Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 70)

D. D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, chapter 24.

ALSO IN: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapter 7.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862-1863 (December-January: Tennessee). Bragg and Rosecrans. The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.

"The Confederate government was greatly disappointed with the issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on assuming command of Buell's army, … concentrated his forces at Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. … Bragg had already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. As it was about the season of Christmas, Murfreesborough was the scene of much gayety … and the giddy Confederates danced on floors carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of December, Rosecrans moved. His march commenced in a heavy min. The Confederate outposts retired before his advance, the pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which was 43,000 strong on the evening of that day, was on the west side of Stone River, a sluggish stream fringed with cedar brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four miles in length. Crittenden was on its left, with three divisions. Wood, Vancleve, Palmer; Thomas in the centre, with two divisions, Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve; McCook on the right with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The left wing touched the river. … Bragg's army, 62,000, stood between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough. … Breckinridge's division formed his right, in his centre, under Polk, were two divisions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, under Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confederate army. Rosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on his left. His intention was that his right wing, standing on the defensive, should simply hold its ground; but his extreme left, the divisions of Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone River, should assail Breckinridge's division, exposed there, and seize the heights. … On his part, also, Bragg had determined to take the offensive. … Both intended to strike with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that wing. … In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while Rosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone River to make its expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the battle-field, he fell furiously upon Johnson's division, and so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a gun could be fired. {3487} The Confederate success was decisive. Johnson's division, which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the shock was too great; he was compelled to give way, with the loss of many guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also coming into play, rushed upon the next division—but that was commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was already paralyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. He had to withdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and defending his communications. He must establish a new line. The possibility of doing this—the fate of the battle—rested on Sheridan." He held his ground for an hour, until "the cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he had steel. The fixed bayonets of his reserve brigade covered him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. In this memorable and most glorious resistance he had lost 1,630 men. 'Here's all that are left,' he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was nothing for Negley but to follow. … Meantime, on a knoll in the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville turnpike on its rear." Against this new line the Confederates dashed themselves, desperately but vainly, four times that day, and were repelled with horrible slaughter. "Bragg, unwilling to be foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on Rosecrans's left flank with 7,000 fresh men. His first attack was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate. So stood affairs when night came, … the closing night of 1862. On New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. On January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank. Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position, ordering him to drive the enemy across the river—a task which that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished, for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to pieces. In twenty minutes he lost 2,000 men. A violent storm prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough, retreating to Tullahoma. … In these dreadful battles the Confederates lost 14,700 men. On the national side there were killed 1,553, wounded more than 7,000, prisoners more than 3,000; more than one third of its artillery and a large portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all thought of crossing the Ohio River."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 53 (volume 2).

"The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far—only behind Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the outset of the campaign. … The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro'. … Had Bragg followed up with the spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and demoralized."

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 12-14.

ALSO IN: A. F. Stevenson, Battle of Stone's River.

T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 16-17 (volume 1).

Official Records, series 1, volume 20.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January). The final Proclamation of Emancipation.

The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on the 22d of September, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue, a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation. But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly free." It was in the following words:

"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: 'That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. {3488} That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate, as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many months before its happy influences became manifest. Its tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give dignity and consistency to the conflict. … It strengthened, too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if it did not entirely remove, the danger of foreign intervention."

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, volume 3, chapter 28.

"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under his guidance as to render the conception practical and the decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force, leaguing liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision, the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln. volume 6, chapter 19.

ALSO IN: O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, division 10, chapter 9 (volume 3).

W. P. and F. J. Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, volume 4. chapters 3-4.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January: Arkansas). The capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.

Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg on the 2d of January, and on the 4th he relinquished the command to General McClernand, who had come down the river with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition sailed on the same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas River, 50 miles from its mouth and 117 below Little Rock. … The expedition moved up the White River through the cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort Hindman. … By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest the post. … The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded, 831; and in missing, 17; total, 977. … By the surrender there fell into our hands 5,000 men. … After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th … they returned to Milliken's Bend."

S. M. Bowman and R B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapters 7-8.

{3489}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: Virginia). Command given to Hooker. President Lincoln's Letter to him. Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac, and its improvement.

"General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. … His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a representative man. … Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than the odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his appointment: … 'I have placed you [wrote the President] at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward, and give us victories!' … Hooker was appointed January 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest words, took leave of the army. The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the power of organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the rate of 200 a day. … Hooker states that he found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls of the army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of the ranks. … The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in command prior to Chancellorsville. … On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about 130,000 men under the colors,—'for duty equipped,' according to the morning report. … While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow flies. … Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty."

T. A. Dodge, The Campaign of Chancellorsville, chapters 3-4.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, History of the 2nd Army Corps, chapter 7.

R. De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 20.

[Image: Map of Vicksburg and Vicinity.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: On the Mississippi). Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg. Futile operations of the first four months.

"General Grant took personal command of the movement against Vicksburg on the 30th of January, 1863. … The first plan made was to dig a canal across the neck of land, or peninsula in front of Vicksburg,—below the city,—at a point where the isthmus was only a mile and a fifth in width. This had been begun before General Grant's arrival. If a canal could have been made large enough for large steamboats, then no matter how strong were the fortifications of Vicksburg, the boats would pass through, far away from their fire. So a canal ten feet wide and six deep was made here, in the hope that the freshets of the river would widen it, and so make it large enough for large steamers. But very little came of the canal. When the river did rise, it would not flow where it was meant to do. It flooded the camps of the workmen. Meanwhile the Rebels had made new batteries below it. Thus ended plan number one. Another similar plan, to open a route by Lake Providence and Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Washita and Red River, did not succeed better. The canals attempted here were both on the west of the river. A very bold attempt was made on the east side, by what was known as the Yazoo Pass, into the Tallahatchee and Yazoo River. The expeditions sent out by this route would come out above Vicksburg; but it was hoped that thus the Rebel gunboats on the Yazoo River might be destroyed. If a practicable route were made here, the whole army could be moved to Haine's Bluff,—above Vicksburg,—an upland region very desirable for occupation. {3491} But nothing came of this movement, though some hard work and some hard fighting were done in it. What resulted of importance was, that the troops found their way into the granary from which Vicksburg had been fed; and in the resistance, many of the Rebels were destroyed. In such attempts February and March passed away. Meanwhile Admiral Farragut, of the navy, ran by the Rebel batteries at Port Hudson, so that he communicated with Grant below Vicksburg,—and Grant could communicate with General Banks, who was trying to do at Port Hudson what Grant was trying to do above. The distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson is about 120 miles in a straight line, and more than twice that by the crooked river. Grant now determined to pass the city of Vicksburg on the west side of the river by marching his army by land—with the help of boats on some bayous if possible—from Milliken's Bend, which is twenty miles above Vicksburg, to New Carthage, which is about as far below. At his request Admiral Porter sent seven of his iron-clads, with three steamers and ten barges, down the river, past the Rebel batteries. They were well laden with forage and supplies. The crews of all but one refused to go. But volunteers from the army offered, enough to man a hundred vessels had they been needed. On a dark night of the 16th of April, led by Admiral Porter, they steamed down, with the barges in tow. They turned the bend without being noticed. Then the first batteries opened on them. The Rebels set fire to houses so as to light up the scene; and from the ships the crews could see the men at the batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg. Though every vessel was hit, all got by, except the Henry Clay steamer. Finding she was sinking, her commander cut off the barge he was towing, which drifted safely down, and, soon after, the vessel herself took fire. The crew escaped in their boats,—the vessel blazed up and lighted up all around. At last, however, after the boats had been under fire two hours and forty minutes, the whole fleet except the Henry Clay arrived safely below the batteries. Grant had thus secured, not only forage and stores, but the means of transportation. On the 26th of April five more vessels passed successfully, one being lost as before. Grant was now strong enough to cross the Mississippi River. His army had to march seventy miles on the west side by muddy roads, scarcely above the river line. He feared he might have to go as far down as a little town called Rodney for a good landing-place on the east side. But a friendly negro man, who knew the country, brought in information that there was a good road inland from Bruinsburg,—and so it proved. Grand Gulf, on the river, where the Rebels had a post, was still between Grant and Bruinsburg. Porter attacked it with his gunboats, and Grant was ready to land 10,000 troops to storm the place if the batteries were silenced. But Porter did not succeed. Grant therefore marched his troops down on the west side of the river. Porter ran by Grand Gulf with transports in the night, and, on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed the river with 10,000 men. They did not carry a tent nor a wagon. General Grant and his staff went without their horses. It was said afterwards that his whole baggage was a toothbrush! Other divisions followed, and on the 3d of May he left the river, and marched, not directly on Vicksburg, but more inland, to cut off all communication with that city. His army took three days' rations with them, and relied principally for provisions on the stores in the rich country through which they marched."

E. E. Hale, Stories of War told by Soldiers, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: F. V. Greene, The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 4.

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 31-32.

G. W. Brown, The Mississippi Squadron and the Siege of Vicksburg (Personal Recollections of the War: New York Com. L. L. of the United States).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D.1863(February-April: Tennessee). Engagements at Dover and Franklin.

"In February [on the 3d], General Wheeler, Bragg's chief of Cavalry, tried to capture Fort Donaldson, so as to stop the navigation of the Cumberland River, by which some of Rosecrans's supplies came in steamboats to Nashville. The fort had not been repaired after its capture by Grant, but the Village of Dover near it had been fortified, and it was then held by Colonel A. C. Harding with about 600 men. The Union men fought bravely, and in the evening the gunboat Fair Play came up and opened a fire on the Confederates which drove them away in confusion, with a loss of more than 500 men. Harding's loss was 126. Early in March, General Van Dorn appeared near Franklin [a little below Nashville] with a large force of mounted men. Colonel Colburn, of the 33d Indiana, moved Southward from Franklin with 2,700 men. Van Dorn and Forrest met him, and after a fight of several hours [March 5] Colburn had to surrender with 1,300 of his men."

J. D. Champlin, Jr., Young Folks' History of the War for the Union, chapter 31.

"Sheridan, with his division, and about 1,800 cavalry, under Colonel Minty, first swept down toward Shelbyville, and then around toward Franklin, skirmishing in several places with detachments of Van Dorn's and Forrest's men. In a sharp fight at Thompson's Station, he captured some of the force which encountered Colburn. He finally drove Van Dorn beyond the Duck River, and then returned to Murfreesboro', with a loss during his ten days' ride and skirmishing of only five men killed and five wounded. His gain was nearly 100 prisoners. On the 18th of March, Colonel A. S. Hall, with a little over 1,400 men, moved eastward from Murfreesboro' to surprise a Confederate camp at Gainesville. He was unexpectedly met by some of Morgan's cavalry, when he fell back to Milton, twelve miles northeast of Murfreesboro' and took a strong position on Vaught's Hill. There he was attacked by 2,000 men, led by Morgan in person. With the aid of Harris's Battery skilfully worked, Hall repulsed the foe after a struggle of about three hours. Morgan lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded. Among the latter was himself. Hall's loss was 55 men, of whom only 6 were killed. Early in April, General Granger, then in command at Franklin, with nearly 5,000 troops, was satisfied that a heavy force under Van Dorn was about to attack him. He was then constructing a fort (which afterwards bore his name), but only two siege-guns and two rifled cannon, belonging to an Ohio battery, were mounted upon it. {3492} The fort … completely commanded the approaches to Franklin. … On the 10th, Van Dorn, with an estimated force of 9,000 mounted men and two regiments of foot, pressed rapidly forward along the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell upon Granger's front. The guns from the fort opened destructively upon the assailants, and their attack was manfully met by Granger's troops. Van Dorn soon found himself in a perilous situation, for Stanley [commanding cavalry] came up and struck him a heavy blow on the flank. Smith [with cavalry] was ordered forward to support Stanley, and Baird's troops were_thrown across the river to engage in the fight. The Confederates were routed at all points on Granger's front, with a heavy Joss in killed and wounded, and about 500 prisoners. Van Dorn then turned his whole force upon Stanley before Smith reached him, and with his overwhelming numbers pushed him back and recovered most of the captured men. By this means Van Dorn extricated himself from his perilous position, and, abandoning his attempt to capture Franklin, he retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about three hundred men in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about 37 killed, wounded and missing."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapter 18, (volume 1).

Official Records, Series 1, volume 23.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (March). The Conscription Act.

"The Rebel Congress having long since passed [April 16, 1862] a conscription act whereby all the "White males in the Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through the war, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, [after] our heavy losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The act providing 'for the enrollment of the National forces' was among the last passed [March 3, 1863] by the XXXVIIth Congress prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by Federal provost-marshals and enrolling officers, of all able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens who had declared their intention to become naturalized, between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to constitute the first class; all others the second class—from which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the National armies for not more than three years; anyone drafted and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as a deserter. A commutation of $300 was to be received in lieu of such service: and there were exemptions provided of certain heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the residue of a family which has already two members in the service, &c., &c. The passage and execution of this act inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of opposition to the War. Those who detested every form of 'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels, with those who especially detested the National effort under its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the division being so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the Senate a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely postponed was supported by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays: consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs. McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith of Oregon. The bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 21.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April: South Carolina). The naval attack on Charleston. Repulse of the Monitors.

"The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned had given to the government and the public a high opinion of their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its surrender. … On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the Monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. At noon on that day the signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a Monitor, took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through its interference with her movements. On her way up she exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did no damage. At 2.10 P, M. she encountered obstructions extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter; beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P. M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and subsequently other Monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., were obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled with the Monitors, and could not bring her batteries to bear upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore, on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into collision with two of the Monitors. The plan of the Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this the 'first circle,' as it was termed. {3493} Two other still more powerful circles of fire must be passed before the city could be reached. While in the centre of the first circle, it was apparent that the Monitors were at a fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes, yet in that brief period time of the ironclads were wholly or partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off and struck him on the head. Many of the bolts of both turret and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across it. All the other Monitors had received damages more or less severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command.' … The iron-clad fleet had therefore been unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired 2,209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of which 40 were filled with melted cast-iron, others with incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used by the forts was 21,093 pounds. The government, thus satisfied that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral effect."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 72 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, Naval History of the War, chapter 33.

C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, volume 2, chapter 33.

W. C. Church, Life of Ericsson, chapter 21 (volume 2).

A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, chapter 30 (volume 2).

Official Records, Series 1, volume 14.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Virginia). Hooker's disastrous movement. Chancellorsville. Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.

"Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations, Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement. Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th, and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken, Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.' … General Lee was fully aware of the preparations that were being made by his adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. … On the 28th … Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for information from the direction of Chancellorsville. … Very soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to follow with three of his divisions, leaving … a force of about 9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately participated. {3494} When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. … It was obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. … The execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. … At dawn on the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. … After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a point on the Orange Courthouse road three miles in the rear of Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry equal in spirit to the 'Virginia horsemen' under W. H. F. Lee that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him to a position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which disclosed the following scene: 'Below and but a few hundred yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of stacked arms in rear. … The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering beeves.' Returning from this point of observation, Jackson proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six o'clock were completed. … Howard's corps was first assailed. This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed, routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day. The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by three bullets, and died from the effects eight days afterward. "Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his position; his troops regained courage and contested the field with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at every point and rapidly retreated … within the strong line of defences which had been previously constructed to cover the road to the United States Ford. … While the operations above described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early, by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance, forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was communicated to General Lee during the fore·noon. Wilcox's brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance, and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give the 'coup de grace' to Hooker, but that general, under cover of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the Rappahannock at the United States Ford."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 14.

The Federal loss at Chancellorsville, in killed and wounded, was 12,197; missing 5,000; total, 17,197. Confederate loss, killed and wounded, 10,266; missing 2,753; total, 13,019.

A. Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6), chapter 8.

ALSO IN: T. A. Dodge, Campaign of Chancellorsville.

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 8.

D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard, and others, Chancellorsville (Battles and Leaders, volume 3).

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 4.

Official Records, Series 1, volume 25.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Mississippi). Grierson's Raid.

Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on the 5th of May, 1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said: "As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi, cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from Tuscumbia down into Alabama and Georgia. {3495} This did not interfere with my plan, but simply required extra force to be developed from Corinth. Delays incident to combined movements, especially from separate commands, kept his expeditionary column back for six days. I commenced the movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. … On the 17th, Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry 1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery, and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. I considered that the effect of these movements would be to puzzle the enemy and withdraw his force from the central line, which has proven to be correct. … Grierson, on the 19th, detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded, without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges." Colonel Grierson, in his own full report of the remarkable expedition thus set on foot, after narrating the proceedings of his command until it struck Newton Station, on the 24th of April, continues: "From captured mails and information obtained by my scouts, I knew that large forces had been sent out to intercept our return, and having instructions from Major-General Hurlbut and Brigadier-General Smith to move in any direction from this point which, in my judgment, would be best for the safety of my command and the success of the expedition, I at once decided to move south, in order to secure the necessary rest and food for men and horses, and then return to La Grange through Alabama, or make for Baton Rouge, as I might hereafter deem best. … After resting about three hours, we moved south to Garlandville. At this point we found the citizens, many of them venerable with age, armed with shot-guns and organized to resist our approach. As the advance entered the town, these citizens fired upon them and wounded one of our men. We charged upon them and captured several. After disarming them, we showed them the folly of their actions, and released them. Without an exception they acknowledged their mistake, and declared that they had been grossly deceived as to our real character. One volunteered his services as guide, and upon leaving us declared that hereafter his prayers should be for the Union Army. I mention this as a sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which our presence produced among the people in the country through which we passed. Hundreds who are skulking and hiding out to avoid conscription, only await the presence of our arms to sustain them, when they will rise up and declare their principles; and thousands who have been deceived, upon the vindication of our cause would immediately return to loyalty." It was not until the 2d of May that Grierson and his small force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important revelation it made of the condition of things in that region of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as follows: "During the expedition we killed and wounded about 100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000 stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules. Our loss during the entire journey was 3 killed, 7 wounded, 5 left on the route sick; the sergeant-major and surgeon of the Seventh Illinois left with Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, and 9 men missing, supposed to have straggled. We marched over 600 miles in less than sixteen days. The last twenty-eight hours we marched 76 miles, had four engagements with the enemy, and forded the Comite River, which was deep enough to swim many of the horses. During this time the men and horses were without food or rest. Much of the country through which we passed was almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the necessaries of life, which have reached most fabulous prices."

Official Records, series 1, volume 24, part 1, pages 520-529.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-July: On the Mississippi). Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg. The final operations. His personal account of the siege and capture.

"April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river [to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson, where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and, after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. … Here I [General Grant] … received a letter from Banks stating that he could not be at Port Hudson [which Grant had intended to join Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did not regard this force of as much value as the time which would be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the 7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the Big Black. {3496} To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek. As the army under Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th the troops were faced to the west and marched towards Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the 16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy intrenched. After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and about 1,200 men. … We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army taking position in their front. On the 19th there was continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better positions. … At two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. … Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food, however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. … By the night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops. … I now determined on a second assault. … The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy … but at no place were we able to enter. … As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege was now determined upon. … The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000 men. … The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. … My line was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced, we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man this. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. … Johnston … abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston." The siege was of six weeks' duration, ending on the memorable 4th of July with the surrender of Pemberton and 31,000 men, who were released on parole. "Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize, We had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom they had so recently been engaged in starving out."

U. S. Grant, The Siege of Vicksburg (Century Magazine, September, 1885).

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 31-30.

The Vicksburg Year (Battles and Leaders, volume 3).

J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapters 6-8.

F. V. Greene, The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapters 5-6.

W. Swinton, Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, chapter 7.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 12.

Official Records, series 1, volume 24.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-June). The arrest of Vallandigham. President Lincoln to the Copperheads.

"The man whose name became unfortunately pre-eminent for disloyalty at this time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democrat, of Ohio. General Burnside was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the moment no Confederates to deal with, he turned his attention to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greater animosity. His Order No. 38, issued on April 13, … warned persons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep that little member in order, they might expect either to suffer death as traitors, or to be sent southward within the lines of 'their friends.' Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a member of Congress since 1856; … he was the popular and rising leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Such was his position that it would have been ignominious for him to allow any Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did he. On the contrary he made speeches which at that time might well have made Unionists mad with rage, and which still seem to have gone far beyond the limit of disloyalty which any government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was arrested by a company of soldiers, brought to Cincinnati, and thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and a riot was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside, he was tried by a military commission. He was charged with 'publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion.' … {3497} The evidence conclusively sustained the indictment, and the officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. … The Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too inconsiderately given them. The country rang with plausible outcries and high sounding oratory concerning military usurpation, violation of the Constitution, and stifling freedom of speech. … Mr. Lincoln only showed that he felt the pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commuting the sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released from confinement and sent within the Confederate lines,—which was, indeed, a very shrewd and clever move, and much better than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was tendered to and accepted by a Confederate picket, on May 25. He protested vehemently, declared his loyalty, and insisted that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiar methods of demonstrating 'loyalty' to their opponents, insisted upon treating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy common to themselves and him; and instead of exchanging him as a prisoner, they facilitated his passage through the blockade on his way to Canada. There he arrived in safety, and thence issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. On June 11 the Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as their candidate for governor, and it seems that for a while they really expected to elect him. … On May 16 a monster meeting of 'the Democrats of New York' was told by Governor Seymour that the question was: 'whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North.' Excited by such instigation, the audience passed sundry damnatory resolutions and sent them to the President. Upon receiving these Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into the arena, without regard to official conventionality. On June 12 he replied by a full presentation of the case, from his point of view. He had once more to do the same thing in response to another address of like character which was sent to him on June 11 by the Democratic State Convention of Ohio."

J. T. Morse, Abraham Lincoln, volume 2, chapter 6.

To the New York Democrats, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is asserted in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the administration or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American citizens.' {3498} In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform, because I am sure that from such more elevated position we could do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none such."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 849-350.

To the Ohio Democrats, the President wrote as follows; "You claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man. These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his special friends and adherents. With perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which is yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter in order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing else;

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion;

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect that on his returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be respectfully yours."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, page 362-363.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, . Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 12.

{3499}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-July: On the Mississippi). Siege and Capture of Port Hudson. The clear opening of the great River.

"About the middle of May all the available force near the river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack on Port Hudson. Thence Generals Augur and Sherman moved to the south and east of that position, to cooperate with General Banks. From Simmesport General Banks moved his army to invest Port Hudson. … It was on the 21st of May that General Banks landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the advance of Major-General Augur and Brigadier-General Sherman. … On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first line of works. On the next day General Weitzel's brigade, which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria, arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was made on the fortifications. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing, as it was called some years ago, is situated on a bend in the Mississippi river, about 22 miles above Baton Rouge, and 147 above New Orleans." It was strongly fortified and well defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o'clock the same day an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it were heavy. "A bombardment of the position had been made by the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another assault on Port Hudson was made. … All the assaulting columns were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the morning. The loss of General Banks was nearly 700 in killed and wounded. … After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the purpose to make another was given up by General Banks, until he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender was sent to General Banks, and it was made the occasion for firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender was communicated. General Gardner, upon receiving the information, sent by flag of truce, about midnight of the 7th, the following note to General Banks: … 'Having received information from your troops that Vicksburg has been surrendered, I make this communication to request you to give me the official assurance whether this is true or not, and if true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the consideration of terms for surrendering this position.'"

W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History of the Rebellion, chapter 29.

ALSO IN: F. V. Greene, The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 7.

R. B. Irwin, Port Hudson (Battles and Leaders, volume 3).

R. B. Irwin, History of the 19th Army Corps, chapters 15-18.

Official Records, Series 1, volume. 26.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June). Call for Six-Months Men.

A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and Ohio, was issued June 15.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June: Virginia). Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it. Northern invitation and Southern clamor. The Southern view.

"The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union; and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North, who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was disappearing. This combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. … On all sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard raising their importunate voices. … The plan of moving the Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal territory, seems to have been the result of many circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. … Another important consideration was the question of supplies. … More than ever before, these supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper, 'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania.' {3500} The considerations here stated were the main inducements for that great movement northward which followed the battle of Chancellorsville. … Throughout the month of May, Lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet remained at the head of his former corps. Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two others. … On the last day of May, General Lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly 10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. … Lee began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one month after the battle of Chancellorsville. … Pursuing his design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to arrest his own movements. … He continued the withdrawal of his troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of 'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of the whole war, followed. … This reconnoisance in force … had no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had infantry in Culpepper. … This attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee. On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100 miles. … When intelligence now reached Washington that the head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere—could you not break him?' … It would seem that nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper, and Ewell from the Valley. But … instead of reënforcing the corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill, General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall back toward Manassas."

J. E. Cooke, Life of General Robert E. Lee, part 6, chapters 9-12.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 21.

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 9.

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg. July 1-3, 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania). Lee's Invasion. The Battle of Gettysburg.

"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction. Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New York and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and ammunition for them were inadequate. "On June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army." {3502} He was accordingly relieved and the command was given to Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime (June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and advanced to Frederick, Maryland. "On June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. … In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what Meade did do. … Under the impression that Lee's army was spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that direction. … The Union corps were marching on and getting farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the support of Buford with the nearest division of the First Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard succeeded to the command of the field, but did not issue any orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the meantime General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate front of all enemies. Before the Eleventh Corps came up the enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry [which, not crossing the Potomac to follow Lee until the 27th, had undertaken a long raid around the Union forces, and did not succeed in joining the main body of the Confederates until July 2d] they had not been kept informed as to the movements Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. … Ewell's attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front with great force. … General Meade, when he heard of Reynold's death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field. Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive battle, determined to hold it if possible. This was not an easy thing to do, for the enemy were in overwhelming force, and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps were not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. … Hancock directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been heavily reënforced. As the losses on both sides had been tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance, particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to Gettysburg. By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close at hand. … Most of the troops, though worn out with hard marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34 miles to march and came later in the afternoon. … The attack as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reënforcements going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting; but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. … The enemy … failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the fact that he had made a lodgement there, Ewell determined to hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reënforcements during the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning. … So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3] General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his position on the right. … Lee having failed in his attacks both on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt to force the Union line. As he had been reënforced by Stuart's cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was available, he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from sending reënforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135 guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. … Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked and he was forced to retreat. … Pickett formed his great column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the Union batteries slackened." {3503} Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically met by Gibbon's division of the Second Corps and by part of the First Corps, under the personal direction of General Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict. Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains, the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade) was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick, however, got in front of the main body on the direct route and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of Ewell's trains. … Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge, and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee and were about—under orders from President Lincoln-to make an attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5,434 missing=Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 missing=Total, 20,451."