Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 55)

O. Turner, History of the Pioneer Settlement of Phelps and Gorham's Purchase, part 1, chapter 4.

"In his general orders of the 17th of October, General Washington announced to the army the result of the expedition, as follows: 'The Commander-in-chief has now the pleasure of congratulating the army on the complete and full success of Major General Sullivan, and the troops under his command, against the Seneca and other tribes of the Six Nations, as a just and necessary punishment for their wanton depredations, their unparalleled and innumerable cruelties, their deafness to all remonstrances and entreaty, and their perseverance in the most horrid acts of barbarity. Forty of their towns have been reduced to ashes, some of them large and commodious; that of the Genesee alone containing one hundred and twenty-eight houses. Their crops of corn have been entirely destroyed, which, by estimation, it is said, would have provided 160,000 bushels, besides large quantities of vegetables of various kinds. Their whole country has been overrun and laid waste, and they themselves compelled to place their security in a precipitate flight to the British fortress at Niagara. And the whole of this has been done with the loss of less than forty men on our part, including the killed, wounded, captured, and those who died natural deaths. The troops employed in this expedition, both officers and men, throughout the whole of it, and in the action they had with the enemy, manifested a patience, perseverance and valor that do them the highest honor. In the course of it, when there still remained a large extent of the enemy's country to be prostrated, it became necessary to lessen the issues of provisions to half the usual allowance. In this the troops acquiesced with a most general and cheerful concurrence, being fully determined to surmount every obstacle, and to prosecute the enterprise to a complete and successful issue. Major General Sullivan, for his great perseverance and activity, for his order of march and attack, and the whole of his dispositions; the Brigadiers and officers of all ranks, and the whole of the soldiers engaged in the expedition, merit and have the Commander-in-chief's warmest acknowledgements for their important services upon this occasion.' On the 9th of November, 1779, General Sullivan wrote to the President of Congress: 'It is with the deepest regret I find myself compelled to request from Congress liberty to retire from the army. My health is so much impaired by a violent bilious disorder, which seized me in the commencement and continued during the whole of the western expedition, that I have not the smallest hope of a perfect recovery.' … {3268} General Sullivan, in transmitting to Congress an official account of his operations, reported that … 'Every creek and river has been traced, and the whole country explored in search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that, except one town situated near the Alleghany, about fifty-eight miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the country of the Five Nations. … I flatter myself that the orders with which I was entrusted are fully executed, as we have not left a single settlement or field of corn in the country of the Five Nations, or is there even the appearance of an Indian on this side of Niagara. Messengers and small parties have been constantly passing, and some imprudent soldiers who straggled from the army mistook the route and went back almost to Chinesee without discovering even the track of an Indian.' Sullivan was mistaken in regard to the destruction of all the Indian towns as there were several small villages undiscovered by his troops. The principal villages, however, and probably nine-tenths of the growing crops, upon which the Indians had depended for sustenance during the following winter, were effectually destroyed. … While Sullivan fully accomplished the task given him to perform, the results expected were not fully realized. The power of the savages had been weakened, but they were not entirely subdued until years afterward, when 'Mad Anthony Wayne' defeated the confederated bands of the Indians of the west, in 1794, a measure which thoroughly humbled the Indians of Western New York, and gave to the settlers peace and security. Sullivan's expedition was fruitful of great results in other ways, however, than the temporary subjugation of the Indians. The fertile and beautiful country now forming the western part of the State of New York, was then an unknown wilderness, and its value and attractiveness were first made known to the white people through this expedition. … Soon after the close of the war the tide of emigration commenced to flow westward. From the New England States, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, came hardy pioneers, led on by the glowing accounts they had heard of the new country, and the vicinity of the inland lakes, the borders of the flowing streams, the forest-covered hills became the dwelling places of a rapidly growing band of settlers. The road which Sullivan had opened from the Susquehanna valley was followed by many of the settlers, even to the banks of the Genesee. Thus many of those who had shared the perils and privations of Sullivan's expedition against the Indian tribes of Western New York, afterward became settlers of the land they had aided to conquer."

A. T. Norton, History of Sullivan's Campaign against the Iroquois, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: L. L. Doty, History of Livingston County, New York, chapter 7.

O. W. B. Peabody, Life of John Sullivan (Library of American Biographies, series 2, volume. 3), chapter 7.

Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan, with records of Centennial Celebrations (including Historical Address by Reverend David Craft, pages 331-388).

J. E. Seaver, Life of Mary Jemison, appendix 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September). Paul Jones' great sea-fight. The Bon Homme Richard and the Serapis.

"Near the end of July [1779], Paul Jones, a Scot by birth, in the service of the United States, sailed from l'Orient as commander of a squadron, consisting of the Poor Richard ['Bon Homme Richard,' Jones named her, in compliment to Franklin and to the language of the country from which Franklin's influence procured the ship] of 40 guns, many of them unserviceable; the Alliance of 36 guns, both American ships-of-war; the Pallas, a French frigate of 32; and the Vengeance, a French brig of 12 guns. They ranged the western coast of Ireland, turned Scotland, and, cruising off Flamborough Head, descried the British merchant fleet from the Baltic, under the convoy of the Serapis of 44 guns and the Countess of Scarborough of 20 guns. An hour after sunset, on the 23d of September, the Serapis, having a great superiority in strength, engaged the Poor Richard. Paul Jones, after suffering exceedingly in a contest of an hour and a half within musket-shot, bore down upon his adversary, whose anchor he hooked to his own quarter. The muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides. Jones could use only three nine-pounders beside muskets from the round-tops, but combustible matters were thrown into every part of the Serapis, which was on fire no less than ten or twelve times. There were moments when both ships were on fire. After a two-hours' conflict in the first watch of the night, the Serapis struck its flag. Jones raised his pendant on the captured frigate, and the next day had but time to transfer to it his wounded men and his crew before the Poor Richard went down. The French frigate engaged and captured the Countess of Scarborough. The Alliance, which from a distance had raked the Serapis during the action, not without injuring the Poor Richard, had not a man injured. On the fourth of October the squadron entered the Texel with its prizes. The British ambassador, of himself and again under instructions, reclaimed the captured British ships and their crews, 'who had been taken by the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, a rebel and a traitor.' 'They,' he insisted, 'are to be treated as pirates whose letters of marque have not emanated from a sovereign power.' The grand pensionary would not apply the name of pirate to officers bearing the commissions of congress. In spite of the stadholder, the squadron enjoyed the protection of a neutral port."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, page 350.

ALSO IN. A. S. Mackenzie, Life of Paul Jones, chapters 8-9 (volume 1).

Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones, pages 179-235.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 24.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September-October). Unsuccessful attack on Savannah by the Americans and French.

"The state of affairs in the South had called so imperatively for the attention of Congress that a portion of Washington's army had been detached to join General Lincoln. Washington solicited more powerful aid from D'Estaing, who then commanded in the West Indies an army sufficiently powerful to crush entirely the English in Georgia. The French admiral received this application just after having fought a hard battle against Commodore Byron without any decisive result, yet such as obliged the latter to go into port to refit. The former, being thus for a time master of the sea, determined at once to comply with the request, took on board 6,000 land-troops, and steered direct for Savannah, where, arriving quite unexpectedly, he captured by surprise a fifty-gun ship and three frigates. Prevost, too, was very unprepared, having his force broken up into detachments distributed along the frontier; but these being instantly ordered in, obeyed with such promptitude that, before the French had landed and formed a junction with Lincoln, nearly all had arrived. {3269} On the 16th of September, D'Estaing appeared before the place and summoned it to surrender. Prevost, under pretext of negotiation, obtained a suspension for twenty-four hours, during which Colonel Maitland entered with the last and largest detachment, eluding the Americans by a route supposed impassable; and the full determination to resist was then announced. The opinion of all military men now is that D'Estaing was guilty of the most outrageous folly in not marching at once to the attack of the city, without summoning the weakened garrison to surrender at all. The surprise would have then been complete, and the victory sure. … A regular siege was now commenced. Heavy ordnance and stores were brought up from the fleet, and the besieging army broke ground. By the 1st of October they had pushed their sap within 300 yards of the abattis, on the left of the British lines. Several batteries were opened on the besieged, which played almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on them. The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the British force in that State. He became uneasy for the possessions of France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for the safety of the ships under his command. The naval officers remonstrated strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of the year, and urged the danger of being overtaken by a British squadron when broken and scattered by a storm." D'Estaing accordingly decided that he must either raise the siege or attempt the enemy's works by storm. "The latter part of the alternative was adopted. … On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, … about 3,500 French and 1,000 Americans, of whom between 600 and 700 were regulars and the residue militia of Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing and Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception was warmer than had been expected. … Both the French and Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were killed in great numbers while endeavoring to force their way into the works. For about fifty minutes the contest was extremely obstinate." Then the assailants gave way and a retreat was ordered. "In this unsuccessful attempt the French lost in killed and wounded about 700 men. Among the latter were the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges, and several other officers of distinction. The continental troops lost 234 men, and the Charleston militia, who, though associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed and six privates wounded. Count Pulaski was among the slain. The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and wounded it amounted only to 55. So great was the advantage of the cover afforded by their works. … Count D'Estaing, having committed a blunder at the beginning, had committed a worse blunder at the end, by insisting on the assault, as unnecessary as it was rash. … He [now] insisted on raising the siege, and both the French and American armies moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October. D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies; and Lincoln recrossed the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and again encamped in South Carolina."

C. B. Hartley, Life of General Marion (Heroes and Patriots of the South), chapter 11.

ALSO IN: C. C. Jones, Jr., History of Georgia, volume 2, chapters 20-21.

J. Sparks, Life of Pulaski (Library of American Biographies, series 2, volume 4).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (January-April). The gloomy winter at Morristown. Depreciation to worthlessness of the Continental Currency. Consequent sufferings of the army and the country.

"The year 1780 opened upon a famishing camp. 'For a fortnight past,' writes Washington, on the 8th of January, 'the troops, both officers and men, have been almost perishing with want. Yet,' adds he, feelingly, 'they have borne their sufferings with a patience that merits the approbation, and ought to excite the sympathies, of their countrymen.' The severest trials of the Revolution, in fact, were not in the field, where there were shouts to excite and laurels to be won; but in the squalid wretchedness of ill-provided camps, where there was nothing to cheer and everything to be endured. To suffer was the lot of the revolutionary soldier. A rigorous winter had much to do with the actual distresses of the army, but the root of the evil lay in the derangement of the currency. Congress had commenced the war without adequate funds, and without the power of imposing direct taxes. To meet pressing emergencies, it had emitted paper money, which, for a time, passed currently at par; but sank in value as further emissions succeeded, and that already in circulation remained unredeemed. The several States added to the evil by emitting paper in their separate capacities: thus the country gradually became flooded with a 'continental currency,' as it was called; irredeemable, and of no intrinsic value. The consequence was a general derangement of trade and finance. The continental currency declined to such a degree that forty dollars in paper were equivalent to only one in specie. Congress attempted to put a stop to this depreciation by making paper money a legal tender, at its nominal value, in the discharge of debts, however contracted. This opened the door to knavery, and added a new feature to the evil. The commissaries now found it difficult to purchase supplies for the immediate wants of the army, and impossible to provide any stores in advance. They were left destitute of funds, and the public credit was prostrated by the accumulating debts suffered to remain uncancelled. The changes which had taken place in the commissary department added to this confusion. The commissary-general, instead of receiving, as heretofore, a commission on expenditures, was to have a fixed salary in paper currency, and his deputies were to be compensated in like manner, without the usual allowance of rations and forage. No competent agents could be procured on such terms. … In the present emergency Washington was reluctantly compelled, by the distresses of the army, to call upon the counties of the State for supplies of grain and cattle, proportioned to their respective abilities. … Wherever a compliance with this call was refused, the articles required were to be impressed: it was a painful alternative, yet nothing else could save the army from dissolution or starving. … As the winter advanced, the cold increased in severity. {3270} It was the most intense ever remembered in the country. The great bay of New York was frozen over. … The insular security of the place was at an end. … Washington was aware of the opportunity which offered itself for a signal 'coup de main,' but was not in a condition to profit by it."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapters 1 and 4.

"Paper for $9,000,000 was issued before any depreciation began. The issues of the separate colonies must have affected it, but the popular enthusiasm went for something. Pelatiah Webster, almost alone as it seems, insisted on taxation, but a member of Congress indignantly asked if he was to help tax the people when they could go to the printing-office and get a cartload of money. In 1776, when the depreciation began, Congress took harsh measures to try to sustain the bills. Committees of safety also took measures to punish those who 'forestalled' or 'engrossed,' these being the terms for speculators who bought up for a rise. … The enemy, perceiving the terrible harm the Americans were doing themselves, thought it well to help on the movement. They counterfeited the bills and passed them through the lines. At the end of 1779 Congress was at its wit's end for money. Its issues had put specie entirely out of reach, and the cause was in danger of being drowned under the paper sea. … The French alliance helped more by giving means of procuring loans in Europe than by military assistance. Congress promised to limit its issues to $200,000,000, and tried a new form of note; also loan offices and lotteries. Over 350,000,000 were issued in all, but it is doubtful if more than 200,000,000 were out at any one time. In the spring of 1780 the bills were worth two cents on the dollar, and then ceased to circulate. Specie now came into circulation, being brought by the French, and also that expended by the English passing the lines. The paper was now worth more for an advertisement or a joke than for any prospect of any kind of redemption. A barber's shop in Philadelphia was papered with it, and a dog, coated with tar, and with the bills stuck all over him, was paraded in the streets."

W. G. Sumner, History of American Currency, pages 44-47.

ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 4 (volume 1).

A. S. Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1774-1789, book 1.

J. J. Knox, United States Notes, chapter 2.

See, also, MONEY AND BANKING, A. D. 1775-1780.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (February-August). The siege and capture of Charleston by the British. Defeat of Gates at Camden. South Carolina subdued.

"After the failure of the attack on Savannah was learned by Sir Henry Clinton, he sent a large additional force to the South. Reinforcements were also sent on to Lincoln, while the main body of the American army went into winter quarters near Morristown, New Jersey. Sir Henry Clinton, as soon as his forces, which had been dispersed by a storm, had been collected at Savannah, proceeded to invest Charleston," landing his troops on St. John's Island in February. The blockading of the port and operations for the investment of the city were conducted cautiously and with success. On the 12th of May, the American commander, General Lincoln, "finding himself incapable of defending Charleston, decided on capitulating; and he acceded to the terms which the besiegers had first offered. The fortifications, shipping, artillery, and public stores were all surrendered. The garrison, and all who had borne arms, were prisoners of war. The militia were allowed to return home on parole. In the siege the British lost 76 killed, and 189 wounded. The Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to 5,618, counting all the adult males of the town. To bring the country entirely under subjection, Clinton sent forth three detachments. The first and largest, in the northern part of the State, was under Lord Cornwallis. He detached Colonel Tarleton with his legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, to disperse Colonel Buford, then encamped near the North Carolina line. [Buford] was overtaken at the Waxhaws, and, on his refusal to surrender, Tarleton made a furious charge on Buford's men, when some, in dismay, threw down their arms and asked for quarter, and some fired on the enemy. After this partial resistance, no quarter was given. Colonel Buford, with a few of the horse, and about 100 infantry, escaped; 113 were killed on the spot; 150 so badly wounded as to be incapable of being moved; and 53 were brought away as prisoners. The American officers deny (what the British assert), that any who had laid down their arms had again taken them up. All further resistance to the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia seems then to have ceased. The two other detachments of the British army every where received the submission of the inhabitants, who either gave their parole not again to bear arms against the king, or took the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation for settling the government, Sir Henry Clinton required all to return to their allegiance on pain of being treated as rebels and enemies. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command, with 4,000 troops. … Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. … A considerable force, under Baron de Kalb, had been ordered for the Southern army by Congress; but, for want of money, and a sufficient Commissary department, they were so delayed in their march, that it was late in July before they reached Cape Fear River. Here they were joined by General Gates, who had been appointed to the command of the Southern army. The men of this detachment, ill-fed, suffered greatly from dysentery. In South Carolina, Gates was joined by Porterfield's Virginia regiment, Rutherford's corps of North Carolina militia, and Armaud's legion. … Gates having under him about 4,000 men, of whom the regulars were less than 1,000, took post at Clermont. As the force of the Americans was daily increasing, Cornwallis, having under him about 2,000 men, of whom 1,900 were regulars, decided on attacking the American army. It so happened, that the period chosen by Cornwallis to surprise Gates, was the very moment in which Gates proposed to surprise his adversary; and thus the advanced corps of both armies unexpectedly met at two o'clock in the morning [August 6, near Camden]. {3271} After some skirmishing, in which the British seemed to have had a decided advantage, both parties suspended their operations till the morning. On the first onset of the British, the Virginia militia under General Stevens fled with precipitation, and were followed by the infantry of Armstrong; and, except Colonel Dixon's regiment, the whole South Carolina division followed the example. Very few of the militia of either State discharged a single musket. Gates was borne away by the torrent, and, with General Caswell, retreated to Clermont, in the hope of collecting a sufficient number of the fugitives to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the hope was vain. He was fain to proceed to Hillsborough, to concert the future plan of operations. Thus left with an inadequate force on the field, De Kalb made a stout resistance; but in an impetuous charge he fell, after having received twelve wounds. His troops were then unable to rally, and their discomfiture was complete. Their loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners, could not have been less than 1,000 men. The British lost 325 men. Just before the action, Sumter had captured a convoy, and made 200 prisoners; but was subsequently surprised by Tarleton, who recaptured the stores, killed 150, and took 300 prisoners. Sumter escaped with difficulty. There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina, and Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction; and Sumter was able to collect a new force, with which he greatly annoyed the north-western parts of the State."

G. Tucker, History of the United States, chapter 3 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: D. Ramsey, History of South Carolina, section 7 (volume l).

H. Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, chapter 17.

F. Bowen, Life of Benjamin Lincoln, chapter 5.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (July). Fresh help from France. The arrival of Rochambeau and his army, with a fleet.

"La Fayette's second visit to his native country [1770], was most opportune. He arrived in Paris at the moment when the war for the independence of America was in high popularity throughout France. He was put in arrest a week for his disobedience to the order not to leave France, but this was a mere formality. Vergennes received him in private. His example had roused the spirit of the French nobles. The stage resounded with his applauses. Crowds followed his steps. Marie Antoinette, with her quick, enthusiastic spirit, joyed at his distinction. The council of state, the Parliament, the towns, the corporations mingled in the noble excitement. The Royal Treasury was assured support by patriotic offers of contributions, and then was formed the auxiliary army that was to bear succor to America. This public enthusiasm triumphed over the hesitating reluctance of Maurepas, and the economical prudence of Necker. The army, placed under the command of the veteran Rochambeau, commended for his 'steadiness, wisdom, ability and prudence,' a pupil of the Marshal de Belle Isle, distinguished in frequent service, was to be composed of 6,000 troops. Among these shone forth the most brilliant of the nobility."

J. C. Hamilton, History of the United States, as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton, chapter 20 (volume 2).

"La Fayette … made the ministers understand that if he was not placed in command of the expedition, which would surprise the Americans, at least it was imperative to place over it a French general who would consent to serve under the American commander-in-chief. But he knew well that his old companions in arms in France were jealous of his rapid military fortune and brilliant renown. He knew still better that the officers who were his seniors in rank would be unwilling to serve under him. His first proposition, therefore, was only made to satisfy public feeling in America, which left the management of this affair almost entirely in his hands. In view of the serious difficulties that necessarily would result from the adoption of such a decision—difficulties that might have most disastrous consequences for the cause to which he had devoted himself—he promised to make the Americans understand that he had preferred remaining at the head of one of their divisions and that he had refused the command of the French forces. But he insisted upon this point, that, in order to avoid wounding the self-respect of the Americans, it was indispensable to choose a general to command the expedition, whose promotion had been recent and whose talents were certainly equal to his mission, but who, considering this mission as a distinction, would consent to acknowledge General Washington's supremacy. The choice that was made, under these conditions, of the Count de Rochambeau was perfectly satisfactory to him, and, without waiting for the departure of the expedition, he embarked at Rochefort, on February the 18th, 1780, on board the frigate Hermione, which the king had given him as being a swift sailer. … He was anxious to inform Washington of the good news himself, and immediately upon his landing at Boston, on April the 28th, he hastened to Morristown to rejoin his well-beloved and revered friend, as he called him in his letters. … General Heath, who commanded the militia in the State of Rhode Is]and, announced on the 11th of July, the arrival of the French squadron to General Washington, who was then with his staff at Bergen. La Fayette set out almost immediately, provided with instructions from the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th, to repair to the French general and admiral to confer with them. For some time Washington had been considering a plan of offensive operation for the capture of the city and the garrison of New York. This plan, which conformed with the wishes of the French government, was only to be carried out upon certain conditions. First, it was necessary that the French troops should unite with the American forces, and, secondly, that the French should have a naval superiority over the forces of Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot, who had effected their junction at New York the day after the arrival of the French at Newport. This last condition was far from being fulfilled. … It had been foreseen that the English, who had concentrated their land and naval forces at New York, would not give the French time to establish themselves on Rhode Island; and Washington informed Rochambeau that Sir Henry Clinton was embarking his troops and would come shortly to attack the forces of the expedition with the squadrons assembled under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, which were anchored at Sandy Hook, beyond New York, at the mouth of the Hudson River. {3272} The American general watched these movements, and, while he gave frequent information to the French of the projected attack upon them, he tried to prevent it. … At the same time, Washington crossed the Hudson above West Point with the greater part of his troops, and proceeded to King's Bridge, at the northern end of the island, where he made some hostile demonstrations. This manœuvre detained General Clinton, who had already embarked eight thousand men upon the ships of Arbuthnot. He landed his troops and gave up his project. Nevertheless, the English admiral set sail and appeared before Rhode Island with eleven ships of the line and a few frigates, twelve days after the French had landed. … On August the 9th, when La Fayette had returned to the headquarters of Washington, which were at Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right bank of the North River, he wrote to Rochambeau and de Ternay an urgent dispatch, in which he finished, in the name of the American general, by proposing to the French generals to come at once to attempt an attack on New York. … On the other hand, the same courier brought a letter from Washington which made no mention of this project, but which only replied by a kind of refusal to the request of Rochambeau for a conference, 'wherein in an hour of conversation they could agree upon more things than in volumes of correspondence.' Washington said with truth that he did not dare to leave his army in front of New York, for it might be attacked at any moment, and that by his presence he prevented the departure of the large body of the English forces that might have been sent against Rhode Island. Indeed, it is certain that if some differences had not arisen between General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, the French might have found themselves in a dangerous position at the beginning. From the earliest letters exchanged upon this occasion some discord resulted between La Fayette, Rochambeau and Washington, but, owing to the good sense of Rochambeau, matters were soon smoothed over. He wrote in English to the American general to ask him thereafter to address himself directly to him, and to explain the reasons that induced him to postpone assuming the offensive. At the same time he urgently requested a conference. From that moment the relations between the two leaders were excellent. The mere presence of the French squadron and army, though they were still paralyzed and really blockaded by Admiral Arbuthnot, had effected a useful diversion, since the English had not been able to profit by all the advantages resulting from the capture of Charleston, and, instead of carrying on operations in the Carolinas with superior forces, they had had to bring the greater part of them back to New York."

T. Balch, The French in America in the War of Independence, chapters 10-11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-September). The Treason of Benedict Arnold.

"Washington contemplated the aspect of affairs with the greatest alarm. Doubtful if the army could be kept together for another campaign, he was exceedingly anxious to strike some decisive blow. He proposed to Rochambeau, commanding the French troops at Newport, an attack upon New York; but that was not thought feasible without a superior naval force. Letters were sent to the French admiral in the West Indies entreating assistance; and Washington presently proceeded to Hartford, there to meet Rochambeau, to devise some definite plan of operations. During Washington's absence at Hartford, a plot came to light for betraying the important fortress of West Point and the other posts of the Highlands into the hands of the enemy, the traitor being no other than Arnold, the most brilliant officer and one of the most honored in the American army. The qualities of a brilliant soldier are unfortunately often quite distinct from those of a virtuous man and a good citizen. … Placed in command at Philadelphia, … he [Arnold] lived in a style of extravagance far beyond his means, and he endeavored to sustain it by entering into privateering and mercantile speculations, most of which proved unsuccessful. He was even accused of perverting his military authority to purposes of private gain. The complaints on this point, made to Congress by the authorities of Pennsylvania, had been at first unheeded; but, being presently brought forward in a solemn manner, and with some appearance of offended dignity on the part of the Pennsylvania council, an interview took place between a committee of that body and a committee of Congress, which had resulted in Arnold's trial by a court martial. Though acquitted of the more serious charges, on two points he had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief. Arnold claimed against the United States a large balance, growing out of the unsettled accounts of his Canada expedition. This claim was greatly cut down by the treasury officers and when Arnold appealed to Congress, a committee reported that more had been allowed than was actually due. Mortified and soured, and complaining of public ingratitude, Arnold attempted, but without success, to get a loan from the French minister. Some months before, he had opened a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton under a feigned name, carried on through Major Andre, adjutant general of the British army. Having at length made himself known to his correspondents, to give importance to his treachery, he solicited and obtained from Washington, who had every confidence in him, the command in the Highlands, with the very view of betraying that important position into the hands of the enemy. To arrange the terms of the bargain, an interview was necessary with some confidential British agent; and Andre, though not without reluctance, finally volunteered for that purpose. Several previous attempts having failed, the British sloop-of-war Vulture, with Andre on board, ascended the Hudson as far as the mouth of Croton River, some miles below King's Ferry. Information being sent to Arnold under a flag, the evening after Washington left West Point for Hartford he dispatched a boat to the Vulture, which took Andre on shore, for an interview on the west side of the river, just below the American lines. Morning appeared before the arrangements for the betrayal of the fortress could be definitely completed, and Andre was reluctantly persuaded to come within the American lines, and to remain till the next night at the house of one Smith, a dupe or tool of Arnold's, the same who had been employed to bring Andre from the ship. {3273} For some reason not very clearly explained, Smith declined to convey Andre back to the Vulture. … Driven thus to the necessity of returning by land, Andre laid aside his uniform, assumed a citizen's dress, and, with a pass from Arnold in the name of John Anderson, a name which Andre had often used in their previous correspondence, he set off toward sunset on horseback, with Smith for a guide. They crossed King's Ferry, passed all the American guards in safety, and spent the night near Crom Pond, with an acquaintance of Smith's. The next morning, having passed Pine's Bridge, across Croton River, Smith left Andre to pursue his way alone. The road led through a district extending some thirty miles above the island of New York, not included in the lines of either army, and thence known as the 'Neutral Ground,' a populous and fertile region, but very much infested by bands of plunderers called 'Cow Boys' and 'Skinners.' The 'Cow Boys' lived within the British lines, and stole or bought cattle for the supply of the British army. The rendezvous of the 'Skinners' was within the American lines. They professed to be great patriots, making it their ostensible business to plunder those who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the State of New York." On the morning of Andre's journey, the road to Tarrytown, on which he rode, was being guarded by a small party of men, who watched for cattle thieves, and for suspicious travelers generally. Three of these intercepted the unfortunate young officer and discovered his character. Arnold received intelligence of what had happened in time to make his escape to the Vulture. Andre was examined before a board of which Lafayette, Steuben and Greene were members, and on his own statements was executed as a spy. The sympathy with him was very great, among Americans as well as among his own countrymen; but lenity in the case appeared too dangerous to Washington and his military advisers.

R. Hildreth, History of the United States, chapter 41 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapters 2, 7, and 9-11.

B. J. Lossing, The Two Spies.

J. Sparks, Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold (Library of American Biographies, volume 3, chapters 8-15).

W. Sargent, Life of Major John André, chapters 11-21.

I. N. Arnold, Life of Benedict Arnold, chapters 13-18.

J. H. Smith, Authentic Narrative of the Causes which led to the Death of Major André.

B. J. Lossing, Field-book of the Revolution, volume 1, chapters 30-32.

See, also, WEST POINT.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-December). Partisan warfare in South Carolina. Sumter and Marion.

A name "which recalls thrilling tales of desperate enterprise, surprises at midnight, sudden attacks in the gray twilight of morning, lurking-places in the depths of forests, restless activity, and untiring perseverance, is the name of Thomas Sumter. He comes before us tall, vigorous, dauntless, with a bold bearing, and imperious brow, stern to look upon, fierce in his self-will, arrogant in his decisions, tenacious in his prejudices, resolute and vigorous in the execution of his own plans, remiss and almost luke-warm in carrying out the plans of others. Born in South Carolina just as that colony had passed from the control of the Proprietaries to the control of the King, he lived to see her take the first decided step towards passing out of the Union. Little has been preserved of his early life, although his subsequent career in the Senate of the United States proves that he was not deficient in education then, wherever or whenever acquired. In the Revolution be took an early part, and soon made himself conspicuous as a bold and enterprising officer. But it was not till after the siege of Charleston that his talents were brought fully into play. Then at the head of a body of volunteers he moved rapidly from point to point, keeping alive the hopes of the Whigs and the fears of the Tories in the regions watered by the Broad River, the Ennoree, and the Tiger. … History, like tradition, has her favorite characters, on which she dwells with peculiar fondness, delighting herself in preserving the memory of every exploit, and giving the brightest tints to every circumstance connected with their career. … Of these children of a happy star, no one holds in our Revolutionary history the same place as Francis Marion. His story, irregularly told by a friend and companion, took an early hold upon the heart of the people; and the romantic traits of his career, warming the imagination of a great poet, have been recorded in beautiful verse. Impartial judgment and sober research have left his own laurels unimpaired, although they have dissipated the halo which tradition and fancy had shed around his men. His life forms one of those pictures upon which the mind loves to dwell, from the singular combination of rare qualities which it displays. His ancestors were Huguenot exiles, who took refuge in South Carolina, from the dragonnades of Louis XIV. His father was a planter near Georgetown, who, portioning out his estate to his children as they came of age, had nothing left for Francis, the youngest, and his next nearest brother, while they were yet children. At sixteen Francis found himself compelled to choose a pursuit for his support. With only a common English education, and no money to carry him through the preparatory courses, he could neither be a physician nor a lawyer. He resolved to be a sailor, and started upon a voyage to the West Indies. But his ship was burnt in a gale, and after tossing about eight days in an open boat, without water and with nothing but the raw flesh and skin of a single dog to eat, and seeing several of his companions die of hunger, he, with the starving survivors, were rescued, barely alive. He renounced the sea, returned to Georgetown, and engaged in farming. The Cherokee war of 1759 found him hard at his work. He was now twenty-six, small in frame, low in stature, but vigorous, active, and healthy. By nature he was taciturn and reticent, with nothing in the expression of his face to attract or interest a casual observer, but still inspiring confidence and commanding respect in those who were brought into intimate relations with him. When, therefore, a company of volunteers was raised to serve against the Indians, he was chosen lieutenant. In a second expedition, which soon after became necessary, he was made captain. Next came the War of Independence; and joining the first South Carolina levies, he was presently made a major; and with this rank took part in the gallant defense of Fort Moultrie in 1776. His next promotion was to the command of a regiment as lieutenant-colonel. {3274} During the siege of Charleston his leg was accidentally broken, a lucky accident, which left him free when the city fell, to engage in an adventurous system of warfare which was the only possible system in that low state of our fortunes. In the course of this he was promoted by Governor Rutledge to a brigadiership. When he first appeared in Gates's camp, he had but twenty men with him, or rather twenty between men and boys. Some of them were negroes. With these he rescued 150 of the prisoners of Camden, coming upon the British escort by surprise and overpowering it. Early in September a body of 200 Tories attempted to surprise him. He had 53 men with him when he heard of their intention, and instantly setting forward, surprised an advance party of 45, killing or wounding all but 15, and then attacked the main body of 200, and put them to flight. Before the end of the month he surprised another body of 60 men; and in October one of 200. His force was constantly fluctuating between 20 men and 70. Up to the 18th of October he had never had over 70. They went and came as they chose, their number ever ebbing and flowing like the tide. Sometimes the very men who had fought with him were ranged in arms against him; a few only serving from honest zeal and true love of country. … As his slender form concealed a lion heart, so under his cold, impassive face, there was a perpetual glow of tender sympathies. … Without claiming for Marion those powers of combination which belong to the highest order of military genius, he must be allowed to have excelled in all the qualities which form the consummate partisan,—vigilance, promptitude, activity, energy, dauntless courage, and unshaken self-control. … Two principles controlled all his actions, and shaped all his ends; the love of country, pure, earnest, and profound; the love of right, sincere, undeviating, and incorruptible."

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, book 4, chapter 7 (volume 3).

"The other partisans … had been compelled to take refuge in the mountains. Marion found his security in the swamps. This able partisan maintained his ground below and along the Santee river, and managed, among the defiles and swamps of that region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. His force had been collected chiefly among his own neighbors, were practised in the swamps, and familiar with the country. Like Sumter, utterly unfurnished with the means of war at first, he procured them by similar means. He took possession of the saws from the mills, and converted them into sabres. So much was he distressed for ammunition that he has engaged in battle when he had not three rounds of powder to each man of his party. … Various were the means employed to draw off or drive away his followers. The houses on the banks of the Pedee, Lynch's Creek, and Black river, from whence they were chiefly taken, were destroyed by fire, the plantations devastated, and the negroes carried away. But the effect of this wantonness was far other than had been intended. Revenge and despair confirmed the patriotism of these ruined men, and strengthened their resolution. … For months, their only shelter was the green wood and the swamp—their only cover the broad forest and the arch of heaven. … With a policy that nothing could distract—a caution that no artifice could mislead—Marion led his followers from thicket to thicket in safety, and was never more perfectly secure than when he was in the neighborhood of his foe. He hung upon his flanks along the march—he skirted his camp in the darkness of the night—he lay in wait for his foraging parties—he shot down his sentries, and, flying or advancing, he never failed to harass the invader, and extort from him a bloody toll at every passage through swamp, thicket, or river, which his smaller parties made. In this sort of warfare—which is peculiarly adapted to the peculiarities of the country in Carolina, and consequently to the genius of her people—he contrived almost wholly to break up the British communications by one of the most eligible routes between the seaboard and the interior."

W. G. Simms, History of South Carolina, book 5, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: C. B. Hartley, Life of General Francis Marion (Heroes and Patriots of the South), chapters 14-15.

W. G. Simms, Life of Francis Marion.

Horry and Weems, Life of Marion.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781. Vermont as an independent State negotiating with the British.

See VERMONT: A. D. 1781.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781. Greene's campaign in the south. King's Mountain. The Cowpens. Guilford Court House. Hobkirk's Hill. Eutaw Springs. The British shut up in Charleston. Cornwallis withdrawn to Virginia.

"After his victory at Camden, Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting that he would soon conquer all the states south of the Susquehanna river. … In traversing Mecklenburg county Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far into the mountains. The back-woodsmen of Tennessee and Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused; and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier, Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. … In the series of events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow him. The events, however, were much more complicated in Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves. … As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army, recruited and reorganized since its crushing defeat at Camden, advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December. Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry Lee, familiarly known as 'Light-horse Harry,' father of the great general, Robert Edward Lee. {3275} The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the British infantry." To increase this small force, Baron Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the Revolutionary armies, was sent down to Virginia, for the purpose of recruiting and organizing troops.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY-DECEMBER).

Thereupon detachments from the British army at New York were dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was given command of them. "The presence of these subsidiary forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into two bodies, one of which cooperated with Marion's partisans in the northeastern part of the state, and threatened Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks, Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost 12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light-armed troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to march the two parts of his army in converging directions northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in South Carolina. … The two wings of the American army came together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene, after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford, faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles distant. … Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in which both sides claimed the victory. … Here, however, as always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. After Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under cover of their ships, and the American government was reëstablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in history that have been conducted with small armies, there have been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's."

J. Fiske, The War of Independence, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 15 (volume 2).

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapters 65-71.

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, volume 3, chapters 1-23.

L. C. Draper, King's Mountain and its Heroes.

H. Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, chapters 18-34.

J. Graham, Life of General Daniel Morgan, chapters 13-17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January). The Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.

"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign, which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says: 'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now served almost twelve months without pay.' … On the 1st of January the Pennsylvania line revolted; Captain Billings was killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns, started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d of January of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt its control. His second impression was to reserve his influence and authority until all other means were exhausted. {3276} The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult passages in the war, and was so handled that the Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control of the army. … General Clinton received information of the revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and sent messengers to the American army with propositions, looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a portion of the troops were discharged without critical examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up arms. … La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world.'"

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 67.

ALSO IN: W. H. Egle, History of Pennsylvania, chapter 12.

C. J. Stillé, Major-General Anthony Wayne, chapter 6.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January-May). Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia. Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.

"In January, 1781, the news reached headquarters in the Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had landed in Virginia with a considerable force, was laying waste the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to the assistance of Cornwallis, who, with a superior force, was pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his designs was, therefore, of the utmost importance. For this purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette. That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust, because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander, and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but, the coöperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime, been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his instructions required him to abandon the expedition and return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took command of all the forces there, and this had increased the anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis. With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. … Lafayette marched with such rapidity … that he reached Richmond, where there were valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent a considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South Carolina, he determined to join Philips. {3277} That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island to take possession of Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's arrival. … On the 13th of May, General Philips died at Petersburg of a fever. … Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men, which number was soon increased to 8,000."

B. Tuckerman, Life of Lafayette, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: J. E. Cooke, Virginia, part 3, chapter 17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (May-October). Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell. Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans. Surrender of the British army.

"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops, marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg, where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion of Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not venture any fighting. … Cornwallis … moved between Lafayette and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received his expected reënforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect the property of the State without losing his army. Through his scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his men through it and took up a strong position before the town. There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains, and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did not venture an attack. … The British commander, so far foiled in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British, harassing their rear and flanks."

B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette, volume 1, chapter 6.

"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in daily operations and excitements. The State north of the James was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham, on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river, encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill, then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots in the State. … The entire British army was soon after concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made to transport a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette, meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not return to the Northern army. … But while the marquis and Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand. Instead of any part going to New York, the British force suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August, at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned but three weeks before. Here again was a new situation. Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia, not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth, a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval station for the protection of the British shipping. In addition, if it appeared necessary, for the better security of the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done. Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on account of its great width. Then, following what he believed to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender. His occupation of the place was simply an incident of the campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of the navy and the health of his command."

H. P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign, chapter 3.

"The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia was the first emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to plan an efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for extensive field service at the north, that the American Commander-in-chief determined to attack that post, and as a secondary purpose, thereby to divert General Clinton from giving further aid to troops in the Southern States. As a matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia campaign eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an army, including militia, nearly as large as that of Washington, and the nominal strength of the allied army near Yorktown, early in September, was nearly or quite as great as that of Lord Cornwallis. There were other elements which, as in previous campaigns, hampered operations at the north. The Indians were still troublesome in Western New York, and the Canadian frontier continued to demand attention. The American navy had practically disappeared. {3278} The scarcity of money and a powerless recruiting service, increased the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner that would use to the best advantage the troops of France. … The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time was one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State authorities failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian reinforcements had landed at New York, and the government as well as himself would be compromised before the whole world by failure to meet the just demands which the French auxiliaries had a right to press upon his attention. Relief came most opportunely. The frigate Concorde arrived at Newport, and a reiteration of the purpose of Count de Grasse to leave St. Domingo on the 3d of August, for the Chesapeake direct, was announced by a special messenger. The possibilities of the future at once quickened him to immediate action. With a reticence so close that the army could not fathom his plans, he re-organized his forces for a false demonstration against New York and a real movement upon Yorktown. … Letters to the Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture New York. Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse embodied such intimations of his plans as would induce proper caution to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure transportation at Head of Elk. Other letters to authorities in New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly defining a plan of operations against New York via Staten Island, with the assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to interception and fell into the hands of General Clinton. As late as the 19th, the roads leading to King's Bridge were cleared of obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey regiment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry, to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to cover some bake-houses which were being erected for the purpose of giving color to the show of operations against New York. The plan of a large encampment had been prepared, which embraced Springfield and the Chatham Pass to Morristown, and this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's headquarters. General Heath was assigned to command of the Hudson-river posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery, Sheldon's dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies, and the militia. The following forces were selected to accompany the Commander-in-chief, viz., the light infantry under Colonel Scammel, four light companies from New York and Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, under the new army establishment, two New York regiments, that of New Jersey and Hazen's regiment, (the last two already across the Hudson) and Lamb's artillery, in all about 2,000 men. The American troops crossed on the 21st, at King's Ferry, and encamped near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the army was united on the 25th. … General Washington and suite reached Philadelphia about noon, August 30th. The army had already realized the fact that they were destined southward. Some dissatisfaction was manifested; but Count de Rochambeau advanced $20,000 in gold upon the pledge of Robert Morris that he would refund the sum by the 1st of October, and the effect upon the troops, who had long been without any pay, was inspiring."

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 74.

"Leaving Philadelphia, with the Army, on the 5th of September, Washington meets an express near Chester, announcing the arrival, in Chesapeake Bay, of the Count de Grasse, with a fleet of twenty-eight ships of the line, and with 3,500 additional French troops, under the command of the Marquis de St. Simon, who had already been landed at Jamestown, with orders to join the Marquis de La Fayette! 'The joy' says the Count William de Deux-Ponts, in his precious journal, 'the joy which this welcome news produces among all the troops, and which penetrates General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau, is more easy to feel than to express.' But, in a foot-note to that passage, he does express and describe it, in terms which cannot be spared and could not be surpassed, and which add a new and charming illustration of the emotional side of Washington's nature. 'I have been equally surprised and touched,' says the gallant Deux-Ponts, 'at the true and pure joy of General Washington. Of a natural coldness and of a serious and noble approach, which in him is only true dignity, and which adorn so well the chief of a whole nation, his features, his physiognomy, his deportment, all were changed in an instant. He put aside his character as arbiter of North America, and contented himself for a moment with that of a citizen, happy at the good fortune of his country. A child, whose every wish had been gratified, would not have experienced a sensation more lively, and I believe I am doing honor to the feelings of this rare man in endeavoring to express all their ardor.' Thanks to God, thanks to France, from all our hearts at this hour, for 'this true and pure joy' which lightened the heart, and at once dispelled the anxieties of our incomparable leader. It may be true that Washington seldom smiled after he had accepted the command of our Revolutionary Army, but it is clear that on the 5th of September he not only smiled but played the boy. … 'All now went merry,' with him, 'as a marriage bell.' Under the immediate influence of this joy, which he had returned for a few hours to Philadelphia to communicate in person to Congress, … and while the Allied Armies are hurrying southward, he makes a hasty trip with Colonel Humphreys to his beloved Mount Vernon and his more beloved wife—his first visit home since he left it for Cambridge in 1775. Rochambeau, with his suite, joins him there on the 10th, and Chastellux and his aids on the 11th; and there with Mrs. Washington, he dispenses for two days, 'a princely hospitality' to his foreign guests. But the 13th finds them all on their way to rejoin the Army at Williamsburg, where they arrive on the 15th, 'to the great joy of the troops and the people,' and where they dine with the Marquis de St. Simon. On the 18th Washington and Rochambeau, with Knox and Chastellux and Du Portail, and with two of Washington's aids, Colonel Cobb of Massachusetts, and Colonel Jonathan Trumbull, jr., of Connecticut, embark on the 'Princess Charlotte' for a visit to the French fleet. … A few days more are spent at Williamsburg on their return, where they find General Lincoln already arrived with a part of the troops from the North, having hurried them as Washington besought him, 'on the wings of speed,' and where the word is soon given, 'On, on, to York and Gloucester!' {3279} Washington takes his share of the exposure of this march, and the night of the 28th of September finds him, with all his military family, sleeping in an open field within two miles of Yorktown, without any other covering, as the journal of one of his aids states, 'than the canopy of the heavens, and the small spreading branches of a tree,' which the writer predicts 'will probably be rendered venerable from this circumstance for a length of time to come.' … Everything now hurries, almost with the rush of a Niagara cataract, to the grand fall of Arbitrary Power in America. Lord Cornwallis had taken post here at Yorktown as early as the 4th of August, after being foiled so often by 'that boy' as he called La Fayette, whose Virginia campaign of four months was the most effective preparation for all that was to follow, and who, with singular foresight, perceived at once that his lordship was now fairly entrapped, and wrote to Washington, as early as the 21st of August, that 'the British army must be forced to surrender.' Day by day, night by night, that prediction presses forward to its fulfillment. The 1st of October finds our engineers reconnoitering the position and works of the enemy. The 2d witnesses the gallantry of the Duke de Lauzun and his legion in driving back Tarleton, whose raids had so long been the terror of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the 6th, the Allied Armies broke ground for their first parallel, and proceeded to mount their batteries on the 7th and 8th. On the 9th, two batteries were opened—Washington himself applying the torch to the first gun; and on the 10th three or four more were in play—silencing the enemy's works, and making,' says the little diary of Colonel Cobb, 'most noble music.' On the 11th, the indefatigable Baron Steuben was breaking the ground for our second parallel, within less than four hundred yards of the enemy, which was finished the next morning, and more batteries mounted on the 13th and 14th. But the great achievement of the siege still awaits its accomplishment. Two formidable British advanced redoubts are blocking the way to any further approach, and they must be stormed. The allied troops divide the danger and the glory between them, and emulate each other in the assault. One of these redoubts is assigned to the French grenadiers and chasseurs, under the general command of the Baron de Viomesnil. The other is assigned to the American light infantry, under the general command of La Fayette. But the detail of special leaders to conduct the two assaults remains to be arranged. Viomesnil readily designates the brave Count William to lead the French storming party, who, though he came off from his victory wounded, counts it 'the happiest day of his life.' A question arises as to the American party, which is soon solved by the impetuous but just demand of our young Alexander Hamilton to lead it. And lead it he did, with an intrepidity, a heroism, and a dash unsurpassed in the whole history of the war. … Both redoubts were soon captured; and these brilliant actions virtually sealed the fate of Cornwallis. 'A small and precipitate sortie,' as Washington calls it, was made by the British on the following evening, resulting in nothing; and the next day a vain attempt to evacuate their works, and to escape by crossing over to Gloucester, was defeated by a violent and, for us … most providential storm of rain and wind. … A suspension of hostilities, to arrange terms of capitulation, was proposed by Cornwallis on the 17th; the 18th was occupied at Moore's House in settling those terms; and on the 19th the articles were signed by which the garrison of York and Gloucester, together with all the officers and seamen of the British ships in the Chesapeake, 'surrender themselves Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America and France.'"

Robert C. Winthrop, Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Oct. 19, 1881.

ALSO IN: Marquis Cornwallis, Correspondence, volume 1, chapters 4-5.

Marquis Cornwallis, Answer to Sir H. Clinton.

Count de Deux-Ponts, My Campaigns in America, 1781.

T. Balch, The French in America during the War of Independence, chapters 13-22.

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 25-26, and 28.

George Washington, Writings, edited by W. C. Ford, volume 9.

C. Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 2, chapters 25-28.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781-1782. Practical suspension of hostilities. Difficulty of maintaining the army. Financial distress of the country.

"Immediately after the surrender of Yorktown Washington returned with his army to the vicinity of New York [see NEWBURGH], but he felt himself far too weak to attempt its capture, and hostilities were restricted to a few indecisive skirmishes or predatory enterprises. It is curious to notice how far from sanguine Washington appeared even after the event which in the eyes of most men, outside America, had determined the contest without appeal. It was still impossible, he maintained, to do anything decisive unless the sea were commanded by a naval force hostile to England, and France alone could provide this force. The difficulties of maintaining the army were unabated. 'All my accounts,' he wrote in April 1782, 'respecting the recruiting service are unfavourable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived to my knowledge from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence of the requisitions of Congress in December last.' He strongly urged the impossibility of recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment, and recommended that, in addition to the compulsory enrolment of Americans, German prisoners should be taken into the army. Silas Deane, in private letters, expressed at this time his belief that it would be utterly impossible to maintain the American army for another year; and even after the surrender of Cornwallis, no less a person than Sir Henry Clinton assured the Government that, with a reinforcement of only 10,000 men he would be responsible for the conquest of America. … Credit was gone, and the troops had long been unpaid. 'The long sufferance of the army,' wrote Washington in October 1782, 'is almost exhausted. It is high time for a peace.' Nothing, indeed, except the great influence, the admirable moderation and good sense, and the perfect integrity of Washington could have restrained the army from open revolt. … Holland, immediately after the surrender of Yorktown, had recognised the independence of America, which had as yet only been recognised by France. John Adams was received as representative at the Hague, and after several abortive efforts he succeeded in raising a Dutch loan. France, as her ablest ministers well knew, was drifting rapidly towards bankruptcy, yet two American loans, amounting together to £600,000, were extorted in the last year of the war. {3280} Up to the very eve of the formal signature of peace, and long after the virtual termination of the war, the Americans found it necessary to besiege the French Court for money. As late as December 5, 1782, Franklin wrote from Paris to Livingston complaining of the humiliating duty which was imposed on him. … The reply of Livingston was dated January 6, 1783, and it paints vividly the extreme distress in America. 'I see the force,' he writes, 'of your objections to soliciting the additional twelve millions, and I feel very sensibly the weight of our obligations to France, but every sentiment of this kind must give way to our necessities. It is not for the interest of our allies to lose the benefit of all they have done by refusing to make a small addition to it. … The army demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The treasury is empty, and no adequate means of filling it presents itself. The people pant for peace; should contributions be exacted, as they have hitherto been, at the point of the sword, the consequences may be more dreadful than is at present apprehended. I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the States in not providing greater supplies. Some of them might do more than they have done; none of them all that is required. It is my duty to confide to you, that if the war is continued in this country, it must be in a great measure at the expense of France. If peace is made, a loan will be absolutely necessary to enable us to discharge the army, that will not easily separate without pay.' It was evident that the time for peace had come. The predatory expeditions which still continued in America could only exasperate still further both nations, and there were some signs—especially in the conflicts between loyalists and revolutionists—that they were having this effect. England had declared herself ready to concede the independence America demanded. Georgia and South Carolina, where the English had found so many faithful friends, were abandoned in the latter half of 1782, and the whole force of the Crown was now concentrated at New York and in Canada. France and Spain for a time wished to protract negotiations in hopes that Rodney might be crushed, that Jamaica and afterwards Gibraltar might be captured; but all these hopes had successively vanished. … If the war continued much longer America would almost certainly drop away, and France, and perhaps Spain, become bankrupt."

W. E. H. Lecky, History of England in the 18th Century, chapter 15 (volume 4).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781-1786. The cession of Western Territory by the States to the Federal Union. The Western Reserve of Connecticut.

Although the Articles of Confederation were adopted by Congress in 1777 and ratified immediately by most of the States, it was not until 1781 that they became operative by the assent of all. "New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland held out against ratifying them for from two to four years. The secret of their resistance was in the claims to the western territory. … The three recalcitrant States had always had fixed western boundaries, and had no legal claim to a share in the western territory. … New Jersey and Delaware gave up the struggle in 1778 and 1779; but Maryland would not and did not yield, until her claims were satisfied. Dr. H. B. Adams has shown that the whole question of real nationality for the United States was bound up in this western territory; that even a 'league government' could not continue long to govern a great and growing territory like this without developing into a real national government, even without a change of strict law; and that the Maryland leaders were working under a complete consciousness of these facts."

A. Johnston, The United States: Its History and Constitution, sections 89-90.

The western claims of Virginia were the most sweeping and were founded upon the oldest historical document. "The charter granted by James I. to South Virginia, in 1600 [see VIRGINIA: A. D. 1609-1616] … embraced the entire north-west of North America, and, within certain limits, all the islands along the coast of the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. … The following is the grant: 'All those lands, countries and territories situate, lying and being in that part of America called Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the northward 200 miles; and from the said Point or Cape Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the southward 200 miles; and all that space and circuit of land lying from the sea-coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west; and also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of both seas of the precinct aforesaid.' The extraordinary ambiguity of this grant of 1609, which was always appealed to as a legal title by Virginia, was first shown by Thomas Paine. … The chief ambiguity … lay in the interpretation of the words 'up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west.' From which point was the north-west line to be drawn, from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above, or from the point 200 miles below Cape Comfort? … The more favorable interpretation for Virginia and, perhaps, in view of the expression 'from sea to sea,' more natural interpretation, was to draw the north-western line from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above Point Comfort, and the western line from the southern limit below Point Comfort. This gave Virginia the greater part, at least, of the entire north-west, for the lines diverged continually. … At the outbreak of the Revolution, Virginia had annexed the 'County of Kentucky' to the Old Dominion, and, in 1778, after the capture of the military posts in the north-west by Colonel George Rogers Clarke, … that enterprising State proceeded to annex the lands beyond the Ohio, under the name of the County of Illinois

See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779, CLARKE'S CONQUEST.

The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong, but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable consideration for the services of other colonies in defending the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and military title of Virginia to the great north-west. … The claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the charter granted by Charles II., in 1662. … {3281} The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in southern Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the region comprehended by the extension westward of her present southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was 'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake Winnipiseogee in New Hampshire. The western claims of Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern boundaries—41° and 42° 2' north latitude—extended westward] covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. … The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies, the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.; again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves under the protection of England, and that they had always been treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780, Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the claimant States began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims, providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the Articles and the first legal union of the United States was complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were acting with a mutual understanding. … The offer of Virginia, reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky; the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammeled by burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three offers were now prominently before the country. … On the 29th of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of March, 1781. … On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia, of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty of Virginia's boundary, and the annulling of all other titles to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."

H. B. Adams, Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States (Johns Hopkins University Studies, 3d series, Number 1), pages 9-11, 19-22, 36-39.

The Massachusetts deed of cession was executed April 19, 1785. It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands "west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20 miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River" —that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. … After a severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone voting in the negative."

B. A. Hinsdale, The Old Northwest, chapter 13.

South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in 1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.

A. Johnston, Connecticut, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: T. Donaldson, The Public Domain: its History, chapter 3.