Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 55)

1st, That the British islands should be declared in a state of blockade.

2nd, That all commerce and correspondence with the British islands should be prohibited; and that letters addressed to England or Englishmen, written in the English language, should be detained and taken.

3rd, That every British subject found in a country occupied by French troops, or by those of their allies, should be made a prisoner of war.

4th, That all merchandise and property belonging to British subjects should be deemed a good prize.

5th, That all commerce in English merchandise should be prohibited, and that all merchandise belonging to England or her colonies, and of British manufacture, should be deemed a good prize. And

6th, That no vessel coming direct from England or her colonies be allowed to enter any French port, or any port subject to French authority; and that every vessel which, by means of a false declaration, should evade such regulations, should at once be captured.

The British Government lost no time in retaliating against France far so bald a course; and, on January 7, 1807, an order in Council was issued, which, after reference to the orders issued by France, enjoined that no vessel should be allowed to trade from one enemy's port to another, or from one port to another of a French ally's coast shut against English vessels; and ordered the commanders of the ships of war and privateers to warn every neutral vessel coming from any such port, and destined to another such port, to discontinue her voyage, and that any vessel, after being so warned, which should be found proceeding to another such port should be captured and considered as lawful prize. This order in Council having reached Napoleon at Warsaw, he immediately ordered the confiscation of all English merchandise and colonial produce found in the Hanseatic Towns. … But Britain, in return, went a step further, and, by order in Council of November 11, 1807, declared all the ports and places of France, and those of her allies, and of all countries where the English flag was excluded, even though they were not at war with Britain, should be placed under the same restrictions for commerce and navigation as if they were blockaded, and consequently that ships destined to those ports should be liable to the visit of British cruisers at a British station, and there subjected to a tax to be imposed by the British Parliament. Napoleon was at Milan when this order in Council was issued, and forthwith, on December 17, the famous decree appeared, by which he imposed on neutrals just the contrary of what was prescribed to them by England, and further declared that every vessel, of whatever nation, that submitted to the order in Council of November 11, should by that very act become denationalised, considered as British property, and condemned as a good prize. The decree placed the British islands in a state of blockade, and ordered that every ship, of whatever nation, and with whatever cargo, proceeding from English ports or English colonies to countries occupied by English troops, or going to England, should be a good prize. This England answered by the order in Council of April 26, 1809, which revoked the order of 1807 as regards America, but confirmed the blockade of all the parts of France and Holland, their colonies and dependencies. And then France, still further incensed against England, issued the tariff of Trianon, dated August 5, 1810, completed by the decree of St. Cloud of September 12, and of Fontainebleau of October 19, which went the length of ordering the seizure and burning of all British goods found in France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, and in every place occupied by French troops. … The princes of the Rhenish Confederation hastened to execute it, same for the purpose of enriching themselves by the wicked deed, same out of hatred towards the English, and some to show their devotion towards their master. From Carlsruhe to Munich, from Cassel to Dresden and Hamburg, everywhere, bonfires were made of English goods. And so exacting were the French that when Frankfort exhibited the least hesitation in carrying out the decree, French troops were sent to execute the order. By means such as these [known as the Continental System of Napoleon] the commerce of the world was greatly deranged, if not destroyed altogether, and none suffered more from them than England herself."

L. Levi, History of British Commerce, part 2, chapter 4 (with appended text of Orders and Decrees).

"The object of the Orders in Council was … twofold: to embarrass France and Napoleon by the prohibition of direct import and export trade, of all external commerce, which for them could only be carried on by neutrals; and at the same time to force into the Continent all the British products or manufactures that it could take. … The whole system was then, and has since been, roundly abused as being in no sense a military measure, but merely a gigantic exhibition of commercial greed; but this simply begs the question. To win her fight Great Britain was obliged not only to weaken Napoleon, but to increase her own strength. The battle between the sea and the land was to be fought out on Commerce. England had no army wherewith to meet Napo lean; Napoleon had no navy to cope with that of his enemy. As in the case of an impregnable fortress, the only alternative for either of these contestants was to reduce the other by starvation. On the common frontier, the coast line, they met in a deadly strife in which no weapon was drawn. The imperial soldiers were turned into coast-guards-men to shut out Great Britain from her markets; the British ships became revenue cutters to prohibit the trade of France. The neutral carrier, pocketing his pride, offered his service to either for pay, and the other then regarded him as taking part in hostilities. {1348} The ministry, in the exigencies of debate, betrayed some lack of definite conviction as to their precise aim. Sometimes the Orders were justified as a military measure of retaliation; sometimes the need of supporting British commerce as essential to her life and to her naval strength was alleged; and, their opponents in either case taunted them with inconsistency. Napoleon, with despotic simplicity, announced clearly his purpose of ruining England through her trade, and the ministry really needed no other arguments than his avowals. 'Salus civitatis suprema lex.' To call the measures of either not military, is as inaccurate as it would be to call the ancient practice of circumvallation, unmilitary, because the only weapon used for it was the spade. … The Orders in Council received various modifications, due largely to the importance to Great Britain of the American market, which absorbed a great part of her manufactures; but these modifications, though sensibly lightening the burden upon neutrals and introducing some changes of form, in no sense departed from the spirit of the originals. The entire series was finally withdrawn in June, 1812, but too late to avert the war with the United States, which was declared in the same month. Napoleon never revoked his Berlin and Milan decrees, although by a trick he induced an over-eager President of the United States to believe that he had done so. … The true function of Great Britain in this long struggle can scarcely be recognized unless there be a clear appreciation of the fact that a really great national movement, like the French Revolution, or a really great military power under an incomparable general, like the French Empire under Napoleon, is not to be brought to terms by ordinary military successes, which simply destroy the organized force opposed. … If the course of aggression which Bonaparte had inherited from the Revolution was to continue, there were needed, not the resources of the Continent only, but of the world. There was needed also a diminution of ultimate resistance below the stored-up aggressive strength of France; otherwise, however procrastinated, the time must come when the latter should fail. On both these points Great Britain withstood Napoleon. She shut him off from the world, and by the same act prolonged her own powers of endurance beyond his power of aggression. This in the retrospect of history was the function of Great Britain, in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period; and that the successive ministries of Pitt and his followers pursued the course best fitted, upon the whole, to discharge that function, is their justification to posterity."

Capt. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, chapters 18-19 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: H. Adams, History of the United States, volume 3, chapters 4 and 16, and volume 4, chapter 4.

Lord Brougham, Life and Times, by himself, chapter 10 (volume 2).

See also: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1804-1809.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807 (February-September). The Turkish alliance. Ineffective attempts of England against Constantinople and in Egypt.

See TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807 (June-July). The Treaties of Tilsit with Russia and Prussia. The latter shorn of half her territory. Formation of the kingdom of Westphalia. Secret understandings between Napoleon and the Czar.

See GERMANY. A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).

FRANCE: A. D. 1807 (July-December). The seeming power and real weakness of Napoleon's empire.

"The dangers … that lay hid under the new arrangement of the map of Europe [by, the Treaty of Tilsit], and in the results of French conquests, were as yet withdrawn from almost every eye; and the power of Napoleon was now at its height, though his empire was afterwards somewhat enlarged. … If England still stood in arms against it, she was without an avowed ally on the Continent; and, drawing to itself the great Power of the North, it appeared to threaten the civilized world with that universal and settled domination which had not been seen since the fall of Rome. The Sovereign of France from the Scheldt to the Pyrenees, and of Italy from the Alps to the Tiber, Napoleon held under his immediate sway the fairest and most favored part of the Continent; and yet this was only the seat and centre of that far-spreading and immense authority. One of his brothers, Louis, governed the Batavian Republic, converted into the kingdom of Holland; another, Joseph wore the old Crown of Naples; and a third, Jerome, sat on the new throne of Westphalia; and he had reduced Spain to a simple dependency, while, with Austria humbled and Prussia crushed, he was supreme in Germany from the Rhine to the Vistula, through his confederate, subject, or allied States. This enormous Empire, with its vassal appendages, rested on great and victorious armies in possession of every point of vantage from the Niemen to the Adige and the Garonne, and proved as yet to be irresistible; and as Germany, Holland, Poland, and Italy swelled the forces of France with large contingents, the whole fabric of conquest seemed firmly cemented. Nor was the Empire the mere creation of brute force and the spoil of the sword; its author endeavoured, in some measure, to consolidate it through better and more lasting influences. Napoleon, indeed, suppressed the ideas of 1789 everywhere, but he introduced his Code and large social reforms into most of the vassal or allied States; he completed the work of destroying Feudalism which the Revolution had daringly begun and he left a permanent mark on the face of Europe, far beyond the limit of Republican France, in innumerable monuments of material splendour. … Nor did the Empire at this time appear more firmly established abroad than within the limits of the dominant State which had become mistress of Continental Europe. The prosperity of the greater part of France was immense; the finances, fed by the contributions of war, seemed overflowing and on the increase; and if sounds of discontent were occasionally heard, they were lost in the universal acclaim which greeted the author of the national greatness, and the restorer of social order and welfare. … In the splendour and success of the Imperial era, the animosities and divisions of the past disappeared, and France seemed to form a united people. If, too, the cost of conquest was great, and exacted a tribute of French blood, the military power of the Empire shone with the brightest radiance of martial renown; Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland could in part console even thinned households. … {1349} The magnificent public works with which Napoleon adorned this part of his reign increased this sentiment of national grandeur; it was now that the Madeleine raised its front, and the Column, moulded from captured cannon; … and Paris, decked out with triumphal arches, with temples of glory, and with stately streets, put on the aspect of ancient Rome, gathering into her lap the gorgeous spoils of subjugated and dependent races. … Yet, notwithstanding its apparent strength, this structure of conquest and domination was essentially weak, and liable to decay. The work of the sword, and of new-made power, it was in opposition to the nature of things. … The material and even social benefits conferred by the Code, and reform of abuses, could not compensate vanquished but martial races for the misery and disgrace of subjection; and, apart from the commercial oppression [of the Continental System, which destroyed commerce in order to do injury to England], … the exasperating pressure of French officials, the exactions of the victorious French armies, and the severities of the conscription introduced among them, provoked discontent in the vassal States on which the yoke of the Empire weighed. … The prostration, too, of Austria and Prussia … had a direct tendency to make these powers forget their old discords in common suffering, and to bring to an end the internal divisions through which France had become supreme in Germany. … The triumphant policy of Tilsit contained the germs of a Coalition against France more formidable than she had yet experienced. At the same time, the real strength of the instrument by which Napoleon maintained his power was being gradually but surely impaired; the imperial armies were more and more filled with raw conscripts and ill-affected allies, as their size increased with the extension of his rule; and the French element in them, on which alone reliance could be placed in possible defeat, was being dissipated, exhausted, and wasted. … Nor was the Empire, within France itself, free from elements of instability and decline. The finances, well administered as they were, were so burdened by the charges of war that they were only sustained by conquest; and flourishing as their condition seemed, they had been often cruelly strained of late, and were unable to bear the shock of disaster. The seaports were beginning to suffer from the policy adopted to subdue England. … Meanwhile, the continual demands on the youth of the nation for never-ceasing wars were gradually telling on its military power; Napoleon, after Eylau, had had recourse to the ruinous expedient of taking beforehand the levies which the conscription raised; and though complaints were as yet rare, the anticipation of the resources of France, which filled the armies with feeble boys, unequal to the hardships of a rude campaign, had been noticed at home as well as abroad. Nor were the moral ills of this splendid despotism less certain than its bad material results. … The inevitable tendency of the Empire, even at the time of its highest glory, was to lessen manliness and self-reliance, to fetter and demoralize the human mind, and to weaken whatever public virtue and mental independence France possessed; and its authority had already begun to disclose some of the harsher features of Cæsarian despotism."

W. O'C. Morris, The French Revolution and First Empire, chapter 12.

"Notwithstanding so many brilliant and specious appearances, France did not possess either true prosperity or true greatness. She was not really prosperous; for not only was there no feeling of security, a necessary condition for the welfare of nations, but all the evils produced by so many years of war still weighed heavily on her. … She was not really great, for all her great men had either been banished or put to silence. She could still point with pride to her generals and soldiers, although the army, which, if brave as ever, had gradually sunk from the worship of the country and liberty to that of glory, and from the worship of glory to that of riches, was corrupt and degenerate; but where were her great citizens? Where were her great orators, her great politicians, her great philosophers, her great writers of every kind? Where, at least, were their descendants? All who had shown a spark of genius or pride had been sacrificed for the benefit of a single man. They had disappeared; some crushed under the wheels of his chariot, others forced to live obscurely in some unknown retreat, and, what was graver still, their race seemed extinct. … France was imprisoned, as it were, in an iron net, and the issues were closed to all the generous and ardent youth that had either intellectual or moral activity."

P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 3, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: H. A. Taine; The Modern Regime, book 1, chapter 2, and book 3, chapter 3 (volume 1).

FRANCE: A. D. 1807 (September-November). Forcible seizure of the Danish fleet by the English. Frustration of Napoleon's plans. Alliance with Denmark. War with Sweden.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1807-1810.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807 (October-November). French invasion and occupation of Portugal. Flight of the royal family to Brazil. Delusive treaty of partition with Spain.

See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1807.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808. Napoleon's alienation of Talleyrand and others.

Charles Maurice Talleyrand de Perigord, made Bishop of Autun by King Louis XVI:, in 1789, and Prince of Benevento by Napoleon, in 1806, had made his first appearance in public life as one of the clerical deputies in the States-General of 1789, and had taken the popular side. He was the only bishop having a benefice in France who took the new oath required of the clergy, and he proposed the appropriation of church property to the wants of the public treasury. He subsequently consecrated the first French bishops appointed under the new constitution, and was excommunicated therefor by the Pope. On the approach of the Terror he escaped from France and took refuge first in England, afterwards in the United States. In 1795 he was permitted to return to Paris, and he took an important part in the revolution of the 18th Brumaire which overthrew the Directory and made Napoleon First Consul. In the new government he received the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, which he retained under the Empire, until 1807, when he obtained permission to retire, with the title of "vice-grand electeur." "M. de Talleyrand, the Empire once established and fortunate, had attached himself to it with a sort of enthusiasm. The poesy of victory, and the eloquence of an exalted imagination, subdued for a time the usual nonchalance and moderation of his character. He entered into all Napoleon's plans for reconstituting an empire of the Francs, and reviving the system of fiefs and feudal dignitaries. … {1350} 'Any other system,' he said, 'but a military one, is in our circumstances at present impossible. I am, then, for making that system splendid, and compensating France for her liberty by her grandeur.' The principality he enjoyed, though it by no means satisfied him, was a link between him and the policy under which he held it. … But he had a strong instinct for the practical; all governments, according to his theory, might be made good, except an impossible one. A government depending on constant success in difficult undertakings, at home and abroad, was, according to his notions, impossible. This idea, after the Peace of Tilsit, more or less haunted him. It made him, in spite of himself, bitter against his chief—bitter at first, more because he liked him than because he disliked him. He would still have aided to save the Empire, but he was irritated because he thought he saw the Empire drifting into a system which would not admit of its being saved. A sentiment of this kind, however, is as little likely to be pardoned by one who is accustomed to consider that his will must be law, as a sentiment of a more hostile nature. Napoleon began little by little to hate the man for whom he had felt at one time a predilection, and if he disliked anyone, he did that which it is most dangerous to do, and most useless; that is, he wounded his pride without diminishing his importance. It is true that M. de Talleyrand never gave any visible sign of being irritated. But few, whatever the philosophy with which they forgive an injury, pardon an humiliation; and thus, stronger and stronger grew by degrees that mutual dissatisfaction which the one vented at times in furious reproaches, and the other disguised under a studiously respectful indifference. This carelessness as to the feelings of those whom it would have been wiser not to offend, was one of the most fatal errors of the conqueror. … He had become at this time equally indifferent to the hatred and affection of his adherents; and … fancied that everything depended on his own merits, and nothing on the merits of his agents. The victory of Wagram, and the marriage with Marie-Louise, commenced, indeed, a new era in his history. Fouché was dismissed, though not without meriting a reprimand for his intrigues; and Talleyrand fell into unequivocal disgrace, in some degree provoked by his witticisms; whilst round these two men gathered a quiet and observant opposition, descending with the clever adventurer to the lowest classes, and ascending with the dissatisfied noble to the highest. … M. de Talleyrand's house then (the only place, perhaps, open to all persons, where the government of the day was treated without reserve) became a sort of 'rendezvous' for a circle which replied to a victory by a bon mot, and confronted the borrowed ceremonies of a new court by the natural graces and acknowledged fashions of an old one."

Sir H. L. Bulwer, Historical Characters, volume 1: Talleyrand, part 4, sections 9-10.

ALSO IN: C. K. McHarg, Life of Prince Talleyrand, chapters 1-13.

Memoirs of Talleyrand, volume 1.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808. Napoleon's over-ingenious plottings in Spain for the theft of the crown. The popular rising.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1807-1808.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808 (November-February). Napoleon in Italy. His arbitrary changes in the Italian constitution. His annexation of Tuscany to France. His quarrel with the Pope and seizure of the Papal States.

"Napoleon … set out for Italy, where great political changes were in progress. Destined, like all the subordinate thrones which surrounded the great nation, to share in the rapid mutations which its government underwent, the kingdom of Italy was soon called upon to accept a change in its constitution. Napoleon, in consequence, suppressed the legislative body, and substituted in its room a Senate, which was exclusively intrusted with the power of submitting observations to government on the public wants, and of superintending the budget and public expenditure. As the members of this Senate were nominated and paid by government; this last shadow of representative institutions became a perfect mockery. Nevertheless Napoleon was received with unbounded adulation by all the towns of Italy; their deputies, who waited upon him at Milan, vied with each other in elegant flattery. He was the Redeemer of France, but the Creator of Italy: they had supplicated heaven for his safety, for his victories; they offered him the tribute of their eternal love and fidelity. Napoleon received their adulation in the most gracious manner; but he was careful not to lose sight of the main object of his policy, the consolidation of his dominions, the rendering them all dependent on his imperial crown, and the fostering of a military spirit among his subjects. … From Milan the Emperor travelled by Verona and Padua to Venice; he there admired the marble palaces, varied scenery, and gorgeous architecture of the Queen of the Adriatic, which appeared to extraordinary advantage amidst illuminations, fireworks, and rejoicings; and returning to Milan, arranged, with an authoritative hand, all the affairs of the peninsula. The discontent of Melzi, who still retained a lingering partiality for the democratic institutions which he had vainly hoped to see established in his country, was stifled by the title of Duke of Lodi. Tuscany was taken from the King of Etruria, on whom Napoleon had settled it, and united to France by the title of the department of Taro; while magnificent public works were set on foot at Milan to dazzle the ardent imagination of the Italians, and console them for the entire loss of their national independence and civil liberty. The cathedral was daily adorned with fresh works of sculpture; its exterior decorated and restored to its original purity, while thousands of pinnacles and statues rose on all sides, glittering in spotless brilliancy in the blue vault of heaven. The Forum of Buonaparte was rapidly advancing; the beautiful basso-relievos of the arch of the Simplon already entranced the admiring gaze of thousands; the roads of the Simplon and Mount Cenis were kept in the finest order, and daily attracted fresh crowds of strangers to the Italian plains. But in the midst of all this external splendour, the remains of which still throw a halo round the recollection of the French domination in Italy, the finances of all the states were involved in hopeless embarrassment, and suffering of the most grinding kind pervaded all classes of the people. … The encroachments thus made on the Italian peninsula were not the only ones which Napoleon effected, in consequence of the liberty to dispose of western Europe acquired by him at the treaty of Tilsit. The territory of the great nation was rounded also on the side of Germany and Holland. {1351} On the 11th of November, the important town and territory of Flushing were ceded to France by the King of Holland, who obtained, in return, merely an elusory equivalent in East Friesland. On the 21st of January following, a decree of the senate united to the French empire, besides these places, the important towns of Kehl Cassel, and Wesel, on the right bank of the Rhine. Shortly after, the French troops, who had already taken possession of the whole of Tuscany, in virtue of the resignation forced upon the Queen of Etruria, invaded the Roman territories, and made themselves masters of the ancient capital of the world. They immediately occupied the castle of St. Angelo, and the gates of the city, and entirely dispossessed the papal troops [see PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814]. … France now, without disguise, assumed the right of annexing neutral and independent states to its already extensive dominions, by no other authority than the decree of its own legislature."

Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 51, sections 51-53 (volume 11).

ALSO IN: C. Botta, Italy during the Consulate and Empire of Napoleon, chapter 5.

FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1809. The American embargo and non-intercourse laws.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1804-1809, and 1808.

FRANCE: A.D. 1808 (May-September). Bestowal of the Spanish crown on Joseph Bonaparte. The national revolt. French reverses. Flight of Joseph Bonaparte from Madrid. Landing of British forces in the Peninsula.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1808 (MAY-SEPTEMBER).

FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (September-October). Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt. The assemblage of kings.

"Napoleon's relations with the Court of Russia, at one time very formal, became far more amicable, according as Spanish affairs grew complicated. After the capitulation of Baylen they became positively affectionate. The Czar was too clear-sighted not to understand the meaning of this gradation. He quickly understood that the more difficulties Napoleon might create for himself in Spain, the more would he be forced to make concessions to Russia. … The Russian alliance, which at Tilsit had only been an arrangement to flatter Napoleon's ambition, had now become a necessity to him. Each side felt this; hence the two sovereigns were equally impatient to meet again; the one to strengthen an alliance so indispensable to the success of his plans, the other to derive from it all the promised advantages. It was settled, therefore, that the desired interview should take place at Erfurt towards the end of September, 1808. … The two Emperors met on the 27th of September, on the road between Weimar and Erfurt. They embraced each other with that air of perfect cordiality of which kings alone possess the secret, especially when their intention is rather to stifle than to embrace. They made their entry into the town on horseback together, amidst an immense concourse of people. Napoleon had wished by its magnificence to render the reception worthy of the illustrious guests who had agreed to meet at Erfurt. He had sent thither from the storehouses of the crown, bronzes, porcelain, the richest hangings, and the most sumptuous furniture. He desired that the Comédie-Française should heighten the brilliant effects of these fêtes by performing the chief masterpieces of our stage, from 'Cinna' down to 'La Mort de César,' before this royal audience. … All the natural adherents of Napoleon hastened to answer his appeal by flocking to Erfurt, for he did not lose sight of his principal object, and his desire was to appear before Europe surrounded by a court composed of kings. In this cortege were to be seen those of Bavaria, of Wurtemburg, of Saxony, of Westphalia, and Prince William of Prussia; and beside these stars of first magnitude twinkled the obscure Pleiades of the Rhenish Confederation. The reunion, almost exclusively German, was meant to prove to German idealists the vanity of their dreams. Were not all present who had any weight in Germany from their power, rank, or riches? Was it not even hinted that the Emperor of Austria had implored the favour, without being able to obtain it, of admission to the conferences of Erfurt? This report was most improbable. … The kings of intellect came in their turn to bow down before Cæsar. Goethe and Wieland were presented to Napoleon; they appeared at his court, and by their glory adorned his triumph. German patriotism was severely tried at Erfurt; but it may be said that of all its humiliations the one which the Germans most deeply resented was that of beholding their greatest literary genius decking himself out with Napoleon's favours [the decoration of the Legion of Honour, which Goethe accepted]. … The theatrical effect which Napoleon had in view in this solemn show at Erfurt having once been produced, his principal object was attained, for the political questions which remained for settlement with Alexander could not raise any serious difficulty. In view of the immediate and certain session of two such important provinces as those of Wallachia and Moldavia, the Czar, without much trouble, renounced that division of the Ottoman Empire with which he had been tantalised for more than a year. … He bound himself … by the Treaty of Erfurt to continue his co-operation with Napoleon in the war against England (Article 2), and, should it so befall, also against Austria (Article 10); but the affairs in Spain threw every attack upon England into the background. … The only very distinct engagement which the treaty imposed on Alexander was the recognition of the new order of things established by France in Spain.'"

P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 3, chapter 10.

ALSO IN: Prince Talleyrand, Memoirs, volume 1.

FRANCE: A. D. 1808-1809. Reverses in Portugal. Napoleon in the field. French victories resumed. The check at Corunna.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (AUGUST-JANUARY).

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (January-September). Reopened war with Austria. Napoleon's advance to Vienna. His defeat at Aspern and victory at Wagram. The Peace of Schönbrunn. Fresh acquisitions of territory.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JANUARY-JUNE), and (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (February-July). Wellington's check to the French in Spain and Portugal. His passage of the Douro. Battle of Talavera.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (May). Annexation of the States of the Church. Removal of the Pope to Savona.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (December). Withdrawal of the English from Spain into Portugal.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

{1352}

FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (February-December). Annexations of territory to the empire. Holland, the Hanse Towns, and the Valais in Switzerland. Other reconstructions of the map of Germany.

"It was not till December 10th 1810 [after the abdication of King Louis—see NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1806-1810] that Holland was united to France by a formal senatus-consulte. By the first article of the same law, the Hanse Towns [Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck], the Duchy of Lauenburg, and the countries situated between the North Sea and a line drawn from the confluence of the Lippe with the Rhine to Halteren, from Halteren to the Ems above Telgte, from the Ems to the confluence of the Werra with the Weser, and from Stolzenau on that river to the Elbe, above the confluence of the Stecknitz, were at the same time incorporated with the French Empire. … The line described would include the northern part of Westphalia and Hanover, and the duchy of Oldenburg. … The Duke of Oldenburg having appealed to the Emperor of Russia, the head of his house, against this spoliation, Napoleon offered to compensate him with the town and territory of Erfurt and the lordship of Blankenheim, which had remained under French administration since the Peace of Tilsit. But this offer was at once rejected, and Alexander reserved, by a formal protest, the rights of his relative. This annexation was only the complement of other incorporations with the French Empire during the year 1810. Early in the year, the Electorate of Hanover had been annexed to the Kingdom of Westphalia. On February 16th Napoleon had erected the Grand Duchy of Frankfort, and presented it to the Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine, with a reversal in favour of Eugene Beauharnais. On November 12th the Valais in Switzerland was also annexed to France, with the view of securing the road over the Simplon. Of all these annexations, that of the Hanse Towns and the districts on the North Sea was the most important, and one of the principal causes of the war that ensued between France and Russia. These annexations were made without the slightest negociation with any European cabinet, and it would be superfluous to add, without even a pretext of right, though the necessity of them from the war with England was alleged as the motive."

T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 7, chapter 15, with foot-note (volume 4).

"'The English,' said Napoleon, 'have torn asunder the public rights of Europe; a new order of things governs the universe. Fresh guarantees having become necessary to me, the annexation of the mouths of the Scheldt, of the Meuse, of the Rhine, of the Ems, of the Weser, and of the Elbe to the Empire appears to me to be the first and the most important. … The annexation of the Valais is the anticipated result of the immense works that I have been making for the past ten years in that part of the Alps.' And this was all. To justify such violence he did not condescend to allege any pretext—to urge forward opportunities that were too long in developing, or to make trickery subserve the use of force—he consulted nothing but his policy; in other words, his good pleasure. To take possession of a country, it was sufficient that the country suited him: he said so openly, as the simplest thing in the world, and thought proper to add that these new usurpations were but a beginning, the first, according to his own expression, of those which seemed to him still necessary. And it was Europe, discontented, humbled, driven wild by the barbarous follies of the continental system, that he thus defied, as though he wished at any cost to convince every one that no amicable arrangement or conciliation was possible; and that there was but one course for governments or men of spirit to adopt, that of fighting unto death."

P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 4, chapter 2.

FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812. Continued hostile attitude towards the United States of America.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1810-1812.

FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812. The War in the Peninsula. Wellington's Lines of Torres Vedras. French retreat from Portugal. English advance into Spain.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809-1810 (OCTOBER-SEPTEMBER), and 1810-1812.

FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812. Napoleon's divorce from Josephine and marriage to Marie-Louise of Austria. His rupture with the Czar and preparations for war with Russia.

"Napoleon now revived the idea which he had often entertained before, of allying himself with one of the great ruling families. A compliant senate and a packed ecclesiastical council pronounced his separation from Josephine Beauharnais, who retired with a magnificent pension to Malmaison, where she died. As previous marriage proposals to the Russian court had not been cordially received, Napoleon now turned to Austria. The matter was speedily arranged with Metternich, and in March, 1810, the archduchess Maria Louisa arrived in France as the emperor's wife. The great importance of the marriage was that it broke the last links which bound Russia to France, and thus overthrew the alliance of Tilsit. Alexander had been exasperated by the addition of Western Galicia to the grand-duchy of Warsaw, which he regarded as a step towards the restoration of Poland, and therefore as a breach of the engagement made at Tilsit. The annexation of Oldenburg, whose duke was a relative of the Czar, was a distinct personal insult. Alexander showed his irritation by formally deserting the continental system, which was more ruinous to Russia than to almost any other country, and by throwing his ports open to British commerce (December 1810). … The chief grievance to Russia was the apparent intention of Napoleon to do something for the Poles. The increase of the grand-duchy of Warsaw by the treaty of Vienna was so annoying to Alexander, that he began to meditate on the possibility of restoring Poland himself, and making it a dependent kingdom for the Czar, in the same way as Napoleon had treated Italy. He even went so far as to sound the Poles on the subject; but he found that they had not forgotten the three partitions of their country, and that their sympathies were rather with France than with Russia. At the same time Napoleon was convinced that until Russia was subdued his empire was unsafe, and all hopes of avenging himself upon England were at an end. All through the year 1811 it was known that war was inevitable, but neither power was in a hurry to take the initiative. Meanwhile the various powers that retained nominal independence had to make up their minds as to the policy they would pursue. For no country was the decision harder than for Prussia. Neutrality was out of the question, as the Prussian territories, lying between the two combatants, must be occupied by one or the other. {1353} The friends and former Colleagues of Stein were unanimous for a Russian alliance and a desperate struggle for liberty. But Hardenberg, who had become chancellor in 1810, was too prudent to embark in a contest, which at the time was hopeless. The Czar had not been so consistent in his policy as to be a very desirable ally; and, even with Russian assistance, it was certain that the Prussian frontiers could not be defended against the French, who had already garrisons in the chief fortresses. Hardenberg fully sympathised with the patriots, but he sacrificed enthusiasm to prudence, and offered the support of Prussia to France. The treaty was arranged on the 24th of February, 1812. Frederick William gave the French a free passage through his territories, and undertook to furnish 20,000 men for service in the field, and as many more for garrison duty. In return for this Napoleon guaranteed the security of the Prussian kingdom as it stood, and held out the prospect of additions to it. It was an unnatural and hollow alliance, and was understood to be so by the Czar. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and other friends of Stein resigned their posts, and many Prussian officers entered the service of the Czar. Austria, actuated by similar motives, adopted the same policy, but with less reluctance. After this example had been set by the two great powers, none of the lesser states of Germany dared to disobey the peremptory orders of Napoleon. But Turkey and Sweden, both of them old allies of France, were at this crisis in the opposition. … The Swedes were threatened with starvation by Napoleon's stern command to close their ports not only against English, but against all German vessels. Bernadotte, who had just been adopted as the heir of the childless Charles XIII.; determined to throw in his lot with his new country, rather than with his old commander. He had also hopes of compensating Sweden for the loss of Finland by wresting Norway from the Danes, and this would never be agreed to by France. Accordingly Sweden prepared to support the cause of Alexander."

R. Lodge, History of Modern Europe, chapter 24, sections 88 and 41.

"Napoleon's Russian expedition should not be regarded as an isolated freak of insane pride. He himself regarded it as the unfortunate effect of a fatality, and he betrayed throughout an unwonted reluctance and perplexity. 'The war must take place,' he said, 'it lies in the nature of things.' That is, it arose naturally, like the other Napoleonic wars, out of the quarrel with England. Upon the Continental system he had staked everything. He had united all Europe in the crusade against England, and no state, least of all such a state as Russia, could withdraw from the system without practically joining England. Nevertheless, we may wonder that, if he felt obliged to make war on Russia, he should have chosen to wage it in the manner he did, by an overwhelming invasion. For an ordinary war his resources were greatly superior to those of Russia. A campaign on the Lithuanian frontier would no doubt have been unfavourable to Alexander, and might have forced him to concede the points at issue. Napoleon had already experienced in Spain the danger of rousing national spirit. It seems, however, that this lesson had been lost on him."

J. R. Seeley, Short History of Napoleon, chapter 5, section 3.

"Warnings and cautions were not … wanting to him. He had been at several different times informed of the desperate plans of Russia and her savage resolve to destroy all around him, provided he could be involved in the destruction of the Empire. He was cautioned, with even more earnestness, of the German conspiracies. Alquier transmitted to him from Stockholm a significant remark of Alexander's: 'If the Emperor Napoleon should experience a reverse, the whole of Germany will rise to oppose his retreat, or to prevent the arrival of his reinforcements.' His brother Jerome, who was still better situated for knowing what was going on in Germany, informed him, in the month of January, 1811, of the proposal that had been made to him to enter into a secret league against France, but the only thanks he received from Napoleon was reproach for having encouraged such overtures by his equivocal conduct. … Marshal Davout and General Rapp transmitted him identically the same information from Hamburg and Dantzig. But far from encouraging such confidential communications, Napoleon was irritated by them. … 'I do not know why Rapp meddles in what does not concern him [he wrote]. … I beg you will not place such rhapsodies under my eyes. My time is too precious to waste on such twaddle.' … In presence of such hallucination, caused by pride and infatuation, we seem to hear Macbeth in his delirium insulting the messengers who announced to him the approach· of the enemy's armies."

P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 4, chapter 6.

"That period ought to have been esteemed the happiest of Napoleon's life. What more could the wildest ambition desire? … All obeyed him. Nothing was wanting to make him happy! Nothing, if he could be happy who possessed not a love of justice. … The being never existed who possessed ampler means for promoting the happiness of mankind. Nothing was required but justice and prudence. The nation expected these from him, and granted him that unlimited confidence which he afterwards so cruelly abused. … Instead of considering with calmness and moderation how he might best employ his vast resources, he ruminated on projects beyond the power of man to execute; forgetting what innumerable victims must be sacrificed in the vain attempt. … He aspired at universal despotism, for no other reason than because a nation, isolated from the continent and profiting by its happy situation, had refused to submit to his intolerable·yoke. … In the hope of conquering that invincible enemy, he vainly endeavoured to grasp the extremities of Europe. … Misled by his rash and hasty temper, he adopted a false line of politics, and converted in the north, as he had done before in the south, the most useful and powerful of his allies into a dangerous enemy."

E. Labaume, Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia, part 1, book 1.

ALSO IN: C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 2, chapter 3.

Imbert de Saint Amand, Memoirs of the Empress Marie Louise.

FRANCE: A. D. 1812 (June). The captive Pope brought to Fontainebleau.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1812 (June-August). Defeat by the English in Spain at Salamanca. Abandonment of Madrid by King Joseph.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812 (JUNE-AUGUST).

{1354}

FRANCE: A. D. 1812 (June-December). Napoleon's Russian campaign. The advance to Moscow. The burning of the city. The retreat and its horrors.

See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812.

FRANCE: A. D. 1812-1813 (December-March) Napoleon's return from Russia. His measures for creating a new army.

"Whilst Europe, agitated at once by hope, by fear, and by hatred, was inquiring what had become of Napoleon, whether he had perished or had been saved, he was crossing in a sledge—accompanied by the Duke of Vicenza, the Grand Marshal Duroc, Count Lobau, General Lefevre-Desnouettes, and the Mameluke Rustan—the vast, plains of Lithuania, of Poland, and of Saxony, concealed by thick furs; for if his name had been imprudently uttered, or his countenance recognised, a tragical catastrophe would have instantly ensued. The man who had so greatly excited the admiration of nations, who was the object of their … superstition, would not at that moment have escaped their fury. In two places only did he allow himself to be known, Warsaw and Dresden. … That he might not occasion too great surprise, he caused himself to be preceded by an officer with a few lines for the 'Moniteur,' saying that on December 5 he had assembled his generals at Smorgoni, had delegated the command to King Murat, only so long as military operations were interrupted by the cold, that he had traversed Warsaw and Dresden, and that he was about to arrive in Paris to take in hand the affairs of the Empire. … Napoleon followed close on the steps of the officer who was to announce his arrival. On December 18, at half-past 11 P. M., he entered the Tuileries. … On the next morning, the 19th, he received the ministers and grandees of the court … with extreme hauteur, maintaining a tranquil but severe aspect, appearing to expect explanations instead of affording them himself, treating foreign affairs as of minor consequence, and those of a domestic nature as of principal import, demanding some light upon these last,—in short, questioning others in order to avoid being questioned himself. … On Sunday, the 20th of December, the second day after his arrival, Napoleon received the Senate, the Council of State, and the principal branches of the administration," which severally addressed to him the most fulsome flatteries and assurances of support. "After an infuriated populace basely outraging vanquished princes, nothing can be seen more melancholy than these great bodies prostrating themselves at the feet of a power, bestowing upon it a degree of admiration which increases with its errors, speaking with ardour of their fidelity, already about to expire, and swearing to die in its cause when they are on the eve of hailing the accession of another. Happy are those countries whose established Constitutions spare them these humiliating spectacles!" As speedily as possible, Napoleon applied himself to the recreation of his lost army, by anticipating the conscription for 1814, and by making new calls upon the classes which had already furnished their contingents. All his measures were submissively sanctioned by the obsequious Senate; but many murmurs of discontent were heard among the people, and some movements of resistance needed to be put down. "However, when the enlightened classes of a country approve a measure, their support is extremely efficacious. In France, all those classes perceiving that it was necessary energetically to defend the country against a foreign enemy, though the Government had been still more in the wrong than they were, the levies were effected, and the high functionaries, sustained by a moral acquiescence which they had not always obtained, fulfilled their duty, though in heart full of sad and sinister forebodings."

A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and the Empire, book 47 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: Duchess d'Abrantes, Memoirs of Napoleon, volume 2, chapter 43.

FRANCE: A. D. 1812-1813. Germanic rising against Napoleon. War of Liberation. Lützen. Bautzen. Dresden. Leipsic. The retreat of the French from beyond the Rhine.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1813 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (February-March). The new Concordat signed and retracted by the Pope.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (June-November). Defeat at Vittoria and in the Pyrenees. Retreat from Spain.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (November-December). Dutch independence regained.

See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1813.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January). The Pope set free to return to Rome.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January-March). The allied invasion. Napoleon's campaign of defense. His cause lost. Surrender of Paris.

"The battle of Leipzig was the overthrow of the French rule in Germany; there only remained, as evidence of what they had lost, 150,000 men, garrisons of the fortresses of the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe. Each success of the allies had been marked by the desertion of one of the peoples that had furnished its contingent to the Grand Army of 1812: after Prussia, Austria; at Leipzig the Saxons: the French had not been able to regain the Rhine except by passing over the bodies of the Bavarians at Hanau. Baden, Wurtemberg, Hesse, and Darmstadt declared their defection at nearly the same time; the sovereigns were still hesitating whether to separate themselves from Napoleon, when their people and regiments, worked upon by the German patriots, had already passed into the allied camp. Jerome Bonaparte had again quitted Cassel; Denmark found Itself forced to adhere to the Coalition. Napoleon had retired to the left bank of the Rhine. Would Alexander cross this natural frontier of revolutionary France? 'Convinced,' says M. Bogdanovitch, 'by the experience of many years, that neither losses inflicted on Napoleon, nor treaties concluded with him, could check his insatiable ambition, Alexander would not stop at setting free the involuntary allies of France, and resolved to pursue the war till he had overthrown his enemy.' The allied sovereigns found themselves reunited at Frankfort, and an immediate march to Paris was discussed. Alexander, Stein. Blücher, Gneisenau, and all the Prussians were on the side of decisive action. The Emperor Francis and Metternich only desired Napoleon to be weakened, as his downfall would expose Austria to another danger, the preponderance of Russia on the Continent. Bernadotte insisted on Napoleon's dethronement, with the ridiculous design of appropriating the crown of France, traitor as he was to her cause. England would have preferred a solid and immediate peace to a war which would exhaust her in subsidies, and augment her already enormous debt. These divergencies, these hesitations, gave Napoleon time to strengthen his position. {1355} After Hanau, in the opinion of Ney, 'the allies might have counted their stages to Paris.' Napoleon had re-opened the negotiations. The relinquishment of Italy (when Murat on his side negotiated the preservation of his kingdom of Naples), of Holland, of Germany, and of Spain, and the confinement of France between her natural boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps; such were the 'Conditions of Frankfort.' Napoleon sent an answer to Metternich, 'that he consented to the opening of a congress at Mannheim: that the conclusion of a peace which would insure the independence of all the nations of the earth had always been the aim of his policy.' This reply seems evasive, but could the proposals of the allies have been serious? Encouraged by disloyal Frenchmen, they published the declaration of Frankfort, by which they affirmed 'that they did not make war with France, but against the preponderance which Napoleon had long exercised beyond the limits of his empire.' Deceitful assurance, too obvious snare, which could only take in a nation weary of war, enervated by twenty-two years of sterile victories, and at the end of its resources! During this time Alexander, with the deputies of the Helvetian Diet summoned at Frankfort, discussed the basis of a new Swiss Confederation. Holland was already raised by the partisans of the house of Orange, and entered by the Prussians. The campaign of France began. Alexander issued at Freiburg a proclamation to his troops. … He refused to receive Caulaincourt at Freiburg, declaring that he would only treat in France. 'Let us spare the French negotiator the trouble of the journey,' he said to Metternich. 'It does not seem to me a matter of indifference to the allied sovereigns, whether the peace with France is signed on this side of the Rhine, or on the other, in the very heart of France. Such an historical event is well worth a change of quarters.' Without counting the armies of Italy and the Pyrenees, Napoleon had now a mere handful of troops, 80,000 men, spread from Nimeguen to Bâle, to resist 500,000 allies. The army of the North (Wintzingerode) invaded Holland, Belgium, and the Rhenish provinces; the army of Silesia (Blücher) crossed the Rhine between Mannheim and Coblentz and entered Nancy; the army of Bohemia (Schwartzenberg) passed through Switzerland, and advanced on Troyes, where the Royalists demanded the restoration of the Bourbons. Napoleon was still able to bar for some time the way to his capital. He first attacked the army of Silesia; he defeated the vanguard, the Russians of Sacken, at St. Didier, and Blücher at Brienne; but at La Rothière he encountered the formidable masses of the Silesian and Bohemian armies, and after a fierce battle (1st February, 1814) had to fall back on Troyes. After this victory had secured their junction, the two armies separated again, the one to go down the Marne, the other the Seine, with the intention of reuniting at Paris. Napoleon profited by this mistake. He threw himself on the left flank of the army of Silesia, near Champeaubert, where he dispersed the troops of Olsoufief and Poltaratski, inflicting on them a loss of 2,500 men, and took the generals prisoners. At Montmirail, in spite of the heroism of Zigrote and Lapoukhine, he defeated Sacken; the Russians alone lost 2,800 men and five guns (11th February). At Château Thierry, he defeated Sacken and York reunited, and again the Russians lost 1,500 men and five guns. At Vauchamp it was the turn of Blücher, who lost 2,000 Russians, 4,000 Prussians, and fifteen guns. The army of Silesia was in terrible disorder. 'The peasants, exasperated by the disorder inseparable from a retreat, and excited by exaggerated rumours of French successes, took up arms, and refused supplies. The soldiers suffered both from cold and hunger, Champagne affording no wood for bivouac fires. When the weather became milder, their shoes wore out, and the men, obliged to make forced marches with bare feet, were carried by hundreds into the hospitals of the country' (Bogdanovitch). Whilst the army of Silesia retreated in disorder on the army of the North, Napoleon, with 50,000 soldiers full of enthusiasm, turned on that of Bohemia, crushed the Bavarians and Russians at Mormans, the Wurtembergers at Montereau, the Prussians at Méry: these Prussians made part of the army of Blücher, who had detached a corps to hang on the rear of Napoleon. This campaign made a profound impression on the allies. Castlereagh expressed, in Alexander's presence, the opinion that peace should be made before they were driven across the Rhine. The military chiefs began to feel uneasy. Sesslavine sent news from Joigny that Napoleon had 180,000 men at Troyes. A general insurrection of the eastern provinces was expected in the rear of the allies. It was the firmness of Alexander which maintained the Coalition, it was the military energy of Blücher which saved it. Soon after his disasters he received reinforcements from the army of the North, and took the offensive against the marshals; then, hearing of the arrival of Napoleon at La Ferté Gaucher, he retreated in great haste, finding an unexpected refuge at Soissons, which had just been taken by the army of the North. At Craonne (March 7) and at Laon (10th to 12th March), with 100,000 men against 80,000, and with strong positions, he managed to repulse all the attacks of Napoleon. At Craonne, however, the Russian loss amounted to 5,000 men, the third of their effective force. The battle of Laon cost them 4,000 men. Meanwhile, De Saint Priest, a general in Alexander's service, had taken Rheims by assault, but was dislodged by Napoleon after a fierce struggle, where the émigré commander was badly wounded, and 4,000 of his men were killed (13th, March). The Congress of Châtillon-sur-Seine was opened on the 28th of February. Russia was represented by Razoumovski and Nesselrode, Napoleon by Caulaincourt, Austria by Stadion and Metternich. The conditions proposed to Napoleon were the reduction of France to its frontiers of 1792, and the right of the allies to dispose, without reference to him, of the reconquered countries. Germany was to be a confederation of independent States, Italy to be divided into free States, Spain to be restored to Ferdinand, and Holland to the house of Orange. Leave France smaller than I found her? Never!' said Napoleon. Alexander and the Prussians would not hear of a peace which left Napoleon on the throne. Still, however, they negotiated. Austria and England were both agreed not to push him to extremities, and many times proposed to treat. After Napoleon's great success against Blücher, Castlereagh declared for peace. 'It would not be a peace,' cried the Emperor of Russia; 'it would be a truce which would not allow us to disarm one moment. I cannot come 400 leagues every day to your assistance. {1356} No peace, as long as Napoleon is on the throne.' Napoleon, in his turn, intoxicated by his success, enjoined Caulaincourt only to treat on the basis of Frankfort—natural frontiers. … As fortune returned· to the allies, the congress was dissolved (19th of March). The Bourbon princes were already in France; Louis XVIII. was on the point of being proclaimed. Alexander, tired of seeing the armies of Bohemia and Silesia fly in turn before thirty or forty thousand French, caused the allies to adopt the fatal plan of a march on Paris, which was executed in eight days. Blücher and Schwartzenberg united, with 200,000 men, were to bear down all opposition on their passage. The first act in the drama was the battle of Arcissur-Aube, where the Russians took six guns from Napoleon. The latter conceived a bold scheme, which perhaps might have saved him if Paris could have resisted, but which was his ruin. He threw himself on the rear of the allied army, abandoning to them the route to Paris, but reckoning on raising Eastern France, and cutting off their retreat to the Rhine. The allies, uneasy for one moment, were reassured by an intercepted letter of Napoleon's, and by the letters of the Parisian royalists, which revealed to them the weakness of the capital. 'Dare all!' writes Talleyrand to them. They, in their turn, deceived Napoleon, by causing him to be followed by a troop of cavalry, continued their march, defeated Marmont and Mortier, crushed the National Guards of Pacthod (battle of La Fère-Champenoise); and arrived in sight of Paris. Barclay de Tolly, forming the centre, first attacked the plateau of Romainville, defended by Marmont; on his left, the Prince of Wurtemberg threatened Vincennes; and on his right, Blücher deployed before Montmartre, which was defended by Mortier. The heights of Chaumont and those of Montmartre were taken; Marmont and Mortier with Moncey were thrown back on the ramparts. Marmont obtained an armistice from Colonel Orlof, to treat for the capitulation of Paris. King Joseph, the Empress Marie-Louise, and all the Imperial Government had already fled to the Loire. Paris was recommended to the generosity of the allied monarchs'; the army could retire on the road to Orleans. Such was the battle of Paris; it had cost, according to M. Bogdanovitch, 8,400 men to the allies, and 4,000 to the French (30th March). … The allied troops maintained a strict discipline, and were not quartered on the inhabitants. Alexander had not come as a friend of the Bourbons—the fiercest enemy of Napoleon, was least bitter against the French; he intended leaving them the choice of their government. He had not favoured any of the intrigues of the émigrés, and had scornfully remarked to Jomini, 'What are the Bourbons to me?'"

A. Rambaud, History of Russia, volume 2, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 3, chapter 1.

M. de Beauchamp, Narrative of the Invasions of France, 1814-15.

Duke de Rovigo, Memoirs, volume 3, part 2, chapters 20-32.

J. Philippart, Campaign in Germany and France, 1818, volume 1, pages 279 and after, and volume 2.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January-May). Desertion of Napoleon by Murat. Murat's treaty with the allies. French evacuation of Italy.

See ITALY: A. D. 1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (February-April). Reverses in the south. Wellington's invasion.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (March-April). Friendly reception of the Allies in Paris. Collapse of the empire. Abdication of Napoleon. Treaty of Fontainebleau.

"At an early hour in the morning [of the 31st of March], the Allied troops had taken possession of the barriers, and occupied the principal avenues leading to the city. Picquets of the Cossacks of the Guard were stationed at the corners of the principal streets. Vast multitudes thronged the Boulevards, in anxious and silent expectation of pending events. The royalists alone were active. The leaders, a small band indeed, had early assembled in the Place Louis XV., whence, with Bourbon banners displayed, they proceeded along the principal streets, haranguing the people and National Guard; but though not interfered with by the police,—for all seemed to feel that the Imperial government was at an end,—they were listened to with such perfect indifference, that many began to think their cause absolutely hopeless. It was between ten and eleven o'clock when the procession began to enter the city. Light horsemen of the Russian Guard opened the march; at the head of the main column rode the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. … Then followed 35,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, the elite of the armies, in all the pride and circumstance of war and conquest. At first the multitude looked on in silent amazement; but the affability of the officers, above all, the condescending manner of the Czar, dispelled any fear they might still entertain; and shouts of 'Vive Alexander!' began to be heard; cries of 'Vive le Roi de Prusse!' were soon added. … The shouts of welcome increased at every step. The conquerors were now hailed as liberators; 'Vivent les Allies!' 'Vivent nos liberateurs!' sounded through the air, mingled at last with the long-forgotten cry of 'Vive le Roi!' 'Vivent les Bourbons!' … The Emperor Alexander had no sooner seen the troops file past on the Place Louis XV., than he repaired to the hôtel of Talleyrand, where in the evening, a council was assembled to deliberate on the important step next to be taken, and, on the best mode of turning the glorious victories achieved to an honourable and beneficial account. … The points discussed were:

I. The possibility, on sufficient guarantees, of a peace with Napoleon;

II. The plan of regency under Marie Louise; and,

III. The restoration of the Bourbons.

The choice was not without difficulties. The first plan was easily dismissed; as the reception of the Allies proved clearly that the power of Napoleon was broken. The second seemed more likely to find favour, as promising to please the Emperor of Austria; but was finally rejected, as being, in fact, nothing more than a continuance of the Imperial reign under a different title. Against the restoration of the Bourbons, it was urged that the nation at large had evinced no desire for their recall, and seemed to have almost forgotten them. This, Talleyrand said, was owing entirely to the Congress of Chatillon, and the negotiations carried on with Napoleon; introducing at the same time, the Abbé de Pradt and Baron Louis, who fully confirmed the assertion. On being asked how he expected to obtain a declaration in favour of the exiled family, Talleyrand replied, that he was certain of the Senate; and that their vote would influence Paris, the example of which would be followed by all France. {1357} Alexander having on this assurance taken the opinion of the King of Prussia and Prince Schwarzenberg, signed a declaration to the effect that 'the Allies would treat no more with Napoleon Bonaparte, or with any member of his family.' A proclamation was issued at the same time, calling on the conservative Senate to assemble and form a provisional government, for the purpose of drawing up a constitution suitable to the wishes of the French people. This the Allies promised to guarantee; as it was their wish, they said, to see France 'powerful, happy, and prosperous.' A printer was ready in attendance; and before dark, this memorable decree was seen placarded in all the streets of Paris. The inconstant populace had not even waited for such a sig nal, and had been already engaged in destroying the emblems of the Imperial government; an attempt had even been made to pull down the statue of Napoleon from the summit of the column of Austerlitz, in the Place Vendome! The decisive impulse thus given, events moved rapidly forward. Caulaincourt's zealous efforts in favour of his master could effect nothing after the declaration already noticed. On the 2d, he took his departure for Fontainbleau; having, however, received the assurance that Napoleon would be suitably provided for. … The funds rose five per cent., and all other public securities in proportion, on the very day after the occupation of the capital; and wherever the Allied Sovereigns appeared in public, they were loudly cheered and hailed as liberators. From the first, officers of the Allied armies filled the public walks, theatres, and coffee-houses, and mixed with the people as welcome guests rather than as conquering invaders. The press, so long enslaved by Napoleon, took the most decided part against its oppressor; and from every quarter injurious pamphlets, epigrams, and satires, now poured upon the fallen ruler. Madame de Staël had characterised him as 'Robespierre on horseback'; De Pradt had more wittily termed him 'Jupiter Scapin'; and these sayings were not forgotten. But by far the most vivid sensation was produced by Chateaubriand's tract of 'Bonaparte and the Bourbons'; 30,000 copies of which are said to have been sold in two days. In proportion as the popular hatred of the Emperor evinced itself, grew the boldness of his adversaries. On the first of April, the Municipal Council of Paris met and already declared the throne vacant; on the next day, the Conservative Senate formed a Provisional Government, and issued a decree, declaring, first,'That Napoleon Bonaparte had forfeited the throne and the right of inheritance established in his family; 2d, That the people and army of France were disengaged and freed from the oath of fidelity which they had taken to him and his constitution.' … The members of the Legislative Assembly who happened to be in Paris, followed the example of the Senate. The Assembly had been dissolved in January, and could not meet constitutionally unless summoned by the Sovereign; this objection was, however, set aside, and the Assembly having met, ratified the act of deposition passed by the Senate. All the public functionaries, authorities and constituted bodies in and near Paris, hastened to send in their submission to the new powers: it was a general race in which honour was not always the prize of speed; for every address, every act of submission sent in to the new government, teemed with invectives against the deposed ruler. … It was in the night between the 2d and 3d, that Caulaincourt returned from his mission, and informed Napoleon of the events which had passed. … In what manner the Emperor received these fatal tidings we are not told. … At first it would seem that he entertained, or affected to entertain, thoughts of resorting to arms; for in the morning he reviewed his Guard, and addressed them in the following terms:—'Officers and soldiers of my Old Guard, the enemy has gained three marches on us, and outstripped us at Paris. Some factious men, emigrants whom I had pardoned, have surrounded the Emperor Alexander; they have mounted the white cockade, and would force us to do the same. In a few days I shall attack the enemy, and force them to quit the capital. I rely on you: am I right?' The troops readily replied with loud cheers to this address, calling out 'To Paris! 'to Paris!' but the Marshals and senior officers were by no means so zealous in the cause. … The Generals and Marshals … followed the Emperor to his apartments after the review; and having advised him to negotiate with the Allies, on the principle of a personal abdication, ended by informing him, that they would not accompany him if he persisted in the proposed attack on Paris. The scene which followed seems to have been of a very undignified description. Napoleon was almost convulsed with rage; he tore and trampled under foot the decree of the Senate; vowed vengeance against the whole body, who should yet, he said, be made to pay for their deed of 'felony'; but ended, nevertheless, by ignobly signing the abdication demanded of him. We say ignobly; for nothing can be more debasing in character, than to sink down from a very tempest of passion to tame submission. … The act of abdication was worded in the following terms: 'The Allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even to relinquish life, for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the regency in the person of the Empress, and from the maintenance of the laws of the empire. Done at our Palace of Fontainbleau, 4th April 1814. Napoleon.' Caulaincourt, Marshals Ney and M'Donald, were appointed to carry this conditional abdication to Paris. … The commissioners on returning to Fontainbleau found the Emperor in his cabinet, impatiently awaiting the result of their mission. Marshal Ney was the first to speak; and in that abrupt, harsh and not very respectful tone which he had lately assumed towards his falling sovereign, told him at once, that 'France, the army and the cause of peace, demanded his unconditional abdication.' Caulaincourt added, that the full sovereignty of the Isle of Elba, with a suitable establishment, had been offered by the Emperor Alexander; and Marshal M'Donald, who had so zealously defended the cause of his master, confirmed the statement,—declaring also that, 'in his opinion, the Imperial cause was completely lost, as they had all three'—the commissioners—'failed against a resolution irrevocably fixed.' 'What!' exclaimed Napoleon, 'not only my own abdication, but that of Marie Louise, and of my son? This is rather too much at once.' {1358} And with these words he delayed the answer till next day, intending, he said, to consider the subject, and consult the army; … Words ran high between the fallen chieftain and his former subordinates; there were altercations, recriminations, and painful scenes, and it was only when Napoleon had signed the following unconditional abdication that perfect calm was restored:—'The Allied Sovereigns having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the re-establishment of a general peace, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares, that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the throne of France and Italy; and that there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not willing to make for the interest of France. Napoleon. Fontainbleau, 6th April 1814.' This deplorable document is written in so agitated and faltering a hand as to be almost illegible. … According to the treaty signed at Paris on the 10th, and usually called the Treaty of Fontainbleau, Napoleon, from being Emperor of France and King of Italy, became Emperor of Elba! He was to have a guard and a navy suited to the extent of his dominions, and to receive from France a pension of six millions of francs annually. The Duchies of Parma, Placentia and Guastala, were to be conferred in sovereignty on Marie Louise and her heirs. Two millions and a half of francs were further to be paid annually by the French government to the Empress Josephine and other members of the Bonaparte family. Splendid as these terms were for a dethroned and defenceless monarch, Napoleon ratified the treaty with reluctance, and delayed the signature as long as possible; still clinging, it would seem, to some vague hope of returning fortune. It is even related by Fain, Norvins, Constant, and in the pretended Memoirs of Caulaincourt, that he attempted to commit suicide by taking poison, 'and was only saved by the weakness of the dose, and the remedies administered by his attendants, who, hearing his groans, hastened to his bedside. It is certain that he was very unwell on the following morning, the 18th April, a circumstance easily accounted for by the anxiety he had undergone; but there can be little difficulty in rejecting the tale of poison, for, it is mentioned in none of the St. Helena Memoirs."

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Mitchell, The Fall of Napoleon, book 8, chapter 8 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: M. de Bourrienne, Private Memoirs of Napoleon, volume 4, chapters 20-23.

Duke of Rovigo, Memoirs, volume 4, part 1, chapters 4-10.

Prince Talleyrand, Memoirs, part 7 (volume 2).

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (April-June). Departure of Napoleon for Elba. Louis XVIII. called to the throne. Settlement of the constitution. Evacuation of France by the Allies. The Treaty of Paris. Determination of the new boundaries of the kingdom.

"April 20, everything being ready for Napoleon's journey, and the commissioners of the four great powers who were to accompany him having arrived, the former drew up the imperial guard in the grand courtyard at Fontainebleau to take leave of them. 'Soldiers,' said he, 'I have one mission left to fulfil in life,—to recount to posterity the glorious deeds we have done together.' Would to Heaven he had kept his word and done nothing else! He kissed the flag, and his brave soldiers, who only saw the man who so often led them on to victory, burst into tears. Seven or eight hundred of them were to form the army left to him who had had a million soldiers at his command, and they were sent in advance, Napoleon going by another road, unescorted save by General Drouot, Bertrand, and the four foreign commissioners with their people. In the first departments through which they passed … the people who had been eye-witnesses of the invasion forgot the evil wrought by Napoleon, and only saw the defender of his country. They shouted 'Long live the Emperor! Down with foreigners!' But beyond Lyons, where the foe never penetrated, the population became hostile: old royalist and Catholic passions were revived in proportion as they went farther south; the mob cried 'Long live the King! down with the tyrant!' and others howled 'Long live the allies!' At Avignon and Organ a furious rabble attacked the carriages, demanding that the tyrant should be handed over to them to be hung or thrown into the Rhone. The man who braved the storm of shot and shell with utter indifference gave way before these ignoble perils, and disguised himself; otherwise the commissioners could scarcely have saved his life at Orgon. The sad journey closed at the Gulf of St. Raphael, on the coast of Provence. … An English frigate awaited him and bore him to Elba, where he landed at Porto-Ferraio, May 4. While the Empire was crumbling to dust … and the fallen Emperor went into exile, the new government was working hard to hold its own at Paris. The royalists were at sword's points with the national sovereignty party in the commission chosen by the senate to draw up a constitution. The pretender's agent, Abbé de Montesquiou, failed to win acceptance of the principle that royal right is superior to the nation's will; and the formula adopted was as follows: 'The French people freely call to the throne of France, Louis Stanislas Xavier de France, brother of the late king, and, after him, the other members of the house of Bourbon.' Thus they did not recognize in the king whom they elected the title of Louis XVIII., and did not admit that between him and his brother, Louis XVI., there had been a rightful king, the poor child who died in the Temple and whom royalists called Louis XVII. The reign of Louis Stanislas Xavier was to date from the day when he swore allegiance to the Constitution: the executive power was vested in the king, who shared the legislative power with the Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution sanctioned individual liberty, freedom of worship and the press, the sale of national goods, the public debt, and proclaimed oblivion of all acts committed since the beginning of the Revolution. The principles of 1789 were maintained, and in the sad state of France there was nothing better to be done than to rally round this Constitution, which was voted by the Senate, April 6, and accepted by the Legislature. … The Senate's lack of popularity gave the royalist party hope that the act of April 6 might be retracted, and at this time that party won a faint success in a matter on which they laid great stress. Count d' Artois was on his way to Paris, and declared that he would not lay aside the white cockade on entering. The temporary government ordered the national guard to assume the white cockade, and let Count d'Artois in without conditions (April 12), He was received in solemn state, the marshals marching before him, still wearing their tri-colored cockades and plumes, which the government dared not attack. {1359} The rabble was cold, but the middle classes received the prince favorably and he proved gracious to every one. … D'Artois … insisted on being recognized, unconditionally, as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, as he had entered Paris without making terms; but this time the Senate and temporary government did not yield. They intended that the prince should make a solemn promise, in his brother's name, in regard to the Constitution. The czar interfered and explained to D' Artois that the allies were pledged to the Senate and the nation, and he was forced to submit and receive the lieutenant-generalcy of the kingdom from the Senate, 'until Louis Stanislas Xavier of France should accept the Constitutional Charter.' … The day after his proclamation as lieutenant-general, the white cockade was finally adopted, and … imposed upon the army and various public buildings, though the national cockade was still worn by many French soldiers from the Garonne to the Elbe, and many warlike deeds still signalized the final efforts of their arms, even after Napoleon had laid aside his sword. … By degrees the truce became universal, and the next question was to fix the terms of peace. … The enemy held nothing but Paris and the unfortified towns, French garrisons still occupying all the strongholds of France, old and new, and several important places far beyond the Rhine. … This was a powerful means of gaining, not the preservation of the natural frontiers, which could no longer be hoped for, but at least an important advance on the limits of the ancient monarchy. Unluckily a movement, natural but hasty, broke out all over France, to claim the immediate evacuation of her soil by foreign armies;"—an impatience which allowed no time for bargaining in the matter, and which precipitated an agreement (April 23) with the allied powers "to leave the French dominion as it had been on the 1st of January, 1792, in proportion as the places still occupied beyond those limits by French troops should be evacuated and restored to the allies. … This compact surrendered to the allies, without any compensation, 58 strongholds, 12,600 pieces of ordnance, arsenals and magazines filled with vast supplies." The new king, calling himself Louis XVIII., arrived in Paris on the 3d of May, from England, where he had latterly resided. He had offended the czar, ruffled public feeling in France, even before he arrived, by saying publicly to the English people that he owed his restoration, under Providence, to them. Negotiations for a definite treaty of peace were opened at once. "At Metternich's suggestion, the allies decided to conclude their arrangements with France in Paris, and to reserve general arrangements with Europe for a congress at Vienna.

See VIENNA: THE CONGRESS OF.

Talleyrand did not object, although this plan was evidently unfavorable to France. … The royal council directed Talleyrand to try to win for the northern frontier those million people promised beyond the old limits; but Louis X VIII., by angering the czar, completed the sad work of April 23. Alexander thought of renewing with the Bourbons the alliance that he had planned with Napoleon, and marrying to the Duke de Berri, Louis's nephew, that one of his sisters to whom Napoleon preferred Marie Louise. Louis … responded churlishly to the czar's advances. Accordingly, when France demanded a solid frontier, including the South of Belgium, … Lord Castlereagh absolutely refused, and was supported by Prussia, hostile to France, and by Austria, indifferent on that score, but disposed to follow England in everything. Russia did not side with France. … The allies were willing to grant, in place of the old dominion of the monarchy, on the Rhine side, the line of the Queich, which opened communication with Landau, and to the southeast the department of Vaucluse (once County Venaissin) given up by the Pope, besides Chambéry and a part of Savoy; finally, in the Jura region, Montbéliard. This made nearly 600,000 people. As for the colonies, England reluctantly returned Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the Isle of Bourbon, but refused to restore the Isle de France [or Mauritius, captured in 1810], that great military post which is to the Indian Ocean what Malta is to the Mediterranean. This island was bravely defended for some years by its governor. … The English declared that they would also keep Malta, taken from France, and the Cape of Good Hope, wrested from Holland, saying that all these belonged to them, being on the road to India. … Secret articles provided that Holland, under the rule of the House of Orange, should be increased by the countries ceded by France, between the sea, the French frontier of 1790, and the Meuse (Austrian Netherlands and Liége). The countries ceded by France on the left bank of the Rhine were to be divided as 'compensation' among the German states. Austria was to have the country bounded by the Po, Ticino, and Lake Maggiore, that is, the old Venetian states, Milan, and Mantua. The territory of the former Republic of Genoa was to be given to the King of Sardinia. Such was the end of the wars of the Empire. Republican France reached the goal of the old monarchy, the natural limits of ancient Gaul; the Empire lost them."

H. Martin, Popular History of France, volume 2, chapter 17.

"The Peace of Paris [signed May 30] was followed by some subsidiary treaties. … By a Convention of June 3rd between Austria and Bavaria, Maximilian Joseph restored to Austria the Tyrol with the Vorarlberg, the principality of Salzburg, the district of the Inn and the Hausrück. During the visit of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia to London in June, it was agreed that the Article of the Peace of Paris stipulating the aggrandisement of Holland, should, be carried out by the annexation of Belgium to that country, an arrangement which was accepted by the Sovereign of the Netherlands, July 21st 1814."

T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 7, chapter 16.

ALSO IN: A. de Lamartine, History of the Restoration, books 13-14 and 16 (volumes 1-2).

E. E. Crowe, History of the Reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X., volume 1, chapter 3.

{1360}

FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815. Ten months of Bourbon rule and its follies. Return of Napoleon from Elba. Flight of the King. The Hundred Days. Preparations for war.

"The peace of Paris did not endure a year. Ten months of Bourbon rule, vengeful, implacable, stupid; alike violent in act and in language; sufficed to bring France once more to the brink of revolution. Two acts alone are sufficient to demonstrate the folly of the royalists—the resumption of the white flag, and the changing of the numbers of the regiments. A prudent king would have adopted the tricolour when he agreed to a constitutional charter, and would have refrained from wounding military sensibility by destroying the numbers of the regiments. But more stupid than these acts was the political policy pursued, a policy which aroused on all sides suspicions of what was worse than the grinding but gilded despotism of Napoleon—namely, that the Government favoured a forcible resumption of the confiscated lands, the restoration of tithes, and of the abolished exactions and imposts of feudalism. It has been surmised, and with much reason, that had Napoleon not reappeared a popular movement would have extorted from the king a really constitutional government. In that case France might have taken some real steps towards a free government, and the bases of liberty rather than of equality might have been laid. But while the Powers were wrangling at Vienna, and the Bourbons were irritating France, Napoleon was watching from Elba for the opportunity of resuming empire. It was not in the nature of the man to yield passively to anything, even to the inevitable. So long as a chance remained he looked out keenly for the propitious hour. He selected Elba as a residence because thence 'he could keep an eye upon France and upon the Bourbons.' It was his duty, he said, to guard the throne of France for his family and for his son. Thus, in making peace at Fontainebleau, he only bowed to a storm he could not then resist, and cherished in his mind the project of an imperial restoration. The hour for which he waited came at length. February, 1815, he had arrived at the conclusion that with the aid of the army he could overthrow the Bourbons, whose government, he said, was good for priests, nobles, and countesses of the old time, but worth nothing to the living generation. The army, he knew, was still, and would be always, devoted to him. … He had weighed all the chances for and against the success of his enterprise, and he had arrived at the conclusion that he should succeed; for, 'Fortune had never deserted him on great occasions.' It has been said that his departure was precipitated by a report of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna. … It is possible, indeed, that the rumour of an intention to confine him upon an island in the Atlantic may have exercised some influence over him; but the real reasons for the selection of the 26th of February were that he was tired of inactivity, and convinced that the favourable moment had arrived. Therefore, instructing Murat to second him by assuming a strong position in front of Ancona, he embarked his faithful Thousand, and set sail for France. On the 1st of March he landed on the shores of the Gulf of Juan, and on the 20th he entered the Tuileries. As he had predicted, the army rallied to the tricolour; the generals could neither restrain nor guide their soldiers; the Bourbon dukes and princes, and the brave Duchess of Angoulême—'the only man of the family'—were utterly powerless before the universal military disaffection; and one after the other they were chased out of France. The army had restored Napoleon. Louis XVIII. drove out of Paris by the road to St. Denis on the 19th, a few hours before Napoleon, on the 20th, drove in by the Barrier of Italy; and on the 23rd, after a short stay at Lille, the King was safe in Ghent. 'The great question is,' wrote Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington three days afterwards, while yet in ignorance of the event, 'can the Bourbons get Frenchmen to fight for them against Frenchmen?' The result showed that they could not. In the then state of France the army was master of France. Louis and his ministers had done nothing to conciliate, and almost everything to irritate, the people; and even so early as November, 1814, Wellington did not see what means the King had of resisting the attack of a few hundred officers determined to risk everything. During the period occupied by Napoleon in passing from Elba to Paris, the conduct of' the sovereigns and diplomatists assembled at Vienna offered a striking contrast to the weakness and inaptitude of the Bourbons. … That there was fear in Vienna is manifest, but the acts of the Allied Powers show that fear speedily gave place to resolution. For, as early as the 12th of' March, before the Allies knew where Napoleon was, or anything about him, except that he was somewhere at large in France, they drew up that famous declaration, and signed it the next day, in which they declared that he had broken the sole legal tie to which his existence was attached, and that it was possible to keep with him 'neither peace nor truce.' 'The Powers, in consequence,' so runs this document, 'declare that Napoleon Buonaparte is placed beyond the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as a common enemy and disturber of the peace of the world, he has delivered himself over to public justice.' This declaration, which has been the subject of vehement criticism, was the natural consequence of the prevailing and correct appreciation of Napoleon's character. There was not a nation in Europe which felt the slightest particle of confidence or trust in him. Hence this declaration, made so promptly, was drawn up in ignorance of any professions he might make, because, beforehand, Europe felt that no professions of his could be relied on. The news of his success was followed by a treaty, adopted on the 25th of March, renewing the alliance of Chaumont, whereby Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia bound themselves to provide each 150,000 men; to employ, in addition, all their resources, and to work together for the common end—the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris, and of the stipulations determined on and signed at the Congress of Vienna. Further, they engaged not to lay down their arms but by common consent; nor before the object of the war should have been attained; nor, continues the document, 'until Buonaparte shall have been rendered absolutely unable to create disturbance, and to renew attempts for possessing himself of supreme power in France.' All the Powers of Europe generally, and Louis XVIII. specially, were invited to accede to the treaty; but, at the instance of Lord Castlereagh, the Four Great Powers declared in the most solemn manner that, although they desired to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and also to contribute to that 'auspicious result,' yet that their 'principles' would not permit them to prosecute the war 'with a view of imposing any particular Government on France.' With Napoleon they refused to hold any communication whatever; and when he sent couriers to announce that he intended to observe existing treaties, they were stopped on the frontiers. … {1361} Wellington, on his own responsibility, acted for England, signed treaties, undertook heavy engagements in her name, and agreed to command an army to be assembled in Belgium; and having satisfied, as well as he could, the clamour of 'all' for subsidies from England, he took his departure from Vienna on the 29th of March, and arrived in Brussels on the 4th of April. The British Parliament and nation confirmed readily the proceedings of the Government and of the Duke of Wellington at Vienna. … Napoleon had formed a Ministry on the very evening of his return to the Tuileries. … He felt certain that war would ensue. Knowing that at the moment when he returned from Elba a large part of the best troops of England were in America, that the German force on the Rhine was weak, and that the Russian armies were in Poland, he calculated that the Allied Powers would not be in a position to open the campaign, at the earliest, until the middle of July; and, for a moment, he hoped that, by working on the feelings of his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and by rousing the anger of the Emperor Alexander against his allies, he would be able, if not to reduce his enemies to two, England and Prussia, at least to defer the period of hostilities until the autumn. … Before his great schemes of military preparation were half complete he found himself compelled by events to begin the war. What he actually did accomplish between March and June has been the subject of fierce controversy. His friends exaggerate, his enemies undervalue, his exertions and their results. But no candid inquirer can fail to see, that if his energetic activity during this period is far below that of the Convention when threatened by Europe, it is far above the standard fixed by his passionate crimes. The real reason why he failed to raise a larger military force during the hundred days was that his genius worked upon exhausted materials. The nation, to use an expressive vulgarism, was 'used up.' … The proper conscription for 1815 had been levied in the autumn of 1813. The drafts on the rising generation had been anticipated, and hence there remained little available except the old soldiers. … The result of Napoleon's prodigious exertions to augment the military force of France appears to be this: Napoleon found ready to his hand a force of 228,972 men of all arms, officers included, giving a disposable effective of 155,000 men ready to take the field. By the 18th of June he had raised this force to 276,982 men, officers included: that is 247,609 of the line, and 29,373 of the Imperial Guard. The number disposable for war was 198,180; and it therefore follows that Napoleon had increased the general effective by 53,010 men, and that part of it disposable for war by 48, 180."