Note 28 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

B. Perfect and intermediate duties. By means of this doctrine of things to be preferred and things to be eschewed, a further addition was made to the conception of duty. Under duty, or what is proper,28 we have already seen, the Stoics understand rational action in general, which becomes good conduct, or κατόρθωμα, by being done with a right intention.29 The conception of duty, therefore, contains in itself the conception of virtuous conduct, and is used primarily to express what is good or rational. Duty thus appears to have a twofold meaning, in consequence of the twofold characters of things desirable and things good. If the good were the only permitted object of desire, there would, of course, be but one duty—that of realising the good; and the various actions which contribute to this result would only be distinguished by their being employed on a different material, but not in respect of their moral value. But if, besides what is absolutely good, there are things relatively good, things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases in which they may be pursued without detriment to the absolute good or virtue—if, moreover, besides vice, as the absolute evil, there are also relative evils, which we have reason to avoid in the same cases—the extent of our duties is increased likewise; a number of conditional duties are placed by the side of duties unconditional, differing from the latter in that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred, and avoiding things to be eschewed. From this platform, all that accords with nature is regarded as proper, or a duty in the more extended sense of the term; and the conception of propriety is extended to include plants and animals.30 Proper and dutiful actions are then divided into those which are always such and those which are only such under peculiar circumstances—the former being called perfect, the latter intermediate duties;31 and it is stated, as a peculiarity of the latter, that, owing to circumstances, a course of conduct may become a duty which would not have been a duty without those peculiar circumstances.32 In the wider sense of the term, every action is proper or in accordance with duty which consists in the choice of a thing to be preferred (προηγμένον) and in avoiding a thing to be eschewed. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only fulfilled by virtuous action. A virtuous life and a wish to do good constitute the only perfect duty.33