Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 64)

C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, chapter 18, section 10.

ALSO IN: F. Schiller, History of the Thirty Years' War, book 4.

J. Mitchell, Life of Wallenstein, chapters 8-10.

Sir E. Cust, Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War, part 1.

GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639. The Thirty Years War: Successes of the Imperialists. Their victory at Nördlingen. Richelieu and France become active in the war. Duke Bernhard's conquest of Alsace. Richelieu's appropriation of the conquest for France.

"Want of union among the Protestants prevented them from deriving all the benefit which they had at first anticipated from Wallenstein's death. The King of Hungary assumed the command of the army, and by the aid of money, which was plentifully distributed, the soldiers were, without difficulty, kept in obedience; not the slightest attempt was any where made to resist the Emperor's orders. On the other hand, Bernhard of Weimar and Field-Marshal Horn were masters of Bavaria. In July 1634, they gained a complete victory at Landshut, over General Altringer, who was slain in the action. … The Swedes, who had so long been victorious, were, in their turn, destined to taste the bitterness of defeat. 15,000 Spaniards, under the Cardinal Infant, son of Philip III., entered Germany [see NETHERLANDS: A.D. 1621-1633, and 1635-1638], and in conjunction with the imperial army, under the King of Hungary, laid siege to Nördlingen. Field-Marshal Horn, and Bernhard of Weimar, hurried to the relief of the place. Owing to the superiority of the enemy, who was besides strongly intrenched, the Swedish commanders had no intention to hazard a battle, before the arrival of the Rhin-graff Count Otho, with another division of the army, which was already close at hand; but the impetuosity of the Duke of Weimar lost every thing. {1480} Horn had succeeded in carrying a hill, called the Amsberg, a strong point, which placed him in communication with the town, and almost secured the victory. Bernhard, thinking that so favourable an opening should not be neglected, hurried on to the attack of another post. It was taken and retaken; both armies were gradually, and without method, drawn into the combat, which, after eight hours' duration, ended in the complete defeat of the Swedes. Horn was made prisoner; and Bernhard escaped on a borrowed horse. … The defeat of' Nördlingen almost ruined the Swedish cause in Germany; the spell of invincibility was gone, and the effects of the panic far surpassed those which the sword had produced. Strong fortresses were abandoned before the enemy came in sight; provinces were evacuated, and armies, that had been deemed almost inconquerable, deserted their chiefs, and broke into bands of lawless robbers, who pillaged their way in every direction. Bavaria, Suabia and Franconia were lost; and it was only behind the Rhine that the scattered fugitives could again be brought into something like order. … The Emperor refused to grant the Swedes any other terms of peace than permission to retire from the empire. The Elector of Saxony, forgetful of what was due to his religion, and forgetful of all that Sweden had done for his country, concluded, at Prague, a separate peace with the Emperor; and soon afterwards joined the Imperialists against his former allies. The fortunes of the Protestants would have sunk beneath this additional blow, had not France come to their aid. Richelieu had before only nourished the war by means of subsidies, and had, at one time, become nearly as jealous of the Swedes as of the Austrians; but no sooner was their power broken, than the crafty priest took an active share in the contest."

J. Mitchell, Life of Wallenstein, chapter 10.

"Richelieu entered resolutely into the contest, and in 1635 displayed enormous diplomatic activity. He wished not only to reduce Austria, but, at the same time, Spain. Spanish soldiers, Spanish treasure, and Spanish generals made in great part the strength of the imperial armies, and Spain besides never ceased to ferment internal troubles in France. Richelieu signed the treaty of Compiegne with the Swedes against Ferdinand II. By its conditions he granted them considerable subsidies in order that they should continue the war in Germany. He made the treaty of St. Germain en Laye with Bernard of Saxe Weimar, to whom he promised an annual allowance of money as well as Alsace, provided that he should remain in arms to wrest Franche-Comté from Philip IV. He made the treaty of Paris with the Dutch, who were to help the King of France to conquer Flanders, which was to be divided between France and the United Provinces. He made the treaty of Rivoli with the dukes of Savoy, of Parma, and of Mantua, who were to undertake in concert with France the invasion of the territories of Milan and to receive a portion of the spoils of Spain. At the same time he declared war against the Spanish Government, which had arrested and imprisoned the Elector of Trèves, the ally of France, and refused to surrender him when demanded. Hostilities immediately began on five different theatres of war—in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, in Eastern Germany, in Italy, and in Spain. The army of the Rhine, commanded by Cardinal de la Valette, was to operate in conjunction with the corps of Bernard of Saxe Weimar against the Imperialists, commanded by Count Gallas. To this army Turenne was attached. It consisted of 20,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 14 guns. This was the army upon which Richelieu mainly relied. … Valette was to annoy the enemy without exposing himself, and was not to approach the Rhine; but induced by Bernard, who had a dashing spirit and wished to reconquer all he had lost, encouraged by the terror of the Imperialists who raised the siege of Mayence, he determined to pass the river. He was not long in repenting of that step. He established his troops round Mayence and revictualled this place, which was occupied by a Swedish garrison, throwing in all the supplies of which the town had need. The Imperialists, who had calculated on this imprudence, immediately took to cutting off his supplies, so that soon everything was wanting in the French camp. … The scourge of famine threatened the French: it was necessary to retreat, to recross the Rhine, to pass the Sarre, and seek a refuge at Metz. Few retreats have been so difficult and so sad. The army was in such a pitiable condition that round Mayence the men had to be fed with roots and green grapes, and the horses with branches of trees. … The sick and the weary were abandoned, the guns were buried, villages were burnt to stay the pursuit of the enemy, and to prevent the wretched soldiers who would fall out of the ranks from taking refuge in them."

H. M. Hozier, Turenne, chapter 2.

"Meanwhile, Saxony had concluded with the Emperor at Pirna, at the close of 1634, a convention which ripened into a treaty of alliance, to which almost all the princes of Northern Germany subscribed, at Prague, in the month of May following. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were thus changed into enemies of Sweden. The Swedish General, Banner [or Baner], who, at the period of the battle of Nördlingen, had been encamped side by side with the Saxon army on the White Hill near Prague, had, on the first indication of wavering on the part of its Elector, managed skilfully to withdraw his troops from the dangerous proximity. On the 22nd October 1635, he defeated the Saxon army, at Dömitz on the Elbe, then invaded Brandenburg, took Havelberg, and even threatened Berlin. Compelled by the approach of a Saxon and Imperialist army to quit his prey, he turned and beat the combined army at Wittstock (24th September 1636). After that battle, he drew the reinforced Imperialists, commanded by Gallas, after him into Pomerania; there he caused them great losses by cutting off their supplies, then forced them back into Saxony, and, following them up closely, attacked and beat them badly at Chemnitz (4th April, 1639)." In the south, Duke Bernhard had gained meantime some solid successes. After his retreat from Mayence, in 1635, he had concluded his secret treaty with Richelieu, placing himself wholly at the service of France, and receiving the promise of 4,000,000 francs yearly, for the support of his army, and the ultimate sovereignty of Alsace for himself. "Having concerted measures with La Valette [1636], … he invaded Lorraine, drove the enemy thence, taking Saarburg and Pfalzburg, and then, entering Alsace, took Saverne. His career of conquest in Alsace was checked by the invasion of Burgundy by Gallas, with an army of 40,000 men. {1481} Duke Bernhard marched with all haste to Dijon, and forced Gallas to fall back, with great loss, beyond the Saone (November 1636). Pursuing his advantages, early the following year he forced the passage of the Saone at Gray, despite the vivid resistance of Prince Charles of Lorraine (June 1637), and pursued that commander as far as Besançon. Reinforced during the autumn, he marched towards the Upper Rhine, and, undertaking a winter campaign, captured Lauffenburg, after a skirmish with John of Werth; then Säckingen and Waldshut, and laid siege to Rheinfelden. The Imperialist army, led by John of Werth, succeeded, indeed, after a very hot encounter, in relieving that place; but three days later Duke Bernhard attacked and completely defeated it (21st February 1638), taking prisoners not only John of Werth himself, but the generals, Savelli, Enkefort, and Sperreuter. The consequences of this victory were the fall of Rheinfelden, Rötteln, Neuenberg, and Freiburg. Duke Bernhard then laid siege to Breisach (July 1638). … The Imperial general, Götz, advanced at the head of a force considerably outnumbering that of Duke Bernhard. Leaving a portion of his army before the place, Duke Bernhard then drew to himself Turenne, who was lying in the vicinity with 3,000 men, fell upon the Imperialists at Wittenweiher (30th July), completely defeated them, and captured their whole convoy. Another Imperialist army, led by the Duke of Lorraine in person, shared a similar fate at Thann, in the Sundgau, on the 4th October following. Götz, who was hastening with a strengthened army to support the Duke of Lorraine, attacked Duke Bernhard ten days later, but was repulsed with great loss. Breisach capitulated on the 7th December. Duke Bernhard took possession of it in his own name, and foiled all the efforts of Richelieu to secure it for France, by garrisoning it with German soldiers. To compensate the French Cardinal Minister for Breisach, Duke Bernhard undertook a winter campaign to drive the Imperialists from Franche-Comté. Entering that province at the end of December, he speedily made himself master of its richest part. He then returned to Alsace with the resolution to cross the Rhine and carry the war once again into Bavaria," and then, in junction with Banner, to Vienna. "He had made all the necessary preparations for this enterprise, had actually sent his army across the Rhine, when he died very suddenly, not without suspicion of poison, at Neuberg am Rhein (8th July, 1639). The lands he had conquered he bequeathed to his brother. … But Richelieu paid no attention to the wishes of the dead general. Before any of the family could interfere, he had secured all the fortresses in Alsace, even Breisach, which was its key, for France."

G. B. Malleson, The Battle-fields of Germany, chapter 5.

"During [1639] Piccolomini, at the head of the Imperialist and Spanish troops, gave battle to the French at Diedenhofen. The battle took place on the 7th of June, and the French were beaten and suffered great losses."

A. Gindely, History of the Thirty Years' War, chapter 8.

ALSO IN: Sir E. Cust, Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War, part 2.

S. R. Gardiner, The Thirty Years' War, chapter 9, section 5.

GERMANY: A. D. 1635-1638. The Thirty Years War: Campaigns in the Netherlands. The Dutch and French against the Spaniards.

See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1635-1638.

GERMANY: A. D. 1636-1637. Diet at Ratisbon. Attempted negotiations of peace. Death of the Emperor Ferdinand II

"An electoral diet was assembled at Ratisbon, by the emperor in person, on the 15th of September, 1636, for the ostensible purpose of restoring peace, for which some vague negotiations had been opened under the mediation of the pope and the king of Denmark, and congresses appointed at Hamburgh and Cologne; but with the real view of procuring the election of his son Ferdinand as king of the Romans. … Ferdinand was elected with only the fruitless protest of the Palatine family, and the dissenting voice of the elector of Treves. … The emperor did not long survive this happy event. He died on the 15th of February, 1637. … Ferdinand … seems to have been the first who formally established the right of primogeniture in all his hereditary territories. By his testament, dated May 10th. 1621, he ordered that all his Austrian dominions should devolve on his eldest male descendant, and fixed the majority at 18 years."

W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 56 (volume 2).

GERMANY: A. D. 1637. Election of the Emperor Ferdinand III.

GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645. The Thirty Years War: Campaigns of Baner and Torstenson. The second Breitenfeld. Jankowitz. Mergentheim. Allerheim. War in Denmark. Swedish army in Austria. Saxony forced to neutrality.

"The war still went on for eight years, but the only influence that it exerted upon the subsequent Peace was that it overcame the last doubts of the Imperial court as to the indispensable principles of the Peace. … The first event of importance on the theatre of war after Bernhard's death was Baner's attempt to join the army of Weimar in central Germany. Not in a condition to pass the winter in Bohemia, and threatened in Saxony and Silesia, he … commenced [March, 1640] a retreat amidst fearful devastations, crossed the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and arrived April 3rd at Zwickau. He succeeded in joining with the mercenaries of Weimar and the troops of Lüneburg and Hesse at Saalfeld;" but no joint action was found possible. "Until December, the war on both sides consisted of marches hither and thither, accompanied with horrible devastation; but nothing decisive occurred. In September the Diet met at Ratisbon. While wearisome attempts were being made to bend the obstinacy of Austria, Baner resolved to compel her to yield by a bold stroke, to invade the Upper Palatinate, to surprise Ratisbon, and to put an end to the Diet and Emperor together. … Not without difficulty Guebriant [commanding the French in Alsace] was induced to follow, and to join Baner at Erfurt. … But the surprise of Ratisbon was a failure. … The armies now separated again. Baner exhausted his powers of persuasion in vain to induce Guebriant to go with him. The French went westward. Hard pressed himself, Baner proceeded by forced marches towards Bohemia, and by the end of March reached Zwickau, where he met Guebriant again, and they had a sharp conflict with the Imperialists on the Saal. There Baner died, on the 21st of May, 1641, leaving his army in a most critical condition, The warfare of the Swedish-French arms was come to a standstill. {1482} Both armies were near dissolution, when, in November, Torstenson, the last of the Gustavus Adolphus school of generals, and the one who most nearly equalled the master, appeared with the Swedish army, and by a few vigorous strokes, which followed each other with unexampled rapidity, restored the supremacy of its arms. … After three months of rest, which he mainly devoted to the reorganization and payment of his army, by the middle of January [1642] he had advanced towards the Elbe and the Altmark; and as the Imperial forces were weakened by sending troops to the Rhine, he formed the great project of proceeding through Silesia to the Austrian hereditary dominions. On April 3rd he crossed the Elbe at Werben, between the Imperial troops, increased his army to 20,000 men, stormed Glogau on May 4th, stood before Schweidnitz on the 30th, and defeated Francis Albert of Lauenburg; Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Oppeln fell into his hands. Meanwhile Guebriant, after subduing the defiant and mutinous spirit of his troops by means of money and promises, had, on January 17th, defeated the Imperialists near Kempen, not far from Crefeld [at Hulst], for which he was honoured with the dignity of marshal. But this was a short-lived gleam of light, and was soon followed by dark days, occasioned by want of money and discontent in the camp. … He had turned eastward from the Rhine to seek quarters for his murmuring troops in nether Germany, when Torstenson effected a decision in Saxony. After relieving Glogau, and having in vain tried to enter Bohemia, he had joined the detachments of Königsmark and Wrangel, and on October 30th he appeared before Leipzig. On November 2nd there was a battle near Breitenfeld, which ended in a disastrous defeat of the Imperialists and Leipzig surrendered to Torstenson three weeks afterwards. In spite of all the advantages which Torstenson gained for himself, it never came to a united action with the French; and the first victory won by the French in the Netherlands, in May, 1643, did not alter this state of things. Torstenson … was suddenly called to a remote scene of war in the north. King Christian IV. of Denmark had been persuaded, by means of the old Danish jealousy of Sweden, to take up arms for the Emperor. He declared war just as Torstenson was proceeding to Austria. Vienna was now saved; but so much the worse for Denmark. In forced marches, which were justly admired, Torstenson set out from Silesia towards Denmark at the end of October, conducted a masterly campaign against the Danes, beat them wherever he met with them, conquered Holstein and Schleswig, pushed on to Jutland, then, while Wrangel and Horn carried on the war (till the peace of Brömsebro, August, 1645), he returned and again took up the war against the Imperialists, everywhere an unvanquished general. The Imperialists under the incompetent Gallas intended to give Denmark breathing-time by creating a diversion; but it did not save Denmark, and brought another defeat upon themselves. Gallas did not bring back more than 2,000 men from Magdeburg to Bohemia, and they were in a very disorganized state. He was pursued by Torstenson, while Ragoczy threatened Hungary. The Emperor hastily collected what forces he could command, and resolved to give battle. Torstenson had advanced as far as Glattau in February, and on March 6th, 1645, a battle was fought near Jankowitz, three miles from Tabor. It was the most brilliant victory ever gained by the Swedes. The Imperial army was cut to pieces; several of its leaders imprisoned or killed. In a few weeks Torstenson conquered Moravia and Austria as far as the Danube. Not far from the capital itself he took possession of the Wolfsbrücke. As in 1618, Vienna was in great danger." But the ill-success of the French "always counterbalanced the Swedes' advantages. Either they were beaten just as the Swedes were victorious, or could not turn a victory to account. So it was during this year [1645]. The west frontier of the empire was guarded on the imperial side by Mercy, together with John of Werth, after he was liberated from prison. On 26th March, Turenne crossed the Rhine, and advanced towards Franconia. There he encamped near Mergentheim and Rosenberg. On 5th May, a battle near Mergentheim ended with the entire defeat of the French, and Turenne escaped with the greatest difficulty by way of Hammelburg, towards Fulda. The victors pushed on to the Rhine. To avenge this defeat, Enghien was sent from Paris, and, at the beginning of July, arrived at Spires, with 12,000 men. His forces, together with Königsmark's, the remnant of Turenne's and the Hessians, amounted to 30,000 men. At first Mercy dexterously avoided a battle under unfavourable circumstances, but on August 3d the contest was inevitable. A bloody battle was fought between Nördlingen and Donauwörth, near Allerheim [called the battle of Nordlingen, by the French], which was long doubtful, but, after tremendous losses, resulted in the victory of the French. Mercy's fall, Werth's imprudent advance, and a final brave assault of the Hessians, decided the day. But the victors were so weakened that they could not fully take advantage of it. Condé was ill; and in the autumn Turenne was compelled, not without perceptible damage to the cause, to retreat with his army to the Neckar and the Rhine. Neither had Torstenson been able to maintain his position in Austria. He had been obliged to raise the siege of Brunn, and learnt at the same time that Ragoczy had just made peace with the Emperor. Obliged to retire to Bohemia, he found his forces considerably diminished. Meanwhile, Kônigsmark had won an important advantage. While Torstenson was in Austria he gained a firm footing in Saxony. Then came the news of Allerheim, and of the peace of Brömsebro. Except Dresden and Königstein, all the important points were in the hands of the Swedes; so, on the 6th of September [1645], the Elector John George concluded a treaty of neutrality for six months. Besides money and supplies, the Swedes received Leipzig, Torgau, and the right of passage through the country. Meanwhile, Torstenson had retreated into the north-east of Bohemia, and severe physical sufferings compelled him to give up the command. He was succeeded by Charles Gustavus Wrangel."

L. Hausser, The Period of the Reformation, 1517 to 1648, chapter 39.

ALSO IN: W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 58 (volume 2).

GERMANY: A. D. 1642-1643. The Thirty Years War: Condé's victory at Rocroi and campaign on the Moselle.

See FRANCE: A.D. 1642-1648, and 1643.

{1483}

GERMANY: A. D. 1643-1644. The Thirty Years War: Campaigns of Turenne and Condé against Merci, on the Upper Rhine. Dütlingen. Freiburg. Philipsburg.

"After the death of Bernard of Saxe Weimar, Marshal Guébriant had been placed in command of the troops of Weimar. He had besieged and taken Rottweil in Suabia, but had there been killed. Rantzau, who succeeded him in command of the Weimar army, marched (24-25 November, 1643) upon Dütlingen [or Tuttlingen], on the Upper Rhine, was there beaten by Mercy and made prisoner, with the loss of many officers and 7,000 soldiers. This was a great triumph for the Bavarians; a terrible disaster for France. The whole of the German infantry in the French service was dispersed or taken, the cavalry retreated as they best could upon the Rhine. … Circumstances required active measures. Plenipotentiaries had just assembled at Münster to begin the negotiations which ended with the peace of Westphalia. It was desired that the French Government should support the French diplomatist by quick successes. … Turenne was sent to the Rhine with reinforcements. … He re-established discipline, and breathed into [the army] a new spirit. … At the same time, by negotiations, the prisoners who had been taken at Dütlingen were restored to France, the gaps in the ranks were filled up, and in the spring of 1644 Turenne found himself at the head of 9,000 men, of whom 5,000 were cavalry, and was in a position to take the field." He "pushed through the Black Forest, and near the source of the Danube gained a success over a Bavarian detachment. For some reason which is not clear he threw a garrison into Freiburg, and retired across the Rhine. Had he remained near the town he would have prevented Mercy from investing it. So soon as Turenne was over the river, Mercy besieged Freiburg, and although Turenne advanced to relieve the place, a stupid error of some of his infantry made him fail, and Freiburg capitulated to Mercy."

H. M. Hozier, Turenne, chapter 3 and 5.

"Affairs being in so bad a state about the Black Forest, the Great Condé, at that time Duc d'Enghien, was brought up, with 10,000 men; thus raising the French to a number above the enemy's. He came crowned with the immortal laurels of Rocroi; and in virtue of his birth, as a prince of the blood-royal, took precedence of the highest officers in the service. Merci, a capable and daring general, aware of his inferiority, now posted himself a short distance from Freyburg, in a position almost inaccessible. He garnished it with felled trees and intrenchments, mountains, woods, and marshes, which of themselves defied attack." Turenne advocated a flank movement, instead of a direct assault upon Merci's position; but Condé, reckless of his soldiers' lives, persisted in leading them against the enemy's works. "A terrible action ensued (August 3, 1644). Turenne made a long detour through a defile; Condé, awaiting his arrival on the ground, postponed the assault till three hours before sunset, and then ascended the steep. Merci had the worse, and retreated to a fresh position on the Black Mountain, where he successfully repulsed for one day Condé's columns (August 5). In this action Gaspard Merci was killed. Condé now adopted the flank movement, which, originally recommended by Turenne, would have saved much bloodshed; and Merci, hard pressed, escaped by a rapid retreat, leaving behind him his artillery and baggage (August 9). These are the 'three days of Freyburg.' To retake the captured Freyburg after their victory … was the natural suggestion first heard." But Turenne persuaded Condé that the reduction of Philipsburg was more important. "Philipsburg was taken after a short siege; and its fall was accompanied by the submission of the adjacent towns of Germersheim, Speier, Worms, Mentz, Oppenheim and Landau. Condé at this conjuncture left the Upper Rhine, and took away his regiments with him."

T. O. Cockayne, Life of Turenne, pages 20-22.

ALSO IN: G. B. Malleson, The Battle-fields of Germany, chapter 6.

GERMANY: A. D. 1646-1648. The Thirty Years War: Its final campaigns. The sufferings of Bavaria. Truce and peace negotiations initiated by the Elector Maximilian. The ending of the war at Prague.

"The retreat of the French [after the battle of Allerheim] enabled the enemy to turn his whole force upon the Swedes in Bohemia. Gustavus Wrangel, no unworthy successor of Banner and Torstensohn, had, in 1646, been appointed Commander-in-chief of the Swedish army. … The Archduke, after reinforcing his army … moved against Wrangel, in the hope of being able to overwhelm him by his superior force before Koenigsmark could join him, or the French effect a diversion in his favour. Wrangel, however, did not await him." He moved through Upper Saxony and Hesse, to Weimar, where he was joined by the flying corps of Koenigsmark. Finally, after much delay, he was joined likewise by Turenne and the French. "The junction took place at Giessen, and they now felt themselves strong enough to meet the enemy. The latter had followed the Swedes into Hesse, in order to intercept their commissariat, and to prevent their union with Turenne. In both designs they had been unsuccessful; and the Imperialists now saw themselves cut off from the Maine, and exposed to great scarcity and want from the loss of their magazines. Wrangel took advantage of their weakness to execute a plan by which he hoped to give a new turn to the war. … He determined to follow the course of the Danube, and to break into the Austrian territories through the midst of Bavaria. … He moved hastily, … defeated a Bavarian corps near Donauwerth, and passed that river, as well as the Lech, unopposed. But by wasting his time in the unsuccessful siege of Augsburg, he gave opportunity to the Imperialists, not only to relieve that city, but also to repulse him as far as Lauingen. No sooner, however, had they turned towards Suabia, with a view to remove the war from Bavaria, than, seizing the opportunity, he repassed the Lech, and guarded the passage of it against the Imperialists themselves. Bavaria now lay open and defenceless before him; the French and Swedes quickly overran it; and the soldiery indemnified themselves for all dangers by frightful outrages, robberies, and extortions. The arrival of the Imperial troops, who at last succeeded in passing the Lech at Thierhaupten, only increased the misery of this country, which friend and foe indiscriminately plundered. And now, for the first time during the whole course of this war, the courage of Maximilian, which for eight-and-twenty years had stood unshaken amidst fearful dangers, began to waver. Ferdinand II., his school-companion at Ingolstadt, and the friend of his youth, was no more; and, with the death of his friend and benefactor, the strong tie was dissolved which had linked the Elector to the House of Austria. … {1484} Accordingly, the motives which the artifices of France now put in operation, in order to detach him from the Austrian alliance, and to induce him to lay down his arms, were drawn entirely from political considerations. … The Elector of Bavaria was unfortunately led to believe that the Spaniards alone were disinclined to peace, and that nothing but Spanish influence had induced the Emperor so long to resist a cessation of hostilities. Maximilian detested the Spaniards, and could never forgive their having opposed his application for the Palatine Electorate. … All doubts disappeared; and, convinced of the necessity of this step, he thought he should sufficiently discharge his obligations to the Emperor if he invited him also to share in the benefit of the truce. The deputies of the three crowns, and of Bavaria, met at Ulm, to adjust the conditions. But it was soon evident, from the instructions of the Austrian ambassador, that it was not the intention of the Emperor to second the conclusion of a truce, but if possible· to prevent it. … The good intentions of the Elector of Bavaria, to include the Emperor in the benefit of the truce, having been thus rendered unavailing, he felt himself justified in providing for his own safety. … He agreed to the Swedes extending their quarters in Suabia and Franconia, and to his own being restricted to Bavaria and the Palatinate. The conquests which he had made in Suabia were ceded to the allies, who, on their part, restored to him what they had taken from Bavaria. Cologne and Hesse Cassel were also included in the truce. After the conclusion of this treaty, upon the 14th March, 1647, the French and Swedes left Bavaria. … Turenne, according to agreement, marched into Wurtemburg, where he forced the Landgrave of Darmstadt and the Elector of Mentz to imitate the example of Bavaria, and to embrace the neutrality. And now, at last, France seemed to have attained the great object of its policy, that of depriving the Emperor of the support of the League, and of his Protestant allies. … But … after a brief crisis, the fallen power of Austria rose again to a formidable strength. The jealousy which France entertained of Sweden, prevented it from permitting the total ruin of the Emperor, or allowing the Swedes to obtain such a preponderance in Germany, which might have been destructive to France herself. Accordingly, the French minister declined to take advantage of the distresses of Austria; and the army of Turenne, separating from that of Wrangel, retired to the frontiers of the Netherlands. Wrangel, indeed, after moving from Suabia into Franconia, taking Schweinfurt, … attempted to make his way into Bohemia, and laid siege to Egra, the key of that kingdom. To relieve this fortress, the Emperor, put his last army in motion, and placed himself at its head. But … on his arrival Egra was already taken." Meantime the Emperor had engaged in intrigues with the Bavarian officers and had nearly seduced the whole army of the Elector. The latter discovered this conspiracy in time to thwart it; but he now suddenly, on his own behalf, struck hands with the Emperor again, and threw over his late agreements with the Swedes and French. "He had not derived from the truce the advantages he expected. Far from tending to accelerate a general peace, it had a pernicious influence upon the negociations at Munster and Osnaburg, and had made the allies bolder in their demands." Maximilian, therefore, renounced the truce and began hostilities anew. "This resolution, and the assistance which he immediately despatched to the Emperor in Bohemia, threatened materially to injure the Swedes, and Wrangel was compelled in haste to evacuate that kingdom. He retired through Thuringia into Westphalia and Lunenburg, in the hope of forming a junction with the French army under Turenne, while the Imperial and Bavarian army followed him to the Weser, under Melander and Gronsfeld. His ruin was inevitable if the enemy should overtake him before his junction with Turenne; but the same consideration which had just saved the Emperor now proved the salvation of the Swedes. … The Elector of Bavaria could not allow the Emperor to obtain so decisive a preponderance as, by the sudden alteration of affairs, might delay the chances of a general peace. … Now that the power of the Emperor threatened once more to attain a dangerous superiority, Maximilian at once ceased to pursue the Swedes. … Melander, prevented by the Bavarians from further pursuing Wrangel, crossed by Jena and Erfurt into Hesse. … In this exhausted country, his army was oppressed by want, while Wrangel was recruiting his strength, and remounting his cavalry in Lunenburg. Too weak to maintain his wretched quarters against the Swedish general, when he opened the campaign in the winter of 1648, and marched against Hesse, he was obliged to retire with disgrace, and take refuge on the banks of the Danube. … Turenne received permission to join the Swedes; and the last campaign of this eventful war was now opened by the united armies. Driving Melander before them along the Danube, they threw supplies into Egra, which was besieged by the Imperialists, and defeated the Imperial and Bavarian armies on the Danube, which ventured to oppose them at Susmarshausen, where Melander was mortally wounded." They then forced a passage of the Lech, at the point where Gustavus Adolphus formerly overcame Tilly, and ravaged Bavaria once more; while nothing but a prolonged rain-storm, which flooded the Inn, saved Austria from a similar devastation. Koenigsmark, with his flying corps, entered Bohemia, penetrated to Prague and surprised and captured the lesser side of the city (the Kleinsite), thus acquiring the reputation of "closing the Thirty Years' War by the last brilliant achievement. This decisive stroke, which vanquished the Emperor's irresolution, cost the Swedes only the loss of a single man. But the old town, the larger half of Prague, which is divided into two parts by the Moldau, by its vigorous resistance wearied out the efforts of the Palatine, Charles Gustavus, the successor of Christina on the throne, who had arrived from Sweden with fresh troops. … The approach of winter at last drove the besiegers into their quarters, and in the meantime the intelligence arrived that a peace had been signed at Munster, on the 24th October,"—the "solemn and ever memorable and sacred treaty which is known by the name of the Peace of Westphalia."

F. Schiller, History of the Thirty Years' War, book 5.

ALSO IN: G. B. Malleson, The Battle-fields of Germany, chapter 7.

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GERMANY: The Thirty Years War: Its horrors. Its destructiveness. The state of the country at its close.

"The materials of which the armies were composed passed inevitably from bad to worse. This, which had been a civil war at the first, did not continue such for long; or rather it united presently all the dreadfulness of a civil war and a foreign. It was not long before the hosts which trampled the German soil had in large part ceased to be German; every region of Europe sending of its children, and, as it would seem, of those whom it must have been gladdest to be rid of, to swell the ranks of the destroyers. … From all quarters they came trooping, not singly, but in whole battalions. … All armies draw after them a train of camp-followers; they are a plague which in the very nature of things is inevitable. But never perhaps did this evil rise to so enormous a height as now. Toward the close of this War an Imperial army of 40,000 men was found to be attended by the ugly accompaniment of 140,000 of these. The conflict had in fact by this time lasted so long that the soldiery had become as a distinct nation, camping in the midst of another; and the march of an army like the migration of some wild nomade horde, moving with wives and children through the land. And not with these only. There were others too in its train, as may easily be supposed. … It is a thought to make one shudder, the passage of one of these armies with its foul retinue through some fair and smiling and well-ordered region—what it found, and what it must have left it, and what its doings there will have been. Bear in mind that there was seldom in these armies any attempt whatever at a regular commissariat; rations being never issued except to the actual soldiers, and most irregularly to them; that the soldier's pay too was almost always enormously in arrear, so that he could not purchase even if he would. … It was indeed the bitterest irony of all, that this War, which claimed at the outset to be waged for the highest religious objects, for the glory of God and for the highest interests of His Church, should be signalized ere long by a more shameless treading under foot of all laws human and divine, disgraced by worse and wickeder outrages against God, and against man, the image of God, than probably any war which modern Christendom has seen. The three master sins of our fallen nature, hate, lust, and covetousness, were all rampant to the full. … Soon it became evident that there was no safety in almost any remoteness from that which might be the scene of warfare at the actual moment. When all in their immediate neighbourhood was wasted, armed bands variously disguised, as merchants, as gipsies, as travellers, or sometimes as women, would penetrate far into the land. … Nor was the condition of the larger towns much better. … It did not need actual siege or capture to make them acquainted with the miseries of the time. With no draught-cattle to bring firewood in, there was no help for it but that abandoned houses, by degrees whole streets, and sometimes the greater part of a town, should be pulled down to prevent those of its inhabitants who remained from perishing by cold, the city thus living upon and gradually consuming itself. … Under conditions like these, it is not wonderful that the fields were left nearly or altogether untilled; for who would sow what he could never hope to reap? … What wonder that famine, thus invited, should before long have arrived? … Persons were found dead in the fields with grass in their mouths; while the tanners' and knackers' yards were beset for the putrid carcasses of beasts; the multitudes, fierce with hunger, hardly enduring to wait till the skin had been stript away. The bodies of malefactors, broken on the wheel, were secretly removed to serve for food; or men climbed up the gibbets, and tore down the bodies which were suspended there, and devoured them. This, indeed, was a supply which was not likely to fail. … Prisoners in Alsace were killed that they might be eaten. Children were enticed from home. … Putting all together, it is not too much to say that the crowning horrors of Samaria, of Jerusalem, of Saguntum, found their parallels, and often worse than their parallels, in Christian Germany only two centuries ago. I had thought at one time that there were isolated examples of these horrors, one here, one there, just enough to warrant the assertion that such things were done; but my conviction now is that they were very frequent indeed, and in almost every part of the land. … Districts which had for centuries been in the occupation of civilized men were repossessed by forests. … When Peace was at length proclaimed, and Germany had leisure to take an inventory of her losses, it was not altogether impossible to make a rude and rough estimate. … The statistics, so far as they were got together, tell a terrible tale. … Of the population it was found that three-fourths, in some parts a far larger proportion, had perished; or, not having perished, were not less effectually lost to their native land, having fled to Switzerland, to Holland, and to other countries, never to return from them again. Thus in one group of twenty villages which had not exceptionally suffered, 85 per cent., or more than four-fifths of the inhabitants, had disappeared. … Of the houses, three-fourths were destroyed. … Careful German writers assure us that there are districts which at this present day [1872] have just attained the population, the agricultural wealth, the productive powers which they had when the War commenced."

R. C. Trench, Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, and other Lectures on the Thirty Years' War, lectures 3 and 5.

See, also, BOHEMIA: A. D. 1621-1648.

GERMANY: A. D. 1648. The Peace of Westphalia. Cession of Alsace to France. Separation of Switzerland from the Empire. Loosening of the constitutional bonds of the Empire.

"The opening of the peace negotiations between the Emperor and his enemies was … fixed for the 25th of March, 1642, and the cities of Münster and Osnabrück as the places of the sitting; but neither in this year nor in the next did it take place. It was not until the year 1644 that in the former of these cities" were assembled the following: The Papal Nuncio and the envoy of the Republic of Venice, acting as mediators, two imperial ambassadors, two representatives of France, three of Spain, and the Catholic Electors; later came also the Catholic Princes. To Osnabrück, Sweden sent two ambassadors and France three, while the Electors, the German Princes and the imperial cities were represented. Questions of etiquette, which demanded prior settlement, occupied months, and serious matters when reached were dealt with slowly and jealously, with many interruptions. It was not until the 24th of October, 1648, that the articles of peace forming the two treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, and known together as the Peace of Westphalia, were signed by all the negotiators at Münster. {1486} The more important of the provisions of the two instruments were the following "To France was secured the perpetual possession of the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, as also Moyenvic and Pignerol, with the right to keep a garrison in Philipsburg, and finally Breisach, Alsace, with its ten imperial cities, and the Sundgau. The Emperor bound himself to gain the assent of the Archduke Ferdinand, of Tyrol and Spain, to this last-named cession. France made good to the Archduke this loss by the payment of 3,000,000 francs. Although it was not expressly provided that the connection with the Empire of the German provinces ceded to France should be dissolved, yet the separation became, as a matter of fact, a complete one. The Emperor did not summon the Kings of France to the Diets of the Empire, and the latter made no demand for such summons. … In relation to Italy, the French treaty provided that the peace concluded in 1631 [see ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631] should remain in force, except the part relating to Pignerol. ['Pinerolo was definitely put under the French overlordship.']

G. W. Kitchin, History of France, volume 3, page 98.

Switzerland was made independent of the German Empire; but the Circle of Burgundy [the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté] was still to form a part of the Empire, and after the close of the war between France and Spain, in which the Emperor and the Empire were to take no part, was to be included in the peace. No aid was to be rendered to the Duke of Lorraine against France, although the Emperor and the Empire were left free to mediate for him a peace. Sweden received Hither Pomerania, including the Island of Rügen, from Further Pomerania the Island of Wollin and several cities, with their surroundings, among which were Stettin, as also the expectancy of Further Pomerania in case of the extinction of the house of Brandenburg. Furthermore, it received the city of Wismar, in Mecklenburg, and the Bishoprics of Bremen [secularized and made a Grand Duchy] and Verden, with reservation of the rights and immunities of the city of Bremen. Sweden was to hold all the ceded territory as feudal tenures of the Empire, and be represented for them in the Imperial Diet. … Brandenburg received for its loss of Pomerania the Bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden, and Camin, and the expectancy of that of Magdeburg as soon as this should become vacant by the death of its Administrator, the Saxon Prince, although the four bailiwicks separated from it were to remain with Saxony as provided in the Peace of Prague. … The house of Brunswick-Lüneberg was to renounce its right to the coadjutorship of Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, and Ratzeburg, and, in return for this renunciation, was to alternate with a Catholic prelate in the possession of the Bishopric of Osnabrück. … To Duke Maximilian of Bavaria was conveyed the Electorate, together with the Upper Palatinate, to be hereditary in his family of the line of William, for which he, on the other hand, was to surrender to the Emperor the account of the 13,000,000 florins which he had made for the execution of the sentence against the Palsgrave Frederic. To the Palsgrave, Charles Lewis, son of the proscribed Elector [Frederic, who had died in 1632], was given back the Lower Palatinate, while a new Electorate, the eighth, was created for him. … There were numerous provisions relating to the restoration of the Dukes of Würtemberg, the Margraves of Baden, and the Counts of Nassau and those of Hanau to several parts of the territories which either belonged to them or were contested. A general amnesty was indeed provided, and everyone was to be restored to the possession of the lands which he had held before the war. This general article was, however, limited by various special provisions, as that in relation to the Palsgrave, and was not to be applied to Austria at all. … Specially important are the sections which relate to the settlement of religious grievances. The treaty of Passau and the Augsburg religious peace were confirmed; the 1st of January, 1624, was fixed as the time which was to govern mutual reclamations between the Catholics and Protestants; both parties were secured the right to all ecclesiastical foundations, whether in mediate or immediate connection with the Empire, which they severally held in possession on the first day of January, 1624; if any such had been taken from them after this date, restoration was to be made, unless otherwise specially provided. The Ecclesiastical Reservation was acknowledged by the Protestants, and Protestant holders of ecclesiastical property were freely admitted to the Imperial Diets. The right of reformation was conceded to the Estates, and permission to emigrate to the subjects; while it was at the same time provided that, if in 1624 Protestant subjects of Catholic Princes, or the reverse, enjoyed freedom of religion, this right should not in the future be diminished. It was specially granted for Silesia that all the concessions which had been made before the war to the Dukes of Liegnitz, Münsterburg, and Oels, and to the city of Breslau, relating to the free exercise of the Augsburg Confession, should remain in force. … Finally, the Reformed—that is, the adherents of Calvinism—were placed upon the same ground with those of the Augsburg Confession; and it was provided that if a Lutheran Estate of the Empire should become a Calvinist, or the reverse, his subjects should not be forced to change with their Prince."

A. Gindely, History of the Thirty Years' War,' volume 2, chapter 10.

"The emperor, in his own name, and in behalf of his family and the 'empire, ceded the full sovereignty of Upper and Lower Alsace, with the prefecture of Haguenau, or the ten towns [Haguenau, Schelestadt, Weissemburgh, Colmar, Landau, Oberenheim, Rosheim, Munster in the Val de St. Gregoire, Kaiserberg, and Turingheim], and their dependencies. But by one of those contradictions which are common in treaties, when both parties wish to preserve their respective claims, another article was introduced, binding the king of France to leave the ecclesiastics and immediate nobility of those provinces in the immediacy which they had hitherto possessed with regard to the Roman empire, and not to pretend to any sovereignty over them, but to remain content with such rights as belonged to the house of Austria. Yet this was again contradicted by a declaration, that this exception should not derogate from the supreme sovereignty before yielded to the king of France."

W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 59 (volume 2).

[Image: Germany at the peace of Westphalia.]

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"Respecting the rights of sovereignty due to the princes and the relations of the states of the empire with the emperor, the Peace of Westphalia contained such regulations as must in the course of time produce a still greater relaxation of those ties, already partially loosened, which held together the empire in one entirety. … At the Peace of Westphalia the independence of the princes was made completely legal. They received the entire right of sovereignty over their territory, together with the power of making war, concluding peace, and forming alliances among themselves, as well as with foreign powers, provided such alliances were not to the injury of the empire. But what a feeble obstacle must this clause have presented? For henceforward, if a prince of the empire, having formed an alliance with a foreign power, became hostile to the emperor, he could immediately avail himself of the pretext that it was for the benefit of the empire, the maintenance of his rights, and the liberty of Germany. And in order that the said pretext might, with some appearance of right, be made available on every occasion, foreigners established themselves as the guardians of the empire; and accordingly France and Sweden took upon themselves the responsibility of legislating as guarantees, not only for the Germanic constitution, but for everything else that was concluded in the Peace of Westphalia at Münster and Osnaburg. Added to this, in reference to the imperial cities, whose rights had hitherto never been definitively fixed, it was now declared that they should always be included under the head of the other states, and that they should command a decisive voice in the diets; thenceforth, therefore, their votes and those of the other states—the electoral and other princes—should be of equal validity."

F. Kohlrausch, History of Germany, chapter 26.

Peace between Spain and the United Provinces was embodied in a separate treaty, but negotiated at Münster, and concluded and signed a few months earlier in the same year. The war between Spain and France went on.

See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1646-1648.

GERMANY: A. D. 1648. Effects of the Peace of Westphalia on the Empire. It becomes a loose confederacy and purely German.

"It may … be said of this famous peace, as of the other so-called 'fundamental law of the Empire,' the Golden Bull, that it did no more than legalize a condition of things already in existence, but which by being legalized acquired new importance. … While the political situation, to use a current phrase, had changed within the last two hundred years, the eyes with which men regarded it had changed still more. Never by their fiercest enemies in earlier times, not once by the Popes or Lombard republicans in the heat of their strife with the Franconian and Swabian Cæsars, had the Emperors been reproached as mere German kings, or their claim to be the lawful heirs of Rome denied. The Protestant jurists of the 16th or rather of the 17th century were the first persons who ventured to scoff at the pretended lordship of the world, and declare their Empire to be nothing more than a German monarchy, in dealing with which no superstitious reverence need prevent its subjects from making the best terms they could for themselves, and controlling a sovereign whose religious predilections made him the friend of their enemies. … It was by these views … that the states, or rather France and Sweden acting on their behalf, were guided in the negotiations of Osnabrück and Münster. By extorting a full recognition of the sovereignty of all the princes, Catholics and Protestants alike, in their respective territories, they bound the Emperor from any direct interference with the administration, either in particular districts or throughout the Empire. All affairs of public importance, including the rights of making war or peace, of levying contributions, raising troops, building fortresses, passing or interpreting laws, were henceforth to be left entirely in the hands of the Diet. … Both Lutherans and Calvinists were declared free from all jurisdiction of the Pope or any Catholic prelate. Thus the last link which bound Germany to Rome was snapped, the last of the principles by virtue of which the Empire had existed was abandoned. For the Empire now contained and recognized as its members persons who formed a visible body at open war with the Holy Roman Church; and its constitution admitted schismatics to a full share in all those civil rights which, according to the doctrines of the early Middle Age, could be enjoyed by no one who was out of the communion of the Catholic Church. The Peace of Westphalia was therefore an abrogation of the sovereignty of Rome, and of the theory of Church and State with which the name of Rome was associated. And in this light was it regarded by Pope Innocent X., who commanded his legate to protest against it, and subsequently declared it void by the bull 'Zelo domus Dei.' … The Peace of Westphalia is an era in imperial history not less clearly marked than the coronation of Otto the Great, or the death of Frederick II. As from the days of Maximilian it had borne a mixed or transitional character, well expressed by the name Romano-Germanic, so henceforth it is in everything but title purely and solely a German Empire. Properly, indeed, it was no longer an empire at all, but a Confederation, and that of the loosest sort. For it had no common treasury, no efficient common tribunals, no means of coercing a refractory member; its states were of different religions, were governed according to different forms, were administered judicially and financially without any regard to each other. … There were 300 petty principalities between the Alps and the Baltic, each with its own laws, its own courts, … its little armies, its separate coinage, its tolls and custom-houses on the frontier, its crowd of meddlesome and pedantic officials. … This vicious system, which paralyzed the trade, the literature, and the political thought of Germany, had been forming itself for some time, but did not become fully established until the Peace of Westphalia, by emancipating the princes from imperial control, had made them despots in their own territories."

J. Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, chapter 19.

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GERMANY: A. D. 1648-1705. After the Peace of Westphalia. French influence in the Empire. Creation of the Ninth Elector.

After the Peace of Westphalia, the remainder of the reign of Ferdinand III. "passed in tranquillity. … He caused his son to be elected king of the Romans, under the title of Ferdinand IV.; but the young prince, already king of Bohemia and Hungary, preceded him to the tomb, and left the question of the succession to be decided by a diet. Ferdinand III. died in 1657. … The interregnum, and, indeed, the century which followed the death of Ferdinand, showed the alarming preponderance of the influence gained by France in the affairs of the empire, and the consequent criminality of the princes who had first invoked the assistance of that power. Her recent victories, her character as joint guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, and the contiguity of her possessions to the states of the empire, encouraged her ministers to demand the imperial crown for the youthful Louis XIV. Still more extraordinary is the fact that four of the electors were gained, by that monarch's gold, to espouse his views. … Fortunately for Germany and for Europe, the electors of Treves, Brandenburg, and Saxony, were too patriotic to sanction this infatuated proposal; they threatened to elect a native prince of their own authority,—a menace which caused the rest to co-operate with them; so that, after some fruitless negotiations, Leopold, son of the late emperor, king of Bohemia and of Hungary, was raised to the vacant dignity. His reign was one of great humiliation to his house and to the empire. Without talents for government, without generosity, feeble, bigoted, and pusillanimous, he was little qualified to augment the glory of the country. … Throughout his long reign [1657-1705], he had the mortification to witness, on the part of Louis XIV., a series of the most unprovoked, wanton, and unprincipled usurpations ever recorded in history. … Internally, the reign of Leopold affords some interesting particulars. … Not the least is the establishment of a ninth electoral dignity in favour of Ernest Augustus, Duke of Brunswick Lunenburg, who then became (1692) the first elector of Hanover. This was the act of Leopold, in return for important aid in money and troops from two princes of that house; but it could not be effected without the concurrence of the electoral body, who long resisted it. … The establishment of a permanent diet, attended, not by the electors in person, but by their representatives, is one of the most striking peculiarities of Leopold's reign."

S. A. Dunham, History of the Germanic Empire, book 3, chapter 3 (volume 3).

See, DIET, THE GERMANIC.

GERMANY: A. D. 1648-1780. The Austrian incubus.

"Before the Thirty Years' War the territories of the German Hapsburgs were not very considerable. The greatest part of Hungary was in the hands of the Turks; the Tyrol belonged to a collateral line; and, in the other provinces, the independence of the Nobility was much stronger than the sovereignty of the Archdukes. The Nobles were all zealous protestants, so that a monarchical power could only be created after a victory of the Catholic faith. For the first time since 1621, the crown was seen in these regions to assume a really dominant position. Efforts in this direction had been zealously carried on since 1648; the Tyrolese Estates now lost their most important privileges; and, above all, the Emperor succeeded, by the help of Polish and German troops, in driving out the Turks from Hungary, and at the same time crushing the national freedom of the Magyars with frightful bloodshed. By these victories the Monarchy gained, in the first place, a large increase of territory—which placed it nearly on a level with France. In the second place it acquired at home the power of raising as many taxes and soldiers as were necessary to increase the army to the extent of its wishes; and of distributing its officials and troops—without distinction of nation—as imperial servants, throughout its dominions. And thus it secured submission at home and disposable strength for its operations abroad. Here it stopped short. As it had no national, and, consequently, no warm and natural relation to any of its provinces—which were merely used as passive tools to promote the lofty aims of the Hapsburg family—the Government had no intention of using its power at home for the furtherance of the public good, or the building up of a generally useful Administration. The Nobility had no longer the strength to resist the demands of the Crown for men and money, but it still retained exemption from taxes, the jurisdiction and police among its own peasants, and a multitude of feudal rights, which, often enough, degraded the peasant to the condition of a serf, and everywhere bound down agriculture in the most galling bonds. Of manufactures there were little or none; trade was carried on on the system of guilds. The State officials exercised but little influence over the internal affairs of the Communes, or Provinces; and the privileged orders had full liberty to prosecute their own interests among their inferiors with inconsiderate selfishness. In this aristocracy, the Church, from its wealth and its close internal unity, assumed the first place; and its superior importance was still farther enhanced by the fact of its being the chief bond of unity between the otherwise so loosely compacted portions of the Empire. … The Church attached the Nobility to the Government; for we must not forget that a very considerable portion of the estates of the Nobles had passed into the hands of new possessors who had received them as a reward for being good catholics. The Church, too, taught all the youth of the Empire—in all its different languages— obedience to the House of Hapsburg, and received from the Crown, in return, exclusive control of the national education. It formed, in spite of the resistance of nationalities, a sort of public opinion in favour of the unity of the Empire; and the Crown, in return, excluded all non-catholic opinions from the schools, from literature and religion. Austria, therefore, continued to be catholic, even after 1648; and by this we mean, not only that its Princes were personally devout—or that the Catholic clergy were supported in the performance of their spiritual functions—or that the institutions of the Church were liberally supported—but also that the State directed its policy according to ecclesiastical views, made use of the Church for political purposes, and crushed every movement hostile to it in all other spheres of the national life. In Austria, therefore, it was not merely a question of theological differences, but of the deepest and most comprehensive points of distinction between the mediæval and the modern world. Austria was still, in its whole nature, a Mediæval State or Confederacy of States. The consequences of this condition were most strikingly seen in its relation to Germany. In the first place, there was a complete separation, in regard to all mental and spiritual matters, between the great body of the Empire, and its powerful Eastern member. This was the period, in which Germany was awaking to a new intellectual life in modern Europe, and laying the foundation of its modern science in every branch—in History and Statistics, Chemistry and Geology, Jurisprudence and Philosophy—and assuming by its Literature, an equal rank with other nations in national refinement and civilization. {1489} By the works of genius which this period produced Austria remained entirely uninfluenced; and it has been said, that Werther had only been made known to the Viennese in the form of fireworks in the Prater. The literary policy allowed no seed of modern culture to enter the Empire; and the Jesuit schools had rendered the soil unfit for its reception. All the progress of German civilization, at this period, was based on the principle of the independence of the mind in art and science. The education of the Jesuits, on the contrary, though unsurpassed where the object is to prepare men for a special purpose, commences by disowning individual peculiarities, and the right of a man to choose his own career. There was, at this time, no other characteristic of an Austrian than an entire estrangement from the progress of the German mind. … The progress of the people in science and art, in politics and military strength, was only seen in the larger secular territories, which, after 1648, enjoyed their own sovereignty; and even these were checked in their movements at every step by the remnants of the Imperial Constitution. The Members of the Empire alone, in whom the decaying remains of Mediæval existence still lingered on—the Ecclesiastical Princes—the small Counts—the Imperial Knights and the Imperial Towns,—clung to the Emperor and the Imperial Diet. In these, partly from their small extent of territory, partly from the inefficiency of their institutions, neither active industry, nor public spirit, nor national pride, were to be found. In all which tended to elevate the nation, and raise its hopes for the future, they took, at this period, as little part as Austria herself. … The Imperial constitution, therefore, was inwardly decayed, and stood in no relation to the internal growth of the nation. … There was the same divergence between Austria and Germany with respect to their foreign interests, as we have observed in their internal relations. After the Turks had been driven from Hungary, and the Swedes from the half of' Pomerania, Germany had only two neighbours whom it was a matter of vital importance to watch,—the Poles and the French. In the South, on the contrary, it had no interests in opposition to Italy, except the protection of its frontier by the possession or the neutrality of the Alpine passes. And yet it was just towards Italy that the eyes of the House of Hapsburg had been uninterruptedly directed for centuries past. The favourite traditions of the family, and their political and ecclesiastical interest in securing the support of the Pope, and thereby that of the Clergy, constantly impelled them to consolidate and extend their dominion in that country. All other considerations yielded to this; and this is intelligible enough from an Austrian point of view; but it was not on that account less injurious to the German Empire. How strikingly was this opposition of interests displayed at the end of the glorious war of the Spanish succession, when the Emperor rejected a peace which would have restored Strasburg and Alsace to the Empire, because only Naples, and not Sicily also, was offered to Austria! How sharply defined do the same relations present themselves to our view, in the last years of the Hapsburg dynasty, at the peace of Vienna in 1738!—on which occasion the Emperor—in order at least to gain Tuscany, as a compensation for the loss of Naples,—gave up Lorraine to the French, without even consulting the Empire, which he had dragged into the war. Austria thus maintained a predominant influence in Italy; but the Empire, during the whole century after the Peace of Westphalia, did not obtain a single noteworthy advantage over France. How much more was this the case with respect to Poland, which during the whole period of the religious wars had been the most zealous ally of Spain and the Hapsburgs, and which subsequently seemed to threaten no danger to Austrian interests."

H. Von Sybel, History of the French Revolution, book 2, chapter 1 (volume 1).

GERMANY: A. D. 1658. Election of the Emperor, Leopold I.

GERMANY: A. D. 1660-1664. Renewed war with the Turks. Victory of St. Gothard. Transylvania liberated. A twenty years truce.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1660-1664.

GERMANY: A. D. 1672-1679. The war of the Coalition against Louis XIV.

See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1672-1674, and 1674-1678; also NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF.

GERMANY: A. D. 1675-1678. War with Sweden. Battle of Fehrbellin.

See BRANDENBURG: A.D. 1640-1688; and SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1644-1697.

GERMANY: A. D. 1679-1681. The final absorption of Alsace and Les Trois-Evêchés by France, with boundaries widened. Bold encroachments of the French Chambers of Reannexation. The seizure of Strasburg.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1679-1681.

GERMANY: A. D. 1686. The League of Augsburg against Louis XIV.

"The Duke of Orleans, the French King's brother, had married the sister of the Elector Palatine, the last of the House of Simmern, who died in May 1685, when his next relative, the Count Palatine Philip William, Duke of Neuberg, took possession of the Electorate. The Duchess of Orleans had by her marriage contract renounced all her feudal rights to the Palatinate, but not her claims to the allodial property and the moveables of her family." These latter claims, taken in hand by Louis XIV. on behalf of his sister-in-law, were made so formidable that the new Elector appealed to the Empire for protection, "and, thus redoubled the uneasiness felt in Germany, and indeed throughout the greater part of Europe, respecting the schemes of Louis. The Prince of Orange availed himself of these suspicions to forward his plans against Louis. He artfully inflamed the general alarm, and at length succeeded in inducing the Emperor Leopold, the Kings of Spain, and Sweden, as princes of the Empire, the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria, the circles of Suabia, Franconia, Upper Saxony, and Bavaria, to enter into the celebrated League of Augsburg (July 9th 1686). The object of this league was to maintain the Treaties of Münster and Nimeguen and the Truce of Ratisbon. If any of the members of it was attacked he was to be assisted by the whole confederacy; 60,000 men were to be raised, who were to be frequently drilled, and to form a camp during some weeks of every year, and a common fund for their support was to be established at Frankfort. The League was to be in force only for three years, but might be prolonged at the expiration of that term should the public safety require it. The Elector Palatine, who was in fact the party most directly interested, acceded to the League early in September, as well as the Duke of Holstein Gottorp."

T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 5, chapter 5 (volume 3).

{1490}

"To Madame's great anger France set up a claim to the Palatinate on her behalf, Louvois persuading the King and the royal family that with a few vigorous measures the Palatinate would be abandoned by the Neubourgs and annexed to France as part of Madame's dowry. This led to the devastation of the states, to which Madame [Charlotte Elizabeth, the Duchess of Orleans] so often and so bitterly alludes during the next ten years. Obliged by Louis XIV. 's policy to represent herself as desirous to recover her rights over her father's and brother's succession, in many documents which she was never even shown, Madame protested in all her private letters against France's action in the matter, and made every one at court thoroughly aware of her grief and disapproval of what the king was doing on her behalf."

Life and Letters of Charlotte Elizabeth, Princess Palatine, chapter 2.

GERMANY: A. D. 1689-1696. The War of the League of Augsburg, or Grand Alliance, against Louis XIV.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690 to 1695-1696.

GERMANY: A. D. 1690. The second Devastation of the Palatinate.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690.

GERMANY: A. D. 1700. Interest in the question of the Spanish Succession.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1698-1700.

GERMANY: A. D. 1700. Prussia raised to the dignity of a kingdom.

See PRUSSIA: A. D. 1700.

GERMANY: A. D. 1700-1740. The first king of Prussia and his shabby court. The second king, his Brobdingnagian army and his extraordinary character. The up-bringing of Frederick the Great.

The "Great Elector" of Brandenburg "left to his son Frederic a principality as considerable as any which was not called a kingdom."

See BRANDENBURG: A. D. 1640-1688.

"Frederic aspired to the style of royalty. Ostentatious and profuse, negligent of his true interests and of his high duties, insatiably eager for frivolous distinctions, he added nothing to the real weight of the state which he governed: perhaps he transmitted his inheritance to his children impaired rather than augmented in value; but he succeeded in gaining the great object of his life, the title of King. In the year 1700 he assumed this new dignity. He had, on that occasion to undergo all the mortifications which fall to the lot of ambitious upstarts. Compared with the other crowned heads of Europe, he made a figure resembling that which a Nabob or a Commissary, who had bought a title, would make in the company of Peers whose ancestors had been attainted for treason against the Plantagenets. The envy of the class which Frederic quitted, and the civil scorn of the class into which he intruded himself, were marked in very significant ways. … Frederic was succeeded by his son, Frederic William, a prince who must be allowed to have possessed some talents for administration, but whose character as disfigured by odious vices, and whose eccentricities were such as had never before been seen out of a madhouse. He was exact and diligent in the transacting of business; and he was the first who formed the design of obtaining for Prussia a place among the European powers, altogether out of proportion to her extent and population, by means of a strong military organization. Strict economy enabled him to keep up a peace establishment of 60,000 troops. These troops were disciplined in such a manner, that, placed beside them, the household regiments of Versailles and St. James's would have appeared an awkward squad. The master of such a force could not but be regarded by all his neighbours as a formidable enemy and a valuable ally. But the mind of Frederic William was so ill regulated, that all his inclinations became passions, and all his passions partook of the character of moral and intellectual disease. His parsimony degenerated into sordid avarice. His taste for military pomp and order became a mania, like that of a Dutch burgomaster for tulips, or that of a member of the Roxburghe Club for Caxtons. While the envoys of the Court of Berlin were in a state of such squalid poverty as moved the laughter of foreign capitals; while the food placed before the princes and princesses of the blood-royal of Prussia was too scanty to appease hunger, and so bad that even hunger loathed it, no price was thought too extravagant for tall recruits. The ambition of the king was to form a brigade of giants, and every country was ransacked by his agents for men above the ordinary stature. … Though his dominant passion was the love of military display, he was yet one of the most pacific of princes. We are afraid that his aversion to war was not the effect of humanity, but was merely one of his thousand whims. His feeling about his troops seems to have resembled a miser's feeling about his money. He loved to collect them, to count them, to see them increase; but he could not find it in his heart to break in upon the precious hoard. He looked forward to some future time when his Patagonian battalions were to drive hostile infantry before them like sheep: but this future time was always receding; and it is probable that, if his life had been prolonged 30 years, his superb army would never have seen any harder service than a sham fight in the fields near Berlin. But the great military means which he had collected were destined to be employed by a spirit far more daring and inventive than his own. Frederic, surnamed the Great, son of Frederic William, was born in January 1712. It may safely be pronounced that he had received from nature a strong and sharp understanding, and a rare firmness of temper and intensity of will. As to the other parts of his character, it is difficult to say whether they are to be ascribed to nature, or to the strange training which he underwent. The history of his boyhood is painfully interesting. Oliver Twist in the parish work-house, Smike at Dotheboys Hall, were petted children when compared with this wretched heir-apparent of a crown. The nature of Frederic William was hard and bad, and the habit of exercising arbitrary power had made him frightfully savage. His rage constantly vented itself to right and left in curses and blows. When his Majesty took a walk, every human being fled before him, as if a tiger had broken loose from a menagerie. … But it was in his own house that he was most unreasonable and ferocious. His palace was hell, and he the most execrable of fiends. … Early in the year 1740, Frederic William met death with a firmness and dignity worthy of a better and wiser man; and Frederic, who had just completed his 28th year, became king of Prussia."

Lord Macaulay, Frederic the Great (Essays).

{1491}

"Frederick William I. became … the founder of the first modern State in Germany. His was a nature in which the repulsive and the imposing, the uncouth and the admirable, were closely united. In his manners a rough and unrefined peasant, in his family a tyrant, in his government a despot, choleric almost to madness, his reign would have been a curse to the country, had he not united with his unlimited power a rare executive ability and an incorruptible fidelity to duty; and from first to last he consecrated all his powers to the common weal. By him effective limitations were put upon the independent action of the provinces, and upon the overgrown privileges of the estates. He did not do away with the guilds of the different orders, but placed them under the strict control of a strongly centralized superintendence, and compelled their members to make every necessary sacrifice for the sake of assisting him in his efforts for the prosperity and power of Prussia. It is astonishing to see with what practical judgment he recognized a needed measure both in general and in detail; how he trained a body of officials, suited in all grades to the requirements of their position; how he disciplined them in activity, prudence, and rectitude, by strict inspection, by encouraging instruction, and by brutal punishments; how he enforced order and economy in the public finances; how he improved the administration of his own domains, so that it became a fruitful example to all proprietors; and how, full of the desire to make the peasants free owners of the soil, although he did not yet venture on such a radical measure, he nevertheless constantly protected the poor against the arbitrariness and oppression of the higher classes. … There was no department of life to which he did not give encouragement and assistance; it is also true that there was none which he did not render subservient to his own will, and the products of which he did not make conducive to the one great end,—the independence and aggrandizement of the State. So that he who was the ruler of, at most, three million people, created, without exhausting the country, a standing army of eighty thousand men: a remarkably skilful and ready army, which he disciplined with barbarous severity on the slightest occasion, at the same time that he looked out for the welfare of every soldier even in the smallest detail, according to his saying, that 'a king's warrior must live better than a gentleman's servant.' What he had in his mind, almost a hundred years before Scharnhorst, was the universal obligation of military service; but it fared with him in regard to this as in regard to the freedom of the peasants: strong as he was, he could not turn the world he lived in upside down; he contented himself with bequeathing his best ideas to a more propitious future. The foundations of the government rested upon the estates in spite of all monarchical reforms. Thus, beside the federative Empire of the Hapsburgs, arose the small, compact Prussian State, which, by reason of the concentration of its forces, was a match for its five-times-larger rival."

H. Von Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire by William I., book 1, chapter 2 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: T. Carlyle, History of Frederick II., called the Great, book 3, chapter 19, books 5-10 (volumes 1-2).

GERMANY: A. D. 1702. The War of the Spanish Succession: Siege of Landau. Battle of Friedlingen.

On the part of the Imperialists, the War of the Spanish Succession was opened on the Rhine frontier in June 1702, by a movement of the army commanded by the Margrave Louis of Baden, which "came over the Rhine and laid siege to the important fortress of Landau,—the bulwark of Alsace as it was then regarded. The Margrave was subsequently joined by the Emperor's eldest son, the young King of the Romans, who desired to share in the glory, though not in the toils of the expected conquest. … The Maréchal de Catinat, one of the soldiers of whom France has most reason to be proud,—the virtuous Catinat as Rousseau terms him—held command at this period in Alsace. So inferior were his numbers that he could make no attempt to relieve Landau. But after its reduction an opportunity appeared in which by detaching a portion of his army he might retrieve the fortunes of France in another quarter. The Elector of Bavaria, after much irresolution, had openly espoused the cause of Louis. He seized upon the city of Ulm and issued a proclamation in favor of his new ally. To support his movements an enterprising and ambitious officer, the Marquis de Villars, was sent across the Rhine with part of the army of Alsace. The declaration of the Elector of Bavaria and the advance of Villars into Germany disquieted in no slight degree the Prince Louis of Baden. Leaving a sufficient garrison in Landau, he also passed the Rhine. The two armies met at Friedlingen on the 14th of October. Louis of Baden, a ponderous tactician bred in the wars against the Turks, might out-manœuvre some Grand Vizier, but was no match for the quick-witted Frenchman. He was signally defeated with the loss of 3,000 men; soon after which, the season being now far advanced, Villars led back his army to winter quarters in France. His victory of Friedlingen gained for him at Versailles the rank of Maréchal de France."

Earl Stanhope (Lord Mahon), History of England: Reign of Queen Anne, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 68 (volume 2).

See, also; NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704, and SPAIN: A. D. 1702.

GERMANY: A. D. 1703. The War of the Spanish Succession: Campaigns on the Upper Rhine and in Bavaria.

"Early in June [A. D. 1703], Marshal Tallard assumed the command of the French forces in Alsace, … took Prissac on the 7th of September, and invested Landau on the 16th of October. The allies, under the Prince of Hesse, attempted to raise the siege, but were defeated with considerable loss; and, soon after, Landau surrendered, thus terminating with disaster the campaign on the Upper Rhine. Still more considerable were the losses sustained in Bavaria. Marshal Villars commanded there, and, at the head of the French and Bavarians, defeated General Stirum, who headed the Imperialists, on the 20th of September. In December, Marshal Marsin, who had succeeded Villars in the command, made himself master of the important city of Augsburg, and in January, 1704, the Bavarians got possession of Passau. Meanwhile, a formidable insurrection had broken out in Hungary, which so distracted the cabinet of Vienna that the capital seemed to be threatened by the combined forces of the French and Bavarians after the fall of Passau. … Instead of confining the war to one of posts and sieges in Flanders and Italy, it was resolved [by the French] to throw the bulk of their forces at once into Bavaria, and operate against Austria from the heart of Germany, by pouring down the valley of the Danube. {1492} The advanced post held there by the Elector of Bavaria in front, forming a salient angle, penetrating, as it were, into the Imperial dominions, the menacing aspect of the Hungarian insurrection in the rear, promised the most successful issue to this decisive operation. For this purpose, Marshal Tallard, with the French army on the Upper Rhine, received orders to cross the Black Forest and advance into Swabia, and unite with the Elector of Bavaria, which he accordingly did at Donawerth, in the beginning of July. Marshal Villeroy, with forty battalions and thirty-nine squadrons, was to break off from the army in Flanders and support the advance by a movement on the Moselle, so as to be in a condition to join the main army on the Danube, of which it would form, as it were, the left wing; while Vendôme, with the army of Italy, was to penetrate into the Tyrol, and advance by Innspruck on Salzburg. The united armies, which it was calculated, after deducting all the losses of the campaign, would muster 80,000 combatants, was then to move direct by Lintz and the valley of the Danube on Vienna, while a large detachment penetrated into Hungary to lend a hand to the already formidable insurrection in that kingdom. The plan was grandly conceived. … Marlborough, by means of the secret information which he obtained from the French head-quarters, had got full intelligence of it, and its dangers to the allies, if it succeeded, struck him as much as the chances of great advantage to them if ably thwarted. His line was instantly taken."

A. Alison, Military Life of Marlborough, chapter 2, sections 30-33.

The measures taken by Marlborough to defeat the plans of the French in this campaign are briefly stated in the account of his first campaigns in the Netherlands.

See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704.

ALSO IN: H. Martin, History of France: Age of Louis XIV. (translated by M. L. Booth), volume 2, chapter 5.

W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 69 (volume 2).

GERMANY: A. D. 1704. The War of the Spanish Succession: Marlborough and Prince Eugene on the Danube. The Battle of Blenheim.

"Marlborough, with his motley army of English, Dutch, Danes and Germans, concealing his main purpose, was marching south along the Rhine, with a design to strike his critical blow, by attacking the French armies that were forming for the campaign of the Danube, and thus protect the Emperor and Vienna, and punish the Elector of Bavaria, whose territories would be then exposed. On the route, Marlborough was joined by Prince Eugene and the Margrave of Baden: but as a new French force was approaching, Prince Eugene was sent to keep it in check. Marlborough and the Prince of Baden, with united forces of about 60,000 men, then advanced, in rapid marches, and took, by gallant assault, the fortifications of the Schellenberg in Bavaria, and the old town of Donauworth, a critical and commanding position on the Danube. The allies were now masters of the main passages of the Danube—and had a strong place as a basis of action. The allied leaders thereupon sent troops into the heart of Bavaria, and devastated the country even to the vicinity of Munich—burning and destroying as they marched, and taking several minor fortresses. Marlborough's forces and those of Prince Eugene were distant from each other some forty miles, when came the news of the march of a French army of 25,000 men under Tallard, to form a junction with the others, to succor the Elector, and take revenge for the defeat of the Schellenberg. Two French Marshals, Tallard and Marsin, were now in command: their design was to attack Marlborough and Eugene's armies in detail. By rapid marches, Marlborough crossed the Danube and joined Prince Eugene near Donauworth, and thereupon occurred one of the most important and decisive contests of modern times, fought between the old town of Hochstadt and the village of Blenheim, about fifteen miles south of Donauworth. The skilful tactics of the allied generals precipitated the battle. The allied French and Bavarians numbered 60,000 [56,000; Malleson] men—the English, Dutch and Germans and other allies, about 53,000 [52,000; Malleson]. The allies were allowed to cross an intervening brook without opposition, and form their lines. A great charge, in full force, of the allies was then made; they broke the enemy's extended line; and an ensuing charge of cavalry scattered his forces right and left, and drove many into the Danube. More than 14,000 French and Bavarians, who had not struck a blow, except to defend their position, entrenched and shut up in the village of Blenheim, waiting for orders to move, were then surrounded by the victorious allies, and compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. The scattered remnants of the French and Bavarian army either disbanded, or were driven over the Rhine. The garrison at Ulm capitulated, and the Elector fled into France."

J. W. Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht, chapter 16.

"The armies of Marchin and of Max Emanuel [of Bavaria] had been defeated; that of Tallard had been annihilated. Whilst the loss of the victors in killed and wounded reached 12,000 men, that of the French and Bavarians exceeded 14,000. In addition, the latter lost 13,000 men taken prisoners, 47 pieces of cannon, 25 standards, and 90 colours. Such was the battle of Blenheim. It was one of the decisive battles of history, and it changed the character of the war. Up to that moment, the action of France against. Germany had been aggressive; thenceforward it became purely defensive. Blenheim, in fact, dashed to the ground the hopes of Louis XIV. and Max Emanuel of Bavaria. It saved the house of Habsburg in Germany, and helped it greatly in Hungary. It showed likewise that it was possible to inflict a crushing defeat on the armies of Louis XIV."

Colonel G. B. Malleson, Prince Eugene of Savoy, chapter 6.

"Marlborough [after the battle], having detached part of his force to besiege Ulm, drew near with the bulk of his army to the Rhine, which he passed near Philipsburg on the 6th of September, and soon after commenced the siege of Landau, on the French side; Prince Louis, with 20,000 men, forming the besieging force, and Eugene and Marlborough, with 30,000, the covering army. Villeroi, with the French army, abandoned an intrenched camp which he had constructed to cover the town. Marlborough followed, and made every effort to bring the French marshal to battle, but in vain. … Ulm surrendered on the 16th of September, … which gave the allies a solid foundation on the Danube, and effectually crushed the power of the Elector of Bavaria, who, isolated now in the midst of his enemies, had no alternative but to abandon his dominions and seek refuge in Brussels, where he arrived in the end of September. … {1493} The Electress of Bavaria, who had been left regent of that state in the absence of the Elector in Flanders, had now no resource left but submission; and a treaty was accordingly concluded in the beginning of November, by which she agreed to disband all her troops. Trêves and Traerbach were taken in the end of December; the Hungarian insurrection was suppressed; Landau capitulated in the beginning of the same month; a diversion which the enemy attempted toward Trêves was defeated by Marlborough's activity and vigilance, and that city put in a sufficient posture of defense; and, the campaign being now finished, that accomplished commander returned to the Hague and London."

A. Alison, Military Life of Marlborough, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: G. B. Malleson, Battle-fields of Germany, chapter 10.

W. Coxe, Memoirs of Marlborough, chapters 22-26 (volume 1).

J. H. Burton, History of the Reign of Queen Anne, chapter 6 (volume 1).

H. Martin, History of France: Age of Louis XIV., volume 2, chapter 5.

GERMANY: A. D. 1705. The Election of the Emperor Joseph I.

GERMANY: A. D. 1705. The War of the Spanish Succession: The dissolution of Bavaria.

"The campaign of 1705 was destitute of any important events on the side of Germany. … In Bavaria, the peasants, irritated by the oppressions of the Austrian government, rose in a body in the autumn, and, could they have been supported by France, would have placed the Emperor in great danger; but without that aid the insurrection only proved fatal to themselves. The insurgents were beaten in detail, and the Emperor now resolved on the complete dissolution of Bavaria as a state. The four elder sons of Maximilian were carried to Klagenfurt in Carinthia, to be there educated under the strictest inspection as Counts of Wittelsbach, while the younger sons were consigned to the care of a court lady at Munich, and the daughters sent to a convent. The Electress, who had been on a visit to Venice, was not permitted to return to her dominions, and the Elector Maximilian, as well as the Elector of Cologne, was, by a decree of the Electoral College, placed under the ban of the Empire. The Upper Palatinate was restored to the Elector Palatine. … The remaining Bavarian territories were confiscated, and divided among various princes."

T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 5, chapter 6 (volume 3).

W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 72 (volume 3).

The campaign of 1705 in the Netherlands was unimportant; but in Spain it had brilliant results.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1705; and NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1705.

GERMANY: A. D. 1706-1711. The War of the Spanish Succession: Successes of the French.

During 1706, little was attempted on either side by the forces which watched each other along the Rhine. In 1707 Villars, the French commander, obtained liberty to act. "The Emperor, greatly preoccupied with Hungary, had furnished but indifferent resources to the new general of the army of the Rhine, Brandenburg-Baireuth; the German army was ill paid and in bad condition in its immense lines on the right bank, which extended along the Rhine from Philippsburg as far as Stolhofen, then, in a square, from Stolhofen to the Black Mountains by Bühl. May 22, the lines were attacked simultaneously at four points. … The success was complete; the enemy fled into the mountains, abandoning artillery, baggage, and munitions, and did not stop till beyond the Neckar. The lines were razed; Swabia and a part of Franconia were put under contribution. Villars marched on Stuttgart, crossed the Neckar, and subjected the whole country to ransom as far as the Danube. The enemies in vain rallied and reinforced themselves with tardy contingents of the Empire; they could not prevent Villars from laying under contribution the Lower Neckar, then the country between the Danube and Lake Constance, and from maintaining himself beyond the Rhine till he went into winter-quarters. French parties scoured the country as conquerors as far as the fatal field of Hochstadt." At the beginning of the campaign of 1708, it was the plan of the allies to make their chief attack on France "by the way of the Rhine and the Moselle, with two armies of 60,000 men each, under the command of the Elector of Hanover and Eugene, whilst Marlborough occupied the great French army in Flanders." But this plan was changed. "Eugene left the Elector of Hanover in the north of Swabia, behind the lines of Etlingen, which the allies had raised during the winter to replace the lines of Bühl at Stolhofen, and, with 24,000 soldiers collected on the Moselle, he marched by the way of Coblentz towards Belgium (June 30). The French forces of the Rhine and the Moselle followed this movement." The campaign then ensuing in the Netherlands was that which was signalized by Marlborough and Eugene's victory at Oudenarde and the siege of Lille. In 1709, "the attention of Europe, as in 1708, was chiefly directed to Flanders; but it was not only on that side that France was menaced. France was to be encroached upon at once on the north and the east. Whilst the great allied army penetrated into Artois, the army of the Rhine and the army of the Alps were to penetrate, the latter into Bresse by the way of Savoy, the former into Franche-Comté by the way of Alsace, and to combine their operations. … The Germans had not taken the offensive in Alsace till in the month of August. Marshal Harcourt, with over 20,000 men, had covered himself with the lines of the Lauter: the Elector of Hanover, who had crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg with superior forces, did not attack Harcourt, and strove to amuse him whilst 8,000 or 9,000 Germans, left in Swabia with General Merci, moved rapidly on Neuberg … and established there a tête-du-pont in order to enter Upper Alsace." By swiftly sending a sufficient force to attack and defeat Merci at Neuberg, August 26, Harcourt completely frustrated these plans. "The Elector of Hanover recrossed the river and retired behind the lines of Etlingen." During the two following years the French and German forces on the side of the Rhine did little more than observe one another.