Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 53)

H. C. Lodge, George Washington, volume 1, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapters 33-36.

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, chapters 8-11 (volume 1).

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the American Revolution, volume 2, chapter 23.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (October). Connecticut assumes independence and sovereignty.

See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777. Washington's retreat through New Jersey and his masterly return movement. The victories at Trenton and Princeton retrieving the situation.

"On the 17th [of November] Washington ordered Lee [who had lately returned from the south, and who had command of 7,000 men at Northcastle] to come over and join him; but Lee disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Washington. A good many people were finding fault with the latter for losing the 3,000 men at Fort Washington, although, as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of Congress. {3239} Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they had been able to do for themselves since they started from Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3,000 men. Here was another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time had expired. It was generally believed that Washington's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the occasion. While the case looked so desperate for Washington, events at the north had taken a less unfavourable turn. Carleton [who began preparations to invade the province of New York as soon as Arnold retreated from Canada] had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in that latitude. The resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hudson with 4,000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown. Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was. Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Washington. Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6,000 men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776, and the following nine days, an Washington's most brilliant powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians, 1,000 strong, was posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at Burlington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts, and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2,500 in number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hessians at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton. By the 31st Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia, waking up his friends to borrow the $50,000, which he sent off to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a rear-guard of 2,000 men left to protect his communications, came on toward Trenton. When he reached that town, late in the afternoon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware river. 'Oho!' said Cornwallis, 'at last we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning.' He sent back to Princeton, and ordered the rearguard to come up. He expected next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and then press him back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his camp-fires. Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown. There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York-which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In nine days the tables had been completely turned. {3240} The attack upon, an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The ill-timed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means."

J. Fiske, The War of Independence, chapter 6.

"The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting his way through the British posts, back to a point where he threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick, give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: 'Washington has shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this country.' Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations until the next season. Meantime the country took heart, Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited and organized on a better basis. 'The business of war is the result of Experience,' wrote Wolcott from Congress, with faith unshaken during the darkest hours of the campaign; and experience was now put to good profit. The crisis was passed. Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do no more than she had done to conquer America; while America was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence was established in the present campaign—in the year of its declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to Princeton."

H. P. Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society, volume 3, part 1, chapter 8.

ALSO IN: J. F. Hageman, History of Princeton, chapter 4, sections 4-5 (volume 1).

J. O. Raum, History of New Jersey, chapter 20 (volume 2).

W. B. Reed, Life of Joseph Reed, volume 1, chapter 4.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 21.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777. Prisoners and exchanges. British treatment of captives. The Jersey Prison-ship and the Sugar-house prison.

In New York, during the British occupation of the city, "wretched indeed was the condition of the poor refugee, of the sick soldier, and, above all, the patriot prisoner. The newspapers are filled with calls for charitable contributions for women and children perishing with cold and hunger, for disabled soldiers and families without a shelter. … But if the favored Tories suffered, what must have been the condition of the patriot prisoners, confined by thousands in bleak barracks, churches, and prison-ships? Let us pass up Broadway, amidst the uncleared ruins, and, turning down Liberty Street, pause before a huge brick building near the Middle Dutch Church. It is five stories high, with broken windows, through which the fierce winds of winter rush unrestrained. Through its imperfect roof and various openings, snow, ice, and water penetrate to every part of the building. Sentries pace round its walls prepared to fire upon any of its maddened inmates who attempt in desperation to escape. Wounded men crawl to the windows begging aid; but the impassive sentinel turns back the gifts of the charitable. No communication with the prisoners can be allowed. The walls within are bare and cheerless, nor do any of the common conveniences of life soften the horrors of those dreary chambers. Yet the old Sugar-House is the most crowded building in New York, and hundreds of prisoners, some chained, others at large, fill its comfortless interior. In the old Sugar-House were confined the prisoners of Long Island, the captives of sudden forays, the patriot citizen, and the heroes of the rebel army. Clothed in rags and scarcely covered from the winter air, crowded in narrow apartments and broken by hunger and disease, the prisoners died by thousands. The sick lay down on beds of snow to perish; the feeble wounded quivered in the February blast. Food of the coarsest kind was served out to them in scanty measure, and devoured with the eagerness of famine. Every night ten or twenty died; every day their corpses were thrown into pits without a single rite of burial. When led out to be exchanged, the glad hope of freedom gave them no joy—they died on the way to their friends, or lingered out a few weeks of miserable decline in the hospitals of the Jerseys. So wretched was their condition that Washington refused to consider them fit subjects for exchange. 'You give us only the dead or dying,' he wrote to Howe, 'for our well-fed and healthy prisoners.' Howe, as if in mockery, replied that they had been kept in 'airy, roomy buildings,' on the same fare as his own soldiers. Washington pointed to the condition in which they reached him—diseased, famished, emaciated, and dying, as they were conducted to his quarters. Across the river, in Wallabout Bay, lay the prison-ship 'Jersey.' She was the hulk of a 64 gun ship, long unseaworthy, her masts and rigging gone, her figurehead broken off, and her whole appearance singularly repulsive. Yet on board of the Jersey were confined 1,200 captured seamen. She was never cleansed, and lay in that condition seven years. No fires warmed her occupants in winter, no screen sheltered them from the August sun; no physician visited the sick, no clergyman consoled the dying there. Poor and scanty food, the want of clothing, cleanliness, and exercise, and raging diseases that never ceased their ravages, made the Jersey a scene of human suffering to which the Black Hole of Calcutta might favorably compare. Benevolent Tories would sometimes convey by stealth food or clothing to her unhappy inmates; but this was little. Toward the close of the war the British, from shame or pity, made some improvement in her condition; but she remained throughout the contest a centre of sickness and death, always decimated by disease and always replenished with new victims. The bones of her dead, estimated at 11,000, lie buried on the Brooklyn shore. The crowded city itself was never free from contagion. In winter the smallpox made fearful ravages."

E. Lawrence, New York in the Revolution (Harper's Magazine, July, 1868).

ALSO IN: Force's American Archives, 4th Series, volume 6, 5th Series, volumes 1-3.

History Magazine, 1866, sup.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 21.

{3241}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778. Attitude and feeling of France. Her disposition to aid the colonies and the reasons for it. The American embassy to the French court. Silas Deane and Beaumarchais. Franklin at Passy.

"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine (secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years evading the search of historians, … was brought to light by De Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in case of failure in North America, England would, to recover its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by this internecine war would prostrate both England and her Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following inferences: (1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English ministry in a state of false security with respect to the intentions of France and Spain. (2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it. (3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until their independence was achieved. (4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance, they should look for no other return than the success of the political object they had at that moment in view, leaving themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any future arrangements. (5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit. The English, he adds, respect only those who can make themselves feared. (6) That the result to which all these considerations led was that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues, the maintenance of peace with that power was the least probable. … It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as well as of India would give her a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth, which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the young nobility and among officers in the army for America, which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards had great power in forming French public opinion. By the enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold, weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign who then, with little political experience but high notions of duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."

F. Wharton, editor, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Introduction, chapter 4 (volume 1).

"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even before there was a declaration of independence or an assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected. He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first and second congresses, had failed of reëlection to the third, and was now without employment. Mr'. Parton describes him as 'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man would make an imposing figure at an European court. {3242} He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor. … Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco, rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the disposition of the French government really held for the insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000 troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply as a merchant conducting his own affairs. … Before the arrival of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit, keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. … He became frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue, inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial cause."

J. T. Morse, Jr., Benjamin Franklin, chapter 9.

Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which, after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed. Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but, the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any specific information concerning them; or to state more than, 'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000 sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than it had been at any time during the war with both France and Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that the American merchants might freely vend in them every article of commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or to enter into any formal negotiation with them."

J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapter 7.

"It is … a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when, from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial intimation, it should have been known that such reception would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be received, at least in a private capacity, France being then ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this reception was accorded … first to Silas Deane, then to Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of recognition of the United States as an independent sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it, should wait till there was some such recognition before thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money. Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. … The policy of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers were not received worked injuriously to the United States from the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority, considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the American legation. {3243} Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there, but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission. When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to receive them, and in the still more important question of the attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French court, Adams agreed with Lee. … It is due to Adams to say that he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues associated with him."

F. Wharton, Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of The United States, chapter 1, sections 16-17, and chapter 9, section 106 (volume 1).

Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside "all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and satisfactorily solved, … it appears that a large part of the misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776. Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London, was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was that he should appear as a merchant. … In May, there was a plan on the part of the French government to employ a real merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This was exactly the role which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill, and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all the accessories of a house of business, as the same are understood and represented on the stage, At that time it was believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products which they could and would contribute for the purpose [purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their main difficulty would be to find any market in which they could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance, therefore, which they would need from France would be secret permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the balance of account, which the French government might have to make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot now be fixed.' … August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops; and that without waiting for their consent he has already procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns, with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales & Co. … A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais, August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy, if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to the cause. … When Arthur Lee received his appointment as Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais … had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been settled between Deane and Hortales. … Arthur Lee always held the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. … September 8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make contracts with persons to come to America. {3244} November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of belief that he was making great gain out of his position. … The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him President of the United States, by winning him votes from Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which conduct others to glory.' … He is in terror of bankruptcy. Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage. Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American produce is to be exported and consigned to this house. Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."

W. G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 8 (volume 1).

"The episode of Beaumarchais … was a survival of the secret diplomacy of Louis XV, for a short time exercising an extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by his predecessor in full operation; and, … for one or two delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign, Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest activity it must be remembered that he was not technically Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by Broglie in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais' political influence ceased … when, on the arrival of Franklin, Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American diplomacy."

F. Wharton, Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, chapter 4, section 55 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, Franklin in France.

J. Bigelow, editor, Life of Franklin, by himself, volume 2, chapters 13-15.

J. Parton, Life of Franklin, part 6 (volume 2).

L. de Lomenie, Beaumarchais and his Times, chapters 20-23 (volume 3).

Papers in relation to the Case of Silas Deane (Seventy-Six Society, 1855).

C. Tower, Jr., The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 1, chapter 5.

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (FEBRUARY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1779. The Thirteen Colonies become States. The framing and adoption of State Constitutions.

"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the general congress; the work was done by the several states, in the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts, which was the first state to frame a government independent of the king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May 1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king. In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and this constitution, having been approved by the people, went into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was approved by the people, and established on the 31st of the following October. {3245} The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the 26th of March 1776. In March 1778, a permanent constitution was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776, required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in the style of its public acts. A disfranchisement of Catholics had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June 1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October. Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the series, first in the completeness of her work, by a legislative convention without any further consultation of the people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of independence, and a constitution. On the second of July 1776, New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. Delaware next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of September 1776, the representatives in convention having been chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose, finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised, and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough organization for more than five months. The delegates of Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its constitution with great deliberation; it was established on the 9th of the following November. On the 18th of December 1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its convention. Last of the thirteen came New York, whose empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a constitution that, in humane liberality, excelled them all. The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent, the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So, too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina it was enough to own in the district or town a certain freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to 'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future state of rewards and punishments.' 'White men alone could claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the law classed the free octaroon as a white, even though descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported African slave; the other ten states raised no question of color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about $200, in Georgia at £10. Similar conditions had always existed, with the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves. Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy to his representative by writing his own name on the back of his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end of the war, the other eight without delay."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, chapter 9.

ALSO IN: American Archives, series 5, volumes 2-3 (as indexed).

See, also, VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776; SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL); NEW YORK: A. D. 1777; CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776; NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776; PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776; MARYLAND: A. D. 1776; GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777; NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (January-December). The campaign on the Delaware. Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia. Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown. The winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.

"Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of June Howe marched from Brunswick and … endeavored to bring on a general engagement, … but Washington refused to leave the strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. … On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. … Signal fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry." Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation on the approach of the enemy, but "the pacific influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to bear down all military efforts. … To impress the lukewarm with the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia. {3246} The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats." The advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until the 11th of September that the Americans encountered him, at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position. In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above, while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford. "The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the British, 579. … The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and attack their rear should they attempt to follow." But Wayne was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having occupied Germantown the day before. "The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city." Here, on the morning of October 4th, Washington attacked him, and, for a time, with great success; but confusion and misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose, which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. "The Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British 521. … While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that, though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still aggressive." The next few weeks were employed by Howe in reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon Washington's lines, at Whitemarsh, intending an attack; but found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt, and returned to Philadelphia. "As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection of huts began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the open fires. … The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. 'The unfortunate soldiers,' wrote Lafayette in after-years, 'were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary to amputate them. … The army frequently remained whole days without provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which each moment served to renew.' … While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have greatly depreciated.'"

F. D. Stone, The Struggle for the Delaware (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6, chapter 5).

The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of Congress, December 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he wrote, "we have had no assistance from the quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this department the commissary-general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as a further proof of the inability of an army, under the circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. {3247} By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Mary]and troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty; notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which, by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul, I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose myself to detraction and calumny."

George Washington, Writings, edited by W. C. Ford, volume 6, pages 259-262.

It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account of the state of things which he found he says: "'My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place, I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the departments, and their various branches in the European armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon the functions of the quarter-masters (maréchaux généraux de logis) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system, bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies. But whether it was that they thought such a system impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were supreme. … The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number, that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal! … The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. {3248} If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men, they could give still less an account of their arms, accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that, previous to the establishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. … The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. … I commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. … I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army, and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander-in-chief.' … The most interesting narrative of the energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt! Without understanding a word of the English language, to think of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word, a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a changement to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more rejoiced." … Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp, and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time, no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite, galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept. Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite sufficient.' … Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief. Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in the army, he had greater power and authority than any general could boast of."

F. Kapp, Life of Frederick William von Steuben, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapters 13, 18-19, and 23-27.

G. W. Greene, Life of General Nathanael Greene, book 2, chapters 16-25 (volume l).

J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, History of Philadelphia, chapter 17 (volume l).

C. J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne, Chapter 3.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (June). Vermont denied admission to the Union.

See VERMONT; A. D. 1777-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July). The coming of Lafayette.

"La Fayette, barely nineteen years old, was in garrison at Metz, when he was invited to a dinner that his commander, the Count de Broglie, gave to the brother of the king of England, the Duke of Gloucester, then on his way through the city. News had just been received of the proclamation of the independence of the United States, and, the conversation having naturally fallen on this subject, La Fayette plied the duke with questions to acquaint himself with the events, entirely new to him, which were happening in America. Before the end of the dinner he had made his decision, and, from that moment, he no longer thought of anything else except setting out for the new world. {3249} He went to Paris and confided his project to his friends, the Count de Segur and the Viscount de Noailles, who were to accompany him. The Count de Broglie, whom he also informed, tried to turn him from his design. 'I saw your uncle die in Italy,' he said to him, 'and your father at Min·den, and I do not wish to contribute to the ruin of your family by allowing you to go.' Nevertheless, he put La Fayette in communication with the former agent of Choiseul in Canada, the Baron de Kalb, who became his friend. De Kalb presented him to Silas Deane, who, considering him too young, wished to dissuade him from his project. But the news of the disasters experienced by the Americans before New York, at White Plains and in New Jersey, confirmed La Fayette in his resolution. He bought and fitted out a vessel at his own expense, and disguised his preparations by making a journey to London. Nevertheless his design was disclosed at Court. His family became angry with him. He was forbidden to go to America, and, to render this order effective, a lettre de cachet was issued against him. Nevertheless he left Paris with an officer named Mauroy, disguised himself as a courier, went on board his ship at Passage in Spain, and set sail April the 26th, 1777. He had several officers on board. La Fayette successfully avoided the English cruisers and the French vessels sent in pursuit of him. Finally, after a hazardous passage of seven weeks, he reached Georgetown, and, furnished with letters of recommendation from Deane, he reported to Congress."

T. Balch, The French in America during the War of Independence, chapter 7.

In consideration of the great personal sacrifice he had made in quitting France, and his offer to serve the American cause at his own expense and without pay, Congress, with hesitation, conferred on the young marquis the rank of Major General, but without command. He succeeded, too, in procuring a like commission for Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied him. While Lafayette was still busy with these arrangements, Washington came to Philadelphia, and they met at a dinner party. They seem to have been drawn to one another at the first exchange of words, and a friendship began which lasted through their lives. Lafayette was soon invited to become a member of the military family of the commander-in-chief.

B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: C. Tower, Jr., The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 1, chapter 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July-October). The struggle for the Hudson. Burgoyne's expedition from Canada. His surrender at Saratoga.

Early in the summer of 1777 a formidable expedition under General Burgoyne was set in motion from Canada toward Lake Champlain. "It was a part of Burgoyne's plan, not merely to take Ticonderoga, but to advance thence upon Albany, and, with the co-operation of the troops at New York, to get possession also of the posts in the Highlands. The British would then command the Hudson through its whole extent, and New England, the head of the rebellion, would be completely cut off from the middle and southern colonies. Burgoyne started on this expedition with a brilliant army of 8,000 men, partly British and partly Germans, besides a large number of Canadian boatmen, laborers and skirmishers. On the western shore of Lake Champlain, near Crown Point, he met the Six Nations in council, and after a feast and a speech, some 400 of their warriors joined this army. His next step was to issue a proclamation … threatening with all the extremities of war all who should presume to resist his arms. Two days after the issue of this proclamation, Burgoyne appeared [July 1] before Ticonderoga." The commander of that important fort, General St. Clair, found defense impracticable and evacuated the place. He was vigorously pursued in his retreat and only escaped with the loss of most of his bag·gage and stores, besides several hundred men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. "After a seven days' march, he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward, on the Hudson. Here was assembled the whole force of the northern army, amounting to about 5,000 men; but a considerable part were militia hastily called in; many were without arms; there was a great deficiency of ammunition and provisions; and the whole force was quite disorganized. The region between Skenesborough [now Whitehall, where Burgoyne had halted] and the Hudson was an almost unbroken wilderness. Wood Creek was navigable as far as Fort Anne [which the Americans had fired and abandoned]; from Fort Anne to the Hudson, over an exceedingly rough country, … extended a single military road. While Burgoyne halted a few days at Skenesborough to put his forces in order, and to bring up the necessary supplies, Schuyler hastened to destroy the navigation of Wood Creek," and to make the road from Fort Anne as nearly impassable as a wilderness road can be made. "All the stock in the neighborhood was driven off, and the militia of New England was summoned to the rescue. … The advance from Skenesborough cost the British infinite labor and fatigue; but … [the] impediments were at length overcome; and Burgoyne, with his troops, artillery, and baggage, presently appeared [July 29] on the banks of the Hudson. … Fort Edward was untenable. As the British approached, the Americans crossed the river, and retired, first to Saratoga, and then to Stillwater, a short distance above the mouth of the Mohawk. Hardly had Schuyler taken up this position, when news arrived of another disaster and a new danger. While moving up Lake Champlain, Burgoyne had detached Colonel St. Leger, with 200 regulars, Sir John Johnson's Royal Greens, some Canadian Rangers, and a body of Indians under Brant, to harass the New York frontier from the west. St. Leger laid siege to Fort Schuyler, late Fort Stanwix, near the head of the Mohawk, then the extreme western post of the State of New York. General Herkimer raised the militia of Tryon county, and advanced to the relief of this important post, which was held by Gansevoort and Willett, with two New York regiments. About six miles from the fort [near Oriskany, August 6], owing to want of proper precaution, Herkimer fell into an ambush. Mortally wounded, he supported himself against a stump, and encouraged his men to the fight. By the aid of a successful sally by Willett, they succeeded at last in repulsing the assailants, but not without a loss of 400, including many of the leading patriots of that region, who met with no mercy at the hands of the Indians and refugees. Tryon county, which included the whole district west of Albany, abounded with Tories. {3250} It was absolutely necessary to relieve Fort Schuyler." General Arnold was accordingly despatched thither, with three regiments, and on his approach St. Leger, deserted by most of his Indian allies, retreated precipitately, leaving most of his stores and baggage behind. Meantime, Burgoyne was beginning to find his situation serious. To feed and otherwise supply his army was the chief difficulty. He could bring enough of stores to the head of Lake George, by the water carriage which he commanded, from Canada; but to transport them thence to the Hudson, though the distance was only eighteen miles, proved nearly impracticable. "The roads were so bad, and the supply of draft cattle so small, that, after a fortnight's hard labor, the British army had only four days' provision in advance." To improve his supplies, and partly, moreover, in the hope of finding discontent among the settlers of the New Hampshire Grants, Burgoyne sent 800 men, under Colonel Baum, into Vermont, They were defeated [August 16] at Bennington by the New Hampshire and Vermont militia under Colonel John Stark, and again defeated a second time the same day, after reinforcements had been sent to them. "Besides the killed, about 200 in number, the Americans took near 600 prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, as many swords, and four pieces of artillery. … The American loss was only 14 killed and 42 wounded. … The victory of Stark had a magical effect in reviving the spirits of the people and the courage of the soldiers."

R. Hildreth, History of the United States, chapter 36 (volume 3).

"Burgoyne's position was by this time very dangerous. His Indians were leaving him; many of his best men had been killed or captured; and he was getting short of provisions. The army opposed to him was increasing: Congress was hurrying men up the Hudson; and the country militia were coming in rapidly. Burgoyne, therefore, desperately attempted to force his way through the American army. He crossed the Hudson, and moved slowly down its west bank toward the Mohawk. About the same time, Gates, who had been sent by Congress to take Schuyler's place, felt strong enough to move up the west bank of the Hudson, away from the Mohawk. The two armies met [September 19] at Bemis Heights, between Saratoga Lake and the Hudson. The battle which followed [called by some writers the battle of Freeman's Farm] was not decisive: the British held the ground; but the Americans had shown that Burgoyne could not break through."

A. Johnston, History of the United States for Schools, sections 222-223.

"Burgoyne now halted again, and strengthened his position by field-works and redoubts; and the Americans also improved their defences. The two armies remained nearly within cannon-shot of each other for a considerable time, during which Burgoyne was anxiously looking for intelligence of the promised expedition from New York, which, according to the original plan, ought by this time to have been approaching Albany from the south. At last, a messenger from Clinton made his way, with great difficulty, to Burgoyne's camp, and brought the information that Clinton was on his way up the Hudson to attack the American forts which barred the passage up that river to Albany. Burgoyne, in reply, on the 30th of September, urged Clinton to attack the forts as speedily as possible, stating that the effect of such an attack, or even the semblance of it, would be to move the American army from its position before his own troops. By another messenger, who reached Clinton on the 5th of October, Burgoyne informed his brother general that he had lost his communications with Canada, but had provisions which would last him till the 20th. Burgoyne described himself as strongly posted, and stated that though the Americans in front of him [at Stillwater] were strongly posted also, he made no doubt of being able to force them, and making his way to Albany; but that he doubted whether he could subsist there, as the country was drained of provisions. He wished Clinton to meet him there, and to keep open a communication with New York. Burgoyne had over-estimated his resources, and in the very beginning of October found difficulty and distress pressing him hard. The Indians and Canadians began to desert him; while, on the other hand, Gates's army was continually reinforced by fresh bodies of the militia. … Finding the number and spirit of the enemy to increase daily, and his own stores of provisions to diminish, Burgoyne determined on attacking the Americans in front of him, and by dislodging them from their position, to gain the means of moving upon Albany, or at least of relieving his troops from the straitened position in which they were cooped up. Burgoyne's force was now reduced to less than 6,000 men. The right of his camp was on some high ground a little to the west of the river; thence his entrenchments extended along the lower ground to the bank of the Hudson, the line of their front being nearly at a right angle with the course of the stream. The lines were fortified with redoubts and field-works. … The numerical force of the Americans was now greater than the British, even in regular troops, and the numbers of the militia and volunteers which had joined Gates and Arnold were greater still. General Lincoln, with 2,000 New England troops, had reached the American camp on the 29th of September. Gates gave him the command of the right wing, and took in person the command of the left wing, which was composed of two brigades under Generals Poor and Leonard, of Colonel Morgan's rifle corps, and part of the fresh New England Militia. The whole of the American lines had been ably fortified under the direction of the celebrated Polish General, Kosciusko, who was now serving as a volunteer in Gates's army. The right of the American position, that is to say, the part of it nearest to the river, was too strong to be assailed with any prospect of success: and Burgoyne therefore determined to endeavour to force their left. For this purpose he formed a column of 1,500 regular troops, with two twelve-pounders, two howitzers, and six six-pounders. He headed this in person, having Generals Philips, Riedesel; and Fraser under him. The enemy's force immediately in front of his lines was so strong that he dared not weaken the troops who guarded them, by detaching any more to strengthen his column of attack. It was on the 7th of October that Burgoyne led his column forward; and on the preceding day, the 6th, Clinton had successfully executed a brilliant enterprise against the two American forts which barred his progress up the Hudson. {3251} He had captured them both, with severe loss to the American forces opposed to him; he had destroyed the fleet which the Americans had been forming on the Hudson, under the protection of their forts; and the upward river was laid open to his squadron. He had also, with admirable skill and industry, collected in small vessels, such as could float within a few miles of Albany, provisions sufficient to supply Burgoyne's army for six months. He was now only 156 miles distant from Burgoyne; and a detachment of 1,700 men actually advanced within 40 miles of Albany. Unfortunately Burgoyne and Clinton were each ignorant of the other's movements; but if Burgoyne had won his battle on the 7th, he must on advancing have soon learned the tidings of Clinton's success, and Clinton would have heard of his. A junction would soon have been made of the two victorious armies, and the great objects of the campaign might yet have been accomplished. All depended on the fortune of the column with which Burgoyne, on the eventful 7th of October, 1777, advanced against the American position." It failed in the attempt to break the American line. Arnold, who bad been deprived of his command by Gates, rushed into the fight at its fiercest stage and assumed a lead, without authority, which contributed greatly to the result. General Fraser, on the British side, was wounded mortally by a sharp-shooter under Morgan's command. Burgoyne's whole force was driven back, with heavy losses in killed and wounded, leaving six cannon behind them, and the Americans, pursuing, carried part of their entrenchments by storm. By this success, the latter "acquired the means of completely turning the right flank of the British, and gaining their rear. To prevent this calamity, Burgoyne effected during the night an entire change of position. With great skill he removed his whole army to some heights near the river, a little northward of the former camp, and he there drew up his men, expecting to be attacked on the following day. But Gates was resolved not to risk the certain triumph which his success had already secured for him. He harassed the English with skirmishes, but attempted no regular attack. Meanwhile he detached bodies of troops on both sides of the Hudson to prevent the British from recrossing that river, and to bar their retreat. When night fell, it became absolutely necessary for Burgoyne to retire again, and, accordingly, the troops were marched through a stormy and rainy night towards Saratoga, abandoning their sick and wounded, and the greater part of their baggage, to the enemy. … Burgoyne now took up his last position on the heights near Saratoga; and hemmed in by the enemy, who refused any encounter, and baffled in all his attempts at finding a path of escape, he there lingered until famine compelled him to capitulate. The fortitude of the British army during this melancholy period has been justly eulogised by many native historians, but I prefer quoting the testimony of a foreign writer, as free from all possibility of partiality. Botta says: 'It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable condition to which the British army was now reduced. The troops were worn down by a series of toil, privation, sickness, and desperate fighting. They were abandoned by the Indians and Canadians; and the effective force of the whole army was now diminished by repeated and heavy losses, which had principally fallen on the best soldiers and the most distinguished officers, from 10,000 combatants to less than one-half that number. Of this remnant, little more than 3,000 were English. In these circumstances, and thus weakened, they were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose position extended three parts of a circle round them; who refused to fight them, as knowing their weakness, and who, from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any part. In this helpless condition, obliged to be constantly under arms, while the enemy's cannon played on every part of their camp, and even the American rifle-balls whistled in many parts of the lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their customary firmness, and while sinking under a hard necessity, they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. They could not be reproached with an action or a word, which betrayed a want of temper or of fortitude.' At length the 13th of October arrived, and as no prospect of assistance appeared, and the provisions were nearly exhausted, Burgoyne, by the unanimous advice of a council of war, sent a messenger to the American camp to treat of a convention. General Gates in the first instance demanded that the royal army should surrender prisoners of war. He also proposed that the British should ground their arms. Burgoyne replied, 'This article is inadmissible in every extremity; sooner than this army will consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.' After various messages, a convention for the surrender of the army was settled, which provided that 'The troops under General Burgoyne were to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river, where the arms and artillery were to be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers. A free passage was to be granted to the army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest.' The articles of capitulation were settled on the 15th of October; and on that very evening a messenger arrived from Clinton with an account of his successes, and with the tidings that part of his force had penetrated as far as Esopus, within 50 miles of Burgoyne's camp. But it was too late. The public faith was pledged; and the army was, indeed, too debilitated by fatigue and hunger to resist an attack if made; and Gates certainly would have made it, if the convention had been broken off. Accordingly, on the 17th, the convention of Saratoga was carried into effect. By this convention 5,790 men surrendered themselves as prisoners. The sick and wounded left in the camp when the British retreated to Saratoga, together with the numbers of the British, German, and Canadian troops, who were killed, wounded, or taken, and who had deserted in the preceding part of the expedition, were reckoned to be 4,689. The British sick and wounded who had fallen into the hands of the Americans after the battle of the 7th, were treated with exemplary humanity; and when the convention was executed, General Gates showed a noble delicacy of feeling, which deserves the highest degree of honour. Every circumstance was avoided which could give the appearance of triumph. {3252} The American troops remained within their lines until the British had piled their arms; and when this was done, the vanquished officers and soldiers were received with friendly kindness by their victors, and their immediate wants were promptly and liberally supplied. Discussions and disputes afterwards arose as to some of the terms of the convention; and the American Congress refused for a long time to carry into effect the article which provided for the return of Burgoyne's men to Europe; but no blame was imputable to General Gates or his army, who showed themselves to be generous as they had proved themselves to be brave."

Sir E. Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, chapter 13.

ALSO IN: General J. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition from Canada.

S. A. Drake, Burgoyne's Invasion.

W. L. Stone, Campaign of Burgoyne.

M. von Eelking, Memoir of General Riedesel, volume 1, pages 88-218.

B. J. Lossing, Life and Times of Philip Schuyler, volume 2, chapters 6-21.

Colonel M. Willett, Narrative of Military Actions, chapter 5.

C. Stark, Memoir of General John Stark, pages 46-140.

T. Dwight, Travels in New England and New York, volume 3, pages 220-233.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1778. The British in Philadelphia. Their gay winter.

See PHILADELPHIA: A. D. 1777-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1778. The Conway Cabal.

The capitulation of Burgoyne at Saratoga "was an all-important event in its influence on the progress of the war; but its immediate effect was unpropitious to the reputation of the Commander-in-chief, who was compelled, at the close of the year, to place his army in a state of almost total destitution in winter-quarters at Valley Forge. The brilliant success of General Gates at Saratoga, in contrast with the reverses which had befallen the American Army under the immediate command of Washington, encouraged the operations of a cabal against him, which had been formed by certain disaffected officers of the army, and was countenanced by a party in Congress. The design was, by a succession of measures implying a want of confidence, to drive Washington to retire from the service in disgust: and, when this object was effected, to give the command of the army to General Gates, who lent a willing ear to these discreditable intrigues. A foreign officer in the American Army, of the name of Conway, was the most active promoter of the project, which was discovered by the accidental disclosure of a part of his correspondence with Gates. Washington bore himself on this occasion with his usual dignity, and allowed the parties concerned, in the army and in Congress, to take refuge in explanations, disclaimers, and apologies, by which those who made them gained no credit, and those who accepted them were not deceived. A part of the machinery of this wretched cabal was the publication, in London, and the republication in New York of [a] collection of forged letters … bearing the name of Washington, and intended to prove his insincerity in the cause of the Revolution. Nothing perhaps more plainly illustrates his conscious strength of character, than the disdainful silence with which he allowed this miserable fabrication to remain for twenty years without exposure. It was only in the year 1796, and when about to retire from the Presidency, that he filed, in the department of Slate, a denial of its authenticity."

E. Everett, Life of Washington, chapter 6.

In a letter written May 30, 1778, addressed to Landon Carter, from the camp at Valley Forge, Washington alluded to the subject of the cabal as follows: "With great truth I think I can assure you, that the information you received from a gentleman at Sabine Hall, respecting a disposition in the northern officers to see me superseded in my command by General G—s is without the least foundation. I have very sufficient reasons to think, that no officers in the army are more attached to me, than those from the northward, and of those, none more so than the gentlemen, who were under the immediate command of G—s last campaign. That there was a scheme of this sort on foot, last fall, admits of no doubt: but it originated in another quarter; with three men who wanted to aggrandize themselves; but finding no support, on the contrary, that their conduct and views, when seen into, were likely to undergo severe reprehension, they slunk back, disavowed the measure, and professed themselves my warmest admirers. Thus stands the matter at present. Whether any members of Congress were privy to this scheme, and inclined to aid and abet it, I shall not take upon me to say; but am well informed, that no whisper of the kind was ever heard in Congress."

George Washington, Writings, edited by W. C. Ford, volume 7, page 39.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapters 28-30.

J. C. Hamilton, History of the United States in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton, volume 1, chapters 13-14.

J. Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, volume 1, chapter 10.

W. V. Wells, Life of Samuel Adams, chapter 46 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1781. Adoption and ratification of the Articles of Confederation.

"On the 11th of June, 1776, the same day on which the committee for preparing the declaration of independence was appointed, congress resolved, that 'a committee be appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these colonies'; and on the next day a committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of a member from each colony. Nearly a year before this period (viz. on the 21st of July, 1775), Dr. Franklin had submitted to congress a sketch of articles of confederation, which does not, however, appear to have been acted on. … On the 12th of July, 1776, the committee appointed to prepare articles of confederation presented a draft, which was in the hand-writing of Mr. Dickenson, one of the committee, and a delegate from Pennsylvania. The draft, so reported, was debated from the 22d to the 31st of July, and on several days between the 5th and 20th of August, 1776. On this last day, congress, in committee of the whole, reported a new draft, which was ordered to be printed for the use of the members. The subject seems not again to have been touched until the 8th of April, 1777, and the articles were debated at several times between that time and the 15th of November of the same year. On this last day the articles were reported with sundry amendments, and finally adopted by congress. A committee was then appointed to draft, and they accordingly drafted, a circular letter, requesting the states respectively to authorize their delegates in congress to subscribe the same in behalf of the state. … It carried, however, very slowly conviction to the minds of the local legislatures. Many objections were stated, and many amendments were proposed. {3253} All of them, however, were rejected by congress, not probably because they were all deemed inexpedient or improper in themselves; but from the danger of sending the instrument back again to all the states, for reconsideration. Accordingly, on the 26th of June, 1778, a copy, engrossed for ratification, was prepared, and the ratification begun on the 9th day of July following. It was ratified by all the states, except Delaware and Maryland, in 1778; by Delaware in 1779, and by Maryland on the 1st of March, 1781, from which last date its final ratification took effect, and was joyfully announced by congress. In reviewing the objections taken by the various states to the adoption of the confederation in the form in which it was presented to them, … that which seemed to be of paramount importance, and which, indeed, protracted the ratification of the confederation to so late a period, was the alarming controversy in respect to the boundaries of some of the states, and the public lands, held by the crown, within these reputed boundaries."