Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 66)

C. A. Fyffe, History of Modern Europe, volume 1, chapters 6-7.

ALSO IN: Sir W. Scott, Life of Napoleon, chapters 51-52.

J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, part 2, chapters 4-5 (volume 1).

P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 2, chapter 15.

{1509}

GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October). Napoleon's sudden invasion of Prussia. The decisive battle of Jena. Prostration of the Prussian Kingdom.

"The Emperor of Russia … visited Berlin, when the feelings of Prussia, and indeed of all the neighbouring states, were in this fever of excitement. He again urged Frederick William to take up arms in the common cause, and offered to back him with all the forces of his own great empire. The English government, taking advantage of the same crisis, sent Lord Morpeth to Berlin, with offers of pecuniary supplies—about the acceptance of which, however, the anxiety of Prussia on the subject of Hanover created some difficulty. Lastly, Buonaparte, well informed of what was passing in Berlin, and desirous, since war must be, to hurry Frederick into the field ere the armies of the Czar could be joined with his, now poured out in the 'Moniteur' such abuse on the persons and characters of the Queen, Prince Louis, and every illustrious patriot throughout Prussia, that the general wrath could no longer be held in check. War-like preparations of every kind filled the kingdom during August and September. On the 1st of October the Prussian minister at Paris presented a note to Talleyrand, demanding, among other things, that the formation of a confederacy in the north of Germany should no longer be thwarted by French interference, and that the French troops within the territories of the Rhenish League should recross the Rhine into France, by the 8th of the same month of October. But Napoleon was already in person on the German side of the Rhine; and his answer to the Prussian note was a general order to his own troops, in which he called on them to observe in what manner a German sovereign still dared to insult the soldiers of Austerlitz. The conduct of Prussia, in thus rushing into hostilities without waiting for the advance of the Russians, was as rash as her holding back from Austria during the campaign of Austerlitz had been cowardly. As if determined to profit by no lesson, the Prussian council also directed their army to advance towards the French, instead of lying on their own frontier—a repetition of the great leading blunder of the Austrians in the preceding year. The Prussian army accordingly invaded the Saxon provinces, and the Elector … was compelled to accept the alliance which the cabinet of Berlin urged on him, and to join his troops with those of the power by which he had been thus insulted and wronged. No sooner did Napoleon know that the Prussians had advanced into the heart of Saxony, than he formed the plan of his campaign; and they, persisting in their advance, and taking up their position finally on the Saale, afforded him, as if studiously, the means of repeating, at their expense, the very manœvres which had ruined the Austrians in the preceding campaign." The flank of the Prussian position was turned,—the bridge across the Saale, at Saalfield, having been secured, after a hot engagement with the corps of Prince Louis of Prussia who fell in the fight,—"the French army passed entirely round them; Napoleon seized Naumburg and blew up the magazines there,—announcing, for the first time, by this explosion, to the King of Prussia and his generalissimo the Duke of Brunswick, that he was in their rear. From this moment the Prussians were isolated, and cut off from all their resources, as completely as the army of Mack was at Ulm, when the French had passed the Danube and overrun Suabia. The Duke of Brunswick hastily endeavoured to concentrate his forces for the purpose of cutting his way back again to the frontier which he had so rashly abandoned. Napoleon, meantime, had posted his divisions so as to watch the chief passages of the Saale, and expected, in confidence, the assault of his outwitted opponent. It was now that he found leisure to answer the manifesto of Frederick William. … His letter, dated at Gera, is written in the most elaborate style of insult. … The Prussian King understood well, on learning the fall of Naumburg, the imminent danger of his position; and his army was forthwith set in motion, in two great masses; the former, where he was in person present, advancing towards Naumburg; the latter attempting, in like manner, to force their passage through the French line in the neighbourhood of Jena. The King's march was arrested at Auerstadt by Davoust, who, after a severely contested action, at length repelled the assailant. Napoleon himself, meanwhile, was engaged with the other great body of the Prussians. Arriving on the evening of the 13th October at Jena, he perceived that the enemy were ready to attempt the advance next morning, while his own heavy train was still six-and-thirty hours' march in his rear. Not discouraged with this adverse circumstance, the Emperor laboured all night in directing and encouraging his soldiery to cut a road through the rocks, and draw up by that means such light guns as he had at command to a position on a lofty plateau in front of Jena, where no man could have expected beforehand that any artillery whatever should be planted. … Lannes commanded the centre, Augereau the right, Soult the left, and Murat the reserve and cavalry. Soult had to sustain the first assault of the Prussians, which was violent—and sudden; for the mist lay so thick on the field that the armies were within half-gunshot of each other ere the sun and wind rose and discovered them, and on that instant Mollendorf charged. The battle was contested well for some time on this point; but at length Ney appeared in the rear of the Emperor with a fresh division; and then the French centre advanced to a general charge, before which the Prussians were forced to retire. They moved for some space in good order; but Murat now poured his masses of cavalry on them, storm after storm, with such rapidity and vehemence that their rout became inevitable. It ended in the complete breaking up of the army—horse and foot all flying together, in the confusion of panic, upon the road to Weimar. At that point the fugitives met and mingled with their brethren flying, as confusedly as themselves, from Auerstadt. In the course of this disastrous day 20,000 Prussians were killed or taken, 300 guns, 20 generals, and 60 standards. The Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Brunswick, being wounded in the face with a grape-shot, was carried early off the field, never to recover. … The various routed divisions roamed about the country, seeking separately the means of escape: they were in consequence destined to fall an easy prey. … The Prince of Hohenlohe at length drew together not less than 50,000 of these wandering soldiers," and retreated towards the Oder; but was forced, in the end, to lay down his arms at Prentzlow. "His rear, consisting of about 10,000, under the command of the celebrated General Blucher, was so far behind as to render it possible for them to attempt escape. Their heroic leader traversed the country with them for some time unbroken, and sustained a variety of assaults, from far superior numbers, with the most obstinate resolution. {1510} By degrees, however, the French, under Soult, hemmed him in on one side, Murat on the other, and Bernadotte appeared close behind him. He was thus forced to throw himself into Lubeck, where a severe action was fought in the streets of the town, on the 6th of November. The Prussian, in this battle, lost 4,000 prisoners, besides the slain and wounded: he retreated to Schwerta, and there, it being impossible for him to go farther without violating the neutrality of Denmark, on the morning of the 7th, Blucher at length laid down his arms. … The strong fortresses of the Prussian monarchy made as ineffectual resistance as the armies in the field. … Buonaparte, in person, entered Berlin on the 25th of October; and before the end of November, except Konigsberg—where the King himself had found refuge, and gathered round, him a few thousand troops … —and a few less important fortresses, the whole of the German possessions of the house of Brandenburg were in the hands of the conqueror. Louis Buonaparte, King of Holland, meanwhile had advanced into Westphalia and occupied that territory also, with great part of Hanover, East Friesland, Embden, and the dominions of Hesse-Cassel."

J. G. Lockhart, Life of Napoleon, chapter 20.

ALSO IN: C. Adams, Great Campaigns in Europe from 1796 to 1870, chapter. 4.

Baron Jomini, Life of Napoleon, chapter 9 (volume 2),

Memoirs of Napoleon dictated at St. Helena, volume 6, pages 60-72.

Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 43 (volume 10).

Duke of Rovigo, Memoirs, volume 1, part 2, chapters 21-23.

GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October-December). Napoleon's ungenerous use of his victory. His insults to the Queen of Prussia. The kingdom governed as conquered territory. The French advance into Poland, to meet the Russians. Saxony made a kingdom.

"Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of Jena, recommending his subjects to his generosity, was in an especial manner the object of invective. His states were overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence inspired, that the wounded general was compelled, with great personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon after died. The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms; and a heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been an excess of patriotic ardour, was compared to Helen, whose faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities consequent on the siege of Troy. The whole dominions of the Elector of Hesse Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions. … The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, … shared the same fate: while to the nobles of Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering to his own reputation than theirs,—'I will render that noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their bread.' … Meanwhile the French armies, without any further resistance, took possession of the whole country between the Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be its theatre, Napoleon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation, directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of 159,000,000 francs (£6,300,000) on the countries at war with France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian states to the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector of Saxony [who had already detached himself from his alliance with Prussia], and the remainder by the lesser states in the Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden … was levied with unrelenting severity. … Nor was this all. The whole civil authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor,—an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great nation. … Early in November there appeared an elaborate ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided into four departments; those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of Stettin, and of Custrin; the military and civil government of the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders of provinces into which it was divided. … The same system of government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by grievous contributions. … The Emperor openly announced his determination to retain possession of all these states till England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty of the seas. … Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. … The severity of the terms demanded, as well as … express assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations. Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, … the King … declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of Russia [who was vigorously preparing to fulfil his promise of help to the stricken nation]. This refusal was anticipated by Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland. {1511} To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree [see FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810] of the 21st November against the commerce of Great Britain. … Napoleon … at Posen, in Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite hopes which his subsequent conduct never realised. … While the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the flanks of the invading force. … The whole of the north of Germany was overrun by French troops, while 100,000 were assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such prodigious efforts, over so great an extent of surface, rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor 80,000 were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the military age in 1807. … A treaty, offensive and defensive, between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his contingent fixed at 20,000 men. By a separate article, it was provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign: a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military outpost of the great nation—while, by a subsidiary treaty, signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the Confederacy."

Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 43, sections 87-99 (volume 10).

ALSO IN: P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 2, chapter 16.

Mrs. S. Austin, Germany from 1760 to 1814, page 294, and after.

E. H. Hudson, Life and Times of Louisa, Queen of Prussia, volume 2, chapters 8-9.

GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1807. Opening of Napoleon's campaign against the Russians. The deluding of the Poles. indecisive battle of Eylau.

The campaign against the Russians "opened early in the winter. The 1st of November, the Russians and French marched towards the Vistula, the former from the Memel, the latter from the Oder. Fifty thousand Russians pressed forward under General Benningsen; a second and equal army followed at a distance with a reserve force. Some of the Russian forces on the Turkish frontier were recalled, but were still remote. The first two Russian armies, with the remaining Prussians, numbered about 120,000. England made many promises and kept few of them, thinking more of conquering Spanish and Dutch colonies than of helping her allies. Her aid was limited to a small reinforcement of the Swedes guarding Swedish Pomerania, the only portion of Northern Germany not yet in French power. Gustavus II., the young King of Sweden, weak and impulsive, rushed headlong, without a motive, into the … alliance [against Napoleon], destined to be so fatal to Sweden. … Eighty thousand men under Murat crossed the Oder and entered Prussian Poland, and an equal number stood ready to sustain them. November 9, Davout's division entered Posen, the principal town of the Polish provinces still preserving the national sentiment, and whose people detested Prussian rule and resented the treachery with which Prussia dismembered Poland after swearing alliance with her. All along the road, the peasants hastened to meet the French; and at Posen, Davout was hailed with an enthusiasm which moved even him, cold and severe as he was, and he urged Napoleon to justify the hopes of Poland, who looked to him as her savior. The Russian vanguard reached Warsaw before the French, but made no effort to remain there, and recrossed the Vistula. November 28, Davout and Murat entered the town, and public delight knew no bounds. It would be a mere illusion to fancy that sentiments of right and justice had any share in Napoleon's resolve, and that he was stirred by a desire to repair great wrongs. His only question was whether the resurrection of Poland would increase his greatness or not; and if he told the Sultan that he meant to restore Poland, it was because he thought Turkey would assist him the more willingly against Russia. He also offered part of Silesia to Austria, if she would aid him in the restoration of Poland by the cession of her Polish provinces; but it was not a sufficient offer, and therefore not serious. The truth was that he wanted promises from the Poles before he made any to them. … Thousands of Poles enlisted under the French flag and joined the Polish legions left from the Italian war. Napoleon established a provisional government of well-known Poles in Warsaw, and required nothing but volunteers of the country. He had seized without a blow that line of the Vistula which the Prussian king would not barter for a truce, and might have gone into winter-quarters there; but the Russians were close at hand on the opposite shore, in two great divisions 100,000 strong, in a wooded and marshy country forming a sort of triangle, whose point touches the union of the Narew and Ukra rivers with the Vistula, a few leagues below Warsaw. The Russians communicated with the sea by a Prussian corps stationed between them and Dantzic. Napoleon would not permit them to hold this post, and resolved to strike a blow, before going into winter-quarters, which should cut them off from the sea and drive them back towards the Memel and Lithuania. He crossed the Vistula, December 23, and attacked the Russians between the Narew and the Ukra. A series of bloody battles followed [the most important being at Pultusk and Golymin, December 26] in the dense forests and deep bogs of the thawing land. Napoleon said that he had discovered a fifth element in Poland,—mud. Men and horses stuck in the swamp and the cannons could not be extricated. Luckily the Russians were in the incompetent hands of General Kamenski, and both parties fought in the dark, the labyrinth of swamps and woods preventing either army from guessing the other's movements. The Russians were finally driven, with great loss, beyond the Narew towards the forests of Belostok, and a Prussian corps striving to assist them was driven back to the sea. … The grand army did not long enjoy the rest it so much needed; for the Russians, whose losses were more than made up by the arrival of their reserves, suddenly resumed the offensive. {1512} General Benningsen, who gave a fearful proof of his sinister energy by the murder of Paul I., had been put in command in Kamenski's place. Marching round the forests and traversing the line of lakes which divide the basin of the Narew from those watercourses flowing directly to the sea, he reached the maritime part of old Prussia, intending to cross the Vistula and drive the French from their position in Poland. He had hoped to surprise the French left wing, lying between the Passarge and Lower Vistula, but arrived too late. Ney and Bernadotte rapidly concentrated their forces and fought with a bravery which arrested the Russians (January 25 and 27). Napoleon came to the rescue, and having once driven the enemy into the woods and marshes of the interior, now strove to turn those who meant to turn him, by an inverse action forcing them to the sea-coast. … Benningsen then halted beyond Eylau, and massed his forces to receive battle next day [February 8]. He had about 70,000 men, twice the artillery of Napoleon (400 guns against 200), and hoped to be joined betimes by a Prussian corps. Napoleon could only dispose of 60,000 out of his 300,000 men,—Ney being some leagues away and Bernadotte out of reach. … The battlefield was a fearful sight next day. Twelve thousand Russians and 10,000 French lay dying and dead on the vast fields of snow reddened with blood. The Russians, besides, carried off 15,000 wounded. 'What an ineffectual massacre" cried Ney, as he traversed the scene of carnage. This was too true; for although Napoleon drove the Russians to the sea, it was not in the way he desired. Benningsen succeeded in reaching Konigsberg, where he could rest and reinforce his army, and Napoleon was not strong enough to drive him from this last shelter."

H. Martin, Popular History of France from 1789, volume 2, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: Baron Jomini, Life of Napoleon, chapter 10 (volume 2).

C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 1, chapter 8.

J. C. Ropes, The First Napoleon, lecture 3.

Baron de Marbot, Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 29-30.

GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1810. Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and Napoleon's Decrees.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (February-June). Closer alliance of Prussia and Russia. Treaty of Bartenstein. Napoleon's victory at Friedland. End of the campaign.

The effect produced in Europe by the doubtful battle of Eylau "was unlucky for France; in Paris the Funds fell. Bennigsen boldly ordered the Te Deum to be sung. In order to confirm his victory, re-organise his army, reassure France, re-establish the opinion of Europe, encourage the Polish insurrection, and to curb the ill-will of Germany and Austria, Napoleon remained a week at Eylau. He negotiated: on one side he caused Talleyrand to write to Zastrow, the Prussian foreign minister, to propose peace and his alliance; he sent Bertrand to Memel to offer to re-establish the King of Prussia, on the condition of no foreign intervention. He also tried to negotiate with Bennigsen; to which the latter made answer, 'that his master had charged him to fight, and not negotiate.' After some hesitation, Prussia ended by joining her fortunes to those of Russia. By the convention of Bartenstein (25th April, 1807) the two sovereigns came to terms on the following points: 1. The re-establishment of Prussia within the limits of 1805. 2. The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. 3. The restitution to Austria of the Tyrol and Venice. 4. The accession of England to the coalition, and the aggrandisement of Hanover. 5. The co-operation of Sweden. 6. The restoration of the house of Orange, and indemnities to the kings of Naples and Sardinia.

This document is important; it nearly reproduces the conditions offered to Napoleon at the Congress of Prague, in 1813. Russia and Prussia proposed then to make a more pressing appeal to Austria, Sweden, and England; but the Emperor Francis was naturally undecided, and the Archduke Charles, alleging the state of the finances and the army, strongly advised him against any new intervention. Sweden was too weak; and notwithstanding his fury against Napoleon, Gustavus III. had just been forced to treat with Mortier. The English minister showed a remarkable inability to conceive the situation; he refused to guarantee the new Russian loan of a hundred and fifty millions, and would lend himself to no maritime diversion. Napoleon showed the greatest diplomatic activity. The Sultan Selim III. declared war against Russia; General Sebastiani, the envoy at Constantinople, put the Bosphorus in a state of defence, and repulsed the English fleet [see TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807]; General Gardane left for Ispahan, with a mission to cause a Persian outbreak in the Caucasus. Dantzig had capitulated [May 24, after a long siege], and Lefèbvre's 40,000 men were therefore ready for service. Masséna took 36,000 of them into Italy, In the spring, Bennigsen, who had been reinforced by 10,000 regular troops, 6,000 Cossacks, and the Imperial Guard, being now at the head of 100,000 men, took the offensive; Gortchakof commanding the right and Bagration the left. He tried, as in the preceding year, to seize Ney's division; but the latter fought, as he retired, two bloody fights, at Gutstadt and Ankendorff. Bennigsen, again in danger of being surrounded, retired on Heilsberg. He defended himself bravely (June 10); but the French, extending their line on his right, marched on Eylau, so as to cut him off from Konigsberg. The Russian generalissimo retreated; but being pressed, he had to draw up at Friedland, on the Alle. The position he had taken up was most dangerous. All his army was enclosed in an angle of the Alle, with the steep bed of the river at their backs, which in case of misfortune left them only one means of retreat, over the three bridges of Friedland. … 'Where are the Russians concealed?' asked Napoleon when he came up. When he had noted their situation, he exclaimed, 'It is not every day that one surprises the enemy in such a fault.' He put Lannes and Victor in reserve, ordered Mortier to oppose Gortchakof on the left and to remain still, as the movement which 'would be made by the right would pivot on the left.' As to Ney, he was to cope on the right with Bagration, who was shut in by the angle of the river; he was to meet them 'with his head down,' without taking any care of his own safety. Ney led the charge with irresistible fury; the Russians were riddled by his artillery at 150 paces: he successively crushed the chasseurs of the Russian Guard, the Ismaïlovski, and the Horse Guards, burnt Friedland by shells, and cannonaded the bridges which were the only means of retreat. … The Russian left wing was almost thrown into the river; Bagration, with the Semenovski and other troops, was hardly able to cover the defeat. {1513} On the Russian right, Gortchakof, who had advanced to attack the immovable Mortier, had only time to ford the Alle. Count Lambert retired with 29 guns by the left bank; the rest fled by the right bank, closely pursued by the cavalry. Meanwhile Murat, Davoust, and Soult, who had taken no part in the battle, arrived before Konigsberg. Lestocq, with 25,000 men, tried to defend it, but on learning the disaster of Friedland he hastily evacuated it. Only one fortress now remained to Frederick William—the little town of Memel. The Russians had lost at Friedland from 15,000 to 20,000 men, besides 80 guns (June 14, 1807). … Alexander had no longer an army. Only one man, Barclay de Tolly, proposed to continue the war; but in order to do this it would be necessary to re-enter Russia, to penetrate into the very heart of the empire, to burn everything on the way, and only present a desert to the enemy. Alexander hoped to get off more cheaply. He wrote a severe letter to Bennigsen, and gave him powers to treat."

A. Rambaud, History of Russia, volume 2, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: Duke de Rovigo, Memoirs, volume 2, part 1, chapters 4-6.

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (June-July). The Treaty of Tilsit. Its known and its unknown agreements.

"Alexander I. now determined to negotiate in person with the rival emperor, and on the 25th of June the two sovereigns met at Tilsit, on a raft which was moored in the middle of the Niemen. The details of the conference are a secret, as Napoleon's subsequent account of it is untrustworthy, and no witnesses were present. All that is certain is that Alexander I., whose character was a curious mixture of nobility and weakness, was completely won over by his conqueror. … Napoleon, … instead of attempting to impose extreme terms upon a country which it was impossible to conquer, … offered to share with Russia the supremacy in Europe which had been won by French arms. The only conditions were the abandonment of the cause of the old monarchies, which seemed hopeless, and an alliance with France against England. Alexander had several grievances against the English government, especially the lukewarm support that had been given in recent operations, and made no objection to resume the policy of his predecessors in this respect. Two interviews sufficed to arrange the basis of an agreement. Both sovereigns abandoned their allies without scruple. Alexander gave up Prussia and Sweden, while Napoleon deserted the cause of the Poles, who had trusted to his zeal for their independence, and of the Turks, whom his envoy had recently induced to make war upon Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit was speedily drawn up; on the 7th of July peace was signed between France and Russia, on the 9th between France and Prussia. Frederick William III. had to resign the whole of his kingdom west of the Elbe, together with all the acquisitions which Prussia had made in the second and third partitions of Poland. The provinces that were left, amounting to barely half of what he had inherited, were burthened with the payment of an enormous sum as compensation to France. The district west of the Elbe was united with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, and ultimately with Hanover, to form the kingdom of Westphalia, which was given to Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome. Of Polish Prussia, one province, Bialystock, was added to Russia, and the rest was made into the grand duchy of Warsaw, and transferred to Saxony. Danzig, with the surrounding territory, was declared a free state under Prussian and Saxon protection, but it was really subject to France, and remained a centre of French power on the Baltic. All trade between Prussia and England was cut off. Alexander I., on his side, recognised all Napoleon's new creations in Europe—the Confederation of the Rhine, the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, and Westphalia, and undertook to mediate between France and England. But the really important agreement between France and Russia was to be found, not in the formal treaties, but in the secret conventions which were arranged by the two emperors. The exact text of these has never been made public, and it is probable that some of the terms rested upon verbal rather than on written understandings, but the general drift of them is unquestionable. The bribe offered to Alexander was the aggrandisement of Russia in the East. To make him an accomplice in the acts of Napoleon, he was to be allowed to annex Finland from Sweden, and Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey. With regard to England, Russia undertook to adopt Napoleon's blockade-system, and to obtain the adhesion of those states which still remained open to English trade—Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal."

H. Lodge, History of Modern Europe, chapter 24, section 25.

"'I thought,' said Napoleon at St. Helena, 'it would benefit the world to drive these brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But when I reflected what power it would give to Russia, from the number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who may be considered Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as Alexander wanted Constantinople, which would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. France would gain Egypt, Syria, and the islands; but those were nothing to what Russia would have obtained.' This coincides with Savary's [Duke de Rovigo's] statement, that Alexander told him Napoleon said he was under no engagements to the new Sultan, and that changes in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to one another; and again, Alexander said that, in their conversations at Tilsit, Napoleon often told him he did not require the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; he would place things in a train to dispense with it, and it was not possible to suffer longer the presence of the Turks in Europe. 'He even left me,' said Alexander, 'to entertain the project of driving them back into Asia. It is only since that he has returned to the idea of leaving Constantinople to them, and some surrounding provinces.' Due day, when Napoleon was talking to Alexander, he asked his secretary, M. Meneval, for the map of Turkey, opened it, then renewed the conversation; and placing his finger on Constantinople said several times to the secretary, though not loud enough to be heard by Alexander, 'Constantinople, Constantinople, never. It is the capital of the world.' … It is very evident in their conversations that Napoleon agreed to his [Alexander's] possessing himself of the Turkish Empire up to the Balkan, if not beyond; though Bignon denies that any plan for the actual partition of Turkey was embodied in the treaty of Tilsit. Hardenberg, not always well informed, asserts that it was. {1514} Savary says he could not believe that Napoleon would have abandoned the Turks without a compensation in some other quarter; and he felt certain Alexander had agreed in return to Napoleon's project for the conquest of Spain, 'which the Emperor had very much at heart'"

C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 1, chapter 8.

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 46 (volume 10).

Count Miot de Melito, Memoirs, chapter 24.

P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, chapters 3-4.

Prince de Talleyrand, Memoirs, part 3 (volume 1).

A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and the Empire, book 27 (volume 2).

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (July). The collapse of Prussia and its Causes.

"For the five years that followed, Prussia is to be conceived, in addition to all her other humiliations, as in the hands of a remorseless creditor whose claims are decided by himself without appeal, and who wants more than all he can get. She is to be thought of as supporting for more than a year after the conclusion of the Treaty a French army of more than 150,000 men, then as supporting a French garrison in three principal fortresses, and finally, just before the period ends, as having to support the huge Russian expedition in its passage through the country. … It was not in fact from the Treaty of Tilsit, but from the systematic breach of it, that the sufferings of Prussia between 1807 and 1813 arose. It is indeed hardly too much to say that the advantage of the Treaty was received only by France, and that the only object Napoleon can have had in signing it was to inflict more harm on Prussia than he could inflict by simply continuing the war. Such was the downfall of Prussia. The tremendousness of the catastrophe strikes us less because we know that it was soon retrieved, and that Prussia rose again and became greater than ever. But could this recovery be anticipated? A great nation, we say, cannot be dissolved by a few disasters; patriotism and energy will retrieve everything. But precisely these seemed wanting. The State seemed to have fallen in pieces because it had no principle of cohesion, and was only held together by an artificial bureaucracy. It had been created by the energy of its government and the efficiency of its soldiers, and now it appeared to come to an end because its government had ceased to be energetic and its soldiers to be efficient. The catastrophe could not but seem as irremediable as it was sudden and complete." There may be discerned "three distinct causes for it. First, the undecided and pusillanimous policy pursued by the Prussian government since 1803 had an evident influence upon the result by making the great Powers, particularly England and Austria, slow to render it assistance, and also by making the commanders, especially Brunswick, irresolute in action because they could not, even at the last moment, believe the war to be serious. This indecision we have observed to have been connected with a mal-organisation of the Foreign Department. Secondly, the corruption of the military system, which led to the surrender of the fortresses. Thirdly, a misfortune for which Prussia was not responsible, its desertion by Russia at a critical moment, and the formation of a close alliance between Russia and France."

J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, part 2, chapter 5 (volume 1).

GERMANY: A. D. 1807-1808. The great Revolutionary Reforms of Hardenberg, Stein and Scharnhorst. Edict of Emancipation. Military reorganization. Beginning of local self-government. Seeds of a new national life.

"The work of those who resisted Napoleon—even if no one of them should ever be placed in the highest class of the benefactors of mankind—has in some cases proved enduring, and nowhere so much as in Germany. They began two great works—the reorganisation of Prussia and the revival of the German nationality, and time has deliberately ratified their views. Without retrogression, without mistake, except the mistake which in such matters is the most venial that can be committed, that, namely, of over-caution, of excessive hesitation, the edifice which was then founded has been raised higher and higher till it is near completion. … Because Frederick-William III. remains quietly seated on the throne through the whole period, we remain totally unaware that a Prussian revolution took place then—a revolution so comprehensive that the old reign and glories of Frederick may fairly be said to belong to another world—to an 'ancien regime' that has utterly passed away. It was a revolution which, though it did not touch the actual framework of government in such a way as to substitute one of Aristotle's forms of government for another, yet went so far beyond government, and made such a transformation both in industry and culture, that it deserves the name of revolution far more, for instance, than our English Revolution of the 17th century. … In Prussia few of the most distinguished statesmen, few even of those who took the lead in her liberation from Napoleon, were Prussians. Blücher himself began life in the service of Sweden, Scharnhorst was a Hanoverian, so was Hardenberg, and Stein came from Nassau. Niebuhr was enticed to Berlin from the Bank of Copenhagen. Hardenberg served George III. and afterwards the Duke of Brunswick before he entered the service of Frederick-William II.; and when Stein was dismissed by Frederick-William III. in the midst of the war of 1806, though he was a man of property and rank, he took measures to ascertain whether they were in want of a Finance Minister at St. Petersburg. … We misapprehend the nature of what took place when we say, as we usually do, that some important and useful reforms were introduced by Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharnhorst. In the first place, such a word as reform is not properly applied to changes so vast, and in the second place. the changes then made or at least commenced, went far beyond legislation. We want some word stronger than reform which shall convey that one of the greatest events of modern history now took place in Prussia. Revolution would convey this, but unfortunately we appropriate that word to changes in the form of government, or even mere changes of dynasty, provided they are violent, though such changes are commonly quite insignificant compared to what now took place in Prussia. … The form of government indeed was not changed. Not merely did the king continue to reign, but no Parliament was created even with powers ever so restricted. Another generation had to pass away before this innovation, which to us seems the beginning of political life, took place. But a nation must be made before it can be made free, and, as we have said, in Prussia there was an administration (in great disorder) and an army, but no nation. {1515} When Stein was placed at the head of affairs in the autumn of 1807, he seems, at first, hardly to have been aware that anything was called for beyond the reform of the administration, and the removal of some abuses in the army. Accordingly he did reform the administration from the top to the bottom, remodelling the whole machinery both of central and local government which had come down from the father of Frederick the Great. But the other work also was forced upon him, and he began to create the nation by emancipating the peasantry, while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were brooding over the ideas which, five years later, took shape in the Landwehr of East Prussia. Besides emancipating the peasant he emancipated industry,—everywhere abolishing that strange caste system which divided the population rigidly into nobles, citizens, and peasants, and even stamped every acre of land in the country with its own unalterable rank as noble, or citizen, or peasant land. Emancipation, so to speak, had to be given before enfranchisement. The peasant must have something to live for; freewill must be awakened in the citizen; and he must be taught to fight for something before he could receive political liberty. Of such liberty Stein only provided one modest germ. By his Städteordnung he introduced popular election into the towns. Thus Prussia and France set out towards political liberty by different roads. Prussia began modestly with local liberties, but did not for a long time attempt a Parliament. France with her charte, and in imitation of France many of the small German States, had grand popular Parliaments, but no local liberties. And so for a long time Prussia was regarded as a backward State. … It was only by accident that Stein stopped short at municipal liberties and created no Parliament. He would have gone further, and in the last years of the wartime Hardenberg did summon deliberative assemblies, which, however, fell into disuse again after the peace. … In spite however of all reaction, the change irrevocably made by the legislation of that time was similar to that made in France by the Revolution, and caused the age before Jena to be regarded as an 'ancien regime.' But in addition to this, a change had been made in men's minds and thoughts by the shocks of the time, which prepared the way for legislative changes which have taken place since. How unprecedented in Prussia, for instance, was the dictatorial authority wielded by Hardenberg early in 1807, by Stein in the latter part of that year and in 1808, and by Hardenberg again from 1810 onwards! Before that time in the history of Prussia we find no subject eclipsing or even approaching the King in importance. Prussia had been made what she was almost entirely by her electors and kings. In war and organisation alike all had been done by the Great Elector or Frederick-William I., or Frederick the Great. But now this is suddenly changed. Everything now turns on the minister. Weak ministers are expelled by pressure put upon the king, strong ones are forced upon him. He is compelled to create a new ministerial power much greater than that of an English Prime Minister, and more like that of a Grand Vizier, and by these dictators the most comprehensive innovations are made. The loyalty of the people was not impaired by this; on the contrary, Stein and Hardenberg saved the Monarchy; but it evidently transferred the Monarchy, though safely, to a lower pedestal."

J. R. Seeley, Prussian History (Macmillan's Magazine, volume 36, pages 342-351).

ALSO IN: J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, parts 3-5 (volumes 1-2).

R. B. D. Morier, Agrarian Legislation of Prussia (Systems of Land Tenure: Cobden Club Essays, chapter 5).

GERMANY: A. D. 1808. The Awakening of the national spirit. Effects of the Spanish rising, and of Fichte's Addresses.

The beginnings of the great rising in Spain against Napoleon (see SPAIN: A. D. 1808, and after) "were watched by Stein from Berlin while he was engaged in negotiating with Daru; we can imagine with what feelings! His cause had been, since his ministry began, substantially the same as that of Spain; but he had perhaps understood it himself but dimly, at any rate hoped but faintly to see it prosper. But now he ripens at once into a great nationality statesman; the reforms of Prussia begin at once to take a more military stamp, and to point more decisively to a great uprising of the German race against the foreign oppressor. The change of feeling which took place in Prussia after the beginning of the Spanish troubles is very clearly marked in Stein's autobiography. After describing the negotiations at Paris and Berlin, … he begins a new paragraph thus: 'The popular war which had broken out in Spain and was attended with good success, had heightened the irritation of the inhabitants of the Prussian State caused by the humiliation they had suffered. All thirsted for revenge; plans of insurrection, which aimed at exterminating the French scattered about the country, were arranged; among others, one was to be carried out at Berlin, and I had the greatest trouble to keep the leaders, who confided their intentions to me, from a premature outbreak. We all watched the progress of the Spanish war and the commencement of the Austrian, for the preparations of that Power had not remained a secret; expectation was strained to the highest point; pains were necessary to moderate the excited eagerness for resistance in order to profit by it in more favourable circumstances. … Fichte's Addresses to the Germans, delivered during the French occupation of Berlin and printed under the censorship of M. Bignon, the Intendant, had a great effect upon the feelings of the cultivated class.' … That in the midst of such weighty matters he should remember to mention Fichte's Addresses is a remarkable testimony to the effect produced by them on the public mind, and at the same time it leads us to conjecture that they must have strongly influenced his own. They had been delivered in the winter at Berlin and of course could not be heard by Stein, who was then with the King, but they were not published till April. As affecting public opinion therefore, and also as known to Stein, the book was almost exactly of the same date as the Spanish Rebellion, and it is not unnatural that he should mention the two influences together. … When the lectures were delivered at Berlin a rising in Spain was not dreamed of, and even when they were published it had not taken place, nor could clearly be foreseen. And yet they teach the same lesson. That doctrine of nationality which was taught affirmatively by Spain had been suggested to Fichte's mind by the reductio ad absurdum which events had given to the negation of it in Germany. {1516} Nothing could be more convincing than the concurrence of the two methods of proof at the same moment, and the prophetic elevation of these discourses (which may have furnished a model to Carlyle) was well fitted to drive the lesson home, particularly to a mind like Stein's, which was quite capable of being impressed by large principles. … Fichte's Addresses do not profess to have in the first instance nationality for their subject. They profess to inquire whether there exists any grand comprehensive remedy for the evils with which Germany is afflicted. They find such a remedy where Turgot long before had looked for deliverance from the selfishness to which he traced all the abuses of the old regime, that is, in a grand system of national education. Fichte reiterates the favourite doctrine of modern Liberalism, that education as hitherto conducted by the Church has aimed only at securing for men happiness in another life, and that this is not enough, inasmuch as they need also to be taught how to bear themselves in the present life so as to do their duty to the state, to others and themselves. He is as sure as Turgot that a system of national education will work so powerfully upon the nation that in a few years they will not be recognisable, and he explains at great length what should be the nature of this system, dwelling principally upon the importance of instilling a love of duty for its own sake rather than for reward. The method to be adopted is that of Pestalozzi. Out of fourteen lectures the first three are entirely occupied with this. But then the subject is changed, and we find ourselves plunged into a long discussion of the peculiar characteristics which distinguish Germany from other nations and particularly other nations of German origin. At the present day this discussion, which occupies four lectures, seems hardly satisfactory; but it is a striking deviation from the fashion of that age. … But up to this point we perceive only that the subject of German nationality occupies Fichte's mind very much, and that there was more significance than we first remarked in the title, Addresses to the German Nation; otherwise we have met with nothing likely to seem of great importance to a statesman. But the eighth Lecture propounds the question, 'What is a Nation in the higher signification of the word, and what is patriotism? It is here that he delivers what might seem a commentary on the Spanish Revolution, which had not yet taken place. … Fichte proclaims the Nation not only to be different from the State, but to be something far higher and greater. … Applied to Germany this doctrine would lead to the practical conclusion that a united German State ought to be set up in which the separate German States should be absorbed. … In the lecture before us he contents himself with advising that patriotism as distinguished from loyalty to the State should be carefully inculcated in the new education, and should influence the individual German Governments. It would not indeed have been safe for Fichte to propose a political reform, but it rather appears that he thought it an advantage rather than a disadvantage that the Nation and the State should be distinct. … I should not have lingered so long over this book if it did not strike me as the prophetical or canonical book which announces and explains a great transition in Modern Europe, and the prophecies of which began to be fulfilled immediately after its publication by the rising in Spain. … It is this Spanish Revolution which when it has extended to the other countries we call the Anti-Napoleonic Revolution of Europe. It gave Europe years of unparalleled bloodshed, but at the same time years over which there broods a light of poetry; for no conception can be more profoundly poetical than that which now woke up in every part of Europe, the conception of the Nation. Those years also led the way to the great movements which have filled so much of the nineteenth century, and have rearranged the whole central part of the map of Europe on a more natural system."

J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, part 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).

GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (January). Kehl, Cassel and Wesel annexed to France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808 (NOVEMBER-FEBRUARY).

GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (April-December). The Tugendbund, and Stein's relations to it.

"English people think of Stein almost exclusively in connexion with land laws. But the second and more warlike period of his Ministry has also left a faint impression in the minds of many among us, who are in the habit of regarding him as the founder of the Tugendbund. In August and September [1808], the very months in which Stein was taking up his new position, this society was attracting general attention, and accordingly this is the place to consider Stein's relation to it. That he was secretly animating and urging it on must have seemed at the time more than probable, almost self-evident. It aimed at the very objects which he had at heart, it spoke of him with warm admiration, and in general it used language which seemed an echo of his own. … Whatever his connexion with the Tugendbund may have been, it cannot have commenced till April, 1808, for it was in that month that the Tugendbund began its existence, and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to represent Stein as beginning to revolutionise the country with the help of the Tugendbund, for his revolutionary edict had been promulgated in the October before. … In his autobiography … Stein [says]: 'An effect and not the cause of this passionate national indignation at the despotism of Napoleon was the Tugendbund, of which I was no more the founder than I was a member, as I can assert on my honour and as is well known to its originators. About July, 1808, there was formed at Königsberg a society consisting of several officers, for example, Colonel Gneisenau, Grolmann, &c., and learned men, such as Professor Krug, in order to combat selfishness and to rouse the nobler moral feelings; and according to the requirements of the existing laws they communicated their statutes and the list of their members to the King's Majesty, who sanctioned the former without any action on my part, it being my belief in general that there was no need of any other institute but to put new life into the spirit of Christian patriotism, the germ of which lay already in the existing institutions of State and Church. The new Society held its meetings, but of the proceedings I knew nothing, and when later it proposed to exert an indirect influence upon educational and military institutions I rejected the proposal as encroaching on the department of the civil and ecclesiastical governing bodies. As I was driven soon afterwards out of the public service, I know nothing of the further operations of this Society.' … {1517} He certainly seems to intend his readers to understand that he had not even any indirect or underhand connexion with it, but from first to last stood entirely aloof, except in one case when he interfered to restrain its action. It is even possible that by telling us that he had nothing to do with the step taken by the King when he sanctioned the statutes of the society he means to hint that; had his advice been taken, the society would not have been even allowed to exist. … The principal fact affirmed by Stein is indeed now beyond controversy; Stein was certainly not either the founder or a member of the Tugendbund. The society commonly known by that name, which however designated itself as the Moral and Scientific Union, was founded by a number of persons, of whom many were Freemasons, at Konigsberg in the month of April. Professor Krug, mentioned by Stein, was one of them; Gneisenau and Grolmann, whom he also mentions, were not among the first members, and Gneisenau, it seems, was never a member. The statutes were drawn by Krug, Bardeleben and Baersch, and if anyone person can be called the Founder of the Tugendbund, the second of these, Bardeleben, seems best to deserve the title. The Order of Cabinet by which the society was licensed is dated Konigsberg, June 30th, and runs as follows: 'The revival of morality, religion, serious taste and public spirit, is assuredly most commendable; and, so far as the society now being formed under the name of a Virtue Union (Tugendverein) is occupied with this within the limits of the laws of the country and without any interference in politics or public administration, His Majesty the King of Prussia approves the object and constitution of the society.' … From Konigsberg missionaries went forth who established branch associations, called Chambers, in other towns, first those of the Province of Prussia, Braunsberg, Elbing, Graudenz, Eylau, Hohenstein, Memel, Stallupöhnen; then in August and September Bardeleben spread the movement with great success through Silesia. The spirit which animated the new society could not but be approved by every patriot. They had been deeply struck with the decay of the nation, as shown in the occurrences of the war, and their views of the way in which it might be revived were much the same as those of Stein and Fichte. The only question was whether they were wise in organising a society in order to promulgate these views, whether such a society was likely to do much good, and also whether it might not by possibility do much harm. Stein's view, as he has given it, was that it was not likely to do much good, and that such an organisation was unnecessary. … It did not follow because he desired Estates or Parliaments that he was prepared to sanction a political club. … It may well have seemed to him that to suffer a political club to come into existence was to allow the guidance of the Revolution which he had begun to pass out of his hands. There appears, then, when we consider it closely, nothing unnatural in the course which Stein declares himself to have taken."

J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, part 4, chapter 3 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: T. Frost, Secret Societies of the European Revolution, volume 1, chapter 4.

GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (September-October). Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (January-June). Outburst of Austrian feeling against France. Reopening of war. Napoleon's advance to Vienna. His defeat at Aspern and perilous situation. Austrian reverses in Italy and Hungary.

"The one man of all the Austrians who felt the least amount of hatred against France, was, perhaps, the Emperor. All his family and all his people—nobles and priests, the middle classes and the peasantry—evinced a feeling full of anger against the nation which had upset Europe. … By reason of the French, the disturbers and spoilers, the enemies of the human race, despisers of morality and religion alike, Princes were suffering in their palaces, workmen in their shops, business men in their offices, priests in their churches, soldiers in their camps, peasants in their huts. The movement of exasperation was irresistible. Everyone said that it was a mistake to have laid down their arms; that they ought against France to have fought on to the bitter end, and to have sacrificed the last man and the last florin; that they had been wrong in not having gone to the assistance of Prussia after the Jena Campaign; and that the moment had arrived for all the Powers to coalesce against the common enemy and crush him. … All Europe had arrived at a paroxysm of indignation. What was she waiting for before rising? A signal. That signal Austria was about to give. And this time with what chances of success! The motto was to be 'victory or death.' But they were sure of victory. The French army, scattered from the Oder to the Tagus, from the mountains of Bohemia to the Sierra Morena, would not be able to resist the onslaught of so many nations eager to break their bonds. … Vienna, in 1809, indulged in the same language, and felt the same passions, that Berlin did in 1806. … The Landwehr, then only organized a few months, were impatiently awaiting the hour when they should measure themselves against the Veterans of the French army. Volunteers flocked in crowds to the colours. Patriotic subscriptions flowed in. … Boys wanted to leave school to fight. All classes of society vied with each other in zeal, courage, and a spirit of sacrifice. When the news was made public that the Archduke Charles had, on the 20th of February, 1809, been appointed Generalissimo, there was an outburst of joy and confidence from one end of the Empire to the other."

Imbert de Saint-Amand, Memoirs of the Empress Marie Louise, part 1, chapter 2.

"On receiving decisive intelligence of these hostile preparations, Napoleon returned with extraordinary expedition from Spain to Paris, in January, 1809, and gave orders to concentrate his forces in Germany, and call out the full contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine. Some further time was consumed by the preparations on either side. At last, on the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers at once on the Inn, in Bohemia, in the Tyrol and in Italy. The whole burthen of the war rested on Austria alone, for Prussia remained neutral, and Russia, now allied to France, was even bound to make a show at least, though it were no more, of hostility to Austria. On the same day on which the Austrian forces crossed the frontiers, the Tyrol rose in insurrection [see below: A. D. 1809-1810 (APRIL-FEBRUARY)], and was swept clear of the enemy in four days, with the exception of a Bavarian garrison, that still held out in Kufstein. {1518} The French army was at this time dispersed over a line of forty leagues in extent, with numerous undefended apertures between the corps; so that the fairest possible opportunity presented itself to the Austrians for cutting to pieces the scattered forces of the French, and marching in triumph to the Rhine. As usual, however, the archduke's early movements were subjected to most impolitic delays by the Aulic Council; and time was allowed Napoleon to arrive on the theatre of war (April 17), and repair the faults committed by his adjutant-general, Berthier. He instantly extricated his army from its perilous position—almost cut in two by the advance of the Austrians—and, beginning on the 19th, he beat the latter in five battles on five successive days, at Thaun, Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon. The Archduke Charles retired into Bohemia to collect reinforcements, but General Hiller was, in consequence of the delay in repairing the fortifications of Linz, unable to maintain that place, the possession of which was important, on account of its forming a connecting point between Bohemia and the Austrian Oberland. Hiller, however, at least saved his honour by pushing forward to the Traun, and in a fearfully bloody encounter at Ebersberg, captured three French eagles, one of his colours alone falling into the enemy's hands. He was, nevertheless, compelled to retire before the superior forces of the French, and crossing over at Krems to the left bank of the Danube, he formed a junction with the Archduke Charles. The way was now clear to Vienna, which, after a slight show of defence, capitulated to Napoleon on the 12th of May. The Archduke Charles had hoped to reach the capital before the French, and to give battle to them beneath its walls; but as he had to make a circuit whilst the French pushed forward in a direct line, his plan was frustrated, and he arrived, when too late, from Bohemia. Both armies, separated by the Danube, stood opposed to one another in the vicinity of the imperial city. Both commanders were desirous of coming to a decisive engagement. The French had secured the island of Lobau, to serve as a mustering place, and point of transit across the Danube. The archduke allowed them to establish a bridge of boats, being resolved to await them on the Marchfeld. There it was that Rudolph of Habsburg, in the battle against Ottakar, had laid the foundation of the greatness of the house of Austria; and there the political existence of that house and the fate of the monarchy were now to be decided. Having crossed the river, Napoleon was received on the opposite bank, near Aspern and Esslingen, by his opponent, and, after a dreadful battle [in which Marshal Lannes was killed], that was carried on with unwearied animosity for two days, May 21st and 22nd, 1809, he was completely beaten, and compelled to fly for refuge to the island of Lobau. The rising stream had, meanwhile, carried away the bridge, Napoleon's sole chance of escape to the opposite bank. For two days he remained on the island with his defeated troops, without provisions, and in hourly expectation of being cut to pieces; the Austrians, however, neglected to turn the opportunity to advantage, and allowed the French leisure to rebuild the bridge, a work of extreme difficulty. During six weeks afterwards, the two armies continued to occupy their former positions under the walls of Vienna, on the right and left banks of the Danube, narrowly watching each other's movements, and preparing for a final struggle. Whilst these events were in progress, the Archduke John had successfully penetrated into Italy, where he had totally defeated the Viceroy Eugene at Salice, on the 16th of April. Favoured by the simultaneous revolt of the Tyrolese, he might have obtained the most decisive results from this victory, but the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the valley of the Danube rendered necessary the concentration of the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the capital. Having begun a retreat, he was pursued by Eugene, and defeated on the Piave, with great loss, on the 8th of May. Escaping thence, without further molestation, to Villach, in Carinthia, he received intelligence of the fall of Vienna, together with a letter from the Archduke Charles, of the 15th of May, directing him to move with all his forces upon Lintz, to act on the rear and communications of Napoleon. Instead of obeying these orders, he thought proper to march into Hungary, abandoning the Tyrol and the whole projected operations on the Upper Danube to their fate. His disobedience was disastrous to the fortunes of his house, for it caused the fruits of the victory at Aspern to be lost. He might have arrived, with 50,000 men, on the 24th or 25th, at Lintz, where no one remained but Bernadotte and the Saxons, who were incapable of offering any serious resistance. Such a force, concentrated on the direct line of Napoleon's communications, immediately after his defeat at Aspern, on the 22nd, would have deprived him of all means of extricating himself from the most perilous situation in which he had yet been placed since ascending the consular throne. After totally defeating Jellachich in the valley of the Muhr, Eugene desisted from his pursuit of the army of Italy, and joined Napoleon at Vienna. The Archduke John united his forces at Raab with those of the Hungarian insurrection, under his brother, the Palatine. The viceroy again marched against him, and defeated him at Raab on the 14th of June. The Palatine remained with the Hungarian insurrection in Komorn; Archduke John moved on to Presburg. In the north, the Archduke Ferdinand, who had advanced as far as Warsaw, had been driven back by the Poles: under Poniatowsky, and by a Russian force sent by the Emperor Alexander to their aid, which, on this success, invaded Galicia."

W. K. Kelly, History of the House of Austria (Continuation of Coxe), chapter 4.

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 56-57 (volume 12).

Duke de Rovigo, Memoirs, volume 2, part 2, chapters 3-12.

Baron Jomini, Life of Napoleon, chapter 14 (volume 3).

Baron de Marbot, Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 42-48.

GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (April-July). Risings against the French in the North.

"A general revolt against the French had nearly taken place in Saxony and Westphalia, where the enormous burdens imposed on the people, and the insolence of the French troops, had kindled a deadly spirit of hostility against the oppressors. Everywhere the Tugendbund were in activity; and the advance of the Austrians towards Franconia and Saxony, at the beginning of the war, blew up the flame. The two first attempts at insurrection, headed respectively by Katt, a Prussian officer (April 3), and Dornberg, a Westphalian colonel (April 23), proved abortive; but the enterprise of the celebrated Schill was of a more formidable character. {1519} This enthusiastic patriot, then a colonel in the Prussian army, had been compromised in the revolt of Dornberg; and finding himself discovered, he boldly raised the standard (April 29) at the head of 600 soldiers. His force speedily received accessions, but failing in his attempts on Wittenberg and Magdeburg, he moved towards the Baltic, in hope of succour from the British cruisers, and at last threw himself into Stralsund. Here he was speedily invested; the place was stormed (May 31), and the gallant Schill slain in the assault, a few hours only before the appearance of the British vessels —the timely arrival of which might have secured the place, and spread the rising over all Northern Germany. The Duke of Brunswick-Oels, with his 'black band' of volunteers, had at the same time invaded Saxony from Bohemia; and though then obliged to retreat, he made a second incursion in June, occupied Dresden and Leipsic, and drove the King of Westphalia into France. After the battle of Wagram he made his way across all Northern Germany, and was eventually conveyed, with his gallant followers, still 2,000 strong, to England."

Epitome of Alison's History of Europe, sections 525-526.

GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (July-September). Napoleon's victory at Wagram. The Peace of Schonbrunn. Immense surrender of Austrian territory.

"The operation of establishing the bridges between the French camp and the left bank of the Danube commenced on the night of the 30th of June; and during the night of the 4th of July the whole French army, passing between the villages of Enzersdorf and Muhlleuten, debouched on the Marchfeld, wheeling to their left. Napoleon was on horseback in the midst of them by daylight; all the Austrian fortifications erected to defend the former bridge were turned, the villages occupied by their army taken, and the Archduke Charles was menaced both in flank and rear, the French line of battle appuyed on Enzersdorf being at a right angle to his left wing. Under these circumstances the Archduke, retiring his left, attempted to outflank the French right, while Napoleon bore down upon his centre at Wagram. This village became the scene of a sanguinary struggle, and one house only remained standing when night closed in. The Archduke sent courier after courier to hasten the advance of his brother, between whom and himself was Napoleon, whose line on the night of the 5th extended from Loibersdorf on the right to some two miles beyond Wagram on the left. Napoleon passed the night in massing his centre, still determining to manœuvre by his left in order to throw back the Archduke Charles on that side before the Archduke John could come up on the other. At six o'clock on the morning of the 6th of July he commanded the attack in person. Disregarding all risk, he appeared throughout the day in the hottest of the fire, mounted on a snow-white charger, Euphrates, a present from the Shah of Persia. The Archduke Charles as usual committed the error which Napoleon's enemies had not even yet learned was invariably fatal to them: extending his line too greatly he weakened his centre, at the same time opening tremendous assaults on the French wings, which suffered dreadfully. Napoleon ordered Lauriston to advance upon the Austrian centre with a hundred guns, supported by two whole divisions of infantry in column. The artillery, when within half cannon-shot, opened a terrific fire: nothing could withstand such a shock. The infantry, led by Macdonald, charged; the Austrian line was broken and the centre driven back in confusion. The right, in a panic, retrograded; the French cavalry then bore down upon them and decided the battle, the Archduke still fighting to secure his retreat, which he at length effected in tolerably good order. By noon the whole Austrian army was abandoning the contest. Their defeat so demoralized them that the Archduke John, who came up on Napoleon's right before the battle was over, was glad to retire with the rest, unnoticed by the enemy. That evening the Marchfeld and Wagram were in possession of the French. The population of Vienna had watched the battle from the roofs and ramparts of the city, and saw the retreat of their army with fear and gloom. Between 300,000 and 400,000 men were engaged, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal. About 20,000 dead and 30,000 wounded strewed the ground; the latter were conveyed to the hospitals of Vienna. … Twenty thousand Austrians were taken prisoners, but the number would have been greater had the French cavalry acted with their usual spirit. Bernadotte, issuing a bulletin, almost assuming to himself the sole merit of the victory, was removed from his command. Macdonald was created a marshal of the empire on the morning after the battle. … The battle of Wagram was won more by good fortune than skill. Napoleon's strategy was at fault, and had the Austrians fought as stoutly as they did at Aspern, Napoleon would have been signally defeated. Had the Archduke John acted promptly and vigorously, he might have united with his brother's left—which was intact—and overwhelmed the French. … The defeated army retired to Znaim, followed by the French; but further resistance was abandoned by the Emperor of Austria. The Archduke Charles solicited an armistice on the 9th; hostilities ceased, and Napoleon returned to the palace of Schonbrunn while the plenipotentiaries settled the terms of peace. … English Ministers displayed another instance of their customary spirit of procrastination. Exactly eight days after the armistice of Znaim, which assured them that Austria was no longer in a position to profit by or co-operate with their proceedings, they sent more than 80,000 fighting men, under the command of Lord Chatham, to besiege Antwerp. …

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1809 (JULY-DECEMBER).

Operations against Naples proved equally abortive. … In Spain alone English arms were successful. Sir Arthur Wellesley won the battle of Talavera on the 28th of July. …

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

A treaty of peace, between France and Austria was signed on the 14th of October at Vienna [sometimes called the Treaty of Vienna, but more commonly the Peace of Schonbrunn]. The Emperor of Austria ceded Salzburg and a part of Upper Austria to the Confederation of the Rhine; part of Bohemia, Cracow, and Western Galicia to the King of Saxony as Grand Duke of Warsaw; part of Eastern Galicia to the Emperor of Russia; and Trieste, Carniola, Friuli, Villach, and some part of Croatia and Dalmatia to France: thus connecting the kingdom of Italy with Napoleon's Illyrian possessions, making him master of the entire coast of the Adriatic, and depriving Austria of its last seaport. It was computed that the Emperor Francis gave up territory to the amount of 45,000 square miles, with a population of nearly 4,000,000. He also paid a large contribution in money."

R. H. Horne, Life of Napoleon, chapter 32.

{1520}

"The cessions made directly to Napoleon were the county of Görtz, or Goricia, and that of Montefalcone, forming the Austrian Friuli; the town and government of Trieste, Carniola, the circle of Villach in Carinthia, part of Croatia and Dalmatia, and the lordship of Räzuns in the Grison territory. All these provinces, with the exception of Räzuns, were incorporated by a decree of Napoleon, with Dalmatia and its islands, into a single state with the name of the Illyrian Provinces. They were never united with France, but always governed by Napoleon as an independent state. A few districts before possessed by Napoleon were also incorporated with them: as Venetian Istria and Dalmatia with the Bocca di Cattaro, Ragusa, and part of the Tyrol. … The only other articles of the treaty of much importance are the recognition by Austria of any changes made, or to be made, in Spain, Portugal, and Italy; the adherence of the Emperor to the prohibitive system adopted by France and Russia, and his engaging to cease all correspondence and relationship with Great Britain. By a decree made at Ratisbon, April 24th, 1809, Napoleon had suppressed the Teutonic Order in all the States belonging to the Rhenish Confederation, reannexed its possessions to the domains of the prince in which they were situated, and incorporated Mergentheim, with the rights, domains, and revenues attached to the Grand Mastership of the Order, with the Kingdom of Würtemberg. These dispositions were confirmed by the Treaty of Schönbrunn. The effect aimed at by the Treaty of Schönbrunn was to surround Austria with powerful states, and thus to paralyse all her military efforts. … The Emperor of Russia … was very ill satisfied with the small portion of the spoils assigned to him, and the augmentation awarded to the duchy of Warsaw. Hence the first occasion of coldness between him and Napoleon, whom he suspected of a design to reestablish the Kingdom of Poland."

T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 7, chapter 14 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapters 59-60 (volume 13).

General Count M. Dumas, Memoirs, chapter 13 (volume 2).

E. Baines, History of the Wars of the French Revolution, book 4, chapter 9 (volume 3).

J. C. Ropes, The First Napoleon, lecture 4.

GERMANY: A. D. 1809-1810. Humboldt's reform of Public Instruction in Prussia.

See EDUCATION, MODERN: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. PRUSSIA: A. D. 1809.

GERMANY: A. D. 1809-1810 (April-February). The revolt in the Tyrol. Heroic struggle of Andrew Hofer and his countrymen.

"The Tyrol, for centuries a possession of Austria, was ceded to Bavaria by the Peace of Presburg in 1805. The Bavarians made many innovations, in the French style, some good and some bad; but the mountaineers, clinging to their ancient ways, resisted them all alike. They hated the Bavarians as foreign masters forced upon them; and especially detested the military conscription, to which Austria had never subjected them. The priests had an almost unlimited influence over these faithful Catholics, and the Bavarians, who treated them rudely, were regarded as innovators and allies of revolutionary France. Thus the country submitted restlessly to the yoke of the Rhine League until the spring of 1809. A secret understanding was maintained with Austria and the Archduke John, and the people never abandoned the hope of returning to their Austrian allegiance. When the great war of 1809 began, the Emperor Francis summoned all his people to arms. The Tyrolese answered the call. … They are a people trained in early life to the use of arms, and to activity, courage, and ready devices in hunting, and in traveling on their mountain paths. Austria could be sure of the faithfulness of the Tyrol, and made haste to occupy the country. When the first troops were seen entering the passes, the people arose and drove away the Bavarian garrisons. The alarm was soon sounded through the deepest ravines of the land. Never was there a more united people, and each troop or company chose its own officers, in the ancient German style, from among their strongest and best men. Their commanders were hunters, shepherds, priests: the former gamekeeper, Speckbacher; the innkeeper, Martin Teimer; the fiery Capuchin monk, Haspinger, whose sole weapon in the field was a huge ebony crucifix, and many more of like peaceful occupations. At the head of the whole army was a man who, like Saul, towered by a head above all others, while his handsome black beard fell to his girdle—Andrew Hofer, formerly an innkeeper at Passeyr—a man of humble piety and simple faithfulness, who fairly represented the people he led. He regarded the war as dutiful service to his religion, his emperor, and his country. The whole land soon swarmed with little bands of men, making their way to Innsprück (April, 1809), whence the Bavarian garrison fled. Meanwhile a small French corps came from Italy to relieve them. Though fired upon by the peasants from every ravine and hill, they passed the Brenner, and reached the Iselberg, near Innsprück. But here they were surrounded on every side, and forced to surrender. The first Austrian soldiers, under General Chasteler, then reached the capital, and their welcome was a popular festival. The liberators, as the Tyrolese soldiers regarded themselves, committed no cruelties, but carried on their enterprise in the spirit of a national jubilee. The tidings of the disasters at Regensburg [Ratisbon] now came upon them like a thunderbolt. The withdrawal of the Austrian army then left the Tyrol without protection. Napoleon treated the war as a mutiny, and set a price upon Chasteler's head. Neither Chasteler nor any of the Austrian officers with him understood the warfare of the peasantry. The Tyrolese were left almost wholly to themselves, but they resolved to defend their mountains. On May 11 the Bavarians under Wrede again set out, from Salzburg, captured the pass of the Strub after a bloody fight, and then climbed into the valley of the Inn. They practiced frightful cruelties in their way. A fierce struggle took place at the little village of Schwatz; the Bavarians burned the place, and marched to Innsprück. Chasteler withdrew, and the Bavarians and French, under Wrede and Lefevre, entered the capital. The country again appeared to be subdued. But cruelty had embittered the people. Wrede was recalled, with his corps, by Napoleon; and now Hofer, with his South Tyrolese, recrossed the Brenner Pass. Again the general alarm was given, the leaders called to arms, and again every pass, every wall of rock, every narrow road was seized. The struggle took place at the Iselberg. {1521} The Bavarians, 7,000 in number, were defeated with heavy loss. The Tyrol now remained for several months undisturbed, during the campaign around Vienna. After the battle of Aspern, an imperial proclamation formally assured the Tyrolese that they should never be severed from the Austrian Empire; and that no peace should be signed unless their indissoluble union with the monarchy were recognized. The Tyrolese quietly trusted the emperor's promise, until the armistice of Znaim. But in this the Tyrol was not mentioned, and the French and their allies prepared to chastise the loyal and abandoned country."

C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, chapter 28.

"In the mouth of July, an army of 40,000 French and Bavarians attacked the Tyrol from the German side; while from Italy, General Rusca, with 18,000 men, entered from Clagenfurth, on the southern side of the Tyrolese Alps. Undismayed by this double and formidable invasion, they assailed the invaders as they penetrated into their fastnesses, defeated and destroyed them. The fate of a division of 10,000 men, belonging to the French and Bavarian army, which entered the Upper Innthal, or Valley of the Inn, will explain in part the means by which these victories were obtained. The invading troops advanced in a long column up a road bordered on the one side by the river Inn, there a deep and rapid torrent, where cliffs of immense height overhang both road and river. The vanguard was permitted to advance unopposed as far as Prutz, the object of their expedition. The rest of the army were therefore induced to trust themselves still deeper in this tremendous pass, where the precipices, becoming more and more narrow as they advanced, seemed about to close above their heads. No sound but of the screaming of the eagles disturbed from, their eyries, and the roar of the river, reached the ears of the soldier, and on the precipices, partly enveloped in a hazy mist, no human forms showed themselves. At length the voice of a man was heard calling across the ravine, 'Shall we begin?'—'No,' was returned in an authoritative tone of voice, by one who, like the first speaker, seemed the inhabitant of some upper region. The Bavarian detachment halted, and sent to the general for orders;' when presently was heard the terrible signal, 'In the name of the Holy Trinity, cut all loose!' Huge rocks, and trunks of trees, long prepared and laid in heaps for the purpose, began now to descend rapidly in every direction, while the deadly fire of the Tyrolese, who never throw away a shot, opened from every bush, crag, or corner of rock, which would afford the shooter cover. As this dreadful attack was made on the whole line at once, two-thirds of the enemy were instantly destroyed; while the Tyrolese, rushing from their shelter, with swords, spears, axes, scythes, clubs and all other rustic instruments which could be converted into weapons, beat down and routed the shattered remainder. As the vanguard, which had reached Prutz, was obliged to surrender, very few of the 10,000 invaders are computed to have extricated themselves from the fatal pass. But not all the courage of the Tyrolese, not all the strength of their country, could possibly enable them to defend themselves, when the peace with Austria had permitted Buonaparte to engage his whole immense means for the acquisition of these mountains. Austria too—Austria herself, in whose cause they had incurred all the dangers of war, instead of securing their indemnity by some stipulations in the treaty, sent them a cold exhortation to lay down their arms. Resistance, therefore, was abandoned as fruitless; Hofer, chief commander of the Tyrolese, resigned his command, and the Bavarians regained the possession of a country which they could never have won back by their own efforts. Hofer, and about thirty chiefs of these valiant defenders of their country, were put to death [February, 1810], in poor revenge for the loss their bravery had occasioned. But their fame, as their immortal spirit, was beyond the power of the judge alike and executioner; and the place where their blood was shed, becomes sacred to the thoughts of freedom, as the precincts of a temple to those of religion."

Sir W. Scott, Life of Napoleon, volume 2, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 58 (volume 12).

History of Hofer (Quarterly Review, July, 1817).

C. H. Hall, Life of Andrew Hofer.

GERMANY: A. D. 1810. Annexation of the Hanse Towns and territory on the North Sea to France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1810-1812. Marriage of the Archduchess Marie Louise of Austria to Napoleon. Alliance of German powers with Napoleon against Russia.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

GERMANY: A. D. 1812. The Russian campaign of Napoleon and its disastrous ending.

See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (JUNE-SEPTEMBER), (SEPTEMBER), and (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813. The Teutonic uprising against Napoleon. Beginning of the War of Liberation. Alliance of Prussia and Russia.

"During Napoleon's march on Moscow and his fatal return, Macdonald remained on the Lower Dwina, before Riga, with an observation corps of Prussians and Poles, nor had he ever received an order to retreat from Napoleon. Learning of the misfortunes of the grand army, he went from the Dwina towards the Niemen. As he passed through Courland, General York, commander of the Prussian troops, allowed him to lead the way with the Poles, and then signed an agreement of neutrality with the Russians (December 30, 1812). The Prussian troops, from a military spirit of honor, had fought the Russians bravely; they retained some scruples relative to the worthy marshal under whom they served, and forsook without betraying him, that is, they left him time to escape. This was a most important event and the beginning of the inevitable defection of Germany. The attitude of Czar Alexander decided General York; the former was completely dazzled by his triumphs, and aspired to nothing less than to destroy Napoleon and liberate Europe, even France! With mingled enthusiasm and calculation, he promised all things to all men; on returning to Wilna, he granted an amnesty for all acts committed in Poland against Russian authority. On the one hand, he circulated a rumor that he was about to make himself King of Poland, and, on the other hand, he announced to the Prussians that he was ready to restore the Polish provinces taken from them by Napoleon. He authorized ex-Minister Stein to take possession, as we may say, of Old Prussia, just evacuated by the French, and to promise the speedy enfranchisement of Germany, protesting, at the same time, that he would not dispute 'the legitimate greatness' of France. {1522} The French army, on hearing of York's defection, left Königsberg with ten or twelve thousand sick men and eight or ten thousand armed troops, withdrawing to the Vistula and thence to Warta and Posen. General Rapp had succeeded in gathering at Dantzic, the great French depot of stores and reserves, 25,000 men, few of whom had gone through the Russian campaign, and a division of almost equal numbers occupied Berlin. The French had in all barely 80,000 men, from Dantzic to the Rhine, not including their Austrian and Saxon allies, who had fallen back on Warsaw and seemed disposed to fight no more. Murat, to whom Napoleon confided the remains of the grand army, followed the Emperor's example and set out to defend his Neapolitan kingdom, leaving the chief command to Prince Eugene. Great agitation prevailed around the feeble French forces still occupying Germany. The Russians themselves, worn out, did not press the French very hotly; but York and Stein, masters of Königsberg, organized and armed Old Prussia without awaiting authorization from the king, who was not considered as a free agent, being under foreign rule. Pamphlets, proclamations, and popular songs were circulated everywhere, provoking the people to rebellion. The idea of German union ran like wildfire from the Niemen to the Rhine; federal union, not unity in a single body or state, which was not thought of then."

H. Martin, Popular History of France from 1789, volume 2, chapter 16.

"The king of Prussia had suddenly abandoned Berlin [January, 1813], which was still in the hands of the French, for Breslau, whence he declared war against France. A conference also took place between him and the emperor Alexander at Calisch [Kalisch], and, on the 28th of February, 1813, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between them. The hour for vengeance had at length arrived. The whole Prussian nation, eager to throw off the hated yoke of the foreigner, to obliterate their disgrace in 1806, to regain their ancient name, cheerfully hastened to place their lives and property at the service of the impoverished government. The whole of the able-bodied population was put under arms. The standing army was increased: to each regiment were appended troops of volunteers, Jaegers, composed of young' men belonging to the higher classes, who furnished their own equipments: a numerous Landwehr, a sort of militia, was, as in Austria, raised besides the standing army, and measures were even taken to call out, in case of necessity, the heads of families and elderly men remaining at home, under the name of the Landsturm. The enthusiastic people, besides furnishing the customary supplies and paying the taxes, contributed to the full extent of their means towards defraying the immense expense of this general arming. Every heart throbbed high with pride and hope. … More loudly than even in 1809 in Austria was the German cause now discussed, the great name of the German empire now invoked in Prussia, for in that name alone could all the races of Germany be united against their hereditary foe. The celebrated proclamation, promising external and internal liberty to Germany, was, with this view, published at Calisch by Prussia and Russia. Nor was the appeal vain. It found an echo in every German heart, and such plain demonstrations of the state of the popular feeling on this side the Rhine were made, that Davoust sent serious warning to Napoleon, who contemptuously replied, 'Pah! Germans never can become Spaniards!' With his customary rapidity he levied in France a fresh army 300,000 strong, with which he so completely awed the Rhenish confederation as to compel it once more to take the field with thousands of Germans against their brother Germans. The troops, however, reluctantly obeyed, and even the traitors were but lukewarm, for they doubted of success. Mecklenburg alone sided with Prussia. Austria remained neutral. A Russian corps under General Tettenborn had preceded the rest of the troops and reached the coasts of the Baltic. As early as the 24th of March, 1813, it appeared in Hamburg and expelled the French authorities from the city. The heavily oppressed people of Hamburg, whose commerce had been totally annihilated by the continental system, gave way to the utmost demonstrations of delight, received their deliverers with open arms, revived their ancient rights, and immediately raised a Hanseatic corps destined to take the field against Napoleon. Dörnberg, the ancient foe to France, with another flying squadron took the French division under Morand prisoner, and the Prussian, Major Hellwig (the same who, in 1806, liberated the garrison of Erfurt), dispersed, with merely 120 hussars, a Bavarian regiment 1,300 strong and captured five pieces of artillery. In January, the peasantry of the upper country had already revolted against the conscription, and, in February, patriotic proclamations had been disseminated throughout Westphalia under the signature of the Baron von Stein. In this month, also, Captain Maas and two other patriots, who had attempted to raise a rebellion, were executed. As the army advanced, Stein was nominated chief of the provisional government of the still unconquered provinces of Western Germany. The first Russian army, 17,000 strong, under Wittgenstein, pushed forward to Magdeburg, and, at Mökern, repulsed 40,000 French who were advancing upon Berlin. The Prussians, under their veteran general, Blücher, entered Saxony and garrisoned Dresden, on the 27th of March, 1813, after an arch of the fine bridge across the Elbe [had] been uselessly blown up by the French. Blücher, whose gallantry in the former wars had gained for him the general esteem and whose kind and generous disposition had won the affection of the soldiery, was nominated generalissimo of the Prussian forces, but subordinate in command to Wittgenstein, who replaced Kutusow as generalissimo of the united forces of Russia and Prussia. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia accompanied the army and were received with loud acclamations by the people of Dresden and Leipzig."

W. Menzel, History of Germany, chapter 260 (volume 3).

Bernadotte, the adopted Crown Prince and expectant King of Sweden, had been finally thrown into the arms of the new Coalition against Napoleon, by the refusal of the latter to take Norway from Denmark and give it to Sweden. "The disastrous retreat of the French from Moscow … led to the signature of the Treaty of Stockholm on the 2d of March, 1813, by which England acceded to the union of Norway to Sweden, and a Swedish force was sent to Pomerania under General Sandels. On the 18th of May, 1813, Bernadotte landed at Stralsund."