Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 21)

The Empress Catherine II. (Edinburgh Review, July, 1893).

"In 1781 Catherine had already sent to Grimm the following resume of the history of her reign, set forth by her new secretary and factotum, Besborodko, in the fantastic form of an inventory:

Governments instituted according to the new form, 29; Towns built, 144; Treaties made, 30; Victories won, 78; Notable edicts, decreeing laws, 88; Edicts on behalf of the people, 123; Total, 492.

{2767}

Four hundred and ninety-two active measures! This astonishing piece of book-keeping, which betrays so naïvely all that there was of romantic, extravagant, childish, and very feminine, in the extraordinary genius that swayed Russia, and in some sort Europe, during thirty-four years, will no doubt make the reader smile. It corresponds, however, truly enough, to a sum-total of great things accomplished under her direct inspiration. … In the management of men … she is simply marvellous. She employs all the resources of a trained diplomatist, of a subtle psychologist, and of a woman who knows the art of fascination; she employs them together or apart, she handles them with unequalled 'maestria.' If it is true that she sometimes takes her lovers for generals and statesmen, it is no less true that she treats on occasion her generals and statesmen as lovers. When the sovereign can do nothing, the Circe intervenes. If it avails nothing to command, to threaten, or to punish, she becomes coaxing and wheedling. Towards the soldiers that she sends to death, bidding them only win for her victory, she has delicate attentions, flattering forethought, adorable little ways. … Should fortune smile upon the efforts she has thus provoked and stimulated, she is profusely grateful: honours, pensions, gifts of money, of peasants, of land, rain upon the artisans of her glory. But she does not abandon those who have had the misfortune to be unlucky. … Catherine's art of ruling was not, however, without its shortcomings, some of which were due to the mere fact of her sex, whose dependences and weaknesses she was powerless to overcome. 'Ah!' she cried one day, 'if heaven had only granted me breeches instead of petticoats, I could do anything. It is with eyes and arms that one rules, and a woman has only ears.' The petticoats were not solely responsible for her difficulties. We have already referred to a defect which bore heavily upon the conduct of affairs during her reign: this great leader of men, who knew so well how to make use of them, did not know how to choose them. … It seems that her vision of men in general was disturbed, in this respect, by the breath of passion which influenced all her life. The general, the statesman, of whom she had need, she seemed to see only through the male whom she liked or disliked. … These mistakes of judgment were frequent. But Catherine did more than this, and worse. With the obstinacy which characterised her, and the infatuation that her successes gave her, she came little by little to translate this capital defect into a 'parti pris,' to formulate it as a system; one man was worth another, in her eyes, so long as he was docile and prompt to obey. … And her idea that one man is worth as much as another causes her, for a mere nothing, for a word that offends her, for a cast of countenance that she finds unpleasing, or even without motive, for the pleasure of change and the delight of having to do with some one new, as she avows naïvely in a letter to Grimm, to set aside, disgraced or merely cashiered, one or another of her most devoted servants."

R. Waliszewski, Romance of an Empress, volume 2, book 2, chapter 1.

ALSO IN: W. Tooke, Life of Catherine II.

Memoirs of Catherine II., by herself.

Princess Daschkaw, Memoirs.

S. Menzies, Royal Favourites.

F. C. Schlosser, History of the 18th Century, volumes 4-7.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1786. Establishment of the Jewish Pale.

See JEWS: A. D. 1727-1880.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1791-1793. Joined in the Coalitions against Revolutionary France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791; 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER); 1793 (MARCH-SEPTEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1796. Accession of Paul.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1798-1799. The war of the Second Coalition against Revolutionary France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1799. Suwarrow's victorious campaign in Italy and failure in Switzerland. Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland. Its disastrous ending.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER); (AUGUST-DECEMBER); and (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1800. Desertion of the Coalition by the Czar. His alliance with Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (JUNE-FEBRUARY).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1800-1801. War with England. The Northern Maritime League and its sudden overthrow at Copenhagen by the British fleet. Peace with England.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1802.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1801. Paul's despotism and assassination. Accession of Alexander I.

The Emperor Paul's "choice of his Ministers was always directed by one dominant idea—that of surrounding himself with servants on whom he could entirely rely; for from the moment of his accession he foresaw and dreaded a Palace revolution. … He erred in the selection, and especially in the extent, of the means which he employed to save his life and his power; they only precipitated his deplorable end. Among the men whom he suspected, he persecuted some with implacable rigour, while he retained others at their posts and endeavoured to secure their fidelity by presents; this, however, only made them ungrateful. Never was there a sovereign more terrible in his severity, or more liberal when he was in a generous mood. But there was no certainty in his favour. A single word uttered intentionally or by accident in a conversation, the shadow of a suspicion, sufficed to make him persecute those whom he had protected. The greatest favourites of to-day feared to be driven from the Court on the morrow, and banished to a distant province. Yet the Emperor wished to be just. … All who belonged to the Court or came before the Emperor were thus in a state of continual fear." This fear, and the hatred which it inspired, produced in due time a conspiracy, headed by Counts Panin and Pahlen, of the Emperor's Council. Purporting to have for its object only the deposition of the Czar, the conspiracy was known and acquiesced in by the heir to the throne, the Grand-Duke Alexander, who had been persuaded to look upon it as a necessary measure for rescuing Russia from a demented ruler. "Paul was precipitating his country into incalculable disasters, and into a complete disorganisation and deterioration of the Government machine. … Although everybody sympathised with the conspiracy, nothing was done until Alexander had given his consent to his father's deposition." Then it was hurried to its accomplishment. The conspirators, including a large number of military and civil officials, supped together, on the evening of March 3, 1801. At midnight, most of them being then intoxicated, they went in a body to the palace, made their way to the Emperor's bed-chamber—resisted by only one young valet—and found him, in his night-clothes, hiding in the folds of a curtain. "They dragged him out in his shirt, more dead than alive; the terror he had inspired was now repaid to him with usury. … {2768} He was placed on a chair before a desk. The long, thin, pale, and angular form of General Bennigsen [a Hanoverian officer, just admitted to the conspiracy, but who had taken the lead when others showed signs of faltering], with his hat on his head and a drawn sword in his hand, must have seemed to him a terrible spectre. 'Sire,' said the General, 'you are my prisoner and have ceased to reign; you will now at once write and sign a deed of abdication in favour of the Grand-Duke Alexander.' Paul was still unable to speak, and a pen was put in his hand. Trembling and almost unconscious, he was about to obey, when more cries were heard. General Bennigsen then left the room, as he has often assured me, to ascertain what these cries meant, and to take steps for securing the safety of the palace and of the Imperial family. He had only just gone out when a terrible scene began. The unfortunate Paul remained alone with men who were maddened by a furious hatred of him. … One of the conspirators took off his official scarf and tied it round the Emperor's throat. Paul struggled. … But the conspirators seized the hand with which he was striving to prolong his life, and furiously tugged at both ends of the scarf. The unhappy emperor had already breathed his last, and yet they tightened the knot and dragged along the dead body, striking it with their bands and feet." When Alexander learned that an assassination instead of a forced abdication had vacated the throne for him, he "was prostrated with grief and despair. … The idea of having caused the death of his father filled him with horror, and he felt that his reputation had received a stain which could never be effaced. … During the first years of his reign, Alexander's position with regard to his father's murderers was an extremely difficult and painful one. For a few months he believed himself to be at their mercy, but it was chiefly his conscience and a feeling of natural equity which prevented him from giving up to justice the most guilty of the conspirators. … The assassins all perished miserably."

Prince Adam Czartoryski, Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 9 and 11.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1805. The Third Coalition against France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1805. The crushing of the Coalition at Austerlitz.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH-DECEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1806-1807. War with Napoleon in aid of Prussia. Battle of Eylau. Treaty of Bartenstein with Prussia. Decisive defeat at Friedland.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER); 1806-1807; and 1807 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1807. Ineffective operations of England as an ally against Turkey. Treaty of Tilsit. Secret understandings of Napoleon with the Czar.

See TURKS: A. D.1806-1807; and GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1807-1810. Northern fruits of the Peace of Tilsit. English seizure of the Danish fleet. War with England and Sweden. Conquest of Finland. Peculiar annexation of the Grand Duchy to the Empire.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1807-1810.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1808. Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1809. Cession of Eastern Galicia by the Emperor of Austria.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1809-1812. War with Turkey. Treaty of Bucharest. Acquisition of Bessarabia.

See TURKS: A. D. 1789-1812.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1810. Grievances against France. Desertion of the Continental System. Resumption of commerce with Great Britain. Rupture with Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (June-September). Napoleon's invasion. Battles of Smolensk and Borodino. The French advance to Moscow.

"With the military resources of France, which then counted 130 departments, with the contingents of her Italian kingdoms, of the Confederation of the Rhine, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and with the auxiliary forces of Prussia and Austria, Napoleon could bring a formidable army into the field. On the first of June the Grand Army amounted to 678,000 men, 356,000 of whom were French, and 322,000 foreigners. It included not only Belgians, Dutchmen, Hanoverians, Hanseats, Piedmontese, and Romans, then confounded under the name of Frenchmen, but also the Italian army, the Neapolitan army, the Spanish regiments, natives of Germany. … Besides Napoleon's marshals, it had at its head Eugene, Viceroy of Italy; Murat, King of Naples; Jerome, King of Westphalia; the princes royal and heirs of nearly all the houses in Europe. The Poles alone in this war, which recalled to them that of 1612, mustered 60,000 men under their standards. Other Slavs from the Illyrian provinces, Carinthians, Dalmatians, and Croats, were led to assault the great Slav empire. It was indeed the 'army of twenty nations,' as it is still called by the Russian people. Napoleon transported all these races from the West to the East by a movement similar to that of the great invasions, and swept them like a human avalanche against Russia. When the Grand Army prepared to cross the Niemen, it was arranged thus:—To the left, before Tilsit, Macdonald with 10,000 French and 20,000 Prussians under General York of Wartenburg; before Kovno, Napoleon with the corps of Davoust, Oudinot, Ney, the Guard commanded by Bessières, the immense reserve cavalry under Murat—in all a total of 180,000 men; before Pilony, Eugène with 50,000 Italians and Bavarians; before Grodno, Jerome Bonaparte, with 60,000 Poles, Westphalians and Saxons, &c. We must add to these the 30,000 Austrians of Schwartzenberg, who were to fight in Gallicia as mildly against the Russians as the Russians had against the Austrians in 1809. Victor guarded the Vistula and the Oder with 30,000 men, Augereau the Elbe with 50,000. Without reckoning the divisions of Macdonald, Schwartzenberg, Victor, and Augereau, it was with about 290,000 men, half of whom were French, that Napoleon marched to cross the Niemen and threaten the centre of Russia. Alexander had collected on the Niemen 90,000 men, commanded by Bagration; on the Bug, tributary to the Vistula, 60,000 men, commanded by Barclay de Tolly; those were what were called the Northern army and the army of the South. On the extreme right, Wittgenstein with 30,000 men was to oppose Macdonald almost throughout the campaign; on the extreme left, to occupy the Austrian Schwartzenberg as harmlessly as possible, Tormassof was placed with 40,000. {2769} Later this latter army, reinforced by 50,000 men from the Danube, became formidable, and was destined, under Admiral Tchitchagof, seriously to embarrass the retreat of the French. In the rear of all these forces was a reserve of 80,000 men—Cossacks and militia. … In reality, to the 290,000 men Napoleon had mustered under his hand, the Emperor of Russia could only oppose the 150,000 of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly. … At the opening of the campaign the head-quarters of Alexander were at Wilna. … They deliberated and argued much. To attack Napoleon was to furnish him with the opportunity he wished; to retire into the interior, as Barclay had advised in 1807, seemed hard and humiliating. A middle course was sought by adopting the scheme of Pfühl—to establish an intrenched camp at Drissa, on the Dwina, and to make it a Russian Torres Vedras. The events in the Peninsula filled all minds. Pfühl desired to act like Wellington at Torres Vedras." But his intrenched camp was badly placed; it was easily turned, and was speedily abandoned when Napoleon advanced beyond the Niemen, which he did on the 24th of June. The Russian armies fell back. "Napoleon made his entry into Wilna, the ancient capital of the Lithuanian Gedimin. He had said in his second proclamation, 'The second Polish war has begun!' The Diet of Warsaw had pronounced the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and sent a deputation to Wilna to demand the adhesion of Lithuania, and to obtain the protection of the Emperor. … Napoleon, whether to please Austria, whether to preserve the possibility of peace with Russia, or whether he was afraid to make Poland too strong, only took half measures. He gave Lithuania an administration distinct from that of Poland. … A last attempt to negotiate a peace had failed. … Napoleon had proposed two unacceptable conditions—the abandonment of Lithuania, and the declaration of war against Great Britain. If Napoleon, instead of plunging into Russia, had contented himself with organising and defending the ancient principality of Lithuania, no power on earth could have prevented the reestablishment of the Polish-Lithuanian State within its former limits. The destinies of France and Europe would have been changed. … Napoleon feared to penetrate into the interior; he would have liked to gain some brilliant success not far from the Lithuanian frontier, and seize one of the two Russian armies. The vast spaces, the bad roads, the misunderstandings, the growing disorganisation of the army, caused all his movements to fail. Barclay de Tolly, after having given battle at Ostrovno and Vitepsk, fell back on Smolensk; Bagration fought at Mohilef and Orcha, and in order to rejoin Barclay retreated to Smolensk. There the two Russian generals held council. Their troops were exasperated by this continual retreat, and Barclay, a good tactician, with a clear and methodical mind, did not agree with Bagration, impetuous, like a true pupil of Souvorof. The one held firmly for a retreat, in which the Russian army would become stronger and stronger, and the French army weaker and weaker, as they advanced into the interior; the other wished to act on the offensive, full of risk as it was. The army was on the side of Bagration, and Barclay, a German of the Baltic provinces, was suspected and all but insulted. He consented to take the initiative against Murat, who had arrived at Krasnoé, and a bloody battle was fought (August 14). On the 16th, 17th, and 18th of August, another desperate fight took place at Smolensk, which was burnt, and 20,000 men perished. Barclay still retired, drawing with him Bagration. In his retreat Bagration fought Ney at Valoutina; it was a lesser Eylau: 15,000 men of both armies remained on the field of battle. Napoleon felt that he was being enticed into the interior of Russia. The Russians still retreated, laying waste all behind them. … The Grand Army melted before their very eyes. From the Niemen to Wilna, without ever having seen the enemy, it had lost 50,000 men from sickness, desertion and marauding; from Wilna to Mohilef nearly 100,000. … In the Russian army, the discontent grew with the retreating movement; … they began to murmur as much against Bagration as against Barclay. It was then that Alexander united the two armies under the supreme command of Koutouzof. … Koutouzof halted at Borodino. He had then 72,000 infantry, 18,000 regular cavalry, 7,000 Cossacks, 10,000 opoltchénié or militiamen, and 640 guns served by 14,000 artillerymen or pioneers; in all, 121,000 men. Napoleon had only been able to concentrate 86,000 infantry, 28,000 cavalry, and 587 guns, served by 16,000 pioneers or artillerymen. … On the 5th of September the French took the redoubt of Chevardino; the 7th was the day of the great battle: this was known as the battle of Borodino among the Russians, as that of the Moskowa in the bulletins of Napoleon, though the Moskowa flows at some distance from the field of carnage. … The battle began by a frightful cannonade of 1,200 guns, which was heard 30 leagues round. Then the French, with an irresistible charge, took Borodino on one side and the redoubts on the other; Ney and Murat crossed the ravine of Semenevskoé, and cut the Russian army nearly in two. At ten o'clock the battle seemed won, but Napoleon refused to carry out his first success by employing the reserve, and the Russian generals had time to bring up new troops in line. They recaptured the great redoubt, and Platof, the Cossack, made an incursion on the rear of the Italian army; an obstinate fight took place at the outworks. At last Napoleon made his reserve troops advance; again Murat's cavalry swept the ravine; Caulaincourt's cuirassiers assaulted the great redoubt from behind, and flung themselves on it like a tempest, while Eugène of Italy scaled the ramparts. Again the Russians had lost their outworks. Then Koutouzof gave the signal to retreat. … The French had lost 30,000 men, the Russians 40,000. … Koutouzof retired in good order, announcing to Alexander that they had made a steady resistance, but were retreating to protect Moscow." But after a council of war, he decided to leave Moscow to its fate, and the retreating Russian army passed through and beyond the city, and the French entered it at their heels.

A. Rambaud, History of Russia, volume 2, chapter 12.

{2770}

"The facts prove beyond doubt that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of an advance upon Moscow, and that Alexander I. and the Russian generals never dreamed of trying to draw him into the heart of the country. Napoleon was led on, not by any plan,—a plan had never been thought of,—but by the intrigues, quarrels, and ambition of men who unconsciously played a part in this terrible war and never foresaw that the result would be the safety of Russia. … Amid these quarrels and intrigues, we are trying to meet the French, although ignorant of their whereabouts. The French encounter Neverovski's division, and approach the walls of Smolensk. It is impossible not to give battle at Smolensk. We must maintain our communications. The battle takes place, and thousands of men on both sides are killed. Contrary to the wishes of the tsar and the people, our generals abandon Smolensk. The inhabitants of Smolensk, betrayed by their governor, set fire to the city, and, with this example to other Russian towns, they take refuge in Moscow, deploring their losses and sowing on every side the seeds of hate against the enemy. Napoleon advances and we retreat, and the result is that we take exactly the measures necessary to conquer the French."

Count L. Tolstoi, The Physiology of War: Napoleon and the Russian Campaign, chapter 1.

ALSO IN: C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 2, chapter 4.

Baron Jomini, Life of Napoleon, chapter 18 (volume 3).

Count P. de Segur, History of the Expedition to Russia, books 1-8 (volumes 1-2).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (September). The French in Moscow. The burning of the city.

"With rapid steps the French army advanced towards the heights whence they hoped to perceive at length the great city of Moscow; and, if the Russians were filled with the utmost sadness, the hearts of the French were equally inspired with feelings of joy and triumph, and the most brilliant illusions. Reduced from 420,000 (which was its number at the passage of the Niemen) to 100,000, and utterly exhausted, our army forgot all its troubles on its approach to the brilliant capital of Muscovy. … Imagination … was strongly excited within them at the idea of entering Moscow, after having entered all the other capitals of Europe with the exception of London, protected by the sea. Whilst Prince Eugene advanced on the left of the army, and Prince Poniatowski on its right, the bulk of the army, with Murat at its head, Davout and Ney in the centre, and the Guard in the rear, followed the great Smolensk road. Napoleon was in the midst of his troops, who, as they gazed upon him and drew near to Moscow, forgot the days of discontent, and uttered loud shouts in honour of his glory and their own. The proposal submitted by Miloradovitch was readily accepted, for the French had no desire to destroy Moscow, and it was agreed that not a shot should be fired during the evacuation, on condition that the Russian army should continue to defile across the city without a moment's halt. … The Russian rear-guard defiled rapidly to yield the ground to our advanced guard, and the King of Naples, followed by his staff and a detachment of cavalry, plunged into the streets of Moscow, and, traversing by turns the humblest quarters and the wealthiest, perceived everywhere the most profound solitude, and seemed to have entered a city of the dead. … The information which was now obtained—that the whole population of the city had fled—saddened the exultation of the commanders of our advanced guard, who had flattered themselves that they would have had the pleasure of surprising the inhabitants by their kindness. … On the morning of the 15th September, Napoleon entered Moscow, at the head of his invincible legions, but passed through a deserted city, and his soldiers were now, for the first time on entering a capital, the sole witnesses of their own glory. Their feelings on the occasion were sad ones. As soon as Napoleon had reached the Kremlin, he hastened to ascend the lofty tower of the great Ivan, and to survey from its elevation the magnificent city he had conquered. … A sullen silence, broken only by the tramp of the cavalry, had replaced that populous life which during the very previous evening had rendered the city one of the most animated in the world. The army was distributed through the various quarters of Moscow, Prince Eugene occupying the northwest quarter, Marshal Davout the southwest, and Prince Poniatowski the southeast. Marshal Ney, who had traversed Moscow from west to east, established his troops in the district comprised between the Riazan and Wladimir roads; and the Guard was naturally posted at the Kremlin and in its environs. The houses were full of provisions of every kind, and the first necessities of the troops were readily satisfied. The Superior officers were received at the gates of palaces by numerous servants in livery, eager in offering a brilliant hospitality; for the owners of these palaces, perfectly unaware that Moscow was about to perish, had taken great pains, although they fully shared the national hatred against the French, to procure protectors for their rich dwellings by receiving into them French officers. … From their splendid lodgings, the officers of the French army wandered with equal delight through the midst of the city, which resembled a Tartar camp sown with Italian palaces. They contemplated with wonder the numerous towns of which the capital is composed, and which are placed in concentric circles, the one within the other. … A few days before, Moscow had contained a population of 300,000 souls, of whom scarcely a sixth part now remained, and of these the greater number were concealed in their houses or prostrated at the foot of the altars. The streets were deserts, and only echoed with the footsteps of our soldiers. … But although the solitude of the city was a source of great vexation to them, they had no suspicion of any approaching catastrophe, for the Russian army, which alone had hitherto devastated their country, had departed, and there appeared to be no fear of fire. The French army hoped, therefore, to enjoy comfort in Moscow, to obtain, probably, peace by means of its possession, and at least good winter-cantonments in case the war should be prolonged. But, on the afternoon they had entered, columns of flame arose from a vast building containing … quantities of spirits, and just as our soldiers had almost succeeded in mastering the fire in this spot, a violent conflagration suddenly burst forth in a collection of buildings called the Bazaar, situated to the northeast of the Kremlin, and containing the richest magazines, abounding in stores of the exquisite tissues of India and Persia, the rarities of Europe, colonial produce, and precious wines. The troops of the Guard immediately hastened up and attempted to subdue the flames; but their energetic efforts were unfortunately unsuccessful, and the immense riches of the establishment fell a prey to the fire, with the exception of some portions which our men were able to snatch from the devouring element. {2771} This fresh accident was again attributed to natural causes, and considered as easily explicable in the tumult of an evacuation. During the night of the 15th of September, however, a sudden change came over the scene; for then as though every species of misfortune were to fall at the same moment on the ancient Muscovite capital, the equinoctial gales suddenly arose with the extreme violence usual to the season and in countries where widespread plains offer no resistance to the storm. This wind, blowing first from the east, carried the fire to the west into the streets comprised between the Iwer and Smolensk routes, which were the most beautiful and the richest in all Moscow. Within some hours the fire, spreading with frightful rapidity, and throwing out long arrows of flame, spread to the other westward quarters. And soon rockets were observed in the air, and wretches were seized in the act of spreading the conflagration. Interrogated under threat of instant death, they revealed the frightful secret,—the order given by Count Rostopschin for the burning of the city of Moscow as though it had been a simple village on the Moscow route. This information filled the whole army with consternation. Napoleon ordered that military commissions should be formed in each quarter of the city for the purpose of judging, shooting, and hanging incendiaries taken in the act, and that all the available troops should be employed in extinguishing the flames. Immediate recourse was had to the pumps, but it was found they had been removed; and this latter circumstance would have proved, if indeed any doubt on the matter had remained, the terrible determination with which Moscow had been given to the flames. In the mean time, the wind, increasing in violence every moment, rendered the efforts of the whole army ineffectual, and, suddenly changing, with the abruptness peculiar to equinoctial gales, from the east to the northwest, it carried the torrent of flame into quarters which the hands of the incendiaries had not yet been able to fire. After having blown during some hours from the northwest, the wind once more changed its direction, and blew from the southwest, as though it had a cruel pleasure in spreading ruin and death over the unhappy city, or, rather, over our army. By this change of the wind to the southwest the Kremlin was placed in extreme peril. More than 400 ammunition wagons were in the court of the Kremlin, and the arsenal contained some 400,000 pounds of powder. There was imminent danger, therefore, that Napoleon with his Guard, and the palace of the Czars, might be blown up into the air. … Napoleon, therefore, followed by some of his lieutenants, descended from the Kremlin to the quay of the Moskowa, where he found his horses ready for him, and had much difficulty in threading the streets, which, towards the northwest (in which direction he proceeded), were already in flames. The terrified army set out from Moscow. The divisions of Prince Eugene and Marshal Ney fell back upon the Zwenigarod and St. Petersburg roads, those of Marshal Davout fell back upon the Smolensk route, and, with the exception of the Guard, which was left around the Kremlin to dispute its possession with the flames, our troops drew back in horror from before the fire, which, after flaming up to heaven, darted back towards them as though it wished to devour them. The few inhabitants who had remained in Moscow, and had hitherto lain concealed in their dwellings, now fled, carrying away such of their possessions as they valued most highly, uttering lamentable cries of distress, and, in many instances, falling victims to the brigands whom Rostopochin had let loose, and who now exulted in the midst of the conflagration, as the genius of evil in the midst of chaos. Napoleon took up his quarters at the Château of Petrowskoié, a league's distance from Moscow on the St. Petersburg route, in the centre of the cantonments of the troops under Prince Eugene, awaiting there the subsidence of the conflagration, which had now reached such a height that it was beyond human power either to increase or extinguish it. As a final misfortune the wind changed on the following day from southwest to direct west, and then the torrents of flame were carried towards the eastern quarters of the city, the streets Messnitskaia and Bassmanaia, and the summer palace. As the conflagration reached its terrible height, frightful crashes were heard every moment,—roofs crushing inward, and stately façades crumbling headlong into the streets as their supports became consumed in the flames. The sky was scarcely visible through the thick cloud of smoke which overshadowed it, and the sun was only apparent as a blood-red globe. For three successive days—the 16th, the 17th, and the 18th of September—this terrific scene continued, and in unabated intensity. At length, after having devoured four-fifths of the city, the fire ceased, gradually quenched by the rain, which, as is usually the case, succeeded the violence of the equinoctial gales. As the flames subsided, only the spectre, as it were, of what had once been a magnificent city was visible; and, indeed, the Kremlin, and about a fifth part of the city, were alone saved,—their preservation being chiefly due to the exertions of the Imperial Guard. As the inhabitants of Moscow themselves entered the ruins, seeking what property still remained in them undestroyed, it was scarcely possible to prevent our soldiers from acting in the same manner. … Of this horrible scene the chiefest horror of all remains to be told: the Russians had left 15,000 wounded in Moscow, and, incapable of escaping, they had perished, victims of Rostopschin's barbarous patriotism."

A. Thiers, History of the] Consulate and the Empire, book 44 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: General Count M. Dumas, Memoirs, chapter 15 (volume 2).

J. Philippart, Northern Campaigns, 1812-1813, volume 1, pages 81-115.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (October-December). The retreat from Moscow. Its horrors.

"Napoleon waited in vain for propositions from the Czar; his own were scornfully rejected. Meanwhile the Russians were reorganizing their armies, and winter set in. On the 13th of October, the first frost gave warning that it was time to think of the retreat, which the enemy, already on the French flank, was threatening to cut off. Leaving Mortier with 10,000 men in the Kremlin, the army quitted Moscow on the 19th of October, thirty-five days after it had entered the city. It still numbered 80,000 fighting men and 600 cannons, but was encumbered with camp-followers and vehicles. At Malo-Jaroslavetz a violent struggle took place on the 24th. The town was captured and recaptured seven times. It was finally left in the hands of the French. Here, however, the route changed. {2772} The road became increasingly difficult, the cold grew intense, the ground was covered with snow, and the confusion in the quartermaster's department was terrible. When the army reached Smolensk, there were only 50,000 men in the ranks (November 9). Napoleon had taken minute precautions to provide supplies and reinforcements all along his line of retreat; but the heedlessness of his subalterns, and the difficulty of being obeyed at such distances and in such a country, rendered his foresight useless. At Smolensk, where he hoped to find provisions and supplies, everything had been squandered. Meanwhile there was not a moment to lose; Wittgenstein, with the army of the North, was coming up on the French right. Tchitchagof was occupying Minsk behind the Beresina, with the army which had just come from the banks of the Danube. Kutusof was near at hand. The three Russian armies proposed to unite and bar the Beresina, which the French were obliged to cross. The French began their march, but the cold became suddenly intense; all verdure had disappeared, and there being no food for the horses, they died by the thousand. The cavalry was forced to dismount; it became necessary to destroy or abandon a large portion of the cannon and ammunition. The enemy surrounded the French columns with a cloud of Cossacks, who captured all stragglers. On the following days the temperature moderated. Then arose another obstacle,—the mud, which prevented the advance; and the famine was constant. Moreover, the retreat was one continuous battle. Ney, 'the bravest of the brave,' accomplished prodigies of valor. At Krasnoi the Emperor himself was obliged to charge at the head of his guard. When the Beresina was reached, the army was reduced to 40,000 fighting men, of whom one-third were Poles. The Russians had burned the bridge of Borisof, and Tchitchagof, on the other shore, barred the passage. Fortunately a ford was found. The river was filled with enormous blocks of ice; General Eblé and his pontoniers, plunged in the water up to their shoulders, built and rebuilt bridges across it. Almost all the pontoniers perished of cold or were drowned. Then, while on the right of the river Ney and Oudinot held back the army of Tchitchagof, and Victor on the left that of Wittgenstein, the guard, with Napoleon, passed over. Victor, after having killed or wounded 10,000 of Wittgenstein's Russians, passed over during the night. When, in the morning, the rear-guard began to cross the bridges, a crowd of fugitives rushed upon them. They were soon filled with a confused mass of cavalry, infantry, caissons, and fugitives. The Russians came up and poured a shower of shells upon the helpless crowd. This frightful scene has ever since been famous as the passage of the Beresina. The governor of Minsk had 24,000 dead bodies picked up and burned. Napoleon conducted the retreat towards Wilna, where the French had large magazines. At Smorgoni he left the army, to repair in all haste to Paris, in order to prevent the disastrous effects of the last events, and to form another army. The army which he had left struggled on under Murat. The cold grew still more intense, and 20,000 men perished in three days. Ney held the enemy a long time in check with desperate valor; be was the last to recross the Niemen (December 20). There the retreat ended, and with it this fatal campaign. Beyond that river the French left 300,000 soldiers, either dead or in captivity."

Victor Duruy, History of France, chapter 66.

"Thousands of horses soon lay groaning on the route, with great pieces of flesh cut off their necks and most fleshy parts by the passing soldiery for food; whilst thousands of naked wretches were wandering like spectres, who seemed to have no sight or sense, and who only kept reeling on till frost, famine, or the Cossack lance put an end to their power of motion. In that wretched state no nourishment could have saved them. There were continual instances, even amongst the Russians, of their lying down, dozing, and dying within a quarter of an hour after a little bread had been supplied. All prisoners, however, were immediately and invariably stripped stark naked and marched in columns in that state, or turned adrift to be the sport and the victims of the peasantry, who would not always let them, as they sought to do, point and hold the muzzles of the guns against their own heads or hearts to terminate their suffering in the most certain and expeditious manner; for the peasantry thought that this mitigation of torture 'would be an offence against the avenging God of Russia, and deprive them of his further protection.' A remarkable instance of this cruel spirit of retaliation was exhibited on the pursuit to Wiazma. Milaradowitch, Beningsen, Korf, and the English General, with various others, were proceeding on the high-road, about a mile from the town, where they found a crowd of peasant-women, with sticks in their hands, hopping round a felled pine-tree, on each side of which lay about sixty naked prisoners, prostrate, but with their heads on the tree, which those furies were striking in accompaniment to a national air or song which they were yelling in concert; while several hundred armed peasants were quietly looking on as guardians of the direful orgies. When the cavalcade approached, the sufferers uttered piercing shrieks, and kept incessantly crying 'La mort, la mort, la mort!' Near Dorogobouche a young and handsome Frenchwoman lay naked, writhing in the snow, which was ensanguined all around her. On hearing the sound of voices she raised her head, from which extremely long black, shining hair flowed over the whole person. Tossing her arms about with wildest expression of agony, she kept frantically crying, 'Rendez moi mon enfant'—Restore me my babe. When soothed sufficiently to explain her story, she related, 'That on sinking from weakness, a child newly born had been snatched away from her; that she had been stripped by her associates, and then stabbed to prevent her falling alive into the hands of their pursuers.' … The slaughter of the prisoners with every imaginable previous mode of torture by the peasantry still continuing, the English General sent off a despatch to the Emperor Alexander' to represent the horrors of these outrages and propose a check.' The Emperor by an express courier instantly transmitted an order 'to prohibit the parties under the severest menaces of his displeasure and punishment;' at the same time he directed 'a ducat in gold to be paid for any prisoner delivered up by peasant or soldier to any civil authority for safe custody.' The order was beneficial as well as creditable, but still the conductors were offered a higher price for their charge, and frequently were prevailed on to surrender their trust, for they doubted the justifiable validity of the order. {2773} Famine also ruthlessly decimated the enemy's ranks. Groups were frequently overtaken, gathered round the burning or burnt embers of buildings which had afforded cover for some wounded or frozen; many in these groups were employed in peeling off with their fingers and making a repast of the charred flesh of their comrades' remains. The English General having asked a grenadier of most martial expression, so occupied, 'if this food was not loathsome to him?' 'Yes,' he said, 'it was; but he did not eat it to preserve life—that he had sought in vain to lose—only to lull gnawing agonies.' On giving the grenadier a piece of food, which happened to be at command, he seized it with voracity, as if he would devour it whole; but suddenly checking himself, he appeared suffocating with emotion: looking at the bread, then at the donor, tears rolled down his cheeks; endeavouring to rise, and making an effort as if he would catch at the hand which administered to his want, he fell back and had expired before he could be reached. Innumerable dogs crouched on the bodies of their former masters, looking in their faces, and howling their hunger and their loss; whilst others were tearing the still living flesh from the feet, hands, and limbs of moaning wretches who could not defend themselves, and whose torment was still greater, as in many cases their consciousness and senses remained unimpaired. The clinging of the dogs to their masters' corpses was most remarkable and interesting. At the commencement of the retreat, at a village near Selino, a detachment of fifty of the enemy had been surprised. The peasants resolved to bury them alive in a pit: a drummer boy bravely led the devoted party and sprang into the grave. A dog belonging to one of the victims could not be secured; every day, however, the dog went to the neighbouring camp, and came back with a bit of food in his mouth to sit and moan over the newly-turned earth. It was a fortnight before he could be killed by the peasants, afraid of discovery. The peasants showed the English General the spot and related the occurrence with exultation, as if they had performed a meritorious deed. The shots of the peasantry at stragglers or prisoners rang continuously through the woods; and altogether it was a complication of misery, of cruelty, of desolation, and of disorder, that can never have been exceeded in the history of mankind. Many incidents and crimes are indeed too horrible or disgusting for relation."

General Sir R. Wilson, Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia, pages 255-261.

General Sir R. Wilson, Private Journal, volume 1, page 202-257.

When Napoleon abandoned the army, at Smorghoni, on the 6th of December, the King of Naples was left in command. "They marched with so much disorder and precipitation that it was only when they arrived at Wilna that the soldiers were informed of a departure as discouraging as it was unexpected. 'What!' said they among themselves, 'is it thus that he abandons those of whom he calls himself the father? Where then is that genius, who, in the height of prosperity, exhorted us to bear our sufferings patiently? He who lavished our blood, is he afraid to die with us? Will he treat us like the army of Egypt, to whom, after having served him faithfully, he became indifferent, when, by a shameful flight, he found himself free from danger?' Such was the conversation of the soldiers, which they accompanied by the most violent execrations. Never was indignation more just, for never were a class of men so worthy of pity. The presence of the emperor had kept the chiefs to their duty, but when they heard of his departure, the greater part of them followed his example, and shamefully abandoned the remains of the regiments with which they had been intrusted. … The road which we followed presented, at every step, brave officers, covered with rags, supported by branches of pine, their hair and beards stiffened by the ice. These warriors, who, a short time before, were the terror of our enemies, and the conquerors of Europe, having now lost their fine appearance, crawled slowly along, and could scarcely obtain a look of pity from the soldiers whom they had formerly commanded. Their situation became still more dreadful, because all who had not strength to march were abandoned, and every one who was abandoned by his comrades, in an hour afterwards inevitably perished. The next day every bivouac presented the image of a field of battle. … The soldiers burnt whole houses to avoid being frozen. We saw round the fires the half-consumed bodies of many unfortunate men, who, having advanced too near, in order to warm themselves, and being too weak to recede, had become a prey to the flames. Some miserable beings, blackened with smoke, and besmeared with the blood of the horses which they had devoured, wandered like ghosts round the burning houses. They gazed on the dead bodies of their companions, and, too feeble to support themselves, fell down, and died like them. … The route was covered with soldiers who no longer retained the human form, and whom the enemy disdained to make prisoners. Every day these miserable men made us witnesses of scenes too dreadful to relate. Some had lost their hearing, others their speech, and many, by excessive cold and hunger, were reduced to a state of frantic stupidity, in which they roasted the dead bodies of their comrades for food, or even gnawed their own hands and arms. Some were so weak that, unable to lift a piece of wood, or roll a stone towards the fires which they had kindled, they sat upon the dead bodies of their comrades, and, with a haggard countenance, steadfastly gazed upon the burning coals. No sooner was the fire extinguished, than these living spectres, unable to rise, fell by the side of those on whom they had sat. We saw many who were absolutely insane. To warm their frozen feet, they plunged them naked into the middle of the fire. Some, with a convulsive laugh, threw themselves into the flames, and perished in the most horrid convulsions, and uttering the most piercing cries; while others, equally insane, immediately followed them, and experienced the same fate."

E. Labaume, Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia, part 2, book 5.

ALSO IN: Count P. de Segur, History of the Expedition to Russia, books 9-12 (volume 2).

C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 2, chapter 5.

Earl Stanhope, The French Retreat from Moscow (Historical Essays; and, also, Quarterly Review., October 1867, volume 123).

Baron de Marbot, Memoirs, volume 2, chapters 28-32.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812-1813. Treaty of Kalisch with Prussia. The War of Liberation in Germany. Alliance of Austria. The driving of the French beyond the Rhine.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1814.

{2774}

RUSSIA: A. D. 1814 (January-April). The Allies in France and in possession of Paris. Fall of Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH), and (MARCH-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1814 (May). The Treaty of Paris. Evacuation of France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL-JUNE).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1814-1815. The Congress of Vienna. Acquisitions in Poland. Surrender of Eastern Galicia.

See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1815. Napoleon's return from Elba. The Quadruple Alliance. The Waterloo campaign and its results.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815, to 1815 (JUNE-AUGUST).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1815. The Allies again in France. Second Treaty of Paris.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY-NOVEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1815. The Holy Alliance.

See HOLY ALLIANCE.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1817. Expulsion of Jesuits.

See JESUITS: A. D. 1769-1871.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1820-1822. The Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona.

See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1825. Accession of Nicholas.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1827-1829. Intervention on behalf of Greece. Battle of Navarino.

See GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1830-1832. Polish revolt and its suppression. Barbarous treatment of the insurgents.

See POLAND: A. D. 1830-1832.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1831-1846. Joint occupation of Cracow. Extinction of the republic. Its annexation to Austria.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1833-1840. The Turko-Egyptian question and its settlement.

See TURKS: A. D. 1831-1840.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1839-1859. Subjugation of the Caucasus.

See CAUCASUS.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1849. Aid rendered to Austria against the Hungarian patriots.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1853-1854. Causes of the Crimean War with Turkey, England and France.

"The immediate cause of the war which broke out in 1853 was a dispute which had arisen between France and Russia upon the custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The real cause was the intention of Russia to hasten the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Nicholas, in a memorable conversation, actually suggested to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that England should receive Egypt and Crete as her own portion of the spoil. This conversation, which took place in January 1853, was at once reported to the British Government. It undoubtedly prepared the way for future trouble. … It had the effect of rendering the British Ministry suspicious of his intentions, at a moment when a good understanding with this country was of the first importance to the Czar of Russia. There can, then, be very little doubt that Nicholas committed a grave error in suggesting a partition, which may have seemed reasonable enough to Continental statesmen, but which was regarded with horror by England. Almost at the same moment he affronted France by declining to call Napoleon 'Monsieur mon frère.' … Nicholas had the singular indiscretion to render a British ministry suspicious of him, and a French emperor angry with him, in the same month. Napoleon could easily avenge the affront. … The Greek and Latin Churches both claimed the right of protecting the Holy Places of Palestine. Both appealed to a Mahometan arrangement in support of their claim: each declined to admit the pretensions of the other. The Latin Church in Palestine was under the protection of France; the Greek Church was under the protection of Russia; and France and Russia had constantly supported, one against the other, these rival claims. In the beginning of 1853 France renewed the controversy. She even threatened to settle the question by force. The man whom Nicholas would not call 'mon frère' was stirring a controversy thick with trouble for the Czar of Russia. It happened, moreover, that the controversy was one which, from its very nature, was certain to spread. Nearly eighty years before, by the Treaty of Kainardji, the Porte had undertaken to afford a constant protection to its Christian subjects, and to place a new Greek Church at Constantinople, which it undertook to erect, 'and the ministers who officiated at it under the specific protection of the Russian Empire.' The exact meaning of this famous article had always been disputed. In Western Europe it had been usually held that it applied only to the new Greek Church at Constantinople, and the ministers who officiated at it. But Russian statesmen had always contended that its meaning was much wider; and British statesmen of repute had supported the contention. The general undertaking which the Porte had given to Russia to afford a constant protection to its Christian subjects gave Russia —so they argued—the right to interfere when such protection was not afforded. In such a country as Turkey, where chronic misgovernment prevailed, opportunity was never wanting for complaining that the Christians were inadequately protected. The dispute about the Holy Places was soon superseded by a general demand of Russia for the adequate protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte; In the summer of 1853 the demand took the shape of an ultimatum; and, when the Turkish ministers declined to comply with the Russian demand, a Russian army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities. In six months a miserable quarrel about the custody of the Holy Places had assumed dimensions which were clearly threatening war. At the advice of England the Porte abstained from treating the occupation of the Principalities as an act of war; and diplomacy consequently secured an interval for arranging peace. The Austrian Government framed a note, which is known as the Vienna Note, as a basis of a settlement. England and the neutral powers assented to the note; Russia accepted it; and it was then presented to the Porte. But Turkey, with the obstinacy which has always characterised its statesmen, declined to accept it. War might even then have been prevented if the British Government had boldly insisted on its acceptance, and had told Turkey that if she modified the conditions she need not count on England's assistance. One of the leading members of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry wished to do this, and declared to the last hour of his life that this course should have been taken. {2775} But the course was not taken. Turkey was permitted, or, according to Baron Stockmar, encouraged to modify the Vienna Note; the modifications were rejected by Russia; and the Porte, on the 26th of September, delivered an ultimatum, and on the 4th of October 1853 declared war. These events excited a very widespread indignation in this country. The people, indeed, were only imperfectly acquainted with the causes which had produced the quarrel; many of them were unaware that the complication had been originally introduced by the act of France; others of them failed to reflect that the refusal of the Porte to accept a note which the four Great Powers—of which England was one—had agreed upon was the immediate cause of hostilities. Those who were better informed thought that the note was a mistake, and that the Turk had exercised a wise discretion in rejecting it; while the whole nation instinctively felt that Russia, throughout the negotiations, had acted with unnecessary harshness. In October 1853, therefore, the country was almost unanimously in favour of supporting the Turk. The events of the next few weeks turned this feeling into enthusiasm. The Turkish army, under Omar Pasha, proved its mettle by winning one or two victories over the Russian troops. The Turkish fleet at Sinope was suddenly attacked and destroyed. Its destruction was, undoubtedly, an act of war: it was distorted into an act of treachery; a rupture between England and Russia became thenceforward inevitable; and in March 1854 England and France declared war."

S. Walpole, Foreign Relations, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: A. W. Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, volume l.

J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, volume 2, chapter 6.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854 (September). The Crimean War: Landing of the Allies. Battle of the Alma. Sufferings of the invading army.

"England, then, and France entered the war as allies. Lord Raglan, formerly Lord Fitzroy Somerset, an old pupil of the Great Duke in the Peninsular War, and who had lost his right arm serving under Wellington at Waterloo, was appointed to command the English forces. Marshal St. Arnaud, a bold, brilliant soldier of fortune, was intrusted by the Emperor of the French with the leadership of the soldiers of France. The allied forces went out to the East and assembled at Varna, on the Black Sea shore, from which they were to make their descent on the Crimea. The war, meantime, had gone badly for the Emperor of Russia in his attempt to crush the Turks. The Turks had found in Omar Pasha a commander of remarkable ability and energy; and they had in one or two instances received the unexpected aid and counsel of clever and successful Englishmen. … The invasion of the Danubian provinces was already, to all intents, a failure. Mr. Kinglake and other writers have argued that but for the ambition of the Emperor of the French and the excited temper of the English people the war might well have ended then and there. The Emperor of Russia had found, it is contended, that he could not maintain an invasion of European Turkey; his fleet was confined to its ports in the Black Sea, and there was nothing for him but to make peace. But we confess we do not see with what propriety or wisdom the allies, having entered on the enterprise at all, could have abandoned it at such a moment, and allowed the Czar to escape thus merely scotched. … The allies went on. They sailed from Varna for the Crimea. … There is much discussion as to the original author of the project for the invasion of the Crimea. The Emperor Napoleon has had it ascribed to him; so has Lord Palmerston; so has the Duke of Newcastle; so, according to Mr. Kinglake, has the 'Times' newspaper. It does not much concern us to know in whom the idea originated, but it is of some importance to know that it was essentially a civilian's and not a soldier's idea. It took possession almost simultaneously, as far as we can observe, of the minds of several statesmen, and it had a sudden fascination for the public. The Emperor Nicholas had raised and sheltered his Black Sea fleet at Sebastopol. That fleet had sallied forth from Sebastopol to commit what was called the massacre of Sinope. Sebastopol was the great arsenal of Russia. It was the point from which Turkey was threatened; from which, it was universally believed, the embodied ambition of Russia was one day to make its most formidable effort of aggression. Within the fence of its vast sea-forts the fleet of the Black Sea lay screened. From the moment when the vessels of England and France entered the Euxine the Russian fleet had withdrawn behind the curtain of these defences, and was seen upon the open waves no more. If, therefore, Sebastopol could be taken or destroyed, it would seem as if the whole material fabric, put together at such cost and labor for the execution of the schemes of Russia, would be shattered at a blow. … The invasion of the Crimea, however, was not a soldier's project. It was not welcomed by the English or the French commander. It was undertaken by Lord Raglan out of deference to the recommendations of the Government; and by Marshal St. Arnaud out of deference to the Emperor of the French, and because Lord Raglan, too, did not see his way to decline the responsibility of it. The allied forces were, therefore, conveyed to the south-western shore of the Crimea, and effected a landing in Kalamita Bay, a short distance north of the point at which the river Alma runs into the sea. Sebastopol itself lies about 30 miles to the south; and then, more southward still, divided by the bulk of a jutting promontory from Sebastopol, is the harbor of Balaklava. The disembarkation began on the morning of September 14th, 1854. It was completed on the fifth day; and there were then some 27,000 English, 30,000 French, and 7,000 Turks landed on the shores of Catherine the Great's Crimea. The landing was effected without any opposition from the Russians. On September 19th, the allies marched out of their encampments and moved southward in the direction of Sebastopol. They had a skirmish or two with a reconnoitring force of Russian cavalry and Cossacks; but they had no business of genuine war until they reached the nearer bank of the Alma. The Russians, in great strength, had taken up a splendid position on the heights that fringed the other side of the river. The allied forces reached the Alma about noon on September 20th. They found that they had to cross the river in the face of the Russian batteries armed with heavy guns on the highest point of the hills or bluffs, of scattered artillery, and of dense masses of infantry which covered the hills. The Russians were under the command of Prince Mentschikoff. {2776} It is certain that Prince Mentschikoff believed his position unassailable, and was convinced that his enemies were delivered into his hands when he saw the allies approach and attempt to effect the crossing of the river. … The attack was made with desperate courage on the part of the allies, but without any great skill of leadership or tenacity of discipline. It was rather a pell-mell sort of fight, in which the headlong courage and the indomitable obstinacy of the English and French troops carried all before them at last. A study of the battle is of little profit to the ordinary reader. It was an heroic scramble. There was little coherence of action between the allied forces. But there was happily an almost total absence of generalship on the part of the Russians. The soldiers of the Czar fought stoutly and stubbornly, as they have always done; but they could not stand up against the blended vehemence and obstinacy of the English and French. The river was crossed, the opposite heights were mounted, Prince Mentschikoff's great redoubt was carried, the Russians were driven from the field, the allies occupied their ground; the victory was to the Western Powers. … The Russians ought to have been pursued. They themselves fully expected a pursuit. They retreated in something like utter confusion. … But there was no pursuit. Lord Raglan was eager to follow up the victory; but the French had as yet hardly any cavalry, and Marshal St. Arnaud would not agree to any further enterprise that day. Lord Raglan believed that he ought not to persist; and nothing was done. … Except for the bravery of those who fought, the battle was not much to boast of. … At this distance of time it is almost touching to read some of the heroic contemporaneous descriptions of the great scramble of the Alma. … Very soon, however, a different note came to be sounded. The campaign had been opened under conditions differing from those of most campaigns that went before it. Science had added many new discoveries to the art of war. Literature had added one remarkable contribution of her own to the conditions amidst which campaigns were to be carried on. She had added the 'special correspondent.' … When the expedition was leaving England it was accompanied by a special correspondent from each of the great daily papers of London. The 'Times' sent out a representative whose name almost immediately became celebrated—Mr. William Howard Russell, the 'preux chevalier' of war correspondents in that day, as Mr. Archibald Forbes of the 'Daily News' is in this. … Mr. Russell soon saw that there was confusion; and he had the soundness of judgment to know that the confusion was that of a breaking-down system. Therefore, while the fervor of delight in the courage and success of our army was still fresh in the minds of the public at home, while every music-hall was ringing with the cheap rewards of valor, in the shape of popular glorifications of our commanders and our soldiers, the readers of the 'Times' began to learn that things were faring badly indeed with the conquering army of the Alma. The ranks were thinned by the ravages of cholera. The men were pursued by cholera to the very battle-field, Lord Raglan himself said. … The hospitals were in a wretchedly disorganized condition. Stores of medicines and strengthening food were decaying in places where no one wanted them or could well get at them, while men were dying in hundreds among our tents in the Crimea for lack of them. The system of clothing, of transport, of feeding, of nursing—everything had broken down. Ample provisions had been got together and paid for; and when they came to be needed no one knew where to get at them. The special correspondent of the 'Times' and other correspondents continued to din these things into the ears of the public at home. Exultation began to give way to a feeling of dismay. The patriotic anger against the Russians was changed for a mood of deep indignation against our own authorities and our own war administration. It soon became apparent to everyone that the whole campaign had been planned on the assumption that it was to be like the career of the hero whom Byron laments, 'brief, brave, and glorious.' Our military authorities here at home—we do not speak of the commanders in the field—had made up their minds that Sebastopol was to fall, like another Jericho, at the sound of the war-trumpets' blast. Our commanders in the field were, on the contrary, rather disposed to overrate than to underrate the strength of the Russians. … It is very likely that if a sudden dash had been made at Sebastopol by land and sea, it might have been taken almost at the very opening of the war. But the delay gave the Russians full warning, and they did not neglect it. On the third day after the battle of the Alma the Russians sank seven vessels of their Black Sea fleet at the entrance of the harbor of Sebastopol. This was done full in the sight of the allied fleets, who at first, misunderstanding the movements going on among the enemy, thought the Russian squadron were about to come out from their shelter and try conclusions with the Western ships. But the real purpose of the Russians became soon apparent. Under the eyes of the allies the seven vessels slowly settled down and sank in the water, until at last only the tops of their masts were to be seen; and the entrance of the harbor was barred as by sunken rocks against any approach of an enemy's ship. There was an end to every dream of a sudden capture of Sebastopol."

J. McCarthy, History of Our Own Times, chapter 27 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: General Sir E. Hamley, The War in the Crimea, chapters 2-3.

W. H. Russell, The British Expedition to the Crimea, books 1-2.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854 (September-October). Opening of the siege of Sebastopol.

Four days after the battle of the Alma the allies reached the Belbek, so close to Sebastopol that "it became a matter of necessity to decide upon their next step. It appears to have been the wish of the English at once to take advantage of their victory and assault the north side. It is now known that such a step would almost certainly have been successful. … But again St. Arnaud offered objections." It was then determined "to undertake a flank march round the head of the harbour, and to take possession of the heights on the south. It was a difficult operation, for the country was unknown and rough, and while in the act of marching the armies were open to any assault upon their left flank. It was however carried out unmolested. … On the 26th the English arrived at the little landlocked harbour of Balaclava, at the foot of the steep hills forming the eastern edge of the plateau. The fleet, duly warned of the operation, had already arrived. … {2777} Canrobert … had now succeeded the dying St. Arnaud. … A similar question to that which had arisen on the 24th now again rose. Should Sebastopol be attacked at once or not? Again it would appear that Lord Raglan, Sir Edmund Lyons, and others, were desirous of immediate assault. Again the French, more instructed in the technical rules of war, and supported by the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, who commanded the English Engineers, declined the more vigorous suggestion, and it was determined at least to wait till the siege guns from the fleet were landed, and the artillery fire of the enemy weakened, in preparation for the assault. In the light of subsequent knowledge, and perhaps even with the knowledge then obtainable if rightly used, it appears that in all the three instances mentioned the bolder less regular course would have been the true wisdom. For Menschikoff had adopted a somewhat strange measure of defence. He had given up all hopes of using his fleet to advantage. He had caused some of his vessels to be sunk at the entrance of the harbour, which was thus closed; and having drawn the crews, some 18,000 in number, from the ships, he had intrusted to them the defence of the town, and had marched away with his whole army. The garrison did not now number more than 25,000, and they were quite unfit—being sailors—for operations in the field. The defences were not those of a regular fortress, but rather of an entrenched position. … There were in Sebastopol two men who, working together, made an extraordinary use of their opportunities. Korniloff, the Admiral, forcing himself to the front by sheer nobleness of character and enthusiasm, found in Colonel von Todleben, at that time on a voluntary mission in the town, an assistant of more than common genius. … The decision of the allies to await the landing of their siege train was more far-reaching than the generals at the time conceived, although some few men appear to have understood its necessary result. It in fact changed what was intended to be a rapid coup de main into a regular siege—and a regular siege of an imperfect and inefficient character, because the allied forces were not strong enough to invest the town. … Preparation had not been made to meet the change of circumstances. The work thrown upon the administration was beyond its powers; the terrible suffering of the army during the ensuing winter was the inevitable result. … The bombardment of the suburb, including the Malakoff and the Redan, fell to the English; the French undertook to carry it out against the city itself, directing their fire principally against the Flagstaff battery. … Slowly the siege trains were landed and brought into position in the batteries marked out by the engineers. … It was not till the 16th of October that these preparations were completed. … The energy of Korniloff and the skill of Todleben had by this time roused the temper of the garrison, and had rendered the defences far more formidable; and in the beginning of October means had been taken to persuade Menschikoff to allow considerable bodies of troops to return to the town. … On the 17th the great bombardment began. The English batteries gained the mastery over those opposed to them, but the efforts of the French, much reduced by the fire of the besieged, were brought to a speedy conclusion by a great explosion within their lines. Canrobert sent word to Lord Raglan that he should be unable to resume the fire for two days. The attack by the fleet had been to little purpose. … Every day till the 25th of October the fire of the allies was continued. But under cover of this fire (always encountered by the ceaseless energy of Todleben) the change had begun, and the French were attacking the Flagstaff bastion by means of regular approaches. On that day the siege was somewhat rudely interrupted. The presence of the Russian army outside the walls and the defect in the position of the allies became evident."

J. F. Bright, History of England, 1837-1880, pages 251-256.

ALSO IN: A. W. Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, volumes 3-4.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854 (October-November). The Crimean War: Balaclava and Inkermann.

"The Russian general soon showed that he was determined not to allow the allies to carry on their operations against the town undisturbed. Large parties of Russian soldiers had for some time been reconnoitring in the direction of Balaclava, showing that an attack in that quarter was meditated. At length, on the 25th of October, an army of 30,000 Russians advanced against the English position, hoping to get possession of the harbours and to cut the allies off from their supplies, or at any rate to destroy the stores which had already been landed. The part of the works on which the Russian troops first came was occupied by redoubts, defended by a body of Turkish recruits, recently arrived from Tunis, who, after offering a very feeble resistance, fled in confusion. But when the Russians, flushed with this first success, attempted to pursue the advantage they had gained, they soon encountered a very different foe in the Highlanders, commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, who bore the brunt of the Russian attack with great firmness. The British cavalry particularly distinguished themselves in this action, routing a far superior force of Russian cavalry. It was in the course of this engagement that the unfortunate blunder occurred, in consequence of which 607 men [the 'Light Brigade' immortalized by Tennyson] galloped forth against an army, and only 198 came back, the rest having been killed, wounded, or made prisoners. A long, unsatisfactory controversy was carried on some time after, having for its object to decide who was to blame for throwing away, in this foolish manner, the lives of so many gallant men. It seems that the orders were not very clearly expressed, and that the general—Lord Lucan—by whom they were received, misapprehended them more completely than a man in his position ought to have done. In the end, the Russians were forced to retire, without having effected their object: but as they retained some portion of the ground that had been occupied by the allies at the commencement of the battle, they too claimed the victory, and Te-Deums were sung all over Russia in honour of this fragmentary success. However, the Russian commander did not abandon the hope of being able to obtain possession of Balaclava. On the very day following the affair which has just been related, the Russians within the town made a sortie with a force of about 6,000 men: but near the village of Inkermann they encountered so strong a resistance from a far inferior force, that they were obliged to retreat. {2778} The Russian army at Balaclava had been prepared to coöperate with them; but the promptitude and vigour with which the allies repelled the sortie prevented the Russians from entrenching themselves at Inkermann, and thus frustrated the plan of a combined attack on the allied position which had probably been formed. The village of Inkermann, which was the scene of this skirmish, shortly after witnessed a more deadly and decisive contest. It was on the morning of Sunday, November 5th, that the approach of the Russian army was heard, while it was still concealed from view by the mists which overhung the British position. That army had been greatly increased by the arrival of large reinforcements, and every effort had been made to exalt the courage of the soldiers: they had been stimulated by religious services and exhortations, as well as by an abundant supply of ardent spirits; and they came on in the full confidence that they would be able to sweep the comparatively small British force from the position it occupied. That position was the centre of a grand attack made by the whole Russian army. The obscurity prevented the generals of the allies from discovering what was going on, or from clearly discerning, among a series of attacks on different parts of their position, which were real, and which were mere feints. There was a good deal of confusion in both armies; but the obscurity, on the whole, favoured the Russians, who had received their instructions before they set out, and were moving together in large masses. It was, in fact, a battle fought pell-mell, man against man, and regiment against regiment, with very little guidance or direction from the commanding officers, and consequently one in which the superior skill of the British gave them little advantage. The principal point of attack throughout was the plateau of Inkermann, occupied by the Guards and a few British regiments, who maintained a long and unequal struggle against the main body of the Russian army. It was, in fact, a hand-to-hand contest between superior civilization on the one hand, and superior numbers on the other, in which it is probable that the small British force would have been eventually swept off the field. Bosquet, the ablest of the French generals, with a soldier's instinct at once divined, amid all the obscurity, turmoil, and confusion, that the British position was the real point of attack; and therefore, leaving a portion of his force to defend his own position, he marched off to Inkermann, and never halted till his troops charged the Russians with such fury that they drove them down the hill, and decided the fate of the battle in favour of the allies. … Meanwhile Mr. Sidney Herbert, the minister at war, had succeeded in inducing Miss Florence Nightingale, well known in London for her skilful and self-denying benevolence, to go out and take charge of the military hospitals in which the wounded soldiers were received. Everything connected with the hospitals there was in a state of the most chaotic confusion. The medical and other stores which had been sent out were rotting in the holds of vessels, or in places where they were not wanted. Provisions had been despatched in abundance, and yet nothing could be found to support men who were simply dying from exhaustion. The system of check and counter-check, which had been devised to prevent waste and extravagance in the time of peace, proved to be the very cause of the most prodigious waste, extravagance, and inefficiency in the great war in which England was now embarked. The sort of dictatorial authority which had been conferred on Miss Nightingale, supported by her own admirable organising and administrative ability, enabled her to substitute order for confusion, and procure for the multitudes of wounded men who came under her care the comforts as well as the medical attendance they needed. She arrived at Scutari with her nurses on the very day of the battle of Inkermann. Winter was setting-in in the Crimea with unusual rigour and severity."

W. N. Molesworth, History of England, 1830-1874, volume 3, chapter 1.

ALSO IN: E. H. Nolan, Illustrated History of the War against Russia, chapters 40-48 (volume 1).

Chambers' Pictorial History of the Russian War, chapters 7-8.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854-1855. Siege and capture of Kars.

"Everywhere unsuccessful in Europe, the Russians were more fortunate in Asia. Towards the close of 1854, the Turkish army at Kars was in a wretched and demoralised condition. Its unsatisfactory state, and the reverses it had experienced, resulting, it was well known, from the misconduct of the Turkish officials, induced the British government to appoint Colonel Williams as a commissioner to examine into the causes of previous failures, and endeavour to prevent a repetition of them. … Colonel Williams, attended only by major Teesdale and Dr. Sandwith, arrived at Kars at the latter end of September, 1854, where he was received with the honour due to his position. Kars, in past times considered the key of Asia Minor, is 'a true Asiatic town in all its picturesque squalor,' and has a fortress partly in ruins, but once considered most formidable. On inspecting the Turkish army there, Colonel Williams found the men in rags; their pay fifteen and even eighteen months in arrear; the horses half-starved; discipline so relaxed that it could be scarcely said to exist; and the officers addicted to the lowest vices and most disorderly habits. … Though treated with an unpardonable superciliousness and neglect by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople, Colonel Williams succeeded in promoting a proper discipline, and in securing the men from being plundered by their officers. In the January of 1855, the Turkish government granted Colonel Williams the rank of terik, or general in the Ottoman army, together with the title of Williams Pasha. The inactivity of the Russian army at Gumri excited much surprise; but notwithstanding the condition of the Turks, they permitted spring to pass away, and summer to arrive, before active hostilities were resumed. … During this period, the Turks at Kars had been employed, under the direction of colonel Lake, in throwing up fortifications around the town, which gradually assumed the appearance of a formidably intrenched camp. Early in June the Russians left Gumri, and encamped within five leagues of Kars. They were estimated at 40,000 men; while the Turkish troops amounted to about 15,000 men, who had been familiarised with defeat, and scourged by fever and the scurvy. In addition to this, their provisions were insufficient to enable them to sustain a siege of any considerable duration, and their stock of ammunition was very low The Russians made a partial attack on the town on the 16th of June, but they met with a repulse. … The road to Erzeroum was in their possession, and the supplies intended for the Turks fell into their hands. {2779} In effect, they had blockaded Kars by drawing a cordon of troops around it. A period of dreary inaction followed this movement of the Russians, broken only by trivial skirmishes at the outposts. Want was already felt within the town, and the prospect of surrender or starvation was imminent. … Omar Pasha, and a large body of Turkish troops from the Crimea, had landed at Batoum, and it was expected that they would soon arrive to raise the siege of Kars. This circumstance, occurring shortly after the arrival of the news of the fall of Sebastopol, induced many of the officers of the besieged army to believe that the Russians were about to retire. This surmise was strengthened by the fact, that, for several days, large convoys of heavily laden waggons were observed leaving the Russian camp. General Williams, however, was not deceived by this artifice, and correctly regarded it as the prelude to an extensive attack upon Kars. An hour before dawn on the 29th of September, the tramp of troops and the rumble of artillery wheels was heard in the distance, and the Turkish garrison made hurried preparations to receive the foe. Soon the dim moonlight revealed a dark moving mass in the valley. It was an advancing column of the enemy, who had hoped to take the Turks by surprise. In this they were deceived; for no sooner were they within range, than a crushing shower of grape informed them that the Moslems were on the alert. The battle commenced almost immediately. The assailants rushed up the hill with a shout, and advanced in close column on the breastworks and redoubts. From these works a murderous fire of musketry and rifles was poured forth, aided by showers of grape from the great guns. This told with terrible effect upon the dense masses of the foe, who fell in heaps. … Riddled with shot, the Russians were completely broken, and sent headlong down the hill, leaving hundreds of dead behind them. … Had not the Turkish cavalry been destroyed by starvation—a circumstance which rendered pursuit impossible—the Russian army might have been almost annihilated. The Turks had obtained an unequivocal victory, after a battle of nearly seven hours' duration. Their loss did not exceed 463 killed, of whom 101 were townspeople, and 631 wounded. That of the Russians was enormous; 6,300 of them were left dead upon the field, and it is said that they carried 7,000 wounded off the ground. Though the Russians had suffered a severe reverse, they were not driven from the position they held prior to the battle … and were enabled to resume the blockade of the city with as much strictness as before. The sufferings of the unhappy garrison and inhabitants of Kars form one of the most terrible pictures incidental to this war. Cholera and famine raged within the town; and those who were enfeebled by the last frequently fell victims to the first. The hospitals were crowded with the sick and wounded, but the nourishment they required could not be obtained. The flesh of starved horses had become a luxury, and the rations of the soldiers consisted only of a small supply of coarse bread, and a kind of broth made merely of flour and water. … Children dropt and died in the streets; and every morning skeleton-like corpses were found in various parts of the camp. The soldiers deserted in large numbers, and discipline was almost at an end. … As all hope of relief from Selim Pasha or Omar Pasha had expired, general Williams resolved to put an end to these miseries by surrendering the town to the foe. … Articles of surrender were signed on the 25th of November. … The fall of Kars was a disgrace and a scandal to all who might have contributed to prevent it."

T. Gaspey, History of England, George III.-Victoria, chapter 56 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: T. H. Ward, Humphrey Sandwith, chapter 9.

S. Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, chapter 31 (volume 2).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854-1856. Unfruitful peace negotiations at Vienna. Renewed bombardment of Sebastopol. Battle of the Tchernaya. Repulse of the English from the Redan. Taking of the Malakhoff by the French. The congress at Paris. Peace.

In November, 1854, the Czar, Nicholas I., authorized Gortschakoff, his Minister at Vienna, to signify to the Western Powers his willingness to conclude peace on the basis of "the four points" which the latter had laid down in the previous spring. These "four points" were as follows:

"(1) The protectorate which Russia had hitherto exercised over the Principalities was to be replaced by a collective guarantee;

(2) the navigation of the mouths of the Danube was to be freed from all impediments;

(3) the treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and

(4) Russia was to renounce all official protectorate over the Sultan's subjects, of whatever religion they might be. …

The Czar's new move was not entirely successful. It did not prevent Austria from concluding a close arrangement with the Western Powers, and it induced her, in concert with France and England, to define more strictly the precise meaning attached to the four points. With some disappointment, Russia was doomed to find that every successive explanation of these points involved some fresh sacrifice on her own part. The freedom of the lower Danube, she was now told, could not be secured unless she surrendered the territory between that river and the Pruth which she had acquired at the treaty of Adrianople; the revision of the treaty of 1841, she was assured, must put an end to her preponderance in the Black Sea. These new exactions, however, did not deter the Czar from his desire to treat. By no other means was it possible to prevent Austria from taking part against him; and a conference, even if it ultimately proved abortive, would in the interim confine her to neutrality. Under these circumstances, Nicholas consented to negotiate. … The conference which it was decided to hold in December did not assemble till the following March. The negotiation which had been agreed to by Aberdeen, was carried out under Palmerston; and, with the double object of temporarily ridding himself of an inconvenient colleague, and of assuring the presence of a statesman of adequate rank at the conference, Palmerston entrusted its conduct to Russell. While Russell was on his way to Vienna, an event occurred of momentous importance. Sore troubled at the events of the war, alarmed at the growing strength of his enemies, the Emperor of Russia had neither heart nor strength to struggle against a slight illness. His sudden death [March 2, 1855] naturally made a profound impression on the mind of Europe. … {2780} Alexander, his successor, a monarch whose reign commenced with disaster and ended with outrage, at once announced his adherence to the policy of his father. His accession, therefore, did not interrupt the proceedings of the Conference; and, in the first instance, the diplomatists who assembled at Vienna succeeded in arriving at a welcome agreement. On the first two of the four points all the Powers admitted to the Conference were substantially in accord. On the third point no such agreement was possible. The Western Powers were determined that an effectual limitation should be placed on the naval strength of Russia in the Black Sea; and they defined this limit by a stipulation that she should not add to the six ships of war which they had ascertained she had still afloat. Russia, on the contrary, regarded any such condition as injurious to her dignity and her rights, and refused to assent to it. Russia, however, did not venture on absolutely rejecting the proposal of the allies. Instead of doing so, she offered either to consent to the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the ships of war of all nations, or to allow the Sultan a discretion in determining whether he would open them to the vessels either of the Western Powers or of Russia. The Western Powers, however, were firm in their determination to prevent the fleets of Russia from passing into the Mediterranean, and refused the alternative. With its rejection the Conference practically terminated. After its members separated, however, Buol, the Austrian Minister, endeavoured to evolve from the Russian offer a possible compromise. …The rejection of the Austrian alternative necessitated the continuance of the war. But the struggle was resumed under conditions very different from those on which it had previously been conducted. Austria, indeed, considered that the rejection of her proposal released her from the necessity of actively joining the Western Powers, and, instead of taking part in the war, reduced her armaments. But the Western Powers obtained other aid. The little State of Sardinia sent a contingent to the Crimea; later on in the year Sweden joined the alliance. Fresh contingents of troops rapidly augmented the strength of the French and English armies, and finer weather as well as better management banished disease from the camp. Under these circumstances the bombardment was renewed in April. In May a successful attack on Kertch and Yenikale, at the extreme east of the Crimea, proved the means of intercepting communication between Sebastopol and the Caucasian provinces, and of destroying vast stores intended for the sustenance of the garrison. In June the French, to whose command Pelissier, a Marshal of more robust fibre than Canrobert, had succeeded, made a successful attack on the Mamelon, while the English concurrently seized another vantage-ground. Men at home, cheered by the news of these successes, fancied that they were witnessing the beginning of the end. Yet the end was not to come immediately. A great assault, delivered on the 18th of June, by the French on the Malakhoff, by the English on the Redan, failed; and its failure, among other consequences, broke the heart· of the old soldier [Lord Raglan] who for nine months had commanded the English army. … His capacity as a general does not suffer from any comparison with that of his successor, General Simpson. That officer had been sent out to the Crimea in the preceding winter; he had served under Raglan as chief of the staff; and he was now selected for the command. He had, at least, the credit which attaches to any military man who holds a responsible post in the crisis of an operation. For the crisis of the campaign had now come. On both sides supreme efforts were made to terminate the struggle. On the 16th of August the Russian army in force crossed the Tchernaya, attacked the French lines, but experienced a sharp repulse. On the 8th of September the assault of June was repeated; and though the British were again driven back from the Redan, the French succeeded in carrying the Malakhoff. The Russians, recognising the significance of the defeat, set Sebastopol and their remaining ships on fire, and retreated to the northern bank of the harbour. After operations, which had lasted for nearly a year, the allies were masters of the south side of the city. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to prolong any further the narrative of operations which had little influence on history. The story of the defence of Kars and of the bombardment of Sweaborg have an interest of their own. But they had no effect on the events which followed or on the peace which ensued. Soon after, the Vienna Conference was dissolved, indeed, it became evident that the war was approaching its close. The cost and the sacrifices which it involved were making the French people weary of the struggle, and the accidental circumstances, which gave them in August and September the chief share in the glory, disposed them to make peace. The reasons which made the French, however, eager for peace, did not apply to the English. They, on the contrary, were mortified at their failures. Their expectations had been raised by the valour of their army at Alma, at Balaklava, and at Inkerman. But, since the day of Inkerman, their own share in the contest had added no new page of splendour to the English story. The English troops had taken no part in the battle of the Tchernaya; their assaulting columns had been driven back on the 18th of June; they had been repulsed in the final attack on the Redan; and the heroic conduct of their own countrymen at Kars had not prevented the fall of that fortress. Men at home, anxious to account for the failure of their expectations, were beginning to say that England is like the runner, never really ripe for the struggle till he has gained his second wind. They were reluctant that she should retire from the contest at the moment when, having repaired her defective administration and reinforced her shattered army, she was in a position to command a victory. Whatever wishes, however, individual Englishmen might entertain, responsible statesmen, as the autumn wore on, could not conceal from themselves the necessity of finding some honourable means for terminating the war. In October the British Cabinet learned with dismay that the French Emperor had decided on withdrawing 100,000 men from the Crimea. About the same time the members of the Government learned with equal alarm that, if war were to be continued at all, the French public were demanding that France should secure some advantage in Poland, in Italy, and on the left bank of the Rhine. In November the French ministry took a much more extreme course, and concerted with Austria terms of peace without the knowledge of England. … {2781} It was impossible any longer to depend on the co-operation of France, and … it was folly to continue the struggle without her assistance. The protocol which Austria had drawn up, and to which France had assented, was, with some modifications, adopted by Britain and presented, as an ultimatum, to Russia by Austria. In the middle of January, 1856, the ultimatum was accepted by Russia; a Congress at which Clarendon, as Foreign Minister, personally represented his country, was assembled at Paris. The plenipotentiaries, meeting on the 25th of February, at once agreed on a suspension of hostilities. Universally disposed towards peace, they found no difficulty in accommodating differences which had proved irreconcilable in the previous year, and on the 30th of March, 1856, peace was signed. The peace which was thus concluded admitted the right of the Porte to participate in the advantages of the public law of Europe; it pledged all the contracting parties, in the case of any fresh misunderstanding with the Turk, to resort to mediation before using force. It required the Sultan to issue and to communicate to the Powers a firman ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects; it declared that the communication of the firman gave the Powers no right, either collectively or separately, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; it neutralised the Black Sea, opening its waters to the mercantile marine of every nation, but, with the exception of a few vessels of light draught necessary for the service of the coast, closing them to every vessel of war; it forbade the establishment or maintenance of arsenals on the shores of the Euxine; it established the free navigation of the Danube; it set back the frontier of Russia from the Danube; it guaranteed the privileges and immunities of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; it similarly guaranteed the privileges of Servia, though it gave the Sultan the right of garrison in that province; and it undertook that Russia and Turkey should restore the conquests which they had made in Asia [Kars, etc.] one from another during the war. Such were the terms on which the war was terminated. Before the plenipotentiaries separated they were invited by Walewski, the Foreign Minister and first representative of France, to discuss the condition of Greece, of the Roman States, and of the two Sicilies; to condemn the licence to which a free press was lending itself in Belgium; and to concert measures for the mitigation of some of the worst evils of maritime war."