Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 67)

In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War," Secretary Seward wrote:

"November 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us. …

January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same power in 1812." In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British Minister, Mr. Seward had written: "If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us. … By the adjustment of the present case upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly settled between them, which, heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two countries from each other."

W. H. Seward, To Lord Lyons, December 26, 1861 (Works, volume 5, Diplomatic History of the War, pages 308-309).

ALSO IN: M. Bernard, Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain, chapter 9.

D. M. Fairfax, Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 135-142).

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 (December-March: Virginia). Protracted inaction of McClellan. His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by the rebel evacuation of Centreville.

"When Congress assembled … in the beginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report. The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. As month after month passed without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the people became more and more anxious for the announcement that the work of preparation had been completed and active operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of discipline by the last of September or the first of October. The men were ready and eager to commence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so. … Your committee endeavored to obtain as accurate information, as possible in relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. … Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain what number of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions at other points. … The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration of your committee. … As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. … The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge. … It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it might bring on a general engagement. … Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one result of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: … 'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham Lincoln.'

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To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, (the Occoquan,) and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would be required to provide the necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed, while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the enemy) at Manassas.' … Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by Genera] McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as your committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was composed of twelve generals. … To them was submitted the question whether they would indorse the line of operations which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the country to Richmond. The four generals who voted against the proposed movement were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard. General Keyes voted for it with the qualification that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac. … Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of the whole army in the direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it. … On the 13th of March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of the York and James rivers."

Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 37th Congress, 3d session, H. R. Rep., part 1, pages 6-12.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, was appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory schoolboys. … It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments, but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. … General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. … December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. … McClellan reported to the Secretary of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of 240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men. … Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 5, chapter 9.

McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in November, 1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent years proved that no large operations could be advantageously conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been followed up and a victory would have given us the barren possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General Scott as general in command of the armies"

G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, pages 199-200.

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapters 3-4.

A. S. Webb, The Peninsula (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 3) chapter 2.

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, book 5, chapter 4 (volume 1).

G. B. McClellan, The Peninsular Campaign (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 2, pages 160-187).

G. B. McClellan, Complete Report.

J. G. Barnard, The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents.

J. C. Ropes, General McClellan's Plans (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 1).

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 (December-April: Virginia). Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Battle of Kernstown.

"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes," In November, Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. … In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men on the Peninsula. … Jackson's little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000 to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jack·son concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government and General Johnston that it was decided to reënforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."

J. D. Imboden, Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 282-285).

"The losses at Kernstown were: Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing=590; Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."

N. Kimball, Fighting Jackson at Kernstown (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, page 307, footnote).

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, chapter 3.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1863. President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.

On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July, another order was issued in exactly the same language, except that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or in the vicinity of any military line … between the city of New York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously, had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the 24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States"; and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority of the President to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the 15th of September in that year another general proclamation was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval service by authority of the President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval service."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406.

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"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. … The case of John Merryman … was the first to come up for judicial interpretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and appears to have been suspected of being captain of a secession troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington, and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to notice it. … The writ of habeas corpus was … not suspended by Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words, Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and without authority from anyone; for two years he made arrests without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased. … There are few things in American history more worthy of discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution. Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself. That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless, injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always their master's nature."

S. G. Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus during the War of the Rebellion (Political Science Quarterly, September, 1888).

The view which President Lincoln himself entertained, and under which he assumed and exercised authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, was submitted to Congress in his first Message, when it convened in special session, July 4, 1861. He said: "Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited ex·tent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion. … Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 59-60.

Congress gave tacit approval to this view of the President's powers by passing no act on the subject until nearly two years afterwards, as shown above.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (January-February: Kentucky—Tennessee). The first breaking of the Confederate line. Grant's capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

"At the beginning of the new year the Union armies were over 660,000 strong, backed by a fleet of 212 vessels. McClellan lay quiet upon the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing, disciplining the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe Johnston, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. The Western generals were more active. Albert Sidney Johnston, perhaps the most promising Southern officer, was in command in the West, with headquarters at Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's front, having superseded Sherman, whose 'crazy' suggestion that 250,000 men would be required for operations on the Western field had lost him the confidence of his superiors. There was abundant method in his madness, as time all too fully showed. In [Eastern] Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey Marshall had been creating more or less political trouble, and General Garfield was sent against him with some 2,000 men. Marshall somewhat outnumbered Garfield; but in a vigorous January campaign [beginning at Paintsville, January 7, and] culminating at Prestonburg [January 10], Garfield quite dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains.

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About the same time, Zollicoffer, with some 12,000 men, had retreated from his post in advance of Cumberland Gap, where he held the extreme right of the Southern line, to Mill Spring, in Central Kentucky. General George H. Thomas was charged with the duty of disposing of him. With about an equal force Thomas promptly moved upon his enemy, and in a sharp action at Mill Spring [January 19] utterly broke up his army. He thus early showed the rare vigor he afterwards so fully developed. Zollicoffer was killed. This first of our substantial western victories (called 'Fishing Creek' by the enemy) [and also called the battle of Logan Cross Roads by some Union writers] was a great encouragement to our arms. Crittenden, who succeeded to the command, withdrew his troops across the Cumberland, abandoning his artillery and trains. Eastern Kentucky was thus freed from the Confederates. Halleck's first task as commander of the Western armies was to penetrate the Confederate line of defense. This could be done by breaking its centre or by turning one of its flanks. The former appeared most feasible to Grant, and Commodore Foote, who commanded the naval forces. Under instructions from Halleck, seven of the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's 17,000 men in reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to attack Fort Henry and essay the value of gun-boats in amphibious warfare. Grant landed below the fort, and Foote then opened fire upon it. Tilghman, in command, foreseeing its capture, was shrewd enough to send off the bulk of his force to Fort Donelson. He himself made a mock defense with a handful of men, surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way. Without the twin citadel of Donelson [distant about eleven miles, southeastwardly, on the Cumberland River], however, Fort Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could advance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threatened its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first laurels as a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn fight, the surrender of this second fortress with its entire garrison. Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the place. He must here fight for the possession of Nashville. Fort Donelson was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Grant moved against it from Fort Henry with 15,000 men; 5,000 less than the enemy. The ground is difficult; the troops are green. But reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's assistance. The fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily there is not much ability in the defense. Floyd, the senior officer, determines to cut his way out. He falls heavily upon Grant's right, held by McClernand and backed by Wallace, thinking to thrust them aside from the river and to escape over the road so won. A stubborn resistance defeats this sortie, though but narrowly. A general assault is ordered, which effects a lodgment in the works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd, Buckner, and Pillow weaken the defense so as to operate a surrender. Our loss was 2,300. The Confederates captured were over 15,000 men. These successes broke through the centre of the Confederate line, established with so much pains, and compromised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to a new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowling Green on receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Henry, and was forced thereby to cede to Buell possession of Nashville, and practically of Kentucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi at Columbus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some forty miles below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon a very substantial gain."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 21-23.

J. M. Hoppin, Life of Rear Admiral Foote, chapters 16-18.

W. P. Johnston, Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, chapters 26-28.

Official Records, series 1, volume 7.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (January-March: Missouri-Arkansas). Expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri. Battle of Pea Ridge.

"Late in December General Samuel R. Curtis took command of 12,000 National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price, who retreated before him to the northwestern corner of Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General McCulloch, and together they took up a position in the Boston Mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains, intrenched, and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between Price and McCulloch, General Earl Van Dorn, who ranked them both, was sent to take command of the Confederate force, arriving late in January. There is no authentic statement as to the size of his army. He himself declared that he had but 14,000 men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that number. Among them was a large body of Cherokee Indians, recruited for the Confederate service by Albert Pike, who thirty years before had won reputation as a poet. On March 5, 1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who knew of his coming and formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing southward. His divisions were commanded by Generals Franz Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than 10,000 men in line, with 48 guns. The Confederates, finding the position too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr's division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, and Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though reenforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch, was more successful; that General was killed and his troops were driven from the field. In the night Curtis reformed and strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and characteristic manœvres. To bring his division into its place on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it was firing rapidly its infantry supports were brought up to it by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again, till the whole division had come into line, pressing back the enemy's right. {3450} Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis's whole line made a curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated artillery fire the Confederates were soon driven to the shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National loss in this action [called the battle of Elk Horn by the Confederates]—killed, wounded, and missing—was over 1,300, Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss is unknown. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the ground, any effective pursuit of Van Dorn's broken forces was impracticable."

R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Secession, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: W. Baxter, Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove.

O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, volume 3, pages 56-71.

Official Records, series 1, volume 8, pages 189-330.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (January-April: North Carolina). Burnside's expedition to Roanoke and capture of Newbern and Beaufort.

"Roanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand-bar that shuts off Upper North Carolina from the Atlantic Ocean, offers some of the most interesting souvenirs of early American history. … As stated by General Wise, to whom its defense was intrusted by the Confederate government, it was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two railroads. It guarded more than four fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure of it endangered the subsistence of the Confederate army there, threatened the navy yard, interrupted the communication between Norfolk and Richmond, and intervened between both and the South. … After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August, 1861, light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon commerce. … An expedition for operating on this part of the North Carolina coast was placed under command of General Burnside, who was ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fortress Monroe, capture Newbern, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort Macon. The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of them carrying heavy guns; 11,500 troops, conveyed in 47 transports; a fleet of small vessels for the transportation of sixty days' supplies. It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th, and arrived off Hatteras in two days, as a storm was coming on. The commander found with dismay that the draught of several of his ships was too great to permit them to enter. … Some dishonest ship-sellers in New York had, by misrepresentation, palmed off on the government unsuitable transport vessels, of which several were lost in that tempestuous sea. … It was only by the greatest exertion and perseverance, and not until a whole fortnight had elapsed, that the entrance to Pamlico Sound was completed. The villainy that led to this delay gave the Confederates ample time for preparation. Not until the end of another week (February 7th) had the reorganized expedition gained the entrance to Croatan Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy passes. The weather was beautiful by day; there was a bright moonshine at night. The gun-boats found a Confederate fleet drawn up behind the obstructions, across the channel, near Pork Point. They opened fire on the fort at that point. It was returned both from the works and the shipping. Meantime troops were being landed at Ashby's, a small force, which was attempting to resist them, being driven off by the fire of the ships. The debarkation went on, though it was raining heavily and night had set in. It was continued until 10,000 men had been landed on the marsh. Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had been silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's Point. … When day broke, Burnside commenced forcing his way up the island. He moved in three columns, the central one, preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, the right and left through the woods. The battery that obstructed this road was soon carried, though not without resistance. The men had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that protected it. … Toward Nag's Head the Confederate force, expelled from the captured work, attempted to retreat. They were, however, overtaken, and the rest of the command on the north of the island, 2,500 strong, was compelled to surrender. The Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, whither it had fled, and there destroyed. A large part of the town was burned. A portion of the national fleet went into the harbor of Edenton and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan River, shared the same fate. Burnside next made an attack (March 14th) on Newbern, one of the most important sea-ports of North Carolina. As the troops advanced from the place of landing, the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and thereby cleared the way. A march of 18 miles in a rain-storm, and over execrable roads, did not damp the energy of the soldiers. … Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy guns, 3 batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores. Burnside's losses were 90 killed and 466 wounded. Preparations were next made for the reduction of Fort Macon, which commands the entrance of Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries; the former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, were compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing their attack, silenced the guns of the garrison, and, in the course of the afternoon, compelled the surrender of the fort. In connection with this expedition some operations of minor importance occurred. … The chief result, however, was the closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part, withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army of General Pope."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 59 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: D. Ammen, The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast, chapters 8-9.

A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th Army Corps, part 1, chapters 3-5.

B. P. Poore, Life of Burnside, chapters 12-14.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (February-April: Georgia-Florida).

Siege and capture of Fort Pulaski. Temporary occupation of Florida. Discouragement of Unionists.

The blockade of Fort Pulaski may be dated from the 22d of February. Preparations were then made on Tybee Island to bombard it. The most of the work had to be done in the night. The work was carried on under the supervision of General Gillmore, who was in chief command, and on the 9th of April eleven batteries, containing an aggregate of 36 guns, were in readiness to open fire. General David Hunter, who had just succeeded General Sherman in command of the Department, arrived at Tybee on the evening of the 8th. At sunrise, on the morning of the 10th, Hunter sent Lieutenant J. H. Wilson to the fort, with a summons to the commander of the garrison to surrender. The latter refused, saying: "I am here to defend this fort, not to surrender it." At a few minutes after eight o'clock the batteries opened fire, and at the end of thirty hours the garrison surrendered. In reporting the capture, General Hunter wrote: "At the end of eighteen hours' firing the fort was breached in the southeast angle, and at the moment of surrender, 2 p. m. on the 11th instant, we had commenced preparations for storming. The whole armament of the fort—47 guns, a great supply of fixed ammunition, 40,000 pounds of powder, and large quantities of commissary stores, have fallen into our hands; also 360 prisoners, of whom the officers will be sent North by the first opportunity that offers. The result of this bombardment must cause, I am convinced, a change in the construction of fortifications as radical as that foreshadowed in naval architecture by the conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac. No works of stone or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy caliber." General Benham, immediately commanding the operations, remarked in his report: "This siege is … the first trial, at least on our side of the Atlantic, of the modern heavy and rifled projectiles against forts erected and supposed to be sufficiently strong prior to these inventions, almost equaling, as it would appear, the revolution accomplished in naval warfare by the iron-clad vessels recently constructed." Captain (acting Brigadier-General) Q. A. Gillmore, the officer immediately in charge of the works on Tybee Island, has given, in a report made in 1865 to the Adjutant-General of the United States of America, an account of the difficulties under which the batteries which performed the chief part in the siege were erected: "Tybee Island is mostly a mud marsh, like other marsh islands on this coast. Several ridges and hummocks of firm ground, however, exist upon it, and the shore of Tybee Roads, where the batteries were located, is partially skirted by low sand banks, formed by the gradual and protracted action of the wind and tides. The distance along this shore from the landing place to the advanced batteries is about 2½ miles. The last mile of this route, on which the seven most advanced batteries were placed, is low and marshy, lies in full view of Fort Pulaski, and is within effective range of its guns. The construction of a causeway resting on fascines and brush-wood over this swampy portion of the line; the erection of the several batteries, with the magazines, gun platforms, and splinter-proof shelters; the transportation of the heaviest ordnance in our service by the labor of men alone; the hauling of ordnance stores and engineer supplies, and the mounting of the guns and mortars on their carriages and beds had to be done almost exclusively at night, alike regardless of the inclemency of the weather and of the miasma from the swamps. No one except an eye-witness can form any but a faint conception of the herculean labor by which mortars of 8½ tons' weight and columbiads but a trifle lighter were moved in the dead of night over a narrow causeway, bordered by swamps on either side, and liable at any moment to be overturned and buried in the mud beyond reach. The stratum of mud is about 12 feet deep, and on several occasions the heaviest pieces, particularly the mortars, became detached from the sling-carts, and were with great difficulty, by the use of planks and skids, kept from sinking to the bottom. Two hundred and fifty men were barely sufficient to move a single piece on sling-carts. The men were not allowed to speak above a whisper, and were guided by the notes of a whistle. The positions selected for the five most advanced batteries were artificially screened from view from the fort by a gradual and almost imperceptible change, made little by little every night, in the condition and appearance of the brush-wood and bushes in front of them. No sudden alteration of the outline of the landscape was permitted. After the concealment was once perfected to such a degree as to afford a good and safe parapet behind it less care was taken, and some of the work in the batteries requiring mechanical skill was done in the daytime, the fatigue parties going to their labor before break of day and returning in the evening after dark. … The three breaching batteries—Sigel, Scott, and McClellan—were established at a mean distance of 1,700 yards from the scarp walls of Fort Pulaski. The circumstance, altogether new in the annals of sieges, that a practicable breach, which compelled the surrender of the work, was made at that distance in a wall 7½ feet thick, standing obliquely to the line of fire and backed by heavy casemate piers and arches, cannot be ignored by a simple reference to the time-honored military maxims that 'Forts cannot sustain a vigorous land attack,' and that 'All masonry should be covered from land batteries.'"

Official Records, series 1, volume 6, pages 134-135, 155, 161.

"By this victory, won on the first anniversary of the fall of Fort Sumter [April 12], the port of Savannah was sealed against blockade-runners. The capture of Fort Jackson above, and of the city, would have been of little advantage to the Nationals then, for the forces necessary to hold them were needed in more important work farther down the coast. While Gillmore and Viele were besieging Fort Pulaski, Commodore Dupont and General Wright were making easy conquests on the coast of Florida." Fort Clinch, on Amelia Island, Fernandina, Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other places, were abandoned by the Rebels on the approach of the National forces. But these conquests proved rather unfortunate than otherwise. "At first, the hopes they inspired in the breasts of the Union people developed quite a widespread loyalty. A Union convention was called to assemble at Jacksonville on the 10th of April, to organize a loyal State Government, when, to the dismay of those engaged in the matter, General Wright prepared to withdraw his forces, two days before the time when the convention was to meet. … In consequence, … very little Union feeling was manifested in Florida during the remainder of the war."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 2, chapter 12.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (February-April: Tennessee). The advance up River. Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.

"By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded all the armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his headquarters in St. Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio, Major-General Buell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Grant, at Forts Henry and Donelson; the Army of the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R. Curtis, in Southwest Missouri. He posted his chief of staff, General Cullum, at Cairo, and me [General Sherman] at Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important operations then in progress up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. … General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville, a city of so much importance to the South that it was at one time proposed as its capital. Both Generals Grant and Buell looked to its capture as an event of great importance. On the 21st General Grant sent General Smith with his division to Clarksville, 50 miles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on the 27th went himself to Nashville to meet and confer with General Buell, but returned to Donelson the next day." Orders sent by General Halleck to Grant did not reach the latter, and a supposed disobedience occurred which caused him to be hastily relieved from his command, which was transferred to General C. F. Smith, on the 4th of March. Halleck's purpose "was evidently to operate up the Tennessee River, to break up Bear Creek Bridge and the railroad communications between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, and no doubt he was provoked that Generals Grant and Smith had turned aside to Nashville. In the mean time several of the gunboats, under Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the Tennessee as far as Florence, and on their return had reported a strong Union feeling among the people along the river. On the 10th of March, having received the necessary orders from General Halleck, I embarked my division at Paducah. … I … steamed up the Tennessee River, following the two gunboats, and, in passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain Gwin that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place for the people about Corinth, distant 30 miles. I sent word back to General Smith that, if we were detained up the river, he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing. We went on up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw, both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small rebel force of infantry. We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of Yellow River, a few miles below," where the troops were landed and an attempt made to push out and destroy the Memphis and Charleston railroad; but heavy rains had so swollen all the streams that the expedition was foiled and returned. "Once more embarked, I concluded to drop down to Pittsburg Landing, and to make the attempt from there. During the night of the 14th, we dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where I found Hurlbut's division in boats. Leaving my command there, I steamed down to Savannah, and reported to General Smith in person, who saw in the flooded Tennessee the full truth of my report; and he then instructed me to disembark my own division, and that of General Hurlbut, at Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad, contemplated by General Halleck's orders. … Within a few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my left, and afterward McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions, which formed a line to our rear. Lew Wallace's division remained on the north side of Snake Creek, on a road leading from Savannah or Crump's Landing to Purdy. General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and I was only responsible for my own division. I kept pickets well out on the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside and outside my lines. … We were all conscious that the enemy was collecting at Corinth, but in what force we could not know, nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th of March, General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up the Tennessee River, by reason of General Smith's extreme illness, and because he had explained to General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct after Donelson; and he too made his headquarters at Savannah, but frequently visited our camps. … From about the 1st of April we were conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolder and more saucy. … On Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there was a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode out along my lines, … and saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach. All my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was favorable to us. … In a few minutes the battle of 'Shiloh' began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. … Probably no single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging reports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army was taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in our tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant was drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were in a measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the steamboat-landing from the east, just before nightfall of the 6th, when there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that our army was all destroyed and beaten. Personally I saw General Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were desperately engaged. But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy, and then held our ground. This gave him great satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as well over on the left. … He came again just before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win. {3453} General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me. About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I was. … Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittenden's divisions of his army, containing 18,000 men, had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued that with these reënforcements we could sweep the field. Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster. … Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence. … Beauregard [who took the rebel command after General Albert Sidney Johnston fell in the first day's battle afterward reported his entire loss as 10,699. Our aggregate loss, made up from official statements, shows 1,700 killed, 7,495 wounded, 3,022 prisoners; aggregate, 12,217, of which 2,167 were in Buell's army, leaving for that of Grant 10,050. This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done by each army. … The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about 32,000 men. We had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions, 45,000 strong."

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, 4th edition, chapter 10 (volume 1); or 1st edition, chapter 9 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 23-25.

W. P. Johnston, Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, chapters 30-35.

U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and others, Shiloh (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1).

Official Records, Series 1, volume 10.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March). President Lincoln's proposal of Compensated Emancipation approved by Congress.

On the 6th of March President Lincoln addressed to Congress the following Special Message: "Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives: I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows: Resolved, That the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system. If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave States north of such part will then say, 'The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is not that all the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say 'initiation' because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all. In the mere financial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census tables and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named State. Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them. In the annual message, last December, I thought fit to say, 'The Union must be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed.' I said this not hastily, but deliberate]y. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency, toward ending the struggle, must and will come. The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the institution and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs? While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject. Abraham Lincoln, Washington, March 6, 1862."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 129-130.

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"Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, having moved and carried a reference of this Message by the House to a Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, and Mr. R. Conkling, of New York, having moved the resolve above recommended, a debate sprung up thereon; which is notable only as developing the repugnance of the Unionists of the Border Slave States, with that of the Democrats of all the States, to compensated or any other Emancipation. … It passed the House by 89 Yeas (Republicans, West Virginians, and a few others not strictly partisans) to 31 Nays." On the 2d of April, the resolution passed the Senate, by 32 Yeas to 10 Nays. "The President of course approved the measure; but no single Slave State ever claimed its benefits; and its only use inhered in its demonstration of the willingness of the Unionists to increase their already heavy burdens to pay for the slaves of the Border States—a willingness which the infatuation of the ruling class in those States rendered abortive."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, volume 3, chapter 23.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 5, chapter 12.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March). The Battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac.

"In August 1861 the Northern States had determined to obtain ironclad steam vessels, and at the end of that month Ericsson offered to construct in a few months a vessel which would destroy the rebel squadron. A board of officers was appointed to consider plans proposed, and in September it recommended that a vessel on Ericsson's design should be built. She was commenced in October, launched on January 30th, 1862, and completed on February 15th, 1862. The design provided for a hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with a flat bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft. The sides, to a short distance below the water line, were protected with 4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck was built a circular turret, revolving on a central spindle, and protected with 8 in. of iron. Inside the turret were mounted two 11-in. smooth bore guns, pointing through port holes. They could thus fire in any direction without turning the vessel, an obvious advantage not only on the open sea but especially in narrow waters, for which she was more intended. Such was the famous 'Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to be also a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in England, suggesting to them doubts as to the propriety of their building four broadside ironclads at three and a half million dollars each."

S. Eardley-Wilmot, The Development of Navies, chapter 4.

"While the Secretary of the Navy was urging forward the construction of the first iron-clads, it was known that the rebel government was making great exertions in the same direction. Iron-clad vessels were under way at New Orleans, Charleston, and at some other points, while at Norfolk the Merrimack [the old frigate of that name, roofed slopingly with railroad iron, was very near completion in the winter of 1861-62.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1861 (APRIL) ACTIVITY OF REBELLION.

The formidable character of this mailed frigate constrained the Government to make every effort to complete the Monitor [the first of the turreted iron-clads, invented by John C. Ericsson] in season to meet her whenever she should come out; and it is stated that information obtained by a rebel spy of the state of forwardness in which the Monitor was, induced the rebels to put a double force upon their frigate, so that she might be able to attack our fleet in Hampton Roads before the Monitor's arrival, and, if possible, also to make a raid upon Washington or the Northern cities. This extra labor, it is said, gained the one day in which the Merrimack destroyed the Cumberland and Congress. … The Monitor, commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, reached the scene of late disaster to our cause, and of her coming triumph, on the 8th of March, at 9 o'clock P. M., and Lieutenant Worden reported for orders to Captain Marston, the commander of the Roanoke. The Minnesota, one of our noblest frigates, the Roanoke of the same class, but partially disabled, the frigate Congress, and the sloop Cumberland, had been stationed at the mouth of the James River to watch for, to engage, and, if possible, destroy, capture, or stop the expected rebel iron-clad frigate then ready for sea at Norfolk. These vessels carried very heavy batteries, and it was hoped that they would be able to cope with the Merrimack. How vain such an expectation was, her first day's operations fully and sadly demonstrated. It is probably no exaggeration to say that she would have destroyed easily, and without any material damage to herself, every wooden ship then in our Navy, had they been within her reach, and with none but themselves to oppose her."

C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, chapter 21.

"Such was the state of affairs when the Monitor arrived at Hampton Roads, that the sturdy commanders trembled in face of the coming day, and all was silence and gloom. The sloop-of-war Cumberland, having a crew of 300 men, and mounting 24 guns, now lay on the bottom with only her top-gallant masts and pennant above the water, marking the spot where 117 mangled bodies lay buried beneath the waves. The Congress, a 50-gun frigate, had also met her destruction, and now lay on shore with the flames kindled by hot shot of the Merrimac sweeping out her hull. The Roanoke and Minnesota, steam frigates of 40 guns each, the pride of the navy and the most perfect of any men-of-war of the period, laid hard and fast on shore, with broken machinery and as powerless as if they had been unarmed. The capture or entire destruction of the Federal fleet at Hampton Roads and the escape of the Merrimac and the rebel cruisers seemed inevitable." Arriving in the evening of the 8th, the Monitor anchored near the frigate Minnesota at Newport News. "At half-past five in the morning all hands were called, and the ship was immediately cleared of her sea-rig and got ready for battle. … At half-past seven o'clock a long line of black smoke was seen, preceded by the steamers Jamestown, Patrick Henry and Teazer. It was the signal for battle. The crews of the different vessels stood by their guns, fuzes in hands. The Monitor steamed slowly from beneath the bows of the Minnesota, where she had been partly concealed, to meet the challenger in an open field. It was alike an astonishment to the rebels and our own people; neither had seen her when she arrived, and many were the conjectures of what it could be. Some said a huge water tank; others an infernal machine; none that she had guns, and not till they saw steam rise from her deck did they think she had power to move herself. … The Merrimac stopped her engines, as if to survey and wonder at the audacity of the nondescript. The Monitor was approaching on her starboard bow. {3455} Then, as if seized with impulsive rage, and as if a huge breath would waft her enemy away, the Merrimac poured a broadside of solid shot at her. For an instant she was enveloped in smoke, and people who were looking on held their breath in doubt of seeing the Monitor again. It was a moment of great suspense. Then as a gentle breeze swept over the scene the Monitor appeared. At this instant the flash of her own guns was seen, and then their report, louder than any cannon that had ever been heard, thundered across the sea. It seemed to jar the very earth, and the iron scales of the invincible crumbled and cracked from their fastenings. One on board the Merrimac at this time has told me that, though at first entirely confident of victory, consternation took hold of them all. 'D-n it!' said one, 'the thing is full of guns!' The enthusiasm at this moment among the thousand of civilians and soldiers, who lined the shore to witness the fight, was beyond description and their own control. Such a spontaneous burst of cheers was never before heard. Men were frantic with joy. The Monitor continued her approach, reserving fire that every shot might take effect, until she came parallel with the Merrimac, but heading in the opposite direction. In this way they passed slowly within a few yards of each other, both delivering and receiving the other's fire. … Captain Worden headed again towards the Merrimac with renewed confidence and engaged her at close quarters. Again they joined in close combat, the Monitor lying bow on, at times touching, both delivering their fire as rapidly as possible. At the same time the marines on the Merrimac poured an incessant fire of musketry at the peek-holes about the pilot-house and turret. The speed of the two vessels was about equal, but the light draught of the Monitor gave her an advantage. The rebels finding that they could make nothing of the invulnerable cheese-box, as they called her, and foiled and maddened at the loss of their coveted prize, turned towards the Minnesota, determined, if possible, to destroy her. The Merrimac went head on and received a full broadside of the Minnesota. Fifty solid nine-inch shot struck square. Any wooden vessel that ever floated would have gone to pieces under such a fire. The Merrimac was unharmed. She returned the fire with her forward rifle guns. One shell passed through four rooms, tearing away partitions and setting the ship on tire. Another passed through the boiler of the steamer Dragon which lay alongside, blowing her up and killing and wounding 17 men. Before a third was fired the Monitor interposed, compelling the Merrimac to change her position. The two combatants then made a complete circle in their endeavors to get a favorable position, each seeking to discharge a broadside into some vital part. The Merrimac then turned sharp and made a plunge towards the Minnesota, but Worden was vigilant, and crossed the stern of the Merrimac, sending two solid shot into her. To get back again between her and the Minnesota, the Monitor had almost to cross her bow. The Merrimac steamed up quickly, and finding that the Monitor would be struck with her prow Worden sheered towards the enemy's stern, avoiding a direct blow, and, as they came into collision, each vessel delivered a broadside into the other. At this point a shell from the Merrimac struck the pilot-house exactly over the peek-hole through which Captain Worden was looking. The shell exploding, filled his face and eyes with powder and fragments of iron, utterly blinding and for a time rendering him unconscious. Lieutenant Greene, who had been in charge of the turret division, immediately left the guns and spent full thirty minutes nursing the wounded commander, during which time the gunners shotted the guns, and, as the Merrimac was turning away, discharged them at close range into her stern, a blow that made her whole frame shudder and seemed at once to be fatal. There was no officer to direct the movements of the vessel except the pilot Howard. As the two combatants parted from the struggle they were headed in opposite directions, both away from their goal. Presuming that the fight would be continued, Pilot Howard ran the vessel a short distance down the channel and turning brought her again close to the protection of the Minnesota, when Lieutenant Greene stepped into the pilot-house and assumed command. It was then observed that the Merrimac had taken the channel and was heading towards Norfolk. She was soon joined by her consorts, and taken up to their refuge under the batteries of Craney Island, the Merrimac apparently sagging down astern. Thus ended the greatest naval battle of the world. … The only perceptible danger to those on board the Monitor, after the first round from the Merrimac, was to those in the turret, who were in great danger from the flying of bolt heads driven with great force across the turret, and from the concussion, which would for a time paralyze a man if he should in any way be in contact with the turret when struck by a shot."

F. B. Butts, The Monitor and the Merrimac (Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island, Fourth series, Number 6).

"The engagement in Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862, between the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, or the Merrimac, as she is known at the North, and the United States wooden fleet, and that on the 9th, between the Virginia and the Monitor, was, in its results, in some respects the most momentous naval conflict ever witnessed. No battle was ever more widely discussed or produced a greater sensation. It revolutionized the navies of the world. … Rams and iron-clads were in future to decide all naval warfare. In this battle old things passed away, and the experience of a thousand years of battle and breeze was forgotten. The naval supremacy of England vanished in the smoke of this fight, only to reappear some years later more commanding than ever. The effect of the news was best described by the London 'Times,' which said: 'Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149 first-class war-ships: we have now two, these two being the Warrior and her sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in the English navy apart from these two that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor.' The Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct the navy. … The same results were produced in France, which had but one sea-going iron-clad, La Gloire, and this one, like the Warrior, was only protected amidships. … And so with all the maritime powers. In this race the United States took the lead, and at the close of the war led all the others in the numbers and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. … Our loss [that is, the Confederate loss on the Virginia, or Merrimac, in the first day's battle, with the wooden ships] in killed and wounded was 21. {3456} The armor was hardly damaged, though at one time our ship was the focus on which were directed at least 100 heavy guns afloat and ashore. But nothing outside escaped. … We slept at our guns, dreaming of other victories in the morning. But at daybreak we discovered, lying between us and the Minnesota, a strange-looking craft, which we knew at once to be Ericsson's Monitor, which had long been expected in Hampton Roads, and of which, from different sources, we had a good idea. She could not possibly have made her appearance at a more inopportune time for us, changing our plans, which were to destroy the Minnesota, and then the remainder of the fleet below Fortress Monroe. She appeared but a pigmy compared with the lofty frigate which she guarded. But in her size was one great element of her success. … After an early breakfast, we got under way and steamed out toward the enemy, opening fire from our bow pivot, and closing in to deliver our starboard broadside at short range, which was returned promptly from her 11-inch guns. Both vessels then turned and passed again still closer. The Monitor was firing every seven or eight minutes, and nearly every shot struck. Our ship was working worse and worse, and after the loss of the smoke-stack, Mr. Ramsay, chief engineer, reported that the draught was so poor that it was with great difficulty he could keep up steam. Once or twice the ship was on the bottom. Drawing 22 feet of water, we were confined to a narrow channel, while the Monitor, with only 12 feet immersion, could take any position, and always have us in range of her guns. … Several times the Monitor ceased firing, and we were in hopes she was disabled, but the revolution again of her turret and the heavy blows of her 11-inch shot on our sides soon undeceived us. … Lieutenant Jones now determined to run her down or board her. For nearly an hour we manœuvred for a position. … The ship was as unwieldy as Noah's Ark. … And so, for six or more hours, the struggle was kept up. At length, the Monitor withdrew over the middle ground where we could not follow. … The battle was a drawn one, so far as the two vessels engaged were concerned. But in its general results the advantage was with the Monitor."

J. T. Wood, The First Fight of Iron Clads (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1, pages 692-711).

ALSO IN: J. Ericsson, The Building of the Monitor (Battles and Leaders. volume 1, pages 730-744).

W. C. Church, Life of John Ericsson, chapters 15-18 (volume 1).

Gideon Welles, The First Iron-Clad Monitor (Annals of the War by leading Participants), page 17.

C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, chapter 21.

On the evacuation of Norfolk by the Confederates, in May, 1862, the Merrimac was destroyed. The following December the Monitor went down in a storm at sea, while on her way to Charleston, and only a few of her crew were saved.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March). Amendment of the Military Code. Officers forbidden to surrender fugitive Slaves.

"As the formal orders of the government regarding the treatment of slaves who sought refuge near the armies were not always executed, Congress determined to give them a legal sanction; and on the 25th of February and the 13th of March both the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced a new article in the military code, prohibiting officers, at the risk of dismissal, from interfering to restore fugitive slaves to their masters. Notwithstanding the powers with which the government was thus armed, great difficulty was experienced in applying this law in those regiments whose commanders openly professed their sympathies in favor of slavery."

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, page 733.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March-April: On the Mississippi). New Madrid and Island No. 10.

On the surrender of Fort Donelson to General Grant, Columbus, on the Mississippi, was hastily abandoned by the rebels, who fell back to Island Number Ten, thirty miles below, where strong works had been erected. These it was hoped would command the passage of the river. "Following the course of the Mississippi, this island is about ten miles above New Madrid, Missouri, which is 79 miles below Cairo; but on account of a long bend in the river … the island is really further south than New Madrid. New Madrid is at the most northerly part of the bend, and its guns were so placed as to be able to fire at vessels coming either way. Besides Fort Thompson, named after Jeff Thompson, it was defended by several batteries and by six gunboats, mounting heavy guns, which had come up the river from New Orleans and were under the command of Commodore Hollins. … As the land around New Madrid is very flat, these gunboats could fire upon troops approaching the place by land. On the same day when the flag of the Union was hoisted over the deserted works of the Confederates at Columbus [March 4], a Union army under General John Pope, who had been commanding in eastern Missouri, appeared before New Madrid. Seeing that he could do but little with his field artillery, he sent to Cairo for heavy guns; and while waiting for these he built a battery at Point Pleasant, about ten miles below New Madrid, so as to blockade the river at that place and prevent supplies from being sent up to the town. Meanwhile the Confederates strengthened their works and reinforced the garrison with men from Island Number Ten, while their fleet of gunboats was increased to nine. Four heavy guns were sent from Bird's Point to General Pope by the Cairo and Fulton Railway, which brought them within 20 miles of where they were wanted. … On the night of March 12 a thousand spades were at work within half a mile of Fort Thompson, and at daylight the guns were in position ready for action. Pope opened a cannonade at once on the gunboats and on Fort Thompson, both of which replied vigorously. The fight raged all day long; several of the gun boats were disabled and the Union army was gradually shutting in the Confederates on the land side, when their commander, General McCown, seeing the danger of capture, left the place in the night, during a heavy thunder-storm, and removed all his troops to Island Number Ten. … General Pope lost 51 men in killed and wounded during the day's bombardment; the loss of the Confederates is not known, but is thought to have been more than a hundred. About the time of the capture of New Madrid, Commodore Foote sailed from Cairo with a fleet of seven iron-clad gunboats, one wooden gunboat, and ten mortar-boats, for the purpose of aiding General Pope in the attack on Island Number Ten. He came in sight of the island on Saturday, March 15, and on the next morning opened the bombardment with the rifled guns of the Benton, his flag-ship. {3457} The mortar-boats, moored at convenient places along the shore, soon took part in the firing, and rained bombs into the Confederate works. … Commodore Foote kept up the bombardment for many days, without doing much damage to the Confederate works. But while he kept the enemy busy, General Pope had been engaged in digging a canal across the swampy peninsula formed by the bend of the river, so that vessels could go through to New Madrid without having to pass Island Number Ten. … A large number of men were employed, and after nineteen days of hard labor a channel deep enough for light-draught vessels was cut through. In the night of April 1 a few men from the gunboats, aided by some of Pope's soldiers, landed on the Kentucky shore, opposite Island Number Ten, took one of the batteries by surprise and spiked its six guns. … A few nights afterward the Carondelet [gunboat] ran safely by all the batteries at midnight, during a heavy thunderstorm. … Two nights afterward the Pittsburgh, another gunboat, performed the same feat, with the same good fortune; and a few days later the Confederates were astonished to see a fleet of transports laden with troops and several floating batteries join the gunboats at New Madrid. … The gunboats soon silenced the one-gun batteries on the opposite side of the river below New Madrid," and the Confederates, attempting to escape, were intercepted and captured (April 7), both those on the mainland and those on the Island.

J. D. Champlin, Jr., Young Folks' History of the War for the Union, chapter 16.

Said General Pope in his report: "It is almost impossible to give a correct account of the immense quantity of artillery, ammunition, and supplies of every description which fell into our hands. Three generals, 273 field and company officers, 6,700 privates, 123 pieces of heavy artillery, 35 pieces of field artillery (all of the very best character and latest patterns), 7,000 stand of small-arms, tents for 12,000 men, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons and harness, &c., are among the spoils. Very few, if any, of the enemy escaped, and only by wading and swimming through the swamps. The conduct of the troops was splendid throughout, as the results of this operation and its whole progress very plainly indicate. We have crossed this great river, the banks of which were lined with batteries and defended by 7,000 men. We have pursued and captured the whole force of the enemy and all his supplies and material of war, and have again recrossed and reoccupied the camps at New Madrid, without losing a man or meeting with any accident. Such results bespeak efficiency, good conduct, high discipline, and soldierly deportment of the best character far more conclusively than they can be exhibited in pitched battle or the storming of fortified places."

Official Records, series 1, volume 8.

"In the years since 1862, Island No. 10 … has disappeared. The river, constantly wearing at its upper end, has little by little swept away the whole. … On the other shore a new No. 10 has risen."

A. T. Mahan, The Navy in the Civil War: The Gulf and Inland Waters, chapter 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March-May: Virginia). The Peninsular Campaign. McClellan before Yorktown.

"When Manassas had been abandoned by the enemy [see UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 (December-March: Virginia)] and he had withdrawn behind the Rapidan, the Urbana movement lost much of its promise, as the enemy was now in position to reach Richmond before we could do so. The alternative remained of making Fort Monroe and its vicinity the base of operations. The plan first adopted was to commence the movement with the First Corps as a unit, to land north of Gloucester and move thence on West Point; or, should circumstances render it advisable, to land a little below Yorktown to turn the defenses between that place and Fort Monroe. The Navy Department were confident that we could rely upon their vessels to neutralize the Merrimac and aid materially in reducing the batteries on the York River. … As transports arrived very slowly, especially those for horses, and the great impatience of the Government grew apace, it became necessary to embark divisions as fast as vessels arrived, and I decided to land them at Fort Monroe, holding the First Corps to the last, still intending to move it in mass to turn Gloucester. On the 17th of March the leading division embarked at Alexandria. The campaign was undertaken with the intention of taking some 145,000 troops, to be increased by a division of 10,000 drawn from the troops in the vicinity of Fort Monroe. … On the 12th of March I learned that there had appeared in the daily papers the order relieving me from the general command of all the armies and confining my authority to the Department of the Potomac. I had received no previous intimation of the intention of the Government in this respect. … On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found five divisions of infantry, Sykes's brigade of regulars, two regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve artillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part of a fourth had arrived, but were still on shipboard; comparatively few wagons had come. … The best information obtainable represented the Confederate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least 15,000, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and it was clear that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly near Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to the Peninsula. … On my arrival at Fort Monroe I learned, in an interview with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the James as a line of supply, and that he could furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction of the batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. He could only aid in the final attack after our land batteries had essentially silenced their fire. I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced by the conditions of the problem just stated. Information was received that Yorktown was already being reenforced from Norfolk, and it was apprehended that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the same course. I therefore determined to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point—near the Halfway House—between Yorktown and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the arrival of reenforcements. {3458} The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April, and was arranged to turn successively the intrenchments on the two roads; the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps was engaged with the enemy's outposts in front of Yorktown and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth Corps came upon Lee's Mills and found it covered by the unfordable line of the Warwick, and reported the position so strong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault. Thus all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intended movement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the 4th, informing me that the First Corps [McDowell's] was withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed to recede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000 … diminished my paper force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of the campaign had been founded, … which reduced the numbers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 68,000. The order withdrawing the First Corps also broke up the Department of the Potomac, forming out of it the Department of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, and the Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, the latter including Washington. … In our front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by land or water. … Whatever may have been said afterward, no one at the time—so far as my knowledge extended—thought an assault practicable without certain preliminary siege operations. … We were thus obliged to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy's artillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May; … but during the night of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions. … Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin's division of McDowell's corps had joined me by water, in consequence of my urgent calls for reënforcements … [and, May 7th] disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover the landing of reënforcements."

G. B. McClellan, The Peninsular Campaign (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 160-187).

General Joseph E. Johnston, who assumed command of the Confederate forces on the Peninsula, April 17, says in his "Narrative": "I went to the Peninsula as soon as possible, reaching General Magruder's headquarters early in the morning. … That officer had estimated the importance of at least delaying the invaders until an army capable of coping with them could be formed; and opposed them with about a tenth of their number, on a line of which Yorktown, intrenched, made the left flank. This boldness imposed upon the Federal general, and made him halt to besiege instead of assailing the Confederate position. This resolute and judicious course on the part of General Magruder was of incalculable value. It saved Richmond, and gave the Confederate Government time to swell that officer's handful to an army. … The arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions increased the army on the Peninsula to about 53,000 men, including 3,000 sick. … I could see no other object in holding the position than that of delaying the enemy's progress, to gain time."

J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapters 4-5.

ALSO IN: J. C. Palfrey, The Siege of Yorktown (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 1, pages 31-92).

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 1, chapter 1.