Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 70)

C. W. C. Oman, History of Greece, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: M. Duncker, History of Greece, book 2 (volume 1).

C. O. Müller, History and Antiquity of the Doric Race, introduction, and book 1, chapters 1-5.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapters 3-8 (volume 2).

See, also, DORIANS AND IONIANS; ACHAIA; ÆOLIANS; THESSALY; and BŒOTIA.

GREECE: The Migrations to Asia Minor and the Islands of the Ægean. Æolian, Ionian and Dorian colonies.

See ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES.

GREECE: Mycenæ and its kings. The unburied memorials.

"Thucydides says that before the Dorian conquest, the date of which is traditionally fixed at B. C. 1104, Mycenae was the only city whence ruled a wealthy race of kings. Archaeology produces the bodies of kings ruling at Mycenae about the twelfth century and spreads their wealth under our eyes. Thucydides says that this wealth was brought in the form of gold from Phrygia by the founder of the line, Pelops. Archaeology tells us that the gold found at Mycenae may very probably have come from the opposite coast of Asia Minor which abounded in gold; and further that the patterns impressed on the gold work at Mycenae bear a very marked resemblance to the decorative patterns found on graves in Phrygia. Thucydides tells us that though Mycenae was small, yet its rulers had the hegemony over a great part of Greece. Archæology shews us that the kings of Mycenae were wealthy and important quite out of proportion to the small city which they ruled, and that the civilisation which centred at Mycenae spread over south Greece and the Aegean, and lasted for some centuries at least. It seems to me that the simplest way of meeting the facts of the case is to suppose that we have recovered at Mycenae the graves of the Pelopid race of monarchs. It will not of course do to go too far. … It would be too much to suppose that we have recovered the bodies of the Agamemnon who seems in the Iliad to be as familiar to us as Caesar or Alexander, or of his father Atreus, or of his charioteer and the rest. {1568} We cannot of course prove the Iliad to be history; and if we could, the world would be poorer than before. But we can insist upon it that the legends of heroic Greece have more of the historic element in them than anyone supposed a few years ago. … Assuming then that we may fairly class the Pelopidae as Achaean, and may regard the remains at Mycenae as characteristic of the Achaean civilisation of Greece, is it possible to trace with bolder hand the history of Achaean Greece? Certainly we gain assistance in our endeavour to realize what the pre-Dorian state of Peloponnesus was like. We secure a hold upon history which is thoroughly objective, while all the history which before existed was so vague and imaginative that the clear mind of Grote refused to rely upon it at all. But the precise dates are more than we can venture to lay down, in the present condition of our knowledge. … The Achaean civilisation was contemporary with the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty (B. C. 1700-1400). It lasted during the invasions of Egypt from the north (1300-1100). When it ceased we cannot say with certainty. There is every historical probability that it was brought to a violent end in the Dorian invasion. The traditional date of that invasion is B. C. 1104. But it is obvious that this date cannot be relied upon."

P. Gardner, New Chapters in Greek History, chapters 2-3.

ALSO IN: R. Schliemann, Mycenæ.

C. Schuchhardt, Schliemann's Excavations, chapter 4.

GREECE: Ancient political and geographical divisions.

"Greece was not a single country. … It was broken up into little districts, each with its own government. Any little city might be a complete state in itself, and independent of its neighbours. It might possess only a few miles of land and a few hundred inhabitants, and yet have its own laws, its own government, and its own army. … In a space smaller than an English county there might be several independent cities, sometimes at war, sometimes at peace with one another. Therefore when we say that the west coast of Asia Minor was part of Greece, we do not mean that this coast-land and European Greece were under one law and one government, for both were broken up into a number of little independent States: but we mean that the people who lived on the west coast of Asia Minor were just as much Greeks as the people who lived in European Greece. They spoke the same language, and had much the same customs, and they called one another Hellenes, in contrast to all other nations of the world, whom they called barbarians … , that is, 'the unintelligible folk,' because they could not understand their tongue."

C. A. Fyffe, History of Greece (History Primers), chapter 1.

"The nature of the country had … a powerful effect on the development of Greek politics. The whole land was broken up by mountains into a number of valleys more or less isolated; there was no central point from which a powerful monarch could control it. Hence Greece was, above all other countries, the home of independence and freedom. Each valley, and even the various hamlets of a valley, felt themselves possessed of a separate life, which they were jealous to preserve."

E. Abbott, History of Greece, part 1, chapter 1.

See AKARNANIANS; ACHAIA; ÆGINA; ÆTOLIA; ARCADIA; ARGOS; ATHENS; ATTICA; BŒOTIA; CORINTH; DORIS AND DRYOPIS; ELIS; EPIRUS; EUBŒA; KORKYRA; LOCRI; MACEDONIA; MANTINEA; MEGALOPOLIS; MEGARA; MESSENE; OLYNTHUS; PHOKIANS; PLATÆA; SICYON; SPARTA; THEBES; and THESSALY.

GREECE: Political evolution of the leading States. Variety in the forms of Government. Rise of democracy at Athens.

"The Hellenes followed no common political aim. … Independent and self-centred, they created, in a constant struggle of citizen with citizen and state with state, the groundwork of those forms of government which have been established in the world at large. We see monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, rising side by side and one after another, the changes being regulated in each community by its past experience and its special interests in the immediate present. These forms of government did not appear in their normal simplicity or in conformity with a distinct ideal, but under the modifications necessary to give them vitality. An example of this is Lakedæmon. If one of the families of the Heracleidæ [the two royal families-see SPARTA: THE CONSTITUTION] aimed at a tyranny, whilst another entered into relations with the native and subject population, fatal to the prerogatives of the conquerors, we can understand that in the third case, that, of the Spartan community, the aristocratic principle was maintained with the greatest strictness. Independently of this, the divisions of the Lakedæmonian monarchy between two lines, neither of which was to have precedence, was intended to guard against the repetition in Sparta of that which had happened in Argos. Above all, the members of the Gerusia, in which the two kings had only equal rights with the rest, held a position which would have been unattainable to the elders of the Homeric age. But even the Gerusia was not independent. There existed in addition to it a general assembly, which, whilst very aristocratic as regards the native and subject population, assumed a democratic aspect in contrast with the king and the elders. The internal life of the Spartan constitution depended upon the relations between the Gerusia and the aristocratic demos. … The Spartan aristocracy dominated the Peloponnesus. But the constitution contained a democratic clement working through the Ephors, by means of which the conduct of affairs might be concentrated in a succession of powerful hands. Alongside of this system, the purely aristocratic constitutions, which were without such a centre, could nowhere hold their ground. The Bacchiadæ in Corinth, two hundred in number, with a prytanis at their head, and inter-marrying only among themselves, were one of the most distinguished of these families. They were deprived of their exclusive supremacy by Kypselus, a man of humble birth on his father's side, but connected with the Bacchiadæ through his mother. … As the Kypselidæ rose in Corinth, the metropolis of the colonies towards the west, so in the corresponding eastern metropolis, Miletus, Thrasybulus raised himself from the dignity of prytanis to that of tyrant; in Ephesus, Pythagoras rose to power, and overthrew the Basilidæ; in Samos, Polycrates, who was master also of the Kyklades, and of whom it is recorded that he confiscated the property of the citizens and then made them a present of it again. By concentrating the forces of their several communities the tyrants obtained the means of surrounding themselves with a certain splendor, and above all of liberally encouraging poetry and art. {1569} To these Polycrates opened his citadel, and in it we find Anacreon and Ibycus; Kypselus dedicated a famous statue to Zeus, at Olympia. The school of art at Sikyon was without a rival, and at the court of Periander were gathered the seven sages—men in whom a distinguished political position was combined with the prudential wisdom derived from the experience of life. This is the epoch of the legislator of Athens, Solon, who more than the rest has attracted to himself the notice of posterity.

See ATHENS: B. C. 594.

He is the founder of the Athenian democracy. … His proverb 'Nothing in excess' indicates his character. He was a man who knew exactly what the time has a right to call for, and who utilized existing complications to bring about the needful changes. It is impossible adequately to express what he was to the people of Athens, and what services he rendered them. That removal of their pecuniary burdens, the seisachtheia, made life for the first time endurable to the humbler classes.

See DEBT, LAWS CONCERNING: ANCIENT GREEK.

Solon cannot be said to have introduced democracy, but, in making the share of the upper classes in the government dependent upon the good pleasure of the community at large, he laid its foundations. The people were invested by him with attributes which they afterwards endeavored to extend. … Solon himself lived long enough to see the order which he established serve as the basis of the tyranny which he wished to avoid; it was the Four Hundred themselves who lent a hand to the change. The radical cause of failure was that the democratic element was too feebly constituted to control or to repress the violence of the families. To elevate the democracy into a true power in the state other events were necessary, which not only rendered possible, but actually brought about, its further development. The conflicts of the principal families, hushed for a moment, were revived under the eyes of Solon himself with redoubled violence. The Alemæonidæ [banished about 595 B. C.—see ATHENS: B. C. 612-595] were recalled, and Æthelred around them a party consisting mainly of the inhabitants of the seacoast, who, favored by trade, had the money in their hands; the genuine aristocrats, described as the inhabitants of the plains, who were in possession of the fruitful soil, were in perpetual antagonism to the Alemæonidæ; and, whilst these two parties were bickering, a third was formed from the inhabitants of the mountain districts, inferior to the two others in wealth, but of superior weight to either in the popular assemblies. At its head stood Peisistratus, a man distinguished by warlike exploits, and at an earlier date a friend of Solon. It was because his adherents did not feel themselves strong enough to protect their leader that they were induced to vote him a body-guard chosen from their own ranks. … As soon, however, as the first two parties combined, the third was at a disadvantage, so that after some time sentence of banishment was passed upon Peisistratus. … Peisistratus … found means to gather around him a troop of brave mercenaries, with whom, and with the support of his old adherents, he then invaded Attica. His opponents made but a feeble resistance, and he became without much trouble master both of the city and of the country.

See ATHENS: B. C. 560-510.

He thus attained to power; it is true, with the approbation of the people, but nevertheless by armed force. … We have almost to stretch a point in order to call Peisistratus a tyrant—a word which carries with it the invidious sense of a selfish exercise of power. No authority could have been more rightly placed than his; it combined Athenian with Panhellenist tendencies. But for him Athens would not have been what she afterwards became to the world. … Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Peisistratus governed Athens absolutely, and even took steps to establish a permanent tyranny. He did, in fact, succeed in leaving the power he possessed to his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus. … Of the two brothers it was the one who had rendered most service to culture, Hipparchus, who was murdered at the festival of the Panathenæa. It was an act of revenge for a personal insult. … In his dread lest he should be visited by a similar doom, Hippias actually became an odious tyrant and excited universal discontent. One effect, however, of the loss of stability which the authority of the dominant family experienced was that the leading exiles ejected by Peisistratus combined in the enterprise which was a necessary condition of their return, the overthrow of Hippias. The Alcmæonidæ took the principal part. … The revolution to which this opened the way could, it might seem, have but one result, the establishment of an oligarchical government. … But the matter had a very different issue," resulting in the constitution of Cleisthenes and the establishment of democracy at Athens, despite the hostile opposition and interference of Sparta.

L. von Ranke, Universal History: The oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks, chapter 5.

See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 510-507, and 509-506.

GREECE: B. C. 752. The Archonship at Athens thrown open to the whole body of the people.

See ATHENS: FROM THE DORIAN MIGRATION TO B. C. 683.

GREECE: B. C. 624. The Draconian legislation at Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 624.

GREECE: B. C. 610-600. War of Athens and Megara for Salamis. Spartan Arbitration.

See ATHENS: B. C. 610-586.

GREECE: B. C. 595-586. The Cirrhæan or first Sacred War.

See ATHENS: B.C. 610-586; and DELPHI.

GREECE: B. C. 500-493. Rising of the Ionians of Asia Minor against the Persians. Aid rendered to them by the Athenians. Provocation to Darius.

The Ionic Greek cities, or states, of Asia Minor, first subjugated by Crœsus, King of Lydia, in the sixth century B. C., were swallowed up, in the same century, with all other parts of the dominion of Crœsus, in the conquests of Cyrus, and formed part of the great Persian Empire, to the sovereignty of which Cambyses and Darius succeeded. In the reign of Darius there occurred a revolt of the Ionians (about 502 B. C.), led by the city of Miletus, under the influence of its governor, Aristagoras. Aristagoras, coming over to Greece in person, sought aid against the Persians, first at Sparta, where it was denied to him, and then, with better success, at Athens. Presenting himself to the citizens, just after they had expelled the Pisistratidæ, Aristagoras said to them "that the Milesians were colonists from Athens, and that it was just that the Athenians, being so mighty, should deliver them from slavery. {1570} And because his need was great, there was nothing that he did not promise, till at the last he persuaded them. For it is easier, it seems, to deceive a multitude than to deceive one man. Cleomenes the Spartan, being but one man, Aristagoras could not deceive; but he brought over to his purpose the people of Athens, being thirty thousand. So the Athenians, being persuaded, made a decree to send twenty ships to help the men of Ionia, and appointed one Melanthius, a man of reputation among them, to be captain. These ships were the beginning of trouble both to the Greeks and the barbarians. … When the twenty ships of the Athenians were arrived, and with them five ships of the Eretrians, which came, not for any love of the Athenians, but because the Milesians had helped them in the old time against the men of Chalcis, Aristagoras sent an army against Sardis, but he himself abode in Miletus. This army, crossing Mount Tmolus, took the city of Sardis without any hindrance; but the citadel they took not, for Artaphernes held it with a great force of soldiers. But though they took the city they had not the plunder of it, and for this reason. The houses in Sardis were for the most part built of reeds, and such as were built of bricks had their roofs of reeds; and when a certain soldier set fire to one of these houses, the fire ran quickly from house to house till the whole city was consumed. And while the city was burning, such Lydians and Persians as were in it, seeing they were cut off from escape (for the fire was in an the outskirts of the city), gathered together in haste to the market-place. Through this market-place flows the river Pactolus, which comes down from Mount Tmolus, having gold in its sands, and when it has passed out of the city it flows into the Hermus, which flows into the sea. Here then the Lydians and Persians were gathered together, being constrained to defend themselves. And when the men of Ionia saw their enemies how many they were, and that these were preparing to give battle, they were stricken with fear, and fled out of the city to Mount Tmolus, and thence, when it was night, they went back to the sea. In this manner was burnt the city of Sardis, and in it the great temple of the goddess Cybele, the burning of which temple was the cause, as said the Persians, for which afterwards they burnt the temples in Greece. Not long after came a host of Persians from beyond the river Halys; and when they found that the men of Ionia had departed from Sardis, they followed hard upon their track, and came up with them at Ephesus. And when the battle was joined, the men of Ionia fled before them. Many indeed were slain, and such as escaped were scattered, every man to his own city. After this the ships of the Athenians departed, and would not help the men of Ionia any more, though Aristagoras besought them to stay. Nevertheless the Ionians ceased not from making preparations of war against the King, making to themselves allies, some by force and some by persuasion, as the cities of the Hellespont and many of the Carians and the island of Cyprus. For all Cyprus, save Amathus only, revolted from the King under Onesilus, brother of King Gorgus. When King Darius heard that Sardis had been taken and burned with fire by the Ionians and the Athenians, with Aristagoras for leader, at the first he took no heed of the Ionians, as knowing that they would surely suffer for their deed, but he asked, 'Who are these Athenians?' And when they told him he took a bow and shot an arrow into the air, saying, 'O Zeus, grant that I may avenge myself on these Athenians.' And he commanded his servant that every day, when his dinner was served, he should say three times, 'Master, remember the Athenians.' … Meanwhile the Persians took not a few cities of the Ionians and Æolians. But while they were busy about these, the Carians revolted from the King; whereupon the captains of the Persians led their army into Caria, and the men of Caria came out to meet them; and they met them at a certain place which is called the White Pillars, near to the river Mæander. Then there were many counsels among the Carians, whereof the best was this, that they should cross the river and so contend with the Persians, having the river behind them, that so there being no escape for them if they fled, they might surpass themselves in courage. But this counsel did not prevail. Nevertheless, when the Persians had crossed the Meander, the Carians fought against them, and the battle was exceeding long and fierce. But at the last the Carians were vanquished, being overborne by numbers, so that there fell of them ten thousand. And when they that escaped—for many had fled to Labranda, where there is a great temple of Zeus and a grove of plane trees—were doubting whether they should yield themselves to the King or depart altogether from Asia, there came to their help the men of Miletus with their allies. Thereupon the Carians, putting away their doubts altogether, fought with the Persians a second time, and were vanquished yet more grievously than before. But on this day the men of Miletus suffered the chief damage. And the Carians fought with the Persians yet again a third time; for, hearing that these were about to attack their cities one by one, they laid an ambush for them on the road to Pedasus. And the Persians, marching by night, fell into the ambush, and were utterly destroyed, they and their captains. After these things, Aristagoras, seeing the power of the Persians, and having no more any hope to prevail over them—and indeed, for all that he had brought about so much trouble, he was of a poor spirit—called together his friends and said to them, 'We must needs have some place of refuge, if we be driven out of Miletus. Shall we therefore go to Sardinia, or to Myrcinus on the river Strymon; which King Darius gave to Histiæus?' To this Hecateus, the writer of chronicles, made answer, 'Let Aristagoras build a fort in Leros (this Leros is an island thirty miles distant from Miletus) and dwell there quietly, if he be driven from Miletus. And hereafter he can come from Leros and set himself up again in Miletus.' But Aristagoras went to Myrcinus, and not long afterwards was slain while he besieged a certain city of the Thracians."

Herodotus, The Story of the Persian War (version of A. J. Church, chapter 2).

See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 521-493; and ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.

GREECE: B. C. 496. War of Sparta with Argos. Overwhelming reverse of the Argives.

See ARGOS: B. C. 496-421.

GREECE: B. C. 492-491. Wrath of the Persian king against Athens. Failure of his first expedition of invasion. Submission of 'Medizing' Greek states. Coercion of Ægina. Enforced union of Hellas. Headship of Sparta recognized.

{1571}

The assistance given by Athens to the Ionian revolt stirred the wrath of the Persian monarch very deeply, and when he had put down the rebellion he prepared to chastise the audacious and insolent Greeks. "A great fleet started from the Hellespont, with orders to sail round the peninsula of Mt. Athos to the Gulf of Therma, while Mardonius advanced by land. His march was so harassed by the Thracians that when he had effected the conquest of Macedonia his force was too weak for any further attempt. The fleet was overtaken by a storm off Mt. Athos, on whose rocks 300 ships were dashed to pieces, and 20,000 men perished. Mardonius returned in disgrace to Asia with the remnant of his fleet and army. This failure only added fury to the resolution of Darius. While preparing all the resources of his empire for a second expedition, he sent round heralds to the chief cities of Greece, to demand the tribute of earth and water as signs of his being their rightful lord. Most of them submitted: Athens and Sparta alone ventured on defiance. Both treated the demand as an outrage which annulled the sanctity of the herald's person. At Athens the envoy was plunged into the loathsome Barathrum, a pit into which the most odious public criminals were cast. At Sparta the herald was hurled into a well, and bidden to seek his earth and water there. The submission of Ægina, the chief maritime state of Greece, and the great enemy of Athens, entailed the most important results. The act was denounced by Athens as treason against Greece, and the design was imputed to Ægina of calling in the Persians to secure vengeance on her rival. The Athenians made a formal complaint to Sparta against the 'Medism' of the Æginetans; a charge which is henceforth often repeated both against individuals and states. The Spartans had recently concluded a successful war with Argos, the only power that could dispute her supremacy in Peloponnesus; and now this appeal from Athens, the second city of Greece, at once recognized and established Sparta as the leading Hellenic state. In that character, her king Cleomenes undertook to punish the Medizing party in Ægina 'for the common good of Greece'; but he was met by proofs of the intrigues of his colleague Demaratus in their favour. … Cleomenes obtained his deposition on a charge of illegitimacy, and a public insult from his successor Leotychides drove Demaratus from Sparta. Hotly pursued as a 'Medist,' he effected his escape to Darius, whose designs against Athens and Sparta were now stimulated by the councils of their exiled sovereigns, Hippias and Demaratus. Meanwhile, Cleomenes and his new colleague returned to Ægina, which no longer resisted, and having seized ten of her leading citizens, placed them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians. Ægina was thus effectually disabled from throwing the weight of her fleet into the scale of Persia: Athens and Sparta, suspending their political jealousies, were united when their disunion would have been fatal; their conjunction drew after them most of the lesser states: and so the Greeks stood forth for the first time as a nation prepared to act in unison, under the leadership of Sparta (B. C. 491). That city retained her proud position till it was forfeited by the misconduct of her statesmen."

P. Smith, History of the World: Ancient, chapter 13 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: G. W. Cox, The Greeks and the Persians, chapter 6.

G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 36 (volume 4.)

See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.

GREECE: B. C. 490. The Persian Wars: Marathon.

The second and greater expedition launched by Darius against the Greeks sailed from the Cilician coast in the summer of the year 490 B. C. It was under the command of two generals,—a Mede, named Datis, and the king's nephew, Artaphernes. It made the passage safely, destroying Naxos on the way, but sparing the sacred island and temple of Delos. Its landing was on the shores of Eubœa, where the city of Eretria was easily taken, its inhabitants dragged into slavery, and the first act of Persian vengeance accomplished. The expedition then sailed to the coast of Attica and came to land on the plain of Marathon, which spreads along the bay of that name. "Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E. N. E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is 22 miles in length. … [The plain] 'is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain; the southern is not very large and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica."

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 36 (volume 4).

The Athenians waited for no nearer approach of the enemy to their city, but met them at their landing-place. They were few in number—only 10,000, with 1,000 more from the grateful city of Platæa, which Athens had protected against Thebes. They had sent to Sparta for aid, but a superstition delayed the march of the Spartans and they came the day after the battle. Of all the nearer Greeks none came to the help of Athens in that hour of extreme need; and so much the greater to her was the glory of Marathon. The ten thousand Athenian hoplites and the one thousand brave Platæans confronted the great host of Persia, of the numbers in which there is no account. Ten generals had the right of command on successive days, but Miltiades was known to be the superior captain and his colleagues gave place to him. "On the morning of the seventeenth day of the month of Metagitnion (September 12th), when the supreme command according to the original order of succession fell to Miltiades, he ordered the army to draw itself up according to the ten tribes. … The troops had advanced with perfect steadiness across the trenches and palisadings of their camp, as they had doubtless already done on previous days. But as soon as they had approached the enemy within a distance of 5,000 feet they changed their march to a double-quick pace, which gradually rose to the rapidity of a charge, while at the same time they raised the war-cry with a loud voice. {1572} When the Persians saw these men rushing down from the heights, they thought they beheld madmen: they quickly placed themselves in order of battle, but before they had time for an orderly discharge of arrows the Athenians were upon them, ready in their excitement to begin a closer contest, man against man in hand-to-hand fight, which is decided by personal courage and gymnastic agility, by the momentum of heavy-armed warriors, and by the use of lance and sword. Thus the well-managed and bold attack of the Athenians had succeeded in bringing into play the whole capability of victory which belonged to the Athenians. Yet the result was not generally successful. The enemy's centre stood firm. … But meanwhile both wings had thrown themselves upon the enemy; and after they had effected a victorious advance, the one on the way to Rhamnus, the other towards the coast, Miltiades … issued orders at the right moment for the wings to return from the pursuit, and to make a combined attack upon the Persian centre in its rear. Hereupon the rout speedily became general, and in their flight the troubles of the Persians increased; … they were driven into the morasses and there slain in numbers."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2).

The Athenian dead, when gathered for the solemn obsequies, numbered 192; the loss of the Persians was estimated by Herodotus at 6,400.

Herodotus, History, book 6.

ALSO IN: E. S. Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles, chapter 1.

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 14 (volume 2).

G. W. Cox, The Greeks and Persians, chapter 6.

Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, Athens: Its Rise and Fall, book 2, chapter 5.

GREECE: B. C. 489-480. The Æginetan War. Naval power of Athens created by Themistocles.

SEE ATHENS: B. C. 489-480.

GREECE: B. C. 481-479. Congress at Corinth. Hellenic union against Persia. Headship of Sparta.

"When it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his march into Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence of the country. At the instigation of the Athenians, the Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of the Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which had resolved to uphold the independence of their country to send plenipotentiaries to a congress at the Isthmus of Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic alliance was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its unity was confirmed by an oath, binding the members to visit with severe penalties those Greeks who, without compulsion, had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever seen in Greece; but though it comprised most of the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achæa, the Megarians, Athenians, and two cities of Bœotia, Thespiæ and Platæa, were the only patriots north of the Isthmus. Others, who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common people of Thessaly, the Phocians and Locrians, were compelled by the force of circumstances to 'medize.' From the time at which it met in the autumn or summer of 481 to the autumn of 480 B. C., the congress at the Isthmus directed the military affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were sent to Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of Xerxes; envoys visited Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining assistance in the impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in Europe, an army of 10,000 men was sent to hold the pass of Tempe, but afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon, this barrier was abandoned; and it was finally resolved to await the approaching forces at Thermopylæ and Artemisium. The supreme authority, both by land and sea, was in the hands of the Spartans; they were the natural leaders of any army which the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to follow unless the ships also were under their charge. … When hostilities were suspended, the congress re-appears, and the Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil and adjudge the prizes of valour. In the next year we hear of no common plan of operations, the fleet and army seeming to act independently of each other; yet we observe that the chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus (Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Platæa. It appears then that, under the stress of the great Persian invasion, the Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation; and for the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress continued to meet, with more or less interruption, at the Isthmus, consisting of plenipotentiaries from the various cities. This congress directed the affairs of the nation, so far as they were in any way connected with the Persian invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there was no longer any alarm from that source, the congress seems to have discontinued its meetings. But the alliance remained; the cities continued to act in common, at any rate, so far as naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the leading power."

E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: C. O. Müller, History and Antiquity of the Doric Race, volume 1, appendix 4.

GREECE: B. C. 480. The Persian War: Thermopylæ.

"Now when tidings of the battle that had been fought at Marathon [B. C. 490] reached the ears of King Darius, the son of Hystaspes, his anger against the Athenians," says Herodotus, "which had been already roused by their attack on Sardis, waxed still fiercer, and he became more than ever eager to lead an army against Greece. Instantly he sent off messengers to make proclamation through the several states that fresh levies were to be raised, and these at an increased rate; while ships, horses, provisions and transports were likewise to be furnished. So the men published his commands; and now all Asia was in commotion by the space of three years." But before his preparations were completed Darius died. His son Xerxes, who ascended the Persian throne, was cold to the Greek undertaking and required long persuasion before he took it up. When he did so, however, his preparations were on a scale more stupendous than those of his father, and consumed nearly five years. It was not until ten years after Marathon that Xerxes led from Sardis a host which, Herodotus computes at 1,700,000 men, besides half a million more which manned the fleet he had assembled. "Was there a nation in all Asia," cries the Greek historian, "which Xerxes did not bring with him against Greece? Or was there a river, except those of unusual size, which sufficed for his troops to drink?" By a bridge of boats at Abydos the army crossed the Hellespont, and moved slowly through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly; while the fleet, moving on the coast circuit of the same countries, avoided the perilous promontory of Mount Athos by cutting a canal. {1573} The Greeks had determined at first to make their stand against the invaders in Thessaly, at the vale of Tempe; but they found the post untenable and were persuaded, instead, to guard the narrower Pass of Thermopylæ. It was there that the Persians, arriving at Trachis, near the Malian gulf, found themselves faced by a small body of Greeks. The spot is thus described by Herodotus: "As for the entrance into Greece by Trachis, it is, at its narrowest point, about fifty feet wide. This, however, is not the place where the passage is most contracted; for it is still narrower a little above and a little below Thermopylae. At Alpeni, which is lower down than that place, it is only wide enough for a single carriage; and up above, at the river Phœnix, near the town called Anthela, it is the same. West of Thermopylæ rises a lofty and precipitous hill, impossible to climb, which runs up into the chain of Œta; while to the east the road is shut in by the sea and by marshes. In this place are the warm springs, which the natives call 'The Cauldrons'; and above them stands an altar sacred to Hercules. A wall had once been carried across the opening; and in this there had of old times been a gateway. … King Xerxes pitched his camp in the region of Malis called Trachinia, while on their side the Greeks occupied the straits. These straits the Greeks in general call Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates); but the natives and those who dwell in the neighbourhood call them Pylæ (the Gates). … The Greeks who at this spot awaited the coming of Xerxes were the following:—From Sparta, 300 men-at-arms; from Arcadia, 1,000 Tegeans and Mantineans, 500 of each people; 120 Orchomenians, from the Arcadian Orchomenus; and 1,000 from other cities; from Corinth, 400 men; from Phlius, 200; and from Mycenæ 80. Such was the number from the Peloponnese. There were also present, from Bœotia, 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans. Besides these troops, the Locrians of Opus and the Phocians had obeyed the call of their countrymen, and sent, the former all the force they had, the latter 1,000 men. … The various nations had each captains of their own under whom they served; but the one to whom all especially looked up, and who had the command of the entire force, was the Lacedæmonian, Leonidas. … The force with Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as it was likely they might have done had they seen Sparta backward. They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army. The rest of the allies also intended to act similarly; for it happened that the Olympic festival fell exactly at this same period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylæ decided so speedily." For two days Leonidas and his little army held the pass against the Persians. Then, there was found a traitor, a man of Malis, who betrayed to Xerxes the secret of a pathway across the mountains, by which he might steal into the rear of the post held by the Greeks. A thousand Phocians had been stationed on the mountain to guard this path; but they took fright when the Persians came upon them in the early dawn, and fled without a blow. When Leonidas learned that the way across the mountain was open to the enemy he knew that his defense was hopeless, and he ordered his allies to retreat while there was yet time. But he and his Spartans remained, thinking it "unseemly" to quit the post they had been specially sent to guard. The Thespians remained with them, and the Thebans—known partisans at heart of the Persians—were forced to stay. The latter deserted when the enemy approached; the Spartans and the Thespians fought and perished to the last man.

Herodotus, History (translated by Rawlinson), book 7.

ALSO IN: E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 40 (volume 4).

See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 480-479.

GREECE: B. C. 480. The Persian Wars: Artemisium.

On the approach of the great invading army and fleet of Xerxes, the Greeks resolved to meet the one at the pass of Thermopylæ and the other at the northern entrance of the Eubœan channel. "The northern side of Eubœa afforded a commodious and advantageous station: it was a long beach, called, from a temple at its eastern extremity, Artemisium, capable of receiving the galleys, if it should be necessary to draw them upon the shore, and commanding a view of the open sea and the coast of Magnesia, and consequently an opportunity of watching the enemy's movements as he advanced towards the south; while, on the other hand, its short distance from Thermopylæ enabled the fleet to keep up a quick and easy communication with the land force."

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 15 (volume 1).

The Persian fleet, after suffering heavily from a destructive storm on the Magnesian coast, reached Aphetæ, opposite Artemisium, at the mouth of the Pagasæan gulf. Notwithstanding its losses, it still vastly outnumbered the armament of the Greeks, and feared nothing but the escape of the latter. But, in the series of conflicts which ensued, the Greeks were generally victorious and proved their superior naval genius. They could not, however, afford the heavy losses which they sustained, and, upon hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ and the Persian possession of the all-important pass, they deemed it necessary to retreat.

W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapter 8, section 4 (volume 2).

GREECE: B. C. 480. The Persian Wars: Salamis.

Leonidas and his Spartan band having perished vainly at Thermopylæ, in their heroic attempt to hold the pass against the host of Xerxes, and the Greek ships at Artemisium having vainly beaten their overwhelming enemies, the whole of Greece north of the isthmus of Corinth lay completely at the mercy of the invader. The Thebans and other false-hearted Greeks joined his ranks, and saved their own cities by helping to destroy their neighbors. The Platæans, the Thespians and the Athenians abandoned their homes in haste, conducted their families, and such property as they might snatch away, to the nearer islands and to places of refuge in Peloponnesus. The Greeks of Peloponnesus rallied in force to the isthmus and began there the building of a defensive wall. Their fleet, retiring from Artemisium, was drawn together, with some re-enforcements, behind the island of Salamis, which stretches across the entrance to the bay of Eleusis, off the inner coast of Attica, near Athens. {1574} Meantime the Persians had advanced through Attica, entered the deserted city of Athens, taken the Acropolis, which a small body of desperate patriots resolved to hold, had slain its defenders and burned its temples. Their fleet had also been assembled in the bay of Phalerum, which was the more easterly of the three harbors of Athens. At Salamis the Greeks were in dispute. The Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were bent upon falling back with the fleet to the isthmus; the Athenians, the Eginetans and the Megarians looked upon all as lost if the present combination of the whole naval power of Hellas in the narrow strait of Salamis was permitted to be broken up. At length Themistocles, the Athenian leader, a man of fertile brain and overbearing resolution, determined the question by sending a secret message to Xerxes that the Greek ships had prepared to escape from him. This brought down the Persian fleet upon them at once and left them no chance for retreat. Of the memorable fight which ensued (September 20 B. C. 480) the following is a part of the description given by Herodotus: "Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus, the Ionians. Of these last, a few only followed the advice of Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far otherwise. … Far the greater number of the Persian ships engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for each thought that the king's eye was upon himself. … During the whole time of the battle Xerxes sat at the base of the hill called Ægaleos, over against Salamis; and whenever he saw any of his own captains perform any worthy exploit he inquired concerning him; and the man's name was taken down by his scribes, together with the names of his father and his city. … When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to make their escape to Phalêrum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance or fled to shore; while the Eginetans dealt with those which endeavoured to escape down the straits; so that the Persian vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than straightway they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. … Such of the barbarian vessels as escaped from the battle fled to Phalêrum, and there sheltered themselves under the protection of the land army. … Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine, to sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe and run great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to fly."

Herodotus, History (edited and translated by Rawlinson), book 8, sections 85—97 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2).

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 4 (volume 4).

W. W. Goodwin, The Battle of Salamis (Papers of the American School at Athens, volume 1).

GREECE: B. C. 479. The Persian Wars: Platæa.

When Xerxes, after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, fled back to Asia with part of his disordered host, he left his lieutenant, Mardonius, with a still formidable army, to repair the disaster and accomplish, if possible, the conquest of the Greeks. Mardonius retired to Thessaly for the winter, but returned to Attica in the spring and drove the Athenians once more from their shattered city, which they were endeavoring to repair. He made overtures to them which they rejected with scorn, and thereupon he destroyed everything in city and country which could be destroyed, reducing Athens to ruins and Attica to a desert. The Spartans and other Peloponnesians who had promised support to the Athenians were slow in coming, but they came in strong force at last. Mardonius fell back into Bœotia, where he took up a favorable position in a plain on the left bank of the Asopus, near Platæa. This was in September, B. C. 479. According to Herodotus, he had 300,000 "barbarian" troops and 50,000 Greek allies. The opposing Greeks, who followed him to the Asopus, were 110,000 in number. The two armies watched one another for more than ten days, unwilling to offer battle because the omens were on both sides discouraging. At length the Greeks undertook a change of position and Mardonius, mistaking this for a movement of retreat, led his Persians on a run to attack them. It was a fatal mistake. The Spartans, who bore the brunt of the Persian assault, soon convinced the deluded Mardonius that they were not in flight, while the Athenians dealt roughly with his Theban allies. "The barbarians," says Herodotus, "many times seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers, untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan ranks, and so perished. … After Mardonius fell, and the troops with him, which were the main strength of the army, perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians and took to flight. Their light clothing and want of bucklers were of the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such defence." Artabazus, who was second in command of the Persians, and who had 40,000 immediately under him, did not strike a blow in the battle, but quitted the field as soon as he saw the turn events had taken, and led his men in a retreat which had no pause until they reached and crossed the Hellespont. Of the remainder of the 300,000 of Mardonius' host, only 3,000, according to Herodotus, outlived the battle. It was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece.

Herodotus, History (translated by Rawlinson), book 9.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5).

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 16 (volume 1).

G. W. Cox, History of Greece, book 2, chapter 7 (volume 1).

{1575}

In celebration of the victory an altar to Zeus was erected and consecrated by the united Greeks with solemn ceremonies, a quintennial festival, called the Feast of Liberty, was instituted at Platæa, and the territory of the Platæans was declared sacred and inviolable, so long as they should maintain the appointed sacrifices and funeral honors to the dead. But these agreements did not avail to protect the Platæans when the subsequent Peloponnesian War broke out, and they stood faithfully among the allies of Athens. "The last act of the assembled army was the expedition against Thebes, in order, according to the obligation incumbent upon them, to take revenge on the most obstinate ally of the national enemy. Eleven days after the battle Pausanias appeared before the city and demanded the surrender of the party-leaders, responsible for the policy of Thebes. Not until the siege had lasted twenty days was the surrender obtained. … Timagenidas and the other leaders of the Thebans were executed as traitors against the nation, by order of Pausanias, after he had dismissed the confederate army."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2).

GREECE: B. C. 479. The Persian Wars: Mycale.

The same day, in September, B. C. 479, on which the Greeks at Platæa destroyed the army of Mardonius, witnessed an almost equal victory won by their compatriots of the fleet, on the coast of Asia Minor. The Persian fleet, to avoid a battle with them, had retreated to Mycale on the narrow strait between the island of Samos and the mainland, where a land army of 60,000 men was stationed at the time. Here they drew their ships on shore and surrounded them with a rampart. The Greeks, under Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, landed and attacked the whole combined force. The Ionians in the Persian army turned against their masters and helped to destroy them. The rout was complete and only a small remnant escaped to reach Sardis, where Xerxes was still lingering.

Herodotus, History (translated by Rawlinson), book 9.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 16 (volume 1).

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5).

GREECE: B. C. 479-478. Athens assumes the protection of Ionia. Siege and capture of Sestus. Rebuilding and enlargement of Athens and its walls. Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

See ATHENS: B. C. 479-478.

GREECE: B. C. 478-477. Reduction of Byzantium. Mad conduct of Pausanias. His recall. Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta. Their closer union with Athens. Withdrawal of the Spartans from the war. Formation of the Delian Confederacy.

"Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thrakian Doriskos, with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern shores of the Egean, were still held by Persian garrisons, when, in the year after the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20 Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the Hellenic world, into something like an organised society, and to kindle in it something like national life. … But she had no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her greatest enemies." Pausanias "was, it would seem, dazzled by Persian wealth and enamoured of Persian pleasures. He had roused the indignation of his own people by having his name inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai: and now his arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent and impatience destined to be followed by more serious consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He forwarded at the same time, it is said, … a letter in which he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to make him lord of all Hellas." Xerxes opened negotiations with him, and "the head of this miserable man was now fairly turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and Egyptian life guards, and to show his insolence to men who were at least his equals. The reports of this significant change in the behaviour of Pausanias led to his recall. He was put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was so strong that he was deprived of his command. … All these events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself incapable of maintaining its authority over its own servants." Even before the recall of Pausanius, "the Asiatic Greeks intreated Aristeides the Athenian commander to admit them into direct relations with Athens; and the same change of feeling had passed over all the non-medising Greek states with the exception of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. In short, it had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her maritime preponderance. When therefore a Spartan commission headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field in which they were unable to compel obedience left the confederacy an accomplished fact."

G. W. Cox, History of Greece, book 2, chapter 8 (volume 2).

This confederacy of the Asiatic Greeks with Athens, now definitely organized, is known as the Confederacy of Delos, or the Delian League. "To Athens, as decidedly the preponderant power, both morally and materially, was of necessity, and also with free good-will, consigned the headship and chief control of the affairs and conduct of the alliance; a position that carried with it the responsibility of the collection and administration of a common fund, and the presidency of the assemblies of delegates. As time went on and circumstances altered, the terms of confederation were modified in various instances; but at first the general rule was the contribution, not only of money or ships, but of actual personal service. … We have no precise enumeration of the allies of Athens at this early time, but the course of the history brings up the mention of many. {1576} … Crete was never directly affected by these events, and Cyprus was also soon to be left aside; but otherwise all the Greek islands of the Aegean northwards—except Melos, Thera, Aegina, and Cythera—were contributory, including Euboea; as were the cities on the coasts of Thrace and the Chalcidic peninsula from the Macedonian boundary to the Hellespont; Byzantium and various cities on the coasts of the Propontis, and less certainly of the Euxine; the important series of cities on the western coast of Asia Minor—though apparently with considerable exceptions—Aeolian, Ionian, Dorian, and Carian, as far as Caunus at least on the borders of Lycia, if not even round to the Chelidonian isles. The sacred island of Delos was chosen as the depository of the common treasure and the place of meeting of the contributors. Apart from its central convenience and defensibleness as an island, and the sanctity of the temple, … it was a traditional centre for solemn reunions of Ionians from either side the Aegean. … At the distinct request of the allies the Athenians appointed Aristides to superintend the difficult process of assessing the various forms and amounts of contribution. … The total annual amount of the assessment was the large sum of 460 talents (£112,125), and this perhaps not inclusive of, but only supplementary to, the costly supply of equipped ships."

W. W. Lloyd, The Age of Pericles, chapter 14 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: E. Abbott, History of Greece, part 2, chapters 6 and 8.

GREECE: B. C. 477-462. Advancing democracy of Athens. Sustentation of the Commons from the Confederate Treasury. The stripping of power from the Areopagus.

See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462.

GREECE: B. C. 477-461. Athens as the head of the Delian League. Triumph of Anti-Spartan policy at Athens and approach of war. Ostracism of Cimon.

"Between the end of the Persian war and the year 464 B. C., Sparta had sunk from the champion of the whole of Hellas to the half-discredited leader of the Peloponnese only. Athens, on the contrary, had risen from a subordinate member of the league controlled by Sparta to be the leader and almost the mistress of a league more dangerous than that over which Sparta held sway. Sparta unquestionably entertained towards Athens the jealous hatred of a defeated rival. By what steps Athens was increasing her control over the Delian League, and changing her position from that of a president to that of an absolute ruler will be explained. …

See ATHENS: B. C. 466-454.

She was at the same time prosecuting the war against Persia with conspicuous success. Her leader in this task was Cimon. In the domain of practice Athens produced no nobler son than this man. He was the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, and by heredity and inclination took his stand with the conservative party in Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462, to 460-449.

He succeeded here to the leading position of Aristides, and he possessed all that statesman's purity of character. … It was as a naval commander, and as a supporter of a forward policy against Persia, that Cimon won his greatest renown. But he had also a keen interest in the domestic development of Athens and her attitude to the other states of Greece. To maintain friendship with Sparta was the root of all his policy. His perfect honesty in supporting this policy was never questioned, and Sparta recognised his good will to them by appointing him Proxenus in Athens. It was his duty in this capacity to protect any Spartan resident in or visiting Athens. His character and personality were eminently attractive. … Under his guidance the Athenian fleet struck Persia blow on blow. … In 466, near the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia [see ATHENS: B. C. 470-466], the Persian fleet was destroyed, and after a fierce struggle her land forces also were defeated with very great slaughter. It was long before Persian influence counted for anything again on the waters of the Mediterranean. Cimon, with the personal qualities of Aristides, had obtained the successes of Themistocles. Opposition to Cimon was not wanting. The Athenian democracy had entered on a path that seemed blocked by his personal supremacy. And now the party of advancing democracy possessed a leader, the ablest and greatest that it was ever to possess. Pericles was about thirty years of age. … He was related to great families through both father and mother, and to great families that had championed the democratic side. His father Zanthippus had prosecuted Miltiades, the father of Cimon. … To lead the party of advanced democracy was to attack Cimon, against whom he had hereditary hostility. … When in 465 Thasos rebelled from Athens, defeat was certain unless she found allies. She applied to Sparta for assistance. Athens and Sparta were still nominally allies, for the creation of the Delian League had not openly destroyed the alliance that had subsisted between them since the days of the Persian war. But the Thasians hoped that Sparta's jealousy of Athens might induce her to disregard the alliance. And they reckoned rightly. The Spartan fleet was so weak that no interference upon the sea could be thought of, but if Attica were attacked by land the Athenians would be forced to draw off some part of their armament from Thasos. Sparta gave a secret promise that this attack should be made. But before they could fulfil their promise their own city was overwhelmed by a terrible earthquake. … Only five houses were left standing, and twenty thousand of the inhabitants lost their lives. King Archidamus saved the state from even more appalling ruin. While the inhabitants were dazed with the catastrophe, he ordered the alarm-trumpet to be blown; the military instincts of the Spartans answered to the call, and all that were left assembled outside of the city safe from the falling ruins. Archidamus's presence of mind saved them from even greater danger than that of earthquake. The disaster seemed to the masses of Helots that surrounded Sparta clear evidence of the wrath of the god Poseidon. … The Helots seized arms, therefore, and from all sides rushed upon Sparta. Thanks to Archidamus's action, they found the Spartans collected and ready for battle. They fell back upon Messenia, and concentrated their strength round Mount Ithome, the natural Acropolis of that district. … All the efforts of their opponents, never very successful in sieges, failed to dislodge them. At last, in 464, Sparta had to appeal to her allies for help against her own slaves; and, as Athens was her ally, she appealed to Athens. Should the help be granted? … Cimon advocated the granting of Sparta's demand with all his strength. … But there was much to be said on the other side, and it was said by Ephialtes and Pericles. {1577} The whole of Pericles's foreign policy is founded on the assumption that union between Athens and Sparta was undesirable and impossible. In everything they stood at opposite poles of thought. …. Cimon gained the vote of the people. He went at once with a force of four thousand heavy-armed soldiers to Ithome. Athenian soldiers enjoyed a great reputation for their ability in the conduct of sieges; but, despite their arrival, the Helots in Ithome still held out. And soon the Spartans grew suspicious of the Athenian contingent. The failure of Sparta was so clearly to the interest of Athens that the Spartans could not believe that the Athenians were in earnest in trying to prevent it; and at last Cimon was told that Sparta no longer had need of the Athenian force. The insult was all the more evident because none of the other allies were dismissed. Cimon at once returned to Athens. …

See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD.

On his return he still opposed those complete democratic changes that Pericles and Ephialtes were at this time introducing into the state. A vote of ostracism was demanded. The requisite number of votes fell to Cimon, and he had to retire into exile (461). … His ostracism doubtless allowed the democratic changes, in any case inevitable, to be accomplished without much opposition or obstruction, but it also deprived Athens of her best soldier at a time when she needed all her military talent. For Athens could not forget Sparta's insult. In 461 she renounced the alliance with her that had existed since the Persian wars; and that this rupture did not mean neutrality was made clear when, immediately afterwards, Athens contracted an alliance with Argos, always the enemy and now the dangerous enemy of Sparta, and with the Thessalians, who also had grounds of hostility to Sparta. Under such circumstances war could not be long in coming."

A. J. Grant, Greece in the Age of Pericles, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: Plutarch, Cimon; Pericles.

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 17 (volume 3).

E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapters 5-6.

GREECE: B. C. 460-449. Disastrous Athenian expedition to Egypt. Cimon's last enterprise against the Persians. The disputed Peace of Cimon, or Callias. Five years truce between Athens and Sparta.

See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.

GREECE: B. C. 458-456. Alliance of Corinth and Ægina against Athens and Megara. Athenian victories. Siege and conquest of Ægina. The Spartans in Bœotia. Defeat of Athens at Tanagra. Her success at Œnophyta. Humiliation of Thebes. Athenian ascendancy restored.

Crippled by the great earthquake of 464 B. C., and harassed by the succeeding Messenian War, "nothing could be done, on the part of Sparta, to oppose the establishment and extension of the separate alliance between Athens and Argos; and accordingly the states of Northern Peloponnesus commenced their armaments against Athens on their own account, in order to obtain by force what formerly they had achieved by secret intrigues and by pushing forward Sparta. To stop the progress of the Attic power was a necessary condition of their own existence; and thus a new warlike group of states formed itself among the members of the disrupted confederation. The Corinthians entered into a secret alliance with Ægina and Epidaurus, and endeavored to extend their territory and obtain strong positions beyond the Isthmus at the expense of Megara. This they considered of special importance to them, inasmuch as they knew the Megareans, whose small country lay in the midst between the two hostile alliances, to be allies little deserving of trust. … The fears of the Corinthians were realized sooner than they had anticipated. The Megareans, under the pressure of events, renounced their treaty obligations to Sparta, and joined the Attico-Argive alliance. … The passes of the Geranea, the inlets and outlets of the Doric peninsula, now fell into the hands of the Athenians; Megara became an outwork of Athens; Attic troops occupied its towns; Attic ships cruised in the Gulf of Corinth, where harbors stood open to them at Pegæ and Ægosthena. The Athenians were eager to unite Megara as closely as possible to themselves, and for this reason immediately built two lines of walls, which connected Megara with its port Nisæa, eight stadia off, and rendered both places impregnable to the Peloponnesians. This extension of the hostile power to the boundaries of the Isthmus, and into the waters of the western gulf, seemed to the maritime cities of Peloponnesus to force them into action. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina commenced an offensive war against Athens—a war which opened without having been formally declared; and Athens unhesitatingly accepted the challenge thrown out with sufficient distinctness in the armaments of her adversaries. Myronides, an experienced general and statesman, … landed with an Attic squadron near Halieis (where the frontiers of the Epidaurians and Argives met), and here found a united force of Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Æginetans awaiting him. Myronides was unsuccessful in his campaign. A few months later the hostile fleets met off the island of Cecryphalea, between Ægina and the coast of Epidaurus. The Athenians were victorious, and the struggle now closed round Ægina itself. Immediately opposite the island ensued a second great naval battle. Seventy of the enemy's ships fell into the hands of the Athenians, whose victorious fleet without delay surrounded Ægina. The Peloponnesians were fully aware of the importance of Ægina to them. Three hundred hoplites came to the relief of the island, and the Corinthians marched across the Geranea into Megaris to the relief of Ægina. It seemed impossible that, while the fleet of the Athenians was fighting in the land of the Nile, and another was lying before Ægina, they should have a third army in readiness for Megara. But the Peloponnesians had no conception of the capabilities of action belonging to the Athenians. True, the whole military levy was absent from the country, and only enough men were left at home for the mere defence of the walls. Yet all were notwithstanding agreed that neither should Ægina be given up nor the new allies be left in the lurch. Myronides advanced to meet the Corinthians with troops composed of those who had passed the age of military service or not yet reached it. In the first fight he held his ground: when the hostile forces returned for the second time, they were routed with tremendous loss. Megara was saved, and the energy of the Athenians had been most splendidly established. {1578} In attestation of it the sepulchral pillars were erected in the Ceramicus, on which were inscribed the names of the Athenian soldiers who had fallen in one and the same year (Ol. lxxx 3; B. C. 458-7) off Cyprus, in Egypt, Phœicia, Halieis, Ægina, and Megara. A fragment of this remarkable historical document is preserved to this day. While thus many years' accumulation of combustible materials had suddenly broken out into a flame of the fiercest war in Central Greece, new complications also arose in the north. The Thebans, who had suffered so deep a humiliation, believed the time to have arrived when the events of the past were forgotten, and when they could attain to new importance and power. In opposition to them the Phocians put forth their strength. … After the dissolution of the Hellenic Confederation, and the calamities which had befallen the Spartans, the Phocians thought they might venture an attack upon the Dorian tetrapolis, in order to extend their frontiers in this direction. … For Sparta it was a point of honor not to desert the primitive communities of the Dorian race. She roused herself to a vigorous effort, and, notwithstanding all her losses and the continuance of the war in Messenia, was able to send 11,500 men of her own troops and those of the confederates across the Isthmus before the Athenians had time to place any obstacles in their way [B. C. 457]. The Phocians were forced to relinquish their conquests. But when the Spartan troops were about to return home across the Isthmus they found the mountain-passes occupied by Athens, and the Gulf of Corinth made equally insecure by the presence of hostile ships. Nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians but to march into Bœotia, where their presence was welcome to Thebes. They entered the valley of the Asopus, and encamped in the territory of Tanagra, not far from the frontiers of Attica. Without calculating the consequences, the Athenians had brought themselves into an extremely dangerous situation. … Their difficulties increased when, contemporaneously, evil signs of treasonable plots made their appearance in the interior of the city. …

See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.

Thus, then, it was now necessary to contend simultaneously against foes within and foes without, to defend the constitution as well as the independence of the state. Nor was the question merely as to an isolated attack and a transitory danger; for the conduct of the Spartans in Bœotia clearly showed that it was now their intention to restore to power Thebes … because they were anxious to have in the rear of Athens a state able to stop the extension of the Attic power in Central Greece. This intention could be best fulfilled by supporting Thebes in the subjugation of the other Bœotian cities. For this purpose the Peloponnesians had busily strengthened the Theban, i. e. the oligarchical party, in the whole of the country, and encircled Thebes itself with new fortifications. Thebes was from a country town to become a great city, an independent fortified position, and a base for the Peloponnesian cause in Central Greece. Hence Athens could not have found herself threatened by a more dangerous complication. The whole civic army accordingly took the field, amounting, together with the Argives, and other allies, to 14,000 men, besides a body of Thessalian cavalry. In the low ground by the Asopus below Tanagra the armies met. An arduous and sanguinary struggle ensued, in which for the first time Athens and Sparta mutually tested their powers in a regular battle. For a long time the result was doubtful; till in the very thick of the battle the cavalry went over to the enemy, probably at the instigation of the Laconian party. This act of treason decided the day in favor of Sparta, although patriotic Athenians would never consent to count this among the battles lost by Athens. The Spartans were far from fulfilling the expectations of the party of the Oligarchs. As soon as they knew that the passes of the Isthmus were once more open, they took their departure, towards the fall of the year, through Megara, making this little country suffer for its defection by the devastation of its territory. … They reckoned upon Thebes being for the present strong enough to maintain herself against her neighbors; for ulterior offensive operations against Athens, Tanagra was to serve as a base. The plan was good, and the conjuncture of affairs favorable. But whatever the Spartans did, they did only by halves: they concluded a truce for four months, and quitted the ground. The Athenians, on the other hand, had no intention of allowing a menacing power to establish itself on the frontiers of their country. Without waiting for the return of the fair season, they crossed Mount Parnes two months after the battle, before any thoughts of war were entertained in Bœotia; Myronides, who was in command, defeated the Theban army which was to defend the valley of the Asopus, near Œnophyta. This battle with one blow put an end to all the plans of Thebes; the walls of Tanagra were razed. Myronides continued his march from town to town; everywhere the existing governments were overthrown, and democratic constitutions established with the help of Attic partisans. … Thus, after a passing humiliation, Athens was soon more powerful than ever, and her sway extended as far as the frontiers of the Phocians. Nay, during the same campaign she extended her military dominion as far as Locris. … Meanwhile the Æginetans also were gradually losing their power of resistance. For nine months they had resisted the Attic squadron. … Now their strength was exhausted; and the proud island of the Æacidæ, which Pindar had sung as the mother of the men who in the glorious rivalry of the festive games shone out before all other Hellenes, had to bow down before the irresistible good fortune of the Athenians, and was forced to pull down her walls, to deliver up her vessels of war, and bind herself to the payment of tribute. Contemporaneously with this event, the two arms of walls [at ATHENS] … between the upper and lower town were completed. Athens was now placed beyond the fear of any attack. … The Peloponnesian confederation was shaken to its very foundations; and Sparta was still let and hindered by the Messenian revolt, while the Athenians were able freely to dispose of their military and naval forces."

E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: G. W. Cox, History of Greece, book 2, chapter 9 (volume 2).

Thucydides, Peloponnesian War (translated by Jowett), book 1, sections 107-108.

{1579}

GREECE: B. C. 449-445. Quarrel of Delphians and Phocians. Interference of Sparta and Athens. Bœotian revolution. Defeat of Athenians at Coroneia. Revolt of Eubœa and Megara. The Thirty Years Truce.

In 449 B. C. "on occasion of a dispute between the Delphians and the Phocians as to which should have the care of the temple and its treasures, the Lacedæmonians sent an army, and gave them to the former; but as soon as they were gone, Pericles led thither an Athenian army, and put the Phocians in possession. Of this the Lacedæmonians took no notice. The right of Promanty, or first consulting the oracle, which had been given to Sparta by the Delphians, was now assigned to Athens by the Phocians; and this honor was probably the cause of the interference of both states. As the Athenians had given the upper hand to the democratic party in Bœotia, there was of course a large number of the opposite party in exile. These had made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other places, and if not checked in time, might greatly endanger the Athenian influence. Tolmidas, therefore, led an army and took and garrisoned Chæroneia; but, as he was returning, he was attacked at Coroneia by the exiles from Orchomenus, joined by those of Eubœa and their other friends. Tolmidas fell, and his troops were all slain or made prisoners. (Ol. 83, 2.) [B. C. 447.] The Athenians, fearing a general war, agreed to a treaty, by which, on their prisoners being restored, they evacuated Bœotia. The exiles returned to their several towns, and things were placed on their old footing. … Eubœa was now (Ol. 83, 3) [B. C. 446] in revolt: and while Pericles was at the head of an army reducing it, the party in Megara adverse to Athens rose and massacred all the Athenian garrisons except that of Nisæa. Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians came to their aid: and the Peloponnesians, led by one of the Spartan kings, entered and wasted the plain of Eleusis. Pericles led back his army from Eubœa, but the enemy was gone; he then returned and reduced that island, and having expelled the people of Hestiæa, gave their lands to Athenian colonists; and the Athenians, being unwilling to risk the chance of war with the Dorian confederacy, gladly formed (Ol. 83, 4) [B. C. 445] a truce for thirty years, surrendering Nisæa and Pegæ, and withdrawing a garrison which they had in Trœzen, and ceasing to interfere in Achaia."

T. Keightley, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 1.

"The Athenians saw themselves compelled to give up their possessions in Peloponnesus, especially Achaia, as well as Trœzene and Pagæ, an important position for their communication with the peninsula. Even Nisæa was abandoned. Yet these losses, sensibly as they affected their influence upon the Grecian continent, were counterbalanced by a concession still more significant, the acknowledgment of the Delian League. It was left open to states and cities which were members of neither confederacy to join either at pleasure. These events happened in Ol. 83,3 (B. C. 445)—the revolt of Megara and Eubœa, the invasion of Pleistoanax, the re-conquest of Eubœa, and the conclusion of the treaty, which assumed the form of an armistice for thirty years. Great importance must be attributed to this settlement, as involving an acknowledgment which satisfied both parties and did justice to the great interests at stake on either side. If Athens renounced some of her possessions, the sacrifice was compensated by the fact that Sparta recognized the existence of the naval supremacy of Athens, and the basis on which it rested. We may perhaps assume that the compromise between Pericles and Pleistoanax was the result of the conviction felt by both these leading men that a fundamental dissociation of the Peloponnesian from the Delian league was a matter of necessity. The Spartans wished to be absolutely supreme in the one, and resigned the other to the Athenians."

L. von Ranke, Universal History: The Oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks, chapter 7, section 2.

ALSO IN: Sir E. B. Lytton, Athens: Its Rise and Fall, book 5, chapter 1.

GREECE: B. C. 445-431. Splendor of Athens and greatness of the Athenian Empire under the rule of Pericles.

See ATHENS: B. C. 445-431.

GREECE: B. C. 440. Subjugation of revolted Samos by the Athenians. Spartan interference prevented by Corinth.

See ATHENS: B. C. 440-437.

GREECE: B. C. 435-432. Causes of the Peloponnesian War.

"In B. C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel between Corinth and Kerkyra [or Korkyra, or Corcyru], in which Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta; Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens, and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that Athens had gained. A far greater number of Greek States were engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere; Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people; so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these classes all over Greece."

C. A. Fyffe, History of Greece (History Primer), chapter 5.

"The Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like period of time. Never were so many cities captured and depopulated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves fighting against one another; and several of them after their capture were re-peopled by strangers. Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife. … There were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."

Thucydides, History (translated by Jowett), book 1, section 23.

The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, out of which, as an immediate excitement, the Peloponnesian War grew, concerned "the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo—a colony founded by the Korkyreans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, considerably to the north of their own island." {1580} The oligarchy of Epidamnus, driven out by the people, had allied themselves with the neighboring Illyrians and were harassing the city. Korkyra refused aid to the latter when appealed to, but Corinth (of which Korkyra was itself a colony) promptly rendered help. This involved Corinth and Korkyra in hostilities, and Athens gave support to the latter.

E. Curtius, History of Greece, volume 3, book 4.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapters 19-30.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapters 47-48 (volume 5).

GREECE: B. C. 432. Great Sea-fight of the Corinthians with the Korkyrians and Athenians. Revolt of Potidæa.

"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of 150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra. The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt. After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships, they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and, still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians, supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force, hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service, supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians, far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard to their own interests. Their object was to send these prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic city.

G. W. Cox, General History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1.

"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct. Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated; the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt; and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them; but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an army under Phormion to lay siege to it.

Early History of Greece (Enc. Metropolitana), page 283.

GREECE: B. C. 432-431. Charges brought by Corinth against Athens. The hearing and the Congress at Sparta. Decision for war. Theban attack on Platæa. The Peloponnesian War begun.

The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded by several other members of the confederacy, who had also wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in Sparta. {1581} They desired permission to attend and address the assembly. … When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace, and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not, perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the gods, to banish all who remained among them of that blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand, they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C. 431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an event took place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot, imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time, raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. … The main body, which had kept together, entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans, who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them. The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as soon as they had transported their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all the prisoners— amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed the women and children and all persons unfit for service in a siege. {1582} After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica."