Volume I—A To Elba (continued 11)

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 10.

ATHENS: B. C. 610-586. Struggle with Megara for Salamis. Cirrhæan or First Sacred War.

"The petty state of Megara, which, since the earlier ages, had, from the dependent of Athens, grown up to the dignity of her rival, taking advantage of the internal dissensions in the latter city, succeeded in wresting from the Athenian government the isle of Salamis. It was not, however, without bitter and repeated struggles that Athens at last submitted to the surrender of the isle. But, after signal losses and defeats, as nothing is ever more odious to the multitude than unsuccessful war, so the popular feeling was such as to induce the government to enact a decree by which it was forbidden, upon pain of death, to propose reasserting the Athenian claims. … Many of the younger portion of the community, pining at the dishonour of their country, and eager for enterprise, were secretly inclined to countenance any stratagem that might induce the reversal of the decree. At this time there went a report through the city that a man of distinguished birth … had incurred the consecrating misfortune of insanity. Suddenly this person appeared in the market place, wearing the peculiar badge [a cap] that distinguished the sick. … Ascending the stone from which the heralds made their proclamations, he began to recite aloud a poem upon the loss of Salamis, boldly reproving the cowardice of the people, and inciting them again to war. His supposed insanity protected him from the law—his rank, reputation, and the circumstance of his being himself a native of Salamis, conspired to give to his exhortation a powerful effect, and the friends he had secured to back his attempt loudly proclaimed their applauding sympathy with the spirit of the address. The name of the pretended madman was Solon, son of Execestides, the descendant of Codrus. … The stratagem and the eloquence of Solon produced its natural effect upon his spirited and excitable audience, and the public enthusiasm permitted the oligarchical government to propose and effect the repeal of the law. An expedition was decreed and planned, and Solon was invested with its command. It was but a brief struggle to recover the little island of Salamis. … But the brave and resolute Megarians were not men to be disheartened by a single reverse; they persisted in the contest—losses were sustained on either side, and at length both states agreed to refer their several claims on the sovereignty of the island to the decision of Spartan arbiters. And this appeal from arms to arbitration is a proof how much throughout Greece had extended that spirit of civilisation which is but an extension of the sense of justice. … The arbitration of the umpires in favour of Athens only suspended hostilities; and the Megarians did not cease to watch (and shortly afterwards they found) a fitting occasion to regain a settlement so tempting to their ambition. The credit acquired by Solon in this expedition was shortly afterwards greatly increased in the estimation of Greece. In the Bay of Corinth was situated a town called Cirrha, inhabited by a fierce and lawless race, who, after devastating the Sacred territories of Delphi, sacrilegiously besieged the city itself, in the desire to possess themselves of the treasures which the piety of Greece had accumulated in the Temple of Apollo. Solon appeared at the Amphictyonic council, represented the sacrilege of the Cirrhæans, and persuaded the Greeks to arm in defence of the altars of their tutelary god [B. C. 595]. Clisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon, was sent as commander-in-chief against the Cirrhæans; and (according to Plutarch) the records of Delphi inform us that Alcmæon was the leader of the Athenians. The war [known as the First Sacred War] was not very successful at the onset; the oracle of Apollo was consulted, and the answer makes one of the most amusing anecdotes of priestcraft. The besiegers were informed by the god that the place would not be reduced until the waves of the Cirrhæan Sea washed the territories of Delphi. The reply perplexed the army; but the superior sagacity of Solon was not slow in discovering that the holy intention of the oracle was to appropriate the lands of the Cirrhæans to the profit of the temple. He therefore advised the besiegers to attack and to conquer Cirrha, and to dedicate its whole territory to the service of the god. The advice was adopted—Cirrha was taken [B. C. 586]; it became thenceforth the arsenal of Delphi, and the insulted deity had the satisfaction of seeing the sacred lands washed by the waves of the Cirrhæan Sea. … The Pythian games commenced, or were revived, in celebration of this victory of the Pythian god."

Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, Athens: Its Rise and Fall, book 2, chapter 1.

See, also, DELPHI.

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ATHENS: B. C. 594. The Constitution of Solon. The Council of Four Hundred.

"Solon, Archon Ol. 46,1, was chosen mediator. Equity and moderation are described by the ancients as the characteristics of his mind; he determined to abolish the privileges of particular classes, and the arbitrary power of officers, and to render all the participators in civil and political freedom equal in the eye of the law, at the same time ensuring to everyone the integrity of those lights to which his real merits entitled him; on the other hand, he was far from contemplating a total subversion of existing regulations. … Whatever was excellent in prescription was incorporated with the new laws and thereby stamped afresh; but prescription as such, with the exception of some unwritten religious ordinances of the Eumolpids, was deprived of force. The law was destined to be the sole centre, whence every member of the political community was to derive a fixed rule of conduct."

W. Wachsmuth, Historical Antiquities of the Greeks, section 46 (volume 1).

"The factions, to allay the reviving animosities of which was Solon's immediate object, had, at that time, formed parties corresponding to the geographical division of the country, which we have already adverted to; the Pediæi, or inhabitants of the lowlands, insisted on a strict oligarchy; the Parali, on the coast, who, did we not find the Alcmaeonid Megacles at their head, might be considered the wealthier portion of the people, wished for a mixed constitution; but the Diacrii or Hyperacrii [of the mountainous district] formed the great majority, who, in their impoverished state, looked for relief only from a total revolution. Solon might, had he so chosen, have made himself tyrant by heading this populace: but he preferred acting as mediator, and with this view caused himself to be elected archon, B. C. 594, as being an Eupatrid of the house … of Codrus."

C. F. Hermann, Manual of the Political Antiquities of Greece, chapter 5, section 106.

"The chief power was vested in the collective people; but in order that it might be exercised with advantage it was necessary that they should be endowed with common rights of citizenship. Solon effected this by raising the lower class from its degradation, and by subjecting to legal control those who had till now formed the governing order, as well as by rendering the liberty of both dependent upon the law. … This change was brought about by two ordinances, which must not be regarded as mere remedies for the abuses of that period, but as the permanent basis of free and legal citizenship. The one was the Seisachtheia; this was enacted by Solon to afford relief to oppressed debtors, by reducing their debts in amount, and by raising the value of money in the payment of interest and principal; at the same time he abrogated the former rigorous law of debt by which the freeman might be reduced to servitude, and thus secured to him the unmolested possession of his legal rights. … A second ordinance enjoined, that their full and entire rights should be restored to all citizens who had incurred Atimia, except to absolute criminals. This was not only destined to heal the wounds which had been caused by the previous dissensions, but as till that time the law of debt had been able to reduce citizens to Atimia, and the majority of the Atimoi pointed out by Solon were slaves for debt, that declaration stood in close connection with the Seisachtheia, and had the effect of a proclamation from the state of its intention to guarantee the validity of the new citizenship. … The right of naturalization was granted by Solon to deserving aliens, when 6,000 citizens declared themselves in favour of the measure, but these new citizens were likewise deficient in a few of the privileges of citizenship. … The statement that Solon received a great many foreigners as citizens, and every artizan that presented himself, appears highly improbable, as Solon was the first legislator who systematically regulated the condition of the Metœci. The Metœci … probably took the place of the former Demiurgi; their position was one of sufferance, but the protection of the laws was guaranteed them. … The servile order, exclusively consisting of purchased aliens and their descendants, did not, as a body, stand in direct relation with the state; individual slaves became the property of individual citizens, but a certain number were employed by the state as clerks, etc., and were abandoned to the arbitrary pleasure of their oppressive taskmasters. … Those who were manumitted stood upon the footing of Metœci; the citizens who enfranchised them becoming their Prostatæ. … Upon attaining the age of puberty, the sons of citizens entered public life under the name of Ephebi. The state gave them two years for the full development of their youthful strength. … Upon the expiration of the second, and according to the most authentic accounts, in their eighteenth year, they received the shield and spear in the popular assembly, complete armour being given to the sons of those who had fallen in battle, and in the temple of Agraulos took the oath of young citizens, the chief obligations of which concerned the defence of their country, and then for the space of one or two years performed military service in the Attic border fortresses under the name of Peripoli. The ceremony of arming them was followed by enrolment in the book which contained the names of those who had attained majority; this empowered the young citizen to manage his own fortune, preside over a household, enter the popular assembly, and speak. When he asserted the last right, viz., the Isegoria, Parrhesia, he was denominated Rhetor, and this appellation denoted the difference between him and the silent member of the assembly, the Idiotes. … Upon attaining his 30th year, the citizen might assert his superior rights; he was qualified for a member of the sworn tribunal entitled Heliæa. … The word Heliast does not merely signify a judge; but the citizen who has fully attained maturity. … The judges of the courts of the Diætetæ and Ephetæ, which existed without the circle of the ordinary tribunals, were required to be still older men than the Heliasts, viz., 50 or 60 years of age. Solon appointed gradations in the rights of citizenship, according to the conditions of a census in reference to offices of state. … Upon the principle of a conditional equality of rights, which assigns to everyone as much as he deserves, and which is highly characteristic of Solon's policy in general, he instituted four classes according to a valuation; these were the Pentacosiomedimni [whose land yielded 500 measures of wheat or oil], the Hippeis [horsemen], the Zeugitæ [owners of a yoke of mules], and the Thetes [or laborers]. The valuation, however, only affected that portion of capital from which contributions to the state-burthens were required, consequently, according to Böckh, a taxable capital. … The Thetes, the last of these classes, were not regularly summoned to perform military service, but only exercised the civic right as members of the assembly and the law-courts; … the highest class exclusively supplied the superior offices, such as the archonship, and through this the council of the Areopagus. … In lieu of the former council of administration, of which no memorial has been preserved, Solon instituted a Council of four hundred citizens taken from the first three classes, 100 from every Phyle, of which no person under 30 years of age could be a member. The appointments were renewed annually; the candidates underwent an examination, and such as were deemed eligible drew lots."

W. Wachsmuth, Historical Antiquities of the Greeks, section 46-47 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: G. F. Schömann, Antiquity of Greece: The State, part 3, chapter 3, section 4.

E. Abbott, History of Greece, part 11, chapter 3.

G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 11.

Plutarch, Solon.

Aristotle, On the Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste), chapters 5-13.

See, also, AREOPAGUS, PRYTANES, HELIÆA, and DEBT.

{149}

ATHENS: B. C. 560-510. The tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

"The constitution which he [Solon] framed was found to be insufficient even in his own life-time. … The poor citizens were still poor, in spite of the Seisachtheia and the reform of the constitution. At the same time the admission of the lowest class in the scale of property to the rights of Athenian citizenship, and the authority given to the General Assembly, had thrown a power into the hands of the masses which filled the more conservative citizens with resentment and alarm. And so the old party quarrels, which had divided Attica before the reforms of Solon, reappeared after them with even greater violence. The men of the plain were led by Miltiades, a grandson of the tyrant of Corinth, and Lycurgus, the son of Aristolaidas; the men of the shore by Megacles, the Alcmæonid, who had recently strengthened the position of his family by his marriage with Agariste, the daughter of Clisthenes of Sicyon. At the head of the mountaineers stood Pisistratus, a descendant of the royal stock of Nestor, who … had greatly distinguished himself in the Salaminian war. As he possessed property in the neighborhood of Marathon, Pisistratus may have been intimately known to the inhabitants of the adjacent hills. … Solon watched the failure of his hopes with the deepest distress. He endeavoured to recall the leaders of the contending parties to a sense of their duty to the country, and to soothe the bitterness of their followers. With a true instinct he regarded Pisistratus as by far the most dangerous of the three. Pisistratus was an approved general, and the faction which he led was composed of poor men who had nothing to lose. … Pisistratus met the vehement expressions of Solon by driving wounded into the market-place. The people's friend had suffered in the people's cause; his life was in danger. The incident roused the Athenians to an unusual exercise of political power. Without any previous discussion in the Council, a decree was passed by the people allowing Pisistratus to surround himself with a body-guard of fifty men, and to arm them with clubs. Thus protected, he threw off all disguises, and established himself in the Acropolis as tyrant of Athens [B. C. 560]. … Herodotus tells us that Pisistratus was a just and moderate ruler. He did not alter the laws or remove the existing forms of government. The Council was still elected, the Assembly continued to meet, though it is improbable that either the one or the other was allowed to extend its functions beyond domestic affairs. The archons still continued to be the executive magistrates of the city, and cases of murder were tried, as of old, at the Areopagus. The tyrant contented himself with occupying the Acropolis with his troops and securing important posts in the administration for his family or his adherents." Twice, however, Pisistratus was driven from power by the combination of his opponents, and into exile, for four years in the first instance and for ten years in the last; but Athens was compelled to accept him for a ruler in the end. "Pisistratus remained in undisturbed possession of the throne till his death in 527 B. C. He was succeeded by his eldest son Hippias, with whom Hipparchus and Thessalus, his younger sons, were associated in the government." But these younger tyrants soon made themselves intolerably hateful, and a conspiracy formed against them by Harmodius and Aristogeiton was successful in taking the life of Hipparchus. Four years later, in 510 B. C., with the help of Delphi and Sparta, Hippias was driven from the city. Clisthenes, at the head of the exiled Alcmæonids, was the master-spirit of the revolution, and it was under his guidance that the Athenian democratic constitution was reorganized.

E. Abbott, History of Greece, volume 1, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 11 and 30.

ATHENS: B. C. 510-507. The constitution of Cleisthenes. Advance of democracy.

"The expulsion of the Pisistratides left the democratical party, which had first raised them to power, without a leader. The Alcmæonids had always been considered as its adversaries, though they were no less opposed to the faction of the nobles, which seems at this time to have been headed by Isagoras. … Cleisthenes found himself, as his party had always been, unable to cope with it; he resolved, therefore, to shift his ground, and to attach himself to that popular cause which Pisistratus had used as the stepping stone of his ambition. His aims, however, were not confined to a temporary advantage over his rivals; he planned an important change in the constitution, which should forever break the power of his whole order, by dissolving some of the main links by which their sway was secured. For this purpose, having gained the confidence of the commonalty and obtained the sanction of the Delphic oracle, he abolished the four ancient tribes, and made a fresh geographical division of Attica into ten new tribes, each of which bore a name derived from some Attic hero. The ten tribes were subdivided into districts of various extent, called demes, each containing a town or village. … Cleisthenes appears to have preserved the ancient phratries; but as they were now left insulated by the abolition of the tribes to which they belonged, they lost all political importance. … Cleisthenes at the same time increased the strength of the commonalty by making a great many new citizens, and he is said to have enfranchised not only aliens—and these both residents and adventurers from abroad—but slaves. … The whole frame of the state was reorganized to correspond with the new division of the country. {150} The Senate of the Four Hundred was increased to Five Hundred, that fifty might be drawn from each tribe, and the rotation of the presidency was adapted to this change, the fifty councillors of each tribe filling that office for thirty-five or thirty-six days in succession, and nine councillors being elected one from each of the other tribes to preside at the Council and the Assembly of the People, which was now called regularly four times in the month, certain business being assigned to each meeting. The Heliæa was also distributed into ten courts: and the same division henceforth prevailed in most of the public offices, though the number of the archons remained unchanged. To Cleisthenes also is ascribed the formal institution of the ostracism. … These changes, and the influence they acquired for their author, reduced the party of Isagoras to utter weakness, and they saw no prospect of maintaining themselves but by foreign aid." Isagoras, accordingly, applied for help to Cleomenes, one of the kings of Sparta, who had already interfered in Athenian affairs by assisting at the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. Cleomenes responded by coming to Athens with a small force [B. C. 508], which sufficed to overawe the people, and, assuming dictatorial authority, he established Isagoras in power, with an attempted rearrangement of the government. "He began by banishing 700 families designated by Isagoras, and then proceeded to suppress the Council of the Five Hundred, and to lodge the government in the hands of Three Hundred of his friend's partisans. When, however, the councillors resisted this attempt, the people took heart, and, Cleomenes and Isagoras having occupied the citadel, rose in a body and besieged them there. As they were not prepared to sustain a siege, they capitulated on the third day: Cleomenes and Isagoras were permitted to depart with the Lacedæmonian troops, but they were compelled to abandon their adherents to the mercy of their enemies. All were put to death, and Cleisthenes and the 700 banished families returned triumphantly to Athens." Cleomenes soon afterwards raised a force with which to subdue Athens and restore Isagoras. The Athenians in their alarm sent an embassy to Sardis to solicit the protection of the Persians. Fortunately, nothing came of it, and Cleomenes was so much opposed in his project, by the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta, that he had to give it up.

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 31.

E. Abbott, History of Greece, chapter 15.

Aristotle, On the Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste), chapter 20-22.

ATHENS: B. C. 509-506. Hostile undertakings of Kleomenes and Sparta. Help solicited from the Persian king. Subjection refused. Failure of Spartan schemes to restore tyranny. Protest of the Corinthians. Successful war with Thebes and Chalcis.

"With Sparta it was obvious that the Athenians now had a deadly quarrel, and on the other side they knew that Hippias was seeking to precipitate on them the power of the Persian king. It seemed therefore to be a matter of stern necessity to anticipate the intrigues of their banished tyrant; and the Athenians accordingly sent ambassadors to Sardeis to make an independent alliance with the Persian despot. The envoys, on being brought into the presence of Artaphernes, the Satrap of Lydia, were told that Dareios would admit them to an alliance if they would give him earth and water,—in other words, if they would acknowledge themselves his slaves. To this demand of absolute subjection the envoys gave an assent which was indignantly repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens. … Foiled for the time in his efforts, Kleomenes was not cast down. Regarding the Kleisthenian constitution as a personal insult to himself, he was resolved that Isagoras should be despot of Athens. Summoning the allies of Sparta [including the Bœotian League headed by Thebes, and the people of Chalcis in Eubœa], he led them as far as Eleusis, 12 miles only from Athens, without informing them of the purpose of the campaign. He had no sooner confessed it than the Corinthians, declaring that they had been brought away from home on an unrighteous errand, went back, followed by the other Spartan King, Demaratos, the son of Ariston; and this conflict of opinion broke up the rest of the army. This discomfiture of their enemy seemed to inspire fresh strength into the Athenians, who won a series of victories over the Boiotians and Euboians"—completely overthrowing the latter—the Chalcidians—taking possession of their city, and making it a peculiar colony and dependency of Athens.—See KLERUCHS. The anger of Kleomenes "on being discomfited at Eleusis by the defection of his own allies was heightened by indignation at the discovery that in driving out his friend Hippias he had been simply the tool of Kleisthenes and of the Delphian priestess whom Kleisthenes had bribed. It was now clear to him and to his countrymen that the Athenians would not acquiesce in the predominance of Sparta, and that if they retained their freedom, the power of Athens would soon be equal to their own. Their only safety lay, therefore, in providing the Athenians with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, sent to Hippias at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the allies at Sparta, who were summoned to meet on the arrival of the exiled despot." The appointed congress was held, and the Spartans besought their allies to aid them in humbling the Athenian Democracy, with the object of restoring Hippias to power. But again the Corinthians protested, bluntly suggesting that if the Spartans thought tyranny a good thing they might first try it for themselves. Hippias, speaking in his own behalf, attempted to convince them that the time was coming "in which they would find the Athenians a thorn in their side. For the present his exhortations were thrown away. The allies protested unanimously against all attempts to interfere with the internal administration of any Hellenic city; and the banished tyrant went back disappointed to Sigeion."

G. W. Cox, The Greeks and the Persians, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 31 (volume 4).

{151}

ATHENS: B. C. 501-490. Aid to Ionians against Persia. Provocation of King Darius. His wrath and attempted vengeance. The first Persian invasions. Battle of Marathon.

"It is undeniable that the extension of the Persian dominion over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt gave a violent check to the onward movement of Greek life. On the other hand, it seemed as if the great enterprise of Darius Hystaspis against the Scythians ought to have united the Greeks and Persians. It was of a piece with the general policy of Darius that, after defeating so many other adversaries, he undertook to prevent for all succeeding time a repetition of those inroads with which, some centuries before, the Scythians had visited Asia and the civilized world. He possessed authority enough to unite the different nations which obeyed his sceptre in a great campaign against the Scythians. … The Greeks were his best allies in his campaign; they built him the bridge by which he crossed the Bosporus, and also the bridge of boats over the Danube by which he made his invasion into the enemy's territory. The result was not one which could properly be called unfortunate; yet it was certainly of a very doubtful character. … A great region, in which they had already obtained very considerable influence, was closed to them once more. The Persian army brought the populations upon the Strymon, many in number and individually weak, under the dominion of Persia; and even Amyntas, the king of Makedonia, one of a race of rulers of Greek origin, was compelled to do homage to the Great King. Thus the movement which had thrust back the Greeks from Egypt and Asia Minor made advances even into the regions of Europe which bordered upon Northern Hellas. It was an almost inevitable consequence of this that the Greeks were menaced and straitened even in their proper home. A pretext and opportunity for an attack upon the Greek islands was presented to the Persians by the questions at issue between the populations of the cities and the tyrants. … The instrument by whom the crisis was brought about was not a person of any great importance. It is not always great natures, or natures strong in the consciousness of their own powers, that bring on such conflicts; this is sometimes the work of those flexible characters which, being at the point of contact between the opposing forces, pass from one side to the other. Such a character was Aristagoras of Miletus. … Morally contemptible, but gifted intellectually with a range of ideas of unlimited extent, Aristagoras made for himself an imperishable name by being the first to entertain the thought of a collective opposition to the Persians on the part of all the Greeks, even contemplating the possibility of waging a great and successful offensive war upon them. … He announced in Miletus his own resignation of power and the restoration to the people of their old laws. … A general overthrow of tyranny ensued [B. C. 501], involving a revolt from Persia, and Strategi were everywhere appointed. The supreme power in the cities was based upon a good understanding between the holders of power and the Persians; the fact that one of these rulers found the authority of the Persians intolerable was the signal for a universal revolt. Aristagoras himself voluntarily renounced the tyranny, the other tyrants were compelled to take the same course; and thus the cities, assuming at the same time a democratic organization, came into hostility with Persia. … The cities and islands which had so often been forced to submission could not hope to resist the Persians by their own unaided efforts. Even Aristagoras could not have expected so much. … He visited Lakedæmon, the strongest of the Greek powers, in person, and endeavored to carry her with him in his plans. … Rejected by Sparta, Aristagoras betook himself to Athens. … The Athenians granted Aristagoras twenty ships, to which the Eretrians, from friendship to Miletus, added five more. The courage of the Ionians was thus revived, and an attack upon the Persian dominion commenced, directed, not indeed against Susa, but against Sardis, in their immediate neighborhood, the capital of the satrapy which imposed on them their heaviest burdens. … By the burning of Sardis, in which a sanctuary of Kybele had been destroyed, the Syrian nations had been outraged in the person of their gods. We know that it was part of the system of the Persians to take the gods of a country under their protection. Nor would the great king who thought himself appointed to be master of the world fail to resent an invasion of his dominions as an insult calling for revenge. The hostile attempts of the Ionians made no great impression upon him, but he asked who were the Athenians, of whose share in the campaign he had been informed. They were foreigners, of whose power the king had scarcely heard. … The enterprise of Aristagoras had meanwhile caused general commotion. He had by far the larger part of Cyprus, together with the Carians, on his side. All the country near the Propontis and the Hellespont was in revolt. The Persians were compelled to make it their first concern to suppress this insurrection, a task which, if attempted by sea, did not promise to be an easy one. In their first encounter with the Phœnicians the Ionians had the advantage. When, however, the forces of the great empire were assembled, the insurrection was everywhere put down. … It must be reckoned among the consequences of the battle of Lade, by which the combination against the Persian empire had been annihilated, that King Darius, not content with having consolidated his dominion in Ionia, once more resumed the plan of pushing forward into Europe, of which his enterprise against the Scythians formed part. With the execution of this project he commissioned one of the principal persons of the empire and the court, … Mardonius by name, whom he united to his family by marrying him to his daughter. … This general crossed the Hellespont with a large army, his fleet always accompanying him along the shore whilst he pushed on by the mainland. He once more subdued Makedonia, probably the districts which had not yet, like the Makedonian king, been brought into subjection, and gave out that his aim was directed against Eretria and Athens, the enemies of the king. … In the stormy waters near Mount Athos, which have always made the navigation of the Ægean difficult, his fleet suffered ship-wreck. But without naval supports he could not hope to gain possession of an island and a maritime town situated on a promontory. Even by land he encountered resistance, so that he found it advisable to postpone the further execution of his undertakings to another time. … In order to subdue the recalcitrants, especially Athens and Eretria, another attempt was organized without delay. Under two generals, one of whom, Datis, was a Mede, the other, Artaphernes, the son of the satrap of Sardis of the same name, and brother of the Darius who was in alliance with Hippias, a maritime expedition was undertaken for the immediate subjugation of the islands and the maritime districts. {152} It was not designed for open hostility against the Greeks in general. … Their design was to utilize the internal dissensions of Greece in conquering the principal enemies upon whom the Great King had sworn vengeance, and presenting them as captives at his feet. The project succeeded in the case of Eretria. In spite of a brave resistance it fell by treachery into their hands, and they could avenge the sacrilege committed at Sardis by plundering and devastating Grecian sanctuaries. They expected now to be able to overpower Athens also without much trouble. … It was a circumstance of great value to the Athenians that there was a man amongst them who was familiar with the Persian tactics. This was Miltiades, the son of Kimon. … Although a Thracian prince, he had never ceased to be a citizen of Athens. Here he was impeached for having held a tyranny, but was acquitted and chosen strategus, for the democracy could not reject a man who was so admirably qualified to be at their head in the interchange of hostilities with Persia. Miltiades was conducting his own personal quarrel in undertaking the defence of Attica. The force of the Persians was indeed incomparably the larger, but the plains of Marathon, on which they were drawn up, prevented their proper deployment, and they saw with astonishment the Athenian hoplites displaying a front as extended as their own. These troops now rushed upon them with an impetus which grew swifter at every moment. The Persians easily succeeded in breaking through the centre of the Athenian army; but that was of no moment, for the strength of the onset lay in the two wings, where now began a hand-to-hand fight. The Persian sword, formidable elsewhere, was not adapted to do good service against the bronze armor and the spear of the Hellenes. On both flanks the Athenians obtained the advantage, and now attacked the Persian centre, which was not able to withstand the onslaught of men whose natural vigor was heightened by gymnastic training. The Persians, to their misfortune, had calculated upon desertion in the ranks of their opponents; foiled in this hope, they retreated to the shore and to their ships. Herodotus intimates that the Persians had secret intelligence with a party in Athens, and took their course round the promontory of Sunium toward the city, in the hope of surprising it. But when they came to anchor the Athenians had arrived also, and they saw themselves once more confronted by the victors of Marathon."

L. von Ranke, Universal History, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: Herodotus, History, book 6.

V. Duruy, History of Greece, chapter 16 (volume 2).

See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 521-493, and GREECE: B. C. 492-491, and 490.

ATHENS: B. C. 489-480. Condemnation and death of Miltiades. The Æginetan war. Naval power created by Themistocles.

"The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was he who brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command on the day when the battle was fought. Such a brilliant success greatly improved his position in the city, and excited in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch for an opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before they found one. Soon after his victory, Miltiades came before the Athenians with a request that a squadron of 70 ships might be placed at his disposal. The purpose for which he required them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that the expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of the city. The request being granted, he sailed with the ships to Paros, an island which at this time was subject to Persia. From the Parians he demanded 100 talents, and when they refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and successful was the resistance offered that, after a long delay, Miltiades, himself dangerously wounded, was compelled to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head, at once attacked him for misconduct in the enterprise. … Miltiades was unable to reply in person; he was carried into court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was given against him, but the penalty was reduced from death to a fine of 50 talents. So large a sum was more than even Miltiades could pay; he was thrown into prison as a public debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his wound. … His condemnation was one in a long series of similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors of judgment. … We have very little information about the state of Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon. So far as we can tell, for the chronology is most uncertain, she was now engaged in a war with Ægina. … Meanwhile, a man was rising to power, who may be said to have created the history of Athens for the rest of the century,—Themistocles, the son of Neocles. … On the very day of Marathon, Themistocles had probably made up his mind that the Persians would visit Greece again. What was to keep them away, so long as they were masters of the Ægean? … With an insight almost incredible he perceived that the Athenians could become a maritime nation; that Athens possesses harbours large enough to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only secure her own safety, but stand forth as a rival power to Sparta. But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a mode of warfare in which even Miltiades had failed? After the fall of the great general, the conduct of affairs was in the hands of Xanthippus … and Aristides. … They were by no means prepared for the change which Themistocles was meditating. This is more especially true of Aristides. He had been a friend of Clisthenes; he was known as an admirer of Spartan customs. … He had been second in command at Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From him Themistocles could only expect the most resolute opposition. Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the support of old traditions and great connections. Themistocles had no support of the kind. He had to make his party … conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather round their unmannerly and uncultivated leader. And they might, perhaps, have maintained their position if it had not been for the Æginetan war. That unlucky struggle had begun, soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an unprovoked attack of the Æginetans on the coast of Attica (506 B. C.), [Ægina being allied with Thebes in the war mentioned above—B.C. 509-506]. {153} It was renewed when the Æginetans gave earth and water to the heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at the time of the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity soon afterwards. The Æginetans had the stronger fleet, and defeated the Athenian ships. "Such experiences naturally caused a change in the minds of the Athenians. … It was clear that the old arrangements for the navy were quite inadequate to the task which was now required of them. Yet the leaders of the state made no proposals." Themistocles now "came forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as he expected, he drew upon himself the strenuous opposition of Aristides. … It was clear that nothing decisive could be done in the Æginetan war unless the proposals of Themistocles were carried; it was equally clear that they never would be carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and accepted; and in this manner, by 483 B. C., Themistocles had got rid of both of his rivals in the city. He was now master of the situation. The only obstacle to the realization of his plans was the expense involved in building ships. And this he was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the treasury at this time a large surplus from the silver mines from Laurium. … By the summer of 480, the Athenians … were able to launch 180 vessels, besides providing 20 for the use of the Chalcideans of Eubœa. … At the same time Themistocles set about the fortification of the Peiræus. … Could he have carried the Athenians with him, he would have made the Peiræus the capital of the country, in order that the ships and the city might be in close connection. But for this the people were not prepared."

E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: Plutarch, Aristides. Themistocles.

ATHENS: B. C. 481-479. Congress at Corinth. Organized Hellenic Union, under the headship of Sparta.

See GREECE: B. C. 481-479.

ATHENS: B. C. 480-479. The second Persian invasion. Thermopylæ, Artemisium, Salamis, Platæa. Abandonment of the City.

"The last days of Darius were clouded by the disaster of Marathon; 'that battle formed the turning point of his good fortune,' and it would seem that the news of it led to several insurrections, particularly that of Egypt; but they were soon put down. Darius died (Olymp. 73, 3), and Xerxes, who succeeded him, was prevented from taking revenge on the Athenians by the revolt of Egypt, which engaged his attention during the first years of his reign. But he completely conquered the insurgents after they had maintained themselves about four or five years; and he then made preparations for that vengeance on Athens for which his barbarian pride was longing. The account of the three years' preparations of Xerxes, how he assembled his army in Asia Minor, how he made a bridge across the Hellespont, how he cut a canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos to prevent his fleet being destroyed by storms—all this is known to everyone who has read Herodotus. History is here so much interwoven with poetry, that they can no longer be separated. … The Greeks awaited the attack (Olymp. 75, 1), 'but they were not agreed among themselves. The Argives from hatred of Sparta joined the Persians, and the miserable Boeotians likewise supported them. The others kept together only from necessity; and without the noble spirit of the Athenians Greece would have been lost, and that from the most paltry circumstances. A dispute arose as to who was to be honoured with the supreme command; the Athenians gave way to all, for their only desire was to save Greece. Had the Persians moved on rapidly, they would have met with no resistance, but they proceeded slowly, and matters turned out differently.' A Greek army was encamped at Tempe, at the entrance of Thessaly, and at first determined on defending Thessaly. But they must have seen that they could be entirely surrounded from Upper Thessaly; and when they thus discovered the impossibility of stopping the Persians, they retreated. The narrative now contains one inconceivable circumstance after another. … It is inconceivable that, as the Greeks did make a stand at Thermopylae, no one else took his position there except King Leonidas and his Spartans, not including even the Lacedaemonians, for they remained at home! Only 1,000 Phocians occupied the heights, though that people might surely have furnished 10,000 men; 400 of the Boeotians were posted in the rear, as a sort of hostages, as Herodotus remarks, and 700 Thespians. Where were all the rest of the Greeks? … Countless hosts are invading Greece; the Greeks want to defend themselves, and are making active preparations at sea; but on land hundreds of thousands are met by a small band of Peloponnesians. 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans as hostages, and 1,000 Phocians, stationed on the heights! A pass is occupied, but only that one, and the others are left unguarded. … All this is quite unintelligible; it would almost appear as if there had been an intention to sacrifice Leonidas and his men; but we cannot suppose this. These circumstances alone suggest to us, that the numbers of the Persian army cannot have been as great as they are described; but even if we reduce them to an immense extent, it still remains inconceivable why they were not opposed by greater numbers of the Greeks, for as afterwards they ventured to attack the Persians in the open field, it was certainly much more natural to oppose them while marching across the hills. But however this may be, it is an undoubted fact, that Leonidas and his Spartans fell in the contest, of which we may form a conception from the description of Herodotus, when after a resistance of three days they were surrounded by the Persians. A few of the Spartans escaped on very excusable grounds, but they were so generally despised, that their life became unendurable, and they made away with themselves. This is certainly historical. … After the victory of Thermopylae all Hellas lay open before the Persians, and they now advanced towards Athens, a distance which they could march in a few days. Thebes opened her gates, and joyfully admitted them from hatred of Athens. Meantime a portion of the army appeared before Delphi. It is almost inconceivable that the Persians did not succeed in taking the temple. … The miracles by which the temple is said to have been saved, are repeated in the same manner during the attack of the Gauls. {154} But the temple of Delphi was certainly not plundered.' … The city of Athens had in the meantime been abandoned by all the people; the defenceless had taken refuge in the small island of Salamis, or of Troezen, 'and all the Athenians capable of bearing arms embarked in the fleet.' … The Persians thus took Athens without any resistance. … During the same days on which the battle of Thermopylae was fought, the Greek fleet was engaged in two indecisive but glorious battles near the promontory of Artemisium. 'In a third the Persians gained the upper hand, and when the Greeks at the same time heard of the defeat at Thermopylae, they withdrew, and doubling Cape Sunium sailed towards Salamis.' God sent them a storm whereby the Persians in their pursuit suffered shipwreck. … While the Greek fleet was stationed in the channel between the island of Salamis and Attica, towards Piraeeus, discord broke out among the Greeks. The Peloponnesians thought only of themselves; they had fortified the Isthmus; there they were assembled, and there they wanted to offer resistance to the Persians. In their folly they forgot, that if the enemy with his superior fleet, should turn against Peloponnesus, they might land wherever they liked. … But Themistocles now declared, that all the hopes of the Athenians were directed towards the recovery of their own city; that, if the Peloponnesians should sacrifice them, and, thinking of themselves only, should abandon Attica to the barbarians, the Athenians would not be so childish as to sacrifice themselves for them, but would take their women and children on board their ships, and sail far away from the Persians to the island of Sardinia, or some other place where Greek colonies were established; that there they would settle as a free people, and abandon Peloponnesus to its fate; and that then the peninsula would soon be in the hands of the enemy. This frightened the Peloponnesians, and they resolved to stand by Athens. It is evident that, throughout that time, Themistocles had to struggle with the most intolerable difficulties, which the allies placed in his way, as well as with their jealousy, meanness, and insolence. 'The rudeness of the Spartans and Corinthians is nowhere more strongly contrasted with the refinement of the Athenians, than on that occasion.' But after he had tried everything, and overcome by every possible means a hundred different difficulties, he yet saw, that he could not rely on the perseverance of the Peloponnesians, and that they would turn to the Isthmus as soon as Xerxes should proceed in that direction. He accordingly induced the Persian king, by a false message, to surround the Greek fleet, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Peloponnesians. He declared himself ready to deliver the whole of the Greek fleet into his hands. This device was quite to the mind of the Persians; Xerxes believed him, and followed his advice. When Themistocles was thus sure of the Peloponnesians, the ever-memorable battle of Salamis commenced, which is as certainly historical as that of Cannae, or any modern battle, 'whatever the numbers may be.' The battle proceeded somewhat in the manner of the battle of Leipzig: when the issue was decided, a portion of those who ought to have joined their countrymen before, made common cause with the Greeks. … Their accession increased the victory of the Greeks. … Certain as the battle of Salamis is, all the accounts of what took place after it, are very doubtful. This much is certain, that Xerxes returned, 'leaving a portion of his army under Mardonius in Greece;' … Winter was now approaching, and Mardonius withdrew from ravaged Attica, taking up his winter-quarters partly in Thessaly and partly in Boeotia. … The probability is, that the Athenians remained the winter in Salamis in sheds, or under the open sky. Mardonius offered to restore to them Attica uninjured, so far as it had not already been devastated, if they would conclude peace with him. They might at that time have obtained any terms they pleased, if they had abandoned the common cause of the Greeks; and the Persians would have kept the peace; for when they concluded treaties they observed them: they were not faithless barbarians. But on this occasion again, we see the Athenian people in all its greatness and excellence; it scorned such a peace, and preferred the good of the Peloponnesians. … Mardonius now again advanced towards Athens; the Spartans, who ought to have proceeded towards Cithaeron, had not arrived, and thus he again took possession of Attica and ravaged it completely. At length, however (Olymp. 75, 2), the Athenians prevailed upon the Peloponnesians to leave the Isthmus, and they gradually advanced towards Boeotia. There the battle of Plataeae was fought. … In regard to the accounts of this battle, it is historically certain that it was completely won by the Greeks, and that the remnants of the Persian army retreated without being vigorously pursued. It must have reached Asia, but it then disappears. It is also historically certain, that Pausanias was the commander of the allied army of the Greeks. … After their victory, the Greeks advanced towards Thebes. In accordance with a vow which they had made before the war, Thebes ought to have been destroyed by the Greeks. But their opinions were divided. … On the same day on which the battle of Plataeae was fought, the allied Greeks gained as complete a victory at sea. … After this victory of Mycale, the Ionian cities revolted against the Persians."

B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History, volume 1, lectures 37 and 38.

ALSO IN: Herodotus, History; translated and edited by H. Rawlinson, book 7 (volume 4).

Plutarch, Themistocles.

G. W. Cox, The Greeks and Persians.

ATHENS: B. C. 479-478. Protection of Ionia assumed. Siege and capture of Sestus. Rebuilding and enlargement of the city and its walls. Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

"The advantages obtained by the Hellenes [in their war with Persia] came upon them so unexpectedly as to find them totally unprepared, and accordingly embarrassed by their own victories. What was to be done with Ionia? Was the whole country to be admitted into the Hellenic confederation? Too great a responsibility would, in the opinion of the Peloponnesians, be incurred by such a step. … It would be better to sacrifice the country, and establish the Ionians in settlements in other parts, at the expense of those who had favoured the Medes, i. e., of the Argives, Bœotians, Locrians, and Thessalians. … The Athenians, on the other hand, espoused the cause of the cities. … Ionia ought to be a bulwark against the Barbarians, and to belong to the Hellenes. {155} … The Athenians found a support in the feeling prevalent among the Ionians, who were naturally opposed to any forced settlement. Accordingly, in the first instance, Samos, Lesbos, Chios, and a number of other island-towns, were admitted into the confederation … and a new Hellas was formed, a Greek empire comprehending both sides of the sea. Considerations of caution made it necessary, above all, to secure the passage from Asia to Europe; for it was universally believed that the bridge over the Hellespont was either still in existence or had been restored. When it was found to have been destroyed, the Peloponnesians urged the termination of the campaign. … The Athenians, on the other hand, declared themselves resolved … not to leave unfinished what they had begun. Sestus, the strongest fortress on the Hellespont, ought not to be left in the hands of the enemy; an attack on it ought to be risked without delay, before the city had prepared for a siege. They allowed the Peloponnesians to take their departure, and under the command of Xanthippus united with the ships of the Ionians and Hellespontians for the purpose of new undertakings." The Persians in Sestus resisted obstinately, enduring a long siege, but were forced to surrender at last. "Meanwhile, the main point consisted in the Athenians having remained alone in the field, in their having fraternized with the Ionians as one naval power, and having after such successes attained to a confidence in victory, to which no enterprise any longer seemed either too distant or too difficult. Already they regarded their city as the centre of the coast-lands of Greece. But what was the condition of this city of Athens itself? A few fragments of the ancient city wall, a few scattered houses, which had served the Persian commanders as their quarters, were yet standing; the rest was ashes and ruins. After the battle of Platææ the inhabitants had returned from Salamis, Trœzene, and Ægina; not even the fleet and its crews were at hand to afford them assistance. They endeavoured to make shift as best they could, to pass through the trials of the winter. As soon as the spring arrived, the restoration of the city was commenced with all possible activity. … But even now it was not the comforts of domesticity which occupied their thoughts, but, above all, the city as a whole and its security. To Themistocles, the founder of the port-town, public confidence was in this matter properly accorded." It was not possible "to carry out a new and regular plan for the city; but it was resolved to extend its circumference beyond the circle of the ancient walls, … so as to be able, in case of a future siege, to offer a retreat to the country-population within the capital itself. … But the Athenians were not even to be permitted to build their walls undisturbed; for, as soon as their grand plan of operations became known, the envy and insidious jealousy of their neighbours broke out afresh. … The Peloponnesian states, above all Ægina and Corinth, hastened to direct the attention of Sparta to the situation of affairs. … As at Sparta city walls were objected to on principle, and as no doubts prevailed with regard to the fact that z well-fortified town was impregnable to the military art of the Peloponnesians, it was actually resolved at any price to prevent the building of the walls in Attica." But, for shame's sake, the interference undertaken by Sparta was put upon the ground that in the event of a future invasion of the country, only the peninsula could be successfully defended; that central Greece would necessarily be abandoned to the enemy; and that every fortified city in it would furnish him a dangerous base. "At such a crisis craft alone could be of avail. When the Spartans made their imperious demand at Athens, Themistocles ordered the immediate cessation of building operations, and with assumed submissiveness, promised to present himself at Sparta, in order to pursue further negotiations in person. On his arrival there, he allowed one day after the other to go by, pretending to be waiting for his fellow envoys." In the meantime, all Athens was toiling night and day at the walls, and time enough was gained by the audacious duplicity of Themistocles to build them to a safe height for defence. "The enemies of Athens saw that their design had been foiled, and were forced to put the best face upon their discomfiture. They now gave out that they had intended nothing beyond good advice."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2).

ALSO IN G. W. Cox, History of Greece, book 2, chapter 7-8 (volume 1-2).

ATHENS: B. C. 478-477. Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta. Formation of the Confederacy of Delos. The founding of Athenian Empire.

See GREECE: B. C. 478-477.

ATHENS: B. C. 477-462. Constitutional gains for the democracy. Ascendency of Aristeides. Declining popularity and ostracism of Themistokles. The sustentation of the commons. The stripping of power from the Areopagus.

At the time when the Confederacy of Delos was formed, "the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula … were not less anxious to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium. … Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed, even with that aid, at the time when the Confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out, especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without. Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias." Pausanias, whose treasonable intrigues with the Persian king began at Byzantium (See GREECE: B. C. 478-477) was convicted some nine or ten years later, and suffered a terrible fate, being shut within a temple to which he had fled, and starved. "His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistokles. … The charge [against Themistokles] of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties. … The rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of cooperation against a common enemy. {156} And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiraeus: Aristeides is commander of the fleet and first organiser of the Confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact. … From henceforth the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. … The triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover, the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. … The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. 'The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,' and instruments of the new vocation at Athens as head of the Delian Confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. … Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenian constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest; no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled and eligibility extended to all the citizens; We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded when we find that it was proposed by Aristeides. … The popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian Confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendency of Themistokles, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising with Aristeides. … Of these the chief were Kimon [Cimon], (son of Miltiades), and Alkmæon." In 471 B. C. Themistokles was sent into exile by a vote of ostracism, and retired to Argos. Five years later he was accused of complicity in the treasonable intrigues of Pausanias, and fled to the court of the Persian king, where he spent the remainder of his days. "Aristeides died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistokles."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 44 (volume 5).

The constitutional effects of the Persian war, and the political situation of Athens immediately after the war, are represented somewhat differently from the account above, in the lately discovered work on the Constitution of Athens which is attributed to Aristotle. The following is quoted from one of the translations of the latter: "After the Median war the council of Areopagus [See AREOPAGUS] recovered strength and ruled the state, not that any law conferred the hegemony on them, but because the aristocratic party had the credit of the victory at Salamis. For when the generals had despaired of the country and proclaimed a sauve qui peut, the Areopagus raised funds, gave every man eight drachmas (6s. 6d.) and induced them to man the ships. In consequence of this public service the Ecclesia yielded the ascendency to the Areopagus, and public affairs were admirably administered during the following epoch. For they acquired the art of war, made their name honoured throughout the Hellenic world, and possessed themselves of the sovereignty of the sea with the consent of Lakedaimon. At this time the leaders of the commons were Aristeides, son of Lusimachos, and Themistokles, son of Neokles; the latter studious of the arts of war, the former reputed eminent in statesmanship and honest beyond his contemporaries; which characters made their countrymen employ the one as a general, the other as a councillor. The rebuilding of the walls of Athens was their joint work, though they were otherwise at feud. The detachment of the Ionians from Persia and the formation of an alliance with Sparta were due to the counsels of Aristeides, who seized the opportunity afforded by the discredit cast on the Lakonians by the conduct of Pausanias. He too originally apportioned, two years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes (478 B. C.), the contribution to be paid by the islanders. … Subsequently, when lofty thoughts filled every bosom and wealth was accumulating, Aristeides advised them to administer the hegemony with their own hands, to leave their country occupations and fix their domicile in the city. Sustentation, he promised, would be provided for all, either as soldiers or sailors in active service, or as troops in garrison or as public servants; and then they could increase the vigour of their imperial sway. They followed his advice, and, taking the rule into their own hands, reduced their allies to the position of vassals, except the Chians, Lesbians, and Samians, whom they kept as satellites of their power, and permitted to retain their own constitutions and to rule their own dependencies: and they provided for their own sustentation by the method which Aristeides indicated; for in the end the public revenues, the taxes and the tributes of the allies gave maintenance to more than 20,000. There were 6,000 dicasts or jurors, 1,600 archers, 1,200 cavalry, 500 senators, 500 soldiers of the dockyard garrison, 50 city guards, 700 home magistrates, 700 foreign magistrates, 2,500 heavy armed soldiers (this was their number at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war), 4,000 sailors manning 20 guardships, 2,000 sailors appointed by lot, manning 20 tribute-collecting ships, and in addition to these the Prutaneion, the orphans, the gaolers; and all these persons were maintained at the expense of the national treasury. The sustentation of the commons was thus secured. {157} The 17 years which followed the Median war were about the period during which the country continued under the ascendency of the Areopagus, though its aristocratic features were gradually on the wane. When the masses had grown more and more preponderant, Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, reputed incorruptible in his loyalty to democracy, became leader of the commons, and began to attack the Areopagus. First, he put to death many of its members, by impeaching them of offences committed in their administration. Afterwards in the archonship of Konon (462 B. C.) he despoiled the council itself of all its more recently acquired attributes, which were the keystone of the existing constitution, and distributed them among the Senate of 500, the Ecclesia, and the courts of law. In this work he had the co-operation of Themistokles, who was himself an Areopagite, but expecting to be impeached for treasonable correspondence with Persia. … Ephialtes and Themistokles kept accusing the Areopagus before the Senate of 500, and again before the commons, till finally they stripped it of all its principal functions. The assassination of Ephialtes by the instrumentality of Aristodikos of Tanagra followed not long after. Such were the circumstances of the overthrow of the Areopagus. After this the degradation of the constitution proceeded without intermission from the eagerness of politicians to win popular favour; and at the same time there happened to be no organizer of the aristocratic party, whose head, Kimon, the son of Miltiades, was too young for some years to enter political life; besides which their ranks were much devastated by war. Expeditionary forces were recruited by conscription; and as the generals had no military experience and owed their appointment to the reputation of their ancestors, each expedition entailed the sacrifice of 2,000 or 3,000 lives, chiefly of the noblest sons of Athens, whether belonging to the wealthy classes or to the commons."—Aristotle, On the Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste.) chapter 23-26.—On the above, Dr. Abbott comments as follows: "So much of this account as refers to Themistocles may be at once dismissed as unhistorical. … If the evidence of Thucydides is to count for anything, it is quite certain that Themistocles finally left Greece for Persia about 466 B. C. … Plutarch says not a word about Themistocles. But the remainder of the account [of the attack on the Areopagus] is supported by all our authorities—if indeed it is not merely repeated by them."

E. Abbott, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 11, section 5.

ALSO IN J. P. Mahaffy, Problems in Greek History, page 96.

Plutarch, Themistocles.

See, also, below: B. C. 466-454.

ATHENS: B. C. 470-466. Continued war against the Persians. Cimon's victories at the Eurymedon. Revolt and subjugation of Naxos.

"Under the guidance of Athens, the war against the Persians was continued. Cimon [Kimon] sailed with a fleet to the coast of Thrace, and laid siege to Eion on the Strymon [B. C. 470]. The Persian garrison made a gallant defence; and finally Boges, the governor, rather than surrender, cast all his gold and silver into the river; and, having raised a huge pile of wood, slew his wives, children and slaves, and laid their bodies on it; then setting fire to it, he flung himself into the flames: the garrison surrendered at discretion. Doriscus was attacked in vain, but all the other Persian garrisons in Europe were reduced. Cimon then, as executor of an Amphictyonic decree, turned his arms against the piratic Dolopians of the Isle of Scyros, whom he expelled, and filled the island with Athenian colonists. On this occasion he sought and found (as was supposed) the bones of the hero Theseus, who had died in this island 800 years before; and he brought them in his own trireme to Athens,—an act which gained him great favour with the people. By this time, some of the confederates were grown weary of war, and began to murmur at the toils and expense to which it put them. The people of Naxos were the first who positively refused to contribute any longer; but the Athenians, who had tasted of the sweets of command, would not now permit the exercise of free will to their allies. Cimon appeared (Ol. 78,3) [B. C. 466] with a large fleet before Naxos; the Naxians defended themselves with vigour, but were at length forced to submit; and the Athenians had the hardihood to reduce them to the condition of subjects to Athens—an example which they soon followed in other cases. … After the reduction of Naxos, Cimon sailed over to the coast of Asia, and learning that the Persian generals had assembled a large fleet and army in Pamphylia, he collected a fleet of 200 triremes at Cnidos, with which he proceeded to the coast of that country, and laid siege to the city of Phaselis, which, though Greek, obeyed the Persian monarch. Having reduced it to submission, he resolved to proceed and attack the Persian fleet and army, which he learned were lying at the river Eurymedon. On his arrival, the Persian fleet, of 350 triremes, fearing at first to fight till 80 Phoenician vessels, which they were expecting, should come up, kept in the river; but finding that the Greeks were preparing to attack, they put out to sea and engaged them. The action did not continue long: the Barbarians fled to the land; 200 ships fell into the hands of the victors, and several were destroyed. Without a moment's delay, Cimon disembarked his men, and led them against the land forces: the resistance of the Persians was obstinate for some time, but at last they turned and fled, leaving their camp a prey to the conquerors; and Cimon had thus the rare glory of having gained two important victories in the one day. Hearing then that the 80 Phoenician vessels were at Hydros, in the Isle of Cyprus, he immediately sailed thither and took or destroyed the whole of them. The victory on the Eurymedon may be regarded as the termination of the conflict between Greece and Persia. The year after it (Ol. 78,4) [B. C. 465], Xerxes was assassinated, and the usual confusion took place in the court of Susa."

T. Keightley, History of Greece, part 1, chapter 13.

ALSO IN W. W. Lloyd, The Age of Pericles, chapter 27 (volume 1).

See also PERSIA: B. C. 486-405.

{158}

ATHENS: B. C. 466-454. Leadership in the Delian confederacy changed to sovereignty. Revolt and subjugation of Thasos. Help to Sparta and its ungracious requital. Fall and exile of Cimon. Rise of Pericles and the democratic anti-Spartan policy. Removal of the federal treasury from Delos. Building the Long Walls.

"It was now evident to the whole body of the allies of Athens that by joining the league they had provided themselves with a mistress rather than a leader. … Two years after the reduction of Naxos another powerful island-state broke out into rebellion against the supremacy of Athens. The people of Thasos had from very early times possessed territory on the mainland of Thrace opposite to their island. By holding this coast-slip they engrossed the trade of the Valley of the Strymon, and held the rich gold mines of Mount Pangaeus. But the Athenians, after the capture of Eïon, set themselves to develop that port as the commercial centre of Thrace. … A spot called 'The Nine Ways,' … where that great river first begins to broaden out into its estuary, but can still be spanned by a bridge, was the chosen site of a fortress to secure the hold of Athens on the land. But the native Thracian tribes banded themselves together, and fell upon the invaders with such desperation that … the Athenian armies were defeated. … It was probably the discouragement which this defeat caused at Athens that emboldened Thasos to declare her secession from the Confederacy of Delos. She wished to save her Thracian trade, before Athens could make another attempt to divert it from her. The Thasians did not rely on their own resources alone; they enlisted the Thracians and Macedonians of the mainland, and sent to Sparta to endeavour to induce the ephors to declare war on Athens." The Spartans were well disposed to take up the cause of the Thasians; but at that moment they were overwhelmed by the calamity of the frightful Earthquake of 464, instantly followed by the rising of the Helots and the third Messenian war (See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD). "The island-state was therefore left to its own resources; and these were so considerable that she held out against the force of the Athenian confederacy for two whole years. … She was obliged at last to surrender to Cimon [B. C. 463], whose army had long been lying before her walls. Like Naxos, she was punished for her defection by the loss of her war-fleet and her fortifications, and the imposition of a fine of many talents. Still more galling must have been the loss of her trade with Thrace, which now passed entirely into Athenian hands. … The Spartans were still engaged in a desperate struggle with their revolted subjects when the siege of Thasos came to an end. Cimon, who was now at the height of his reputation and power, saw with distress the troubles of the city he so much admired. He set himself to persuade the Athenians that they ought to forego old grudges, and save from destruction the state which had shared with them the glory of the Persian war. … His pleading was bitterly opposed by the anti-Spartan party at Athens, headed by two statesmen, Ephialtes and Pericles, who had already come into notice as antagonists of Cimon. But the more generous and unwise policy prevailed, and 4,000 hoplites were sent to the aid of Sparta [B. C. 462]. This army was pursued by misfortune; it was so unsuccessful in attacking Ithome that the Spartans attributed its failure to ill will rather than ill luck. They, therefore, began to treat their allies with marked discourtesy, and at last sent them home without a word of thanks, merely stating that their services could be of no further use [See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD]. This rudeness and ingratitude fully justified the anti-Spartan party at Athens. … Cimon was now no longer able to deal with the policy of the state as he chose, and the conduct of affairs began to pass into the hands of men whose foreign and domestic policy were alike opposed to all his views. Ephialtes and Pericles proceeded to form alliances abroad with all the states which were ill disposed toward Sparta, and at home to commence a revision of the constitution. They were determined to carry out to its furthest logical development the democratic tendency which Cleisthenes had introduced into the Athenian polity. Of Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, comparatively little is known. But Pericles … was the son of Xanthippus, the accuser of Miltiades in 489, B. C., and the victor of Mycale and Sestos; while, on his mother's side, he came of the blood of the Alcmaeonidae. Pericles was staid, self-contained, and haughty—a strange chief for the popular party. But his relationship to Cleisthenes, and the enmity which existed between his house and that of Cimon, urged him to espouse the cause of democracy. … While Cimon had Greece in his mind, Pericles could only think of Athens, and the temper of the times was favourable to the narrower policy. … The first aim which Pericles and Ephialtes set before themselves was the cutting down of the power of the Areopagus [See above: B. C. 477-462]. That body had since the Persian war become the stronghold of the Conservative and philo-Laconian party. … Ephialtes took the lead in the attack on the Areopagus. He chose a moment when Cimon was away at sea, bent on assisting a rebellion against the Great King which had broken out in Egypt. After a violent struggle, he succeeded in carrying a law which deprived the Areopagus of its ancient censorial power, and reduced it to a mere court to try homicides. … When Cimon came home from Egypt he was wildly enraged. … Recourse was had to the test of ostracism. It decided against Cimon, who therefore went into banishment [B. C. 459]. But this wrong against the greatest general of Athens was, not long after, avenged by an over-zealous and unscrupulous friend. Ephialtes was slain by assassins in his own house. … The immediate result of this murder was to leave Pericles in sole and undivided command of the democratic party. The foreign policy of Pericles soon began to involve Athens in troubles at home. He concluded alliances with Argos and Thessaly, both states at variance with Sparta, and thereby made a collision with the Lacedæmonian confederacy inevitable. He gave still more direct offence to Corinth, one of the most powerful members of that confederacy, by concluding a close alliance with Megara. … In Boeotia, too, he stirred up enmity, by giving an active support to the democratic party in that country. These provocations made a war inevitable. In 458 B. C. the storm burst. … At the moment of the outbreak of the first important naval war which she had to wage with a Greek enemy since the formation of her empire, Athens took two important steps. The first was destined to guard against the risk of misfortunes by sea; it consisted in the transference from Delos to Athens [dated by different authorities between 461 and 454 B. C.] of the central treasury of the confederacy. … {159} It was not long before the Athenians came to regard the treasury as their own, and to draw upon it for purely Attic needs, which had no connection with the welfare of the other confederates. … The second important event of the year 458 B. C. was the commencement of the famous 'Long Walls' of Athens [See LONG WALLS]. … When they were finished Athens, Peiræus, and Phalerum, formed the angles of a vast fortified triangle, while the space between them, a considerable expanse of open country, could be utilized as a place of refuge for the population of Attica, and even for their flocks and herds."

C. W. C. Oman, History of Greece, chapters 23-24.

ALSO IN E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapters 5-6.

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 17 (volume 3).

Plutarch, Cimon; Pericles.

ATHENS: B. C. 460-449. Disastrous expedition to Egypt. Attacks on the Peloponnesian Coast. Recall of Cimon. His last enterprise against the Persians. The disputed Peace of Cimon or Callias. Five years truce with Sparta.

"Inarus, king of some of the Libyan tribes on the western border of Egypt, had excited an insurrection there against the Persians [about 460 B. C.], and his authority was acknowledged throughout the greater part of the country. Artaxerxes sent his brother Achæmenes with a great army to quell this rebellion. An Athenian armament of 200 galleys was lying at the time off Cyprus, and Inarus sent to obtain its assistance. The Athenian commanders, whether following their own discretion, or after orders received from home, quitted Cyprus, and having joined with the insurgents, enabled them to defeat Achæmenes, who fell in the battle by the hand of Inarus. They then sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where a body of Persians, and some Egyptians, who still adhered to their cause were in possession of one quarter of the city, called White Castle. The rest was subject to Inarus, and there the Athenians stationed themselves, and besieged the Persians. … Artaxerxes sent a Persian, named Megabazus, to Sparta, with a sum of money, to be employed in bribing the principal Spartans to use their influence, so as to engage their countrymen in an expedition against Attica. Megabazus did not find the leading Spartans unwilling to receive his money; but they seem to have been unable to render him the service for which it was offered. Ithome still held out: and Sparta had probably not yet sufficiently either recovered her strength or restored internal tranquility, to venture on the proposed invasion. Some rumours of this negotiation may have reached Athens, and have quickened the energy with which Pericles now urged the completion of the long walls. … But among his opponents there was a faction who viewed the progress of this great work in a different light from Cimon, and saw in it, not the means of securing the independence of Athens, but a bulwark of the hated commonalty. They too would have gladly seen an invading army in Attica, which might assist them in destroying the work and its authors." This party was accused of sympathy with the Spartan expedition which came to the help of Doris against the Phocians in 457 B. C., and which defeated the Athenians at Tanagra (See GREECE: B. C. 458-456). In 455, "the Spartans were reminded that they were also liable to be attacked at home. An Athenian armament of 50 galleys, and, if we may trust Diadorus, with 4,000 heavy armed troops on board, sailed round Peloponnesus under Tolmides, burnt the Spartan arsenal at Gythium, took a town named Chalcis belonging to the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians, who attempted to oppose the landing of the troops. But the most important advantage gained in the expedition was the capture of Naupactus, which belonged to the Ozolian Locrians, and now fell into the hands of the Athenians at a very seasonable juncture. The third Messenian war had just come to a close. The brave defenders of Ithome had obtained honourable terms. … The besieged were permitted to quit Peloponnesus with their families, on condition of being detained in slavery if they ever returned. Tolmides now settled the homeless wanderers in Naupactus. … But these successes were counterbalanced by a reverse which befell the arms of Athens this same year in another quarter. After the defeat of Achæmens, Artaxerxes, disappointed in his hopes of assistance from Sparta, … raised a great army, which he placed under the command of an abler general, Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus. Megabyzus defeated the insurgents and their allies, and forced the Greeks to evacuate Memphis, and to take refuge in an island of the Nile, named Prosopitis, which contained a town called Byblus, where he besieged them for 18 months. At length he resorted to the contrivance of turning the stream. … The Greek galleys were all left aground, and were fired by the Athenians themselves, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands. The Persians then marched into the island over the dry bed of the river: the Egyptians in dismay abandoned their allies, who were overpowered by numbers and almost all destroyed. … Inarus himself was betrayed into the hands of the Persians and put to death. … Egypt … was again reduced under the Persian yoke, except a part of the Delta, where another pretender, named Amyrtæus, who assumed the title of king … maintained himself for several years against the power of the Persian monarchy. But the misfortune of the Athenians did not end with the destruction of the great fleet and army which had been first employed in the war. They had sent a squadron of 50 galleys to the relief of their countrymen, which, arriving before the news of the recent disaster had reached them, entered the Mendesian branch of the Nile. They were here surprised by a combined attack of the Persian land force and a Phoenician fleet, and but few escaped to bear the mournful tidings to Athens. Yet even after this calamity we find the Athenians, not suing for peace, but bent on extending their power, and annoying their enemies." Early in 454 they sent an expedition into Thessaly, to restore a ruler named Orestes, who had been driven out. "But the superiority of the Thessalians in cavalry checked all their operations in the field; they failed in an attempt upon Pharsalus, and were at length forced to retire without having accomplished any of their ends. It was perhaps to soothe the public disappointment that Pericles shortly afterwards embarked at Pegæ with 1,000 men, and, coasting the south side of the Corinthian gulf made a descent on the territory of Sicyon, and routed the Sicyon force sent to oppose his landing. {160} He then … laid siege to the town of Œniadæ. … This attempt, however, proved unsuccessful; and the general result of the campaign seems not to have been on the whole advantageous or encouraging. … It seems to have been not long after the events which have been just related that Cimon was recalled from his exile; and the decree for that purpose was moved by Pericles himself;—a fact which seems to intimate that some change had taken place in the relations or the temper of parties at Athens. … The three years next following Cimon's return, as we have fixed its date [B. C. 454 or 453], passed, happily for his contemporaries, without affording any matter for the historian; and this pause was followed by a five years' truce [with Sparta], in the course of which Cimon embarked in his last expedition, and died near the scene of his ancient glory. The pretender Amyrtæus had solicited succour from the Athenians. … Cimon was appointed to the command of a fleet of 200 galleys, with which he sailed to Cyprus, and sent a squadron of 60 to the assistance of Amyrtæus, while he himself with the rest laid siege to Citium. Here he was carried off by illness, or the consequences of a wound; and the armament was soon after compelled, by want of provisions, to raise the siege. But Cymon's spirit still animated his countrymen, who, when they had sailed away with his remains, fell in with a great fleet of Phoenician and Cilician galleys, near the Cyprian Salamis, and, having completely defeated them, followed up their naval victory with another which they gained on shore, either over the troops which had landed from the enemy's ships, or over a land force by which they were supported. After this they were joined by the squadron which had been sent to Egypt, and which returned, it would appear, without having achieved any material object, and all sailed home (B. C. 449). In after-times Cimon's military renown was enhanced by the report of a peace [sometimes called the Peace of Cimon, and sometimes the Peace of Callias], which his victories had compelled the Persian king to conclude on terms most humiliating to the monarchy. Within less than a century after his death it was, if not commonly believed, confidently asserted, that by this treaty, negotiated, as it was supposed, by Callias, son of Hipponicus, the Persians had agreed to abandon at least the military occupation of Asia Minor, to the distance of three days journey on foot, or one on horseback, from the coast, or, according to another account, the whole peninsula west of the Halys, and to abstain from passing the mouth of the Bosphorus and the Chelidonian islands, on the coast of Lycia, or the town of Phaselis, into the Western Sea. The mere silence of Thucydides on so important a transaction would be enough to render the whole account extremely suspicious."

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 17 (volume 3).

Mr. Grote accepts the Peace of Cimon as an historical fact; Professor Curtius rejects it.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 45 (volume 5).

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2).

ATHENS: B. C. 458-456. War for Megara with Corinth and Ægina. Victories of Myronides. Siege and conquest of Ægina. Collision with the Spartans in Bœotia. Defeat at Tanagra. Overthrow of the Thebans. Recovered Ascendency.

See GREECE: B. C. 458-456.

ATHENS: B. C. 449-445. Hostile revolution in Bœotia. Defeat at Coroneia. Revolt of Eubœa and Megara. The thirty years' truce. Territorial losses. Spartan recognition of the Delian Confederacy.

See GREECE: B. C. 449-445.

ATHENS: B. C. 445-431. Supremacy of Pericles and the popular arts by which he attained it. The splendor of Athens and grandeur of the Athenian Empire under his rule.

"The conclusion of peace left the Athenians to their confederacy and their internal politics. … After the death of Cimon the oligarchical party at Athens had been led by Thucydides, the son of Melesias, a man of high character and a kinsman of Cimon. … Hitherto the members had sat here or there in the assembly as they pleased; now they were combined into a single body, and sat in a special place. Such a consolidation was doubtless needed if the party was to hold its own against Pericles, who was rapidly carrying all before him. For years past he had provided a subsistence for many of the poorer citizens by means of his numerous colonies—no fewer than 5,000 Athenians must have been sent out to the 'cleruchies' in the interval between 453 B. C. and 444 B. C. The new system of juries [See DICASTERIA] had also been established on the fall of the Areopagus, and the jurymen were paid—a second source of income to the poor. Such measures were beyond anything that the private liberality of Cimon—splendid as it was—could achieve; and on Cimon's death no other aristocrat came forward to aid his party with his purse. Pericles did not stop here. Since the cessation of the war with Persia there had been fewer drafts on the public purse, and the contributions of the allies were accumulating in the public treasury. A scrupulous man would have regarded the surplus as the money of the allies. … Pericles took another view. He plainly told the Athenians that so long as the city fulfilled the contract made with the allied cities, and kept Persian vessels from their shores, the surplus was at the disposal of Athens. Acting on this principle, he devoted a part of it to the embellishment of the city. With the aid of Pheidias, the sculptor, and Ictinus, the architect, a new temple began to rise on the Acropolis in honour of Athena—the celebrated Parthenon or 'Virgin's Chamber' [See PARTHENON]. … Other public buildings were also begun about this time. Athens was in fact a vast workshop, in which employment was found for a great number of citizens. Nor was this all. … For eight months of the year 60 ships were kept at sea with crews on board, in order that there might be an ample supply of practical seamen. … Thus by direct or indirect means Pericles made the state the paymaster of a vast number of citizens, and the state was practically himself, with these paid citizens at his back. At the same time the public festivals of the city were enlarged and adorned with new splendour. … That all might attend the theatre in which the plays were acted, Pericles provided that every citizen should receive from the state a sum sufficient to pay the charge demanded from the spectators by the lessee [See DIOBOLY]. We may look on these measures as the arts of a demagogue. … Or we may say that Pericles was able to gratify his passion for art at the expense of the Athenians and their allies. {161} Neither of these views is altogether untenable; and both are far from including the whole truth. Pericles … was, if we please to say it, a demagogue and a connoisseur. But he was something more. Looking at the whole evidence before us with impartial eyes, we cannot refuse to acknowledge that he cherished aspirations worthy of a great statesman. He sincerely desired that every Athenian should owe to his city the blessing of an education in all that was beautiful, and the opportunity of a happy and useful life. … The oligarchs determined to pull down Pericles, if it were possible. … They proposed, in the winter of 445 B. C., that there should be an ostracism in the city. The people agreed, and the usual arrangements were made. But when the day came for decision, in the spring of 444 B. C., the sentence fell, not on Pericles, but on Thucydides. The sentence left no doubt about the feeling of the Athenian people, and it was accepted as final. Thucydides disappeared from Athens, and for the next fifteen years Pericles was master of the city. … While Athens was active, organizing her confederacy and securing her communication with the north, the Peloponnesians had allowed the years to pass in apathy and inattention. At length they awoke to a sense of the situation. It was clear that Athens had abandoned all idea of war with Persia, and that the confederacy of Delos was transformed into an Athenian empire, of whose forces the great city was absolutely mistress. And meanwhile in visible greatness Athens had become far the first city in Greece."

E. Abbott, Pericles, chapters 10-11.

"A rapid glance will suffice to show the eminence which Athens had attained over the other states of Greece. She was the head of the Ionian League—the mistress of the Grecian seas; with Sparta, the sole rival that could cope with her armies and arrest her ambition, she had obtained a peace; Corinth was Humbled—Ægina ruined—Megara had shrunk into her dependency and garrison. The states of Bœotia had received their very constitution from the hands of an Athenian general—the democracies planted by Athens served to make liberty itself subservient to her will, and involved in her safety. She had remedied the sterility of her own soil by securing the rich pastures of the neighbouring Eubœa. She had added the gold of Thasos to the silver of Laurion, and established a footing in Thessaly which was at once a fortress against the Asiatic arms and a mart for Asiatic commerce. The fairest lands of the opposite coast—the most powerful islands of the Grecian seas—contributed to her treasury, or were almost legally subjected to her revenge. … In all Greece, Myronides was perhaps the ablest general—Pericles … was undoubtedly the most highly educated, cautious and commanding statesman. … In actual possession of the tribute of her allies, Athens acquired a new right to its collection and its management, and while she devoted some of the treasures to the maintenance of her strength, she began early to uphold the prerogative of appropriating a part to the enhancement of her splendour. … It was now [about B. C. 444] resolved to make Athens also the seat and centre of the judicial authority. The subject-allies were compelled, if not on minor, at least on all important cases, resort to Athenian courts of law for justice. And thus Athens became, as it were, the metropolis of the allies. … Before the Persian war, and even scarcely before the time of Cimon, Athens cannot be said to have eclipsed her neighbours in the arts and sciences. She became the centre and capital of the most polished communities of Greece, and she drew into a focus all the Grecian intellect; she obtained from her dependents the wealth to administer the arts, which universal traffic and intercourse taught her to appreciate; and thus the Odeon, and the Parthenon, and the Propylæa arose. During the same administration, the fortifications were completed, and a third wall, parallel and near to that uniting Piræus with Athens, consummated the works of Themistocles and Cimon, and preserved the communication between the two-fold city, even should the outer walls fall into the hands of an enemy."