Note 24 — Chapter X · ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

(3) Pleasure and the good. Least of all, can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue;24 he who considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and the peculiar value of virtue;25 he appeals to feelings, rather than to actions;26 he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments of the lower animals.27 Pleasure must never be the object of pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably involved in virtue. That it no doubt is.28 It is true that there is always a peculiar satisfaction, and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of mind, in moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack of inward peace; and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone knows what true and lasting pleasure is.29 But even the pleasure afforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but only a natural consequence, of virtuous conduct; otherwise the independent value of virtue is impaired.30