Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 73)

H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 18.

The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan 21. The popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan, 1,802,237. Many of the States had made provision for taking the votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was 116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.

E. Stanwood, History of Presidential Elections, chapter 21.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws.

At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the 6th, by a vote of 82 to 57, and by the Senate on the 22d by 27 to 12. The President approved it on the 28th, and it became a law.

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, volume 3, chapter 29.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). Revenue Measures. The War Tariff and Internal Taxes.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). The destruction of the Alabama by the Kearsarge.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June: Virginia). Grant's movement to the south of James River. The Siege of Petersburg.

"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness was becoming general among the people, which the government in vain pretended not to notice. … Public opinion, shaken in its confidence, already began to listen to the sinister interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last half of June, it learned that the lieutenant: general had boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. … This passage of the James was … a very fine movement, as ably executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new phase in the campaign. … Henceforth, the battering not having produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the resources of military science, and give precedence to strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that the latter did not recognize the character of the movement until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.) reëmbarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers collected at Wilcox Landing for that purpose. {3534} At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad. The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W. F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his first success. Proceeding methodically and cautiously, where it was, above all, necessary to act with vigor and promptness, he put off the serious work until the next morning. Hancock, in his turn, debarked on the right bank, did not receive the order to march on Petersburg until he had been delayed to wait for rations which were behind-hand, and went astray in his march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was too late; Lee's troops had arrived. Nevertheless, the intrenchments thrown up hastily by the enemy were not so formidable that they might not be carried. In the morning, a fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon, the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown, after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning, a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance. In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side, amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates defended the ground step by step, with such determination, only to gain the time necessary to finish a stronger and better selected line, on the hills immediately around the city. They retired to these lines in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on the right, bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where the new base of supplies of the army was naturally established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves across a part of the enemy's communications with the South, and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem and Boydton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these, the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the west, and the Dansville railroad, to the south. The latter did not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources. If, then, we succeeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point towards which all the operations of the siege were directed for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded, Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."

R. de Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 28.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapters 19-23.

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 56 (volume 2).

Official Records, Series 1, volume 40.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July). The Greeley and the Jaques-Gilmore Peace Missions.

"Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one of whom wrote [July 5, 1864] to the author of this work [Horace Greeley], averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders (the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise confidentially assured that the two former had full powers from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and suggesting certain terms of reunion and peace which he judged might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they should be accepted or rejected. … The 'Plan of Adjustment,' which he suggested that the President might advantageously offer," contemplated the restoration of the Union, abolition of slavery, with $400,000,000 paid in compensation to the slave states, and complete amnesty for all political offenses. "The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the regret of his correspondent—to depute him to proceed to Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question. He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment … it was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was, in effect, to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of adjustment und peace. … The whole matter thus terminated in failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the opposition. … Happily, another negotiation—even more irregular and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaques, 73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies for the purpose. {3535} Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar, earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief presented his ultimatum in these terms: … The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will have'. … Thus it was not only incontestably settled but proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens, that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be recognized as an independent power, or till it should be utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was worth more than a victory to the National cause."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 30.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Great Rebellion, pages 301-307.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland.) Early in the Shenandoah Valley. His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.

"… [General Jubal Anderson] Early had forced Hunter into the Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not again be threatened from that direction;

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (MAY-JUNE: VIRGINIA).

[Early then] united to his own corps General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson, and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. … By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarm and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume the offensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without shelter or food. … This second irruption of Early and his ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. … Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander. … On the evening of August 1, I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corps organization. I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day received instructions from General Halleck, to report to General Grant at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, in consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President indicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder and helplessness prevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant's presence there was necessary."

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 23.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapters 4-6.

F. Sigel, Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

{3536}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia). The siege of Petersburg: The Mine.

"Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front. Under this fort a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defences by the explosion. … The explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of them should go in—or rather which two of them should stay out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brigadier-General Ledlie—and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three. … Several minutes passed—precious, fatal minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path—went forward into the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but once in the crater, Ledlie's men barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together, losing their formation and becoming mixed up; General Potter finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest; but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while the Rebels recovering their self-possession, were planting batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. … A first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands of course took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, pages 590-591.

ALSO IN: W. H. Powell and others, The Battle of the Petersburg Crater (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th Army Corps, part 4, chapter 5.

A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865, chapter 9.

Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War, 38th Congress, 2d Session: volume 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Virginia). The Siege of Petersburg: Fighting for the Weldon Road. Battle of Reams's Station. The Dutch Gap Canal.

"Taking advantage of the absence of many of Lee's troops from Petersburg, Grant made a vigorous movement for securing possession of the Weldon road, not more than three miles from the left flank of his lines on the Jerusalem plank road. This movement was made by Warren, with the Fifth Corps, on the morning of the 18th of August, and at noon he reached the coveted railway without opposition, where he left Griffin to hold the point seized, while with the divisions of Ayres and Crawford he moved toward Petersburg. He had marched but a short distance when a division of Confederates suddenly and heavily fell upon his flank. … Warren held the ground he had gained at a cost of 1,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners." The next day (August 19), Lee sent Hill with a heavy force to drive Warren from the road, and the attempt, desperately made, was nearly successful, but not quite. Two days later it was repeated, and the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of 1,200 men. "In his entire movement for the possession of the road Warren lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 4,450 men. He now rendered his position almost impregnable, and General Lee was compelled to see one of his most important lines of communication wrested from him. On the day of Warren's Victory [August 21], Hancock, who … had been called from the north bank of the James [where an unsuccessful demonstration towards Richmond had been made from Deep Bottom], and who had moved with part of his corps rapidly toward the Weldon road, in the rear of Warren, struck that highway north of Reams's Station, and destroyed the track to that point and some miles south of it. He formed an intrenched camp at Reams's," and was attacked there on the 25th by Hill with such determination that he was forced back to a rear line, "where the troops had been rallied, and when night fell Hancock withdrew from Reams's Station. He had lost in the fight 2,400 of his 8,000 men, and five guns; 1,700 of the men were made prisoners. Hill's loss was but little less, and he, too, withdrew from Reams's. But this disaster did not loosen Warren's hold upon the Weldon road. … For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing armies. … A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a peninsula formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's Island. {3537} By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the National war vessels, by which they might flank several important works of the Confederates." The Dutch Gap Canal, as it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth of water never being secured during the war, though the canal has been brought into use since.

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 13.

ALSO IN: P. S. Michie, Dutch Gap Canal (Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 575).

O. B. Willcox, Actions on the Weldon Railroad (Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 568).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Alabama). The Battle of Mobile Bay. Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.

"After the capitulation of Vicksburg the vessels of the so-called Gulf Squadron which had been cruising on the lower Mississippi and its tributaries were in part joined to the Upper Squadron, under the command of Admiral Porter. The remainder were recalled to their duties on the outside blockade. Admiral Farragut was now free to turn his whole attention to the coast of the Gulf, whither he returned in January, 1864, after a well-earned rest at the North. Mobile was now the principal port in the possession of the Confederates in this quarter, and earnestly did the Admiral desire to attack and reduce the forts at the entrance of the bay. But troops were required to invest the forts after the fleet had passed them, and at this moment it seemed that there were no troops to be spared. It was also much to be desired that at least a few monitors should be added to the fleet, but neither were these as yet available. So the time wore on; winter passed into spring and spring into summer, but still the attack was not made. This delay was of incalculable advantage to the enemy, enabling him to complete his preparations. The Confederate force afloat in Mobile Bay was commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan. … This force consisted of only four vessels, but they nevertheless made an important addition to the defences of the place. Three of them were only paddle-wheel gun-boats … while the fourth was the iron-clad ram Tennessee … the most formidable vessel that the Confederates had ever built. … The City of Mobile lies at the head of a long bay, which is about 20 miles wide at its lower end. The greater portion of the bay is very shallow, too shallow even for vessels of moderate draft. The entrance lies between a long sandspit … and a shoal. … The ship-channel between the shoals, five miles in length, is perhaps half a mile wide at its narrowest point. Two forts guarded the passage,—on the right hand Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and on the left Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island. … In addition to the land and naval defences, additional protection had been given by obstructions in the water. A line of piles ran out from Fort Gaines, which was continued nearly across the main ship-channel by a triple line of torpedoes. The eastern end of the row of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the buoy and Fort Morgan the channel had been left open for blockade runners. The open space, only 100 yards wide, lay directly under the guns of the fort, and it was through this narrow passage that Admiral Farragut intended to carry his fleet. The ships were gradually assembled toward the latter part of July. The Admiral's plan of action was simple, but in the highest degree effective. His fleet consisted of four monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, seven of the latter large and seven small. The wooden vessels were arranged in pairs, as at Port Hudson, each of the larger vessels having a smaller one lashed to her port side, so that if one was disabled the engines of the other would carry both past the forts. The four monitors were placed in a flanking column inshore, between the fleet and Fort Morgan. … At six o'clock on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main rigging of the Hartford, so that he might have a good post of observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were on board the Hartford, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging, after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. … Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the Confederate ram Tennessee and her three attendant gunboats. … Soon after half-past six the Tecumseh [the leading monitor] fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of vessels was hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going well with the fleet. The Tecumseh, though all the while advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the Tennessee, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and altering his course, he headed straight for the Tennessee, passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; the huge mass of iron gave a lurch first to one side, then to the other; her bow made one downward plunge, her screw was seen for a moment revolving high in air, and she sank to the bottom of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. … From the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now descried in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and the sloop, with the Octorara lashed to her side, suddenly stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The Hartford, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with the Metacomet toward the two vessels ahead, and the Richmond and Port Royal were close upon them, followed by the others. At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest height. … 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!' came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's place in the rigging. {3538} In a moment the Hartford had turned, and dashing with the Metacomet past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier. Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no explosion followed, and the Hartford passed safely into the waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain Jenkins of the Richmond, an officer of cool head and splendid courage, backed away from the others, and began a furious cannonade on the fort with his whole broadside, driving the enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead, followed by the Richmond and the rest of the fleet. … No sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle began with the Tennessee. The moment that the ships had fairly entered the bay, the Confederate ram … came charging down the whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had lagged behind, "the Tennessee took refuge under the guns of the fort, and the fleet rejoined the Hartford, now four miles up the bay." Meantime the Hartford and the Metacomet had disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the Selma, which surrendered, and the Gaines, which had been run ashore and set on fire. The third, the Morgan, took shelter, with the Tennessee, near the fort. "The Hartford had by this time come to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the Tennessee was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the Monongahela, the Lackawanna, the Hartford and the Ossipee, and pounded by the terrible guns of the monitor Chickasaw, until, with her commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame, she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to exist. The fall of the city did not come about until some time afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay served every purpose of the Federal Government."

J. R. Soley, The Sailor Boys of '61, chapter 13.

"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. … The losses in the rebel fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to the Tennessee and Selma—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in the forts is unknown."

Loyal Farragut, Life of David Glasgow Farragut, chapter 27.

ALSO IN: J. O. Kinney and J. D. Johnston; Farragut at Mobile Bay, and The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay, (Battles and Leaders, volume 3).

A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (The Navy in the Civil War, volume 3), chapter 8.

A. T. Mahan, Admiral Farragut, chapter 10.

Official Records, Series 1, volume 39.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August-October: Virginia). Sheridan's Victories in the Shenandoah Valley. Winchester. Fisher's Hill. Cedar Creek. The famous Ride.

"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August, consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the Susquehanna, West Virginia and the Middle Department] into one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was appointed to the command on the 7th of August, and took the field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His operations during that month and the fore part of September were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that officer expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened the communications of the other, and either could bring on a battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the morning of September 19th, and a battle ensued—known as the battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of Opequan Creek—which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It is due to state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and 3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M., made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified heights: the Confederates … broke in confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle-flags. … After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack, while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the right. {3539} Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. … Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad, returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The desolution of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. … The army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack, and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during the night of the 18-19th of October." A flanking column, "favored by a heavy fog … attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps … and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery (18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned. The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was, however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. … At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact line, and prepare either to resist further attack, or himself resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten A. M., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very inspiriting effect. General Wright had already brought order out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. … A counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. … A large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The refluent wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. … The retreat soon became a rout. … In the pursuit all the captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition, The captures included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. … With this defeat of Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever ended," and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to the main field of operations, at Petersburg.

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 12, part 8.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 2, chapters 1-4.

G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapters 7-13.

M. M. Granger, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, L. L. of the United States, volume 3).

W. Merritt, Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley.

J. A. Early, Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

R. B. Irwin, History of the 19th Army Corps, chapters 33-34.

H. C. King, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Personal Recollections of the War: New York Com. L. L. of the United States).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia) Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants. Sherman's Preparations for the March to the Sea. Hood's Raid to the rear.

"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained grouped about Atlanta. … The Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. … Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government.' … This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city, he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses. … My military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. … War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. … You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was arranged, during which "446 families were moved south, comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 79 servants, with an average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of all kinds to each family."

S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapter 18.

{3540}

"General Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia; and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Governor Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. … To allow their principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not however the intention of the rebel authorities. … Something must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably lost. … The whole army of General Hood, it was decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee river at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated from Nashville, and General Sherman, cut off from his primary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful attacks of the Georgia militia. In connection with this movement, General Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee. … A week sufficed to complete General Hood's arrangements, and by the 2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth, effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two places. He also sent a division under General French to capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to replenish his commissariat. … General Sherman, … immediately upon hearing that General Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, … despatched General Corse with reënforcements to Rome, which he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week he had sent General Thomas with troops to Nashville to look after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in the direction of Marietta, with 15 days' rations. The 20th corps, General Slocum, was left to garrison Atlanta. Learning that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity of holding the latter place, General Sherman at once communicated by signals instruction to General Corse at Rome to reënforce the small garrison and hold the defences until the main body of the Federal army could come to his assistance. Upon receiving the message General Corse placed 900 men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men, with six guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, General French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned the Federal commander, 'in order to save the unnecessary effusion of blood,' to make an immediate surrender; to which the latter replied: 'I shall not surrender, and you can commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you please.' The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort, until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the enemy. … During the heat of the contest General Sherman reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly signalled to General Corse to hold out to the last. The announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's (4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy left 700 to 800 killed, wounded and prisoners in the hands of the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000. The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced to a mere wreck by the [severe fire of the enemy, and all the Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Allatoona, which General Sherman immediately commenced to repair. For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona, General Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome, and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. … General Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held by Colonel Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery. … No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton than wasting their time or strength upon the reduction of a post, the possession of which they wisely considered would be of no particular advantage to them. … Meanwhile the rebel army, pursuing its devastating march north, reached Dalton on the 14th. … The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel Hill. … {3541} The approach of the Federal columns now warned General Hood to move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat for Lafayette, followed by General Sherman. … From Lafayette the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens, on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused for several days, receiving a few reënforcements brought up by General Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the Confederate military division of the West. … General Hood still retained his special command, subject to the supervision or direction of General Beauregard, and his army, after remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles distant. General Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville, which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the enemy's movements. … Whatever … might be the final result of Hood's flanking movement, it had entirely failed to interrupt the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. … In the light of subsequent events it would now appear that General Sherman, making only a show of following his adversary, deliberately lured him into Northern Alabama, for the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted march with his own army through the heart of Georgia. The ill-advised plan of General Hood had given him the very opportunity which he desired, and he prepared at once to avail himself of it."

W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History in the United States, chapter 45.

ALSO IN: J. D. Cox, Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 9), chapter 17.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 19 (volume 2).

T. B. Van Horne, Life of Major-General George H. Thomas, volume 2, chapter 12.

J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapter 15.

Official Records, 1st Series, volume 39.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). Admission of Nevada into the Union.

See NEVADA: A. D. 1848-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). Report on secret disloyal associations in the North. Knights of the Golden Circle, etc.

"During more than a year past [this report bears date October 8, 1864], it has been generally known to our military authorities that a secret and treasonable organization, affiliated with the Southern Rebellion, and chiefly military in its character, has been rapidly extending itself throughout the West. A variety of agencies … have been employed, and successfully, to ascertain its nature and extent, as well as its aims and its results; and, as this investigation has led to the arrest, in several States, of a number of its prominent members, as dangerous public enemies, it has been deemed proper to set forth in full the acts and purposes of this organization. … This secret association first developed itself in the West in the year 1862, about the period [August] of the first conscription of troops, which it aimed to obstruct and resist. Originally known in certain localities as the 'Mutual Protection Society,' the 'Circle of Honor,' or the 'Circle' or 'Knights of the Mighty Host,' but more widely as the 'Knights of the Golden Circle,' it was simply an inspiration of the Rebellion, being little other than an extension, among the disloyal and disaffected at the North, of the association of the latter name, which had existed for some years at the South [see GOLDEN CIRCLE, KNIGHTS OF], and from which it derived all the chief features of its organization. During the Summer and Fall of 1863, the Order, both at the North and South, underwent some modifications as well as a change of name. In consequence of a partial exposure which had been made of the signs and ritual of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sterling Price had instituted, as its successor in Missouri, a secret political association, which he called the Corps de Belgique, or Southern League, his principal coadjutor being Charles L. Hunt, of St. Louis, then Belgian Consul at that city. … Meanwhile, also, there had been instituted at the North, in the autumn of 1863, by sundry disloyal persons, prominent among whom were Vallandigham and P. C. Wright, of New York, a secret, Order intended to be general throughout the country … and which was termed, and has since been widely known as the O. A. K., or 'Order of American Knights.' … The secret signs and character of the Order having become known to our military authorities, further modifications in the ritual and forms were introduced, and its name was finally changed to that of the O. S. L., or 'Order of the Sons of Liberty,' or the 'Knights of the Order of the Sons of Liberty.' These later changes are represented to have been first instituted … in May last [1864], but the new name was at once generally adopted throughout the West, though in some localities the association is still better known as the 'Order of American Knights.' Meanwhile, also, the Order has received certain local designations. In parts of Illinois it has been called at times the 'Peace Organization,' in Kentucky the 'Star Organization,' and in Missouri the 'American Organization;' these, however, being apparently names used outside of the lodges of the Order. Its members have also been familiarly designated as 'Butternuts' by the country people of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. … The 'Temples' or 'Lodges' of the Order are numerously scattered through the States of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Kentucky. They are also officially reported as established, to a less extent, in Michigan and the other Western States, as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Tennessee. … It has been asserted by delegates to the Supreme Council of February last, that the number was there represented to be from 800,000 to 1,000,000; but Vallandigham, in his speech last summer at Dayton, Ohio, placed it at 500,000, which is probably much nearer the true total. … Although the Order has, from the outset, partaken of the military character, it was not till the summer or fall of 1863 that it began to be generally organized as an armed body.' … In March last the entire armed force of the Order capable of being mobilized for effective service was represented to be 340,000 men."

J. Holt, Judge Advocate General's Report on Secret Associations and Conspiracies against the Government.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Great Rebellion, appendix, pages 445-454.

J. A. Logan, The Great Conspiracy, page 499, and appendix chapter B.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 1.

See, also, COPPERHEADS.

{3542}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). The St. Albans Raid.

"Along the Northern border … the rebel agents, sent thither on 'detached service' by the Rebel Government, were active in movements intended to terrify and harass the people. On the 19th of October, a party of them made a raid into St. Albans, Vermont, robbing the banks there, and making their escape across the lines into Canada with their plunder, having killed one of the citizens in their attack. Pursuit was made, and several of the marauders were arrested in Canada. Proceedings were commenced to procure their extradition [which were protracted until after the close of the war]. … The Government received information that this affair was but one of a projected series, and that similar attempts would be made all along the frontier. More than this, there were threats, followed by actual attempts, to set fire to the principal Northern cities."

H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, page 611.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 1.

Correspondence relating to the Fenian Invasion and the Rebellion of the Southern States (Ottawa, 1869), pages 117-138.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October: North Carolina). The destruction of the ram Albemarle.

The ram Albemarle, which had proved in the spring so dangerous an antagonist to the blockading vessels in the North Carolina Sounds, was still lying at Plymouth, in the Roanoke River, and another attack from her was feared by the fleet.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (APRIL-MAY: NORTH CAROLINA).

"She was finally destroyed by a brave young lieutenant, William B. Cushing, who blew her up with a torpedo. Though only twenty years old, he was one of the most daring officers in the navy, and he had become noted for his fearlessness in the expeditions in the sounds and rivers of North Carolina. One dark night (October 27) he set out from the fleet in a steam launch—a long open boat used by naval vessels—with a crew of thirteen officers and men. The launch was fitted with a torpedo which could be run out forward on the end of a long boom so as to be thrust under the vessel to be attacked. Cushing got within sixty feet of the Albemarle before his boat was seen. The guards then shouted the alarm, rang the boat's bell, and began firing their muskets at the launch. There was a raft of logs thirty feet wide around the Albemarle to protect her from just such attacks, but Cushing ran the bow of the launch upon the logs, lowered the boom so that the torpedo came right under the side of the vessel, and fired it. At the same moment a shot from one of the great guns of the ram crashed through the launch, and it was overwhelmed by a flood of water thrown up by the explosion of the torpedo. The Confederates called out to Cushing to surrender, but he refused, and ordering his men to save themselves as they best could, he sprang into the water amid a shower of musket balls and swam down the river. He succeeded in reaching the shore, almost exhausted, and hid himself during the next day in a swamp, where he was cared for by some negroes. From them he heard that the Albemarle had been sunk by his torpedo. The next night he found a small boat in a creek, paddled in it down the river, and before midnight was safe on board one of the vessels of the fleet. Only one other man of the party escaped, all the rest being either drowned or captured. The Albemarle being thus put out of the way, Plymouth was recaptured a few days afterward."

J. D. Champlin, Jr. Young Folks' History of the War for the Union, chapter 33.

ALSO IN: W. B. Cushing, E. Holden, and others, The Confederate Ram Albemarle (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November: Tennessee). Hood's advance Northward. The Battle of Franklin.

When General Sherman started on his march to the sea General Thomas was left to oppose Hood. "The force Thomas had for this purpose was curiously small, considering how formidable Hood's army had been in the Atlanta Campaign, and still was. All Thomas had for immediate field service were the Fourth and Twenty-Third Corps, numbering together about 22,000 infantry, and also about 3,000 cavalry. These troops were sent to Pulaski, Tennessee, in command of General Schofield, Thomas, himself remaining at Nashville. A little after the middle of November, 1864, Hood crossed the Tennessee River and inaugurated his campaign by a flank movement. He made a rapid march upon Columbia, with the view of getting in behind Schofield, who was at Pulaski. But Schofield retired to Columbia in time to frustrate Hood's plans. The two armies remained in close proximity to each other at Columbia until November 28th, when Hood made another skilfully-planned flank movement … to Spring Hill, in rear of Schofield. Again Hood was foiled. … General Thomas at Nashville wanted the Confederates held back as long as possible, in order that he might have time to receive there his expected reinforcement of A. J. Smith's corps. It was, therefore, Schofield's duty to check Hood's advance as long as he could. … He started General Stanley, with a division of 5,000 men, and a great part of his artillery, to Spring Hill (12 miles north of Columbia) early in the morning. He put two other divisions on the road. He held one division in front of Columbia, and prevented the enemy from crossing the river during the entire day, and also that night. Stanley reached Spring Hill in time to prevent Hood from occupying that place. He skirmished and fought with Hood's advance troops at Spring Hill during the afternoon of November 29th. … Schofield … accomplished exactly what he believed he could accomplish. He held back his enemy at Columbia with one hand and fenced off the blow at Spring Hill with the other. … The beneficial result of all this bold management of Schofield, November 29th, was apparent the next day in the battle of Franklin. Hood fought that great battle practically without his artillery. He only had the two batteries which he took with him on his detour to Spring Hill. Those two he used. … But his vast supply of artillery had all been detained at Columbia too long to be of any service at the time and place it was most needed. … The Federal troops left Spring Hill in the night for Franklin, ten miles distant. Early in the morning of November 30th they began to arrive at Franklin, and were placed in position covering the town. Early the same morning the Confederates moved up from Spring Hill, following hard upon the rearmost of the Federals. … {3543} General Stanley says, in his official report: 'From one o'clock until four in the evening, the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack. Yet, in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during the campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault.'" The assault was made, however, with a terrible persistency which proved the ruin of Hood's army, for it failed. "The Confederate loss in this dreadful battle can be estimated from data given. There is good authority for stating the killed at 1,750. The usual proportion of killed and wounded is four or five to one. This would make the killed and wounded not less than 7,000 or 8,000. The attacking force numbered full 20,000. … Hood's loss was, indeed, more than one-third of the attacking force. The Federal loss was much smaller, being 1,222 killed and wounded. … One of the features of this battle was the enormous expenditure of ammunition [100 wagon loads] in the short time of its duration. … The expenditure of so much ammunition produced a dense smoke, which hung over the field, and brought on sudden darkness, like an eclipse. So noticeable was this phenomenon, it is mentioned in all the official reports. … In the darkness of the night the battle ended. The Confederates desisted, and the Federal line became quiet. … In their front, and so near that the outstretched hand could almost reach them, were thousands of men in the agonies of death. The wail that went up from that field as the thunder of the battle ceased can never be forgotten by those who heard it. … The [Federal] troops were quietly withdrawn before midnight. A silent rapid march brought them to Nashville the next morning, and weary with fighting and marching they bivouacked in the blue grass pastures under the guns of Fort Negley."

T. Speed, The Battle of Franklin (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3).

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, Life of General George H. Thomas, chapter 13.

J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapters 10-17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November-December: Georgia). Sherman's March to the Sea.

"It was at Alatoona, probably, that Sherman first realized that, with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communications with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia).

He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. … Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself [writes General Grant] was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. … Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. … The army was expected to live on the country. … Each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. … The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army 'bummers,' in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous."

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 59 (volume 2).

All preparations being completed, General Sherman caused the foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome to be destroyed on the 10th of November, and "started on the 12th with his full staff from Kingston to Atlanta. … As Sherman rode towards Atlanta that night he met railroad trains going to the rear with furious speed. He was profoundly impressed with the strange aspect of affairs: two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in the great war. 'I was strongly inspired,' he writes, 'with a feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened; and that for better or worse it would end the war.' The result was a magnificent vindication of this soldierly intuition. His army consisted in round numbers of 60,000 men, the most perfect in strength, health, and intelligence that ever went to war. He had thoroughly purged it of all inefficient material, sending to the rear all organizations and even all individuals that he thought would be a drag upon his celerity or strength. His right wing, under Howard, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by Osterhaus, in the absence of John A. Logan; and the Seventeenth Corps, commanded by Frank P. Blair, Jr. The left wing, commanded by Slocum, comprised the Fourteenth Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under A. S. Williams. In his general orders he had not intimated to the army the object of their march. 'It is sufficient for you to know,' he said, 'that it involves a departure from our present base and a long, difficult march to a new one.' His special field orders are a model of clearness and conciseness. The habitual order of march was to be, wherever practicable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points to be indicated from time to time. There was to be no general train of supplies; behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; a due proportion of wagons for ammunition and provision behind each brigade; the separate columns were to start at seven in the morning and make about fifteen miles a day. The army was to subsist liberally on the country; forage parties, under the command of discreet officers, were to gather near the routes traveled whatever was needed by the command, aiming to keep in the wagons a reserve of at least ten days' provisions; soldiers were strictly forbidden to enter dwellings of inhabitants or commit trespasses; the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., was intrusted to corps commanders alone. {3544} No destruction of property was to be permitted in districts where the army was unmolested; but relentless devastation was ordered in case of the manifestation of local hostility by the shooting of soldiers or the burning of bridges. … Precisely at seven o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November the great army started on its march. A band struck up the anthem of 'John Brown's body lies a-moldering in the grave'; the soldiers caught up the refrain, and, to the swelling chorus of 'Glory, Hallelujah,' the great march was begun. The month that followed will always remain to those 60,000 men the most romantic and inspiring memory of their lives. The weather was favorable all the way; to veterans the marches were of reasonable length; the work of destroying the Southern railroads was so easy to their experienced hands that it hardly delayed the day's march. With the exception of the affair on the 22d of November, when P. J. Phillips with a division of Smith's Georgia troops attacked C. C. Walcutt's Brigade, which was marching as the rear-guard of the right wing at Griswoldville, and met with a severe repulse, and a series of cavalry fights between Wheeler and Kilpatrick near 'Waynesboro', there was no fighting to do between Atlanta and Savannah. A swarm of militia and irregular cavalry hung, it is true, about the front and flank of the marching army, but were hardly a source of more annoyance than so many mosquitoes would have been. The foragers brought in every evening their heterogeneous supplies from the outlying plantations, and although they had to defend themselves every day from scattered forces of the enemy, the casualties which they reported each evening were insignificant. The utmost efforts of Sherman and his officers to induce the negroes to remain quietly at home were not entirely successful. The promise of freedom which was to come to them from the victory of the Union cause was too vague and indefinite to content them. … The simple-hearted freedmen gathered in an ever-increasing cloud in rear of the army; and when the campaign was over they peopled the sea-islands of Georgia and furnished, after the war, the principal employment of the Freedmen's Commission. The march produced an extraordinary effervescence throughout the Confederacy. If words could avail anything against heavy battalions, Sherman would have been annihilated in his first day's march. … As Sherman drew near to Milledgeville on the 23d of November the Georgia Legislature passed an act to levy the population en masse; but this act of desperate legislation had no effect in checking the march of the 'Yankees,' and the Governor, State officers, and Legislature fled in the utmost confusion as Sherman entered the place. The Union general occupied the Executive Mansion for a day; some of the soldiers went to the State House, organized themselves into a constituent assembly, and after a spirited mock-serious debate, repealed the ordinance of secession. Sherman took the greatest possible pains to prevent any damage to the city and marched out on the 24th on the way to Millen. … Finding it impossible to stop him, the Georgia State troops by sharp marching had made their way directly to the vicinity of Savannah, where Sherman himself arrived and invested the city from the Savannah to the little Ogeechee River, on the 10th of December."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 9, chapter 20.

On the 13th, Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee River, was stormed and taken by Hazen's division, and communication was opened with Admiral Dahlgren, and with General Foster, the Union commander at Port Royal. On the 17th, General Hardee, the Confederate commander at Savannah, refused a demand for the surrender of the city, but on the night of the 20th he escaped, with his forces, and on the 22d General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln: "I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

ALSO IN: J. D. Cox, The March to the Sea (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10), chapter 3.

O. O. Howard, and others, Sherman's March (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 20 (volume 2).

G. W. Nichols, The Story of the Great March.

W. B. Hazen, Narrative of Military Service, chapters 21-22.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (December: Tennessee). The Battle of Nashville and the destruction of Hood's army.

After the battle of Franklin Hood went forward to Nashville, with his badly shaken army, and invested that place.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE).

Thomas was strongly fortified, and quietly took his time to make ready before striking his audacious antagonist, unmoved by repeated demands for an advance, from the War Office, the President, and General Grant. "With all just confidence in Thomas' ability, the entire North insisted on instant action, and Grant finally ordered Thomas either to move upon Hood at once or else turn over the command to Schofield. Thomas quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the latter, if directed, but would not attack Hood until he was satisfied that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable weather and to increase his force of mounted men. But the enemy was devastating a considerable part of Tennessee and was forcing all the young men into their ranks; and everyone was fearful of a repetition of Bragg's march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan was finally ordered to Nashville to supplant Thomas. But before he could reach the ground, Thomas had struck his blow. His preparations had been two weeks before substantially completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesboro', Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had been, however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. A heavy storm of sleet and ice had made the country almost impassable and would render the operations of the attacking party uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind to wait for clearing weather. Finally came sunshine and with it Thomas' advance. Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in the centre and Cheatham on the right, while a portion of Forrest's cavalry was operating out upon his left. He had some 44,000 men, but his check and heavy losses at Franklin had seriously impaired the 'morale' of his army as well as thinned his ranks. Hood could, however, not retreat. He was committed to a death-struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a soldier. The Union general had placed A. J. Smith on his right, the Fourth corps in the centre, and Schofield on the left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his right, while sharply demonstrating with his left. The position of the Confederate Army had placed A. J. Smith's corps obliquely to their general line of battle, an advantage not to be neglected. {3545} Smith pushed in, later supported by Schofield, and successively capturing the field-works erected by the enemy's main line and reserves, disastrously crushed Hood's left flank. Meanwhile Wood was making all but equal headway against Hood's right, and the first day closed with remarkable success for the amount of loss sustained. Still this was not victory. The morrow might bring reverse. Hood's fight promised to be with clenched teeth. Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he had detached on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry his flanks were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay intrenched upon the hills back of his former line, with either flank somewhat refused. Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work his way unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown back. At 4 P. M. a general assault was made all along the line. Upon our left, Wood's advance did not meet with success. On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated at the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough to break down the Confederate defense. Sharply following up his successes, allowing no breathing time to the exultant troops, Smith pushed well home, and overcoming all resistance, drove the enemy in wild confusion from the field. Meanwhile Wilson's troopers, dismounted, fell upon the Confederate flank and rear and increased the wreck tenfold. This advantage again enabled Wood to make some headway, and with renewed joint effort the rout of the enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country towards Franklin. Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though seriously harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tennessee river with the remnants of his army. Thomas' losses were 3,000 men, Hood's were never officially given, but our trophies included 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns. Thomas had settled all adverse speculation upon his slowness in attacking Hood by the next to annihilation he wrought when he actually moved upon him. No army was so completely overthrown during our war."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War, chapter 58.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapter 35 (volume 2).

W. Swinton, The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, chapter 11.

J. D. Cox, The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10), chapters 6-7.

H. Stone, Repelling Hood's Invasion (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

H. Coppée, General Thomas, chapter 11-12.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864-1865 (December-January: North Carolina). The Capture of Fort Fisher.

"In the latter part of 1864 two ports only, Wilmington and Charleston, remained to the Confederates. … The northward march of Sherman would cut off Charleston, too, so that the Confederates would have to abandon it. The National government now desired to complete its work by capturing Fort Fisher, and thus finally shutting off the Confederacy from all communication with the foreign world. The accomplishment of this task was in no wise easy. … The army and navy co-operated in the attempts to reduce Fort Fisher. There were more than 50 men-of-war tossing on the waves before the lowering sea-front of the work. Six thousand five hundred men were in the military force. They were in command of General B. F. Butler, whom we saw last in New Orleans. The General's active and ingenious mind conceived a plan for destroying the fort without sacrificing a single Federal soldier. He procured an old gun-boat, painted it white and otherwise disguised it, so as to look like a blockade-runner, stored 250 tons of gunpowder in its hold with fuses penetrating every part, ran the craft in within 1,500 feet of the works and exploded it. Butler expected that the shock would demolish the seaward face of the fort altogether, and perhaps bury the guns under great masses of sand, but in this he was mistaken, for the heavy bastions were not in the least disturbed by the shock. … The navy then took its turn, and for some hours the heavy vessels of Admiral Porter's fleet poured so rapid and well aimed a fire upon the work, that the garrison were driven from their guns, and only the occasional report of a heavy cannon told that the fort was still tenanted. But secure in their heavy bomb-proofs, the garrison minded the storm of shells and solid shot no more than the well-housed farmer heeds a hailstorm. It was very clear that Fort Fisher could not be taken at long range. … The original plan had contemplated an assault as soon as the fire of the fleet should have silenced the guns of the fort, and in pursuance of this 700 men had been landed from the army transports. But the weather was too rough to permit of landing more troops that day, and the next morning General Butler concluded that Fort Fisher was impregnable, withdrew his men already landed, and sailed away, greatly to the disgust of the navy. This was on the 25th of December, 1864. The chagrin of the whole North over the failure of the expedition was so great that it was speedily determined to renew the attempt. January 13th saw a new Federal force, this time under command of General A. H. Terry, landing on the shore of the sandy neck of land above the fort. … At early dawn of the 15th the attack was begun. The ships arranged in a great semicircle poured their fire upon the fort, dismantling guns, driving the garrison to the bomb-proofs, and mowing down the stockade. A line of sharp-shooters, each carrying a shovel in one hand and a gun in the other, spring out from Terry's most advanced lines, rush forward to within 175 yards of the fort and dig pits for their protection before the Confederates can attack them. Then the sharpshooters and the navy occupy the attention of the enemy, while Curtis's brigade dashes forward and digs a trench within 500 yards of the fort. By this time too a party of 2,000 sailors and marines has been landed from the fleet. They are to storm the sea-wall of the fort while the army attacks its landward face. Suddenly the thunder of the naval artillery is stilled. There is a moment of silence, and then the shrill scream of the whistles rises from every steamer in the fleet. It is the signal for the assault. The sailors on the beach spring to their feet and dash forward at a rapid run; they fire no shot, for they carry no guns. Cutlasses and pistols, the blue-jackets' traditional weapons, are their only arms. Toward the other side of the fort came Terry's troops. … The fate of the naval column is quickly determined. Upon it is concentrated the fire of the heaviest Confederate batteries, Napoleon guns, Columbiads, and rifles shotted with grape and cannister. {3546} The blue-jackets, unable to reply to this murderous fire, and seeing their companions falling fast around them, waver, halt, and fall back to the beach, throwing themselves upon the ground to escape the enemy's missiles. But though repulsed they have contributed largely to the capture of the fort. While the chief attention of Confederates has been directed toward them, the troops have been carrying all before them on the other front. Colonel Lamb turns from his direction of the defense against the naval column to see three Union flags waving over other portions of the work. … The Confederates were determined, even desperate. Long after the fort was virtually in the hands of its captors they stubbornly clung to a bomb-proof. Finally they retreated to Battery Buchanan and there maintained themselves stoutly until late at night when, all hope being at an end, they surrendered themselves, and the National victory was complete."

W. J. Abbot, Battle-Fields and Victory, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, chapters 49-51.

W. Lamb and T. O. Selfridge, Jr., The Capture of Fort Fisher (Battles and Leaders, volume 4).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (January). Congressional adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.

"On the last day of [January, 1865] … one of the grandest events of the century was witnessed in the House of Representatives in the final passage of the Constitutional Amendment [the Thirteenth] forever prohibiting slavery. Numerous propositions on the subject had been submitted, but the honor of drafting the one adopted belongs to Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced it early in the first session of this Congress. It passed the Senate on the 8th of April, 1864, only six members voting against it, … but failed in the House on the 15th of June following. It now came up on the motion of Mr. Ashley to reconsider this vote. Congress had abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibited it in all the Territories. It had repealed the Fugitive Slave law, and declared free all negro soldiers in the Union armies and their families; and the President had played his grand part in the Proclamation of Emancipation. But the question now to be decided completely overshadowed all others. The debate on the subject had been protracted and very spirited. … The time for the momentous vote had now come, and no language could describe the solemnity and impressiveness of the spectacle pending the roll-call. The success of the measure had been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain negotiations, the result of which was not fully assured, and the particulars of which never reached the public. The anxiety and suspense during the balloting produced a deathly stillness, but when it became certainly known that the measure had prevailed the cheering in the densely-packed hall and galleries surpassed all precedent and beggared all description. Members joined in the general shouting, which was kept up for several minutes, many embracing each other, and others completely surrendering themselves to their tears of joy. It seemed to me I had been born into a new life."

G. W. Julian, Political Recollections, chapter 11.

"The Joint Resolution passed [the House of Representatives, on the 31st of January], 119 to 56, 8 not voting, 10 Democrats voting aye. … It was the greatest day the House had ever seen, nor is it likely ever to see a greater."

O. J. Hollister, Life of Schuyler Colfax, page 245.

The Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified before the close of the year by three-fourths of the States, and its embodiment in the Constitution of the United States proclaimed by the Secretary of State on the 18th of December, 1865, is as follows:

"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February). The Hampton Roads Peace Conference.

"Several informal attempts at opening negotiations for the termination of hostilities were made in the course of this Winter—Honorable Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, visiting Richmond twice on the subject, with the consent, though not by the request, of President Lincoln. At length, upon their direct application, Messrs. Alex. H. Stephens, John A. Campbell, and Robert M. T. Hunter, were permitted to pass General Grant's lines before Petersburg, and proceed to Fortress Monroe; where [on board a steamer in Hampton Roads] they were met by Gov. [Secretary of State] Seward, followed by President Lincoln; and a free, full conference was had."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 30.

Secretary Seward first went to meet the three Confederate Commissioners, with the following letter of instructions from President Lincoln, dated January 31, 1865: "Honorable William H. Seward, Secretary of State: You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: 1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. 2. No receding by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government.

You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything. Yours, etc., Abraham Lincoln." Two days later, the President followed him, persuaded by a telegram from General Grant to meet the Commissioners personally. In a subsequent message to the Senate, Mr. Lincoln reported the results of the conference as follows: "On the morning of the 3d, the three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself, of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely. {3547} On our part the whole substance of the instructions to the Secretary of State, hereinbefore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while, by the other party, it was not said that in any event or on any condition, they ever would consent to reunion; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first which, as some of them seemed to argue, might or might not lead to reunion; but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result."

A. Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 644-649.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 20.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 10, chapter 6.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February: South Carolina). Evacuation of Charleston by the Confederates. Federal occupation of the City.

While General Hardee, with 14,000 men, waited at Charleston for the expected coming of General Sherman to attack that city, the latter pursued a movement which made Charleston untenable and shook it like a ripened apple into the hands of General Gillmore, who was waiting at the gates. The Confederates evacuated the city in haste and with reckless disorder, and it was occupied by the Federal troops on the morning of the 18th of February. The following is the report of Colonel A. G. Bennett, who was the first to enter the city: "On the morning of February the 18th I received information that led me to believe the defences and lines guarding the city of Charles·ton had been deserted by the enemy. I immediately proceeded to Cummings Point, from whence I sent a small boat in the direction of Fort Moultrie, which boat, when 40 yards east from Fort Sumter, was met by a boat from Sullivan's Island, containing a full corps of band musicians abandoned by the enemy. These con·firmed my belief of an evacuation. I had no troops that could be available under two hours, as, except in a few pontoon boats, there were no means whatever of landing troops near the enemy's works or into the city. I directed Major Hennessy to proceed to Fort Sumter and there replace our flag. The flag was replaced over the southeast angle of Fort Sumter at 9 o'clock A. M. I now pushed for the city, stopping at Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney, from which works Rebel flags were hauled down and the American flag substituted. … I landed at Mill's wharf, Charleston, at 10 o'clock A. M. where I learned that a part of the enemy's troops yet remained in the city, while mounted patrols were out in every direction applying the torch and driving the inhabitants before them. I at once addressed to the Mayor of the city [a communication demanding its surrender]. … My whole force consisted of five officers and the armed crews of two small boats, comprising in all 22 men. Both officers and men volunteered to advance from the wharf into the city; but no reenforcements being in sight, I did not deem it expedient to move on. Public buildings, stores, warehouses, private dwellings, shipping, etc., were burning and being fired by armed Rebels, but with the force at my disposal it was impossible to save the cotton and other property. While awaiting the arrival of my troops at Mill's wharf, a number of explosions took place. The Rebel commissary depot was blown up, and with it is estimated that not less than 200 human beings—most of whom were women and children—were blown to atoms. These people were engaged in procuring food for themselves and their families by permission from the Rebel military authorities. … Observing a small boat sailing toward the bay under a flag of truce, I put off to it, and received from a member of the common council a letter [from the Mayor, announcing the evacuation of the city by the Confederate military authorities]. … The deputation sent to convey the above letter represented to me that the city was in the hands of either the Rebel soldiery or the mob. They entreated of me in the name of humanity to interpose my military authority and save the city from utter destruction. … Two companies of the 52d Pennsylvania regiment and about 30 men of the 3d Rhode Island volunteer heavy artillery having landed, I proceeded with them to the citadel. I here established my headquarters, and sent small parties in all directions with instructions to impress negroes wherever found, and to make them work the fire apparatus, until all fires were extinguished."