Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 78)

E. Pears, The Fall of Constantinople, chapter 8.

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VENICE: A. D. 1201-1203. Perfidious part in the conquest of Constantinople.

See CRUSADES: A. D. 1201-1203.

VENICE: A. D. 1204. Share of the Republic in the partition of the Byzantine Empire.

See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 1204-1205.

VENICE: A. D. 1216. Acquisition of the Ionian Islands.

See CORFU: A. D. 1216-1880; and IONIAN ISLANDS: To 1814.

VENICE: A. D. 1256-1258. Battles with the Genoese at Acre.

"At the period of the Crusades, it was usual in those cities or towns where the Christians held sway, to assign to each of the mercantile communities which had borne a part in the conquest or recovery of the particular district, a separate quarter where they might have their own mill, their own oven, their own bath, their own weights and measures, their own church, and where they might be governed by their own laws, and protected by their own magistrates. … At Saint Jean d'Acre, however, the Church of Saint Sabbas was frequented by the Venetians and the Genoese in common; and it happened that, in course of time, both nations sought to found a right to the exclusive property of the building." Collisions ensued, in one of which (1256), the Genoese drove the Venetians from their factory at Acre and burned the church of Saint Sabbas. The Venetians retaliated by sending a squadron to Acre which destroyed all the Genoese shipping in the port, burned their factory, and reduced a castle near the town which was held by a Genoese garrison. Early in 1257 the fleets of the two republics met and fought a battle, between Acre and Tyre, in which the Venetians were the victors. On the 24th of June, 1258, a second battle was fought very nearly on the same spot, and again Venice triumphed, taking 2,600 prisoners and 25 galleys. Through the efforts of the Pope, a suspension of hostilities was then brought about; but other causes of war were working in the east, which soon led to fresh encounters in arms between the two jealous commercial rivals.

W. C. Hazlitt, History of the Venetian Republic, chapter 11 (volume 1).

VENICE: A. D. 1261-1263. The supplanting of the Venetians by the Genoese at Constantinople and in the Black Sea. War between the Republics. The victory at Malvasia.

See GENOA: A. D. 1261-1299.

VENICE: A. D. 1294-1299. War with Genoa. Disastrous defeat at Curzola.

See GENOA: A. D. 1261-1299.

VENICE: 14th Century. Fleets. Commerce. Industries.

"In the 14th century Venice had 3,000 merchantmen manned by 25,000 sailors. A tenth part of these were ships exceeding 700 tons burden. There were besides 45 war-galleys manned by 11,000 hands; and 10,000 workmen, as well as 36,000 seamen, were employed in the arsenals. The largest of the war-galleys was called the Bucentaur; it was a state vessel of the most gorgeous description. Every year the Doge of Venice, seated upon a magnificent throne surmounted by a regal canopy, dropped from this vessel a ring into the Adriatic, to symbolise the fact that land and sea were united under the Venetian flag. This ceremony commemorated the victory gained over the fleet of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa In 1177, when the Venetians obliged him to sue for peace.

See VENICE: A. D. 1177.

Ascension Day was selected for its celebration, and the Bucentaur, glorious with new scarlet and gold, its deck and seats inlaid with costly woods, and rowed with long banks of burnished oars, for many years bore the Doge to plight his troth with the words, 'We espouse thee, O Sea! in token of true and eternal sovereignty.' The merchant fleet of Venice was divided into companies sailing together according to their trade. Their routes, and the days for departure and return, their size, armament, crew, and amount of cargo, were all defined. In those times the seas were as much infested with pirates as the deserts with robbers; each squadron therefore hired a convoy of war-galleys for its protection on the voyage. There were six or seven such squadrons in regular employment. The argosies of Cyprus and Egypt, and the vessels engaged in the Barbary and Syrian commerce, concentrated their traffic chiefly at Alexandria and Cairo. The so-called Armenian fleet proceeded to Constantinople and the Euxine, visiting Kaffa and the Gulf of Alexandretta. A Catalonian fleet traded with Spain and Portugal, and another with France; while the most famous of all, the Flanders galleys, connected the seaports of France, England, and Holland with the great commercial city of Bruges. The internal traffic with Germany and Italy was encouraged with equal care, oriental produce arriving from Constantinople and Egypt, and many other commodities being distributed, at first by way of Carinthia, and afterwards of the Tyrol. Germans, Hungarians, and Bohemians conducted this distribution. In Venice a bonded warehouse (fondaco dei tedeschi), or custom-house, was accorded to the Germans, where they were allowed to offer their wares for sale, though only to Venetian dealers. Similar privileges were granted to the Armenians, Moors, and Turks, but not to the Greeks, against whom a strong animosity prevailed. … The ancient industries of preparing salt and curing fish were never disregarded. The Adriatic sands supplied material adapted for a glass of rare beauty and value, of which mirrors and other articles of Venetian manufacture were made. Venetian goldsmiths' work was universally famed. Brass and iron foundries prepared the raw material for the armourers, whose weapons, helmets, and bucklers were unsurpassed for strength and beauty. Ship-building, with a people whose principle it was always to have more ships than any other state, was necessarily a very important branch of industry. Not satisfied with penetrating to every part already opened to enterprise, the Venetians travelled into regions before unknown, and gave to the world the record of their daring adventures. Maffeo and Nicolo Polo spent fifteen years visiting Egypt, Persia, India, the Khan of Tartary, and the Grand Khan or Emperor of China. Marco Polo, son of Nicolo, as well as Barthema and Joseph Barbaro, extended the knowledge obtained by their precursors in northern Europe and Asia."

J. Yeats, Growth and Vicissitudes of Commerce, page 98-101.

See (In Supplement) COMMERCE, MEDIÆVAL.

ALSO IN: A. Anderson, Origin of Commerce, volume 1.

Venetian Commerce (Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, volume 5, pages 393-411).

VENICE: A. D. 1336-1338. Alliance with Florence against Mastino della Scala. Conquest of Treviso and other territory on the mainland.

See VERONA: A. D. 1260-1338.

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VENICE: A. D. 1351-1355. Alliance with the Greeks and Aragonese in war with Genoa.

See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1348-1355.

VENICE: A. D. 1358. Loss of Dalmatia.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1301-1442.

VENICE: A. D. 1378-1379. Renewed war with Genoa. The defeat at Pola.

The treaty of June, 1355, between Venice and Genoa (see CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1348-1355), established a peace which lasted only until April, 1378, when, "a dispute having arisen between the rival States in relation to the island of Tenedos, which the Venetians had taken possession of, the Signory formally declared war against Genoa, which it denounced as false to all its oaths and obligations. On the 26th of this month, Vettore Pisani was invested with the supreme command of the naval forces of the republic. … The new commander-in-chief was the son of Nicolo Pisani, and had held a commission in the Navy for 25 years. … Of the seamen he was the idol. … Pisani sailed from Venice early in May, with 14 galleys; and, on the 30th of the month, while cruising off Antium, came across a Genoese squadron of 10 galleys, commanded by Admiral Fieschi. It was blowing a gale at the time, and five of Pisani's vessels, which had parted company with him, and fallen to leeward, were unable to rejoin him, while one of Fieschi's drifted ashore, and was wrecked. Thus the battle which immediately ensued was between equal forces; but the Genoese admiral was no match for Vettore Pisani," and sustained a disastrous defeat, losing four vessels, with all their officers and crew. "During the summer, Pisani captured great numbers of the enemy's merchantmen; but was unable to find their fleet, which, under Luciano Doria, was actively engaged in cutting up Venetian commerce in the East. In November he asked permission to return to Venice to refit his vessels, which were in a very bad condition, but this was denied him; and, being kept constantly cruising through the winter, at its expiration only six of his vessels were found to be seaworthy. Twelve others, however, were fitted out at their own expense and sent to him by his friends, who perceived that his political enemies were making an effort to ruin him. At the end of February, 1379, Michele Steno and Donato Zeno were appointed by the Government' proveditori' of the fleet. These officers, like the field deputies of the Dutch republic in later times, were set as spies over the commander-in-chief, whose operations they entirely controlled. On the 1st of May, Pisani left Brindisi, bound to Venice, having a large number of merchantmen in charge, laden with wheat; and, on the 6th instant, as the weather looked squally, put into Pola, with his convoy, for the night. On the following morning, at day-break, it was reported to him that Doria was off the port with 25 vessels; whereupon he determined not to leave his anchorage until Carlo Zeno, whom he was expecting with a reenforcement of 10 galleys, should be seen approaching. But the Proveditori, loudly denouncing such a determination as a reflection upon the valor of his officers and men, ordered him, peremptorily, in the name of the Senate, to engage the enemy without delay." The result was an overwhelming defeat, out of which Pisani brought six galleys, only—" which were all that were saved from this most terrible engagement, wherein 800 Venetians perished and 2,000 were taken prisoners. … Pisani was now violently assailed by his enemies; although they well knew that he had fought the battle of Pola against his own judgment, and agreeably to the wishes of the government, as made known to him by its accredited agents, Michele Steno and Donato Zeno. The Great Council decreed his immediate removal from the supreme command, and he was brought to Venice loaded with chains." Condemned, upon trial before the Senate, he was sentenced to imprisonment for six months.

F. A. Parker, The Fleets of the World, pages 100-105.

VENICE: A. D. 1379-1381. The war of Chioggia. The dire extremity of the Republic and her deliverance.

After the great victory of Pola, which cost the Genoese the life of Luciano D'Oria, they lost no time in pressing their beaten enemy, to make the most of the advantage they had won. "Fresh galleys were forthwith placed under the command of Pietro, another of the noble D'Oria family; and before the eyes of all Genoa, and after the benediction of the archbishop, the fleet sailed from the harbour, and a great cry was raised from roof to roof, and from window to window, and each alley and each street re-echoed it with enthusiasm, 'to Venice! to Venice!' On arriving in the Adriatic, Pietro D'Oria joined the fleet already there, and prepared for his attack on Venice. These were pitiful days for the Queen of the Adriatic, the days of her greatest peril and humiliation. The Lord of Padua joined the Genoese; the King of Hungary sent troops, as did also the Marquis of Friuli, and all seemed lost to her both by sea and land. Everywhere within the city was misery and dismay. … To possess himself of Chioggia, which was 25 miles distant from Venice, was D'Oria's first plan. It was the key of the capital, commanded the entrance to the harbour, and cut off any assistance which might come from Lombardy. Chioggia was very strong in itself, defended by bastions on all sides; its weak point lay in being built on two sides of a river, which was spanned by a large wooden bridge. It was the first care of the defenders to block up the mouth of this river. After a few days of gallant defence, and a few days of gallant attack by sea and land, the defenders of Chioggia were reduced to the last extremity. The entrance to the river was broken open, and the bridge, which for some time was a stumbling-block to the besiegers, was destroyed with all the soldiers upon it by the bravery of a Genoese sailor, who took a boat laden with tar and wool and other combustible materials, and set fire to it, escaping by means of swimming. The defenders having thus perished in the flames, and Chioggia being taken [August, 1379], the triumph of the Genoese was at its height. It now seemed as if Pietro D'Oria had but the word of command to give, and Venice would have met with the same fate as Pisa had but a century before. But with this the fortune of the Ligurians began to wane. One small cannon of leather, with a wooden car, brought from Chioggia as a trophy to Genoa, is all that exists to-day to testify to their victory." The Venetians, in consternation at the fall of Chioggia, sent a deputation to D'Oria humbly offering to submit to any terms of peace he might dictate; but the insolent victor ordered them home with the message that there could be no peace until he had entered their city to bridle the bronze horses which stand on the Piazza of St. Mark. {3609} This roused the indignation and courage of Venice anew, and every nerve was strained in the defense of the port. "Vettor Pisani, who since the defeat at Pola had languished in prison, was brought out by unanimous consent, and before an assembled multitude he quietly and modestly accepted the position of saviour of his country. … The one saving point for Venice lay in the arrival of a few ships from Constantinople, which … Carlo Zeno had under his command, endeavouring to make a diversion in the favour of the Venetians at the Eastern capital. Pending the return of this fleet, the Venetians made an attack on Chioggia. And an additional gleam of hope raised the spirits of Pisani's men in the disaffection of the King of Hungary from the Genoese cause; and gradually, as if by the magic hand of a fickle fortune, Pietro D'Oria found himself and his troops besieged in Chioggia, instead of going on his way to Venice as he had himself prophesied. But the Genoese position was still too strong, and Pisani found it hopeless to attempt to dislodge them; his troops became restless: they wished to return to Venice, though they had sworn never to go back thither except as conquerors. It was in this moment of dire distress that the ultimate resort was vaguely whispered from the Venetian Council Hall to the Piazza. A solemn decree was passed, 'that if within four days the succour from Carlo Zeno did not arrive, the fleet should be recalled from Chioggia, and then a general council should be held as to whether their country could be saved, or if another more secure might not be found elsewhere.' Then did the law-givers of Venice determine that on the fifth day the lagunes should be abandoned, and that they should proceed en masse to Crete or Negropont to form for themselves a fresh nucleus of power on a foreign soil. It is indeed hard to realize that the fate of Venice, associated with all that is Italian, the offspring of the hardy few who raised the city from the very waves, once hung in such a balance. But so it was, when towards the evening of the fourth day [January 1, 1380] sails were descried on the horizon, and Carlo Zeno arrived to save his country from so great a sacrifice. Meanwhile, at Chioggia the Genoese were day by day becoming more careless; they felt their position so strong, they talked merrily of fixing the day when they should bivouac on the Piazza of St. Mark. Little did they dream of the net of misfortune into which they were being drawn so fast. Besides reinforcements by sea, assistance by land flocked in towards Venice. Barnabo Visconti, and his company of the Star, a roving company of Germans, and the celebrated Breton band under Sir John Hawkwood, the Englishman, all hurried to assist the fallen banner of St. Mark. Pietro D'Oria did all he could to maintain discipline amongst his troops; but when he fell one day in an engagement, through being struck by a Venetian arrow, a general demoralization set in, and their only thought was how to save themselves and abandon Chioggia. … On the 18th of February, 1380, the Venetians made another gallant attack. Both sides fought with desperation, the Genoese for life, their rivals for their country and their country's fame. Fearful slaughter occurred amongst the Genoese, and they were obliged to retire within the walls. … Driven to extremities, on the 22nd of June In that year, 4,000 Genoese were taken to the public prisons in Venice. … Since both parties were tired of war, and weakened with these extreme efforts, it was no difficult matter to establish a peace [August 8, 1381]."

J. T. Bent, Genoa, chapter 8.

ALSO IN: W. O. Hazlitt, History of the Venetian Republic, chapter 20 (volume 3).

H. F. Brown, Venice, chapter 12.

VENICE: A. D. 1386. Acquisition of Corfu.

See Corfu: A. D. 1216-1880.

VENICE: A. D. 1406-1447. Acquisition of neighboring territory in northeastern Italy.

On the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the first Duke of Milan (see MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447), the eastern parts of his duchy, "Padua, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, were gradually added to the dominion of Venice. By the middle of the 15th century, that republic had become the greatest power In northern Italy."

E. A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, page 241.

See ITALY: A. D. 1402-1406.

VENICE: A. D. 1426-1447. League with Florence, Naples, Savoy, and other States against the Duke of Milan.

See ITALY: A. D. 1412-1447.

VENICE: A. D. 1450-1454. War with Milan and Florence. Alliance with Naples and Savoy.

See MILAN: A. D. 1447-1454.

VENICE: A. D. 1454-1479. Treaty with the Turks, followed by war. Loss of ground in Greece and the islands.

See GREECE: A. D. 1454-1479.

VENICE: A. D. 1460-1479. Losing struggle with the Turks in Greece and the Archipelago.

See TURKS: A. D. 1451-1481; and ITALY: A. D. 1447-1480.

VENICE: A. D. 1469-1515. The early Printers. The Aldine Press.

See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: A. D. 1469-1515.

VENICE: A. D. 1489. Acquisition of Cyprus.

See Cyprus: A. D.1489-1570.

VENICE: A. D. 1492-1496. The invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. of France. Alliance with Naples, Milan, Spain, the Emperor and the Pope. Expulsion of the French.

See ITALY: A. D. 1492-1494; and 1494-1496.

VENICE: A. D. 1494-1503. The rising power and spreading dominion of the republic. The fears and jealousies excited.

"The disturbances which had taken place In Italy since Charles VIII.'s advent there, came very opportunely for their [the Venetians'] plans and policy.

See ITALY: A. D. 1494-1496; 1499-1500; 1501-1504.

On every available occasion the Venetians spread their power all round about them. In the struggle between Charles and Ferrantino [or Ferdinand, of Naples] they acquired five fine cities in Apulia, excellently situated for their requirements, which they peopled by the reception of fugitive Jews from Spain. Moreover, in the kingdom of Naples, one party had declared for them. … Tarento raised their standard. During the Florentine disorders they were within an ace of becoming masters of Pisa. In the Milanese feuds they acquired Cremona and Ghiara d'Adda. Their power was all the more terrible, as they had never been known to lose again anything which they had once gotten. No one doubted that their aim was the complete sovereignty over the whole of Italy. {3610} Their historians always talked as if Venice was the ancient Rome once more. … The Turkish war, which had kept them a while employed, now at an end, they next tried their fortune in Romagna, and endeavoured, availing themselves of the quarrels between the returning nobles and Cesar [Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI.], to become, if not the sole, at all events the most powerful, vassals of the papal chair. … The Venetians prepared to espouse the cause of those whom Cesar had suppressed. The cities reflected how genuine and substantial that peace was that the lion of Venice spread over all its dependencies. Having appeared in this country at the end of October, 1503, and having first promised the Malatesti other possessions in their own country, they took Rimini, with the concurrence of the prince and citizens. Without ado they attacked Faenza. … They continued their conquests, and, in the territories of Imola, Cesena, and Forli, took stronghold after stronghold. … Then it was that the first minister of France stated his belief that, 'had they only Romagna, they would forthwith attack Florence, on account of a debt of 180,000 guilders owing them.' If they were to make an inroad into Tuscany, Pisa would fall immediately on their arrival. Their object in calling the French into the Milanese territory was, that they considered them more fitted to make a conquest than to keep it; and, in the year 1504, they were negotiating how it were possible to wrest Milan again from them. Could they only succeed in this, nothing in Italy would be able longer to withstand them. 'They wanted,' as Macchiavelli said, 'to make the Pope their chaplain.' But they met with the staunchest resistance in Julius [the Pope, Julius II.], as in him they could discover no weak point to attack. As pointedly as he could express himself, he declared to them, on the 9th November, 1503, that, 'though hitherto their friend, he would now do his utmost against them, and would besides incite all the princes of Christendom against them.'"

L. von Ranke, History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations, book 2, chapter 3.

VENICE: A. D. 1498-1502. War with the Turks.

See TURKS: A. D. 1498-1502.

VENICE: A. D. 1499-1500. Alliance with France against the Duke of Milan. French conquest of the duchy. Acquisition of Cremona.

See ITALY: A. D. 1499-1500.

VENICE: 15-17th Centuries. The decline of Venetian commerce and its causes.

"Commerce was for a long time free at Venice; and the republic only began to decline when its government had caused the source of its prosperity to be exhausted by monopoly. At first all the young patricians were subjected to the most severe ordeals of a commercial training. They were often sent as novices on board state-vessels to try fortune with a light venture, so much did it enter into the views of the administration to direct all citizens toward industrial occupations! The only reproach that can be brought against the Venetians, is the effort to exclude foreigners from all competition with them. Although commercial jealousy had not yet erected prohibitions into a system, and the ports of the republic were open to all the merchandise of the world, yet the Venetians only permitted its transportation in their own ships; and they reigned as absolute masters over all the Mediterranean. War had given them security from the Pisans, the Sicilians and the Genoese. Spain, long occupied by the Moors, gave them little occasion of offence. France disdained commerce; England had not yet begun to think of it; the republic of Holland was not in existence. Under cover of the right of sovereignty on the gulf, which she had arrogated to herself, Venice reserved the almost exclusive right to navigate. Armed flotillas guarded the mouths of all her rivers, and allowed no barque to enter or depart without being vigorously examined. But what profited that jealous solicitude for the interests of her navigation? A day came when the Portuguese discovered the Cape of Good Hope, and all that structure of precautions and mistrust suddenly fell to pieces. Here begin the first wars of customs-duties, and political economy receives from history valuable instruction. The Venetians had levelled all obstacles, but for themselves alone, and to the exclusion of other nations. Their legislation was very strict in respect to foreigners, in the matter of commerce. The laws forbade a merchant who was not a subject of the republic to be even received on board a vessel of the state. Foreigners paid customs-duties twice as high as natives. They could neither build nor buy vessels in Venetian ports. The ships, the captains, the owners, must all be Venetian. Every alliance between natives and strangers was interdicted; there was no protection, no privileges and no benefits save for Venetians: the latter, however, all had the same rights. In Venice itself, and there alone, was it permitted to negotiate with the Germans, Bohemians and Hungarians. As national manufactures acquired importance, the government departed from the liberal policy it had hitherto pursued, and the manufacturers obtained an absolute prohibition of such foreign merchandise as they produced. In vain, in the 17th century, did declining commerce urge the reestablishment of former liberties and the freedom of the port: the attempt was made for a brief moment, but the spirit of restriction won the day, and the prohibitory regime early prepared the way for the death of the republic. The people of Ita]y, however, pardoned the Venetians for their commercial intolerance, because of the moderate price at which they delivered all commodities. The Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Germans flocked to Venice and engaged with safety in speculations, which were always advantageous, because of the security which the credit institutions gave and the recognized probity of the merchants. But soon Venice saw numerous manufactures spring up in Europe rivaling her own, and her commerce encountered most formidable competition in that of the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and English. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope took away from her the monopoly of the spices of the Indies.

See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1463-1498.

The taking of Constantinople, by Mahomet II, had already deprived her of the magnificent privileges which her subjects enjoyed in that rich capital of the Orient. But the discovery of America and the vigorous reprisals of Charles V, who, at the commencement of his reign, in 1517, doubled the customs-duties which the Venetians paid in his states, completed the ruin of that fortunate monopoly which had made all Europe tributary. Charles V raised the import and export duties on all Venetian merchandise to twenty per cent; and this tariff, which would to-day appear moderate, sufficed then to prevent the Venetians from entering Spanish ports. {3611} Such was the origin of the exclusive system, the fatal invention which the republic of Venice was so cruelly to expiate. So long as she sought fortune only in the free competition of the talent and capital of her own citizens, she increased from age to age and became for a moment the arbiter of Europe; but as soon as she wished to rule the markets by the tyranny of monopoly, she saw a league formed against her commerce, formidable for a very different reason from that of Cambray."

J. A. Blanqui, History of Political Economy in Europe, chapter 20.

See, also (in Supplement) COMMERCE, MODERN.

VENICE: A. D. 1501. Hostile schemes of the Emperor and the King of France.

See ITALY: A. D. 1501-1504.

VENICE: A. D. 1508-1509. The League of Cambrai. The republic despoiled of her continental provinces.

"The craving appetite of Louis XII., … sharpened by the loss of Naples, sought to indemnify itself by more ample acquisitions in the north. As far back as 1504, he had arranged a plan with the emperor for the partition of the continental possessions of Venice. …

See ITALY: A. D. 1504-1506.

The scheme is said to have been communicated to Ferdinand [of Aragon] in the royal interview at Savona [1507]. No immediate action followed, and it seems probable that the latter monarch, with his usual circumspection, reserved his decision until he should be more clearly satisfied of the advantages to himself. At length the projected partition was definitely settled by the celebrated treaty of Cambray, December 10th, 1508, between Louis XII. and the emperor Maximilian, in which the Pope, King Ferdinand, and all princes who had any claims for spoliations by the Venetians, were invited to take part. The share of the spoil assigned to the Catholic monarch [Ferdinand] was the five Neapolitan cities, Trani, Brindisi, Gallipoli, Pulignano, and Otranto, pledged to Venice for considerable sums advanced by her during the late war. The Spanish court, and, not long after, Julius II., ratified the treaty, although it was in direct contravention of the avowed purpose of the pontiff, to chase the 'barbarians' from Italy. It was his bold policy, however, to make use of them first for the aggrandisement of the church, and then to trust to his augmented strength and more favorable opportunities for eradicating them altogether. Never was there a project more destitute of principle or sound policy. There was not one of the contracting parties who was not at that very time in close alliance with the state, the dismemberment of which he was plotting. As a matter of policy, it went to break down the principal barrier on which each of these powers could rely for keeping in check the overweening ambition of its neighbors, and maintaining the balance of Italy. The alarm of Venice was quieted for a time by assurances from the courts of France and Spain that the league was directed solely against the Turks, accompanied by the most hypocritical professions of good will, and amicable offers to the republic. The preamble of the treaty declares that, it being the intention of the allies to support the pope in a crusade against the infidel, they first proposed to recover from Venice the territories of which she had despoiled the church and other powers, to the manifest hindrance of these pious designs. … The true reasons for the confederacy are to be found in a speech delivered at the German diet, some time after, by the French minister Hélian. 'We,' he remarks, after enumerating various enormities of the republic, 'wear no fine purple; feast from no sumptuous services of plate; have no coffers overflowing with gold. We are barbarians. Surely,' he continues in another place, 'if it is derogatory to princes to act the part of merchants, it is unbecoming in merchants to assume the state of princes.' This, then, was the true key to the conspiracy against Venice; envy of her superior wealth and magnificence, hatred engendered by her too arrogant bearing, and lastly the evil eye with which kings naturally regard the movements of an active, aspiring republic. To secure the co-operation of Florence, the kings of France and Spain agreed to withdraw their protection from Pisa, for a stipulated sum of money.

See PISA: A. D. 1494-1509.

There is nothing in the whole history of the merchant princes of Venice so mercenary and base as this bartering away for gold the independence for which this little republic had been so nobly contending for more than 14 years. Early in April, 1509, Louis XII. crossed the Alps at the head of a force which bore down all opposition. City and castle fell before him, and his demeanor to the vanquished, over whom he had no rights beyond the ordinary ones of war, was that of an incensed master taking vengeance on his rebellious vassals. In revenge for his detention before Peschiera, he hung the Venetian governor and his son from the battlements. This was an outrage on the laws of chivalry, which, however hard they bore on the peasant, respected those of high degree. … On the 14th of May, 1509, was fought the bloody battle of Agnadel, which broke the power of Venice and at once decided the fate of the war. Ferdinand had contributed nothing to these operations, except by his diversion on the side of Naples, where he possessed himself without difficulty of the cities allotted to his share. They were the cheapest, and, if not the most valuable, were the most permanent acquisitions of the war, being reincorporated in the monarchy of Naples. Then followed the memorable decree by which Venice released her continental provinces from their allegiance, authorizing them to provide in any way they could for their safety; a measure which, whether originating in panic or policy, was perfectly consonant with the latter. The confederates, who had remained united during the chase, soon quarrelled over the division of the spoil. Ancient jealousies revived. The republic, with cool and consummate policy, availed herself of this state of feeling. Pope Julius, who had gained all that he had proposed, and was satisfied with the humiliation of Venice, now felt all his former antipathies and distrust of the French return in full force. The rising flame was diligently fanned by the artful emissaries of the republic, who at length effected a reconciliation on her behalf with the haughty pontiff. The latter … planned a new coalition for the expulsion of the French, calling on the other allies to take part in it."

W. H. Prescott, History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, part 2, chapter 22 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, History of the Commonwealth of Florence, book 9, chapter 10 (volume 4).

The City in the Sea, chapter 21.

M. Creighton, History of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation, book 5, chapter 14.

L. von Ranke, History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514, book 2, chapter 3.

H. F. Brown, Venice, chapters 17-18.

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VENICE: A. D. 1510-1513. The breaking of the League of Cambrai. The" Holy League" of Pope Julius with Venice, Ferdinand, Maximilian, and Henry VIII. against France. The French expelled from Italy. The Republic recovers its domain.

See ITALY: A. D. 1510-1513.

VENICE: A. D. 1517. Peace with the Emperor Maximilian. Recovery of Verona.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1516-1517.

VENICE: A. D. 1526. The Holy League against the Emperor, Charles V.

See ITALY: A. D. 1523-1527.

VENICE: A. D. 1527. Fresh alliance with France and England against the Emperor.

See ITALY: A. D. 1527-1529.

VENICE: A. D. 1570-1571. Holy League with Spain and the Pope against the Turks. Great battle and victory of Lepanto.

See TURKS: A. D. 1566-1571.

VENICE: A. D. 1572. Withdrawal from the Holy League. Separate peace with the Turks.

See TURKS: A. D. 1572-1573.

VENICE: 16th Century. The Art of the Renaissance.

"It was a fact of the greatest importance for the development of the fine arts in Italy that painting in Venice reached maturity later than in Florence. Owing to this circumstance one chief aspect of the Renaissance, its material magnificence and freedom, received consummate treatment at the hands of Titian, Tintoretto, and Veronese. To idealise the sensualities of the external universe, to achieve for colour what the Florentines had done for form, to invest the worldly grandeur of human life at one of its most gorgeous epochs with the dignity of the highest art, was what these great artists were called on to accomplish. Their task could not have been so worthily performed in the fifteenth century as in the sixteenth, if the development of the æsthetic sense had been more premature among the Venetians. Venice was precisely fitted for the part her painters had to play. Free, isolated, wealthy, powerful; famous throughout Europe for the pomp of her state equipage, and for the immorality of her private manners; ruled by a prudent aristocracy, who spent vast wealth on public shows and on the maintenance of a more than imperial civic majesty: Venice with her pavement of liquid chrysoprase, with her palaces of porphyry and marble, her frescoed façades, her quays and squares aglow with the costumes of the Levant, her lagoons afloat with the galleys of all nations, her churches floored with mosaics, her silvery domes and ceilings glittering with sculpture bathed in molten gold: Venice luxurious in the light and colour of a vaporous atmosphere, where sea-mists rose into the mounded summer clouds; arched over by the broad expanse of sky, bounded only by the horizon of waves and plain and distant mountain ranges, and reflected in all its many hues of sunrise and sunset upon the glassy surface of smooth waters: Venice asleep like a miracle of opal or of pearl upon the bosom of an undulating lake:—here and here only on the face of the whole globe was the unique city wherein the pride of life might combine with the lustre of the physical universe to create and stimulate in the artist a sense of all that was most sumptuous in the pageant of the world of sense. … The Venetians had no green fields and trees, no garden borders, no blossoming orchards, to teach them the tender suggestiveness, the quaint poetry of isolated or contrasted tints. Their meadows were the fruitless furrows of the Adriatic, hued like a peacock's neck; they called the pearl-shells of their Lido flowers, fior di mare. Nothing distracted their attention from the glories of morning and of evening presented to them by their sea and sky. It was in consequence of this that the Venetians conceived colour heroically, not as a matter of missal-margins or of subordinate decoration, but as a motive worthy in itself of sublime treatment. In like manner, hedged in by no limitary hills, contracted by no city walls, stifled by no narrow streets, but open to the liberal airs of heaven and ocean, the Venetians understood space and imagined pictures almost boundless in their immensity. Light, colour, air, space: those are the elemental conditions of Venetian art; of those the painters weaved their ideal world for beautiful and proud humanity. … In order to understand the destiny of Venice in art, it is not enough to concentrate attention on the peculiarities of her physical environment. Potent as these were in the creation of her style, the political and social conditions of the Republic require also to be taken into account. Among Italian cities Venice was unique. She alone was tranquil in her empire, unimpeded in her constitutional development, independent of Church interference, undisturbed by the cross purposes and intrigues of the despots, inhabited by merchants who were princes, and by a free-born people who had never seen war at their gates. The serenity of undisturbed security, the luxury of wealth amassed abroad and liberally spent at home, gave a physiognomy of ease and proud self-confidence to all her edifices. The grim and anxious struggles of the Middle Ages left no mark on Venice. How different was this town from Florence, every inch of whose domain could tell of civic warfare. … It is not an insignificant, though a slight, detail, that the predominant colour of Florence is brown, while the predominant colour of Venice is that of mother-of-pearl, concealing within its general whiteness every tint that can be placed upon the palette of a painter. The conditions of Florence stimulated mental energy and turned the forces of the soul inwards. Those of Venice inclined the individual to accept life as he found it. Instead of exciting him to think, they disposed him to enjoy, or to acquire by industry the means of manifold enjoyment. To represent in art the intellectual strivings of the Renaissance was the task of Florence and her sons; to create a monument of Renaissance magnificence was the task of Venice."

J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy: The Fine Arts, chapter 7.

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VENICE: A. D. 1606-1607. The Republic under the guidance of Fra Paolo Sarpi. Conflict with the Pope. The Interdict which had no terrors.

"In the Constitution of the Republic at this time [1606] there were three permanent officials called Counsellors of Law, or State Counsellors, whose duties were to instruct the Doge and Senate on the legal bearings of any question in dispute in which the Republic was involved. But at the beginning of this year, because of the ecclesiastical element that frequently appeared in these quarrels (for they were mostly between the State and the Pope), the Senate resolved to create a new office, namely, that of 'Teologo-Consultore,' or Theological Counsellor. In looking about for one to fill this office the choice of Doge and Senate unanimously fell upon Fra Paolo Sarpi. … I have called Fra Paolo Sarpi the greatest of the Venetians. … Venice has produced many great men—Doges, soldiers, sailors, statesmen, writers, poets, painters, travellers—but I agree with Mrs. Oliphant that Fra Paolo is 'a personage more grave and great, a figure unique in the midst of this ever animated, strong, stormy, and restless race'; and with Lord Macaulay, who has said of him that 'what he did, he did better than anybody.' … He was supreme as a thinker, as a man of action, and as a transcript and pattern of every Christian principle. … Foreigners who came to Venice sought above all things to see him as 'the greatest genius of his age.' … On the 28th of January, 1606, he entered upon his public duties." From that time until his death, seventeen years later, he not only held the office of Theological Counsellor, but the duties of the three Counsellors of Law were gradually transferred to him, as those offices were vacated, in succession, by death. "During this time question after question arose for settlement, many of which were of momentous import, the resolution of which bore, not upon the interests of Venice merely, but of Europe; and affected, not the then living generation only, but a remote posterity. In every case Fra Paolo's advice was sought, in every case it was followed, and in every case it was right. The consequence was that the history of the Republic during these seventeen years was one unbroken record of great intellectual and moral victories. … Never was there in any land, by any Government, a servant more honoured and more beloved. The solicitude of the Doge, of the dreaded Council of Ten, of the Senate, of the whole people, for the safety and well-being of their Consultore, was like that of a mother for her only child. 'Fate largo a Fra Paolo'—'Make room for Fra Paolo,' was often heard as he passed along the crowded Merceria. Fra Paolo loved Venice with an undying devotion, and Venice loved him with a romantic and tender affection. The Pope, whose quarrels with the Republic were the chief cause of the creation of the office of Theological Counsellor, and of Fra Paolo's election to it, was Paul V. … Strained relations … [had] existed between Venice and the Vatican during the last years of Clement VIII.'s Pontificate. His seizure of the Duchy of Ferrara, his conduct in the matter of the Patriarch Zane's appointment, his attempt to cripple the book-trade of Venice by means of the Index Expurgatorius, all led to serious disputes, in everyone of which he got the worst of it. Pope Paul V., who was then Cardinal Borghese, chafed at what he considered Clement's pusillanimity. Talking of these matters to the Venetian ambassador at Rome, Leonardo Donato, he once said, 'If I were Pope, I would place Venice under an interdict and excommunication;' 'And if I were Doge,' was the reply, 'I would trample your interdict and excommunication under foot.' Curiously enough, both were called upon to fill these offices, and both proved as good as their words. … Paul V. … found several excuses for quarrel. The Patriarch, Matteo Zane—he whose appointment had been a matter of dispute with Clement VIII.—died, and the Senate appointed Francesco Vendramin as his successor. Pope Paul claimed the right of presentation, and demanded that he should be sent to Rome for examination and approval. The Senate replied by ordering his investiture, and forbidding him to leave Venice. Again, money had to be raised in Brescia for the restoration of the ramparts, and the Senate imposed a tax on all the citizens—laymen and ecclesiastics alike. Pope Paul V. claimed exemption for the latter, as being his subjects. The Senate refused to listen to him. … These differences were causing both the Pope and the Republic to look to their armoury and to try the temper of their weapons, when two more serious matters occurred which brought them into open warfare. The prologue was passed, the drama was about to open. First, two priests in high position were leading flagrantly wicked and criminal lives. … The Senate sent its officers, and had the offenders seized and brought to Venice, and locked up from further mischief in the dungeons of the Ducal Palace. Pope Paul V. angrily remonstrated, and peremptorily demanded their instant liberation, on the ground that being priests they were not amenable to the secular arm. … Secondly, two ecclesiastical property laws were in force throughout the Republic; by one the Church was prohibited from building any new monasteries, convents, or churches without the consent of the Government under penalty of forfeiture; and by the other it was disqualified from retaining property which it might become possessed of by donation or by inheritance, but was bound to turn it into money. … Pope Paul V. … demanded the repeal of these property laws. These two demands, regarding the imprisoned ecclesiastics and the property laws, were first put forward in October, 1605. … Early in December, the Pope, impatient to bring the quarrel to a head, threatened to place Venice under interdict and excommunication if it did not yield to his demands. … It was at this acute stage of the quarrel that the Republic laid hold of Fra Paolo Sarpi, and, as we have already noted, made him its Theological Counsellor, and the struggle henceforth became, to a large extent, a duel between 'Paul the Pope, and Paul the Friar.' On the very day that Fra Paolo accepted this office he informed the Senate that two courses of action were open to them. They could argue the case either de jure or de facto. First, de jure, that is, they could appeal against the judgment of the Pope to a Church Council. … Secondly, the Republic could adopt the de facto course; that is, it could rely on its own authority and strength. It could set these over against the Pope's, and whilst willing to argue out the matter in a spirit of reason with him, yet meet his force with opposing force. If he turned a deaf ear to right, there was no help for it but to make it a question of might. The de facto course was therefore the one Fra Paolo recommended; adding very significantly, 'He who appeals to a Council admits that the righteousness of his cause may be questioned, whereas that of Venice is indisputable.' {3614} The Senate hailed the advice thus given, and instructed him to draw out a reply to the Pope's brief in accordance with it. … From the moment this reply was received a bitter controversy was set on foot. Renewed demands came from Rome, and renewed refusals were sent from Venice. … Meanwhile the eyes of all the Courts of Europe were directed to the great struggle, and Venice made them more than spectators by laying its case as prepared by their Consultore fairly and fully before them. The time had not arrived for any nation to enter as a party into the contest, but all frankly expressed their opinions, which were, with the exception of that of Spain, unequivocally on the side of Venice. … At last the Pope determined to put into execution the threats contained in the briefs, and to place the Republic under interdict and excommunication. On the 17th of April, 1606, the bull of interdict and excommunication was launched; twenty-four days being allowed Venice for repentance, with three more added of the Pope's gracious clemency. The die was thus cast by Pope Paul V., by which he was either to humble the Republic, or discredit himself and his 'spiritual arms' in the sight of Europe. The bull was a sweeping one. … No more masses were to be said. Baptism, marriage, and burial services were to cease. The churches were to be locked up, and the priests could withdraw from the devoted land. All social relationships were dissolved. Marriages were declared invalid, and all children born were illegitimate. Husbands could desert their wives, and children disobey their parents. Contracts of all kinds were declared null and void. Allegiance to the Government was at an end."

A. Robertson, Fra Paolo Sarpi, chapter 5, and preface.

"It was proposed in the college of Venice to enter a solemn protest, as had been done in earlier times; but this proposal was rejected, on the ground that the sentence of the pope was in itself null and void, and had not even a show of justice. In a short proclamation, occupying only a quarto page, Leonardo Donato made known to the clergy the resolution of the republic to maintain the sovereign authority, 'which acknowledges no other superior in worldly things save God alone.' Her faithful clergy would of themselves perceive the nullity of the 'censures' issued against them, and would continue the discharge of their functions, the cure of souls and the worship of God, without interruption. No alarm was expressed, no menaces were uttered, the proclamation was a mere expression of confidence and security. It is, however, probable that something more may have been done by verbal communication. By these proceedings, the question of claim and right became at once a question of strength and of possession. Commanded by their two superiors—the pope and the republic—to give contradictory proofs of obedience, the Venetian clergy were now called on to decide to which of the two they would render that obedience. They did not hesitate; they obeyed the republic: not a copy of the brief was fixed up. The delay appointed by the pope expired; public worship was everywhere conducted as usual. As the secular clergy had decided, so did also the monastic orders. The only exception to this was presented by the orders newly instituted, and in which the principle of ecclesiastical restoration was more particularly represented; these were the Jesuits, Theatines, and Capuchins. The Jesuits, in so far as they were themselves concerned, were not altogether decided; they first took counsel of their Provincial at Ferrara, and afterwards of their General in Rome, who referred the question to the pope himself. Paul V. replied that they must either observe the interdict, or shake the dust from their feet and leave Venice. A hard decision assuredly, since they were distinctly informed that they would never be permitted to return; but the principle of their institution allowed them no choice. Embarking in their boats, they departed from the city, and took shelter in the papal dominions. Their example influenced the other two orders. A middle course was proposed by the Theatines, but the Venetians did not think it advisable; they would suffer no division in their land, and demanded either obedience or departure. The deserted churches were easily provided with other priests, and care was taken that none should perceive a deficiency. … It is manifest that the result was a complete schism. The pope was amazed; his exaggerated pretensions were confronted by the realities of things with the most unshrinking boldness. Did any means exist by which these might be overcome? Paul V. thought at times of having recourse to arms. … Legates were despatched, and troops fitted out; but in effect they dared not venture to attempt force. There would have been cause to apprehend that Venice would call the Protestants to her aid, and thus throw all Italy, nay the Catholic world at large, into the most perilous commotions. They must again betake themselves, as on former occasions, to political measures, for the adjustment of these questions touching the rights of the Church. … I have neither inclination nor means for a detailed account of these negotiations through the whole course of the proceedings. … The first difficulty was presented by the pope, who insisted, before all things, that the Venetian laws, which had given him so much offence, should be repealed; and he made the suspension of his ecclesiastical censures to depend on their repeal. But the Venetians, also, on their part, with a certain republican self-complacency, were accustomed to declare their laws sacred and inviolable. When the papal demand was brought under discussion in January, 1607, although the college wavered, yet at last it was decidedly rejected in the senate. The French, who had given their word to the pope, succeeded in bringing the question forward once more in March, when of the four opponents in the college, one at least withdrew his objections. After the arguments on both sides had again been fully stated in the senate, there was still, it is true, no formal or express repeal of the laws, but a decision was adopted to the effect that 'the republic would conduct itself with its accustomed piety.' However obscure these words appear, the ambassador and the pope thought they discovered in them the fulfilment of their wishes. The pope then suspended his censures."

L. Ranke, History of the Popes, book 6, section 12 (volume 2).

"The moral victory remained with Venice. She did not recall her laws as to taxation of the clergy and the foundation of new churches and monasteries [nor permit the Jesuits to return, until many years later]. … The hero of the whole episode, Fra Paolo Sarpi, continued to live quietly in his convent of the Servites at S. Fosca.

{3615}

The Government received warning from Rome that danger was threatening. In its turn it cautioned Fra Paolo. But he paid little or no heed." On the 25th of October, 1607, towards five o'clock in the evening, as he was returning to his convent, he was attacked by three assassins, who inflicted serious wounds upon him and left him for dead. By great care, however, Fra Paolo's life was saved, and prolonged until 1623. The would-be assassins escaped into the Papal States, where "they found not only shelter but a welcome."

H. F. Brown, Venice, chapter 20.

ALSO IN: J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy: The Catholic Reaction, chapter 10 (volume 2).

T. A. Trollope, Paul the Pope and Paul the Friar.

See, also, PAPACY: A. D. 1605-1700.

VENICE: A. D. 1620-1626. The Valteline War. Alliance with France and Savoy against the Austro-Spanish power.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.

VENICE: A. D. 1629-1631. League with France against Spain and the Emperor. The Mantuan War.

See ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631.

VENICE: A. D. 1645-1669. The war of Candia with the Turks. Loss of Crete.

See TURKS: A. D. 1645-1669.

VENICE: A. D. 1684-1696. War of the Holy League against the Turks. Siege and capture of Athens. Conquest of the Morea and parts of Dalmatia and Albania.

See TURKS: A. D. 1684-1696.

VENICE: A. D. 1699. Peace of Carlowitz with the Sultan. Turkish Cession of part of the Morea and most of Dalmatia.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.

VENICE: A. D. 1714-1718. War with the Turks. The Morea lost. Defense of Corfu. Peace of Passarowitz.

See TURKS: A. D. 1714-1718.

VENICE: A. D. 1767. Expulsion of the Jesuits.

See JESUITS: A. D. 1761-1769.

VENICE: A. D. 1796. Bonaparte's schemes for the destruction of the Republic. The picking of the quarrel.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER).

VENICE: A. D. 1797. The ignominious overthrow of the Republic by Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL); and 1797 (APRIL-MAY).

VENICE: A. D. 1797 (October). City and territories given over to Austria by the Treaty of Campo-Formio.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).

VENICE: A. D. 1805. Territories ceded by Austria to the kingdom of Italy.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806.

VENICE: A. D. 1814. Transfer of Venetian states to Austria. Formation of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL-JUNE); VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF; AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846; and ITALY: A. D. 1814-1815.

VENICE: A. D. 1815. Restoration of the Bronze Horses taken away by Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY-NOVEMBER).

VENICE: A. D. 1848-1849. Insurrection. Expulsion of the Austrians. Provisional government under Daniel Manin. Renewed subjugation.

See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

VENICE: A. D. 1859. Grievous disappointment in the Austro-Italian war.

See ITALY: A. D. 1856-1859; and 1859-1861.

VENICE: A. D. 1866. Relinquishment by Austria. Annexation to the kingdom of Italy.

See ITALY: A. D. 1862-1866.

—————VENICE: End————

VENICONII, The.

See IRELAND, TRIBES OF EARLY CELTIC INHABITANTS.

VENLOO, Surrender of.

See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1585-1586.

VENNER'S INSURRECTION.

See FIFTH MONARCHY MEN.

VENNONES, The.

See RHÆTIA.

VENTA.

Three important cities in Roman Britain bore the name of Venta; one occupying the site of modern Winchester, a second standing near Norwich, the third at Caerwent in Wales. They were distinguished, respectively, as Venta Belgarum, Venta Icenorum and Venta Silurum.

T. Wright, Celt, Roman and Saxon.

VENTÔSE, The month.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (OCTOBER) NEW REPUBLICAN CALENDAR.

VERA CRUZ, Mexico: A. D. 1519. Founded by Cortes.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1519 (JUNE-OCTOBER).

VERA CRUZ, Mexico: A. D. 1839. Attacked by the French.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1828-1844.

VERA CRUZ, Mexico: A. D. 1847. Bombardment and capture by the Americans.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1847 (MARCH-SEPTEMBER).

VERAGUA: A. D. 1502. Attempted settlement by Columbus.

See AMERICA: A D. 1498-1505.

VERAGUA: A. D. 1509. Attempted settlement by Nicuesa.

See AMERICA: A. D. 1500-1511.

VERCELLI: A. D. 1638-1659. Siege and capture by the Spaniards. Restoration to Savoy.

See ITALY: A. D. 1635-1659.

VERDUN: A. D. 1552-1559. Possession taken by France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559.

VERDUN: A. D. 1648. Ceded to France in the Peace of Westphalia.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

VERDUN, The Treaty of: A. D. 843.

The contest and civil war which arose between the three grandsons of Charlemagne resulted in a treaty of partition, brought about in 843, which forever dissolved the great Frank Empire of Clovis, and of the Pippins and Karls who finished what he began. "A commission of 300 members was appointed to distribute itself over the surface of the empire, and by an exact examination of the wealth of each region, and the wishes of its people, acquire a knowledge of the best means of making an equitable division. The next year the commissioners reported the result of their researches to the three kings, assembled at Verdun, and a treaty of separation was drawn up and executed, which gave Gaul, from the Meuse and Saone as far as the Pyrenees, to Karl; which gave Germany, beyond the Rhine, to Ludwig the Germanic; and which secured to Lother Italy, with a broad strip on the Rhine, between the dominions of Karl and Ludwig, under the names of Lotheringia or Lorraine. This was the first great treaty of modern Europe; it began a political division which lasted for many centuries; the great empire of Karl was formally dismembered by it, and the pieces of it scattered among his degenerate descendants."

P. Godwin, History of France: Ancient Gaul, chapter 18.

{3616}

"The treaty of Verdun, in 843, abrogated the sovereignty that had been attached to the eldest brother and to the imperial name in former partitions; each held his respective kingdom as an independent right. This is the epoch of a final separation between the French and German members of the empire. Its millenary was celebrated by some of the latter nation in 1843."

H. Hallam, The Middle Ages, chapter 1, part 1 (volume l).

See, also, FRANKS: A. D. 814-962.

VERGARA, Treaty of (1839).

See SPAIN: A. D. 1833-1846.

VERGENNES, Count de, and the French alliance with the revolted American Colonies.

See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776-1778; 1778 (FEBRUARY): 1778-1779, and 1782 (SEPTEMBER) and (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER).

VERGNIAUD AND THE GIRONDISTS.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (OCTOBER), to 1793 (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER).

VERGOBRET, The.

The chief magistrate of the tribe of Gauls known as the Ædui was called the vergobret. "Cæsar terms this magistrate vergobretus, which Celtic scholars derive from the words 'ver-go-breith,' ('homme de jugement,' O'Brien, Thierry). He was elected by a council of priests and nobles, and had the power of life and death. But his office was only annual." Divitiacus, the Æduian friend of Cæsar and the Romans, had been the vergobret of his tribe.

C. Merivale, History of the Romans, chapter 6, foot-note.

VERMANDOIS, House of.

The noble House of Vermandois which played an important part in French history during the Middle Ages, boasted a descent from Charlemagne, through his best loved son, Pippin, king of Italy. "Peronne and the Abbey of Saint-Quintin composed the nucleus of their Principality; but, quietly and without contradiction, they had extended their sway over the heart of the kingdom of Soissons; and that antient Soissons, and the rock of Lâon, and Rheims, the prerogative city of the Gauls, were all within the geographical ambit of their territory. In such enclavures as we have named, Vermandois did not possess direct authority. Lâon, for example, had a Count and a bishop, and was a royal domain."

Sir F. Palgrave, History of Normandy and England, book 1, chapter 5, section 6 (volume 1).

—————VERMONT: Start————

VERMONT: A. D. 1749-1774. Beginning of settlement. The New Hampshire Grants and the conflict with New York. Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys.

"Among the causes of the controversies which existed between the colonies in early times, and continued down to the revolution, was the uncertainty of boundary lines as described in the old charters. … A difficulty of this kind arose between the colony of New York and those of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. By the grant of King Charles II. to his brother, the Duke of York, the tract of country called New York was bounded on the east by Connecticut River, thus conflicting with the express letter of the Massachusetts and Connecticut charters, which extended those colonies westward to the South Sea, or Pacific Ocean. After a long controversy, kept up at times with a good deal of heat on both sides, the line of division between these colonies was fixed by mutual agreement at 20 miles east of Hudson's River, running nearly in a north and south direction. … The Massachusetts boundary was decided much later to be a continuation of the Connecticut line to the north, making the western limit of Massachusetts also 20 miles from the same river. … Meantime New Hampshire had never been brought into the controversy, because the lands to the westward of that province beyond Connecticut River had been neither settled nor surveyed. There was indeed a small settlement at Fort Dummer on the western margin of the River, which was under the protection of Massachusetts. … Such was the state of things when Benning Wentworth became governor of New Hampshire, with authority from the King to issue patents for unimproved lands within the limits of his province. Application was made for grants to the west of Connecticut River, and even beyond the Green Mountains, and in 1749 he gave a patent for a township 6 miles square, near the north west angle of Massachusetts, to be so laid out, that its western limit should be 20 miles from the Hudson, and coincide with the boundary line of Connecticut and Massachusetts continued northward. This township was called Bennington. Although the governor and council of New York remonstrated against this grant, and claimed for that colony the whole territory north of Massachusetts as far eastward as Connecticut River, yet Governor Wentworth was not deterred by this remonstrance from issuing other patents, urging in his justification, that New Hampshire had a right to the same extension westward as Massachusetts and Connecticut." After the British conquest of Canada, 1760, "applications for new patents thronged daily upon Governor Wentworth, and within four years' time the whole number of townships granted by him, to the westward of Connecticut River, was 138. The territory including these townships was known by the name of the New Hampshire Grants, which it retained till the opening of the revolution, when its present name of Vermont began to be adopted."

J. Sparks, Life of Ethan Allen (Library of American Biographies, volume 1).

"Lieutenant Governor Colden, acting chief magistrate of New York in the absence of General Monckton, perceiving the necessity of asserting the claims of that province to the country westward of the Connecticut river, wrote an energetic letter to Governor Wentworth, protesting against his grants. He also sent a proclamation among the people, declaring the Connecticut river to be the boundary between New York and New Hampshire. But protests and proclamations were alike unheeded by the governor and the people until the year 1764, when the matter was laid before the King and council for adjudication. The decision was in favor of New York. Wentworth immediately bowed to supreme authority, and ceased issuing patents for lands westward of the Connecticut. The settlers, considering all questions in dispute to be thus finally disposed of, were contented, and went on hopefully in the improvement of their lands. Among these settlers in the Bennington township were members of the Allen family, in Connecticut, two of whom, Ethan and Ira, were conspicuous in public affairs for many years, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe. The authorities of New York, not content with the award of territorial jurisdiction over the domain, proceeded, on the decision of able legal authority, to assert the right of property in the soil of that territory, and declared Wentworth's patents all void. {3617} They went further. Orders were issued for the survey and sale of farms in the possession of actual settlers, who had bought and paid for them, and, in many instances, had made great progress in improvements. In this, New York acted not only unjustly, but very unwisely. This oppression, for oppression it was, was a fatal mistake. It was like sowing dragons' teeth to see them produce a crop of full-armed men. The settlers were disposed to be quiet, loyal subjects of New York. They cared not who was their political master, so long as their private rights were respected. But this act of injustice converted them into rebellious foes, determined and defiant. … Meanwhile speculators had been purchasing from New York large tracts of these estates in the disputed territory, and were making preparations to take possession. The people of the Grants sent one of their number to England, and laid their cause before the King and council. He came back in August, 1767, armed with an order for the Governor of New York to abstain from issuing any more patents for lands eastward of Lake Champlain. But as the order was not 'ex post facto' in its operations, the New York patentees proceeded to take possession of their purchased lands. This speedily brought on a crisis, and for seven years the New Hampshire Grants formed a theater where all the elements of civil war, except actual carnage, were in active exercise. … The hardy yeomanry who first appeared in arms for the defense of their territorial rights, and afterwards as patriots in the common cause when the Revolution broke out, were called Green Mountain Boys."

B. J. Lossing, Life and Times of Philip Schuyler, volume 1, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: S. Williams, History of Vermont, chapter 9.

W. Slade, editor, Vermont State Papers, pages 1-49.

Vermont Historical Society Collection, volumes 1 and 3.

VERMONT: A. D. 1775. Ticonderoga surprised by the Green Mountain Boys.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (MAY).

VERMONT: A. D. 1777. Stark's victory at Bennington.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (JULY-OCTOBER).

VERMONT: A. D. 1777-1778. State independence declared and constitution framed. Admission to the Union denied.

"The settlers in the land which this year [1777] took the name of Vermont refused by a great majority to come under the jurisdiction of New York; on the 15th of January 1777, their convention declared the independence of their state. At Windsor, on the 2d of June, they appointed a committee to prepare a constitution; and they hoped to be received into the American union. But, as New York opposed, congress, by an uncertain majority against a determined minority, disclaimed the intention of recognising Vermont as a separate state. … On the 2d of July the convention of Vermont reassembled at Windsor. The organic law which they adopted, blending the culture of their age with the traditions of Protestantism, assumed that all men are born free and with inalienable rights; that they may emigrate from one state to another, or form a new state in vacant countries; that 'every sect should observe the Lord's day, and keep up some sort of religious worship'; that every man may choose that form of religious worship 'which shall seem to him most agreeable to the revealed will of God. 'They provided for a school in each town, a grammar-school in each county, and a university in the state. All officers, alike executive and legislative, were to be chosen annually and by ballot; the freemen of every town and all one year's residents were electors. Every member of the house of representatives must declare his 'belief in one God …; in the divine inspiration of the scriptures; and in the Protestant religion.' The legislative power was vested in one general assembly, subject to no veto. … Slavery was forbidden and forever; and there could be no imprisonment for debt. … After the loss of Ticonderoga, the introduction of the constitution was postponed [until March, 1778], lest the process of change should interfere with the public defence."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, pages 157, and 161-162.

ALSO IN; Ira Allen, History of Vermont (Vermont Historical Society Collection, volume 1, pages 375-393).

Vermont Historical Society Collection, volume 3.

R. E. Robinson, Vermont: a Study of Independence, chapters 10-14.

VERMONT: A. D. 1781. Negotiations with the British authorities as an independent State.

Vermont had repeatedly applied for admission into the Union; but the opposition of her neighbors, who claimed her territory, and the jealousy of the southern states, who objected to the admission of another northern state, prevented favorable action in Congress. In 1780 a fresh appeal was made with a declaration that if it failed the people of the Green Mountains would propose to the other New England states and to New York, "an alliance and confederation for mutual defense, independent of Congress and of the other states." If neither Congress nor the northern states would listen to them, then, said the memorial, "they are, if necessitated to it, at liberty to offer or accept terms of cessation of hostilities with Great Britain without the approbation of any other man or body of men." "The British generals in America had for some time entertained hopes of turning the disputes in relation to Vermont to their own account, by detaching that district from the American cause and making it a British province. But the first intimation of their views and wishes was communicated in a letter from Colonel Beverly Robinson to Ethan Allen; dated New York, March 30th, 1780. In July, this letter was delivered to Allen in the street in Arlington, by a British soldier in the habit of an American farmer. Allen perused the letter, and then told the bearer that he should consider it, and that he might return. … Allen immediately communicated the contents of this letter to Governor Chittenden and some other confidential friends, who agreed in opinion, that no answer should be returned. Robinson, not receiving a reply to his letter and supposing it to have been miscarried, wrote again to Allen on the 2d of February, 1781, enclosing his former letter. In his second letter, after saying he had received new assurances of the inclination of Vermont to join the king's cause, he said that he could then write with more authority; and assured Allen that he and the people of Vermont could obtain the most favorable terms, provided they would take a decisive and active part in favor of Great Britain. He requested an answer; and that the way might be pointed out for continuing the correspondence; and desired to be informed in what manner the people of Vermont could be most serviceable to the British cause. {3618} Allen returned no answer to either of these letters; but, on the 9th of March, 1781, inclosed them in a letter to Congress, informing them of all the circumstances which had thus far attended the business. He then proceeded to justify the conduct of Vermont in asserting her right to independence, and expressed his determinate resolution to do every thing in his power to establish it. … 'I am confident,' said he, 'that Congress will not dispute my sincere attachment to the cause of my country, though I do not hesitate to say, I am fully grounded in opinion, that Vermont has an indubitable right to agree on terms of a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain, provided the United States persist in rejecting her application for an union with them.' … During the spring of 1780, some of the scouting parties belonging to Vermont had been taken by the British and carried prisoners to Canada. On the application of their friends to Governor Chittenden, he, in the month of July, sent a flag with a letter to the commanding officer in Canada, requesting their release or exchange. In the fall, the British came up lake Champlain in great force, and a very favorable answer was returned by General Haldimand to Governor Chittenden's letter. A flag was at the same time sent to Ethan Allen, then a brigadier general and commanding officer in Vermont, proposing a cessation of hostilities with Vermont, during negotiations for the exchange of prisoners."

Z. Thompson, History of the State of Vermont, chapter 4, section 6.

"The immediate results were a truce, which covered not only Vermont but the frontiers of New York to Hudson river; the disbanding of the militia of Vermont; and the retiring of the British troops to winter quarters in Canada. Until the truce became generally known, the results of it occasioned much surprise in New York. It was further agreed, that the commissioners of both parties should meet on the subject of the cartel, and go together to Canada. This was attempted, but failed on account of the difficulty of getting through the ice on Lake Champlain. After contending several days with the elements, the commissioners separated; but 'while their men [wrote Ira Allen] were breaking through the ice, much political conversation and exhibits of papers took place.' Williams ['History of Vermont'] is more definite: 'the British agents availed themselves of this opportunity to explain their views, to make their proposals, and offer as complete an establishment for Vermont, from the royal authority, as should be desired. The commissioners from Vermont treated the proposals with affability and good humor, and though they avoided bringing anything to a decision, the British concluded they were in a fair way to effect their purposes.' The subsequent negotiations at Isle aux Noix, between Ira Allen and the British commissioners, as to matters beyond settling a cartel, were secret, and even the commander of the post had no knowledge of them, although he was associated with the British commissioners on the question of an exchange of prisoners. These facts show that the public had no knowledge except of a truce for a humane and proper attempt to relieve citizens of Vermont, and its officers and soldiers, who were then prisoners in Canada; and the conclusion is that all the suspicion that then existed of the patriotism and fidelity of the great body of the people of the state, and all the obloquy since drawn from the negotiation with Haldimand and cast upon the state, were entirely unjust. If any body was really at fault, the number implicated was very small. Williams asserted that 'eight persons only in Vermont, were in the secret of this correspondence;' and Ira Allen that, in May, 1781, 'only eight persons were in the secret, but more were added as the circumstances required.'"

Vermont Historical Society Collection, volume 2, introduction.

"By the definitive treaty between Great Britain and the United States, September 3, 1783, Vermont was included within the boundaries separating the independent American from British territory, and thus the independence of Vermont was acknowledged first by the mother country. The State had been de facto independent from its organization; and therefore the following record, with the other papers contained in this and the first volume of the Historical Society Collections covers the existence of Vermont as an independent and sovereign state."

Vermont Historical Society Collection, volume 2, page 397.

ALSO IN: Vermont Historical Society Collection, volume 2, Haldimand Papers.

D. Brymner, Report on Canadian Archives, 1889, pages 53-58.

R. E. Robinson, Vermont: a Study of Independence, chapter 15.

VERMONT: A. D. 1790-1791. Renunciation of the claims of New York and admission of the State to the Union.

"The rapid increase of the population of Vermont having destroyed all hope on the part of New York, of re-establishing her jurisdiction over that rebellious district, the holders of the New York grants, seeing no better prospect before them, were ready to accept such an indemnity as might be obtained by negotiation. Political considerations had also operated. The vote of Vermont might aid to establish the seat of the federal government at New York. At all events, that state would serve as a counterbalance to Kentucky, the speedy admission of which was foreseen. The Assembly of New York [July, 1789] had appointed commissioners with full powers to acknowledge the independence of Vermont, and to arrange a settlement of all matters in controversy. To this appointment Vermont had responded, and terms had been soon arranged. In consideration of the sum of $30,000, as an indemnity to the New York grantees, New York renounced all claim of jurisdiction [October 7, 1790], consented to the admission of Vermont into the Union, and agreed to the boundary heretofore claimed—the western line of the westernmost townships granted by New Hampshire and the middle channel of Lake Champlain. This arrangement was immediately ratified by the Legislature of Vermont. A Convention, which met at the beginning of the year [1791], had voted unanimously to ratify the Federal Constitution, and to ask admission into the Union. Commissioners were soon after appointed by the Assembly to wait upon Congress and to negotiate the admission. No opposition was made to it, and [February 18, 1791] within fourteen days after the passage of the bill for the prospective admission of Kentucky, Vermont was received into the Union, from and after the termination of the present session of Congress. The Constitution under which Vermont came into the Union, originally adopted in 1777, had been slightly altered in 1785. Most of its provisions seem to have been copied from the first Constitution of Pennsylvania. … The revision of 1785 struck out the requirement of Protestantism; another revision in 1793, still following the example of Pennsylvania, released the members of Assembly from the necessity of any religious subscription."

R. Hildreth, History of the United States, volume 4, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: H. Beckley, History of Vermont, chapters 5-6.

J. L. Heaton, Story of Vermont, chapter 4.

{3619}

VERMONT: A. D. 1812. Vigorous support of the war with England.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1812 (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER).

VERMONT: A. D. 1814. The Hartford Convention.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1814 (DECEMBER).

VERMONT: A. D. 1864. The St. Albans Raid.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (OCTOBER) THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

—————VERMONT: End————

VERMONT UNIVERSITY.

"At the time of the organization of the State government, in 1798, the University of Vermont was endowed with lands which proved subsequently to amount to 29,000 acres. In 1791 the university was organized. … The early years of the university, planted as it was in the wilderness, were full of struggles and misfortunes. The State was generous in the extreme at the beginning, but failed to support the university it had created. The land was poor and brought little income, the whole tract bringing but 2,500 dollars at that time. In 1813 the buildings of the university were seized by the Government and used for the storage of United States arms, by which much damage was suffered, and the houseless students all left, most of them to shoulder muskets against the British invaders. The buildings were rented in 1814 for the United States Army. Worse misfortunes occurred in 1824, the buildings being consumed by fire, but were restored by the citizens of Burlington in the following year. For the first ninety-five years of the corporate existence of the university the State never gave anything toward the support of it more than has been set forth in the above statements."

F. W. Blackmar, History of Federal and State Aid to Higher Education in the United States (Bureau of Education, Circ. of Information, 1890, number 1), pages 125-126.

VERNEUIL, Battle of (1424).

See FRANCE: A. D. 1429-1431.

VERNICOMES.

A tribe in ancient Caledonia, whose territory was the eastern half of Fife.

See BRITAIN, CELTIC TRIBES.

VEROMANDUI, The.

See BELGÆ.

—————VERONA: Start————

VERONA: A. D. 312. Siege, battle, and victory of Constantine.

See ROME: A. D. 805-323.

VERONA: A. D. 403. Defeat of Alaric by Stilicho.

See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 400-403.

VERONA: A. D. 489. Defeat of Odoacer by Theodoric.

See ROME: A. D. 488-526.

VERONA: A. D. 493-525. Residence of Theodoric the Ostrogoth.

"Pavia and Verona [as well as his ordinary capital city, Ravenna] were also places honoured with the occasional residence of Theodoric. At both he built a palace and public baths. … At Verona, the palace, of which there were still some noble remains incorporated into the castle of the Viscontis, was blown up by the French in 1801, and an absolutely modern building stands upon its site. … It seems probable that Theodoric's residence at both these places depended on the state of Transalpine politics. When the tribes of the middle Danube were moving suspiciously to and fro, and the vulnerable point by the Brenner Pass needed to be especially guarded, he fixed his quarters at Verona. When Gaul menaced greater danger, then he removed to Ticinum [Pavia]. It was apparently the fact that Verona was his coign of vantage, from whence be watched the German barbarians, which obtained for him from their minstrels the title of Dietrich of Bern. Thus strangely travestied, he was swept within the wide current of the legends relating to Attila, and hence it is that the really grandest figure in the history of the migration of the peoples appears in the Nibelungen Lied, not as a great king and conqueror on his own account, but only as a faithful squire of the terrible Hunnish king whose empire had in fact crumbled into dust before the birth of Theodoric."

T. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, book 4, chapter 8 (volume 3).

VERONA: 11-12th Centuries. Acquisition of Republican Independence.

See ITALY: A. D. 1056-1152.

VERONA: A. D. 1236-1259. The tyranny of Eccelino di Romano and the crusade against him.

"In the north-eastern corner of Italy the influence of the old Lombard lords, which had been extinguished there as in most other parts of the peninsula, was succeeded by that of a family that had accompanied one of the emperors from Germany. … The eye of a traveller passing from Verona to Padua may still be struck by one or two isolated hills, which seem as it were designed by nature to be meet residences for the tyrants of the surrounding plains. One of these gave birth to a person destined to become the scourge of the neighbouring country. … Eccelino di Romano … was descended from a German noble brought into Italy by Otho III. The office of Podesta of Verona had become hereditary in his family. In the wars of the second Frederic [1236-1250], he put himself at the head of the Ghibellines in the surrounding principalities, and became a strenuous supporter of the emperor. Under the protection of so powerful an ally, be soon made himself master of Padua, where he established his headquarters, and built the dungeons, where the most revolting cruelties were inflicted on his victims."

W. P. Urquhart, Life and Times of Francesco Sforza, book 1, chapter 3 (volume 1).

In 1237, the emperor, Frederick II., "obliged to return to Germany, left under the command of Eccelino a body of German soldiers, and another of Saracens, with which this able captain made himself, the same year, master of Vicenza, which he barbarously pillaged, and the following year of Padua. … Eccelino judged it necessary to secure obedience, by taking hostages from the richest and most powerful families; he employed his spies to discover the malcontents, whom he punished with torture, and redoubled his cruelty in proportion to the hatred which he excited." Subsequently, the emperor confided "the exclusive government of the Veronese marches [also called the Trevisan marches] to Eccelino. The hatred which this ferocious man excited by his crimes fell on the emperor. Eccelino imprisoned in the most loathsome dungeons those whom he considered his enemies, and frequently put them to death by torture, or suffered them to perish by hunger. … {3620} In the single town of Padua there were eight prisons always full, notwithstanding the incessant toil of the executioner to empty them; two of these contained each 300 prisoners. A brother of Eccelino, named Alberic, governed Treviso with less ferocity, but with a power not less absolute." Eccelino maintained the power which he had gathered into his hands for several years after Frederick's death. At length, the pope, "Alexander IV., to destroy the monster that held in terror the Trevisan march, caused a crusade to be preached in that country. He promised those who combated the ferocious Eccelino all the indulgences usually reserved for the deliverers of the Holy Land. The marquis d'Este, the count di San Bonifazio, with the cities of Ferrara, Mantua, and Bologna, assembled their troops under the standard of the church; they were joined by a horde of ignorant fanatics from the lowest class." Headed by the legate Philip, archbishop of Ravenna, the crusaders took Padua, June 18, 1256, and "for seven days the city was inhumanly pillaged by those whom it had received as deliverers. As soon as Eccelino was informed of the loss he had sustained, he hastened to separate and disarm the 11,000 Paduans belonging to his army; he confined them in prisons, where all, with the exception of 200, met a violent or lingering death. During the two following years, the Guelphs experienced nothing but disasters: the legate, whom the pope had placed at their head, proved incompetent to command them; and the crowd of crusaders whom he called to his ranks served only to compromise them, by want of courage and discipline. … The following year, this tyrant, unequalled in Ita]y for bravery and military talent, always an enemy to luxury, and proof against the seductions of women, making the boldest tremble with a look, and preserving in his diminutive person, at the age of 65, all the vigor of a soldier, advanced into the centre of Lombardy, in the hope that the nobles of Milan, with whom he had already opened a correspondence, would surrender this great city." But, by this time, even his old Ghibelline associates had formed alliances with the Guelphs against him, and he was beset on all sides. "On the 16th of September, 1259, whilst he was preparing to retire, he found himself stopped at the bridge of Cassano. … Repulsed, pursued as far as Vimercato, and at last wounded in the foot, he was made prisoner and taken to Soncino: there, he refused to speak; rejected all the aid of medicine; tore off all the bandages from his wounds, and finally expired, on the eleventh day of his captivity. His brother with all his family were massacred in the following year."

J. C. L. de Sismondi, History of the Italian Republics, chapters 3-4.

ALSO IN: J. Miley, History of the Papal States, book 7, chapter 1 (volume 3).

VERONA: A. D. 1260-1338. Rise of the House of the Scaligeri. Successes of Can' Grande della Scala. Wars and Reverses of Mastino.

After the death of Eccelino, Verona, by its own choice came under the government of the first Mastino della Scala, who established the power of a house which became famous in Italian history. Mastino's grandson, Cane, or Can' Grande della Scala, "reigned in that city from 1312 to 1329, with a splendor which no other prince in Ita]y equalled. … Among the Lombard princes he was the first protector of literature and the arts. The best poets, painters, and sculptors of Italy, Dante, to whom he offered an asylum, as well as Uguccione da Faggiuola, and many other exiles illustrious in war or politics, were assembled at his court. He aspired to subdue the Veronese and Trevisan marches, or what has since been called the Terra Firma of Venice. He took possession of Vicenza; and afterwards maintained a long war against the republic of Padua, the most powerful in the district, and that which had shown the most attachment to the Guelph party and to liberty." In 1328, Padua submitted to him; and "the year following he attacked and took Treviso, which surrendered on the 6th of July, 1329. He possessed himself of Feltre and Cividale soon after. The whole province seemed subjugated to his power; but the conqueror also was subdued." He died on the 22d of the same month in which Treviso was taken.

J. C. L. de Sismondi, History of the Italian Republics, chapter 6.

Can' Grande was succeeded by his nephew, the second Mastino della Scala, who, in the next six years, "extended his states from the northeastern frontiers of Italy to the confines of Tuscany; and the possession of the strong city of Lucca now gave him a secure footing in this province. He shortly made it appear to what purpose he meant to apply this new advantage. Under the plea of re-establishing the Ghibelin interests, but in reality to forward his own schemes of dominion, he began to fill all Tuscany with his machinations. Florence was neither slow to discover her danger, nor to resent the treachery of her faithless ally,"—which Mastino had recently been. Florence, according]y, formed an alliance with Venice, which Mastino had rashly offended by restricting the manufacture of salt on the Trevisan coast, and by laying heavy duties on the navigation of the Po. Florence agreed "to resign to Venice the sole possession of such conquests as might be made in that quarter; only reserving for herself the acquisition of Lucca, which she was to obtain by attacking Mastino in Tuscany, entirely with her own resources. Upon these terms an alliance was signed between the two republics, and the lord of Verona had soon abundant reason to repent of the pride and treachery by which he had provoked their formidable union (A. D. 1336). … During three campaigns he was unable to oppose the league in the field, and was compelled to witness the successive loss of many of his principal cities (A. D. 1337). His brother Albert was surprised and made prisoner in Padua, by the treachery of the family of Carrara, who acquired the sovereignty of that city; Feltro was captured by the Duke of Carinthia, Brescia revolted, and fell with other places to Azzo Visconti. … In this hopeless condition Mastino artfully addressed himself to the Venetians, and, by satisfying all their demands, detached them from the general interests of the coalition (A. D. 1338). By a separate treaty which their republic concluded with him, and which was then only communicated to the Florentines for their acceptance, Mastino ceded to Venice Treviso, with other fortresses and possessions, and the right of free navigation on the Po; he agreed at the same time to yield Bassano and an extension of territory to the new lord of Padua, and to confirm the sovereignty of Brescia to Azzo Visconti; but for the Florentine republic no farther advantage was stipulated than the enjoyment of a few castles which they had already conquered in Tuscany."

G. Procter, History of Italy, chapter 4, part 3.

ALSO IN: H. E. Napier, Florentine History, chapter 19 (volume 2).

{3621}

VERONA: A. D. 1351-1387. Degeneracy and fall of the Scaligeri. Subjugation by the Visconti of Milan.

See MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447.

VERONA: A. D. 1405. Added to the dominion of Venice.

See ITALY: A. D. 1402-1406.

VERONA: A. D. 1797. Massacre of French Soldiers.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (APRIL-MAY).

VERONA: A. D. 1814. Surrender to the Austrians.

See ITALY: A. D. 1814.

—————VERONA: End————

VERONA, The Congress of (after Troppau and Laybach).

"The rapid spread of revolution in Europe inspired serious misgivings among the great powers, and impelled the Holy Alliance [see HOLY ALLIANCE] to show its true colours. Austria was especially alarmed by the movement in Naples [see ITALY: A. D. 1820-1821], which threatened to overthrow its power in Italy, and Metternich convoked a congress at Troppau, in Upper Silesia (October, 1820), at which Austria, Russia, Prussia, France and England were represented. Neapolitan affairs were the chief subject of discussion, and it was soon evident that Austria, Russia and Prussia were agreed as to the necessity of armed intervention. England made a formal protest against such high-handed treatment of a peaceful country; but as the protest was not supported by France, and England was not prepared to go to war for Naples, it was disregarded. The three allied powers decided to transfer the congress to Laybach and to invite Ferdinand I. to attend in person." The result of the conference at Laybach was a movement of 60,000 Austrian troops into Naples and Sicily, in March, 1821, and a restoration of Ferdinand, who made a merciless use of his opportunity for revenge.

R. Lodge, History of Modern Europe, chapter 25, section 8.

From Laybach, the allied sovereigns issued a circular to their representatives at the various foreign courts, in which portentous document they declared that "useful and necessary changes in legislation and in the administration of states could only emanate from the free will, and from the intelligent and well-weighed convictions, of those whom God has made responsible for power. Penetrated with this eternal truth, the sovereigns have not hesitated to proclaim it with frankness and vigour. They have declared that, in respecting the rights and independence of legitimate power, they regarded as legally null, and disavowed by the principles which constituted the public right of Europe, all pretended reforms operated by revolt and open hostilities." "These principles, stated nakedly and without shame, were too much even for Lord Castlereagh. In a despatch, written early in the year 1821, while admitting the right of a state to interfere in the internal affairs of another state when its own interests were endangered, he protested against the pretension to put down revolutionary movements apart from their immediate bearing on the security of the state so intervening, and denied that merely possible revolutionary movements can properly be made the basis of a hostile alliance. The principles of the Holy Alliance were not intended to remain a dead letter; they were promptly acted upon. Popular movements were suppressed in Naples and Piedmont; and intervention in Spain, where the Cortes had been summoned and the despotic rule of Ferdinand VII. had been overthrown, was in contemplation. Greece imitated the example set in the western peninsulas of Europe. The Congress of Verona was summoned, and Lord Castlereagh (now the Marquis of Londonderry) was preparing to join it, when in an access of despondency, the origin of which is variously explained, he took his own life." He was succeeded in the British Ministry by Mr. Canning.