Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 56)

See, also, OHIO: A. D. 1786-1796.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (February-May). Peace Resolutions in the British House of Commons. Retirement of Lord North. Pacific overtures through General Carleton.

"Fortunately for the United States, the temper of the British nation on the question of continuing the American war was not in unison with that of its sovereign. That war into which the nation had entered with at least as much eagerness as the minister had now become almost universally unpopular. Motions against the measures of administration respecting America were repeated by the opposition, and on every new experiment the strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of February [1782], general Conway moved in the house of commons, 'that it is the opinion of this house that a further prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies, and tend to increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his majesty and the country, all those who should advise or attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to the commanding officers of his Brittanic majesty's forces in America which conformed to them. … {3282} Early in May, Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in conjunction with admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill which had been introduced on the part of administration, authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of North America. These papers he said would manifest the dispositions prevailing with the government and people of England towards those of America, and if the like pacific temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter containing the same communications, and he solicited from the American general a passport for the person who should convey it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a law; nor was any assurance given that the present commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he requested were refused by congress, to whom the application was, of course, referred. … The several states passed resolutions expressing their objections to separate negotiations, and declaring those to be enemies to America who should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But the public votes which have been stated, and probably the private instructions given to the British general, restrained him from offensive war, and the state of the American army disabled general Washington from making any attempt on the posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently passed away without furnishing any military operations of moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the respective commanders in chief."

J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope) History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 65 (volume 7).

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (April). Recognition by the Dutch Republic.

"Henry Laurens, the American plenipotentiary to the Netherlands, having been taken captive and carried to England, John Adams was appointed in his place. The new envoy had waited more than eight months for an audience of reception. Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January 1782 Adams presented himself to the president of the states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland, and, following the order of their rank in the confederation, repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure. Not one of the representatives of foreign powers at the Hague believed that it could succeed;" but, beginning with Friesland, in February, the seven states, one by one, declared in favor of receiving the American envoy. "On the day which chanced to be the seventh anniversary of 'the battle of Lexington' their high mightinesses, the states-general, reporting the unanimous decision of the seven provinces, resolved that John Adams should be received as the minister of the United States of America. The Dutch republic was the second power in the world to recognise their independence."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, page 527.

ALSO IN: J. Q. and C. F. Adams, Life of John Adams, chapter 6 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September). The opening of negotiations for Peace.

The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783), "though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity, and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1780-1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may be given to the reports of the day, the government looked forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been appointed to the command of the forces in North America. … Mr. Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, 1782, observes, 'I cannot see a probability that the English will ever make peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil war.' It was not till September of the same year, under Lord Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner, Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the colonies. … This is the first instruction given by the British Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now made in the preliminaries. … The commission, under which the preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was issued by Congress in June 1781. It empowered 'John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power and authority, general and special commission, … to sign, and thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally present and acted therein.' {3283} All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did not leave it, as a report reached the government that the preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in proper form was not issued till the 21st of September."

The Diplomacy of the United States, chapter 8.

"At the moment … that negotiations were set on foot, there seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It was therefore his wish to recognize that independence immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace. Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions would be asked by France, and that the best chance England possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the recognition of independence as part of the valuable consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable terms, and to use the points where the interests of France, Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and the United States to balance one another, and so make France paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States, and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had determined to obtain formal possession of these territories, and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached the great lakes. The United States, according to both the French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by almost the same line which France had contended for against England after the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1779, when the alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure of M. Gerard, the French envoy, had adopted the following conditions as the ultimatum of peace:

(l.) The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation for peace.

(2.) The Mississippi as their western boundary.

(3.) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of the States with a port below it.

They also passed a resolution to the effect that any interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus belli. 'The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American interests, and their own discretion,' were in other matters to guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts. As however the war progressed, and French assistance, especially in money, became of greater and greater importance to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and then of Count Luzerne, his successor. On the 25th January 1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United States extended no further west than the limits to which settlements were permitted by the English proclamation of 1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of the river; that Spain would probably conquer both Floridas, and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On the 15th February, Congress having considered this communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne, the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered. Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran, 'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual support in every thing that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless independence of character, and because of the tenacity with which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The French he hated. {3284} He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he believed their interests as a power required them to adopt. Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and warned them that if France was to be asked to continue hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to say what the result might be, for the system of France depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at war."

Lord E. Fitzmaurice, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, volume 3, chapter 4.

"Benjamin Franklin, now venerable with years, had been doing at the court of Versailles a work hardly less important than that of Washington on the battle-fields of America. By the simple grace and dignity of his manners, by his large good sense and freedom of thought, by his fame as a scientific discoverer, above all by his consummate tact in the management of men, the whilom printer, king's postmaster-general for America, discoverer, London colonial agent, delegate in the Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence, had completely captivated elegant, free-thinking France. Learned and common folk, the sober and the frivolous alike swore by Franklin. Snuff-boxes, furniture, dishes, even stoves were gotten up 'à la Franklin.' The old man's portrait was in every house. That the French Government, in spite of a monarch who was half afraid of the rising nation beyond sea, had given America her hearty support, was in no small measure due to the influence of Franklin. And his skill in diplomacy was of the greatest value in the negotiations now pending."

E. B. Andrews, History of the United States, volume 1, pages 208-209.

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, Franklin in France, volume 2, chapters 3-4.

Lord J. Russell, Life of Fox, chapters 16-17 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September-November). The Peace parleyings at Paris. Distrust of French aims by Jay and Adams. A secret and separate negotiation with England.

"The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by [the change of ministry which placed Lord Shelburne at the head of affairs in England] … and by the total defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar in September [see ENGLAND; A. D. 1780-1782]. Six months before, England had seemed worsted in every quarter. Now England, though defeated in America was victorious as regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United States, and this point was now substantially gained. The chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to persuade England to cede the great stronghold, in exchange for West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain at the expense of the United States; and he did this the more willingly as he had no love for the Americans, and did not wish to see them become too powerful. France had strictly kept her pledges; she had given us valuable and timely aid in gaining our independence; and the sympathies of the French people were entirely with the American cause. But the object of the French government had been simply to humiliate England, and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of her thirteen colonies. The immense territory extending from the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and from the border of West Florida to the Great Lakes, had passed from the hands of France into those of England at the peace of 1763; and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. … Vergennes maintained that the Americans ought to recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to England all the territory north of the Ohio River. The region south of this limit should, he thought, be made an Indian territory, and placed under the protection of Spain and the United States. … Upon another important point the views of the French government were directly opposed to American interests. The right to catch fish on the banks of Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the king of Great Britain, had participated in this privilege. The matter was of very great importance, not only to New England, but to the United States in general. … The British government was not inclined to grant the privilege, and on this point Vergennes took sides with England, in order to establish a claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in some other quarter. … Jay [who had lately arrived in Paris to take part in the negotiations] soon began to suspect the designs of the French minister. He found that he was sending M. de Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne under an assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the United States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of legation at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American claim to the Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned these facts, he sent his friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him that it was greatly for the interest of England to dissolve the alliance between America and France, he declared himself ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the recognition of independence, provided that Oswald's commission should speak of the thirteen United States of America, instead of calling them colonies and naming them separately. {3285} This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own responsibility, and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been averse to anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served to set the ball rolling at once. … Lord Shelburne at once perceived the antagonism that had arisen between the allies, and promptly took advantage of it. A new commission was made out for Oswald, in which the British government first described our country as the United States; and early in October negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the part of England the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey and Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In the course of the month John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens. … The arrival of Adams fully decided the matter as to a separate negotiation with England. He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as far as possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of alliance between France and the United States had expressly stipulated that neither power should ever make peace without the consent of the other. … In justice to Vergennes, it should be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith with us in regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated. … At the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated, Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it is undeniable that, without departing technically from the obligations of the alliance, Jay and Adams—two men as honourable as ever lived—played a very sharp defensive game against him. … The treaty with England was not concluded until the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the express stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed agreement was reached as to what the purport of the treaty should be, while our not too friendly ally was kept in the dark."

J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, chapter 1.

"If his [Vergennes'] policy had been carried out, it seems clear that he would have established a claim for concessions from England by supporting her against America on the questions of Canada and the Canadian border and the Newfoundland fishery. … The success of such a policy would have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay and Adams defeated it. … The act was done, and if it can be justified by success, that justification, at least, is not wanting."

W. E. H. Lecky, History of England in the 18th Century, chapter 15 (volume 4).

"The instructions of congress, given to the American commissioners under the instigation of the French court, were absolute and imperative, 'to undertake nothing without the knowledge and concurrence of that court, and ultimately to govern themselves by their advice and opinion.' These orders, transmitted at the time of the enlargement of the commission, had just been reinforced by assurances given to quiet the uneasiness created in France by the British overtures through Governor Carleton. Thus far, although the commissioners had felt them to be derogatory to the honor of their country, as well as to their own character as its representatives, there had been no necessity for action either under or against them. But now that matters were coming to the point of a serious negotiation, and the secondary questions of interest to America were to be determined, especially those to which France had shown herself indifferent, not to say adverse, it seemed as if no chance remained of escaping a decision. Mr. Jay, jealous of the mission of De Rayneval, of which not a hint had been dropped by the French court, suspicious of its good faith from the disclosures of the remarkable dispatch of Marbois, and fearful of any advice like that of which he had received a foretaste through M. de Rayneval, at the same time provoked that the confidence expected should be all on one side, the Count communicating nothing of the separate French negotiation, came to the conclusion that the interests of America were safest when retained in American hands. He therefore declared himself in favor of going on to treat with Great Britain, without consulting the French court. Dr. Franklin, on the other hand, expressing his confidence in that court, secured by his sense of the steady reception of benefits by his country, signified his willingness to abide by the instructions he had received. Yet it is a singular fact, but lately disclosed, that, notwithstanding this general feeling, which was doubtless sincerely entertained, Dr. Franklin had been the first person to violate those instructions, at the very inception of the negotiations, by proposing to Lord Shelburne the cession of Canada, and covering his proposal with an earnest injunction to keep it secret from France, because of his belief that she was adverse to the measure. … It may fairly be inferred that, whatever Franklin might have been disposed to believe of the French court, his instincts were too strong to enable him to trust them implicitly with the care of interests purely American. And, in this, there can be no reasonable cause for doubt that he was right. The more full the disclosures have been of the French policy from their confidential papers, the more do they show Count de Vergennes assailing England in America, with quite as fixed a purpose as ever Chatham had to conquer America in Germany. Mr. Adams had no doubt of it. He had never seen any signs of a disposition to aid the United States from affection or sympathy. On the contrary, he had perceived their cause everywhere made subordinate to the general considerations of continental politics. Perhaps his impressions at some moments carried him even further, and led him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and depress America. In this he fell into the natural mistake of exaggerating the importance of his own country. In the great game of nations which was now playing at Paris under the practised eye of France's chief (for Count de Maurepas was no longer living), the United States probably held a relative position, in his mind, not higher than that of a pawn, or possibly a knight, on a chess-table. Whilst his attention was absorbed in arranging the combinations of several powers, it necessarily followed that he had not the time to devote that attention to any one, which its special representative might imagine to be its due. But even this hypothesis was to Mr. Adams justification quite sufficient for declining to submit the interests of his country implicitly to the Count's control. If not so material in the Count's eyes, the greater the necessity of keeping them in his own care. He therefore seized the first opportunity to announce to his colleagues his preference for the views of Mr. Jay. {3286} After some little reflection, Dr. Franklin signified his acquiescence in this decision. His objections to it had doubtless been increased by the peculiar relations he had previously sustained to the French court, and by a very proper desire to be released from the responsibility of what might from him be regarded as a discourteous act. No such delicacy was called for on the part of the other commissioners. Neither does it appear that Count de Vergennes manifested a sign of discontent with them at the time. He saw that little confidence was placed in him, but he does not seem to have made the slightest effort to change the decision or even to get an explanation of it. The truth is, that the course thus taken had its conveniences for him, provided only that the good faith of the American negotiators, not to make a separate peace, could be depended upon. Neither did he ever affect to complain of it, excepting at one particular moment when he thought he had cause to fear that the support he relied on might fail."

J. Q. and C. F. Adams, The Life of John Adams, volume 2, chapter 7.

"The radical difference between Franklin and his colleagues was in the question of trust. Franklin saw no reason to distrust the fidelity of France at any time to her engagements to the United States during the revolutionary war. His colleagues did not share this confidence, and yet, while impressed by this distrust of their ally, they made no appeal for explanation. The weight of opinion, as will hereafter be more fully seen, is now that Franklin was right, and they in this respect wrong. But whatever may have been the correctness of their view, it was proper that, before making it the basis of their throwing off the burden of treaty obligation and their own instructions, they should have first notified France of their complaint. Obligations cannot be repudiated by one party on the ground of the failure of the other party to perform some condition imposed on him, without giving him notice of the charge against him, so that he could have the opportunity of explanation. It may be added, on the merits, that the extenuation set up by Jay and Adams, that France was herself untrue to her obligations, however honestly they believed it, can not now be sustained. Livingston, who knew more of the attitude of France than any public man on the American side except Franklin, swept it aside as groundless. Edward Everett, one of the most accomplished historical writers and diplomatists the country has ever produced, speaks, as we shall see, to the same effect, and other historical critics of authority, to be also hereafter cited, give us the same conclusion. Yet there are other reasons which may excuse their course, and that of Franklin, who concurred with them rather than defeat a peace. In the first place, such was their isolation, that their means of communication with Congress was stopped; and they might well have argued that if Congress knew that the English envoys refused to treat with them except in secret conference their instructions would have been modified. In the second place we may accept Adams' statement that Vergennes was from time to time informally advised of the nature of the pending propositions. In the third place, the articles agreed on in 1782 were not to be a definite treaty except with the assent of France. … It now appears that the famous Marbois letter, handed to Jay by one of the British loyalists, and relied on by him as showing France's duplicity, was disavowed by Marbois; and there are, aside from this, very strong reasons to distrust its genuineness. In the second place, we have in the correspondence of George III a new light thrown, on the action taken by Jay in consequence of this letter. … Benjamin Vaughan, while a gentleman of great amiability and personal worth, was, when Jay sent him without Franklin's knowledge on a confidential mission to the British ministry, in the employ of that ministry as secret agent at Paris. It is due to Jay to say that he was ignorant of this fact, though he would have been notified of it had he consulted Franklin. One of the most singular incidents of this transaction is that George III, seeking double treachery in thus sending back to him his own agent in the guise of an agent from the American legation, regarded it as a peculiarly subtle machination of Franklin, which it was his duty to baffle by utterly discrediting Benjamin Vaughan. It should be added that Franklin's affection for Benjamin Vaughan was in no wise diminished by Vaughan's assumption, with an honesty which no one who knew him would question, of this peculiar kind of mediatorship. And in Jay Franklin's confidence was unabated. He more than once said that no one could be found more suited than Jay to represent the United States abroad. And when, in view of death, he prepared to settle his estate, he selected; Jay as his executor."

F. Wharton, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, chapter 9, section 111, and chapter 13, section 158 (volume 1).

Writing to M. de la Luzerne, the French Minister in the United States, under date of December 19, 1782, Count de Vergennes expressed himself on the conduct of the American Commissioners as follows: "You will surely be gratified, as well as myself, with the very extensive advantages, which our allies, the Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly will, not be less surprised than I have been, at the conduct of the Commissioners. According to the instructions of Congress, they ought to have done nothing without our participation. I have informed you, that the King did not seek to influence the negotiation any further than his offices might be necessary to his friends. The American Commissioners will not say that I have interfered, and much less that I have wearied them with my curiosity. They have cautiously kept themselves at a distance from me. Mr. Adams, one of them, coming from Holland, where he had been received and served by our ambassador, had been in Paris nearly three weeks, without imagining that he owed me any mark of attention, and probably I should not have seen him till this time, if I had not caused him to be reminded of it. Whenever I have had occasion to see anyone of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise, when, on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have mutually made, not to sign except conjointly. {3287} I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on the next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly complain that I received them without demonstrations of sensibility. It was not till some days after, that, when this minister had come to see me, I allowed myself to make him perceive that his proceeding in this abrupt signature of the articles had little in it, which could be agreeable to the King. He appeared sensible of it, and excused, in the best manner he could, himself and his colleagues. Our conversation was amicable."

J. Bigelow, Life of Benjamin Franklin, volume 3, page 207, note.

ALSO IN: J. Jay, The Peace Negotiations of 1782-3 (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 7, chapter 2).

E. Fitzmaurice, Life of the Earl of Shelburne, volume 3, chapter 6.

E. E. Hale, Franklin in France, volume 2, chapters 5-8.

H. Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'établissement des États-Unis d'Amérique, tome 5.

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

[Image: Map of the United States.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1783. Grievances of the Army. The Newburgh Addresses.

"Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of the army, and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and if so, that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and irritated by the neglect of Congress; destitute of money and credit and of the means of living from day to day; oppressed with debts; saddened by the distresses of their families at home, and by the prospect of misery before them,—they presented a memorial to Congress in December [1782], in which they urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered to commute the half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or for such a sum in gross as should be agreed on by their committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress of the memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in this document, as well as from other evidence, that the officers were nearly driven to desperation, and that their offer of commutation was wrung from them by a state of public opinion little creditable to the country. … The committee of the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole winter, and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their constituents that nothing had been done. At this moment, the predicament in which Washington stood, in the double relation of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and patriotism, all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side, and his fidelity to the government, on the other, were severely tried. On the 10th of March, an anonymous address was circulated among the officers at Newburgh, calling a meeting of the general and field officers, and of one officer from each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the late letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to determine what measures should be adopted to obtain that redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in vain. It was written with great ability and skill [by John Armstrong, afterwards General]. … Washington met the crisis with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper, and directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th, to hear the report of their committee, and to deliberate what further measures ought to be adopted as most rational and best calculated to obtain the just and important object in view. The senior officer in rank present [General Gates] was directed to preside, and to report the result to the Commander-in-chief. On the next day after these orders were issued, a second anonymous address appeared from the same writer. In this paper he affected to consider the orders of General Washington, assuming the direction of the meeting, as a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed. Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the meeting himself, or that his name would be used to justify measures which he intended to discountenance and prevent. He therefore attended the meeting, and under his influence, seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all attempts to seduce them from their civil allegiance, referred the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration of Congress. Even at this distant day, the peril of that crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the Commander-in-chief been other than Washington, had the leading officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood of a civil war."

G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution of the United States, book 2, chapter 1 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1784. Persecution and flight of the Tories or Loyalists.

See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (April). Formation of the Society of the Cincinnati.

See CINCINNATI, THE SOCIETY OF THE.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (September). The definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States.

The four difficult questions on which the British and American negotiators at Paris arrived, after much discussion and wise compromise, at a settlement of differences originally wide, were (1) Boundaries; (2) Fishing rights; (3) Payment of debts from American to British merchants that were outstanding when the war began; (4) Amnesty to American loyalists, or Tories, and restoration of their confiscated property.

Within two months after the separate negotiations with England opened an agreement had been reached, and preliminary or provisional articles were signed on the 30th of November, 1782. The treaty was not to take effect, otherwise than by the cessation of hostilities, until terms of peace should be agreed upon between England and France. This occurred in the following January, and on the 3d of September, 1783, the definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States was signed [at Paris]. Its essential provisions were the following:

"Article 1. His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the Government, propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof.

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Article II. And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the subject of the boundaries of the United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are, and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint Croix River to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwestern most head of Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence, by a line due west on the said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the middle of said water communication into the Lake Huron; thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake to the most northwestern point thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line last mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the Equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean. East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.

Article III. It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of Saint Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.

Article IV. It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

Article V. It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of His Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the said United States. …

Article VI. That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced, against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war. …

Article VII. There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall from henceforth cease: All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States. …

Article VIII. The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain, and the citizens of the United States."

Documents Illustrative of American History, edited by H. W. Preston, page 232.

ALSO IN: Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers (edition of 1889), pages 370-379.

Parliamentary History of England, volume 23.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (November-December). The British evacuation of New York. Dissolution of the Continental Army and Washington's farewell to it.

"The definitive treaty had been signed at Paris on the 3d of September, 1783, and was soon to be ratified by the United States in Congress assembled. The last remnant of the British army in the east had sailed down the Narrows on the 25th of November, a day which, under the appellation of Evacuation Day, was long held in grateful remembrance by the inhabitants of New York, and was, till a few years since, annually celebrated with fireworks and with military display. Of the continental army scarce a remnant was then [at the beginning of 1784] in the service of the States, and these few were under the command of General Knox. His great work of deliverance over, Washington had resigned his commission, had gone back to his estate on the banks of the Potomac, and was deeply engaged with plans for the improvement of his plantations. {3289} The retirement to private life of the American Fabius, as the newspapers delighted to call him, had been attended by many pleasing ceremonies, and had been made the occasion for new manifestations of affectionate regard by the people. The same day that witnessed the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from New York also witnessed the entry into that city of the army of the States. Nine days later Washington bid adieu to his officers. About noon on Thursday, the 4th of December, the chiefs of the army assembled in the great room of Fraunces's Tavern, then the resort of merchants and men of fashion, and there Washington joined them. Rarely as he gave way to his emotions, he could not on that day get the mastery of them. … He filled a glass from a decanter that stood on the table, raised it with a trembling hand, and said: 'With a heart full of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most devoutly wish your latter days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable.' Then he drank to them, and, after a pause, said: 'I cannot come to each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged if you will each come and shake me by the hand.' General Knox came forward first, and Washington embraced him. The other officers approached one by one, and silently took their leave. A line of infantry had been drawn up extending from the tavern to Whitehall ferry, where a barge was in waiting to carry the commander across the Hudson to Paulus Hook. Washington, with his officers following, walked down the line of soldiers to the water. The streets, the balconies, the windows, were crowded with gazers. All the churches in the city sent forth a joyous din. Arrived at the ferry, he entered the barge in silence, stood up, took off his hat and waved farewell. Then, as the boat moved slowly out into the stream amid the shouts of the citizens, his companions in arms stood bareheaded on the shore till the form of their illustrious commander was lost to view."

J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, chapter 2 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 33.

Mrs. M. J. Lamb, History of the City of New York, volume 2, chapters 6-7.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1787. After the war. Resistance to the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace. National feebleness and humiliation. Failure of the Articles of Confederation. Movements toward a firmer Constitution.

"The revolution was at last accomplished. The evils it had removed, being no longer felt, were speedily forgotten. The evils it had brought pressed heavily upon them. They could devise no remedy. They saw no way of escape. They soon began to grumble, became sullen, hard to please, dissatisfied with themselves and with everything done for them. The States, differing in habits, in customs, in occupations, had been during a few years united by a common danger. But the danger was gone; old animosities and jealousies broke forth again with all their strength, and the union seemed likely to be dissolved. In this state of public discontent the House met at Philadelphia early in January, 1784. Some days were spent in examining credentials of new members, and in waiting for the delinquents to come in. It was not till the 14th of the month that the definitive treaty was taken under consideration and duly ratified. Nothing remained, therefore, but to carry out the stipulations with as much haste as possible. But there were some articles which the people had long before made up their minds never should be carried out. While the treaty was yet in course of preparation the royal commissioners had stoutly insisted on the introduction of articles providing for the return of the refugees and the payment of debts due to British subjects at the opening of the war. The commissioners on behalf of the United States, who well knew the tempers of their countrymen, had at first firmly stood out against any such articles. But some concessions were afterward made by each party, and certain stipulations touching the debts and the refugees inserted. Adams, who wrote in the name of his fellow-commissioners, … hoped that the middle line adopted would be approved. The middle line to which Adams referred was that Congress should recommend the States to make no more seizures of the goods and property of men lately in arms against the Confederation, and to put no bar in the way of the recovery of such as had already been confiscated. It was distinctly understood by each side that these were recommendations, and nothing more than recommendations. Yet no sooner were they made known than a shout of indignation and abuse went up from all parts of the country. The community in a moment was divided between three parties. The smallest of the three was made up of the Tories, who still hoped for place and power, and still nursed the delusion that the past would be forgotten. Yet they daily contributed to keep the remembrance of it alive by a strong and avowed attachment to Great Britain. Opposed to these was the large and influential body of violent Whigs, who insisted vehemently that every loyalist should instantly be driven from the States. A less numerous and less violent body of Whigs constituted the third party." The fury of the violent Whigs proved generally irresistible and great numbers of the obnoxious Tories fled before it.

See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain, and founded settlements which their descendants have since raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England, beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused, with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the severe restrictions which England began to lay on American commerce. Many more … set out for Nova Scotia. … The open contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into which Congress had fallen was most wretched. … Each of the thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against the central government. {3290} Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond the borders of the State was made with protestations, with trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. … From beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of population. … But this absolute equality of the States was more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once created for preferring a representation of two to a representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all. While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed, some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the organization of the Government under the Constitution six years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a period of thirteen consecutive days. … No occasion, however impressive or important, could call out a large attendance. Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. … It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built. In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing was more diverting than the uncertain wanderings of Congress. … In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in the army and come rapidly into vogue. … The men who, in after years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution, who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents, cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."

J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, volume 1, chapter 2.

Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of the Federalist, of the state of the country in 1787, is very graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence! These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered! These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. {3291} To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded what indication is there of National disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? … The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. … There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations, for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. … If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a National Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a Government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of Government."

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, number 15.

"Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless. Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they could lay any desired burden upon American commerce without fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785 Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States. The Federal Government, in short, was despised abroad and disobeyed at home. The apparent remedy was the possession by Congress of the power of levying and collecting internal taxes and duties on imports, but, after long urging, it was found impossible to gain the necessary consent of all the States to the article of taxation by Congress. In 1786, therefore, this was abandoned, and, as a last resort, the States were asked to pass an Amendment intrusting to Congress the collection of a revenue from imports. This Amendment was agreed to by all the States but one. New York alone rejected it, after long debate, and her veto seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds of many for an immediate and complete revision of the government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In 1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786, delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the States were not represented. The general conclusion was that the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed, May 14th, 1787."

A. Johnston, History of American Politics, 2d edition, chapter 1.

"Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of perpetual duration. … But this brief interval was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience during that period."

G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution, book 3, chapter 1.

"It is not too much to say that the period of five years following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people."

J. Fiske, Critical Period of American History, page 55.

ALSO IN: J. S. Landon, Constitutional History and Government of the United States, lecture 3.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1789. Depressed state of Trade and Industry. Commercial consequences of the want of nationality.

"The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the United States, was not so disastrous as might have been expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt. Before the Revolution the colonies had had open trade with their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar, cotton, rum, and indigo. … As a result of independence, the West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of the United States then came in on the footing of foreign vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of the mainland for the necessaries of life. Pitt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as to articles that were the produce of either country. The measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen. Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the necessary supply of food when their own crops had been destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition of the West India trade, another and more important cause had operated to check the prosperous development of American commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others."

J. R. Soley, Maritime Industries of America (The United States of America, edition by N. S. Shaler, volume 1, chapter 10).

"The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities called the United States, from 1783 to 1780, was probably the poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country. England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784, and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and detail of the internal management of this commerce added to the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time. Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming of the troops had been to the political rights of the old colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about three weeks the mechanics and artisans met in the old Green Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries. The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process. Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to treat with any} power which excluded American shipping from its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports were closed to American products unless they were brought in British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade, and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the whole country."

W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1780, chapter 22 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. Plans for new States in the Northwest Territory.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A. D. 1784.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. Revolt in Tennessee against the territorial cession to Congress. The State of Franklin.

See TENNESSEE; A. D. 1776-1784; and 1785.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. The first daily Newspaper publication.

See PRINTING and PRESS; A. D. 1784-1813.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. The financial administration of Robert Morris. Cost of the war.

From May, 1781, until April, 1785, the burden of the financial management of the revolutionary struggle rested upon Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, who held the office which Congress had created and entitled "the Superintendent of Finances." Morris's detractors argued that he deserved no great credit for his management of the finances as compared with his predecessors, because in his time everything turned in his favour. It is true that if things had remained as before, he could not have restored the finances; for the miracle of carrying on a war without means has never yet been performed by anybody. The events which gave him an opportunity to restore the finances, by intelligent and energetic action, were as follows. The first was the collapse of the paper currency and its absolute removal from circulation, in May, 1781, just before he took office. As soon as it was out of the way, specie came in. He was able to throw aside all the trammels in which the treasury operations had been entangled by the paper system. It is true that he did not succeed in his attempt to relieve himself entirely from these anticipations, which, inasmuch as they were anticipations, would have used up the revenues of his time; but it was a great gain for him to be able to conduct his current operations at least in terms of specie. The second thing in his favour was the great help granted by France in 1781, and especially the importation of a part of this in specie. This enabled him to found the bank, from which he borrowed six times what he put into it. The chief use of the bank to him, however, was to discount the notes which he took for bills of exchange. Then also it was possible for him to reduce the expenses in a way which his predecessors had not had the courage or the opportunity to accomplish, because in their time the abuses of the old method had not gone far enough to force acquiescence in the reforms. In Morris's time, and chiefly, as it appears, by his exertions and merit, the expenditures were greatly reduced for an army of a given size. When the war came to an end, it was possible for him to reduce the entire establishment to a very low scale. Next we notice that the efforts to introduce taxation bore fruit which, although it was trivial in one point of view, was large enough to be very important to him in his desperate circumstances. Finally, when his need was the greatest, and these advantages and opportunities proved inadequate, the rise of American credit made the loan in Holland possible, and this carried him through to the result. … By the Report of 1790 the total amount of expenditures and advances at the treasury of the United States, during the war, in specie value, was estimated as follows; 1775 and 1776, $20,064,666. 1777, $24,986,646. 1778, $24,289,438. 1779, $10,794,620. 1780, $3,000,000. 1781, $1,942,465. 1782, $3,632,745. 1783, $3,226,583. 1784, $548,525 to November 1. Total $92,485,693.

This table shows how the country lapsed into dependence on France after the alliance was formed. The round number opposite 1780 is very eloquent. It means anarchy and guesswork. … According to the best records we possess, the cost of the war to the United States, reduced to specie value year by year at the official scale of depreciation, which, being always below the truth, makes these figures too high, was, as above stated, $92,485,693, at the treasury. There were also certificates of indebtedness out for $16,708,009. There had been expended in Europe, which never went through the treasury, $5,000,000. The States were estimated to have expended $21,000,000. Total, $135,000,000. Jefferson calculated it at $140,000,000, by adding the debts incurred and the continental currency. The debt contracted by England during the war was £115,000,000, for which £91,000,000 were realized. The Comptroller of the Treasury of France said that it cost 60,000,000 livres a year to support the army in America. Vergennes told Lafayette, in November, 1782, that France had expended 250,000,000 livres in the war. There is an often-repeated statement that the war cost France 1,200,000,000 livres, or 1,280,000,000, or 1,500,000,000. Arthur Young put it at £50,000,000, sterling. Probably if 60,000,000 a year for five years, or $60,000,000, was taken as the amount directly expended for and in America by France, it would be as fair a computation as could be made of her contribution to American independence. She had large expenditures elsewhere in the prosecution of her war against Great Britain, and her incidental losses of ships, etc., were great. When England abandoned the effort to subdue the colonies, she was in a far better position for continuing it than either of her adversaries. George III. was by no means stupid in his comments and suggestions about the war. No Englishman of the period said things which now seem wiser in the retrospect. As early as September, 1780, he said: 'America is distressed to the greatest degree. The finances of France, as well as Spain, are in no good situation: This war, like the last, will prove one of credit.' This opinion was fully justified in 1782. French finances were then hastening toward bankruptcy, so that France could not continue the war expenses or the loans and subsidies to America. English credit was high. October 2, 1782, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, that the English fleet was stronger than at the beginning of the war, while the fleets of France and Spain were weaker; that French finances were greatly weakened, while English credit was high; that England had recovered influence in Russia, and through Russia on Prussia and Austria. He wanted peace and reconciliation with England in order to act with her in eastern Europe. If England had chosen to persevere in the war, the matter of credit would have been the most important element in her chances of success, aside from the natural difficulties of the enterprise."

W. G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 23 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784-1788. Disputes with England over the execution of the Treaty of Peace. Difficulties with Spain. The question of the Navigation of the Mississippi. Eastern jealousy and Western excitement.

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"Serious disputes soon arose, concerning the execution of the treaty of peace; and each nation complained of infractions by the other. On the part of the United States, it was alleged that negroes had been carried away, contrary to the treaty; and as early as May, 1783, congress instructed their ministers for negotiating peace to remonstrate to the British court against this conduct of their commander in America, and to take measures to obtain reparation. The United States, also, complained that the western posts had not been sur·rendered, agreeably to treaty stipulations. Great Britain, on her part, alleged that legal impediments had been interposed to prevent the collection of British debts in America; and that the 5th and 6th articles, relating to the property of the loyalists, had not been complied with. In June, 1784, the legislature of Virginia not only declared that there had been an infraction on the part of Great Britain of the 7th article, in detaining the slaves and other property of the citizens of the United States, but instructed their delegates in congress to request that a remonstrance be presented to the British court against such infraction and to require reparation. They also directed them to inform congress that the state of Virginia conceived a just regard to the national honor and interest obliged her assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete fulfilment of the treaty until the success of such remonstrance was known, or they should have further directions from congress. They at the same time declared, that as soon as reparation for such infraction should be made, or congress should judge it indispensably necessary, such acts as inhibited the recovery of British debts should be repealed, and payment made, in such time and manner as should consist with the exhausted situation of the state. In consequence of these difficulties and disputes, congress, early in the year 1785, determined to send a minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain; and on the 24th of February John Adams was appointed to represent the United States at the court of London. He was instructed 'in a respectful but firm manner to insist that the United States be put, without further delay, into possession of all the posts and territories within their limits which are now held by British garrisons.' … Mr. Jefferson was soon after appointed to represent the United States at the court of Versailles, in the room of Dr. Franklin, who had leave to return home, after an absence of nine years. Mr. Livingston having resigned the office of secretary of foreign affairs, Mr. Jay, in March, 1784, and before his return from Europe, was appointed in his place. Mr. Adams repaired to the British court, and was received as the first minister from the United States since their independence was acknowledged. … In December, 1785, Mr. Adams presented a memorial to the British secretary of state, in which, after stating the detention of the western posts contrary to the stipulations in the treaty of peace, he in the name and in behalf of the United States required 'that all his majesty's armies and garrisons be forthwith withdrawn from the said United States, from all and every of the posts and fortresses before enumerated, and from every port, place and harbor, within the territory of the said United States, according to the true intention of the treaties.' To this memorial the British secretary, lord Carmarthen, returned an answer, on the 28th of February, 1786, in which he acknowledges the detention of the posts, but alleges a breach of the 4th article of the treaty of peace on the part of the United States, by interposing impediments to the recovery of British debts in America. … This answer was accompanied with a statement of the various instances in which the 4th article had been violated by acts of the states. The complaints of Great Britain also extended to breaches of the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty, relating to the recovery of certain property and to confiscations. The answer of the British secretary was submitted to congress; and in order to remove the difficulties complained of, that body, in March, 1787, unanimously declared that all the acts, or parts of acts, existing in any of the states, repugnant to the treaty of peace, ought to be repealed; and they recommended to the states to make such repeal by a general law. … A circular letter to the states accompanied these declarations, in which congress say, 'we have deliberately and dispassionately examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by Great Britain, as infractions of the treaty of peace, on the part of America, and we regret that, in some of the states, too little attention has been paid to the public faith pledged by that treaty.' In consequence of this letter, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed acts complying with the recommendations contained in it. The operation of the act of Virginia, however, which repealed all acts preventing the recovery of debts due to British subjects, was suspended until the governor of that state should issue a proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had delivered up the western posts, and was also taking measures for the further fulfilment of the treaty of peace by delivering up the negroes belonging to the citizens of that state, carried away contrary to the 7th article of the treaty, or by making compensation for the same. … The British court was not yet disposed to enter into any commercial treaty with the United States. The ministers were, no doubt, satisfied that the advantages they enjoyed under their own regulations were greater than could be obtained by any treaty they could make with America. And this was, probably, one of the principal reasons of their refusal to enter into any such treaty. As the British court declined sending a minister to the United States, Mr. Adams, in October, 1787, at his request, had leave to return home. … The United States had also at this period to encounter difficulties with Spain as well as Great Britain. The two Floridas having been ceded to his catholic majesty, serious disputes soon arose, not only on the old subject of the navigation of the Mississippi, but with respect to the boundaries of Louisiana and the ceded territory. The Spanish court still persisted in its determination to exclude the Americans from the navigation of the Mississippi. … In December, 1784, congress declared it necessary to send a minister to Spain, for the purpose of adjusting the interfering claims of the two nations respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, and other matters highly interesting to the peace and good understanding which ought to subsist between them. This was prevented by the appointment of Don Diego Gardoqui, a minister from Spain, who arrived in the United States and was acknowledged by congress in the summer of 1785. {3295} Soon after his arrival, Mr. Jay, then secretary of foreign affairs, was appointed to treat with the Spanish minister on the part of the United States. … As Mr. Jay, by his instructions, was not to conclude a treaty until the same was communicated to congress and approved by them, and was also specially directed to obtain a stipulation acknowledging the right of the United States to their territorial claims and the free navigation of the Mississippi, as established in their treaty with Great Britain, he, on the 3d of August, 1786, submitted to congress the … plan of a commercial treaty, and stated the difficulties in obtaining the stipulation required. … 'Circumstanced as we are [said Mr. Jay] I think it would be expedient to agree that the treaty should be limited to twenty five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean. Thus the duration of the treaty and of the forbearance in question should be limited to the same period.' … Among other reasons, Mr. Jay stated that the navigation of the Mississippi was not at that time very important, and would not probably become so in less than twenty five or thirty years, and that a forbearance to use it, while it was not wanted, was no great sacrifice—that Spain then excluded the people of the United States from that navigation; and that it could only be acquired by war, for which the United States were not then prepared; and that in case of war France would no doubt join Spain. Congress were much divided on this interesting subject. The seven states at the north, including Pennsylvania, were disposed, in case a treaty could not otherwise be made, to forbear the use of the navigation of the Mississippi below the southern boundary of the United States, for a limited time, and a resolution was submitted to congress repealing Mr. Jay's instructions of the 25th of August, 1785, and which was carried, seven states against five. … This, however, was to be on the express condition that a stipulation of forbearance should not be construed to extinguish the right of the United States, independent of such stipulation, to use and navigate said river from its source to the ocean; and that such stipulation was not to be made unless it should be agreed in the same treaty that the navigation and use of the said river above such intersection to its source should be common to both nations—and Mr. Jay was to make no treaty unless the territorial limits of the United States were acknowledged and secured according to the terms agreed between the United States and Great Britain. … As by the confederation the assent of nine states was necessary in making a treaty the same number was considered requisite in giving specific instructions in relation to it; … and it was questioned whether the previous instructions given to Mr. Jay could be rescinded without the assent of nine states. These proceedings in congress, though with closed doors, soon became partly known, and excited great alarm in Virginia and in the western settlements. … While these negociations were pending, the fertile country at the west was settling with a rapidity beyond the most sanguine calculations; and it is not surprising that the news of an actual or intended abandonment of the navigation of the Mississippi, the only outlet for their productions, should have excited great alarm among its inhabitants. They were much exasperated by the seizure and confiscation of American property by the Spaniards, on its way down the river, which took place about the same time. The proposition made in congress was magnified into an actual treaty, and called from the western people most bitter complaints and reproaches. … To quiet the apprehensions of the western inhabitants, the delegates from North Carolina, in September, 1788, submitted to congress a resolution declaring that 'whereas many citizens of the United States, who possess lands on the western waters, have expressed much uneasiness from a report that congress are disposed to treat with Spain for the surrender of their claim to the navigation of the river Mississippi; in order therefore to quiet the minds of our fellow citizens by removing such ill founded apprehensions, resolved, that the United States have a clear, absolute, and unalienable claim to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, which claim is not only supported by the express stipulations of treaties, but by the great law of nature.' The secretary of foreign affairs, to whom this resolution was referred, reported, that as the rumor mentioned in the resolution was not warranted by the negociations between the United States and Spain, the members be permitted to contradict it, in the most explicit terms. Mr. Jay also stated, there could be no objection to declaring the right of the United States to the navigation of the river clear and absolute—that this had always been his opinion; and that the only question had been whether a modification of that right for equivalent advantages was advisable; and though he formerly thought such a modification might be proper, yet that circumstances and discontents had since interposed to render it questionable. He also advised that further negociations with Spain be transferred to the new general government. On this report, congress, on the 16th of September, 1788, in order to remove the apprehensions of the western settlers, declared that the members be permitted to contradict the report referred to by the delegates from North Carolina; and at the same time resolved 'that the free navigation of the river Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the United States, and that the same ought to be considered and supported as such.' All further negociations with Spain were also referred to the new federal government."