Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 65)

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The provisions in reference to the election of Senators and Representatives and the powers and duties of each House were unaltered except that the electors of each State were required to be citizens, and the Senators were to be chosen by the Legislatures of the State at the session next immediately preceding the beginning of the term of service. In reference to the general powers of Congress, some of the changes were more vital. The general welfare clause was omitted from the taxing grant. Bounties from the Treasury and extra compensation to contractors, officers, and agents were prohibited. 'A Protective Tariff' was so far forbidden that no duties or taxes on importations could be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry. Export duties were allowed with the concurrence of two thirds of both Houses. Congress was forbidden to make internal improvements except to furnish lights, beacons, buoys, to improve harbors, and to remove obstructions in river navigation, and the cost of these was to be paid by duties levied on the navigation facilitated. That the objects might be better attained, States, with the consent of Congress and under certain other restrictions, were allowed to lay a duty on the sea-going tonnage participating in the trades of the river or harbor improved. States, divided by rivers, or through which rivers flowed, could enter into compacts for improving their navigation. Uniform laws of naturalization and bankruptcy were authorized, but bankruptcy could not affect debts contracted prior to the passage of the law. A two-thirds vote was made requisite to appropriate money unless asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of the departments. Every law must relate but to one subject, and that was to be expressed in the title. To admit new States required a vote of two thirds of each House, the Senate voting by States. Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several conventions, Congress could summon a convention to consider amendments to the Constitution, but the convention was confined in its action to propositions suggested by the States making the call. … 'The importation of negroes of the African race was forbidden, and Congress was required to pass laws effectually to prevent it.' The right of transit or sojourn with slaves in any State was secured and fugitive slaves—called 'slaves' without the euphemism of the old instrument—were to be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom they belonged. Congress could prohibit the introduction of slaves from States and Territories not included in the Confederacy, and laws impairing the right of property in negro slaves were prohibited. Slaves could be carried into any Territory of the Confederacy by citizens of the Confederate States and be protected as property. This clause was intended to forbid 'squatter sovereignty,' and to prevent adverse action against property in slaves, until the Territory should emerge from a condition of pupilage and dependence into the dignity, equality, and sovereignty of a State, when its right to define 'property' would be beyond the interference or control of Congress."

J. L. M. Curry, The Southern States of the American Union, chapter 13.

Alexander H. Stephens, in his "Constitutional view of the late War between the States," expresses the opinion that the selection of Jefferson Davis for the Presidency of the Confederacy was due to a misunderstanding. He says that a majority of the states were looking to Georgia for the President, and the Georgia delegation had unanimously agreed to present Mr. Toombs, who would have been acceptable. But a rumor got currency that Georgia would put forward Howell Cobb, whereupon the other states took up Davis, and united upon him. It was generally understood, says Mr. Stephens, that Davis "did not desire the office of President. He preferred a military position, and the one he desired above all others was the chief command of the army."

A. H. Stephens, Constitutional View of the War between the States, volume 2, page 328-333.

ALSO IN: R. B. Rhett, The Confederate Government at Montgomery (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1, pages 99-111).

Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, part 3, chapter. 5, and appendix K (volume 1).

The text of both the Provisional and the Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States is given in the appendix referred to.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (February). Urgency of South Carolina for the reduction of Fort Sumter before the inauguration of President Lincoln.

"I am perfectly satisfied," wrote Governor Pickens of South Carolina to Howell Cobb, "President of the Provisional Congress" of the Confederacy, in a letter dated February 13, 1861,—"I am perfectly satisfied that the welfare of the new confederation and the necessities of the State require that Fort Sumter should be reduced before the close of the present administration at Washington. If an attack is delayed until after the inauguration of the incoming President of the United States, the troops now gathered in the capital may then be employed in attempting that which, previous to that time, they could not be spared to do. They dare not leave Washington now and do that which then will be a measure too inviting to be resisted. Mr. Lincoln cannot do more for this State than Mr. Buchanan has done. Mr. Lincoln will not concede what Mr. Buchanan has refused. Mr. Buchanan has placed his refusal upon grounds which determine his reply to six States, as completely as to the same demand if made by a single State. If peace can be secured, it will be by the prompt use of the occasion, when the forces of the United States are withheld from our harbor. If war can be averted, it will be by making the capture of Fort Sumter a fact accomplished during the continuance of the present administration, and leaving to the incoming administration the question of an open declaration of war. Such a declaration, separated, as it will be, from any present act of hostilities during Mr. Lincoln's administration, may become to him a matter requiring consideration. That consideration will not be expected of him, if the attack on the fort is made during his administration, and becomes, therefore, as to him, an act of present hostility. Mr. Buchanan cannot resist, because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of the quarrel will have been, or may be, considered by him as past. Upon this line of policy I have acted, and upon the adherence to it may be found, I think, the most rational expectation of seeing that fort, which is even now a source of danger to the State, restored to the possession of the State without those consequences which I should most deeply deplore."

Official Records, volume 1, page 256.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (February-March). The inauguration and the inaugural address of President Lincoln.

"On the 11th of February, with his family and some personal friends, Lincoln left his home at Springfield for Washington. … On his way to Washington, he passed through the great states of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and was everywhere received with demonstrations of loyalty, as the representative of the national government. He addressed the people at the capitals of these states, and at many of their chief towns and cities. The city of Washington was surrounded by slave territory, and was really within the lines of the insurgents. Baltimore was not only a slaveholding city, but nowhere was the spirit of rebellion more hot and ferocious than among a large class of its people. The lower classes, the material of which mobs are made, were reckless, and ready for any outrage. From the date of his election to the time of his start for Washington, there had often appeared in the press and elsewhere, vulgar threats and menaces that he should never be inaugurated, nor reach the capital alive. Little attention was paid to these threats, yet some of the President's personal friends, without his knowledge, employed a detective, who sent agents to Baltimore and Washington to investigate. … The detectives ascertained the existence of a plot to assassinate the President elect, as he passed through Baltimore. The first intelligence of this conspiracy was communicated to Lincoln at Philadelphia. On the facts being laid before him, he was urged to take the train that night (the 21st of February), by which he would reach Washington the next morning, passing through Baltimore earlier than the conspirators expected, and thus avoid the danger. Having already made appointments to meet the citizens of Philadelphia at, and raise the United States flag over, Independence Hall, on Washington's birthday, the 22nd, and also to meet the Legislature of Pennsylvania at Harrisburgh, he declined starting for Washington that night. Finally his friends persuaded him to allow the detectives and the officers of the railways to arrange for him to return from Harrisburgh, and, by special train, to go to Washington the night following the ceremonies at Harrisburgh. … He went to Harrisburgh according to arrangement, met the Legislature, and retired to his room. In the meanwhile, General Scott and Mr. Seward had learned, through other sources, of the existence of the plot to assassinate him, and had despatched Mr. F. W. Seward, a son of Senator Seward, to apprise him of the danger. Information coming to him from both of these sources, each independent of the other, induced him to yield to the wishes of his friends, and anticipate his journey to Washington. Besides, there had reached him from Baltimore no committee, either of the municipal authorities or of citizens, to tender him the hospitalities, and to extend to him the courtesies of that city, as had been done by every other city through which he had passed. He was persuaded to permit the detective to arrange for his going to Washington that night. The telegraph wires to Baltimore were cut, Harrisburgh was isolated, and, taking a special train, he reached Philadelphia, and driving to the Baltimore depot, found the Washington train waiting his arrival, stepped on board, and passed on without interruption through Baltimore to the national capital. … He afterwards declared: 'I did not then, nor do I now believe I should have been assassinated, had I gone through Baltimore as first contemplated, but I thought it wise to run no risk where no risk was necessary.' … On the 4th of March, 1861, he was inaugurated President of the United States. … In the open air, and with a voice so clear and distinct that he could be heard by thrice ten thousand men, he read his inaugural address, and on the very verge of civil war, he made a most earnest appeal for peace."

I. N. Arnold, Life of Abraham Lincoln, chapters 11-12.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, chapter 13.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 3, chapters 19-21.

H. J. Raymond, Life of Abraham Lincoln, chapters 5-6.

The following is the full text of the inaugural address, from Lincoln's "Complete Works."

"Fellow-Citizens of the United States: In compliance with a custom as old as the government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President 'before he enters on the execution of his office.' I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the southern states, that, by the accession of a republican administration, their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches, when I declare that 'I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.' Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read: 'Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.' I now reiterate these sentiments; and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the states when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—as cheerfully to one section as to another. {3418} There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions: 'No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.' It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the law-giver is the law. All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause 'shall be delivered up,' their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath? There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by state authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done. And should anyone, in any case, be content that this oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept? Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states'? I take the official oath today with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules. And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional. It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period, fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task, for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these states is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself. Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of states in the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these genera] principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen states expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation, in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was 'to form a more perfect Union.' But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the states be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no state, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence within any state or states against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances. I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the states. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego, for the time, the uses of such offices. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. {3419} The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. That there are persons, in one section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to them. To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak? Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step, while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from—will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution—certainly would if such a right were a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by state authority? The Constitution does not expressly say. May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other. If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which, in turn, will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a new Confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the states to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession? Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism, in some form, is all that is left. I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decide by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must he binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes. One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived, without restriction, in one section; while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other. Physically speaking, we cannot separate; we cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? {3420} Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you. This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I cannot be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution—which amendment, however, I have not seen—has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the states, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable. The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the states. The people themselves can do this also if they choose, but the Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present government as it came to his hands, and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. By the frame of the Government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief; and have with equal wisdom provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years. My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty. In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect, and defend it.' I am loth to close. W are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (March). President Lincoln and his Cabinet. Secretary Seward.

President Lincoln, "in selecting his cabinet, which he did substantially before he left Springfield for Washington, … thought it wise to call to his assistance the strong men of his party, especially those who had given evidence of the support they commanded as his competitors in the Chicago convention. … This was sound policy under the circumstances. It might indeed have been foreseen that among the members of a cabinet so composed, troublesome disagreements and rivalries would break out. But it was better for the President to have these strong and ambitious men near him as his coöperators than to have them as his critics in Congress, where their differences might have been composed in a common opposition to him. As members of his cabinet he could hope to control them, and to keep them busily employed in the service of a common purpose, if he had the strength to do so. Whether he did possess this strength was soon tested by a singularly rude trial. There can be no doubt that the foremost members of his cabinet, Seward and Chase, the most eminent Republican statesmen, had felt themselves wronged by their party when in its national convention it preferred to them for the presidency a man whom, not unnaturally, they thought greatly their inferior in ability and experience as well as in service. … Seward, who, as Secretary of State, considered himself next to the Chief Executive, and who quickly accustomed himself to giving orders and making arrangements upon his own motion, thought it necessary that he should rescue the direction of public affairs from hands so unskilled, and take full charge of them himself. At the end of the first month of the administration he submitted a 'memorandum' to President Lincoln, which has been first brought to light by Nicolay and Hay, and is one of their most valuable contributions to the history of those days.

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In that paper Seward actually told the President that, at the end of a month's administration, the government was still without a policy, either domestic or foreign; that the slavery question should be eliminated from the struggle about the Union; that the matter of the maintenance of the forts and other possessions in the South should be decided with that view; that explanations should be demanded categorically from the governments of Spain and France, which were then preparing, one for the annexation of San Domingo, and both for the invasion of Mexico; that if no satisfactory explanations were received war should be declared against Spain and France by the United States; that explanations should also be sought from Russia and Great Britain, and a vigorous continental spirit of independence against European intervention be aroused all over the American continent; that this policy should be incessantly pursued and directed by somebody; that either the President should devote himself entirely to it, or devolve the direction on some member of his cabinet, whereupon all debate on this policy must end. This could be understood only as a formal demand that the President should acknowledge his own incompetency to perform his duties, content himself with the amusement of distributing post offices, and resign his power as to all important affairs into the hands of his Secretary of State. … Had Lincoln, as most Presidents would have done, instantly dismissed Seward, and published the true reason for that dismissal, it would inevitably have been the end of Seward's career. But Lincoln did what not many of the noblest and greatest men in history would have been noble and great enough to do. He considered that Seward was still capable of rendering great service to his country in the place in which he was, if rightly controlled. He ignored the insult, but firmly established his superiority. In his reply, which he forthwith dispatched, he told Seward that the administration had a domestic policy as laid down in the inaugural address with Seward's approval; that it had a foreign policy as traced in Seward's dispatches with the President's approval; that if any policy was to be maintained or changed, he, the President, was to direct that on his responsibility; and that in performing that duty the President had a right to the advice of his secretaries. Seward's fantastic schemes of foreign war and continental policies Lincoln brushed aside by passing them over in silence. Nothing more was said. Seward must have felt that he was at the mercy of a superior man."

Carl Schurz, Abraham Lincoln, pages 67-73.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: a History, volume 3, chapters 22 and 26.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (March). Surrender of Alexander H. Stephens to Secession. His "Corner-stone" speech at Savannah.

The following is from a speech made by Alexander H. Stephens at Savannah, on the evening after the secession of Georgia, which he had opposed, but to which he now yielded himself without reserve. It is a speech that became famous on account of its bold declaration that Slavery formed the "corner-stone" of the New Confederacy. "The new constitution," said Mr. Stephens, "has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the 'rock upon which the old Union would split.' He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the 'storm came and the wind blew.' Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery —subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science. It has been so even amongst us."

A. H. Stephens, Speech in Savannah, March 21, 1861 (in "Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private; by H. Cleveland").

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (March-April). The breaking of rebellion into open war by the attack on Fort Sumter. President Lincoln's statement of the circumstances. His first difficulties. Attitude of the Border States.

The circumstances under which the first blow of the civil war was struck by the rebels at Charleston were recited by President Lincoln, in his Message to Congress, at the special session convened July 4, 1861; "On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. {3422} The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship 'Brooklyn' into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the 'Sabine,' to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the 'Brooklyn,' acting upon some quasi armistice of the late administration (and of the existence of which the present administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible—rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition. It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 56-57.

The President's delay of action in the case of Fort Sumter was mainly due, on the political side of the question, to the state of things in the border states—especially in Virginia. "There were fifteen slave states, which those engaged in the rebellion hoped to lead or to force into secession. At the time of the inauguration, only seven of these fifteen—less than a majority—had revolted. The cotton states alone had followed the lead of South Carolina out of the Union. Several weeks had passed since a state had seceded; and unless other states could be dragooned into the movement, the rebellion would be practically a failure from the start. Such a confederacy could not hope to live a year, and would be obliged to find its way back into the Union upon some terms. In the meantime, two or three conventions in the border states [Virginia, April 4, and Missouri, March], delegated freshly from the people, had voted distinctly and decidedly not to secede. [Kentucky and Tennessee had refused even the call of conventions; while North Carolina, February 28, and Arkansas, March 18, of the states farther south, had voted secession down.] The affairs of the confederacy were really in a very precarious condition when Mr. Lincoln came into power. The rebel government was making very much more bluster than progress. It became Mr. Lincoln's policy so to conduct affairs as to strengthen the Union feeling in the border states, and to give utterance to no sentiment and to do no deed which should drive these states toward the confederacy. … The confederacy found that it must make progress or die. The rebel Congress passed a measure for the organization of an army, on the 9th of March, and on the 12th two confederate commissioners—Mr. Forsyth of Alabama and Mr. Crawford of Georgia—presented themselves at the State Department at Washington for the purpose of making a treaty with the United States. They knew, of course, that they could not be received officially, and that they ought to be arrested for treason. The President would not recognize them, but sent to them a copy of his inaugural, as the embodiment of the views of the government. … In the meantime, Lieutenant Talbot, on behalf of Mr. Lincoln, was having interviews with Governor Pickens of South Carolina and with General Beauregard, in command of the confederate forces there, in which he informed them that provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably if possible,—otherwise by force. This was communicated to L. P. Walker, then rebel Secretary of War. Before Talbot had made his communication, Beauregard had informed Major Anderson, in command of Fort Sumter, that he must have no further intercourse with Charleston; and Talbot himself was refused permission to visit that gallant and faithful officer. … The wisdom of Mr. Lincoln's waiting became evident at a day not too long delayed. Fort Pickens, which the rebels had not taken, was quietly reinforced [April 12], and when the vessels which carried the relief [to Sumter] were dispatched, Mr. Lincoln gave official information to General Beauregard that provisions were to be sent to Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, by an unarmed vessel. He was determined that no hostile act on the part of the government should commence the war, for which both sides were preparing; although an act of open war had already transpired in Charleston harbor"—the rebel batteries having fired upon and driven off the unarmed steamer Star of the West, which had been sent to convey troops and provisions to Fort Sumter on the 9th of January, two months before Lincoln's inauguration. {3423} "Beauregard laid this last intelligence before his Secretary of War, and, under special instructions, on the 12th of April, he demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. He was ready to make the demand, and to back it by force. The city of Charleston was full of troops, and, for months, batteries had been in course of construction, with the special purpose of compelling the surrender of the fort. Major Anderson had seen these batteries going up, day after day, without the liberty to fire a gun. He declined to surrender. He was called upon to state when he would evacuate the fort. He replied that on the 15th he would do so, should he not meantime receive controlling instructions from the government, or additional supplies. The response which he received was that the confederate batteries would open on Fort Sumter in one hour from the date of the message. The date of the message was 'April 12, 1861, 3:30 A. M.' Beauregard was true to his word. At half past four the batteries opened upon the Fort, which, after a long and terrible bombardment, and a gallant though comparatively feeble defense by a small and half-starved garrison, was surrendered the following day. … The fall of Sumter was the resurrection of patriotism. The North needed just this. Such a universal burst of patriotic indignation as ran over the North under the influence of this insult to the national flag has never been witnessed. It swept away all party lines as if it had been flame and they had been flax."

J. G. Holland, Life of Lincoln, chapter 18.

ALSO IN: F. W. Seward, Seward at Washington, chapter 56.

S. W. Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, chapters 24-32.

A. Doubleday, Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, chapters 8-11.

A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, volume 1, chapters 2-4.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, The Century Company, volume 1, pages 40-83.

S. L. Woodford, The Story of Fort Sumter (Personal Recollections of the War: N. Y. Com. L. L. of the United States).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April). President Lincoln's call to arms. The mighty uprising of the North. The response of disloyal Governors.

"By the next morning (Sunday April 14) the news of the close of the bombardment and capitulation of Sumter was in Washington. In the forenoon, at the time Anderson and his garrison were evacuating the fort, Lincoln and his Cabinet, together with sundry military officers, were at the Executive Mansion, giving final shape to the details of the action the Government had decided to take. A proclamation, drafted by himself, copied on the spot by his secretary, was concurred in by his Cabinet, signed, and sent to the State Department to be sealed, filed, and copied for publication in the next morning's newspapers. The document bears date April 15 (Monday), but was made and signed on Sunday." It was as follows:

"Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government; and to redress wrongs already long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country. And I hereby command the persons composing the combination aforesaid to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective abodes within twenty days from date. Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers, at twelve o'clock noon, on Thursday the fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this 15th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, page 34.

"In view of the subsequent gigantic expansion of the civil war, eleventh-hour critics continue to insist that a larger force should have been called at once. They forget that this was nearly five times the then existing regular army; that only very limited quantities of arms, equipments, and supplies were in the Northern arsenals; that the treasury was bankrupt; and that an insignificant eight million loan had not two weeks before been discounted nearly six per cent. by the New York bankers, some bids ranging as low as eighty-five. They forget that the shameful events of the past four months had elicited scarcely a spark of war feeling; that the loyal States had suffered the siege of Sumter and firing on the 'Star of the West' with a dangerous indifference. They forget the doubt and dismay, the panic of commerce, the division of counsels, the attacks from within, the sneers from without—that faith seemed gone and patriotism dead. Twenty-four hours later all this was measurably changed, … The guns of the Sumter bombardment woke the country from the political nightmare which had so long tormented and paralyzed it. {3424} The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted, outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun-casting in the great foundries; cartridge-making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage-rolling, and lint-scraping in nearly every household. Before the lapse of forty-eight hours a Massachusetts regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington; within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 4, chapters 4-5.

"In intelligence no army, except perhaps the Athenian, can have ever equalled or approached that of the North. Most of the soldiers carried books and writing materials in their knapsacks, and mail bags heavily weighted with letters were sent from every cantonment. Such privates would sometimes reason instead of obeying, and they would see errors of their commanders to which they had better have been blind. But on the whole, in a war in which much was thrown upon the individual soldier, intelligence was likely to prevail. In wealth, in the means of providing the weapons and ammunitions of war, the North had an immense advantage, which, combined with that of numbers, could not fail, if, to use Lincoln's homely phrase, it 'pegged away,' to tell in the end. It was also vastly superior in mechanical invention; which was destined to play a great part, and in mechanical skill; almost every Yankee regiment was full of mechanics, some of whom could devise as well as execute. In artillery and engineering the North took the lead from the first, having many civil engineers, whose conversion into military civil engineers was easy. The South, to begin with, had the contents of Federal arsenals and armouries, which had been well stocked by the provident treason of Buchanan's Minister of War. … But when these resources were exhausted, replacement was difficult, the blockade having been established, though extraordinary efforts in the way of military manufacture were made. To the wealthy North, besides its own factories, were opened the markets of England and the world. Of the small regular army the Confederacy had carried off a share, with nearly half the regular officers. The South had the advantage of the defensive, which, with long-range muskets and in a difficult country, was reckoned in battle as five to two. The South had the superiority of the unity, force, and secrecy which autocracy lends to the operations of war. On the side of the North these were comparatively wanting."

Goldwin Smith, The United States, chapter 5.

In six of the eight Slave-labor States included in the call, the President's Proclamation and the requisition of the Secretary of War "were treated by the authorities with words of scorn and defiance. The exceptions were Maryland and Delaware. In the other States, disloyal Governors held the reins of power. 'I have only to say,' replied Governor Letcher of Virginia, 'that the militia of this State will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not within the province of the Constitution or the Act of 1795—will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South.' Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, answered:—'Your dispatch is received, and if genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt, I have to say in reply, that I regard the levy of troops, made by the Administration for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.' Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:—'Your dispatch is received. I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.' Governor Harris, of Tennessee, said:—'Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those of our Southern brethren.' Governor Rector, of Arkansas, replied:—'In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury.' … Governor Jackson, of Missouri, responded:—'There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that these men are intended to make war upon the seceded States. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade.' … Governor Hicks, of Maryland, appalled by the presence of great dangers, and sorely pressed by the secessionists on every side, hastened, in a proclamation, to assure the people of his State that no troops would be sent from Maryland unless it might be for the defense of the National Capital, and that they (the people) would, in a short time, 'have the opportunity afforded them, in a special election for members of the Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up.' Governor Burton, of Delaware, made no response until the 26th, when he informed the President that he had no authority to comply with his requisition. At the same time he recommended the formation of volunteer companies for the protection of the citizens and property of Delaware, and not for the preservation of the Union. … In the seven excepted Slave-labor States in which insurrection prevailed, the proclamation and the requisition produced hot indignation, and were assailed with the bitterest scorn. … Even in the Free-labor States, there were vehement opposers of the war policy of the Government from its inception." But, speaking generally, "the uprising of the people of the Free-labor States in defense of Nationality was a sublime spectacle. Nothing like it had been seen on the earth since the preaching of Peter the Hermit and of Pope Urban the Second filled all Christian Europe with religious zeal, and sent armed hosts, with the cry of 'God wills it! God wills it!' to rescue the sepulcher of Jesus from the hands of the infidel."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 1, chapter 14.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, editor, Rebellion Record, volume 1.

W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History of the Rebellion, chapters 4-6.

{3425}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April). The Morrill Tariff Act.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April). Secession of Virginia.

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-JUNE).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April). Activity of Rebellion in Virginia and Maryland. Peril of the national capital. Attack on Massachusetts volunteers in Baltimore.

"Massachusetts, always the most zealous, was the first in the field [with troops in response to the President's call], and on the 17th [April] she forwarded a regiment of volunteers from Boston to Washington. Pennsylvania, although nearly one-half of her votes had been given for Mr. Breckinridge, followed this example; and, owing to her geographical position, her volunteers reached the shores of the Potomac in advance of all the others. After passing through the great city of Baltimore in the midst of an incipient insurrection, they encamped around the Capitol, on the 18th of April. The seceders, on their side, had not lost a moment in Virginia. They were in possession of Richmond, where the convention was in session. … The workshops and arsenal of Harper's Ferry, situated at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah, on a spot which was destined to play an important part during the war, were only guarded by a detachment of 64 dismounted dragoons; and the Virginia volunteers, assembled in the valleys of the Blue Ridge, were ready to take possession of them as soon as the ordinance for the secession of Virginia should furnish them a pretext. They were then to cross the Potomac and join the insurgents of Maryland, for the purpose of attempting the capture of Washington, where their accomplices were expecting them. On the morning of the 18th [April], a portion of them were on their march, in the hope of seizing the prey which was to be of so much value to the future armies of the Confederacy. But Lieutenant Jones, who was in command at Harper's Ferry, had been informed of the approach of the Confederate troops under the lead of Ashby—a chief well known since; notwithstanding their despatch, they only arrived in sight of Harper's Ferry in time to see from a distance a large conflagration that was consuming the workshops, store-houses, and the enormous piles of muskets heaped in the yards, while the Federal soldiers who had just kindled it were crossing the Potomac on their way to Washington. The Confederates found nothing but smoking ruins, and some machinery, which they sent to Richmond; their allies from Maryland had not made their appearance, and they did not feel strong enough to venture alone to the other side of the Potomac. During the last few days the authorities of Virginia had been making preparations for capturing the Norfolk [or Gosport] arsenal (navy-yard). That establishment possessed a magnificent granite basin, construction docks, and a depot of artillery with more than 2,000 guns; a two-decked vessel was on the stocks, two others, with a three-decker, three frigates, a steam sloop, and a brig, lay dismantled in the port; the steam frigate Merrimac was there undergoing repairs; the steam sloop Germantown was in the harbor ready to go to sea, while the sailing sloop Cumberland was lying to at the entrance of the port. … Commodore McCauley, the Federal commandant, was surrounded by traitors," and, being deficient in energy and capability, he allowed himself to be put in a position where he thought it necessary to sink all the vessels in the harbor except the Cumberland. As they were sinking, reinforcements arrived from Washington, under Captain Paulding, who superseded McCauley in command. But they came too late. Captain Paulding could do nothing except hastily destroy as far as possible the sinking ships and the arsenal buildings, and then retreat. "The Confederates found abundant resources in artillery and 'materiel' of every description in Norfolk; the fire was soon extinguished, the docks repaired, and they succeeded in raising the Merrimac, which we shall see at work the following year. Fort Monroe had just been occupied by a small Federal garrison. Its loss would have been even more disastrous to the Federal cause than that of the Norfolk navy-yard and arsenal, because the Confederates, instead of having to cover Richmond, would have been able to blockade Washington by sea and besiege it by land. … The example of Virginia fired the enthusiasm of the secessionists everywhere, and they applied themselves to the task of drawing into the conflict those slave States which were still hesitating. … The sight of the Pennsylvania volunteers had caused a great irritation in Baltimore. That city, the largest in the slave States, … warmly sympathized with the South. Her location on the railway line which connects Washington with the great cities of the North imparted to her a peculiar importance. Consequently, the accomplices of the South, who were numerous in Baltimore, determined to seize the first opportunity that might offer to drag that city into the rebellion. … The looked-for opportunity occurred … April 19. When the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, with a few battalions of Pennsylvania volunteers, arrived at the northern station, an immense crowd bore down upon them. A line of rails, laid in the centre of the streets, connected this with the southern station, and enabled the cars, drawn by horses, to pass through the city. The crowd surround the soldiers of the Sixth Massachusetts, who occupy these cars. The last cars are stopped, and the occupants, being obliged to get out, endeavor to make their way through the crowd. But, being hemmed in on all sides, they are soon attacked by a shower of stones, which wound many of them, and injure a few mortally. The soldiers have to defend themselves, and the first discharge of musketry, which has considerable effect, opens them a passage. But the aggressors, being armed, rally, and a regular battle ensues. … The ground is strewn with the wounded of both parties. At last, the Massachusetts soldiers rejoin their comrades at the southern station," and are conveyed to Washington. "Baltimore was thenceforth in possession of the secessionists, who were fully determined to take advantage of the situation of that city to intercept all communications between Washington and the North. {3426} Accordingly, they hastened to burn the railroad bridges which had been constructed over large estuaries north of Baltimore, and to cut the telegraph wires. Deprived of all sources of information from the North, the capital of the Union was soon wrapped in mournful silence. For some days the occupant of the White House was unable to forward any instructions to the people who had remained faithful to the Union; but their zeal did not abate on that account. Patriotism extinguished all party animosities in the hearts of most of the Democrats who had opposed the election of Mr. Lincoln. In the presence of the national peril they loyally tendered their assistance to the President; and breaking loose from their former accomplices of the South, they assumed the name of War Democrats in opposition to that of Peace Democrats."

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 1, book 2, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: J. W. Hanson, History of the Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers, pages 21-57.

G. W. Brown, Baltimore and the 29th of April, 1861 (Johns Hopkins University Studies, extra volume 3).

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April: South Carolina). Monarchical cravings. Intensity of the Carolinian hatred of New England and the North.

Mr. Russell, who was famous in his day as a correspondent of "The Times" (London), spent some time in South Carolina at the beginning of the war, and described the state of feeling there in a letter from Charleston, written at the end of April: "Nothing I could say," he wrote, "can be worth one fact which has forced itself upon my mind in reference to the sentiments which prevail among the gentlemen of this State. I have been among them for several days. I have visited their plantations, I have conversed with them freely and fully, and I have enjoyed that frank, courteous and graceful intercourse which constitutes an irresistible charm of their society. From all quarters have come to my ears the echoes of the same voice. … That voice says, 'If we could only get one of the royal race of England to rule over us, we should be content.' Let there be no misconception on this point. That sentiment, varied in a hundred ways, has been repeated to me over and over again. There is a general admission that the means to such an end are wanting, and that the desire cannot be gratified. But the admiration for monarchical institutions on the English model, for privileged classes, and for a landed aristocracy and gentry, is undisguised and apparently genuine. With the pride of having achieved their independence is mingled in the South Carolinians' hearts a strange regret at the result and consequences, and many are they who 'would go back tomorrow if we could.' An intense affection for the British connection, a love of British habits and customs, a respect for British sentiment, law, authority, order, civilization, and literature, preeminently distinguish the inhabitants of this State, who, glorying in their descent from ancient families on the three islands, whose fortunes they still follow, and with whose members they maintain not unfrequently familiar relations, regard with an aversion of which it is impossible to give an idea to one who has not seen its manifestations, the people of New England and the populations of the Northern States, whom they regard as tainted beyond cure by the venom of 'Puritanism.' Whatever may be the cause, this is the fact and the effect. 'The State of South Carolina was,' I am told, 'founded by gentlemen.' It was not established by witch-burning Puritans, by cruel persecuting fanatics, who implanted in the North the standard of Torquemada, and breathed into the nostrils of their newly-born colonies all the ferocity, blood-thirstiness, and rabid intolerance of the Inquisition. … We could have got on with these fanatics if they had been either Christians or gentlemen,' says [one], 'for in the first case they would have acted with common charity, and in the second they would have fought when they insulted us; but there are neither Christians nor gentlemen among them!' 'Any thing on earth!' exclaims [another], 'any form of government, any tyranny or despotism you will; but '—and here is an appeal more terrible than the adjuration of all the Gods—'nothing on earth shall ever induce us to submit to any union with the brutal, bigoted blackguards of the New England States, who neither comprehend nor regard the feelings of gentlemen! Man, woman and child, we'll die first.' … The hatred of the Italian for the Tedesco, of the Greek for the Turk, of the Turk for the Russ, is warm and fierce enough to satisfy the prince of darkness, not to speak of a few little pet aversions among allied powers and the atoms of composite empires; but they are all mere indifference and neutrality of feeling compared to the animosity evinced by the 'gentry' of South Carolina for the 'rabble of the North.' The contests of Cavalier and Roundhead, of Vendean and Republican, even of Orangeman and Croppy, have been elegant joustings, regulated by the finest rules of chivalry, compared with those which North and South will carry on if their deeds support their words. 'Immortal hate, the study of revenge' will actuate every blow, and never in the history of the world, perhaps, will go forth such a 'væ victis' as that which may be heard before the fight has begun. There is nothing in all the dark caves of human passion so cruel and deadly as the hatred the South Carolinians profess for the Yankees. That hatred has been swelling for years, till it is the very life-blood of the state. … Believe a southern man as he believes himself, and you must regard New England and the kindred States as the birthplace of impurity of mind among men and of unchastity in women—the home of free love, of Fourrierism, of infidelity, of abolitionism, of false teachings in political economy and in social life; a land saturated with the drippings of rotten philosophy, with the poisonous infections of a fanatic press; without honor or modesty; whose wisdom is paltry cunning, whose valor and manhood have been swallowed up in a corrupt, howling demagogy, and in the marts of a dishonest commerce."

W. H. Russell, Letter to the Times (London), April 30, 1861.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April-May). Proclamation by the Confederate President. President Lincoln's proclamation of a Blockade of Southern ports. The Queen's proclamation of British neutrality.

On the 17th of April, two days after President Lincoln's call for troops, Jefferson Davis, the chief of the rebellious Confederacy, published a counter-proclamation, giving notice of the intention of the government at Montgomery to issue letters of marque to privateers, for the destruction of American commerce. It was as follows:

"Whereas, Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States has, by proclamation announced the intention of invading this Confederacy with an armed force, for the purpose of capturing its fortresses, and thereby subverting its independence, and subjecting the free people thereof to the dominion of a foreign power; and whereas it has thus become the duty of this Government to repel the threatened invasion, and to defend the rights and liberties of the people by all the means which the laws of nations and the usages of civilized warfare place at its disposal; Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, do issue this my Proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this Government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal, to be issued under the Seal of these Confederate States. And I do further notify all persons applying for Letters of Marque, to make a statement in writing, giving the name and a suitable description of the character, tonnage, and force of the vessel, and the name and place of residence of each owner concerned therein, and the intended number of the crew, and to sign said statement and deliver the same to the Secretary of State, or to the Collector of any port of entry of these Confederate States, to be by him transmitted to the Secretary of State. And I do further notify all applicants aforesaid that before any commission or Letter of Marque is issued to any vessel, the owner or owners thereof, and the commander for the time being, will be required to give bond to the Confederate States, with at least two responsible sureties, not interested in such vessel, in the penal sum of five thousand dollars; or if such vessel be provided with more than one hundred and fifty men, then in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, with condition that the owners, officers, and crew who shall be employed on board such commissioned vessel, shall observe the laws of these Confederate States and the instructions given to them for the regulation of their conduct. That they shall satisfy all damages done contrary to the tenor thereof by such vessel during her commission, and deliver up the same when revoked by the President of the Confederate States. And I do further specially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil and military, under the authority of the Confederate States, that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties incident thereto; and I do, moreover, solemnly exhort the good people of these Confederate States as they love their country, as they prize the blessings of free government, as they feel the wrongs of the past and these now threatened in aggravated form by those whose enmity is more implacable because unprovoked, that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority and efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted for the common defence, and by which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, we may hope for a speedy, just, and honorable peace. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal of the Confederate States to be affixed, this seventeenth day of April 1861. By the President, (Signed) Jefferson Davis. R. Toombs, Secretary of State."

The response to this menace was a second proclamation by President Lincoln, announcing a blockade of the ports of the Confederacy, and warning all persons who should accept and act under the proposed letters of marque that they would be held amenable to the laws against piracy. This proclamation was in the following language:

"Whereas an insurrection against the government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed therein conformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States: And whereas a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United States: And whereas an executive proclamation has been already issued requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of repressing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session to deliberate and determine thereon: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall have ceased, have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the law of nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable. And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 35-36.

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Apparently on unofficial information of these announcements, indicating a state of civil war in the United States, the Government of Great Britain made haste—unfriendly haste, as the United States complained—to declare neutrality between the belligerents, thus placing the insurgent Confederacy on an exactly equal footing with the United States so far as a foreign recognition might do so. The Queen's Proclamation was as follows:

"Whereas, We are happily at peace with all Sovereigns, Powers, and States; And whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves 'the Confederate States of America'; And whereas we, being at peace with the Government of the United States, have declared our Royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between the said contending parties; We, therefore, have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to issue this our Royal Proclamation: And we do hereby strictly charge and command all our loving subjects to observe a strict neutrality in and during the aforesaid hostilities, and to abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the law of nations in relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary at their peril." After reciting the language of certain statutes which forbid the subjects of Her Majesty to engage, without leave and license from the Crown, in any foreign military or naval service, or to furnish or equip any ship or vessel for service against any state with which Her Majesty is not at war, the Proclamation proceeds as follows: "Now, in order that none of our subjects may unwarily render themselves liable to the penalties imposed by said statute, we do hereby strictly command, that no person or persons whatsoever do commit any act, matter or thing whatsoever, contrary to the provisions of the said statute, upon pain of the several penalties by the said statute imposed, and of our high displeasure. And we do hereby further warn all our loving subjects, and all persons whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them shall presume, in contempt of this Royal Proclamation, and of our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign, in the said contest, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf—as, for example and more especially, by entering into the military service of either of the said contending parties as commissioned or non-commissioned officers or soldiers; or by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any ship or vessel of war or transport of or in the service of either of the said contending parties; or by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any privateer bearing letters of marque of or from either of the said contending parties; or by engaging to go or going to any place beyond the seas with intent to enlist or engage in any such service, or by procuring or attempting to procure, within Her Majesty's dominions, at home or abroad, others to do so; or by fitting out, arming, or equipping, any ship or vessel to be employed as a ship-of-war, or privateer, or transport, by either of the said contending parties; or by breaking, or endeavoring to break, any blockade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of either of the said contending parties; or by carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, military stores or materials, or any article or articles considered and deemed to be contraband of war according to the law of modern usage of nations, for the use or service of either of the said contending parties, all persons so offending will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences by the said statute, or by the law of nations, in that behalf imposed or denounced. And we do hereby declare that all our subjects and persons entitled to our protection who may misconduct themselves in the premises will do so at their peril and of their own wrong, and that they will in no wise obtain any protection from us against any liability or penal consequences, but will, on the contrary, incur our high displeasure by such misconduct. Given at our Court at the White Lodge, Richmond Park, this 13th day of May, in the year of our Lord 1861, and in the 24th year of our reign. God save the Queen."

In the complaint of the United States subsequently submitted to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, the facts attending this remarkably hastened Proclamation of Neutrality were set forth as follows: "Before any armed collision had taken place, there existed an understanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French, with a view to securing a simultaneous and identical course of action of the two Governments on American questions. … The fact that it had been agreed to by the two Governments was communicated to Mr. Dallas, by Lord John Russell, on the first day of May, 1861. There was nothing in the previous relations between Great Britain and the United States which made it necessary for Her Majesty's Government to seek the advice or to invite the support of the Emperor of the French in the crisis which was threatened. … When the news of the bloodless attack upon Fort Sumter became known in Europe, Her Majesty's Government apparently assumed that the time had come for the joint action which had been previously agreed upon; and, without waiting to learn the purposes of the United States, it announced its intention to take the first step by recognizing the insurgents as belligerents. The President's Proclamation, which has since been made the ostensible reason for this determination, was issued on the 19th of April, and was made public in the Washington newspapers of the morning of the 20th. An imperfect copy of it was also telegraphed to New York, and from thence to Boston, in each of which cities it appeared in the newspapers of the morning of the 20th. The New York papers of the 20th gave the substance of the Proclamation, without the official commencement and close, and with several errors of more or less importance. The Boston papers of the same date, in addition to the errors in the New York copy, omitted the very important statement in regard to the collection of the revenue, which appears in the Proclamation as the main cause of its issue. {3429} During the morning of the 19th of April, a riot took place in Baltimore, which ended in severing direct communication, by rail or telegraph, between Washington and New York. Telegraphic communication was not restored until the 30th of the month. The regular passage of the mails and trains was resumed about the same time. … It is absolutely certain that no full copy of the text of the Proclamation could have left Washington by the mails of the 19th, and equally certain that no copy could have reached New York from Washington after the 19th for several days. On the 20th the steamer Canadian sailed from Portland, taking the Boston papers of that day, with the imperfect copy of the Proclamation, in which the clause in regard to the collection of the revenue was suppressed. This steamer arrived at Londonderry on the 1st of May, and the 'Daily News' of London, of the 2d of May, published the following telegraphic items of news: 'President Lincoln has issued a Proclamation, declaring a blockade of all the ports in the seceded States. The Federal Government will condemn as pirates all privateer-vessels which may be seized by Federal ships.' The Canadian arrived at Liverpool on the 2d of May, and the 'Daily News,' of the 3d, and the 'Times,' of the 4th of May, published the imperfect Boston copy of the Proclamation. … No other than the Boston copy of the Proclamation appears to have been published in the London newspapers. It is not likely that a copy was received in London before the 10th, by the Fulton from New York. It was on this meager and incorrect information that the advice of the British Law Officers was based, upon which that Government acted. … On the 5th of May the steamship Persia arrived at Liverpool with advices from New York to the 25th of April. Lord John Russell stated on Monday, the 6th of May, in a communication to Lord Cowley, 'that Her Majesty's Government received no dispatches from Lord Lyons by the mail which has just arrived, [the Persia,] the communication between Washington and New York being interrupted.' In the same dispatch Lord Cowley is informed 'that Her Majesty's Government cannot hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and as such invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent,' and he is instructed to invite the French Government to a joint action, and a line of joint policy with the British Government, toward the United States."

The Case of the United States before the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva [42d congress, 2d session, Senate ex. doc. 31], pages 24-27.

"The British government is accustomed to preserve an attitude of neutrality towards contending nations; but it would seem that neutrality does not so far interfere with the sympathies and freedom of its subjects as to compel it to issue proclamations against Irishmen enlisting with Francis Joseph, or Englishmen fighting for Victor Emanuel and Garibaldi. … In the case of the United States, the laws of England and its treaty stipulations with our Government already forbade its subjects from engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow our institutions. The proclamation, therefore, in forbidding English subjects to fight in the service of the rebels against the United States, simply declared the law as it was already understood; while in forbidding Englishmen to fight for the United States against the rebels, it intervened to change the existing practice, to revive the almost obsolete act of Geo. III. forbidding English subjects from engaging in foreign service without the royal consent, which had slumbered in regard to Austria and Italy, for the purpose of forbidding Englishmen from assisting to maintain in the United States constitutional order against conspiracy and rebellion, and the cause of freedom against chattel slavery. The first effect of the proclamation, therefore, was to change the position in which England and Englishmen stood to the United States, to the disadvantage of the latter. Before the proclamation, for an Englishman to serve the United States Government in maintaining its integrity was regarded honorable; after the proclamation such service became a crime. The proclamation makes it an offence now for an Englishman to fight for the Government at Washington as great as it was for Englishmen before the proclamation to fight for the rebels of Montgomery. It thus, in a moral view, lowered the American Government to the level of the rebel confederacy, and in the next place, it proceeded, in an international view, to place the rebel confederacy on a par with the American Government. … No ingenuity can blind us to these facts:—Before the proclamation, to support our Government was an honorable office for the subjects of Great Britain, and the rebels were insurgents, with no rights save under the American Constitution. After the proclamation, for an Englishman to serve the United States is a crime, and the rebels are elevated into a belligerent power—and this intervention of England, depriving us of a support which her practice permitted, and giving the rebels a status and right they did not possess, we are coolly told is neutrality. … What would England have said to such a proclamation of neutrality from us in her domestic troubles in Canada, in Ireland, or in India? What would the English people have thought of a state paper from Washington, declaring it the sovereign will of the people of the United States to remain perfectly neutral in the contest being waged in Hindostan between the British government on the one side and the Mogul dynasty on the other, and forbidding American citizens to enter the services of either of the said belligerents? What would they have thought of the American President intimating with cold etiquette that it was a matter of profound indifference to this Government which of the belligerents should be victorious, the King of Oude and Nana Sahib, or Lord Canning and the immortal Havelock?"

John Jay, The Great Conspiracy: Address at Mount Kisco, July 4, 1861.

ALSO IN: J. H. Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers, chapter 2.

W. H. Seward, Works, volume 5 (Diplomatic History of the War).

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 4, chapter 15.

M. Bernard, Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War, chapters 4-10.

See, also, ALABAMA CLAIMS.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April-May: Maryland). The ending of rebellious trouble in Baltimore and the state. General Butler in the field.

The Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Monroe, arrived at Philadelphia on the 20th of April, the day following the passage of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment through Baltimore, and its battle with the rebel mob of that city. The Eighth was accompanied by General Benjamin F. Butler, who had been appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts to command the first brigade from that state. At Philadelphia General Butler "first heard of the attack on the Sixth, in Baltimore. His orders commanded him to march through that city. It was now impossible to do so with less than 10,000 armed men. He counselled with Major-General Robert Patterson, who had just been appointed commander of the 'Department of Washington,' which embraced the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia, and whose head-quarters were at Philadelphia. Commodore Dupont, commandant of the Navy Yard there, was also consulted, and it was agreed that the troops should go by water from Perryville, at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, to Annapolis, and thence across Maryland to Washington." This route was accordingly taken by General Butler. Colonel Lefferts, who had reached Philadelphia with the New York Seventh Regiment, preferred to attempt going directly to Washington by a steamer which he secured for the purpose; but a report of rebel batteries on the Potomac turned him back, and his regiment, likewise, proceeded to Annapolis, arriving there some hours after the Eighth Massachusetts. Despite the protests and remonstrances of the Governor of Maryland-who was striving hard to put his state in an attitude of "neutrality," and to persuade the national government to respect it by passing no armed troops across Maryland soil—both regiments were landed, and took possession of the town, where the secessionists were making ready to capture the Naval Academy and the training ship Constitution. The track of the railroad from Annapolis had been torn up and the locomotives disabled. The mechanics of the Massachusetts Eighth proceeded quickly to repair both, and the two regiments moved forward. "The troops reached Annapolis Junction on the morning of the 25th, when the co-operation of the two regiments ceased, the Seventh New York going on to Washington, and the Eighth Massachusetts remaining to hold the road they had just opened. Before their departure from Annapolis, the Baltic, a large steamship transport, had arrived there with troops, and officers speedily followed. General Scott ordered General Butler to remain there, hold the town and the road, and superintend the forwarding of troops to the Capital. The 'Department of Annapolis,' which embraced the country twenty miles on each side of the railway, as far as Bladensburg, was created, and General Butler was placed in command of it, with ample discretionary powers to make him a sort of military dictator. … At the close of April, General Butler had full 10,000 men under his command at Annapolis, and an equal number were guarding the seat of Government [Washington]." Meantime, Baltimore had been given up to the control of the Secessionists, though the Maryland Unionists were numerous and strong and were gathering courage to assert themselves. But the rebellious and riotous city was now brought to its senses. On the 5th of May General Butler sent two regiments to occupy the Relay House, within nine miles of Baltimore. On the 9th, a force of 1,200 Pennsylvania troops and regulars, ordered forward by General Patterson from Philadelphia, were landed near Fort McHenry, under the guns of a United States vessel, and marched through the city. On the night of the 13th, General Butler, in person, with about 1,000 men, including the Massachusetts Sixth, entered the place and took a commanding position on Federal Hill, which was afterwards permanently fortified. From that day the disloyalty in Baltimore gave no trouble to the Government.