If justice calls for punishment, feelings will not betray him into forgiveness. We shall subsequently have an opportunity for learning the further application of these principles.