Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 71)

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 19 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: Thucydides, History, books 1-2.

GREECE: B. C. 431-429. The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided. The opposing camps. Peloponnesian invasions of Attica. The Plague at Athens. Death of Pericles. Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.

"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief cities. … The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. … The general indignation against the Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway. … The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign expedition. The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each, met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.

Thucydides, History (translated by Jowett), book 2, sections 8-70 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: E. Abbott, Pericles, chapters 13-15.

See ATHENS: 431 B. C. 431 and 430-429.

GREECE: B. C. 429-427. The Peloponnesian War: Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.

"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle, and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was determined to direct the principal effort. … Under the command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. … The town was small, as may be judged from the very small force which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans, with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress; the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then, in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a force sufficient for assault might ascend. … Such was at that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the science of his age. … To oppose this mode of attack, the first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and, within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built, in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less favorable situation. … A ram, advanced upon the Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of the garrison, but with little farther effect. {1583} Other machines of the same kind were employed against different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose. … No means however were neglected by the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility. Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire. The conflagration was such as was never before known, says Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands or men. … But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege to a blockade. … To the palisade, which already surrounded the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch, one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy, and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter."

W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapter 15, section 1 (volume 2).

When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families of the Platæans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege began.

Thucydides, History, books 2-3.

GREECE: B. C. 429-427. The Peloponnesian War: Phormio's sea-fights. Revolt of Lesbos. Siege and capture of Mitylene. The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.

"At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataea, a small Peloponnesian expedition, under a Spartan officer named Cnemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and joined the land forces of the Leucadians and Ambraciots. They were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Messenians of Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed in Western Greece. … When Cnemus had been joined by the troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had further strengthened himself by summoning to his standard a number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth, and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only Athenian force in these waters consisted of twenty galleys under an able officer named Phormio, who was cruising off the straits of Rhium, to protect Naupactus and blockade the Corinthian Gulf. Both by land and by sea the operations of the Peloponnesians miscarried miserably. Cnemus collected a very considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack Stratus by three separate roads, he exposed them to defeat in detail. … By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even more disgraceful; the Corinthian admirals Machaon and Isocrates were so scared, when they came across the squadron of Phormio at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they mustered 47 ships to his 20, they took up the defensive. Huddling together in a circle, they shrank from his attack, and allowed themselves to be hustled and worried into the Achaian harbour of Patrae, losing several ships in their flight. Presently reinforcements arrived; the Peloponnesian fleet was raised to no less than 77 vessels, and three Spartan officers were sent on board, to compel the Corinthian admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio. They found him with his 20 ships coasting along the Aetolian shore towards Naupactus, and at once set out in pursuit. The long chase separated the larger fleet into scattered knots, and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular character. While the rear ships of Phormio's squadron were compelled to run on shore a few miles outside Naupactus, the 11 leading vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now only pursued by about a score of the enemy—the rest having stayed behind to take possession of the stranded Athenian vessels—Phormio came boldly out of port again. His 11 vessels took 6, and sunk one of their pursuers; and then, pushing on westward, actually succeeded in recapturing most of the 9 ships which had been lost in the morning. This engagement, though it had no great results, was considered the most daring feat performed by the Athenian navy during the whole war. … The winter passed uneventfully, and the war seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 B. C. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her empire. For the first time since the commencement of hostilities, an important subject state made an endeavour to free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of the two Aegean islands which still remained free from tribute, and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by accumulating war-like stores and enlisting foreign mercenaries. … The whole island except Methymna, where a democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid to Sparta. The Athenians at once despatched against Mitylene a squadron of 40 ships under Cleïppides, which had just been equipped for a cruise in Peloponnesian waters. This force had an engagement with the Lesbian fleet, and drove it back into the harbour of Mitylene. {1584} To gain time for assistance from across the Aegean to arrive, the Lesbians now pretended to be anxious to surrender, and engaged Cleïppides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while they were repeating their demands at Sparta. But at last the Athenian grew suspicious, established a close blockade of Mitylene by sea, and landed a small force of hoplites to hold a fortified camp on shore. … Believing the revolt of the Lesbians to be the earnest of a general rising of all the vassals of Athens, the Peloponnesians determined to make a vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingents of the various states were summoned to the Isthmus—though the harvest was now ripe, and the allies were loath to leave their reaping—while it was also determined to haul over the Corinthian Isthmus the fleet which had fought against Phormio, and then to despatch it to relieve Mitylene. … The Athenians were furious at the idea that their vassals were now about to be stirred up to revolt, and strained every nerve to defend themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, and 100 galleys cruised in the Aegean to intercept any succours sent to Lesbos, another squadron of 100 ships sailed round Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic ferocity that surpassed any of their previous doings. To complete the crews of the 250 ships now afloat and in active service proved so great a drain on the military force of Athens, that not only the Thetes but citizens of the higher classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect which they designed by this display of power was fully produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the strength of the Athenian fleet was so great that the plan of sending naval aid to Lesbos was put off for the present. … All through the winter of 428-7 B. C. the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable force of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on the spot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines of circumvallation. … When the spring of 427 B. C. arrived, the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid to Lesbos; but the fear of imperiling all their naval resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a fleet of sufficient size. Only 42 galleys, under an admiral named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corinth. This squadron managed to cross the Aegean without meeting the Athenians, by steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands. But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off Embatum in Ionia, Ælia found that Mitylene had surrendered just seven days before. … Learning the fall of Mitylene, he made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant vessels off the Ionian coast and brutally slaying their crews, returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for the cause of Sparta. Paches soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him the Laconian general Salaethus, who had been caught in hiding at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt. When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salaethus was at once put to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the subject of an important and characteristic debate in the Ecclesia. Led by the demagogue Cleon, the Athenians at first passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the Mitylenaeans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but no excuse for this horrible decree that Lesbos had been an especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and Aeolis. Cleon the leather-seller, the author of this infamous decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. … On the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Cleon had been passed, and a galley sent off to Paches at Mitylene, bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning … the decree of Cleon was rescinded by a small majority, and a second galley sent off to stay Paches from the massacre. … By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve contrived to reach Lesbos only a few hours after Paches had received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it into execution. Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than 1,000 in number, were put to death. … The land of the Lesbians was divided into 3,000 lots, of which a tenth was consecrated to the gods, while the rest were granted out to Athenian cleruchs, who became the landlords of the old owners."

C. W. C. Oman, History of Greece, chapter 28.

ALSO IN: Thucydides, History, book 2, sections 80-92, and book 3, sections 1-50.

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3).

GREECE: B. C. 425. The Peloponnesian War: Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria. Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.

In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino, which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue, persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of it in the end.

{1585}

Thucydides, History, book 4, sections 2-38.

Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 52.

ALSO IN: E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3).

GREECE: B. C. 424-421. The Peloponnesian War: Brasidas in Chalcidice. Athenian defeat at Delium. A year's Truce. Renewed hostilities. Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis. The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).

"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas understood that the most effective method of assailing the Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike, and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only 700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded, through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about 1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of 1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom, and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides, to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances; yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he composed his history. … The revolution of the allied cities in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424, to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking, however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them, Socrates, the philosopher—see DELIUM], several hundred horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed under command of Hippokrates, took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated, overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse, and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat, and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding year they could have ended the war in a manner most advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused to send him any assistance whatever: The opportunity, therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace, … Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423 B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians. Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his promises of assistance. The war-like party at Athens, taking advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians, seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in Chalkidike. … The Athenians decided to forward a new force, and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August, 422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300 horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world. {1586} All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him at the public expense, in front of the market-place of Amphipolis. … Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as follows:

1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of the time of Aristeides.

2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.

3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right to adopt such measures as they pleased.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its beginning; Both the combatants came out from it terribly maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal allies. … Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This, however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the increase of the common hatred."

T. T. Timayenis, History of Greece, part 5, chapter 4 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 23 (volume 3).

GREECE: B. C. 421-418. The Peloponnesian War: New combinations. The Argive League against Sparta. Conflicting alliances of Athens with both. Rising influence of Alcibiades. War in Argos. Spartan victory at Mantinea. Revolution in Argos.

"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … , probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced her, because they found themselves given over to the Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis, and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their union, the three people of the country had separated themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos. Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to Athens, and when it became evident that this was the consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece, and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans, Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an hereditary proxenus to Argos. {1587} A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing, and we forget that part of his character which history reveals to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that, if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean, motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens, for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them, whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore, the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans, and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand, and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution took place, in which an oligarchical government was instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."

B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History, lecture 49 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: Plutarch, Alcibiades.

W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapter 17 (volume 3).

GREECE: B. C. 416. Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians. Massacre of the inhabitants.

"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 56.

"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city. The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in breaking through part of the wall built round them by the enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived; and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery; and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the women and children to slavery."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: Thucydides, History, book 5, sections 84-116.

GREECE: B. C. 415. The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 415.

GREECE: B. C. 415-413. The Peloponnesian War: Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse. Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta. His enmity to Athens.

See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.

{1588}

GREECE: B. C. 413. The Peloponnesian War: Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition. Prostration of Athens. Strengthening of Sparta. Negotiations with the Persians against Athens. Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. The Decelian War.

"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass, that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than 200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted. … But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships, and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens, and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any other state, because her whole power was based on the fear inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica, —in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious dominion of Athens. … Sparta, on the other hand, had in the course of a few months, without sending out an army or incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of the most important and momentous transaction of the entire war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. … Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities. Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of Archidamus. … Nothing was now required, except pecuniary means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the meantime occurred in the Persian empire. … Everywhere [in that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son, Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King. Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King (possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied. Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia; and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced to pursue a war policy. … Everything now depended for the satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all the more important cities of which a Persian party existed. … The most important and only independent power in Ionia was Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity contrived to retain the government. … It was their government which now became the focus of the conspiracy against Athens, in the first instance establishing a connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern province. … Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their alliance. … While thus the most dangerous combinations were on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to commence direct hostilities. … A Peloponnesian army under Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C. 413 (Olympiad xci. 3); at which date it was already to be anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of former wars had been effaced. {1589} The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved, instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the connecting link between the Sicilian War and the Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. … Its immediate object … it failed to effect; inasmuch as the Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. … One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping watch."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapters 4-5 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 61 (volume 7).

GREECE: B. C. 413-412. The Peloponnesian War: Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos, and Rhodes from Athens. Revolution at Samos. Intrigues of Alcibiades for a revolution at Athens and for his own recall.

"Alkibiades … persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of the nobles; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy. Now, however, they revolted (B. C. 413). This was a heavy blow to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian States, and others would be sure to follow its example. Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B. C. 412. The nobles of Samos prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens, and rose against the nobles, killing 200 of them, and banishing 400 more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal ally, instead of its subject, and Samos became the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army. … The Athenians … had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet from Syracuse. [This reinforcement of the enemy held them powerless to prevent a revolt in Rhodes, carried out by the oligarchs though opposed by the people.] Alkibiades had made enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death. He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could never return while there was a democracy; so that if they wished for the help of Persia they must change the government to an oligarchy (B. C. 412). In the army at Samos there were many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at Athens, and peace made with Sparta. … Therefore, though the great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for changing the government. One of the conspirators, named Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles and rich men to work secretly for this object. In these clubs the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to be zealous for the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew who did, and who did not, belong to the plot; and at last, partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the popular government."

C. A. Fyffe, History of Greece (History Primer), chapter 5, sections 36-39.

ALSO IN: G. W. Cox, The Athenian Empire, chapter 6.

Thucydides, History, book 8, chapters 4-51.

GREECE: B. C. 411-407. The Peloponnesian War: Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos. Exploits of Alcibiades. His return to Athens and to supreme command. His second deposition and exile.

While Athens was in the throes of its revolution, "the war was prosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus, who now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length by the often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty and irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus and proceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of assisting the satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if possible, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies in that quarter. Hither he was pursued by the Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus. In a few days an engagement ensued (in August, 411 B. C.), in the famous straits between Sestos and Abydos, in which the Athenians, though with a smaller force, gained the victory, and erected a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema [see CYNOSSEMA] near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the reduction of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or two afterward, another obstinate engagement took place between the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets near Abydos, which lasted a whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the Athenians by the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of 18 ships from Samos."

W. Smith, Smaller History of Greece, chapter 13.

{1590}

Alcibiades, although recalled, had "resolved to delay his return until he had performed such exploits as might throw fresh lustre over his name, and endear him to all classes of his fellow-citizens. With this ambition he sailed with a small squadron from Samos, and having gained information that Mindarus, with the Peloponnesian fleet, had gone in pursuit of the Athenian navy, he hastened to afford his countrymen succour. Happily he arrived at the scene of action, near Abydos, at a most critical moment; when, after a severe engagement, the Spartans had on one side obtained an advantage, and were pursuing the broken lines of the Athenians. … He speedily decided the fortune of the day, completely routed the Spartans, … broke many of their ships in pieces, and took 30 from them. … His vanity after this signal success had, however, nearly destroyed him; for, being desirous of appearing to Tissaphernes as a conqueror instead of a fugitive, he hastened with a splendid retinue to visit him, when the crafty barbarian, thinking he should thus appease the suspicions of the Spartans, caused him to be arrested and confined in prison at Sardis. Hence, however, he found means to escape. … He sailed immediately for the Athenian camp to diffuse fresh animation among the soldiers, and induce them hastily to embark on an expedition against Mindarus and Pharnabazus, who were then with the residue of the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicum" (Cyzicus). Mindarus was defeated and killed and Pharnabazus driven to flight (B. C. 410). "Alcibiades pursued his victory, took Cyzicum without difficulty, and, staining his conquest with a cruelty with which he was not generally chargeable, put to death all the Peloponnesians whom he found within the city. A very short space of time elapsed after this brilliant success before Alcibiades found another occasion to deserve the gratitude of Athens," by defeating Pharnabazus, who had attacked the troops of Thrasyllus while they were wasting the territory of Abydos. He next reduced Chalcedon, bringing it back into the Athenian alliance, and once more defeating Pharnabazus, when the Persian satrap attempted to relieve the town. He also recovered Selymbria, and took Byzantium (which had revolted) after a severe fight (B. C. 408). "Alcibiades having raised the fortunes of his country from the lowest state of depression, not only by his brilliant victories, but his conciliating policy, prepared to return and enjoy the praise of his successes. He entered the Piræus [B. C. 407] in a galley adorned with the spoils of numerous victories, followed by a long line of ships which he had taken from the foe. … The whole city came down to the harbour to see and welcome him, and took no notice of Thrasybulus or Theramenes, his fellow-commanders. … An assembly of the people being convened, he addressed them in a gentle and modest speech, imputing his calamities not to their envy, but to some evil genius which pursued him. He exhorted them to take courage, bade them oppose their enemies with all the fresh inspiration of their zeal, and taught them to hope for happier days. Delighted with these assurances, they presented him with a crown of brass and gold, which never was before given to any but the Olympic victors, invested him with absolute control over their naval and military affairs, restored to him his confiscated wealth, and ordered the ministers of religion to absolve him from the curses which they had denounced against him. Theodorus, however, the high-priest, evaded the last part of the decree, by alleging that he had never cast any imprecation on him, if he had committed no offence against the republic. The tablets on which the curses against him had been inscribed were taken to the shore, and thrown with eagerness into the sea. His next measure heightened, if possible, the brief lustre of his triumph. In consequence of the fortification of Decelea by the Lacedæmonians, and their having possession of the passes of the country, the procession to Eleusis, in honour of Athene, had been long unable to take its usual course, and being conducted by sea, had lost many of its solemn and august ceremonials. He now, therefore, offered to conduct the solemnity by land. … His proposal being gladly accepted, he placed sentinels on the hills; and, surrounding the consecrated band with his soldiers, conducted the whole to Eleusis and back to Athens, without the slightest opposition, or breach of that order and profound stillness which he had exhorted the troops to maintain. After this graceful act of homage to the religion he was once accused of destroying, he was regarded by the common people as something more than human; they looked on him as destined never to know defeat, and believed their triumph was certain so long as he was their commander. But, in the very height of his popularity, causes of a second exile were maturing. The great envied him in proportion to the people's confidence, and that confidence itself became the means of his ruin: for, as the people really thought the spell of invincibility was upon him, they were prepared to attribute the least pause in his career of glory to a treacherous design. He departed with a hundred vessels, manned under his inspection, with colleagues of his own choice, to reduce the isle of Chios to obedience. At Andros he once more gained a victory over both the natives and the Spartans, who attempted to assist them. But, on his arrival at the chief scene of action, he found that he would be unable to keep the soldiers from deserting, unless he could raise money to pay them sums more nearly equal to those which the Lacedæmonians offered, than the pay he was able to bestow. He was compelled, therefore, to leave the fleet [at Notium] and go into Caria in order to obtain supplies. While absent on this occasion, he left Antiochus in the command. … To this officer Alcibiades gave express directions that he should refrain from coming to an engagement, whatever provocations he might receive. Anxious, however, to display his bravery, Antiochus took the first occasion to sail out in front of the Lacedæmonian fleet, which lay near Ephesus, under the command of Lysander, and attempt, by insults, to incite them to attack him. Lysander accordingly pursued him; the fleets came to the support of their respective admirals, and a general engagement ensued, in which Antiochus was slain, and the Athenians completely defeated. On receiving intelligence of this unhappy reverse, Alcibiades hastened to the fleet, and eager to repair the misfortune, offered battle to the Spartans; Lysander, however, did not choose to risk the loss of his advantage by accepting the challenge, and the Athenians were compelled to retire. This event, for which no blame really attached to Alcibiades, completed the ruin of his influence at Athens. {1591} It was believed that this, the first instance of his failure, must have arisen from corruption, or, at least, from a want of inclination to serve his country. He was also accused of leaving the navy under the direction of those who had no other recommendation to the charge but having been sharers in his luxurious banquets, and of having wandered about to indulge in profligate excesses. … On these grounds, the people in his absence took from him his command, and confided it to other generals. As soon as he heard of this new act of ingratitude, he resolved not to return home, but withdrew into Thrace, and fortified three castles … near to Perinthus. Here, having collected a formidable band, as an independent captain, he made incursions on the territories of those of the Thracians who acknowledged no settled form of government, and acquired considerable spoils."

Sir T. N. Talfourd, Early History of Greece (Encyclopedia Metropolitana), chapter 11.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 29 (volume 4).

Plutarch, Alcibiades.

Xenophon, Hellenica, book 1, chapters 1-4.

GREECE: B. C. 406. The Peloponnesian War: Battle of Arginusæ. Trial and execution of the generals at Athens.

Alcibiades was succeeded by Conon and nine colleagues in command of the Athenian fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. The Athenians, soon afterwards, were driven into the harbor of Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, by a superior Peloponnesian fleet, commanded by Callicratidas, and were blockaded there with small chance of escape. Conon contrived to send news of their desperate situation to Athens, and vigorous measures were promptly taken to rescue the fleet and to save Mitylene. Within thirty days, a fleet of 110 triremes was fitted out at the Piræus, and manned with a crew which took nearly the last able-bodied Athenian to make it complete. At Samos these were joined by 40 more triremes, making 150 in all, against which Callicratidas was able to bring out only 120 ships from Mitylene, when the relieving armament approached. The two fleets encountered one another near the islands of Arginusæ, off Cape Malea, the southern promontory of Lesbos. In the battle that ensued, which was the greatest naval conflict of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were completely victorious; Callicratidas was drowned and no less than 77 of the Peloponnesian ships were destroyed, while the Athenians themselves lost 25. As the result of this battle Sparta again made overtures of peace, as she had done after the battle of Cyzicus, and Athens, led by her demagogues, again rejected them. But the Athenian demagogues and populace did worse. They summoned home the eight generals who had won the battle of Arginusæ, to answer to a charge of having neglected, after the victory, to pick up the floating bodies of the Athenian dead and to rescue the drowning from the wrecked ships of their fleet. Six of the accused generals came home to meet the charge; but two thought it prudent to go into voluntary exile. The six were brought to trial; the forms of legality were violated to their prejudice and all means were unscrupulously employed to work up the popular passion against them. One man, only, among the prytanes—senators, that is, of the tribe then presiding, and who were the presidents of the popular assembly—stood out, without flinching, against the lawless rage of his fellow citizens, and refused, in calm scorn of all fierce threats against himself, to join in taking the unconstitutional vote. That one was the philosopher Socrates. The generals were condemned to death and received the fatal draught of hemlock from the same populace which pressed it a little later to the lips of the philosopher. "Thus died the son of Pericles and Aspasia [one of the generals, who bore his father's name], to whom his father had made a fatal gift in obtaining for him the Attic citizenship, and with him Erasinides, Thrasylus, Lysias, Aristocrates, and Diomedon. The last-named, the most innocent of all, who had wished that the whole fleet should immediately be employed in search of the wrecked, addressed the people once more; he expressed a wish that the decree dooming him to death might be beneficial to the state, and called upon his fellow-citizens to perform the thanksgiving offerings to the saving gods which they, the generals, had vowed on account of their victory. These words may have sunk deep into the hearts of many of his hearers; but their only effect has been to cast a yet brighter halo in the eyes of subsequent generations around the memory of these martyrs. Their innocence is best proved by the series of glaring infractions of law and morality which were needed to ensure their destruction, as well as by the shame and repugnance which seized upon the citizens, when they had recognized how fearfully, they had been led astray by a traitorous faction.

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 5 (volume 3).

Mr. Grote attempts to uphold a view more unfavorable to the generals and less severe upon the Athenian people.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 64.

ALSO IN: Xenophon, Hellenica, book 1, chapters 5-7.

See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 424-406.

GREECE: B. C. 405. The Peloponnesian War Decisive battle of Aigospotamoi. Defeat of the Athenians.

After the execution of the generals, "no long time passed before the Athenians repented of their madness and their crimes: but, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they insisted, as they had done in the days of Miltiades and after the catastrophe at Syracuse, on throwing the blame not on themselves but on their advisers. This great crime began at once to produce its natural fruits. The people were losing confidence in their officers, who, in their turn, felt that no services to the state could secure them against illegal prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating its way into the heart of the state, and treason was losing its ugliness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none the worse for dallying with it. … The Athenian fleet had fallen back upon Samos; and with this island as a base, the generals were occupying themselves with movements, not for crushing the enemy, but for obtaining money. … The Spartans, whether at home or on the Asiatic coast, were now well aware that one more battle would decide the issue of the war; for with another defeat the subsidies of the Persians would be withdrawn from them as from men doomed to failure, and perhaps be transferred to the Athenians. In the army and fleet the cry was raised that Lysandros was the only man equal to the emergency. Spartan custom could not appoint the same man twice to the office of admiral; but when Arakos was sent out with Lysandros [Lysander] as his secretary, it was understood that the latter was really the man in power." {1592} In the summer of 405 B. C. Lysandros made a sudden movement from the southern Ægean to the Hellespont, and laid siege to the rich town of Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side. The Athenians followed him, but not promptly enough to save Lampsacus, which they found in his possession when they arrived. They took their station, thereupon, at the mouth of the little stream called the Aigospotamoi (the Goat's Stream), directly opposite to Lampsacus, and endeavored for four successive days to provoke Lysandros to fight. He refused, watching his opportunity for the surprise which he effected on the fifth day, when he dashed across the narrow channel and caught the Athenian ships unprepared, their crews mostly scattered on shore. One only, of the six Athenian generals, Conon, had foreseen danger and was alert. Conon, with twelve triremes, escaped. The remaining ships, about one hundred and seventy in number, were captured almost without the loss of a man on the Peloponnesian side. Of the crews, some three or four thousand Athenians were pursued on shore and taken prisoners, to be afterwards slaughtered in cold blood. Two of the incapable generals shared their fate. Of the other generals who escaped, some at least were believed to have been bribed by Lysandros to betray the fleet into his hands. The blow to Athens was deadly. She had no power of resistance left, and when her enemies closed around her, a little later, she starved within her walls until resistance seemed no longer heroic, and then gave herself up to their mercy.

G. W. Cox, The Athenian Empire, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 30 (volume 4).

Plutarch, Lysander.

Xenophon, Hellenica, book 2, chapter 1.

GREECE: B. C. 404. End of the Peloponnesian War. Fall of Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 404.

GREECE: B. C. 404-403. The Year of Anarchy at Athens. Reign of the Thirty.

See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

GREECE: B. C. 401-400. The expedition of Cyrus, and the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks.

See PERSIA: B. C.,401-400.

GREECE: B. C. 399-387. Spartan war with Persia. Greek confederacy against Sparta. The Corinthian War. Peace of Antalcidas.

The successful retreat of the Ten Thousand from Cunaxa, through the length of the Persian dominions (B. C. 401-400), and the account which they brought of the essential hollowness of the power of the Great King, produced an important change among the Greeks in their estimate of the Persian monarchy as an enemy to be feared. Sparta became ashamed of having abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to their old oppressors, as she did after breaking the strength of their protector, Athens, in the Peloponnesian War. When, therefore, the Persians began to lay siege to the coast cities which resisted them, Sparta found spirit enough to interfere (B. C. 399) and sent over a small army, into which the surviving Cyreans were also enlisted. The only immediate result was a truce with the Persian satrap. But, meantime, the Athenian general Conon—he who escaped with a few triremes from Ægospotami and fled to Cyprus—had there established relations with the Persian court at Susa and had acquired a great influence, which he used to bring about the creation of a powerful Persian armament against Sparta, himself in command. The news of this armament, reaching Sparta, provoked the latter to a more vigorous prosecution of the war in Asia Minor. King Agesilaus took the field in Ionia with a strong army and conducted two brilliant campaigns (B. C. 396-395), pointing the way, as it were, to the expedition of Alexander a couple of generations later. The most important victory won was on the Pactolus, not far from Sardis. But, in the midst of his successes, Agesilaus was called home by troubles which arose in Greece. Sparta, by her arrogance and oppressive policy, had already alienated all the Greek states which helped her to break down Athens in the Peloponnesian War. Persian agents, with money, had assisted her enemies to organize a league against her. Thebes and Athens, first, then Argos and Corinth, with several of the lesser states, became confederated in an agreement to overthrow her domination. In an attempt to crush Thebes, the Spartans were badly beaten at Haliartus (B. C. 395), where their famous Lysander, conqueror of Athens, was killed. Their power in central and northern Greece was virtually annihilated, and then followed a struggle with their leagued enemies for the control or the Corinthian isthmus, whence came the name of the Corinthian War. It was this situation of things at home which called back King Agesilaus from his campaigns in Asia Minor. He had scarcely crossed the Hellespont on his return, in July B. C. 394, before all his work in Asia was undone by an overwhelming naval victory achieved at Cnydus by the Athenian Conon, commanding the Persian-Phœnician fleet. With his veteran army, including the old Cyreans, now returning home after seven years of incredible adventures and hardships, he made his way through all enemies into Bœotia and fought a battle with the league at Coronea, in which he so far gained a victory that he held the field, although the fruits of it were doubtful. The Spartans on the isthmus had also just gained a considerable success near Corinth, on the banks of the Nemea. On the whole, the results of the war were in their favor, until Conon and the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus, came over with the victorious fleet from Cnydus and lent its aid to the league. The most important proceeding of Conon was to rebuild (B. C. 393), with the help of his Persian friends, the Long Walls of Athens, which the Peloponnesians had required to be thrown down eleven years before. By this means he restored to Athens her independence and secured for her a new career of commercial prosperity. During six years more the war was tediously prolonged, without important or decisive events, while Sparta intrigued to detach the Persian king from his Athenian allies and the latter intrigued to retain his friendship. In the end, all parties were exhausted—Sparta, perhaps, least so—and accepted a shameful peace which was practically dictated by the Persian and had the form of an edict or mandate from Susa, in the following terms: "The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with those who share my views. {1593} This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money." By this, called the Peace of Antalcidas (B. C. 387) from the Lacedæmonian who was instrumental in bringing it about, the Ionian Greeks were once more abandoned to the Persian king and his satraps, while Sparta, which assumed to be the administrator and executor of the treaty, was confirmed in her supremacy over the other Grecian states.

Xenophon, Hellenica (translated by Dakyns), books 3-5 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: C. Sankey, The Spartan and Theban Supremacies, chapters 7-9.

W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapters 24-25 (volume 4).

G. Rawlinson, The Five Great Monarchies, volume 3; Persia, chapter 7.

GREECE: B. C. 385. Destruction of Mantinea by the Spartans.

The Mantineians, having displayed unfriendliness to Sparta during the Corinthian War, were required by the latter, after the Peace of Antalcidas, to demolish their walls. On their refusal, king Agesipolis was sent to subdue them. By damming up the waters of the river Ophis he flooded the city and brought it to terms. "The city of Mantineia was now broken up, and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantineia as a village. Each village was placed under oligarchical government and left unfortified."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9).

ALSO IN: Xenophon, Hellenica, book 5, chapter 2.

GREECE: B. C. 383. The betrayal of Thebes to the Spartans.

When the Spartans sent their expedition against Olynthus, in 383 B. C., it marched in two divisions, the last of which, under Phoebidas, halted at Thebes, on the way, probably having secret orders to do so. "On reaching Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, being the respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established between them, he made a proposal as follows: 'You have it in your power,' he said, addressing Phoebidas, 'this very day to confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel.'"

Xenophon, Hellenica (translated by Dakyns), book 5, chapter 2 (volume 2).

"On the day of the Thesmophoria, a religious festival celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis, or Kadmeia, was consecrated to their exclusive use, Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat of a summer's noon had driven everyone out of the streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened to his order as Polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. … The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes [was] … received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognised public law of Greece, it was a flagitions iniquity, for which Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. … It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan power. … Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two really formidable enemies."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 76.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 37 (volume 5).

GREECE: B. C. 383-379. Overthrow of the Olynthian confederacy by Sparta.

Among the Greek cities which were founded at an early day in that peninsula of Macedonia called Chalcidice, from Chalcis, in Eubœa, which colonized the greater number of them, Olynthus became the most important. It long maintained its independence against the Macedonian kings, on one hand, and against Athens, when Athens ruled the Ægean and its coasts, on the other. As it grew in power, it took under its protection the lesser towns of the peninsula and adjacent Macedonia, and formed a confederacy among them, which gradually extended to the larger cities and acquired a formidable character. But two of the Chalcidian cities watched this growth of Olynthus with jealousy and refused to be confederated with her. More than that, they joined the Macedonians in sending an embassy (B. C. 383) to Sparta, then all-powerful in Greece, after the Peace of Antalcidas, and invoked her intervention, to suppress the rising Olynthian confederacy. The response of Sparta was prompt, and although the Olynthians defended themselves with valor, inflicting one severe defeat upon the Lacedæmonian allies, they were forced at last (B. C. 379) to submit and the confederacy was dissolved. "By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. … She gave the victory to Amyntas [king of Macedonia], and prepared the indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not only Olynthus, but … the major part of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9).

ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government, chapter 4, section 3.

GREECE: B. C. 379-371. The liberation of Thebes and her rise to supremacy. The humbling of Sparta.

For three years after the betrayal of the Acropolis, or Cadmea, of Thebes to the Spartans, the city groaned under the tyranny of the oligarchical party of Leontiades, whom the Spartans supported. Several hundreds of the more prominent of the democratic and patriotic party found a refuge at Athens, and the deliverance of Thebes was effected at last, about December, B. C. 379, by a daring enterprise on the part of some of these exiles. {1594} Their plans were concerted with friends at Thebes, especially with one Phyllidas, who had retained the confidence of the party in power, being secretary to the polemarchs. The leader of the undertaking was Melon. "After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion. Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs. They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be found in Thebes. … Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the rest as their attendant maidens. … It was preconcerted that as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the polemarchs. According to another, Melon and his friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims."

Xenophon, Hellenica, (translated by Dakyns), book 5, chapter 4.

Having thus made way with the polemarchs, the conspirators surprised Leontiades in his own house and slew him. They then liberated and armed the prisoners whom they found in confinement and sent heralds through the city to proclaim the freedom of Thebes. A general rally of the citizens followed promptly. The party of the oppression was totally crushed and its prominent members put to death. The Spartan garrison in the Cadmea capitulated and was suffered to march out without molestation. The government of Thebes was reorganized on a more popular basis, and with a view to restoring the Bœotian League, in a perfected state, with Thebes for its head.

See THEBES: B. C. 378.

In the war with Sparta which followed, Athens was soon involved, and the Spartans were driven from all their footholds in the Bœotian towns. Then Athens and Thebes quarreled afresh, and the Spartans, to take advantage of the isolation of the latter, invaded her territory once more. But Thebes, under the training of her great statesman and soldier, Epaminondas, had become strong enough to face her Lacedæmonian enemy without help, and in the momentous battle of Leuctra, fought July 6, B. C. 371, on a plain not far from Platæa, the domineering power of Sparta was broken forever. "It was the most important of all the battles ever fought between Greeks. On this day Thebes became an independent power in Greece, and a return of Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for all times."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 6, chapter 1 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: Plutarch, Pelopidas.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapters 77-78.

C. Sankey, The Spartan and Theban Supremacies, chapters 10-11.

GREECE: B. C. 378-357. The new Athenian Confederacy. The Social War.

See ATHENS: B. C. 378-357.

GREECE: B. C. 371. The Arcadian union. Restoration of Mantinea. Building of Megalopolis.

One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra (B. C. 371), which ended the domination of Sparta in Greek affairs, was to emancipate the Arcadians and to work great changes among them. Mantinea, which the Spartans had destroyed, was rebuilt the same year. Then "the chiefs of the parties opposed to the Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land, and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of foreign powers. … The object was to unite the Arcadian people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs, particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a military force for the protection of the public safety. … Within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of Arcadians from all the principal towns was held to deliberate on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists, collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City). The site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream tributary to the Alpheus. … The city was designed on a very large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious in Greece. … The population was to be drawn … from a great number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by their inhabitants."

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 39 (volume 5).

"The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preeminence or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 78.

GREECE: B. C. 371-362. Popular fury in Argos. Arcadian union and disunion. Restoration of Mantinea. Expeditions of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. His attempts against Sparta. His victory and death at Mantinea.

"In many of the Peloponnesian cities, when the power of Sparta seemed visibly on the wane, internal commotions had arisen, and much blood had been shed on both sides. But now Argos displayed the most fearful example of popular fury recorded in Greek annals, red as they are with tales of civil bloodshed. {1595} The democratic populace detected a conspiracy among the oligarchs, and thirty of the chief citizens were at once put to death. The excitement of the people was inflamed by the harangues of demagogues, and the mob, arming itself with cudgels, commenced a general massacre. When 1,200 citizens had fallen, the popular orators interfered to check the atrocities, but met with the same fate; and, sated at length with bloodshed, the multitude stayed the deadly work. But where the pressure of Spartan interference had been heaviest and most constant, there the reaction was naturally most striking. The popular impulses which were at work in Arkadia [see above] found their first outlet in the rebuilding of Mantineia." But there was far from unanimity in the Arkadian national movement. "In Tegea … public opinion was divided. The city had been treated by Sparta with special consideration, and had for centuries been her faithful ally; hence the oligarchical government looked with disfavour upon the project of union. But the democratical party was powerful and unscrupulous; and, with the help of the Mantineians, they effected a revolution, in which many were killed, and 800 exiles fled to Sparta." The Spartans, under Agesilaos, avenged them by ravaging the plain in front of Mantineia. "This invasion of Arkadia is chiefly important for the pretext which it furnished for Theban intervention. The Mantineians applied for help at first to Athens, and, meeting with a refusal, went on to Thebes. For this request Epameinondas must have been thoroughly prepared beforehand, and he was soon on the march with a powerful army. … On his arrival in the Peloponnese [B. C. 370], he found that Agesilaos had already retired; and some of the Theban generals, considering the season of the year, wished at once to return." But Epameinondas was persuaded by the allies of Thebes to make an attempt upon Sparta itself. "In four divisions the invading host streamed into the land which, according to the proudest boast of its inhabitants, had felt no hostile tread for 600 years. At Sellasia, not ten miles distant from Sparta, the army reunited; and, having plundered and burnt the town, swept down into the valley of the Eurotas, and marched along the left bank till it reached the bridge opposite the city. Within Sparta itself, though a universal terror prevailed, one man rose equal to the emergency. While the men fainted in spirit as they thought how few they were, and how wide their unwalled city, … Agesilaos accepted, not without mistrust, the services of 6,000 helots, collected reinforcements, preserved order, suppressed conspiracy, stamped out mutiny, posted guards on every vantage-ground, and refused to be tempted to a battle by the taunts of foes or the clamours of over-eager friends. … After one unsuccessful cavalry skirmish, the Theban general, who, in a campaign undertaken on his sole responsibility, dared not risk the chance of defeat, decided to leave the 'wasps'-nest' untaken. He completed his work of devastation by ravaging the whole of southern Lakonia, … and then turned back into Arkadia to devote himself to the more permanent objects of his expedition." Messene was now rebuilt (see MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD), and "the descendants of the old Messenian stock were gathered to form a new nation from Rhegion and Messene [Sicily], and from the parts of Lybia round Kyrene. … By thus restoring the Messenians to their ancient territory, Epameinondas deprived Sparta at one blow of nearly half her possessions. … At last Epameinondas had done his work; and, leaving Pammenes with a garrison in Tegea, he hastened to lead his soldiers home. At the Isthmus he found a hostile army from Athens," which had been persuaded to send succor to Sparta; but the Athenians did not care to give battle to the conquering Thebans, and the latter passed unopposed. On the arrival of Epameinondas at Thebes, "the leaders of a petty faction threatened to bring him and his colleagues to trial for retaining their command for four months beyond the legal term of office. But Epameinondas stood up in the assembly, and told his simple tale of victorious generalship and still more triumphant statesmanship; and the invidious cavils of snarling intriguers were at once forgotten." Sparta and Athens now formed an alliance, with the senseless agreement that command of the common forces "should be given alternately to each state for five days. … The first aim of the confederates was to occupy the passes of the isthmus," but Epameinondas forced a passage for his army, captured Sikyon, ravaged the territory of Epidauros, and made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to surprise Corinth. Then, on the arrival of reinforcements to the Spartans from Syracuse, he drew back to Thebes (B. C. 368). For a time the Thebans were occupied with troubles in Thessaly, and their Arkadian proteges in Peloponnese were carrying on war against Sparta independently, with so much momentary success that they became over-confident and rash. They paid for their foolhardiness by a frightful defeat, which cost them 10,000 men, whilst no Spartan is said to have fallen; hence the fight was known in Sparta as the Tearless Battle. "This defeat probably caused little grief at Thebes, for it would prove to the arrogant Arkadians that they could not yet dispense with Theban aid; and it decided Epameinondas to make a third expedition into the Peloponnese." The result of his third expedition was the enrolment of a number of Achaian cities as Theban allies, which gave to Thebes "the control of the coast-line of the Corinthian gulf." But the broad and statesmanlike terms on which Epameinondas arranged these alliances were set aside by his narrow-minded fellow citizens, and a policy adopted by which Achaia was "converted from a lukewarm neutral into an enthusiastic supporter of Sparta. In this unsettled state of Greek politics the Thebans resolved to have recourse, like the Spartans before them, to the authority of the Great King. Existing treaties, for which they were not responsible, acknowledged his right to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece." Pelopidas and other envoys were accordingly sent to Susa (E. C. 366), where they procured from Artaxerxes a rescript "which recognised the independence of Messene and ordered the Athenians to dismantle their fleet." But the mandate of the Great King proved void of effect. "After this the confusion in Greece grew infinitely worse. An accident transferred the town of Oropos … from the hands of Athens to those of Thebes; and as the Peloponnesian allies of the Athenians refused to help them to regain it, they broke with them, and, in spite of the efforts of Epameinondas, formed an alliance with Arkadia. … {1596} The Athenians made soon after a vain attempt to seize the friendly city of Corinth, and the disgusted Corinthians, together with the citizens of Epidauros and Phlious, … obtained the grudging consent of Sparta, and made a separate peace with Thebes. As soon as tranquillity was restored in one quarter, in another the flame of war would again burst forth." Its next outbreak (B. C. 365) was between Elis and Arkadia, the former being assisted by Sparta, and its principal event was a desperate battle fought for the possession of Olympia. The Arkadians held part of the city and acquired possession of the sacred treasures in the Olympian temple, which they determined to apply to the expenses of the war. "Raising the cry of sacrilege, the Mantineians, who were jealous both of Tegea and Megalopolis, at once broke loose and shut their gates." Soon afterwards, Mantineia separated herself wholly from the Arkadian confederacy and entered the Spartan alliance. This was among the causes which drew Epameinondas once more, and for the last time, into the Peloponnese (B. C. 362). "The armies of Greece were now gathering from all quarters for the great struggle. On the one side stood Sparta, Athens, Elis, Achaia, and a part of Arkadia, led by Mantineia; on the other side were ranged Boiotia [Thebes], Argos, Messenia, and the rest of Arkadia, while a few of the smaller states—as Phokis, Phlious, and Corinth—remained neutral." At the outset of his campaign, Epameinondas made a bold attempt, by a rapid night march, to surprise Sparta; but a traitorous warning had been given, the Spartans were barricaded and prepared for defence, and the undertaking failed. Then he marched quickly to Mantineia, and failed in his design there, likewise. A pitched battle was necessary to decide the issue, and it was fought on the plain between Mantineia and Tegea, on the 3d day of July, B. C. 362. The fine discipline of the Theban troops and the skilful tactics of Epameinondas had given the victory into his hands, when, "suddenly, the aspect of the battle changed. Except among the light troops on the extreme right, the advance was everywhere stayed. The Spartan hoplites were in full flight, but the conquerors did not stir a step in the pursuit. … The fury of the battle had instantly ceased. … Epameinondas had fallen wounded to death, and this was the result. … Every heart was broken, every arm paralysed. … Both sides claimed the victory in the battle, and erected the usual trophies, but the real advantage remained with the Thebans. … By the peace that ensued, the independence of Messenia was secured, and Megalopolis and the Pan-Arkadian constitution were preserved from destruction. The work of Epameinondas, though cut short, was thus not thrown away; and the power of Sparta was confined within the limits which he had assigned."