Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 65)
Reading edition
H. Martin, History of France: Age of Louis XIV:, volume 2, chapters 5-6.
Meantime, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet had been fought in the Netherlands; Prince Eugene had won his victory at Turin, and the contest had been practically decided in Spain, at Almanza.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1706-1707, 1708-1709, 1710-1712; ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713; SPAIN: A. D. 1706, 1707, and 1707-1710; and ENGLAND: A. D. 1710-1712.
ALSO IN: W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapters 75-79 (volume 3).
F. P. Guizot, Popular History of France, chapter 45 (volume 5).
GERMANY: A. D. 1711. Election of the Emperor Charles VI.
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GERMANY: A. D. 1711. The War of the Spanish Succession: Change in the circumstances of the war.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1711.
GERMANY: A. D. 1713-1719. The Emperor's continued differences with the King of Spain. The Triple Alliance. The Quadruple Alliance.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725.
GERMANY: A. D. 1714. Ending of the War of the Spanish Succession: The Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.
See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.
GERMANY: A. D. 1732-1733. Interference in the election of the King of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.
GERMANY: A. D. 1733-1735. The War of the Polish Succession. Cession of Lorraine to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.
GERMANY: A. D. 1740. The question of the Austrian Succession. The Pragmatic Sanction.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738, and 1740.
GERMANY: A. D. 1740-1756. Early years of the reign of Frederick the Great in Prussia. The War of the Austrian Succession.
When Frederick II., known as Frederick the Great, succeeded his father, in 1740, "nobody had the least suspicion that a tyrant of extraordinary military and political talents, of industry more extraordinary still, without fear, without faith, and without mercy, had ascended the throne."
Lord Macaulay, Frederic the Great (Essays).
The reign of Frederick II. "was expected to be an effeminate one; but when at the age of twenty-nine he became king, he forgot his pleasures, thought of nothing but glory, and no longer employed himself but in attention to his finances, his army, his policy, and his laws. His provinces were scattered, his resources weak, his power precarious; his army of seventy thousand soldiers was more remarkable for handsomeness of the men, and the elegance of their appearance, than for their discipline. He augmented it, instructed it, exercised it, and fortune began to open the field of glory to him at the moment he was fully prepared to enjoy her favours. Charles XII. was dead, and his station filled by a king without authority. Russia, deprived of Peter the Great, who had only rough-hewn her civilization, languished under the feeble government of the Empress Anne, and of a cruel and ignorant minister. Augustus III. King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, a Prince devoid of character, could not inspire him with any dread. Louis XV., a weak and peaceable king, was governed by Cardinal Fleuri, who loved peace, but always by his weakness suffered himself to be drawn into war. He presented to Frederic rather a support than an obstacle. The court of France had espoused the cause of Charles VII. against Francis I. Maria Theresa, wife of Francis, and Queen of Hungary, saw herself threatened by England, Holland, and France; and whilst she had but little reason to hope the preservation of her hereditary dominions, that arrogant princess wished to place her husband on the Imperial Throne. This quarrel kindled the flames of war in Europe; the genius of Frederic saw by a single glance that the moment was arrived for elevating Prussia to the second order of powers; he made an offer to Maria Theresa to defend her, if she would cede Silesia to him, and threatened her with war in case of refusal. The Empress, whose firmness nothing could shake, impoliticly refused that proposition; war was declared, and Frederic entered Silesia at the head of eighty thousand men. This first war lasted eighteen months.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740 to 1741.
Frederic, by gaining five battles, shewed that Europe would recognize one great man more in her bloody annals. He had begun the war from ambition, and contrary to strict justice; he concluded it with ability, but by the abandonment of France his ally, without giving her information of it, and he thus put in practice, when he was seated on the throne, the principles of Machiavel, whom he had refuted before he ascended it. Men judge according to the event. The hero was absolved by victory from the wrongs with which justice reproached him; and this brilliant example serves to confirm men in that error, too generally and too lightly adopted, that ability in politics is incompatible with the strict rule of morality. Four years after, in [1744], Frederic again took up arms.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1743-1744 to 1744-1745.
He invaded Bohemia, Upper Silesia, and Moravia. Vienna thought him at her gates; but the defection of the Bavarians, the retreat of the French, and the return of Prince Charles into Bohemia, rapidly changed the face of affairs. The position of Frederic became as dangerous as it had been menacing; he was on the point of being lost, and he saw himself compelled to retire with as much precipitation, as he had advanced with boldness. The gaining the battle of Hohen-Friedberg saved him. That retreat and that victory fixed the seal to his reputation. It was after this action that he wrote to Louis XV. 'I have just discharged in Silesia the bill of exchange which your majesty drew on me at Fontenoy.' A letter so much the more modest, as Frederic had conquered, and Louis had only been witness to a victory. He displayed the same genius and the same activity in the campaign of 1745, and once more abandoned France in making his separate peace at Dresden. By this treaty Francis was peaceably assured of the empire, and the cession of Silesia was confirmed to Frederic. France during this war committed some wrongs, which might palliate the abandonment of Prussia. The French did not keep Prince Charles within bounds, they made no diversion into Germany, and fought no where but in Flanders. … In 1756, Europe was again in a flame. France and England declared war against each other, and both sought alliances; Frederic ranged himself on the side of England, and by that became the object of the unreflecting vengeance of the French, and of the alliance of that power with Austria; Austria also formed an alliance with the Court of Petersburg by means of a Saxon secretary; Frederic discovered the project of the Courts of Petersburg, Dresden, and Vienna, to invade the Prussian dominions. He was before-hand with them, and began the war by some conquests."
L. P. Ségur, the elder, History of the Principal Events of the Reign of Frederic William II., King of Prussia, volume 1, pages 2-6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1742. The Elector of Bavaria crowned Emperor (Charles VII.).
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1745. The consort of Maria Theresa elected Emperor (Francis I.). Rise of the imperial house of Hapsburg-Lorraine.
See AUSTRIA: A. D.1745 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER); also, 1744-1745.
GERMANY: A. D. 1748. End and results of the War of the Austrian Succession.
See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. THE CONGRESS.
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GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1756. The Seven Years War: Its causes and provocations.
"The great national quarrel between England and the powers which restrained her free movements on the sea and her extension of colonies, had never ceased. England would have the freedom of the sea: and on land she pushed population and ploughs where France paraded soldiers. In such a struggle war must come, but, by laws invariable as the laws of nature, the population will win in the end. After much bickering, blows began in 1754, and at the beginning of 1755 England despatched the ill-fated Braddock with a small force, which was destroyed in July. … As yet, however, the quarrel was only colonial. England embittered it by seizing French ships without any declaration of war. But why did Frederick [of Prussia] strike in, if indeed he desired peace? In truth there was no choice for him. As early as 1752-53 his secret agents had discovered that Austria, Russia and Saxony were hatching a plot for the destruction of Prussia, and such a partition as afterwards befell unhappy Poland. In 1753 a Saxon official, Mentzel by name, began to supply the Prussian agents with copies of secret documents from the archives at Dresden, which proved that, during the whole of the peace, negotiations had been proceeding for a simultaneous attack on Frederick, though the astute Brühl [Saxon minister], mindful of former defeats, objected to playing the part of jackal to the neighbouring lions. In short, by the end of 1755 the king knew that preparations were already on foot in Austria and Russia, and that he would probably be attacked next year certainly, or, at latest, the year after. A great war was coming between England and France, in which the continental power would attack Hanover, and tread closely on the skirts of Prussia. The situation was dangerous, and became terribly menacing when England bargained with Russia to subsidise a Muscovite army of 55,000 men for defence of Hanover. Russia consented with alacrity. Money was all that the czarina needed for her preparations against Frederick, and in the autumn of 1755 she assembled, not 55,000, but 70,000 men on the Prussian frontier, nominally for the use of England. But throughout the winter all the talk at St. Petersburg was of Frederick's destruction in the coming spring. It was time for him to stir. His first move was one of policy. He offered England a 'neutrality convention' by which the two powers jointly should guarantee the German Reich against all foreign intervention during the coming war. On the 16th of January, 1756, the convention was signed in London, and the Russian agreement thrown over, as it could well be, since it had not been ratified. Europe was now ranking herself for the struggle. In preceding years, the Austrian diplomatist, Kaunitz, had so managed the French court, especially through the medium of Madame de Pompadour, that Louis XV. was now on the side of Maria Theresa, who had bowed her neck so far as to write to the French king's mistress as 'Ma Cousine,' while Frederick forgot policy, and spoke of the Pompadour in slighting terms. 'Je ne la connais pas,' said he once, and was never forgiven. … The agreement with Russia to partition Prussia had already been made, and Frederick's sharp tongue had betrayed him into calling the czarina that 'Infame catin du nord.' Saxony waited for the appearance of her stronger neighbours in order to join them. England alone was Frederick's ally."
Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, Frederick the Great, chapter 9.
"The secret sources of the Third Silesian War, since called 'Seven-Years War,' go back to 1745; nay, we may say, to the First Invasion of Silesia in 1740. For it was in Maria Theresa's incurable sorrow at loss of Silesia, and her inextinguishable hope to reconquer it, that this and all Friedrich's other Wars had their origin. … Traitor Menzel the Saxon Kanzellist … has been busy for Prussia ever since 'the end of 1752.' Got admittance to the Presses; sent his first Excerpt 'about the time of Easter-Fair 1753,'—time of Voltaire's taking wing. And has been at work ever since. Copying Despatches from the most secret Saxon Repositories; ready always on Excellency Maltzahn's indicating the Piece wanted [Maltzahn being the Prussian Minister at Dresden]. … Menzel … lasted in free activity till 1757; and was then put under lock and key. Was not hanged: sat prisoner for twenty-seven years after; over-grown with hair, legs and arms chained together, heavy iron-bar uniting both ankles; diet bread-and-water;—for the rest, healthy; and died, not very miserable it is said, in 1784."
T. Carlyle, History of Friedrich II. of Prussia, book 17, chapter 1 (volume 7).
ALSO IN: Duc de Broglie, The King's Secret, chapters 1-2 (volume 1).
Frederick II., History of the Seven Years War (Posthumous Works, volume 2), chapter 3.
H. Tuttle, History of Prussia, 1745-1756 (volume 3), chapters 6-9.
F. Von Raumer, Contributions to Modern History: Frederick II. and his Times, chapters 24-28.
See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1754-1755; and AUSTRIA: A. D. 1755-1763.
GERMANY: A. D. 1756. The Seven Years War: Frederick strikes the first blow. Saxony subdued.
"Finding that the storm was wholly inevitable, and must burst on him next year, he [Frederick], with bold sagacity, determined to forestall it. First, then, in August, 1756, his ambassador at Vienna had orders to demand of the Empress Queen a statement of her intentions, to announce war as the alternative, and to declare that he would accept no answer 'in the style of an oracle.' The answer, as he expected, was evasive. Without further delay an army of 60,000 Prussians, headed by Frederick in person, poured into Saxony. The Queen of Poland was taken in Dresden: the King of Poland [Augustus III. Elector of Saxony, and, by election, King of Poland] and his troops were blockaded in Pirna. Thus did Frederick commence that mighty struggle which is known to Germans by the name of the Seven Years' War. The first object of the Prussian monarch at Dresden was to obtain possession of the original documents of the coalition against him, whose existence he knew by means of the traitor Menzel. The Queen of Poland, no less aware than Frederick of the importance of these papers, had carried them to her own bed-chamber. She sat down on the trunk which contained the most material ones, and declared to the Prussian officer sent to seize them that nothing but force should move her from the spot. [The official account of this occurrence which Carlyle produces represents the Queen as 'standing before the door' of the 'archive apartment' in which the compromising documents were locked up, she having previously sealed the door.] This officer was of Scottish blood, General Keith, the Earl Marischal's brother. {1496} 'All Europe,' said the Queen, 'would exclaim against this outrage; and then, sir, you will be the victim; depend upon it, your King is a man to sacrifice you to his own honour!' Keith, who knew Frederick's character, was startled, and sent for further orders; but on receiving a reiteration of the first he did his duty. The papers were then made public, appended to a manifesto in vindication of Frederick's conduct; and they convinced the world that, although the apparent aggressor in his invasion of Saxony, he had only acted on the principles of self-defence. Meanwhile, the Prussian army closely blockaded the Saxon in Pirna, but the Austrian, under Marshal Brown, an officer of British extraction, was advancing to its relief through the mountain passes of Bohemia. Frederick left a sufficient force to maintain the blockade, marched against Brown with the remainder, and gave him battle at Lowositz [or Lobositz] on the 1st of October. It proved a hard-fought day; the King no longer found, as he says in one of his letters, the old Austrians he remembered; and his loss in killed and wounded was greater than theirs [3,308 against 2,984]; but victory declared on his side. Then retracing his steps towards Pirna he compelled, by the pressure of famine, the whole Saxon army, 17,000 strong, to an unconditional surrender. The officers were sent home on parole, but the soldiers were induced, partly by force and partly by persuasion, to enlist in the Prussian ranks, and swear fidelity to Frederick. Their former sovereign, King Augustus, remained securely perched on his castle-rock of Königstein, but, becoming weary of confinement, solicited, and was most readily granted, passports to Warsaw. During the whole winter Frederick fixed his head-quarters at Dresden, treating Saxony in all respects as a conquered province, or as one of his own. Troops and taxes were levied throughout that rich and populous land with unsparing rigour, and were directed against the very cause which the sovereign of that land had embraced."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 33 (volume 4).
ALSO IN: T. Carlyle, History of Friedrich II., book 17, chapters 4-8 (volume 7).
Lord Dover, Life of Frederick IL, volume 2, chapter 1.
GERMANY: A.-D. 1756-1757. The Seven Years War: Frederick under the Ban of the Empire. The coalition against Frederick.
"All through the winter Austria strained every nerve to consolidate her alliances, and she did not scruple to use her position at the head of the Empire, in order to drag that body into the quarrel that had arisen between two of its members. On his own responsibility, without consulting the electors, princes, and cities, the Emperor passed sentence on Frederick, and condemned him, unheard, as a disturber of the peace. Many of the great cities altogether refused to publish the Emperor's decree, and even among the states generally subservient to Austria there were some that were alarmed at so flagrant a disregard of law and precedent. It may have seemed a sign of what was to be expected should Prussia be annihilated, and no state remain in Germany that dared to lift up its voice against Austria. Nevertheless, in spite of this feeling, and in spite of the opposition of nearly all the Protestant states, Austria succeeded in inducing the Empire to espouse her cause. In all three colleges of electors, princes, and cities she obtained a majority, and at a diet held on January 17, 1757, it was resolved that an army of the Empire should be set on foot for the purpose of making war on Prussia. Some months later Frederick was put to the ban of the Empire. But the use of this antiquated weapon served rather to throw ridicule on those who employed it than to injure him against whom it was launched. … It has been calculated that the population of the States arrayed against Frederick the Great amounted to 90,000,000, and that they put 430,000 men into the field in the year 1757. The population of Prussia was 4,500,000, her army 200,000 strong; but, after deducting the garrisons of the fortresses, there remained little over 150,000 men available for service in the field. The odds against Frederick were great, but they were not absolutely overwhelming. His territories were scattered and difficult of defence, the extremities hardly defensible at all; but he occupied a central position from which he might, by rapidity of movement, be able to take his assailants in detail, unless their plans were distinguished by a harmony unusual in the efforts of a coalition."
F. W. Longman, Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War, chapter 8, section 3.
GERMANY: A. D. 1756-1758. War of Prussia with Sweden in Pomerania.
See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1720-1792.
GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (April-June). The Seven Years War: Frederick's, invasion of Bohemia. Victory at Prague and defeat at Kolin.
"At the commencement of 1757, the grand confederacy against the king of Prussia was consolidated by the efforts and intrigues of the court of Vienna. The French had drawn together 80,000 men on the Rhine, under the command of marshal d' Etrées; the army of execution was assembling in the empire; the Swedes were preparing to penetrate into Pomerania, and 60,000 Russians were stationed on the frontiers of Livonia, waiting the season of action to burst into the kingdom of Prussia. With this favourable aspect of affairs, the empress prepared for the campaign by augmenting her forces in Hungary and Bohemia to 150,000 men; the main army, stationed in the vicinity of Prague, was commanded by Prince Charles, who was assisted by the skill of marshal Brown, and the other corps intrusted to count Daun. Frederic possessed too much foresight and vigilance to remain inactive while his enemies were collecting their forces; he therefore resolved to carry the war into the heart of the Austrian territories, and by a decisive stroke to shake the basis of the confederacy. He covered this plan with consummate address; he affected great trepidation and uncertainty, and, to deceive the Austrians into a belief that he only intended to maintain himself in Saxony, put Dresden in a state of defence, broke down the bridges, and marked out various camps in the vicinity. In the midst of this apparent alarm three Prussian columns burst into Bohemia, in April, and rapidly advanced towards Prague. … The Austrians, pressed on all sides, retreated with precipitation under the walls of Prague, on the southern side of the Moldau, while the Prussians advancing towards the capital formed two bodies; one under Schwerin remaining at Jung Bunzlau, and the other, headed by the king, occupying the heights between the Moldau and the Weisseberg. {1497} Expecting to be joined by marshal Daun, who was hastening from Moravia, the Austrians remained on the defensive; but prince Charles took so strong a position as seemed to defy all apprehensions of an attack. … These obstacles, however, were insufficient to arrest the daring spirit of Frederic, who resolved to attack the Austrians before the arrival of Daun. Leaving a corps under prince Maurice above Prague, he crossed the Moldau near Rostock and Podabe on the 5th of May, with 16,000 men, and on the following morning at break of day was joined by the corps under marshal Schwerin. … Victory declared on the side of the Prussians, but was purchased by the loss of their best troops, not less than 18,000, even by the avowal of the king, being killed, with many of his bravest officers, and Schwerin, the father of the Prussian discipline, and the guide of Frederic in the career of victory. Of the Austrians 8,000 were killed and wounded, 9,000 made prisoners, and 28,000 shut up within the walls of Prague. … A column of 16,000 Austrians made good their retreat along the Moldau to join the army of marshal Daun. Prague was instantly blockaded by the victorious army, and not less than 100,000 souls were confined within the walls, almost without the means of subsistence. They were soon reduced to the greatest extremities. … In this disastrous moment the house of Austria was preserved from impending destruction by the skill and caution of a general, who now, for the first time, appeared at the head of an army. This general was Leopold count Daun, a native of Bohemia. … Daun had marched through Moravia towards Prague, to effect a junction with prince Charles. On arriving at Boehmischgrod, within a few miles of Prague, he was apprised of the recent defeat, and halted a few days to collect the fugitives, till his corps swelled so considerably that Frederic detached against him the prince of Bevern with 20,000 men." Daun declined battle and retreated, until he had collected an army of 60,000 men and restored their courage. He then advanced, forcing back the prince of Bevern, and when Frederick, joining the latter with reinforcements, attacked him at Kolin, on the 18th of June, he inflicted on the Prussian king a disastrous defeat—the first which Frederick had known. The Prussian troops, "for the first time defeated, gave way to despondency, and in their retreat exclaimed, 'This is our Pultawa.' Daun purchased the victory with the loss of 9,000 men; but on the side of the Prussians not less than 14,000 were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, and 43 pieces of artillery, with 22 standards, fell into the hands of the Austrians. Maria Theresa … conveyed in person the news of this important victory to the countess Daun, and instituted the military order of merit, or the Order of Maria Theresa, with which she decorated the commander and officers who had most signalised themselves, and dated its commencement from the æra of that glorious victory. To give repose to the troops, and to replace the magazines which had been destroyed by the Prussians, Daun remained several days on the field of battle; and as he advanced to Prague found that the Prussians had raised the siege on the 20th of June, and were retreating with precipitation towards Saxony and Lusatia."
W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 112 (volume 3).
ALSO IN: Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, Frederick the Great, chapters 11-12.
F. Kugler, Pict. History of Germany during the Reign of Frederick the Great, chapter 25.
GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (July-December). The Seven Years War: Darkening and brightening of Frederick's career. Closter-Seven. Rossbach. Leuthen.
The enemies of the King of Prussia "were now closing upon him from every side. The provinces beyond the Vistula became the prey of Russian hordes, to which only one division of Prussians under Marshal Lehwald was opposed. In the result, however, their own devastations, and the consequent want of supplies, proved a check to their further progress during this campaign. In Westphalia above 80,000 effective French soldiers were advancing, commanded by the Mareschal d'Estrées, a grandson of the famous minister Louvois. The Duke of Cumberland, who had undertaken to defend his father's electorate against them, was at the head of a motley army of scarce 50,000 men. … His military talents were not such as to supply his want of numbers or of combination; he allowed the French to pass the deep and rapid Weser unopposed; he gave them no disturbance when laying waste great part of the Electorate; he only fell back from position to position until at length the enemy came up with him at the village of Hastenback near Hameln. There, on the 26th of July, an action was fought, and the Duke was worsted with the loss of several hundred men, The only resource of His Royal Highness was a retreat across the wide Lüneberg moors, to cover the town of Stade towards the mouth of the Elbe, where the archives and other valuable effects from Hanover had been already deposited for safety." Intrigue at Versailles having recalled D'Estrées and sent the Duke de Richelieu into his place, the latter pressed the Duke of Cumberland so closely, hemming him in and cutting off his communications, that he was soon glad to make terms. On the 8th of September the English Duke signed, at Closter-Seven, a convention under which the auxiliary troops in his army were sent home, the Hanoverians dispersed, and only a garrison left at Stade. "After the battle of Kolin and the Convention of Closter-Seven, the position of Frederick,— hemmed in on almost every side by victorious enemies,—was not only most dangerous but well-nigh desperate. To his own eyes it seemed so. He resolved in his thoughts, and discussed with his friends, the voluntary death of Otho as a worthy example to follow. Fully resolved never to fall alive into the hands of his enemies, nor yet to survive any decisive overthrow, he carried about his person a sure poison in a small glass phial. Yet … he could still, with indomitable skill and energy, make every preparation for encountering the Prince de Soubise. He marched against the French commander at the head of only 22,000 men; but these were veterans, trained in the strictest discipline, and full of confidence in their chief. Soubise, on the other hand, owed his appointment in part to his illustrious lineage, as head of the House of Rohan, and still more to Court-favour, as the minion of Madame de Pompadour, but in no degree to his own experience or abilities. He had under his orders nearly 40,000 of his countrymen, and nearly 20,000 troops of the Empire; for the Germanic diet also had been induced to join the league against Frederick. On the 5th of November the two armies came to a battle at Rosbach [or Rossbach], close to the plain of Lützen, where in the preceding century Gustavus Adolphus conquered and fell. {1498} By the skilful manœvres of Frederick the French were brought to believe that the Prussians intended nothing but retreat, and they advanced in high spirits as if only to pursue the fugitives. Of a sudden they found themselves attacked with all the compactness of discipline, and all the courage of despair. The troops of the Empire, a motley crew, fled at the first fire. … So rapid was the victory that the right wing of the Prussians, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, was never engaged at all. Great numbers of the French were cut down in their flight by the Prussian cavalry, not a few perished in the waters of the Saale, and full 7,000 were made prisoners, with a large amount of baggage, artillery and standards. … The battle of Rosbach was not more remarkable for its military results than for its moral influence. It was hailed throughout Germany as a triumph of the Teutonic over the Gallic race. … So precarious was now Frederick's position that the battle of Rosbach, as he said himself, gained him nothing but leisure to fight another battle elsewhere. During his absence on the Saale, the Austrian armies had poured over the mountains into Silesia; they had defeated the Prussians under the Duke of Bevern; they had taken the main fortress, Schweidnitz, and the capital, Breslau; nearly the whole province was already theirs. A flying detachment of 4,000 cavalry, under General Haddick, had even pushed into Brandenburg, and levied a contribution from the city of Berlin [entering one of the suburbs of the Prussian capital and holding it for twelve hours]. The advancing season seemed to require winter quarters, but Frederick never dreamed of rest until Silesia was recovered. He hastened by forced marches from the Saale to the Oder, gathering reinforcements while he went along. As he drew near Breslau, the Imperial commander, Prince Charles of Lorraine, flushed with recent victory and confident in superior numbers, disregarded the prudent advice of Marshal Daun, and descended from an almost inaccessible position to give the King of Prussia battle on the open plain. … On the 5th of December, one month from the battle of Rosbach, the two armies met at Leuthen, a small village near Breslau, Frederick with 40,000, Prince Charles of Lorraine with between 60,000 and 70,000 men. For several hours did the conflict rage doubtfully and fiercely. It was decided mainly by the skill and the spirit of the Prussian monarch. 'The battle of Leuthen,' says Napoleon, 'was a master-piece. Did it even stand alone it would of itself entitle Frederick to immortal fame.' In killed, wounded and taken, the Austrians lost no less than 27,000 men; above 50 standards, above 100 cannon, above 4,000 waggons, became the spoil of the victors; Breslau was taken, Schweidnitz blockaded, Silesia recovered; the remnant of the Imperial forces fled back across the mountains; and Frederick, after one of the longest and most glorious campaigns that History records, at length allowed himself and his soldiers some repose."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 34 (volume 4).
ALSO IN: T. Carlyle, History of Friedrich II., book 18, chapters 5-10.
Lord Dover, Life of Frederick II., volume 2, chapters 3-4.
Sir E. Cust, Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century, volume 2, pages 217-240.
GERMANY: A. D. 1758. The Seven Years War: Campaign in Hanover. Siege of Olmütz. Russian defeat at Zorndorf. Prussian defeat at Hochkirch.
"Before the end of 1757, England began to take a more active part on the Continent. Lord Chatham brought about the rejection of the Convention of Closter-Zeven by Parliament, and the recall of Cumberland by the king. The efficient Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was proposed by Frederick and made commander of the English and Hanoverian forces. He opened the campaign of 1758 in the winter. The French, under Clermont, being without discipline or control, he drove them in headlong flight out of their winter-quarters in Hanover and Westphalia, to the Rhine and across it; and on June 23 defeated them at the battle of Crefeld. A French army under Soubise afterward crossed the Rhine higher up, and Ferdinand, retreated, but succeeded in protecting the west as far as the Weser against General Contades. Frederick first retook Schweidnitz, April 16. He then, in order to prevent the junction of the Russians and Austrians, ventured to attack Austria, and invaded Moravia. His brother, Prince Henry, had but a small force in Saxony, and Frederick thought that he could best cover that country by an attack on Austria. But the siege of Olmütz detained him from May until July, and his prospects grew more doubtful. The Austrians captured a convoy of 300 wagons of military stores, which Ziethen was to have escorted to him. [Instead of 800, the convoy comprised 3,000 to 4,000 wagons, of which only 200 reached the Prussian camp, and its destruction by General Loudon completely frustrated Frederick's plan of campaign.] Frederick raised the siege, and, by an admirable retreat, brought his army through Bohemia by way of Königgrätz to Landshut. Here he received bad news. The Russians, under Fermor, were again in Prussia, occupying the eastern province, but treating it mildly as a conquered country, where the empress already received the homage of the people. They then advanced, with frightful ravages, through Pomerania and Neumark to the Oder, and were now near Küstrin, which they laid in ashes. Frederick made haste to meet them. He was so indignant at the desolation of the country and the suffering of his people that he forbade quarter to be given. The report of this fact also embittered the Russians. At Zorndorf, Frederick met the enemy, 50,000 strong, August 25, 1758. They were drawn up in a great square or phalanx, in the ancient, half-barbarous manner. A frightfully bloody fight followed, since the Russians would not yield, and were cut down in heaps. Seidlitz, the victor of Rossbach, by a timely charge of his cavalry, captured the Russian artillery, and crushed their right wing. On the second day the Russians were driven back, but not without inflicting heavy loss on the Prussians, who, though they suffered much less than their enemies, left more than one third of their force on the field. The Russians were compelled to withdraw from Prussia. Frederick then hastened to Saxony, where his brother Henry was sorely pressed by Daun and the imperial army. He could not even wait to relieve Silesia, where Neisse, his principal fortress, was threatened. Daun, hearing of his approach, took up a position in his way, between Bautzen and Görlitz. But Frederick, whose contempt for this prudent and slow general was excessive, occupied a camp in a weak and exposed position, at Hochkirch, under Daun's very eyes, against the protest of his own generals. {1499} He remained there three days unmolested; but on October 14, the day fixed for advancing, the Austrians attacked him with twice his numbers. A desperate fight took place in the burning village; the Prussians were driven out, and lost many guns. Frederick himself was in imminent danger, and his friends Keith and Duke Francis of Brunswick fell at his side. Yet the army did not lose its spirit or its discipline. Within eleven days Frederick, who had been joined by his brother Henry, was in Silesia, and relieved Neisse and Kosel. Thus the campaign of 1758 ended favorably to Frederick. The pope sent Daun a consecrated hat and sword, as a testimonial for his victory at Hochkirch."
C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, book 5, chapter 23, sections 7-9.
ALSO IN: G. B. Malleson, Military Life of Loudon, chapters 7-8.
F. Kugler, Pict. History of Germany during the Reign of Frederick the Great, chapters 29-31.
Frederick II., History of the Seven Years War (Posthumous Works, volume 2), chapter 8.
GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (April-August). The Seven Years War: Prince Ferdinand's Hanoverian campaign. Defeat at Bergen and victory at Minden.
In the Hanoverian field of war, where Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick held command, the campaign of 1759 was important, and prosperous in the end for the allies of Prussia. "Besides the Hanoverians and Hessians in British pay, he [Prince Ferdinand] had under his direction 10,000 or 12,000 British soldiers, amongst whom, since the death of the Duke of Marlborough, Lord George Sackville was the senior officer. The French, on their part, were making great exertions, under the new administration of the Duke de Choiseul; large reinforcements were sent into Germany, and early in the year they surprised by stratagem the free city of Frankfort and made it the place of arms for their southern army. No object could be of greater moment to Ferdinand than to dislodge them from this important post." Marching quickly, with 30,000 of his army, he attacked the French, under the Duke de Broglie, at Bergen, on the Nidda, in front of Frankfort, April 13, and was repulsed, after heavy fighting, with a loss of 2,000 men. "This reverse would, it was supposed, reduce Prince Ferdinand to the defensive during the remainder of the campaign. Both De Broglie and Contades eagerly pushed forward, their opponents giving way before them. Combining their forces, they reduced Cassel, Munster, and Minden, and they felt assured that the whole Electorate must soon again be theirs. Already had the archives and the most valuable property been sent off from Hanover to Stade. Already did a new Hastenbeck—a new Closter-Seven—rise in view. But it was under such difficulties that the genius of Ferdinand shone forth. With a far inferior army (for thus much is acknowledged, although I do not find the French numbers clearly or precisely stated), he still maintained his ground on the left of the Weser, and supplied every defect by his superiority of tactics. He left a detachment of 5,000 men exposed, and seemingly unguarded, as a bait to lure De Contades from his strong position at Minden. The French Mareschal was deceived by the feint, and directed the Duke De Broglie to march forward and profit by the blunder, as he deemed it to be. On the 1st of August, accordingly, De Broglie advanced into the plain, his force divided in eight columns." Instead of the small corps expected, he found the whole army of the allies in front of him. De Contades hurried to his assistance, and the French, forced to accept battle in an unfavorable position, were overcome. At the decisive moment of their retreat, "the Prince sent his orders to Lord George Sackville, who commanded the whole English and some German cavalry on the right wing of the Allies, and who had hitherto been kept back as a reserve. The orders were to charge and overwhelm the French in their retreat, before they could reach any clear ground to rally. Had these orders been duly fulfilled, it is acknowledged by French writers that their army must have been utterly destroyed; but Lord George either could not or would not understand what was enjoined on him. … Under such circumstances the victory of Minden would not have been signal or complete but for a previous and most high-spirited precaution of Prince Ferdinand. He had sent round to the rear of the French a body of 10,000 men, under his nephew—and also the King of Prussia's—the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick. … Thus Ferdinand became master of the passes, and the French were constrained to continue their retreat in disorder. Upon the whole, their loss was 8,000 men killed, wounded, or taken, 30 pieces of artillery, and 17 standards. … Great was the rejoicing in England at the victory of Minden"; but loud the outcry against Lord George Sackville, who was recalled and dismissed from all his employments.
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 36 (volume 4).
ALSO IN: Sir E. Cust, Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century, volume 2, pages 327-333.
GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (July-November). The Seven Years War: Disasters of Frederick. Kunersdorf. Dresden. Maxen.
"Three years of the war were gone and the ardour of Frederick's' enemies showed no signs of abating. The war was unpopular in the Russian army, but the Czarina thought no sacrifice too great for the gratification of her hatred. France was sick of it too, and tottering on the verge of national bankruptcy, but Louis was kept true to his engagements by domestic influences and by the unbending determination of Maria Theresa never to lay down arms until Prussia was thoroughly humbled. … Already Frederick was at his wits' end for men and money. Of the splendid infantry which had stormed the heights at Prague, and stemmed the rout of Kollin, very little now remained. … Moreover, Austria, relying on her vastly larger population, had ceased to exchange prisoners, and after the end of 1759 Russia followed her example. … Frederick's pecuniary difficulties were even greater still. But for the English subsidy he could hardly have subsisted at all. … The summer was half gone before there was any serious fighting. Frederick had got together 125,000 men of some sort, besides garrison troops, but he no longer felt strong enough to take the initiative, and the Austrians were equally indisposed to attack without the co-operation of their allies. Towards the middle of July the Russians, under Count Soltikoff, issued from Posen, advanced to the Oder', and, after defeating a weak Prussian corps near Kay, took possession of Frankfort. {1500} It now became necessary for the king to march in person against them, the more especially as Laudon [or Loudon] with 18,000 Austrians was on his way to join Soltikoff. Before he could reach Frankfort, Laudon, eluding with much dexterity the vigilance of his enemies, effected his junction, and Frederick, with 48,000 men, found himself confronted by an army 78,000 strong. The Russians were encamped on the heights of Kunersdorf, east of Frankfort." Frederick attacked them, August 12, with brilliant success at first, routing their left wing and taking 70 guns, with several thousand prisoners. "The Prussian generals then besought the king to rest content with the advantage he had gained. The day was intensely hot; his soldiers had been on foot for twelve hours, and were suffering severely from thirst and exhaustion; moreover, if the Russians were let alone, they would probably go off quietly in the night, as they had done after Zorndorf. Unhappily Frederick refused to take counsel. He wanted to destroy the Russian army, not merely to defeat it; he had seized the Frankfort bridge and cut off its retreat." He persisted in his attack and was beaten off. "The Prussians were in full retreat when Laudon swept down upon them with eighteen fresh squadrons. The retreat became a rout more disorderly than in any battle of the war except Rossbach. The king, stupefied with his disaster, could hardly be induced to quit the field, and was heard to mutter, 'Is there then no cursed bullet that can reach me?' The defeat was overwhelming. Had it been properly followed up, it must have put an end to the war, and Kunersdorf would have ranked among the decisive battles of the world. Berlin lay open to the enemy; the royal family fled to Magdeburg. For the first (and last) time in his life Frederick gave way utterly to despair. 'I have no resources left,' he wrote to the minister Finckenstein the evening after the battle, 'and to tell the truth I hold all for lost. I shall not survive the ruin of my country. Farewell for ever.' The same night he resigned the command of the army to General Finck. Eighteen thousand, five hundred of his soldiers were killed, wounded, or prisoners, and the rest were so scattered that no more than 3,000 remained under his command. All the artillery was lost, and most of his best generals were killed or wounded. … By degrees, however, the prospect brightened. The fugitives kept coming in, and the enemy neglected to give the finishing stroke. Frederick shook off his despair, and resumed the command of his army. Artillery was ordered up from Berlin, and the troops serving against the Swedes were recalled from Pomerania. Within a week of Kunersdorf he was at the head of 33,000 men, and in a position to send relief to Dresden, which was besieged by an Austrian and Imperialist army. The relief, as it happened, arrived just too late." Dresden was surrendered by its commandant, Schmettau, on the 4th of September, to the great wrath of Frederick. By a wonderful march of fifty-eight miles in fifty hours, Prince Henry, the brother of Frederick, prevented the Austrians from gaining the whole electorate of Saxony. The Russians and the Austrians quarrelled, the former complaining that they were left to do all the fighting, and presently they withdrew into Poland. "With the departure of the Russians, the campaign would probably have ended, had not Frederick's desire to close it with a victory led him into a fresh disaster, hardly less serious and far more disgraceful than that of Kunersdorf. … With the view of hastening the retreat of the Austrians, and of driving them, if possible, into the difficult Pirna country, he ordered General Finck to take post with his corps at Maxen, to bar their direct line of communications with Bohemia." As the result, Finck, with his whole corps, of 12,000, were overwhelmed and taken prisoners. "The capitulation of Maxen was no less destructive of Frederick's plans than galling to his pride. The Austrians now retained Dresden, a place of great strategical importance, though the king, in the hope of dislodging them, exposed the wrecks of his army to the ruinous hardships of a winter campaign, in weather of unusual severity, and borrowed 12,000 men of Ferdinand of Brunswick to cover his flank while so engaged. The new year had commenced before he allowed his harassed troops to go into winter-quarters."
F. W. Longman, Frederick the Great and the Seven Years War, chapter 10, section 2.
ALSO IN: T. Carlyle, History of Friedrich II.; book 19, chapters 4-7.
Frederick II., History of the Seven Years War (Posthumous Works, volume 3), chapter 10.
GERMANY: A. D. 1760. The Seven Years War: Saxony reconquered by Frederick. Dresden bombarded. Battles of Liegnitz, Torgau and Warburg.
"The campaign of 1759 had extended far into the winter, and Frederick conceived the bold idea of renewing it while the vigilance of his enemies was relaxed in winter quarters, and of making another effort to drive the Austrians from Saxony. His head-quarters were at Freyberg. Having received reinforcements from Prince Ferdinand, and been joined by 12,000 men under the hereditary prince, he left the latter to keep guard behind the Mulde, and in January 1760, at a time when the snow lay deep upon the ground, he made a fierce spring upon the Austrians, who were posted at Dippoldiswalde; but General Maguire, who commanded there, baffled him by the vigilance and skill with which he guarded every pass, and compelled him to retrace his steps to Freyberg. When the winter had passed and the regular campaign had opened, Laudohn [Loudon], one of the most active of the Austrian generals—the same who had borne a great part in the victories of Hochkirchen and Kunersdorf—entered Silesia, surprised with a greatly superior force the Prussian General Fouqué, compelled him, with some thousands of soldiers, to surrender [at Landshut, June 22], and a few days later reduced the important fortress of Glatz [July 26]. Frederick, at the first news of the danger of Fouqué, marched rapidly towards Silesia, Daun slowly following, while an Austrian corps, under General Lacy, impeded his march by incessant skirmishes. On learning the surrender of Fouqué, Frederick at once turned and hastened towards Dresden. It was July, and the heat was so intense that on a single day more than a hundred of his soldiers dropped dead upon the march. He hoped to gain some days upon Daun, who was still pursuing, and to become master of Dresden before succours arrived. As he expected, he soon outstripped the Austrian general, and the materials for the siege were collected with astonishing rapidity, but General Maguire, who commanded at Dresden, defended it with complete success till the approach of the Austrian army obliged Frederick to retire. {1501} Baffled in his design, he took a characteristic vengeance by bombarding that beautiful city with red-hot balls, slaughtering multitudes of its peaceable inhabitants, and reducing whole quarters to ashes; and he then darted again upon Silesia, still followed by the Austrian general. Laudohn had just met with his first reverse, having failed in the siege of Breslau [an attempted surprise and a brief bombardment]; on August 15, when Daun was still far off, Frederick fell upon him and beat him in the battle of Liegnitz. [The statement that 'Daun was still far off' appears to be erroneous. Loudon and Daun had formed a junction four days before, and had planned a concerted attack on Frederick's camp; Loudon was struck and defeated while making the movement agreed upon, and Daun was only a few miles away at the time.] Soon after, however, this success was counterbalanced by Lacy and Totleben, who; at the head of some Austrians and Russians, had marched upon Berlin, which, after a brave resistance, was once more captured and ruthlessly plundered; but on the approach of Frederick the enemy speedily retreated. Frederick then turned again towards Saxony, which was again occupied by Daun, and on November 3 he attacked his old enemy in his strong entrenchments at Torgau. Daun, in addition to the advantage of position, had the advantage of great numerical superiority, for his army was reckoned at 65,000, while that of Frederick was not more than 44,000. But the generalship of Frederick gained the victory. General Ziethen succeeded in attacking the Austrians in the rear, gaining the height, and throwing them into confusion. Daun was wounded and disabled, and General O'Donnell, who was next in command, was unable to restore the Austrian line. The day was conspicuous for its carnage, even among the bloody battles of the Seven Years' War: 20,000 Austrians were killed, wounded, or prisoners, while 14,000 Prussians were left on the field. The battle closed the campaign for the year, leaving all Saxony in the possession of the Prussians, with the exception of Dresden, which was still held by Maguire. The English and German army, under Prince Ferdinand, succeeded in the meantime in keeping at bay a very superior French army, under Marshal Broglio; and several slight skirmishes took place, with various results. The battle of Warburg, which was the most important, was won chiefly by the British cavalry, but Prince Ferdinand failed in his attempts to take Wesel and Gottingen; and at the close of the year the French took up their quarters at Cassel."
W. E. H. Lecky, History of England, 18th Century, chapter 8 (volume 2).
ALSO IN: W. Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chapter 115 (volume 3).
G. B. Malleson, Military Life of Loudon, chapter 10.
T. Carlyle, History of Friedrich II., book 20, chapters 1-6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1761-1762. The Seven Years War: The closing campaigns.
"All Frederick's exertions produced him only 96,000 men for defence of Silesia and Saxony this year [1761]. Prince Henry had to face Daun in Saxony; the king himself stood in Silesia against Loudon and the Russians under Butterlin. Loudon opened the campaign by advancing against Goltz, near Schweidnitz, in April. Goltz had only 12,000 to his adversary's 30,000, but posted himself so well that Loudon could not attack him. Reinforcements came gradually to Loudon, raising his army to 72,000, but orders from Vienna obliged him to remain inactive till he could be joined near Neisse by the Russians with 60,000. Goltz, manœuvring against the Russians, was taken prisoner. The king himself delayed the junction of his enemies for some time, but could not now offer battle. The junction took place the 18th of August. He then struck at Loudon's communications, but the thrust was well parried, and on the 20th of August, Frederick, for the first time, was reduced to an attitude of pure defence. He formed an intrenched camp at Bunzelwitz, and lay there, blocking the way to Schweidnitz. Loudon's intreaties could not persuade the Russians to join him in full force to attack the position, and on the 9th of September Butterlin's army fell back across the Oder, leaving 20,000 of his men to act under Loudon. Frederick remained a fortnight longer in the camp of Bunzelwitz, but was then forced to go, as his army was eating up the magazines of Schweidnitz. Again he moved against Loudon's magazines, but the Austrian general boldly marched for Schweidnitz, and captured the place by assault on the night of the 30th September—1st October. No fight took place between London and the king. They both went into winter quarters in December—Prussians at Strehlen, Austrians at Kunzendorf, and Russians about Glatz. … In the western theatre Ferdinand defeated Broglio and Soubise at Vellinghausen [or Wellinghausen, or Kirch-Denkern, as the battle, fought July 15, is differently called], the English contingent again behaving gloriously. … Prince Henry and Daun manœuvred skilfully throughout the campaign, but never came to serious blows. Frederick is described as being very gloomy in mind this winter. The end of the year left him with but 60,000 men in Saxony, Silesia, and the north. Eugene of Wurtemburg had 5,000 to hold back the Swedes, Prince Henry 25,000 in Saxony, the king himself 30,000. But the agony of France was increasing; Maria Theresa had to discharge 20,000 men from want of money, and Frederick's bitter enemy, 'cette infame Catin du Nord' [the czarina Elizabeth], was failing fast in health. A worse blow to the king than the loss of a battle had been the fall of Pitt, in October, and with him all hope of English subsidies. Still, the enemies of Prussia were almost exhausted. One more year of brave and stubborn resistance, and Prussia must be left in peace. By extraordinary exertions, and a power of administrative organisation which was one of his greatest qualities, Frederick not only kept up his 60, 000, but doubled their number. In the spring he had 70,000 for his Silesian army, 40,000 for Prince Henry in Saxony, and 10,000 for the Swedes or other purposes. Best news of all, the czarina died on the 5th of January, 1762, and Peter, who succeeded her—only for a short time, poor boy—was an ardent admirer of the great king. Frederick at once released and sent home his Russian prisoners, an act which brought back his Prussians from Russia. On the 23rd February Peter declared his intention to be at peace and amity with Frederick, concluded peace on the 5th of May, and a treaty of alliance a month later. The Swedes, following suit, declared peace on the 22nd of May, and Frederick could now give his sole attention to the Austrians." For a few weeks, only, the Prussian king had a Russian contingent of 20,000 in alliance with him, but could make no use of it. {1502} It was recalled in July, by the revolution at St. Petersburg, which deposed the young czar, Peter, in favour of his ambitious consort, Catherine. Frederick succeeded in concealing the fact long enough to frighten Daun by a show of preparations for attacking him, with the Russian troops included in his army, and the Austrian general retired to Glatz and Bohemia. Frederick then took Schweidnitz, and marched on Dresden. "Daun followed heavily. Like a prize-fighter knocked out of time, he had no more fight in him. Prince Henry had two affairs with the Reich's army and its Austrian contingent. Forced to retire from Freyburg on the 15th, he afterwards attacked them on the 29th of October and defeated them by a turning movement. They had 40,000, he 30, 000. The Austrian contingent suffered most. In the western theatre Ferdinand held his own and had his usual successes. His part in the war was to defend only, and he never failed to show high qualities as a general. Thus, nowhere had Frederick's enemies succeeded in crushing his defences. For seven years the little kingdom of Prussia had held her ground against the three great military powers, France, Austria, and Russia. All were now equally exhausted. The constancy, courage, and ability of Frederick were rewarded at last; on the 15th of February, 1763, the treaty of Hubertsburg was signed, by which Austria once more agreed to the cession of Silesia. Prussia was now a Great Power like the rest, her greatness resting on no shams, as she had proved."
Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, Frederick the Great, chapter 18.
ALSO IN: Sir E. Cust, Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century, volume 3, pages 57-87.
Frederick II., History of the Seven Years War (Posthumous Works, volume 3), chapters 14-16.
GERMANY: A. D. 1763. The end, results and costs of the Seven Years War. The Peace of Hubertsburg and Peace of Paris.
See SEVEN YEARS WAR.
GERMANY: A. D. 1763-1790. A period of peace and progress. Intellectual cultivation. Accession of the Emperor Joseph II. His character and his reforms. Accession of Leopold II.
"The peace of nearly thirty years which followed the Seven-Years' War in Germany was a time of rich mental activity and growth. Court life itself, if its vanities were not abolished, still acquired a more enlightened and humane tone. The fierce passions of the princes no longer exclusively controlled it: there was something of regard for education, for art and science, and for the public welfare. This is particularly true of courts which were intimately connected with Prussia; as that of Brunswick, where Duke Charles, Frederick II.'s brother-in-law, though personally an extravagant prince, founded an institution of learning which brought together many of the best intellects of Germany (1740 to 1760), or that of Anhalt-Dessau, where the famous 'Philanthropinum' was established. Several princes imitated Frederick's military administration, and that sometimes on a scale so small as to be ludicrous. Prince William of Lippe-Schaumburg founded in his little territory a fortress and a school of war. But this school educated Scharnhorst, and the prince himself won fame in distant lands. He invited Herder to his little court at Bückeburg. Weimar, too, imitated Frederick's example, where the Duchess Amalie, daughter of Charles of Brunswick, and her intellectual son, Charles Augustus, made their little cities Weimar and Jena places of gathering for the greatest men of genius of the time. Among the petty Thuringian princes of this period, there were others of noble character. In 1764 the Saxon throne was ascended by Frederick Augustus, grandson of Augustus III., but, being a minor, he could not be elected king of Poland. This put an end to the union of the two titles, which had been the cause of immeasurable evil to Saxony and to Germany. When the young elector attained his majority, the government of Saxony was greatly improved, and a period of prosperity followed. Duke Charles Eugene of Wirtemberg (1737-1793), during his early years, rivaled Louis XV. in extravagance and immorality, but in after-days was greatly changed. He founded the Charles School, at which Schiller was educated. Baden enjoyed a high degree of prosperity under Charles Frederick (1746-1811). Even the spiritual lords, on the whole, threw their influence in favor of enlightenment and progress. … The prelates of Cologne, Trèves, Mayence, and Salzburg, strange to say, agreed at Ems in 1786 to renounce the supremacy of Rome, and to found an independent German Catholic Church; but the plan was broken down by the resistance of the inferior clergy and of the Emperor Joseph II. Some of the German states were slow to take part in the general progress. Bavaria was constantly retarded by the influence of the Jesuits. … The Palatinate, too, was under luxurious and idle rulers, mostly in the pay of France. In some territories the boundless extravagance of the princes was a terrible burden upon their subjects. … Men who professed enlightenment and humanity were often shamefully tyrannical. The courts of Cassel and Wirtemberg sold their people by regiments to England, to fight against the independence of the North American Colonies. …
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (JANUARY-JUNE).
Austria shared in the general intellectual awakening of Germany. Maria Theresa was a firm, strong character, with a clear mind and sincere desire for the people's welfare. She found Austria in decay, and was able to introduce many reforms. She alleviated the condition of the peasants, who were still mostly serfs. The nobles had before lived mainly for show, but she provided institutions for their education. … It was a condition of the Peace of Hubertsburg that Frederick II. should give his electoral vote for the eldest son of Francis I. None of the other electors objected to the choice, and on March 27, 1764, they performed the ceremony of choosing Joseph 'King of the Romans,' but without power to interfere with the government during his father's life. Francis I. died August 18, 1765, and his son Joseph II. (1765-1790) was then crowned emperor in the traditional fashion. He was also associated with his mother in the government of' Austria; but she retained the royal power mainly in her own hands, assigning to her son the executive control of military affairs. Joseph II. was an impetuous and intellectual character, all aglow with the new ideas of enlightenment and progress, and was perhaps more deeply impressed by the example of Frederick II. than any other prince of the age. … At the same time, Joseph II. was eager to aggrandize Austria, and at least to obtain an equivalent for Silesia. {1503} For a long time Austria had been longing to acquire Bavaria, and there now seemed to be some reason to hope for success, The ancient line of electors of the house of Wittelsbach died out in 1777 with Maximilian Joseph (December 30). The next heir was the Elector Palatine, Charles Theodore, also Duke of Jülich and Berg, who was not eager to obtain Bavaria, since, by the Peace of Westphalia, he must then forfeit the electorate of the Palatinate. … Under these circumstances Joseph II. made an unfounded claim to Lower Bavaria, under a pretended grant of the Emperor Sigismund in 1426. A secret treaty was made by him with Charles Theodore, by which he was to pay that prince a large sum of money for Lower Bavaria; and soon after Maximilian Joseph's death, Joseph II. occupied the land with troops. Frederick II., who was ever jealous of the growth of Austria, resolved to prevent this acquisition. …
See BAVARIA: A. D. 1777-1779.
Thus the war of the Bavarian Succession broke out (1778-79). … By the death of Maria Theresa, November 29, 1780, her son Joseph II. became sole monarch of Austria. … Joseph II. was a man of large mind and noble aims. Like Frederick, he was unwearying in labor, accessible to everyone, and eager to assume his share of work or responsibility. The books and the people's memory are full of anecdotes of him, though he was far from popular during his life. But he lacked the strong practical sense and calculating foresight of the veteran Prussian king. In his zeal for reforms he hastened to heap one upon another in confusion. Torture was abolished, and for a time even the death penalty. Rigid equality before the law was introduced, and slavery done away.
See SLAVERY, MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.
His reforms in the Church were still more sweeping. He closed more than half of the monasteries, and devoted their estates to public instruction; he introduced German hymns of praise and the German Bible. By his Edict of Toleration, June 22, 1781, he secured to all Protestants throughout the Austrian states their civil rights and freedom of worship, 'in houses of prayer without bells or towers.' … He zealously followed up Maria Theresa's policy of consolidating Austria into one state; and it was this course which made him enemies. He offended the powerful nobility of Hungary by abolishing serfdom (November 1, 1781), and the whole people by the measures he took to promote the use of the German language. In the Netherlands, he alienated from him the powerful clergy by his innovations; and they stirred up against him the people, already aggrieved by the loss of some of their ancient liberties. A revolution broke out among them in 1788, and was threatening to extend to Hungary and Bohemia, when the emperor suddenly died, still in the full vigor of manhood, at the age of forty-nine, February 20, 1790. … After his death, the progress of reform was checked in Austria; but he had awakened new and strong forces there, and a complete return to the ancient system was impossible. … Leopold II. (1790-1792), who succeeded his brother Joseph II., both in Austria and as emperor, was a self-indulgent but prudent ruler."
C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, book 5, chapter 24, sections 8-18.
GERMANY: A. D. 1772-1773. The first Partition of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773.
GERMANY: A. D. 1787. Prussian intervention in Holland. Restoration of the expelled stadtholder.
See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1746-1787.
GERMANY: A. D. 1791. The forming of the Coalition against French democracy.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791; and 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1791-1792. The question of war with France, and the question of the Partition of Poland. Motives and action of Prussia and Austria.
"After the acceptance of the Constitution by Louis XVI. [September—see FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER)], the Emperor indulged for a time a confident hope, that the French question was solved, and that he was relieved from all fear of trouble from that quarter. He had cares enough upon him to make him heartily congratulate himself on this result. … In foreign affairs, the Polish question—the next in importance to the French—was still unsettled, and daily presented fresh difficulties. … The fact that Russia began to show the greatest favour to the Emigrés, and to preach at Berlin and Vienna a crusade against the wicked Jacobins, only served to confirm the Emperor in his peaceful sentiments. He rightly concluded that Catharine wished to entangle the German Powers in a struggle with France, that she might have her own way in Poland; and he was not at all inclined to be the dupe of so shallow an artifice. … At the same time he set about bringing his alliance with Prussia to a definite conclusion, in order to secure to himself a firm support for every emergency. On the 17th of November—a week after the enactment of the first edict against the Emigrés—Prince Reuss made a communication on this subject to the Prussian Ministry, and on this occasion declared himself empowered to commence at any moment the formal draft of an alliance. … 'We are now convinced,' wrote the Ministers to their ambassador at Vienna, 'that Austria will undertake nothing against France.' This persuasion was soon afterwards fully confirmed by Kaunitz, who descanted in the severest terms on the intrigues of the Emigrés on the Rhine, which it was not in the interest of any Power to support. It was ridiculous, he said, in the French Princes, and in Russia and Spain, to declare the acceptance of the constitution by the King compulsory, and therefore void; and still more so to dispute the right of Louis XVI. to alter the constitution at all. He said that they would vainly endeavour to goad Austria into a war, which could only have the very worst consequences for Louis and the present predominance of the moderate party in France. … Here, again, we see that without the machinations of the Girondists, the revolutionary war would never have been commenced. It is true, indeed, that at this time a very perceptible change took place in the opinions of the second German potentate—the King of Prussia. Immediately after the Congress of Pillnitz, great numbers of French Emigrés, who had been driven from Vienna by the coldness of Leopold, had betaken themselves to Berlin. At the Prussian Court they met with a hospitable reception, and aroused in the King, by their graphic descriptions, a warm interest for the victims of the Revolution. … He loaded the Emigrés with marks of favour of every kind, and thereby excited in them the most exaggerated hopes. {1504} Yet the King was far from intending to risk any important interest of the State for the sake of his protégés; he had no idea of pursuing an aggressive policy towards France; and the only point in which he differed from Leopold was in the feeling with which he regarded the development of the warlike tendencies of the French. His Ministers, moreover, were, without exception, possessed by the same idea as Prince Kaunitz; that a French war would be a misfortune to all Europe." As the year 1791 drew towards its close, "unfavourable news arrived from Paris. The attempts of the Feuillants had failed; Lafayette had separated himself from them and from the Court; and the zeal and confidence of victory among the Democrats were greater than ever. The Emigrés in Berlin were jubilant; they had always declared that no impression was to be made upon the Jacobins except by the edge of the sword, and that all hopes founded on the stability of a moderate middle party were futile. The King of Prussia agreed with them, and determined to begin the unavoidable struggle as quickly as possible. He told his Ministers that war was certain, and that Bischoffswerder ought to go once more to the Emperor. … Bischoffswerder, having received instructions from the King himself, left Berlin, and arrived in Vienna, after a speedy journey, on the 28th of February. But he was not destined again to discuss the fate of Europe with his Imperial patron; for on the 29th the smallpox showed itself, of which Leopold died after three days sickness. The greatest consternation and confusion reigned in Vienna. … No one knew to whom the young King Francis—he was as yet only king of Hungary and Bohemia—would give his confidence, or what course he would take; nay, his weakly and nervous constitution rendered it doubtful whether he could bear—even for a short period—the burdens of his office. For the present he confirmed the Ministers in their places, and expressed to them his wish to adhere to the political system of his father. … He … ordered one of his most experienced Generals, Prince Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, to be summoned to Vienna, that he might take council with Bischoffswerder respecting the warlike measures to be adopted by both Powers, in case of a French attack. At the same time, however, the Polish question was, if possible, to be brought to a decision, and Leopold's plan in all its details was to be categorically recommended for adoption, both in Berlin and Petersburg. … The Austrian Minister, Spielmann, had prepared the memorial on Poland, which Prince Reuss presented at Berlin, on the 10th of March. It represented that Austria and Prussia had the same interest in stopping a source of eternal embarrassment and discussion, by strengthening the cause of peace and order in Poland. That herein lay an especially powerful motive to make the crown of that country hereditary; that for both Powers the Elector of Saxony would be the most acceptable wearer of that crown. … The important point, the memorial went on to say, was this, that Poland should no longer be dependent on the predominant influence of any one neighbouring Power. … When the King had read this memorial, in which the Saxon-Polish union was brought forward, not as an idea of the feeble Elector, but as a proposal of powerful Austria; he cried out, 'We must never give our consent to this.' He agreed with his Ministers in the conclusion that nothing would be more dangerous to Prussia, than the formation of such a Power as would result from the proposed lasting union of Poland and Saxony—a Power, which, in alliance with Austria, could immediately overrun Silesia, and in alliance with Russia, might be fatal to East Prussia. … In the midst of this angry and anxious excitement, which for a moment alienated his heart from Austria, the King received a fresh and no less important despatch from Petersburg. Count Golz announced the first direct communication of Russia respecting Poland. 'Should Poland' [wrote the Russian Vice Chancellor] 'be firmly and lastingly united to Saxony, a Power of the first rank will arise, and one which will be able to exercise the most sensible pressure upon each of its neighbours. We are greatly concerned in this, in consequence of the extension of our Polish frontier; and Prussia is no less so, from the inevitable increase which would ensue of Saxon influence in the German Empire. We therefore suggest, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia, should come to an intimate understanding with one another on this most important subject.' … This communication sounded differently in the ears of the King from that which he had received from Austria. The fears which agitated his own mind and those of the Russian chancellor were identical. While Austria called upon him to commit a political suicide, Russia offered her aid in averting the most harassing danger, and even opened a prospect of a considerable territorial increase. The King had no doubt to which of the two Powers he ought to incline. He would have come to terms with Russia on the spot, had not an insurmountable obstacle existed in the new path which was opened to the aggrandizement of Prussia,—viz., the Polish treaty of 1790; in which Prussia had expressly bound herself to protect the independence and integrity of Poland. … He decided that there was no middle course between the Russian and Austrian plans. On the one side was his Polish treaty of 1790, the immediate consequence of which would be a new breach, and perhaps a war, with Russia, and the final result such a strengthening of Poland, as would throw back the Prussian State into that subordinate position, both in Germany and Europe, which it had occupied in the seventeenth century. On the other side there was, indeed, a manifest breach of faith, but also the salvation of Prussia from a perilous dilemma, and perhaps the extension of her boundaries by a goodly Polish Province. If he wavered at all in this conflict of feeling, the Parisian complications soon put an end to his doubts. In quick succession came the announcements that Delessart's peaceful Ministry had fallen; that King Louis had suffered the deepest humiliation; and that the helm of the State had passed into the hands of the Girondist war party. A declaration of war on the part of France against Francis· II. might be daily expected, and the Russian-Polish contest would then only form the less important moiety of the European catastrophe. Austria would now be occupied for a long time in the West; there could be no more question of the formation of a Polish-Saxon State; and Austria could no longer be reckoned upon to protect the constitution of 1791, or even to repel a Russian invasion of Poland. Prussia was bound to aid the Austrians against France, and for many months the King had cherished no more ardent wish than to fulfil this obligation with all his power. {1505} Simultaneously to oppose the Empress Catharine, was out of the question. … The King wrote on the 12th of March to his Ministers as follows: … 'Russia is not far removed from thoughts of a new partition; and this would indeed be the most effectual means of limiting the power of a Polish King, whether hereditary or elective. I doubt, however, whether in this case a suitable compensation could be found for Austria; and whether, after such a curtailment of the power of Poland, the Elector of Saxony would accept the crown. Yet if Austria could be compensated, the Russian plan would be the most advantageous for Prussia,—always provided that Prussia received the whole left bank of the Vistula, by the acquisition of which that distant frontier—so hard to be defended—would be well rounded off. This is my judgment respecting Polish affairs.' This was Poland's sentence of death. It was not, as we have seen, the result of a long-existing greed, but a suddenly seized expedient, which seemed to be accompanied with the least evil, in the midst of an unexampled European crisis. … On the 20th of April the French National Assembly proclaimed war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. A fortnight later the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg appeared in Berlin to settle some common plan for the campaign; and at the same time Kaunitz directed Prince Reuss to enter into negociations on the political question of expenditure and compensation. Count Schulenburg … immediately sent a reply to the Prince, to the effect that Prussia—as it had uniformly declared since the previous summer—could only engage in the war on condition of receiving an adequate compensation. … Both statesmen well knew with what secret mistrust each of these Powers contemplated the aggrandizement of the other; their deliberations were therefore conducted with slow and anxious caution, and months passed by before their respective demands were reduced to any definite shape."
H. von Sybel, History of the French Revolution, book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1792. Accession of the Emperor Francis II.
GERMANY: A. D. 1792-1793. War with Revolutionary France. The Coalition.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1791-1792; 1792 (APRIL-JULY), and (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER); 1792-1793 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY); 1793 (FEBRUARY-APRIL), (MARCH-SEPTEMBER), and (JULY-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1192-1796. The second and third Partitions of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792; and 1793-1796.
GERMANY: A. D. 1794. Withdrawal of Prussia from the Coalition. French conquest of the Austrian Netherlands and successes on the Rhine.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1795. Treaty of Basle between Prussia and France. Crumbling of the Coalition.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER-MAY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1796-1797. Expulsion of Austria from Italy. Bonaparte's first campaigns. Advance of Moreau and Jourdan beyond the Rhine. Their retreat. Peace preliminaries of Leoben.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER); and 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1797 (October). The Treaty of Campo Formio between Austria and France. Austrian cession of the Netherlands and Lombardy and acquisition of Venice.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1798. The second Coalition against Revolutionary France. Prussia and the Empire withheld from it.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1799. The Congress at Rastadt. Murder of French envoys.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1800 (May-December). The disastrous campaigns of Marengo and Hohenlinden.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY-FEBRUARY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803. The Peace of Luneville. Territorial cessions and changes. The settlement of indemnities in the Empire. Confiscation and secularization of the ecclesiastical principalities. Absorption of Free Cities. Re-constitution of the Electoral College.
"By the treaty of Luneville, which the Emperor Francis was obliged to subscribe, 'not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German empire,' Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family [who was thereupon raised to royal rank by the fiat of Bonaparte, who transformed the grand-duchy of Tuscany into the kingdom of Etruria], on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared 'to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred.' These conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war. … The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this treaty as head of the empire, as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel … to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence or express powers to that effect previously conferred. … The emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th February 1801, the day before that when the treaty was signed. … The electors and princes of the empire felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the empire, assembled after the treaty of Luneville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then placed. {1506} But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterwards, under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and broke up the venerable fabric of the German empire."
Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 32 (volume 7).
"Germany: lost by this treaty about 24,000 square miles of its best territory and 3,500,000 of its people; while the princes were indemnified by the plunder of their peers. But the hardest task, the satisfactory distribution of this plunder, remained. While the Diet at Regensburg, after much complaint and management, assigned the arrangement of these affairs to a committee, the princely bargainers were in Paris, employing the most disgraceful means to obtain the favor of Talleyrand and other influential diplomatists. On the 25th of February, 1803, the final decision of the delegation or committee of the empire was adopted by the Diet, and promulgated with the approval of the emperor, Francis II., and of Prussia and Bavaria. It confiscated all the spiritual principalities in Germany, except that the Elector of Mayence, Charles Theodore of Dalberg, received Regensburg, Aschaffenburg, and Wetzlar, as an indemnity, and retained a seat and a voice in the imperial Diet. Of the 48 free cities of the empire, six only remained—Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Frankfort, Nuremburg, and Augsburg. Austria obtained the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen; Prussia, as a compensation for the loss of 1,018 square miles with 122,000 inhabitants west of the Rhine, received 4,875 square miles, with 580,000 inhabitants, including the endowments of the religious houses of Hildesheim and Paderborn, and most of Münster; also Erfurt and Eichsfeld, and the free cities of Nordhausen, Mülhausen, and Goslar; Hanover obtained Osnabruck; to Bavaria, in exchange for the Palatinate, were assigned Würzburg, Bamberg, Freisingen, Augsburg, and Passau, besides a number of cities of the empire, in all about 6,150 square miles, to compensate for 4,240, vastly increasing its political importance. Wirtemberg, too, was richly compensated for the loss of the Mömpelgard by the confiscation of monastery endowments and free cities in Suabia. But Baden made the best bargain of all, receiving about 1,270 square miles of land, formerly belonging to bishops or to the Palatinate, in exchange for 170. After this acquisition, Baden extended, though in patches, from the Neckar to the Swiss border. By building up these three South German states, Napoleon sought to erect a barrier for himself against Austria and Prussia. With the same design, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau were much enlarged. There were multitudes of smaller changes, under the name of 'compensations and indemnities.' Four new lay electorates were established in the place of the three secularized prelacies, and were given to Baden, Wirtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg. But they never had occasion to take part in the election of an emperor."
C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, chapter 25, sections 26-27.
ALSO IN: A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and the Empire, books 7 and 15 (volume 1).
J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, part 1, chapter 4 (volume 1).
GERMANY: A. D. 1803. Bonaparte's seizure of Hanover in his war with England.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1802-1803.
GERMANY: A. D. 1805 (January-April). The third Coalition against France. Prussian Neutrality.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1805 (September-December). Napoleon's overwhelming campaign. The catastrophes at Ulm and Austerlitz.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806. The Peace of Presburg. Territorial losses of Austria. Aggrandizement of Bavaria and Würtemberg, which become kingdoms, and Baden a grand duchy. The Confederation of the Rhine. End of the Holy Roman Empire.
"On the 6th of December, hostilities ceased, and the Russians retired by way of Galicia, but in accordance with the terms of the armistice, the French troops continued to occupy all the lands they had invaded, Austria, Tyrol, Venetia, Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria; within Bohemia they were to have the circle of Tabor, together with Brno and Znoymo in Moravia and Pozsony (Pressburg) in Hungary. The Morava (March) and the Hungarian frontier formed the line of demarcation between the two armies. A definitive peace was signed at Pressburg on the 26th of December, 1805. Austria recognized the conquests of France in Holland and Switzerland and the annexation of Genoa, and ceded to the kingdom of Italy Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia with its islands, and the Bocche di Cattaro. A little later, by the explanatory Act of Fontainebleau, she lost the last of her possessions to the west of the Isonzo, when she exchanged those portions of the counties of Gorico and Gradisca which are situated on the right bank of that river for the county of Montefalcone in Istria. The new kingdoms of Bavaria and Würtemberg [brought into existence by this treaty, through the recognition of them by the Emperor Francis] were aggrandized at the expense of Austria. Bavaria obtained Vorarlberg, the county of Hohenembs, the town of Lindau, and the whole of Tyrol, with Brixen and Trent. Austrian Suabia was given to Würtemberg, while Breisgau and the Ortenau were bestowed on the new grand duke of Baden. One compensation alone, the duchy of Salzburg, fell to Austria for all her sacrifices, and this has remained in her possession ever since. The old bishopric of Würzburg was created an electorate and granted to Ferdinand III. of Tuscany and Salzburg. Altogether the monarchy lost about 25,400 square miles and nearly 3,000,000 of inhabitants. She lost Tyrol with its brave and loyal inhabitants and the Vörlande which had assured Austrian influence in Germany; every possession on the Rhine, in the Black Forest, and on the Lower Danube; she no longer touched either Switzerland or Italy, and she ceased to be a maritime power. Besides all this, she had to pay forty millions for the expenses of the war, while she was exhausted by contributions and requisitions. Vienna had suffered much, and the French army had carried off the 2,000 cannons and the 100,000 guns which had been contained in her arsenals. On the 16th of January, 1806, the emperor Francis returned to his capital. {1507} He was enthusiastically received, and the Viennese returned to the luxurious and easy way of life which has always characterized them. … Austria seemed no longer to have any part to play in German politics. Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden had been formed into a separate league—the Confederation of the Rhine—under French protection. On the 1st of August, 1806, these states announced to the Reichstag at Ratisbon that they looked upon the empire as at an end, and on the 6th, Francis II. formally resigned the empire altogether, and released all the Imperial officials from their engagements to him. Thus the sceptre of Charlemagne fell from the hands of the dynasty which had held it without interruption from 1438."
L. Leger, History of Austro-Hungary, chapter 25.
"Every bond of union was dissolved with the diet of the empire and with the imperial chamber. The barons and counts of the empire and the petty princes were mediatised; the princes of Hohenlohe, Oettingen, Schwarzenberg, Thurn, and Taxis, the Truchsess von Waldburg, Fürstenberg, Fugger, Leiningen, Löwenstein, Solms, Hesse-Homburg, Wied-Runkel, and Orange-Fulda, became subject to the neighbouring Rhenish confederated princes. Of the remaining six imperial free cities, Augsburg and Nuremberg fell to Bavaria; Frankfurt, under the title of grand-duchy, to the ancient elector of Mayence, who was again transferred thither from Ratisbon. The ancient Hanse-towns, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, alone retained their freedom."
W. Menzel, History of Germany, chapter 253 (volume 3).
"A swift succession of triumphs had left only one thing still preventing the full recognition of the Corsican warrior as sovereign of Western Europe, and that one was the existence of the old Romano-Germanic Empire. Napoleon had not long assumed his new title when he began to mark a distinction between 'la France' and 'l'Empire Française.' France had, since A. D. 1792, advanced to the Rhine, and, by the annexation of Piedmont, had overstepped the Alps; the French Empire included, besides the kingdom of Italy, a mass of dependent states, Naples, Holland, Switzerland, and many German principalities, the allies of France in the same sense in which the 'socii populi Romani' were allies of Rome. When the last of Pitt's coalitions had been destroyed at Austerlitz, and Austria had made her submission by the peace of Presburg, the conqueror felt that his hour was come. He had now overcome two Emperors, those of Austria and Russia, claiming to represent the old and new Rome respectively, and had in eighteen months created more kings than the occupants of the Germanic throne in as many centuries. It was time, he thought, to sweep away obsolete pretensions, and claim the sole inheritance of that Western Empire, of which the titles and ceremonies of his court presented a grotesque imitation. The task was an easy one after what had been already accomplished. Previous wars and treaties had so redistributed the territories and changed the constitution of the Germanic Empire that it could hardly be said to exist in anything but name. … The Emperor Francis, partly foreboding the events that were at hand, partly in order to meet Napoleon's assumption of the imperial name by depriving that name of its peculiar meaning, began in A. D. 1805 to style himself 'Hereditary Emperor of Austria,' while retaining at the same time his former title. The next act of the drama was one in which we may more readily pardon the ambition of a foreign conqueror than the traitorous selfishness of the German princes, who broke every tie of ancient friendship and duty to grovel at his throne. By the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine, signed at Paris, July 12th, 1806, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and several other states, sixteen in all, withdrew from the body and repudiated the laws of the Empire, while on August 1st the French envoy at Regensburg announced to the Diet that his master, who had consented to become Protector of the Confederate princes, no longer recognized the existence of the Empire. Francis II. resolved at once to anticipate this new Odoacer, and by a declaration, dated August 6th, 1806, resigned the imperial dignity. His deed states that finding it impossible, in the altered state of things, to fulfil the obligations imposed by his capitulation, he considers as dissolved the bonds which attached him to the Germanic body, releases from their allegiance the states who formed it, and retires to the government of his hereditary dominions under the title of 'Emperor of Austria.' Throughout, the term 'German Empire' (Deutsches Reich) is employed. But it was the crown of Augustus, of Constantine, of Charles, of Maximilian, that Francis of Hapsburg laid down, and a new era in the world's history was marked by the fall of its most venerable institution. One thousand and six years after Leo the Pope had crowned the Frankish king, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight years after Cæsar had conquered at Pharsalia, the Holy Roman Empire came to its end."
J. Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, chapter 20.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (January-August). The Confederation of the Rhine. Cession of Hanover to Prussia. Double dealing and weakness of the latter. Her submission to Napoleon's insults and wrongs. Final goading of the nation to war.
"The object at which all French politicians had aimed since the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the exclusion of both Austria and Prussia from influence in Western Germany, was now completely attained. The triumph of French statesmanship, the consummation of two centuries of German discord, was seen in the Act of Federation subscribed by the Western German Sovereigns in the summer of 1806. By this Act the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Elector of Baden, and 13 minor princes, united themselves, in the League known as the Rhenish Confederacy, under the protection of the French Emperor, and undertook to furnish contingents, amounting to 63,000 men, in all wars in which the French Empire should engage. Their connection with the ancient Germanic Body was completely severed; the very town in which the Diet of the Empire had held its meetings was annexed by one of the members of the Confederacy. The Confederacy itself, with a population of 8,000,000, became for all purposes of war and foreign policy a part of France. Its armies were organised by French officers; its frontiers were fortified by French engineers; its treaties were made for it at Paris. In the domestic changes which took place within these States the work of consolidation begun in 1801 was carried forward with increased vigour. Scores of tiny principalities which had escaped dissolution in the earlier movement were now absorbed by their stronger neighbours. … {1508} With the establishment of the Rhenish Confederacy and the conquest of Naples, Napoleon's empire reached, but did not overpass, the limits within which the sovereignty of France might probably have been long maintained. … If we may judge from the feeling with which Napoleon was regarded in Germany down to the middle of the year 1806, and in Italy down to a much later date, the Empire then founded might have been permanently upheld, if Napoleon had abstained from attacking other States." During the winter of 1806, Count Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, had visited Paris "for the purpose of obtaining some modification in the treaty which he had signed [at the palace of Schönbrunn, near Vienna] on behalf of Prussia after the battle of Austerlitz. The principal feature in that treaty had been the grant of Hanover to Prussia by the French Emperor in return for its alliance. This was the point which above all others excited King Frederick William's fears and scruples; He desired to acquire Hanover, but he also desired to derive his title rather from its English owner [King George III., who was also Elector of Hanover] than from its French invader. It was the object of Haugwitz' visit to Paris to obtain an alteration in the terms of the treaty which should make the Prussian occupation of Hanover appear to be merely provisional, and reserve to the King of England at least a nominal voice in its ultimate transfer. In full confidence that Napoleon would agree to such a change, the King of Prussia, on taking possession of Hanover in January, 1806, concealed the fact of its cession to himself by Napoleon, and published an untruthful proclamation. … The bitter truth that the treaty between France and Prussia contained no single word reserving the rights of the Elector, and that the very idea of qualifying the absolute cession of Hanover was an afterthought, lay hidden in the conscience of the Prussian Government. Never had a Government more completely placed itself at the mercy of a pitiless enemy. Count Haugwitz, on reaching Paris, was received by Napoleon with a storm of indignation and contempt. Napoleon declared that the ill-faith of Prussia had made an end even of that miserable pact which had been extorted after Austerlitz, and insisted that Prussia should openly defy Great Britain by closing the ports of Northern Germany to British vessels, and by declaring itself endowed by Napoleon with Hanover in virtue of Napoleon's own right of conquest. Haugwitz signed a second and more humiliating treaty [February 15] embodying these conditions; and the Prussian Government, now brought into the depths of contempt, but unready for immediate war, executed the orders of its master. … A decree was published excluding the ships of England from the ports of Prussia and from those of Hanover itself (March 28, 1806). It was promptly followed by the seizure of 400 Prussian vessels in British harbours, and by the total extinction of Prussian maritime commerce by British privateers. Scarcely was Prussia committed to this ruinous conflict with Great Britain when Napoleon opened negotiations for peace with Mr. Fox's Government. The first condition required by Great Britain was the restitution of Hanover to King George III. It was unhesitatingly granted by Napoleon. Thus was Prussia to be mocked of its prey, after it had been robbed of all its honour. … There was scarcely a courtier in Berlin who did not feel that the yoke of the French had become past endurance; even Haugwitz himself now considered war as a question of time. The patriotic party in the capital and the younger officers of the army bitterly denounced the dishonoured Government, and urged the King to strike for the credit of his country. … Brunswick was summoned to the King's council to form plans of a campaign; and appeals for help were sent to Vienna, to St. Petersburg, and even to the hostile Court of London. The condition of Prussia at this critical moment was one which filled with the deepest alarm those few patriotic statesmen who were not blinded by national vanity or by a slavery to routine. … Early in the year 1806 a paper was drawn up by Stein, exposing, in language seldom used by a statesman, the character of the men by whom Frederick William was surrounded, and declaring that nothing but a speedy change of system could save the Prussian State from utter downfall and ruin. Two measures of immediate necessity were specified by Stein, the establishment of a responsible council of Ministers, and the removal of Haugwitz and all his friends from power. … The army of Prussia … was nothing but the army of Frederick the Great grown twenty years older. … All Southern Germany was still in Napoleon's hands. The appearance of a Russian force in Dalmatia, after that country had been ceded by Austria to the French Emperor, had given Napoleon an excuse for maintaining his troops in their positions beyond the Rhine. As the probability of a war with Prussia became greater and greater, Napoleon tightened his grasp upon the Confederate States. Publications originating among the patriotic circles of Austria were beginning to appeal to the German people to unite against a foreign oppressor. An anonymous pamphlet, entitled 'Germany in its Deep Humiliation,' was sold by various booksellers in Bavaria, among others by Palm, a citizen of Nuremberg. There is no evidence that Palm was even acquainted with the contents of the pamphlet; but … Napoleon … required a victim to terrify those who, among the German people, might be inclined to listen to the call of patriotism. Palm was not too obscure for the new Charlemagne. The innocent and unoffending man, innocent even of the honourable crime of attempting to save his country, was dragged before a tribunal of French soldiers, and executed within twenty-four hours of his trial, in pursuance of the imperative orders of Napoleon (August 26). … Several years later, … the story of Palm's death was one of those that kindled the bitterest sense of wrong; at the time, it exercised no influence upon the course of political events. Prussia had already resolved upon war."