Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 69)

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 2, chapter 3.

"Halleck soon leaves for Washington to assume supreme control of the Union forces from the War Department. Grant is left in command of the Army of the Tennessee, Buell of the Army of the Ohio, Pope of the Army of the Mississippi. Everyone is without definite instructions; there is no one head; and the Western armies are practically put upon the defensive. Rosecrans succeeds Pope, who is transferred to Virginia, and to Grant's lot now fall the armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee, 42,000 effectives, with which to keep open his communications with Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur. While Grant and Sherman devote their energies to the line of the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennessee, where the loyal population is in extreme suffering. Mitchell's [General O. M. Mitchell] capture of Huntsville [in Alabama, which he surprised, by a remarkable forced march, from Nashville, in April], and some hundred miles of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which he had held, together with all territory north of the Tennessee river, had been full of possibilities. Had he but received the authority, he might readily have anticipated Bragg in taking possession of Chattanooga, and have saved much subsequent blood and treasure. For this town is the key to that entire strategic field. … Buell supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his right in order to obtain possession of Nashville. He therefore concentrated the bulk of his force at Murfreesboro. Thomas, then commanding a wing of the Army of the Ohio, whose military intuitions were as keen as his judgment was reliable, … was shrewd enough to recognize Bragg's crossing of the Tennessee river as a threat to invade Kentucky. Not so Buell, to his sorrow. By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around Buell's left, through the Sequatchie Valley [August 28], and marches straight toward Louisville, while Kirby Smith turns Cumberland Gap, defeats Nelson at Richmond, and makes for Cincinnati. … Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country, Buell at once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, while he endeavors to retain his grasp on Nashville with his right. Bragg has the shorter line and the start. But he is delayed a day or two [September 16-17] by the capture of Mumfordsville, and by scattering his forces instead of pushing home. This is a serious fault on Bragg's part. He fairly holds success in his hand, but forfeits it by this delay. After some rapid marching and manœuvring, Buell enters Louisville just ahead of his opponent. The authorities in Washington have lost all confidence in Buell. He is summarily relieved from command and Thomas appointed to succeed him. But this magnanimous soldier, though far from always agreeing with the methods of his chief, declines the proffered honor, and, at his earnest solicitation, Buell is reinstated. The Army of the Ohio marches out to meet Bragg, with Thomas second in command. Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and Duck rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith near Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon Bragg's communications. After some cautious feeling, Buell comes upon Hardee with only 15,000 men, at Perryville, where, had he at once attacked, he could have punished Bragg severely for this division. But, owing to lack of water, one-half of Buell's army is distant from the field, and he in turn pays the penalty of lack of concentration. Polk joins Hardee, and the latter [October 8] falls heavily upon McCook, who holds Buell's left, and bears him back. But he cannot break the Union centre; and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires, leaving to our forces the field. Our left has not been engaged. The loss is nearly 5,000 men on either side, a quarter of the numbers actually engaged. On being followed up, Bragg retreats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves Kentucky and Tennessee once more in our possession. His retreat ends only at Chattanooga. {3473} What Bragg expected to obtain in Kentucky was a vast accession of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland. Both fell short of their calculations, though Bragg carried off a goodly train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had really done, the South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's failure to hold Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. … Halleck now insists that Buell shall undertake a campaign in East Tennessee, still occupied by the enemy. But Buell alleges the utter impossibility of subsisting his troops so far from the railroad; and again concentrates at Nashville. Here he is relieved [October 30] and General Rosecrans is appointed to the command."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: D. C. Buell, J. Wheeler, and others, The Perryville Campaign (Battles and Leaders, volume 3).

T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 12-15 (volume 1).

J. B. Fry, Operations of the Army under Buell.

Official Records, series 1, volume 16.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Three hundred thousand more.

On the 2d of July, 1862, the President issued his proclamation calling for 300,000 volunteers.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Land-grant for agricultural and mechanical Colleges.

See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1862.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Prescription of the Ironclad Oath. See IRONCLAD OATH.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). The fitting out of the Rebel cruiser, Alabama, at Liverpool.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Confiscation of the property of rebels, giving freedom to their slaves.

Immediately on the assembling of Congress at its regular session in December, 1861, "Mr. Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill, providing that the slaves of all who had taken up arms against the United States should 'become forever thereafter free, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.' … On the 25th of February it came up for general debate, which was very extended. … Divergences of views, even among those who had been most prominent and pronounced in their antislavery action, and the general drift of the discussion, seemed to preclude any reasonable hope of agreement upon any motion or measure then before the Senate. It was therefore moved by Mr. Clark of New Hampshire to refer the whole matter, the original bill, and all motions, amendments, and substitutes, to a select committee. This, too, gave rise to a sharp debate. … The motion was carried by a vote of 24 to 14; and the committee, consisting of Clark, Collamer, Trumbull, Cowan, Wilson, Harris, Sherman, Henderson, and Willey, was appointed. Mr. Trumbull declining, Mr. Harlan was appointed in his place. The committee reported 'a bill to suppress insurrection, and punish treason and rebellion'; and on the 16th of May it came up for consideration. Its main provision was that at any time after the passage of the act, the President might issue his proclamation that the slaves of persons found, 30 days after the issuing of the proclamation, in arms against the government, will be free, any law or custom to the contrary; that no slave escaping from his master shall be given up, unless the claimant proves he has not given aid or comfort to the Rebellion; and that the President shall be authorized to employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the Rebellion. … The bill was further debated, but did not reach a vote. In the House a substantially similar course was pursued. On the first day of the regular session Mr. Eliot of Massachusetts introduced a resolution confiscating the property and freeing the slaves of those engaged in the Rebellion. It did not, however, come up for consideration till the close of the following week. … A motion was finally made and carried to refer the whole subject to a select committee of seven, consisting of Olin, Eliot, Noell, Hutchins, Mallory, Beaman, and Cobb. Mr. Olin was excused, and Mr. Sedgwick of New York was appointed in his place. On the 14th of May Mr. Eliot from the committee reported two bills,—the one confiscating Rebel property, and the other freeing the slaves of Rebels,—and opened the debate on 'the twin measures of confiscation and emancipation.' … On the 26th of May Mr. Eliot closed the debate, and the two bills he had reported from the special committee were brought to a vote. The first, or that providing for the confiscation of Rebel property, was passed by a strong majority. The second, or that freeing the slaves of Rebels, coming up for action, the first business was the disposal of the several amendments that had been offered. The amendments having all been voted down, the original bill was lost by a vote of 74 to 78. That vote was, however, reconsidered and the bill was recommitted. On the 18th of June Mr. Eliot moved a substitute for the bill reported by the committee, which was accepted by the House, and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by a vote of 82 to 54. The gist of this bill consisted in the provision, that all slaves of persons found in rebellion 60 days after the President shall issue his proclamation should be free; and the President should appoint commissioners to carry its provisions into effect. The House confiscation bill was taken up in the Senate on the 23d of June. An amendment was moved by Mr. Clark combining confiscation and emancipation. The amendment was sharply debated, but was adopted on the 28th. The bill as amended was adopted by a vote of 28 to 13. The bill as thus amended was taken up in the House on the 3d of July, and the House non-concurred in the Senate's amendment. … A committee of conference was appointed, which reported, on the 11th, in substance the Senate amendment. The report was accepted by both bodies, … and the President gave it his approval on the 17th. It provided that all slaves of Rebels coming into the possession or under the protection of the government should be deemed captives of war, and made free; that fugitive slaves should not be surrendered; that no person engaged in the military or naval service should render fugitives on pain of being dismissed from the service; and that the President might employ persons of the African race for the suppression of the Rebellion in such manner as he might deem best."

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, volume 3, chapter 25.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, pages 373-377.

E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Rebellion, pages 196-203.

{3474}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia). The end of the Peninsular Campaign. The army at Harrison's Landing. Results of the Seven Days fighting. Withdrawal from the Peninsula.

"On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely 50,000 men in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps commanders made their reports, it was found that the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to 15,249 men, of whom 1,582 had been killed, 7,700 wounded, and 5,958 missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this number may be added, without exaggeration, 6,000 sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore found himself with about 84,000 men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him. The losses of Lee's army during the seven days amounted to 20,000 men, to which number must also be added at least 5,000 rendered unfit for active service by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of 25,000 men. This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June. An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the environs of Richmond. … In the estimation of those who did not allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far from bad. … Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water communication. Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted under those grave circumstances. … On the occasion of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that position that [the President] went back fully determined to allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of action. But General Halleck … claimed for himself, as commander-in-chief [lately so appointed], the exclusive direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln, conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new authority." Measures taken during July for placing the army of the Potomac again upon the offensive were altered on the 3d of August, when Halleck gave orders to McClellan to transfer his army with all possible expedition to Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, for the support of General Pope and the Army of Virginia.

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 1, chapter 4 and book 3, chapter 1.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 5, chapter 24.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia). The beginning of Pope's campaign: Cedar Mountain, or Cedar Run.

"While Lee and McClellan were resting, important events were taking place at Washington and in Northern Virginia. The Federal administration, satisfied of the impolicy of the separate departments and independent commands which they had organized in that region, had determined to unite under one leader the three armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which Jackson had beaten or baffled in succession. … Their united armies were henceforth to be styled the Army of Virginia, while McClellan's forces continued to be known as the Army of the Potomac. General John Pope, whose deeds and still more his dispatches in the West, had given him some reputation, was called to Washington and placed at the head of the new army. General Pope was assigned to command on the 26th of June. … The unification of these commands under Pope was followed by another and still more important change of the same kind. The dissatisfaction of the Federal administration with General McClellan had been steadily growing for many months. This officer's caution often exposed him, and sometimes not unjustly, to the charge of timidity. … No doubt other causes, such as his moderation and his conservative political views, rendered him distasteful to the progressive radicals who at this time predominated in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet; but it must be confessed that McClellan's military conduct was not such as to inspire confidence or diminish antagonisms, and it, alone, is sufficient to account for the manner in which he was treated by his government. … After the Seven Days' Battles, the Federal government called General Halleck from the West … and placed him in chief command of the armies of the United States, the position from which McClellan had been deposed in March. The order assigning General Halleck was dated July 11, but the latter did not arrive in Washington and enter upon his duties until Ju]y 23. By this appointment it was designed to give a common head to the two armies in Virginia, and insure the cooperation of McClellan and Pope. The first great question that presented itself to Halleck was, what to do with McClellan's forces, and on the day after assuming command he left Washington to visit this army. The visit seems to have satisfied him of the propriety of withdrawing the Army of the Potomac at once from the Peninsula, and of placing it on the line of the Rappahannock. … During the month of Ju]y, while McClellan was resting at Westover, General Pope, though in Washington, was not idle. Having devoted some days to the reorganization and equipment of his command, he directed the concentration of the mass of his forces at the eastern base of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, from which position he could cover the approach to Washington, or threaten the flank of any columns going toward the Shenandoah Valley, while he prepared for an aggressive campaign. … General Lee on July 13 ordered Jackson with the veteran troops of his own and Ewell's division to Gordonsville to oppose Pope's advance. The force thus sent numbered about 11,000 men. Robertson's brigade of cavalry, which was already in Pope's front, added 1,000 or 1,200 more. General Lee remained with some 65,000 men between McClellan and Richmond. General Jackson reached the vicinity of Gordonsville on July 19. His arrival was opportune. The Federal reconnoitring parties had already advanced through Culpeper to the Rapidan, and on July 14 Banks had been ordered to send forward all his cavalry under Hatch to seize Gordonsville."

William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, chapter 20.

{3475}

"After ascertaining that the enemy were in large force under General Pope … Jackson applied to General Lee for reinforcements. The division of A. P. Hill was immediately sent to him, and, with this accession to his small army, Jackson had no intention of remaining idle or of awaiting an attack from so powerful a foe, but determined to strike a blow himself before the enemy had time to concentrate all their forces. He therefore advanced towards them on the 7th of August. Before taking this step, it was observed that he was much in prayer, but this was his custom previous to every battle. … Pope's army was gathering in all its strength at Culpepper Court-House, and on the 9th of August Jackson's little army came in contact with his advance-guard about six miles from the Court-House, on the borders of a little stream called Cedar Run. Here hostilities began by a furious cannonade on both sides, lasting two hours, when, about five o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry of both armies became hotly engaged. The conflict was fierce and stubborn, but the overwhelming numbers of the enemy swept down with such impetuosity that the weaker party were forced to yield, and it looked as if it were doomed to destruction. Ewell, Early, A. P. Hill, Winder, and other commanders all fought their bravest and best—the gallant Winder receiving a mortal wound—and still they were pressed back. 'It was at this fearful moment,' says his late chief-of-staff, Dr. Dabney, 'that the genius of the storm reared his head, and in an instant the tide was turned, Jackson appeared in the mid-torrent of the highway, … he drew his own sword (the first time in the war), and shouted to the broken troops with a voice which pealed higher than the roar of battle: "Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your general will lead you! Jackson will lead you† Follow me!" This appeal was not in vain, and the Federals, startled by this unexpected rally, were driven from the field. They afterwards made an attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day, which they had so nearly won, by an assault from a magnificent body of cavalry, but even this was repelled, and the troopers driven in full retreat.' … This battle of Cedar Run [called Cedar Mountain by the Unionists] Jackson himself pronounced the most successful of his exploits. … In this battle the Confederates had between eighteen and twenty thousand men engaged, while the Federals, according to their own returns, had thirty-two thousand. Jackson, however, had one incalculable advantage over the enemy, which he gained by his promptitude in seizing and holding Slaughter's Mountain—an elevation which commanded all the surrounding plains, and enabled him to overlook the whole scene of action. … It was to the advantage of this position as well as the bravery of his troops that he was indebted for his complete success. By this victory Pope received such a blow that he was deterred from making another advance until he could gather reinforcements. Burnside's corps was withdrawn from North Carolina and sent on to Culpepper Court-House, and it was believed that McClellan's remaining forces would be recalled from James River and sent also to swell the ranks of the grand 'Army of Virginia,' as the command of Pope was called. At all events, General Lee was convinced that McClellan was incapable of further aggression, and that the most effective way to dislodge him from the Peninsula was to threaten Washington! He therefore determined to move his army from Richmond to Gordonsville. He began his march on the 13th, and four days after, on the 17th, McClellan evacuated the Peninsula and removed his troops to the Potomac." Pope's army was withdrawn behind the Rappahannock. "General Lee now ordered Jackson to cross the Rappahannock high up, and by a forced march go to Manassas and get in Pope's rear. Other divisions were sent to Pope's front, and the two hostile armies marched along on either side of the stream, opening fire upon each other whenever the opportunity offered. Jackson continued his march up stream until he reached Warrenton Springs, on the 22d, where he found the bridge destroyed, but he passed Early's brigade over on a mill-dam, and took possession of the Springs. Before other troops could be crossed to his support, a sudden and heavy rainfall swelled the river so as to render it impassable, and Early was thus cut off from his friends and surrounded by the enemy. His situation was one of extreme peril, but he managed to conceal his troops in the woods, and hold his foes at bay with artillery, until Jackson had constructed a temporary bridge, and by the dawn of the morning of the 24th the gallant Early, with his command, had recrossed the river without the loss of a man. While a fierce artillery duel was going on across the river between A. P. Hill and the enemy, Jackson left the river-bank a few miles, and marched to the village of Jeffersonton. He was thus lost sight of by the Federals, and to Longstreet was given the task of amusing Pope by the appearance of a crossing at Warrenton Springs. Jackson was now preparing to obey Lee's order to separate himself from the rest of the army, pass around Pope to the westward, and place his corps between him and Washington at Manassas Junction.

Mrs. M. A. Jackson, Life and letters of General Thomas J. Jackson, chapter 17.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon. History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 1-3.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 4, chapter 19.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-September: Missouri-Arkansas). Warfare with the Rebel Guerrillas.

"Since the autumn of 1861, General J. M. Schofield, Lyon's second at the battle of Wilson's Creek, had been in command of the militia of Missouri, and in June, 1862, that State was erected into a separate military district, with Schofield at its head. He was vigilant and active; but when Curtis withdrew to the Mississippi, and left Arkansas and Southern Missouri open to the operations of guerrilla bands, then numerous in the western part of the former State, he found his forces inadequate to keep down the secessionists in his district. When Price crossed the Mississippi, early in May, he sent back large numbers of Missourians to recruit guerrilla bands for active service during, the summer, and these, at the middle of July, were very numerous in the interior, and were preparing to seize important points in the State. To meet the danger, Schofield obtained authority from the Governor to organize all the militia of the State. {3476} This drew a sharp dividing line between the loyal and disloyal inhabitants. He soon had 50,000 names on his rolls, of whom nearly 20,000 were ready for effective service at the close of July, when the failure of the campaign against Richmond so encouraged the secessionists in Missouri that it was very difficult to keep them in check. Schofield's army of volunteers and militia was scattered over Missouri in six divisions, and for two months a desperate and sanguinary guerrilla warfare was carried on in the bosom of that Commonwealth, the chief theater being northward of the Missouri River, in McNeill's division, where insurgent bands under leaders like Poindexter, Porter, Cobb, and others, about 5,000 strong, were very active." They were also aided by incursions from Arkansas, under Hughes, Coffey and other leaders. The encounters were many and fierce. At Kirksville, August 6, and Chariton River, four days later, the loyal forces achieved considerable victories; at Independence (which was captured) August 11, and at Lone Jack, about the same time, they suffered defeat. These were the principal engagements of the month. With the cooperation of General Blunt, commanding in Kansas, the Arkansas invasion was driven back. Missouri was now somewhat relieved, but the Confederates were gathering in force in Arkansas, where they were joined by conscripts from Southern Missouri and a large number of troops from Texas. Their entire number was estimated to be 50,000 at the middle of September, with General T. C. Hindman in chief command. … So threatening was this gathering that Schofield took the field in person, and General Curtis succeeded him in command of the District of Missouri." Schofield's vanguard, under General Salomon, encountered the enemy at Newtonia, September 30, and was defeated; but the Confederates retreated before the united forces of Schofield and Blunt and "were chased about 30 miles into Arkansas."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 2, chapter 20.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 4, chapter 3.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August). Draft of Militia for nine months.

By proclamation, August 4, the President ordered a draft of 300,000 militia, for nine months service unless sooner discharged.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August). President Lincoln's "policy" explained to Horace Greeley.

"Executive Mansion, Washington, August 22, 1862. Hon. Horace Greeley. Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York 'Tribune.' If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free. Yours, A. Lincoln."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, page 227-228.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August: Virginia.) General Pope's campaign: Stonewall Jackson's movement into the rear of the Federal Army.

"By the capture of Pope's papers [effected in a raid of Stuart's cavalry to the Federal rear] Lee gained an accurate knowledge of the situation of the Federal army. Acting on it, he ordered Jackson to advance his corps to Jeffersonton and secure the bridge over the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs. … Jackson, on arriving at Jeffersonton in the afternoon of the 22d, found that the bridge on the Warrenton turnpike had been destroyed by the Federals. … On the 23d Lee ordered Longstreet's corps to follow Jackson and mass in the vicinity of Jeffersonton. The headquarters of the army was also moved to that place. … General Longstreet made a feint on the position of Warrenton on the morning of the 24th, under cover of which Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the front to the vicinity of the road from Jeffersonton to the upper fords of the Rappahannock. Jackson was then directed to make preparations to turn the Federal position and seize their communications about Manassas Junction. Longstreet continued his cannonade at intervals throughout the day, to which the Federals replied with increasing vigor, showing that Pope was massing his army in Lee's front. It was the object of Lee to hold Pope in his present position by deluding him with the belief that it was his intention to force a passage of the river at that point, until Jackson by a flank movement could gain his rear. Longstreet, on the morning of the 25th, resumed his cannonade with increased energy, and at the same time made a display of infantry above and below the bridge. Jackson then, moved up the river to a ford eight miles above; crossing at that point and turning eastward, by a rapid march he reached the vicinity of Salem. Having made a march of 25 miles, he bivouacked for the night. Stuart's cavalry covered his right flank, the movement being masked by the natural features of the country. The next morning at dawn the march was resumed by the route through Thoroughfare Gap. The cavalry, moving well to the right, passed around the west end of Bull Run Mountain and joined the infantry at the village of Gainesville, a few miles from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. {3477} Pressing forward, still keeping the cavalry well to the right, Jackson struck the railroad at Bristoe Station late in the afternoon, where he captured two empty trains going east. After dark he sent a detachment under Stuart to secure Manassas Junction, the main depot of supplies of the Federal army. The cavalry moved upon the flanks of this position, while the infantry, commanded by Trimble, assaulted the works in front and carried them with insignificant loss, capturing two batteries of light artillery with their horses and a detachment of 300 men, besides an immense amount of army supplies. The next morning, after effectually destroying the railroad at Bristoe, Jackson … moved his main body to Manassas, where he allowed his troops a few hours to refresh themselves upon the abundant stores that had been captured. About 12 o'clock the sound of artillery in the direction of Bristoe announced the Federal advance. Not having transportation to remove the captured supplies, Jackson directed his men to take what they could carry off, and ordered the rest to be destroyed. General Ewell, having repulsed the advance of two Federal columns [at Bristoe Station], rejoined Jackson at Manassas. The destruction of the captured stores having been completed, Jackson retired with his whole force to Bull Run, and took a position for the night, a part of his troops resting on the battle-field of the previous year. Pope, … upon learning that Jackson was in his rear, … immediately abandoned his position on the Rappahannock and proceeded with al despatch to intercept him before he could be reinforced by Lee. His advance having been arrested on the 27th by Ewell, he did not proceed beyond Bristoe that day. Lee on the 26th withdrew Longstreet's corps from its position in front of Warrenton Springs, covering the withdrawal by a small rear-guard and artillery, and directed it to follow Jackson by the route he had taken the day before. … The corps bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Salem. On the morning of the succeeding day, the 27th, a messenger appeared bringing the important and cheering news of the success of Jackson at Bristoe and Manassas. … Thoroughfare Gap was reached about noon of the 28th. It was quickly found to be occupied by a Federal force. Some slight attempt was made to dislodge the enemy, but without success, as their position proved too strong, and it seemed as if the movement of the Confederate army in that direction was destined to be seriously interfered with. Meanwhile, nothing further had been heard from Jackson, and there was a natural anxiety in regard to his position and possible peril. … Under these critical circumstances General Lee made every effort to find some available route over the mountains," and had already succeeded in doing so when his adversary saved him further trouble. "Pope … had ordered McDowell to retire from the Gap and join him to aid in the anticipated crushing of Jackson. McDowell did so, leaving Rickett's division to hold the Gap. In evident ignorance of the vicinity of Longstreet's corps, this force was also withdrawn during the night, and on the morning of the 29th Lee found the Gap unoccupied, and at once marched through at the head of Longstreet's column. … Pope had unknowingly favored the advance of the Confederate commander. His removal of McDowell from his position had been a tactical error of such magnitude that it could not well be retrieved. … The cannonade at the Gap on the 28th had informed Jackson of Lee's proximity. He at once took a position north of the Warrenton turnpike, his left resting on Bull Run. … About three o'clock the Federals bore down in heavy force upon Ewell and Taliaferro, who maintained their positions with admirable firmness, repelling attack after attack until night. The loss on both sides was considerable. … Jackson, with barely 20,000 men, now found himself confronted by the greater part of the Federal army. Any commander with less firmness would have sought safety in retreat. But having heard the Confederate guns at Thoroughfare Gap, he knew that Lee would join him the next day. Therefore he determined to hold his position at all hazards. By the morning of the 29th … Hood's division had reached the south side of the mountain, and early in the day was joined by the remainder of Longstreet's corps, by way of the open Gap. While these important movements were in progress, Pope had resumed his attack upon Jackson. … On the arrival of Lee, Pope discontinued his attack, and retired to the position which the year before had been the scene of the famous battle of Bull Run, or Manassas."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: R. L. Dabney, Life and Campaigns of General Thomas J. Jackson.

G. H. Gordon, History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 4-10.

W. B. Taliaferro, Jackson's Raid around Pope (Battles and Leader, volume 2, pages 501-511).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August-September: Virginia). The end of General Pope's campaign: Groveton. Second Bull Run. Chantilly.

"By contradictory orders and the useless marches and counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too, with his forces very much out of position, and he himself ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy. When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville, reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike; Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very little success for a direct attack, and especially for a partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that officer remonstrated against it; but the order being imperative, he made a very determined attack with his division," and was driven back. {3478} "Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor, especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left, where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left [right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is, however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted from its execution. … Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter] had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then between Washington and Centreville. … With untimely obstinacy, Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle. To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. … Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. … Pope … telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was 'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat' of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and 'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check, Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back. "Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat of the Union forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled, and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had now yet given up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse; to intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington. Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime, fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September, Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but severe action which then occurred (called the battle of Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was, by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of Washington."

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, pages 184-193.

"The Second Battle of Bull Hun … was a severe defeat for General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor anything like a rout. … Lee claims to have captured in these engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded prisoners."

J. C. Ropes, The Army under Pope (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 4), chapters 8-11.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 11-13.

The Virginia Campaign of General Pope (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 2).

J. Pope, The Second Battle of Bull Run (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 449-494).

Official Records, Series 1, volume 12, part 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland). Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.

"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from Richmond. … He accordingly determined to advance into Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army, which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has been the subject of much discussion. … It can only be said that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words. {3479} His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. … The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says, 'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the Shenandoah Valley. … The Southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on the next day General Lee Issued an address to the people of Maryland. … This address, couched in terms of such dignity, had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in the condition Of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings. A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral. … Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his own men for success in his future movements. He faced that conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of Pennsylvania."

J. E. Cooke, Life of Robert E. Lee, part 5, chapters 1-2.

ALSO IN: A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 12.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland). Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry. South Mountain. Antietam.

"On the 2d of September the President went to General McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to that accorded to the army that had left the town two days before. … But this flattering reception was not the best fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out. … General Lee had taken it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws, the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation, with 73 guns. … Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the sur·render to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about 1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering 600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to look out for Crampton's. … There was stubborn and bloody fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the Confederates. {3480} At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side, and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap, the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with 400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took up a position on high ground between that stream and the village of Sharpsburg. … Lee now had his army together and strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000 combatants. … McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. … The ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges. McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the 16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with his left and centre. … All day long an artillery duel was kept up. … It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men. Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on, and the lines rested for the night where they were." At sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his centre and left, under Porter und Burnside, did not make any movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front, cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But, though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had been so severely punished that neither was inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army was not annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent reader. … General McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399 wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. … Nothing was done on the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000 prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the field … and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory was his."

R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Secession, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5).

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 3, chapter 4.

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 4.

A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th. Army Corps, part 2, chapters 2-3.

Official Records, series 1, volume 19.

G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, chapters 33-38.

D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others, Lee's Invasion of Maryland (Battles and Leaders, volume 2).

W. Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, chapters 37-48.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September). President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.

Abraham Lincoln "believed that without the Union permanent liberty for either race on this continent would be impossible. And because of this belief, he was reluctant, perhaps more reluctant than most of his associates, to strike slavery with the sword. For many months, the passionate appeals of millions of his associates seemed not to move him. He listened to all the phases of the discussion, and stated in language clearer and stronger than any opponent had used, the dangers, the difficulties, and the possible futility of the act. In reference to its practical wisdom, Congress, the Cabinet, and the country were divided. Several of his generals had proclaimed the freedom of slaves within the limits of their commands. The President revoked their proclamations. His first Secretary of War had inserted a paragraph in his annual report advocating a similar policy. The President suppressed it. On the 19th of August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter addressed to the President, entitled 'The Prayer of Twenty Millions,' in which he said, 'On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile.' To this the President responded in that ever memorable reply of August 22, in which he said:—'If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery. {3481} If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it,—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause.' Thus, against all importunities on the one hand and remonstrances on the other, he took the mighty question to his own heart, and, during the long months of that terrible battle-summer, wrestled with it alone. But at length he realized the saving truth, that great unsettled questions have no pity for the repose of nations. On the 22d of September, he summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments came in, one by one, they found the President reading a favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit. He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote, from the published Journal of the late Chief Justice, an entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript of Lincoln's words: 'The President then took a graver tone and said: "Gentlemen I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and (hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other observation I will make, I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in all the lights under which it had been presented to him.' The Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was signed and published that day."

J. A. Garfield, Works, volume 2, pages 538-540.

"I was alone with Mr. Lincoln more than two hours of the Sunday next after Pope's defeat in August, 1802. That was the darkest day of the sad years of the war. … When the business to which I had been summoned by the President was over—strange business for the time: the appointment of assessors and collectors of internal revenue—he was kind enough to ask my opinion as to the command of the army. The way was thus opened for conversation, and for me to say at the end that I thought our success depended upon the emancipation of the slaves. To this he said: 'You would not have it done now, would you? Must we not wait for something like a victory?' This was the second and most explicit intimation to me of his purpose in regard to slavery. In the preceding July or early in August, at an interview upon business connected with my official duties, he said, 'Let me read two letters,' and taking them from a pigeon-hole over his table he proceeded at once to do what he had proposed. I have not seen the letters in print. His correspondent was a gentleman in Louisiana, who claimed to be a Union man. He tendered his advice to the President in regard to the reorganization of that State, and he labored zealous]y to impress upon him the dangers and evils of emancipation. The reply of the President is only important from the fact that when he came to that part of his correspondent's letter he used this expression: 'You must not expect me to give up this government without playing my last card.' Emancipation was his last card. He waited for the time when two facts or events should coincide. Mr. Lincoln was as devoted to the Constitution as was ever Mr. Webster. In his view, a military necessity was the only ground on which the overthrow of slavery in the States could be justified. Next, he waited for a public sentiment in the loyal States not only demanding emancipation but giving full assurance that the act would be sustained to the end. As for himself, I cannot doubt that he had contemplated the policy of emancipation for many months, and anticipated the time when he should adopt it."

G. S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by Distinguished Men of his Time, pages 123-125.

{3482}

"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national treasury, had failed [that the President determined to decree emancipation in the rebellious states by a military order]. To Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose, and asked our views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with the representatives in Congress from the border slave states, at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, be said, had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element should be for or against us. Mr. Seward … was appalled and not prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a proposition, he informed the President that the consequences of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to advise on the subject without further reflection. … While Mr. Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation, which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an original emancipationist, and committed to the principle, thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of the colored race should be coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades of difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."

G. Welles, Lincoln and Seward, pages 210-212.

The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation, issued on the 22d of September, 1862, was as follows:

"'I. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then, after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9 and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and the people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.'"

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 6, chapters 6 and 8.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, chapter 20.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September-October: Mississippi). Union successes under Grant. Iuka and Corinth.

"In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of that month Halleck was assigned to the command of all the armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more independent than while Halleck had heen immediately present in the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point, but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. … He remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and threatened him continually.

{3483}

During this time, he directed the strengthening and remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. … New works, closer to the town, were … erected. … Van Dorn at last determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and reënforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his intention to prevent it. … On the 13th [of September], Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of Corinth. … Grant had called in his forces some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to move by way of Renzi, along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord had 8,000 men, and Rosecrans reported 9,000, a greater force combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate." Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked (September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men, killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka, over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did not. "By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same state of affairs continued which had annoyed Grant for so many weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at Bolivar, and on the 23d of September removed his own headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate more readily with all points of his district, including Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and Ripley. … At last it was rendered certain … that Corinth was to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops." He also "hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, 44 miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear, as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they could not get into the town. On the 2d of October the rebel array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust, appeared in front of Corinth. … On the 3d the fighting began in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth, and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before, assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they advanced to the works, but each time were received with a determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans. The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at 1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. … The repulse was complete, by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river, about ten miles from Corinth. … A battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance was dispersed or drowned. … Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile [six miles up the stream, where Van Dorn finally made his crossing]. In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete. … These two fights relieved the command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."

A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, volume 1, chapter 4.

"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early next morning for the pursuit."

W. S. Rosecrans, The Battle of Corinth (Battles and Leaders, volume 2), page 753.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September-December: Missouri-Arkansas). Social demoralizations of the Civil War. Battle of Prairie Grove.

"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the license of war to settle personal grudges by all the violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination; and parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. … A rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory should constitute a new department to be called the Department of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R. Curtis. … This new arrangement served to change the relative positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his headquarters and assume the general administration of the new Department of the Missouri. … The difficulties in the military situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck … in postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union campaigns on both sides of the great river. … From the midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general significance. … The only action of importance which marks the military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who, finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman. The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of the same place. … So effectually did this engagement serve to scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31, 1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas.'"

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 6, chapter 18.

ALSO IN: W. Baxter, Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove.

O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, division 10, chapter 4 (volume 3).

W. Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, chapter 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (October-December: Virginia). The final removal of McClellan. Burnside at Fredericksburg.

"Both armies … felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be freed from each other's presence, they rested on their arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its purpose, though it assumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and during this period no military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable government stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. … On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan hastened to seize the débouehé of the Shenandoah Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. … At first McClellan contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton. Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm, General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington, reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to General McClellan: … 'By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' … It chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in his tent. {3485} Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as head of the Army of the Potomac. … The moment chosen was an inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan acted with such vigor and rapidity-never had he shown so much confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and file as well his officers—enthusiastic in their affection for his person, but that the very general appointed as his successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 6, sections 2-3.

"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing … the new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards Fredericksburg. … Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords, for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement, by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. … Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000 troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attacking party for a long period under fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front. … To turn them above was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the first. Preparations foe crossing were begun. The better part of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter pen. … All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river. Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000 men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of ours."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War, chapter 21.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps, part 2, chapters 4-8.

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapters 5-6.

B. P. Poore, Life of Burnside, chapters 18-19.

Official Records, series 1, volume 21.

J. Longstreet, D. N. Couch, and others, Burnside at Fredericksburg, (Battles and Leaders, volume 3).

F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5), pages 129-135.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi). The second attempt against Vicksburg. General Sherman and Admiral Porter. Miscarriage of Grant's plans.

"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron in October, 1862. … Up to this time the gun-boats had, strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all the other naval forces, was brought directly under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. … The new arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy Department. … Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was informed by the President that General McClernand had been ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Illinois, to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo, sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs, Mississippi, informing him of McClernand's intention; that he, Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena, Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada, until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of the defences of Vicksburg. {3486} General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly Springs to carry out his part of the programme. … The expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862. Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with [three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] … to clear the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and perilous service was well performed," but one of the iron-clads engaged in it, the Cairo, was sunk by a torpedo. "General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being covered in every direction by the gunboats. Sherman first made a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. … Sherman and his Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the Army. … Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his attack on that place. … Grant moved towards Granada, and everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points between that place and Jackson. … Due precautions had been taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving, the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in Sherman's repulse. … Sherman made all his arrangements to attack the enemy's works on the 20th of December, 1862, and the assault took place early on that day. One division succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but the division that was to follow the advance was behind time and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive back the small force that had gained the hills. … The enemy did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but to get his Army safely back to the transports."