Note 132 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

All virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction,132 which is only to be found where it is to be found perfect, and ceases to exist the moment it is deprived of one of its component parts.133 They are, indeed, distinct from one another, each one having its own end, towards which it is primarily directed; but, at the same time, they again coalesce, inasmuch as none can pursue its own end without pursuing that of the others at the same time.134 Accordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from its other parts. Where one virtue exists, the rest exist also, and where there is one fault, there all is faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains all other virtues, for the moral tone of which it is the outcome includes in itself all the rest.135 What makes virtue virtue, and vice vice, is simply and solely the intention.136 The will, although it may lack the means of execution, is worth quite as much as the deed;137 a wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification of that desire.138 Hence only that action can be called virtuous which is not only good in itself, but which proceeds from willing the good; and although, in the first instance, the difference between the discharge and the neglect of duty (κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα) depends on the real agreement or disagreement of our actions with the moral law,139 yet that alone can be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty which arises from a morally perfect character.140