Note 140 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any discharge of duty, or rational action; κατόρθωμα only refers to a perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf. Stob. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα … τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A κατόρθωμα is a καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (καθήκοντα) ponatur depositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum; the former is called κατόρθωμα, the latter καθῆκον. A virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention, i.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod κατόρθωμα dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem officium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed to them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum. ↑