Part 2 — Chapter III. (These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.) Article 118. The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended. (continued 96)

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 4.

KYRENE.

See CYRENAICA.

KYZICUS.

See CYZICUS.

LABARUM, The.

"The chief banner of the Christian emperors [Roman] was the so-called 'labarum.' Eusebius describes it as a long lance with a cross-piece; to the latter a square silk flag was attached, into which the images of the reigning emperor and his children were woven. To the point of the lance was fastened a golden crown enclosing the monogram of Christ and the sign of the cross."

E. Guhl and W. Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, section 107.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chapter 20.

See CHRISTIANITY: A.D. 312-337.

LA BICOQUE, Battle of (1522).

See FRANCE: A. D. 1520-1523.

LABOR ORGANIZATION.

See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

LABRADOR, The Name.

"Labrador—Laboratoris Terra—is so called from the circumstance that Cortereal in the year 1500 stole thence a cargo of Indians for slaves."

F. Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World: Champlain, chapter 1, foot-note.

LABYRINTHS. MAZES.

"The Labyrinths of the classical age and the quaint devices of later times, the Mazes, of which they were the prototypes, present to the archaeologist a subject of investigation which hitherto has not received that degree of attention of which it appears so well deserving. … Labyrinths may be divided into several distinct classes, comprising complicated ranges of caverns, architectural labyrinths or sepulchral buildings, tortuous devices indicated by coloured marbles or cut in turf, and topiary labyrinths or mazes formed by clipped hedges. … Of the first class we may instance the labyrinth near Nauplia in Argolis, termed that of the Cyclops, and described by Strabo; also the celebrated Cretan example, which from the observations of modern travellers is supposed to have consisted of a series of caves, resembling in some degree the catacombs of Rome or Paris. It has been questioned, however, whether such a labyrinth actually existed. … Of architectural labyrinths, the most extraordinary specimen was without doubt that at the southern end of the lake Mœris in Egypt, and about thirty miles from Arsinoe. Herodotus, who describes it very distinctly, says that … it consisted of twelve covered courts, 1,500 subterranean chambers, in which the bodies of the Egyptian princes and the sacred crocodiles were interred, and of as many chambers above ground, which last only he was permitted to enter."

E. Trollope, Notices of Ancient and Mediaeval Labyrinths (Archaeological Journal, volume 15).

ALSO IN: Herodotus, History, book 2, chapter 148.

LA CADIE, ACADIA.

See NOVA SCOTIA.

LACEDÆMON.

See SPARTA: THE CITY.

LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE, The.

See SPARTA: B. C. 404-403.

LACONIA.

See SPARTA: THE CITY.

LACONIA, the American Province.

See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1621-1631.

LACUSTRINE HABITATIONS.

See LAKE DWELLINGS.

LADE, Naval Battle of (B. C. 495).

See PERSIA: B. C. 521-493.

LADIES' PEACE, The.

See ITALY: A. D. 1527-1529.

LADISLAS, King of Naples, A. D. 1386-1414.

LADISLAUS I. (called Saint), King of Hungary, A. D. 1077-1095.

Ladislaus II., King of Hungary, 1162.

Ladislaus III., King of Hungary, 1204-1205.

Ladislaus IV. (called The Cuman), King of Hungary, 1272-1290.

Ladislaus V. (called The Posthumous), King, of Hungary and Bohemia, 1439-1457.

Ladislaus VI. (Jagellon), King of Hungary, 1440-1444; King of Poland, 1434-1444.

{1950}

LADOCEA, OR LADOKEIA, Battle of.

Fought in what was called the Cleomenic War, between Cleomenes, king of Sparta, and the Achæan League, B. C. 226. The battle was fought near the city of Megalopolis, in Arcadia, which belonged to the League and which was threatened by Cleomenes. The latter won a complete victory, and Lydiades, of Megalopolis, one of the noblest of the later Greeks, was slain.

C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 62.

LADY, Original use of the title.

"Hlæfdige," the Saxon word from which our modern English word "lady" comes, was the highest female title among the West-Saxons, being reserved for the king's wife.

E. A. Freeman, History of the Norman Conquest of England, volume 1, note F.

LADY OF THE ENGLISH.

By the custom of the West Saxons, the king's wife was called Lady, not Queen, and when the Wessex kingdom widened to cover England, its queen was known as the Lady of the English.

LÆNLAND.

"Either book land or folkland could be leased out by its holders [in early England]; and, under the name of 'lænland,' held by free cultivators."

W. Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, chapter 5, section 36 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: J. M. Kemble, The Saxons in England, book 1, chapter 11.

LÆTI. LÆT. LAZZI.

"Families of the conquered tribes of Germany, who were forcibly settled within the 'limes' of the Roman provinces, in order that they might repeople desolated districts, or replace the otherwise dwindling provincial population—in order that they might bear the public burdens and minister to the public needs, i. e., till the public land, pay the public tribute, and also provide for the defence of the empire. They formed a semi-servile class, partly agricultural and partly military; they furnished corn for the granaries and soldiers for the cohorts of the empire, and were generally known in later times by the name of Læti or Liti."

F. Seebohm, English Village Community, chapter 8.

"There seems to be no reason for questioning that the eorl, ceorl and læt of the earliest English laws, those of Ethelbert, answer exactly to the edhiling, the friling and the lazzus of the old Saxons. Whether the Kentish læts were of German origin has been questioned. Lappenberg thinks they were 'unfree of kindred race.' K. Maurer thinks them a relic of ancient British population who came between the free wealh and the slave. … The name (lazzus= slow or lazy) signifies condition, not nationality. … The wer-gild of the Kentish læt was 40, 60, or 80 shillings, according to rank, that of the ceorl being 200."

W. Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, chapter 4, section 31, foot-note (volume 1).

LA FAVORITA, Battle of (1797).

See FRANCE: A. D. 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL).

LAFAYETTE IN THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (JUNE), (JULY-NOVEMBER); 1780 (JULY); 1781 (JANUARY-MAY), and (MAY-OCTOBER).

LAFAYETTE: And the French Revolution.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1789 (JULY), to 1792 (AUGUST).

LA FÈRE, Siege and capture by Henry IV. of France (1596).

See FRANCE: A. D. 1593-1598.

LA FÈRE-CHAMPENOISE, Battle of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH).

LAGIDE PRINCES.

The Egyptian dynasty founded by Ptolemy Soter, the Macedonian general, is sometimes called the Lagide dynasty and its princes the Lagide princes, with reference to the reputed father of Ptolemy, who bore the name of Lagus.

LAGOS, Naval Battle of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1759 (AUGUST-NOVEMBER).

LAGTHING.

See CONSTITUTION OF NORWAY.

LA HOGUE, Naval Battle of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1692.

LAKE DWELLINGS.

"Among the most interesting relics of antiquity which have yet been discovered are the famous lake-dwellings of Switzerland, described by Dr. Keller and others. … Dr. Keller … has arranged them in three groups, according to the character of their substructure.

[1] Those of the first group, the Pile Dwellings, are, he tells us, by far the most numerous in the lakes of Switzerland and Upper Italy. In these the substructure consists of piles of various kinds of wood, sharpened sometimes by fire, sometimes by stone hatchets or celts, and in later times by tools of bronze, and probably of iron, the piles being driven into the bottom of the lake at various distances from the shore. …

[2] The Frame Pile-Dwellings are very rare. 'The distinction between this form and the regular pile-settlement consists in the fact that the piles, instead of having been driven into the mud of the lake, had been fixed by a mortise-and-tenon arrangement into split trunks, lying horizontally on the bed of the lake.' …

[3] In the Fascine Dwellings, as Dr. Keller terms his third group of lake-habitations, the substructure consisted of successive layers of sticks or small stems of trees built up from the bottom of the lake till they reached above the lake-level. …

Lake-dwellings have been met with in many other regions of Europe besides Switzerland and Italy, as in Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, France, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. The 'Crannoges' of Ireland and Scotland were rather artificial islands than dwellings like those described above."

J. Geikie, Prehistoric Europe, pages 369-372.

ALSO IN: F. Keller, Lake Dwellings.

R. Munro, Ancient Scottish Lake Dwellings.

E. P. S., Crannoges (in Archaeological Journal, volume 3).

LAKE GEORGE, Battle of.

See CANADA: A. D. 1755 (SEPTEMBER).

LAMARTINE, and the French Government of 1848.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1848 (FEBRUARY-MAY), and (APRIL-DECEMBER).

LAMAS. LAMAISM.

"The development of the Buddhist doctrine which has taken place in the Panjab, Nepal, and Tibet … has resulted at last in the complete establishment of Lamaism, a religion not only in many points different from, but actually antagonistic to, the primitive system of Buddhism; and this not only in its doctrine, but also in its church organization." Tibet is "the only country where the Order has become a hierarchy, and acquired temporal power. Here, as in so many other countries, civilization entered and history began with Buddhism. When the first missionaries went there is not, however, accurately known; but Nepal was becoming Buddhist in the 6th century, and the first Buddhist king of Tibet sent to India for the holy scriptures in 632 A. D. A century afterwards an adherent of the native devil-worship drove the monks away, destroyed the monasteries, and burnt the holy books; but the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church—it returned triumphant after his death, and rapidly gained in wealth and influence. … {1951} As the Order became wealthy, rival abbots had contended for supremacy, and the chiefs had first tried to use the church as a means of binding the people to themselves, and then, startled at its progress, had to fight against it for their own privilege and power. When, in the long run, the crozier proved stronger than the sword, the Dalai Lama became in 1419 sole temporal sovereign of Tibet."

T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, chapters 8-9.

"Up to the moment of its conversion to Buddhism, a profound darkness had rested on [Tibet]. The inhabitants were ignorant and uncultivated, and their indigenous religion, sometimes called Bon, consisted chiefly of magic based on a kind of Shamanism. … The word is said to be of Tungusic origin, and to be used as a name for the earliest religion of Mongolia, Siberia and other Northern countries. … It is easy to understand that the chief function of the Shamans, or wizard-priests, was to exorcise evil demons, or to propitiate them by sacrifices and various magical practices. … The various gradations of the Tibetan hierarchy are not easily described, and only a general idea of them can be given. … First and lowest in rank comes the novice or junior monk, called Gethsul (Getzul). … Secondly and higher in rank we have the rull monk, called Gelong (or Gelon). … Thirdly we have the superior Gelong or Khanpo (strictly mKhan po), who has a real right to the further title Lama. … As the chief monk in a monastery he may be compared to the European Abbot. … Some of the higher Khanpo Lamas are supposed to be living re-incarnations or re-embodiments of certain canonized saints and Bodhi-sattvas who differ in rank. These are called Avatara Lamas, and of such there are three degrees. … There is also a whole class of mendicant Lamas. … Examples of the highest Avataras are the two quasi-Popes, or spiritual Kings, who are supreme Lamas of the Yellow sect—the one residing at Lhassa, and the other at Tashi Lunpo (Krashi Lunpo), about 100 miles distant. … The Grand Lama at Lhassa is the Dalai Lama, that is, 'the Ocean-Lama, or one whose power and learning are as great as the ocean. … The other Grand Lama, who resides in the monastery of Tashi Lunpo, is known in Europe under the names of the Tashi Lama."

Sir M. Monier-Williams, Buddhism, lecture 11.

"Kublai-Khan, after subduing China [see CHINA: A. D. 1259-1294], adopted the Buddhist doctrines, which had made considerable progress among the Tartars. In the year 1261 he raised a Buddhist priest named Mati to the dignity of head of the Faith in the empire. This priest is better known under the name of Pakbo Lama, or supreme Lama: he was a native of Thibet, and had gained the good graces and confidence of Kublai, who, at the same time that he conferred on him the supreme sacerdotal office, invested him with the temporal power in Thibet, with the titles of 'King of the Great and Precious Law,' and 'Institutor of the Empire.' Such was the origin of the Grand Lamas of Thibet, and it is not impossible that the Tartar Emperor, who had had frequent communications with the Christian missionaries, may have wished to create a religious organisation after the model of the Romish hierarchy."

Abbé Huc, Christianity in China, Tartary and Thibet, volume 2, page 10.

ALSO IN: Abbé Huc, Journey through Tartary, Thibet and China, volume 2.

W. W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas.

LAMBALLE, Madame de, The death of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).

LAMBETH, Treaty of.

A treaty of September 11, A. D. 1217, which was, in a certain sense, the sequel of Magna Carta. The barons who extorted the Great Charter from King John in 1215 were driven subsequently to a renewal of war with him. They renounced their allegiance and offered the crown to a French prince, Louis, husband of Blanche of Castile, who was John's niece. The pretensions of Louis were maintained after John's death, against his young son, Henry III. The cause of the latter triumphed in a decisive battle fought at Lincoln, May 20, 1217, and the contest was ended by the treaty named above. "The treaty of Lambeth is, in practical importance, scarcely inferior to the Charter itself.

W. Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, chapter 14, section 170 (volume 2).

LAMEGO, The Cortes of.

See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1095-1325.

LAMIAN WAR, The.

See GREECE: B. C. 323-322.

LAMONE, Battle of (1425).

See ITALY: A. D. 1412-1447.

LAMPADARCHY, The.

See LITURGIES.

LANCASTER, Chancellorship of the Duchy of.

"The Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster is an office more remarkable for its antiquity than for its present usefulness. It dates from the time of Henry the Fourth, when the County of Lancashire was under a government distinct from the rest of the Kingdom. About the only duty now associated with the office is the appointment of magistrates for the county of Lancashire. In the other English and Welsh counties, these appointments are made by the Lord High Chancellor, who is the head of the Judicial system. The duties of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster are thus exceedingly light. The holder of the office is often spoken of as 'the maid of all work to the Cabinet,' from the fact that he is accorded a place in the Cabinet without being assigned any special duties likely to occupy the whole of his time. Usually the office is bestowed upon some statesman whom it is desirable for special reasons to have in the Cabinet, but for whom no other office of equal rank or importance is available."

E. Porritt, The Englishman at Home, chapter 8.

LANCASTER, House of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1399-1471.

LANCASTRIANS.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

LANCES, Free.

With Sir John Hawkwood and his "free company" of English mercenaries, "came first into Italy [about 1360] the use of the term 'lances,' as applied to hired troops; each 'lance' being understood to consist of three men; of whom one carried a lance, and the others were bowmen. … They mostly fought on foot, having between each two archers a lance, which was held as men hold their hunting-spears in a boar-hunt."

T. A. Trollope, History of the Commonwealth of Florence, volume 2, page 144.

LAND GRANTS FOR SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES.

See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1800; 1862; and 1862-1886.

{1952}

LAND LEAGUE, The.

See IRELAND: A. D. 1873-1879; and 1881-1882.

LAND QUESTION AND LAND LAWS, The Irish.

See IRELAND: A. D. 1870-1894.

LANDAMMANN.

See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1803-1848.

—————LANDAU: Start————

LANDAU: A. D. 1648. Cession to France.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

LANDAU: A. D. 1702-1703. Taken by the Imperialists and retaken by the French.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1702; and 1703.

LANDAU: A. D. 1704. Taken by the Allies.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1704.

LANDAU: A. D. 1713. Taken and retained by France.

See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

—————LANDAU: End————

LANDEN, OR NEERWINDEN, Battle of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1693 (JULY).

LANDFRIEDE. FEHDERECHT. THE SWABIAN LEAGUE. "Landfriede—Peace of the Land.

The expression, Public Peace, which, in deference to numerous and high authorities I have generally used in the text, is liable to important objections. 'A breach of the public peace' means, in England, any open disorder or outrage. But [in mediæval Germany] the Landfriede (Pax publica) was a special act or provision directed against the abuse of an ancient and established institution,—the Fehderecht (jus diffidationis, or right of private warfare). The attempts to restrain this abuse were, for a long time, local and temporary. … The first energetic measure of the general government to put down private wars was that of the diet of Nürnberg (1466). … The Fehde is a middle term between duel and war. Every affront or injury led, after certain formalities, to the declaration, addressed to the offending party, that the aggrieved party would be his foe, and that of his helpers and helpers'-helpers. … I shall not go into an elaborate description of the evils attendant on the right of diffidation or private warfare (Fehderecht); they were probably not so great as is commonly imagined."

L. Ranke, History of the Reformation in Germany, volume 1, pages 77 (foot-note), 71, and 81.

"The right of diffidation, or of private warfare, had been the immemorial privilege of the Germanic nobles—a privilege as clear as it was ancient, which no diet attempted to abolish, but which, from the mischiefs attending its exercise, almost everyone had endeavoured to restrain. … Not only state, could declare war against state, prince against prince, noble against noble, but any noble could legally defy the emperor himself." In the reign of Frederick III. (1440-1493) efforts were made to institute a tribunal—an imperial chamber—which should have powers that would operate to restrain these private wars; but the emperor and the college of princes could not agree as to the constitution of the court proposed. To attain somewhat the same end, the emperor then "established a league both of the princes and of the imperial cities, which was destined to be better observed than most preceding confederations. Its object was to punish all who, during ten years, should, by the right of diffidation, violate the public tranquillity. He commenced with Swabia, which had ever been regarded as the imperial domain; and which, having no elector, no governing duke, no actual head other than the emperor himself, and, consequently, no other acknowledged protector, was sufficiently disposed to his views. In its origin the Swabian league consisted only of six cities, four prelates, three counts, sixteen knights; but by promises, or reasoning, or threats, Frederic soon augmented it. The number of towns was raised to 22, of prelates to 13, of counts to 12, of knights or inferior nobles to 350. It derived additional strength from the adhesion of princes and cities beyond the confines of Swabia; and additional splendour from the names of two electors, three margraves, and other reigning princes. It maintained constantly on foot 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry,—a force generally sufficient for the preservation of tranquillity. Of its salutary effects some notion may be formed from the fact that, in a very short period, one-and-forty bandit dens were stormed, and that two powerful offenders, George duke of Bavaria, and duke Albert of Munich, were compelled by an armed force to make satisfaction for their infraction of the public peace."

S. A. Dunham, History of the Germanic Empire, volume 2, pages 281-283.

The final suppression of the Fehderecht was brought about in the succeeding reign, of Maximilian, by the institution of the Imperial Chamber and the organization of the Circles to enforce its decrees.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1493-1519.

LANDO, Pope, A. D. 913-914.

—————LANDRECIES: Start————

LANDRECIES: A. D. 1647. Spanish siege and capture.

See NETHERLANDS (SPANISH PROVINCES): A. D. 1647-1648.

LANDRECIES: A. D. 1655. Siege and capture by Turenne.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1653-1656.

LANDRECIES: A. D. 1659. Ceded to France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1659-1661.

LANDRECIES: A. D. 1794. Siege and capture by the Allies. Recovery by the French.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).

—————LANDRECIES: End————

LANDRIANO, Battle of (1529).

See ITALY: A. D. 1527-1529.

LANDSHUT, Battle of (1760).

See GERMANY: A. D. 1760.

LANDSHUT, Battle of (1809.)

See GERMANY: A. D. 1809, (JANUARY-JUNE).

LANDSQUENETS.

"After the accession of Maximilian I. [Emperor, A. D. 1493-1519], the troops so celebrated in history under the name of 'Landsquenets' began to be known in Europe. They were native Germans, and soon rose to a high degree of military estimation. That Emperor, who had studied the art of war, and who conducted it on principles of Tactics, armed them with long lances; divided them into regiments, composed of ensigns and squads; compelled them to submit to a rigorous discipline, and retained them under their standards after the conclusion of the wars in which he was engaged. … Pikes were substituted in the place of their long lances, under Charles V."

Sir N. W. Wraxall, History of France, 1574-1610, volume 2, page 183.

LANDSTING.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (DENMARK-ICELAND): A. D. 1849-1874; and CONSTITUTION OF SWEDEN.

LANDWEHR, The.

See FYRD.

LANGENSALZA, Battle at (1075).

See SAXONY: A. D. 1073-1075.

LANGENSALZA, Battle at (1866.)

See GERMANY: A. D. 1866.

LANGOBARDI, The.

See LOMBARDS.

LANGPORT, Battle of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1645 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

{1953}

LANG'S NEK, Battle of (1881).

See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1806-1881.

LANGSIDE, Battle of (1568).

See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1561-1568.

LANGUE D'OC.

"It is well known that French is in the main a descendant from the Latin, not the Latin of Rome, but the corrupter Latin which was spoken in Gaul. Now these Latin-speaking Gauls did not, for some reason, say 'est,' 'it is,' for 'yes,' as the Romans did; but they used a pronoun, either 'ille,' 'he,' or 'hoc,' 'this.' When, therefore, a Gaul desired to say 'yes,' he nodded, and said 'he' or else 'this,' meaning 'He is so,' or 'This is so.' As it happens the Gauls of the north said 'ille,' and those of the south said 'hoc,' and these words gradually got corrupted into two meaningless words, 'oui' and 'oc.' It is well known that the people in the south of France were especially distinguished by using the word 'oc' instead of 'oui' for 'yes,' so that their 'dialect' got to be called the 'langue d'oc,' and this word Langue-doc gave the name to a province of France."

C. F. Keary, Dawn of History, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: F. Hueffer, The Troubadours, chapter 1.

Sir G. C. Lewis, The Romance Languages, page 52, and after.

LANGUEDOC.

When, as a consequence of the Albigensian wars, the dominions of the Counts of Toulouse were broken up and absorbed for the most part in the domain of the French crown, the country which had been chiefly ravaged in those wars, including Septimania and much of the old county of Toulouse, acquired the name by which its language was known—Languedoc. The 'langue d'oc' was spoken likewise in Provence and in Aquitaine; but it gave a definite geographical name only to the region between the Rhone and the Garonne.

See ALBIGENSES: A. D. 1217-1229; also, PROVENCE: A. D. 1179-1207.

LANNES, Marshal, Campaigns of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY-FEBRUARY); GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER); SPAIN: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER), 1808-1809 (DECEMBER-MARCH), 1809 (FEBRUARY-JULY); and GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JANUARY-JUNE).

LANSDOWNE, Lord, The Indian administration of.

See INDIA: A. D. 1880-1893.

—————LAON: Start————

LAON: The last capital of the Carolingian kings.

The rock-lifted castle and stronghold of Laon, situated in the modern department of Aisne, about 74 miles northeast from Paris, was the last refuge and capital—sometimes the sole dominion—of the Carolingian kings, in their final struggle with the new dynasty sprung from the Dukes of France. The "King of Laon" and the "King of St. Denis," as the contestants are sometimes called, disputed with one another for a monarchy which was small when the sovereignty of the two had been united in one. In 991 the "King of Laon" was betrayed to his rival, Hugh Capet, and died in prison. "Laon ceased to be a capital, and became a quiet country town; the castle, relic of those days, stood till 1832, when it was rased to the ground."

G. W. Kitchin, History of France, volume 1, book 3, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: Sir F. Palgrave, History of Normandy and England, book 1, part 2, chapter 4, parts 1-2 (volume 2).

See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 877-987.

LAON: A. D. 1594. Siege and capture by Henry IV.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1593-1598.

LAON, Battle of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH).

—————LAON: End————

LAPITHÆ, The.

A race which occupied in early times the valley of the Peneus, in Thessaly; "a race which derived its origin from Almopia in Macedonia, and was at least very nearly connected with the Minyans and Æolians of Ephyra."

C. O. Müller, History and Antiquity of the Doric Race, book 1, chapter 1.

LA PLATA, Provinces of.

See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

LA PUERTA, Battle of (1814).

See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1810-1821.

LARGS, Battle of.

See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1263.

LARISSA.

There were several ancient cities in Greece and Asia Minor called Larissa.

See ARGOS, and PERRHÆBIANS.

LAROCHEJACQUELIN, Henri de, and the insurrection in La Vendée.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (MARCH-APRIL); (JUNE); and (JULY-DECEMBER).

LA ROCHELLE.

See ROCHELLE.

LA ROTHIERÈ, Battle of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH).

LA SALLE'S EXPLORATIONS.

See CANADA: A. D. 1669-1687.

LAS CASAS, The humane labors of.

See SLAVERY: MODERN: OF THE INDIANS.

LAS CRUCES, Battle of.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1810-1819.

LASSI, LAZZI, The.

See LÆTI.

LASWARI, Battle of (1803).

See INDIA: A. D. 1798-1805.

LATERAN, The.

"The Lateran derives its name from a rich patrician family, whose estates were confiscated by Nero. … It afterwards became an imperial residence, and a portion of it … was given by Constantine to Pope Melchiades in 312,—a donation which was confirmed to St. Sylvester, in whose reign the first basilica was built here. … The ancient Palace of the Lateran was the residence of the popes for nearly 1,000 years. … The modern Palace of the Lateran was built from designs of Fontana by Sixtus V. In 1693 Innocent XII. turned it into a hospital,—in 1438 Gregory XVI. appropriated it as a museum."

A. J. C. Hare, Walks in Rome, chapter 13.

LATHES OF KENT.

"The county of Kent [England] is divided into six 'lathes,' of nearly equal size, having the jurisdiction of the hundreds in other shires. The lathe may be derived from the Jutish 'lething' (in modern Danish 'leding')—a military levy."

T. P. Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History, chapter 1, foot-note.

LATHOM HOUSE, Siege of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1644 (JANUARY).

LATIFUNDIA.

The great slave-tilled estates of the Romans, which swallowed up the properties of the small land-holders of earlier times, were called Latifundia.

LATIN CHURCH, The.

The Roman Catholic Church (see PAPACY) is often referred to as the Latin Church, in distinction from the Greek or Orthodox Church of the East.

LATIN EMPIRE AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

See ROMANIA, THE EMPIRE OF.

LATIN LANGUAGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

See EDUCATION, MEDIÆVAL.

{1954}

"LATIN NAME," The.

"We must … explain what was meant in the sixth century of Rome [third century B. C.] by the 'Latin name.' … The Latin name was now extended far beyond its old geographical limits, and was represented by a multitude of flourishing cities scattered over the whole of Italy, from the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul to the southern extremity of Apulia. … Not that they were Latins in their origin, or connected with the cities of the old Latium: on the contrary they were by extraction Romans; they were colonies founded by the Roman people, and consisting of Roman Citizens: but the Roman government had resolved that, in their political relations, they should be considered, not as Romans, but as Latins; and the Roman settlers, in consideration of the advantages which they enjoyed as colonists, were content to descend politically to a lower condition than that which they had received as their birthright. The states of the Latin name, whether cities of old Latium or Roman colonies, all enjoyed their own laws and municipal government, like the other allies; and all were, like the other allies, subject to the sovereign dominion of the Romans. They were also so much regarded as foreigners that they could not buy or inherit land from Roman citizens; nor had they generally the right of intermarriage with Romans. But they had two peculiar privileges: one, that any Latin who left behind him a son in his own city, to perpetuate his family there, might remove to Rome, and acquire the Roman franchise; the other, that every person who had held any magistracy or distinguished office in a Latin state, might become at once a Roman citizen."

T. Arnold, History of Rome, chapter 41.

LATINS, Subjugation of, by the Romans.

See ROME: B. C. 339-338.

LATIUM. THE OLD LATINS.

"The plain of Latium must have been in primeval times the scene of the grandest conflicts of nature, while the slowly formative agency of water deposited, and the eruptions of mighty volcanoes upheaved, the successive strata of that soil on which was to be decided the question to what people the sovereignty of the world should belong. Latium is bounded on the east by the mountains of the Sabines and Aequi, which form part of the Apennines; and on the south by the Volscian range rising to the height of 4,000 feet, which is separated from the main chain of the Apennines by the ancient territory of the Hernici, the table-land of the Sacco (Trerus, a tributary of the Liris), and stretching in a westerly direction terminates in the promontory of Terracina. On the west its boundary is the sea, which on this part of the coast forms but few and indifferent harbours. On the north it imperceptibly merges into the broad highlands of Etruria. The region thus enclosed forms a magnificent plain traversed by the Tiber, the 'mountain-stream' which issues from the Umbrian, and by the Anio, which rises in the Sabine mountains. Hills here and there emerge, like islands, from the plain; some of them steep limestone cliffs, such as that of Soracte in the north-east, and that of the Circeian promontory on the south-west, as well as the similar though lower height of the Janiculum near Rome; others volcanic elevations, whose extinct craters had become converted into lakes which in some cases still exist; the most important of these is the Alban range, which, free on every side, stands forth from the plain between the Volscian chain and the river Tiber. Here settled the stock which is known to history under the name of the Latins, or, as they were subsequently called by way of distinction from the Latin communities beyond the bounds of Latium, the 'Old Latins' ('prisci Latini'). But the territory occupied by them, the district of Latium, was only a small portion of the central plain of Italy. All the country north of the Tiber was to the Latins a foreign and even hostile domain, with whose inhabitants no lasting alliance, no public peace, was possible, and such armistices as were concluded appear always to have been for a limited period. The Tiber formed the northern boundary from early times. … We find, at the time when our history begins, the flat and marshy tracts to the south of the Alban range in the hands of Umbro-Sabellian stocks, the Rutuli and Volsci; Ardea and Velitrae are no longer in the number of originally Latin towns. Only the central portion of that region between the Tiber, the spurs of the Apennines, the Alban Mount, and the sea—a district of about 700 square miles, not much larger than the present canton of Zurich—was Latium proper, the 'plain,' as it appears to the eye of the observer from the heights of Monte Cavo. Though the country is a plain, it is not monotonously flat. With the exception of the sea-beach which is sandy and formed in part by the accumulations of the Tiber, the level is everywhere broken by hills of tufa moderate in height, though often somewhat steep, and by deep fissures of the ground. These alternating elevations and depressions of the surface lead to the formation of lakes in winter; and the exhalations proceeding in the heat of summer from the putrescent organic substances which they contain engender that noxious fever-laden atmosphere, which in ancient times tainted the district as it taints it at the present day."

T. Mommsen, History of Rome, book 1, chapter 3.

See, also, ITALY, ANCIENT.

LATT, OR LIDUS, The.

See SLAVERY: MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.

LATTER DAY SAINTS, Church of.

See MORMONISM: A. D. 1805-1830.

LAUD, Archbishop, Church tyranny of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1633-1640.

LAUDER BRIDGE.

See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1482-1488.

LAUDERDALE, Duke of. His oppression in Scotland.

See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1669-1679.

LAUFFENBURG, Captured by Duke Bernhard (1637).

See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

LAURAS.

"The institution of Lauras was the connecting link between the hermitage and the monastery, in the later and more ordinary use of that word. … A Laura was an aggregation of separate cells, under the not very strongly defined control of a superior, the inmates meeting together only on the first and last days, the old and new Sabbaths, of each week, for their common meal in the refectory and for common worship. … The origin of the word 'Laura' is uncertain. … Probably it is another form of 'labra,' the popular term in Alexandria for an alley or narrow court."

I. G. Smith, Christian Monasticism, pages 38-39.

{1955}

LAUREATE, English Poets.

"From the appointment of Chaucer about five hundred years have elapsed, and during that period a long line of poets have held the title of Laureate. For the first two hundred years they were somewhat irregularly appointed, but from the creation of Richard Edwards in 1561, they come down to the present time without interruption. The selection of the Laureate has not always been a wise one, but the list contains the names of a few of our greatest authors, and the honour was certainly worthily bestowed upon Edmund Spenser, Ben Jonson, John Dryden, Robert Southey, William Wordsworth, and Alfred Tennyson. As the custom of crowning successful poets appears to have been in use since the origin of poetry itself, the office of Poet Laureate can certainly boast of considerable antiquity, and the laurel wreath of the Greeks and Romans was an envied trophy long before our Druidical forefathers held aloft the mistletoe bough in their mystic rites. From what foreign nation we first borrowed the idea of a King of the Poets is doubtful."

W. Hamilton, Origin of the Office of Poet Laureate (Royal Historical Society, Transactions, volume 8).

The following is a list of the Poets Laureate of England, with the dates of their appointment:

Geoffrey Chaucer, 1368; Sir John Gower, 1400; Henry Scogan; John Kay; Andrew Bernard, 1486; John Skelton, 1489; Robert Whittington, 1512; Richard Edwards, 1561; Edmund Spenser, 1590; Samuel Daniel, 1598; Ben Jonson, 1616; Sir William Davenant, 1638; John Dryden, 1670; Thomas Shadwell, 1688; Nahum Tate, 1692; Nicholas Rowe, 1715; Rev. Laurence Eusden, 1718; Colley Cibber, 1730; William Whitehead, 1757; Thomas Warton, 1785; Henry James Pye, 1790; Robert Southey, 1813; William Wordsworth, 1843; Alfred Tennyson, 1850.

W. Hamilton, The Poets Laureate of England.

LAURIUM, Silver Mines of.

These mines, in Attica, were owned and worked at an early time by the Athenian state, and seem to have yielded a large revenue, more or less of which was divided among the citizens. It was by persuading the Athenians to forego that division that Themistocles secured money to build the fleet which made Athens a great naval power. The mines were situated in the southern part of Attica, in a district of low hills, not far from the promontory of Sunium.

G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 39.

LAUSITZ.

See BRANDENBURG.

LAUTULÆ, Battle of.

See ROME: B. C. 343-290.

LAW, John, and his Mississippi Scheme.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1717-1720; and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1717-1718.

—————LAW: Start—————

LAW. [Prepared for this work by Austin Abbott, Dean of the New York University Law School.]

The subject is here treated with reference to the history of the rights of persons and property, and that of procedure, rather than in its political and economic aspects, which are discussed under other heads. And those parts of the history of law thus considered which enter into our present systems are given the preference in space,—purely historical matters, such as the Roman Law, being treated elsewhere, as indicated in the references placed at the end of this article:

—————ADMIRALTY LAW: Start—————

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1183. Law as to Shipwrecks.

"The Emperor Constantine, or Antonine (for there is some doubt as to which it was), had the honour of being the first to renounce the claim to shipwrecked property in favor of the rightful owner. But the inhuman customs on this subject were too deeply rooted to be eradicated by the wisdom and vigilance of the Roman law givers. The legislation in favor of the unfortunate was disregarded by succeeding emperors, and when the empire itself was overturned by the northern barbarians, the laws of humanity were swept away in the tempest, and the continual depredations of the Saxons and Normans induced the inhabitants of the western coasts of Europe to treat all navigators who were thrown by the perils of the sea upon their shores as pirates, and to punish them as such, without inquiry or discrimination. The Emperor Andronicus Comnenus, who reigned at Constantinople in 1183, made great efforts to repress this inhuman practice. His edict was worthy of the highest praise, but it ceased to be put in execution after his death. … Valin says, it was reserved to the ordinances of Lewis XIV. to put the finishing stroke towards the extinction of this species of piracy, by declaring that shipwrecked persons and property were placed under the special protection and safe guard of the crown, and the punishment of death without hope of pardon, was pronounced against the guilty."

James Kent, International Law, edited by J. T. Abdy, page 31.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1537. Jurisdiction.

The Act of 28 Henry VIII., c. 15, granted jurisdiction to the Lord High Admiral of England.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1575. Jurisdiction.

"The Request of the Judge of the Admiralty, to the Lord Chief Justice of her Majesty's Bench, and his Colleagues, and the Judges' Agreement 7th May 1575,"—by which the long controversy between these Courts as to their relative jurisdiction was terminated, will be found in full in

Benedict's American Admiralty, 3d edition, page 41.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1664. Tide-mark.

The space between high and low water mark is to be taken as part of the sea, when the tide is in.

Erastus C. Benedict, American Admiralty, 3d edition, by Robert D. Benedict, page 35, citing Sir John Constable's Case, Anderson's Rep. 89.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1789. United States Judiciary Act.

The Act of 1789 declared admiralty jurisdiction to extend to all cases "where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen."

Judiciary Act, United States Stat. at Large, volume 1, page 76.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1798. Lord Stowell and Admiralty Law.

"Lord Mansfield, at a very early period of his judicial life, introduced to the notice of the English bar the Rhodian laws, the Consolato del mare, the laws of Oleron, the treatises of Roccus, the laws of Wisbuy, and, above all, the marine ordinances of Louis XIV., and the commentary of Valin. These authorities were cited by him in Luke v. Lyde [2 Burr. 882], and from that time a new direction was given to English studies, and new vigor, and more liberal and enlarged views, communicated to forensic investigations. {1956} Since the year 1798, the decisions of Sir William Scott (now Lord Stowell) on the admiralty side of Westminster Hall, have been read and admired in every region of the republic of letters, as models of the most cultivated and the most enlightened human reason. … The doctrines are there reasoned out at large, and practically applied. The arguments at the bar, and the opinions from the bench, are intermingled with the greatest reflections, … the soundest policy, and a thorough acquaintance with all the various topics which concern the great social interests of mankind."

James Kent, Commentaries, part 5, lecture 42.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1841-1842. Jurisdiction.

The act 3 and 4 Vic., c. 65, restored to the English Admiralty some jurisdiction of which it had been deprived by the Common Law Courts.

Benedict's Am. Admiralty, page 56.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1845. Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction.

"It took the Supreme Court of the United States more than fifty years to reject the antiquated doctrine of the English courts, that admiralty jurisdiction was confined to salt water, or water where the tide ebbed and flowed. Congress in 1845 passed an act extending the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts to certain cases upon the great lakes, and the navigable waters connecting the same. The constitutionality of this act was seriously questioned, and it was not till 1851 that the Supreme Court, by a divided court, in the case of the Genesee Chief, which collided with another vessel on Lake Ontario, sustained the constitutionality of the act, and repudiated the absurd doctrine that tides had anything to do with the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the constitution upon Federal courts."

Lyman Trumbull, Precedent versus Justice, American Law Review, volume 27, page 324.

See, also Act of 1845, 5 U. S. Stat. at L. 726.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1873. Division of Loss in case of Collision settled by Judicature Act.

"The rule that where both ships are at fault for a collision each shall recover half his loss from the other, contradicts the old rule of the common law that a plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence can recover nothing. This conflict between the common law and the law of the Admiralty was put an end to in 1873 by the Judicature Act of that year, which (s. 25, subs. 9) provides that 'if both ships shall be found to have been in fault' the Admiralty rule shall prevail. … There can be no doubt that in some instances it works positive injustice; as where it prevents the innocent cargo-owner from recovering more than half his loss from one of the two wrong-doing shipowners. And recent cases show that it works in an arbitrary and uncertain manner when combined with the enactments limiting the shipowner's liability for damage done by his ship. The fact, however, remains, that it has been in operation with the approval of the shipping community for at least two centuries, and probably for a much longer period; and an attempt to abolish it at the time of the passing of the Judicature Acts met with no success. The true reason of its very general acceptance is probably this—that it gives effect to the principle of distributing losses at sea, which is widely prevalent in maritime affairs. Insurance, limitation of shipowner's liability, and general average contribution are all connected, more or less directly, with this principle."

R. G. Marsden, Two Points of Admiralty Law, Law Quarterly Review, volume 2, pages 357-362.

For an enumeration of the various Maritime codes with their dates,

See Benedict's Am. Admiralty, pages 91-97, and Davis' Outlines of International Law, pages 5, 6, &c.

—————ADMIRALTY LAW: End—————

—————COMMON LAW: Start—————

Common Law. [Including legislation in modification of It.]

COMMON LAW: A. D. 449-1066. Trial by Jury unknown to Anglo-Saxons.

"It may be confidently asserted that trial by jury was unknown to our Anglo-Saxon ancestors; and the idea of its existence in their legal system has arisen from a want of attention to the radical distinction between the members or judges composing a court, and a body of men apart from that court, but summoned to attend it in order to determine conclusively the facts of the case in dispute. This is the principle on which is founded the intervention of a jury; and no trace whatever can be found of such an institution in Anglo-Saxon times."

W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, page 45.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 630. The first Written Body of English Law.

"The first written body of English Law is said to have been promulgated in the Heptarchy by Ethelbert, about the year 630, and enacted with the consent of the states of his kingdom."

Joseph Parke, History of Chancery, page 14.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 871-1066. The King's Peace.

1. The technical use of "the king's peace" is, I suspect, connected with the very ancient rule that a breach of the peace in a house must be atoned for in proportion to the householder's rank. If it was in the king's dwelling, the offender's life was in the king's hand. This peculiar sanctity of the king's house was gradually extended to all persons who were about his business, or specially under his protection; but when the Crown undertook to keep the peace everywhere, the king's peace became coincident with the general peace of the kingdom, and his especial protection was deemed to be extended to all peaceable subjects. In substance, the term marks the establishment of the conception of public justice, exercised on behalf of the whole commonwealth, as something apart from and above the right of private vengeance,—a right which the party offended might pursue or not, or accept composition for, as he thought fit. The private blood feud, it is true, formally and finally disappeared from English jurisprudence only in the present century; but in its legalized historical shape of the wager of battle it was not a native English institution.

Sir Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, page 205.

See, also, KING'S PEACE.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066. Inquisition, parent of Modern Jury.

"When the Normans came into England they brought with them, not only a far more vigorous and searching kingly power than had been known there, but also a certain product of the exercise of this power by the Frankish kings and the Norman dukes; namely, the use of the inquisition in public administration, i. e., the practice of ascertaining facts by summoning together by public authority a number of people most likely, as being neighbors, to know and tell the truth, and calling for their answer under oath. This was the parent of the modern jury. … {1957} With the Normans came also another novelty, the judicial duel—one of the chief methods for determining controversies in the royal courts; and it was largely the cost, danger, and unpopularity of the last of these institutions which fed the wonderful growth of the other."

J. B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial (Harvard Law Review, volume 5, page 45).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066-1154. Trial by Jury unknown to Anglo-Normans.

"The same remark which has already been made, with reference to the absence of all mention of the form of jury trial in the Anglo-Saxon Laws, applies equally to the first hundred years after the Conquest. It is incredible that so important a feature of our jurisprudence, if it had been known, would not have been alluded to in the various compilations of law which were made in the reigns of the early Norman kings. … Although the form of the jury did not then exist, the rudiments of that mode of trial may be distinctly traced, in the selection from the neighborhood where the dispute arose, of a certain number of persons, who after being duly sworn testified to the truth of the facts within their own knowledge. This is what distinguishes the proceeding from what took place among the Anglo-Saxons—namely, the choosing a limited number of probi homines to represent the community, and give testimony for them."

W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, pages 82-90.

See, also, JURY: TRIAL BY.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066-1154. The Curia Regis.

"As a legal tribunal the jurisdiction of the Curia was both civil and criminal, original and appellate. As a primary court it heard all causes in which the king's interests were concerned, as well as all causes between the tenants-in-chief of the crown, who were too great to submit to the local tribunals of the shire and the hundred. As an appellate court it was resorted to in those cases in which the powers of the local courts had been exhausted or had failed to do justice. By virtue of special writs, and as a special favor, the king could at his pleasure call up causes from the local courts to be heard in his own court according to such new methods as his advisers might invent. Through the issuance of these special writs the king became practically the fountain of justice, and through their agency the new system of royal law, which finds its source in the person of the king, was brought in to remedy the defects of the old, unelastic system of customary law which prevailed in the provincial courts of the people. The curia followed the person of the king, or the justiciar in the king's absence."

Hannis Taylor, Origin and Growth of the English Constitution, part 1, pages 245-246.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066-1215. Purchasing Writs.

"The course of application to the curia regis was of this nature. The party suing paid, or undertook to pay, to the king a fine to have justitiam et rectam in his court: and thereupon he obtained a writ or precept, by means of which he commenced his suit; and the justices were authorized to hear and determine his claim."

Reeves' (Finlason's) History English Law, volume 1, page 267.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1077. Trial by Battle.

"The earliest reference to the battle, I believe, in any account of a trial in England, is at the end of the case of Bishop Wulfstan v. Abbot Walter, in 1077. The controversy was settled, and we read: 'Thereof there are lawful witnesses … who said and heard this, ready to prove it by oath and battle.' This is an allusion to a common practice in the Middle Ages, that of challenging an adversary's witness, or perhaps to one method of disposing of cases where witnesses were allowed on opposite sides and contradicted each other. … Thus, as among nations still, so then in the popular courts and between contending private parties, the battle was often the ultima ratio, in cases where their rude and unrational methods of trial yielded no results. It was mainly in order to displace this dangerous … mode of proof that the recognitions—that is to say, the first organized form of the jury—were introduced. These were regarded as a special boon to the poor man, who was oppressed in many ways by the duel. It was by enactment of Henry II. that this reform was brought about, first in his Norman dominions (in 1150-52), before reaching the English throne, and afterwards in England, sometime after he became king, in 1154."

J. B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial (Harvard Law Review, volume 5, pages 66-67).

See, also: WAGER OF BATTLE.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1100 (circa). Origin of Statutes of Limitation.

"Our ancestors, instead of fixing a given number of years as the period within which legal proceedings to recover real property must be resorted to, had recourse to the singular expedient of making the period of limitation run from particular events or dates. From the time of Henry I. to that of Henry III., on a writ of right, the time within which a descent must be shown was the time of King Henry I. (Co. Litt. 114b). In the twentieth year of Henry III., by the Statute of Merton (c. 8) the date was altered to the time of Henry II. Writs of 'mort d'ancestor' were limited to the time of the last return of King John into England; writs of novel disseisin to the time of the king's first crossing the sea into Gascony. In the previous reign, according to Glanville (lib. 13, c. 33), the disseisin must have been since the last voyage of King Henry II. into Normandy. So that the time necessary to bar a claim varied materially at different epochs. Thus matters remained until the 3 Edw. I. (Stat. West. 1, c. 39), when, as all lawyers are aware, the time within which a writ of right might be brought was limited to cases in which the seisin of the ancestor was since the time of King Richard I., which was construed to mean the beginning of that king's reign (2 Inst. 238), a period of not less than eighty-six years. The legislature having thus adopted the reign of Richard I. as the date from which the limitation in a real action was to run, the courts of law adopted it as the period to which, in all matters of prescription or custom, legal memory, which till then had been confined to the time to which living memory could go back, should thenceforth be required to extend. Thus the law remained for two centuries and a half, by which time the limitation imposed in respect of actions to recover real property having long become inoperative to bar claims which had their origin posterior to the time of Richard I., and having therefore ceased practically to afford any protection against antiquated claims, the legislature, in 32d of Henry VIII. (c. 2), again interfered, and on this occasion, instead of dating the period of limitation from some particular event or date, took the wiser course of prescribing a fixed number of years as the limit within which a suit should be entertained. … {1958} It was of course impossible that as time went on the adoption of a fixed epoch, as the time from which legal memory was to run, should not be attended by grievous inconvenience and hardship. Possession, however long, enjoyment, however interrupted, afforded no protection against stale and obsolete claims, or the assertion of long abandoned rights. And as parliament failed to intervene to amend the law, the judges set their ingenuity to work, by fictions and presumptions, to atone for the supineness of the legislature. … They first laid down the somewhat startling rule that from the usage of a lifetime the presumption arose that a similar usage had existed from a remote antiquity. Next, as it could not but happen that, in the case of many private rights, especially in that of easements, which had a more recent origin, such a presumption was impossible, judicial astuteness to support possession and enjoyment, which the law ought to have invested with the character of rights, had recourse to the questionable theory of lost grants. Juries were first told that from user, during living memory, or even during twenty years, they might presume a lost grant or deed; next they were recommended to make such presumption; and lastly, as the final consummation of judicial legislation, it was held that a jury should be told, not only that they might, but also that they were bound to presume the existence of such a lost grant, although neither judge nor jury, nor anyone else, had the shadow of a belief that any such instrument had ever really existed. … When the doctrine of presumptions had proceeded far towards its development, the legislature at length interfered, and in respect of real property and of certain specified easements, fixed certain periods of possession or enjoyment as establishing presumptive rights."

C. J. Cockburn, in Bryant v. Foot, L. R. 2 Q. B., 161; s. c. (Thayer's Cases on Evidence, 94).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1110 (circa). The King's Peace superior to the Peace of the Subject.

"We find in the so-called laws of Henry I, that wherever men meet for drinking, selling, or like occasions, the peace of God and of the lord of the house is to be declared between them. The amount payable to the host is only one shilling, the king taking twelve, and the injured party, in case of insult, six. Thus the king is already concerned, and more concerned than anyone else; but the private right of the householder is distinctly though not largely acknowledged. We have the same feeling well marked in our modern law by the adage that every man's house is his castle, and the rule that forcible entry may not be made for the execution of ordinary civil process against the occupier: though for contempt of Court arising in a civil cause, it may, as not long ago the Sheriff of Kent had to learn in a sufficiently curious form. The theoretical stringency of our law of trespass goes back, probably, to the same origin. And in a quite recent American textbook we read, on the authority of several modern cases in various States of the Union, that 'a man assaulted in his dwelling is not obliged to retreat, but may defend his possession to the last extremity.'"

F. Pollock, The King's Peace (Law Quarterly Review, volume 1, pages 40-41).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1135. Abeyance of the King's Peace.

"The King's Peace is proclaimed in general terms at his accession. But, though generalized in its application, it still was subject to a strange and inconvenient limit in time. The fiction that the king is everywhere present, though not formulated, was tacitly adopted; the protection once confined to his household was extended to the whole kingdom. The fiction that the king never dies was yet to come. It was not the peace of the Crown, an authority having continuous and perpetual succession, that was proclaimed, but the peace of William or Henry. When William or Henry died, all authorities derived from him were determined or suspended; and among other consequences, his peace died with him. What this abeyance of the King's Peace practically meant is best told in the words of the Chronicle, which says upon the death of Henry I. (anno 1135): 'Then there was tribulation soon in the land, for every man that could forthwith robbed another.' Order was taken in this matter (as our English fashion is) only when the inconvenience became flagrant in a particular case. At the time of Henry III.'s death his son Edward was in Palestine. It was intolerable that there should be no way of enforcing the King's Peace till the king had come back to be crowned; and the great men of the realm, by a wise audacity, took upon them to issue a proclamation of the peace in the new king's name forthwith. This good precedent being once made, the doctrine of the King's Peace being in suspense was never afterwards heard of."

F. Pollock, The King's Peace (Law Quarterly Review, volume 1, pages 48-49).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1154-1189. Origin of Unanimity of Jury.

"The origin of the rule as to unanimity may, I think, be explained as follows: In the assise as instituted in the reign of Henry II. it was necessary that twelve jurors should agree in order to determine the question of disseisin; but this unanimity was not then secured by any process which tended to make the agreement compulsory. The mode adopted was called, indeed, an afforcement of the jury; but this term did not imply that any violence was done to the conscientious opinions of the minority. It merely meant that a sufficient number were to be added to the panel until twelve were at last found to agree in the same conclusion; and this became the verdict of the assise. … The civil law required two witnesses at least, and in some cases a greater number, to establish a fact in dispute; as, for instance, where a debt was secured by a written instrument, five witnesses were necessary to prove payment. These would have been called by our ancestors a jurata of five. At the present day, with us no will is valid which is not attested by at least two witnesses. In all countries the policy of the law determines what it will accept as the minimum of proof. Bearing then in mind that the jury system was in its inception nothing but the testimony of witnesses informing the court of facts supposed to lie within their own knowledge, we see at once that to require that twelve men should be unanimous was simply to fix the amount of evidence which the law deemed to be conclusive of a matter in dispute."

W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury, chapter 11, section 1.

{1959}

A. D. 1154-1189. Reign of Law initiated.

"The reign of Henry II. initiates the rule of law. The administrative machinery, which had been regulated by routine under Henry I., is now made a part of the constitution, enunciated in laws, and perfected by a steady series of reforms: The mind of Henry II. was that of a lawyer and man of business. He set to work from the very beginning of the reign to place order on a permanent basis, and, recurring to the men and measures of his grandfather, to complete an organization which should make a return to feudalism impossible."

W. Stubbs, Select Charters of English Constitutional History, page 21.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1164-1176. Trial by Assize.

"The first mention of the trial by assise in our existing statutes occurs in the Constitutions of Clarendon, A. D. 1164 [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1162-1170], where it was provided that if any dispute arose between a layman and a clerk as to whether a particular tenement was the property of the Church or belonged to a lay fief, this was to be determined before the chief justiciary of the kingdom, by the verdict of twelve lawful men. … This was followed by the Statute of Northampton, A. D. 1176, which directs the justices, in case a lord should refuse to give to the heir the seisin of his deceased ancestor, 'to cause a recognition to be made by means of twelve lawful men as to what seisin the deceased had on the day of his death;' and also orders them to inquire in the same manner in cases of novel disseisin."

W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, chapter 6, section 3.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1165 (circa). Justice bought and sold.

"The king's justice was one great source of his revenue, and he sold it very dear. Observe that this buying and selling was not in itself corruption, though it is hard to believe that corruption did not get mixed up with it. Suitors paid heavily not to have causes decided in their favour in the king's court, but to have them heard there at all. The king's justice was not a matter of right, but of exceptional favour; and this was especially the case when he undertook, as he sometimes did, to review and overrule the actual decisions of local courts, or even reverse, on better information, his own previous commands. And not only was the king's writ sold, but it was sold at arbitrary and varying prices, the only explanation of which appears to be that in every case the king's officers took as much as they could get. Now we are in a position to understand that famous clause of the Great Charter: 'To no man will we sell, nor to none deny or delay, right or justice.' The Great Charter comes about half a century after the time of which we have been speaking; so in that time, you see, the great advance had been made of regarding the king's justice as a matter not of favour but of right. And besides this clause there is another which provides for the regular sending of the king's judges into the counties. Thus we may date from Magna Carta the regular administration of a uniform system of law throughout England. What is more, we may almost say that Magna Carta gave England a capital. For the king's court had till then no fixed seat; it would be now at Oxford, now at Westminster, now at Winchester, sometimes at places which by this time are quite obscure. But the Charter provided that causes between subject and subject which had to be tried by the king's judges should be tried not where the king's court happened to be, but in some certain place; and so the principal seat of the courts of justice, and ultimately the political capital of the realm, became established at Westminster."

Sir F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, page 209.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1166. Assize of Clarendon.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1162-1170.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1176. Justices in Eyre.

"It has been generally supposed that justices in Eyre (justitiarii itinerantes) were first established in 1176, by Henry II., for we find it recorded that in that year, in a great counsel held at Northampton, the king divided the realm into six parts, and appointed three traveling justices to go each circuit, so that the number was eighteen in all. … But although the formal division of the kingdom into separate circuits may have been first made by Henry II., yet there is no doubt that single justiciars were appointed by William I., a few years after the Conquest, who visited the different shires to administer justice in the king's name, and thus represented the curia regis as distinct from the hundred and county courts."

W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, pages 81-82.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1189. Legal Memory. Its effect.

"No doubt usage for the last fifty or sixty years would be some evidence of usage 700 years ago, but if the question is to be considered as an ordinary question of fact, I certainly for one would very seldom find a verdict in support of the right as in fact so ancient. I can hardly believe, for instance, that the same fees in courts of justice which were till recently received by the officers as ancient fees attached to their ancient offices were in fact received 700 years ago; or that the city of London took before the time of Richard I. the same payments for measuring corn and coals and oysters that they do now. I have no doubt the city of Bristol did levy dues in the Avon before the time of legal memory, and that the mayor, as head of that corporation, got some fees at that time; but I can hardly bring myself to believe that the mayor of Bristol at that time received 5s. a year from every ship above sixty tons burthen which entered the Avon; yet the claim of the city of Bristol to their ancient mayor's dues, of which this is one, was established before Lord Tenterden, in 1828. I think the only way in which verdicts in support of such claims, and there are many such, could have properly been found, is by supposing that the jury were advised that, in favor of the long continued user, a presumption arose that it was legal, on which they ought to find that the user was immemorial, if that was necessary to legalize it, unless the contrary was proved; that presumption not being one purely of fact, and to be acted on only when the jury really entertained the opinion that in fact the legal origin existed. This was stated by Parke B., on the first trial of Jenkins v. Harvey, 1 C. M. & R. 894, as being his practice, and what he considered the correct mode of leaving the question to the jury; and that was the view of the majority of the judges in the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Shephard v. Payne, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 132; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 158. This is by no means a modern doctrine; it is as ancient as the time of Littleton, who, in his Tenures, § 170, says that all are agreed that usage since the time of Richard I. is a title; some, he says, have thought it the only title of prescription, but that others have said 'that there is also another title of prescription that was at the common law before any statute of limitation of writs, &c., and that it was where a custom or usage or other thing hath been used for time whereof mind of man runneth not to the contrary. {1960} And they have said that this is proved by the pleading where a man will plead a title of prescription of custom. He shall say that such a custom hath been used from time whereof the memory of men runneth not to the contrary, that is as much as to say, when such a matter is pleaded, that no man then alive hath heard any proof of the contrary, nor hath no knowledge to the contrary; and insomuch that such title of prescription was at the common law, and not put out by any statute, ergo, it abideth as it was at the common law; and the rather that the said limitation of a writ of right is of so long time past. 'Ideo quaere de hoc.' It is practically the same thing whether we say that usage as far back as proof extends is a title, though it does not go so far back as the year 1189; or that such usage is to be taken in the absence of proof to the contrary to establish that the usage began before that year; and certainly the lapse of 400 years since Littleton wrote has added force to the remark, 'the rather that the limitation of a writ of right is of so long time past.' But either way, proof that the origin of the usage was since that date, puts an end to the title by prescription; and the question comes round to be whether the amount of the fee, viz. 13s., is by itself sufficient proof that it must have originated since."

J. Blackburn, in Bryant v. Foot, L. R. 2 Q. B., 161,. s. c. (Thayer's Cases on Evidence, page 88).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1194. English Law Repositories.

"The extant English judicial records do not begin until 1194 (Mich. 6 Rich. I.). We have a series of such records from 1384 (6 Rich. II.). The first law treatise by Glanvill was not written before 1187. The law reports begin in 1292. The knowledge of the laws of England prior to the twelfth century is in many points obscure and uncertain. From that time, however, the growth and development of these laws can be traced in the parliamentary and official records, treatises, and law reports."

John F. Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America, pages 28-29.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1199. Earliest instance of Action for Trespass.

"A case of the year 1199 (2 Rot. Cur. Reg. 34) seems to be the earliest reported instance of an action of trespass in the royal courts. Only a few cases are recorded during the next fifty years. But about 1250 the action came suddenly into great popularity. In the 'Abbreviatio Placitorum,' twenty-five cases are given of the single year 1252-1253. We may infer that the writ, which had before been granted as a special favor, became at that time a writ of course. In Britton (f. 49), pleaders are advised to sue in trespass rather than by appeal, in order to avoid 'la perilouse aventure de batayles.' Trespass in the popular courts of the hundred and county was doubtless of far greater antiquity than the same action in the Curia Regis. Several cases of the reign of Henry I, are collected in Bigelow, Placita Anglo-Normannica, 89, 98, 102, 127."

J. B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels (Harvard Law Review, volume 3, page 29, note).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1208. Evidence: Attesting Witnesses.

"From the beginning of our records, we find cases, in a dispute over the genuineness of a deed, where the jury are combined with the witnesses to the deed. This goes back to the Franks; and their custom of requiring the witness to a document to defend it by battle also crossed the channel, and is found in Glanville (lib. X., c. 12). … In these cases the jury and the witnesses named in the deed were summoned together, and all went out and conferred privately as if composing one body; the witnesses did not regularly testify in open court. Cases of this kind are found very early, e. g. in 1208-1209 (Pl. Ab. 63, col. 1, Berk.). … In the earlier cases these witnesses appear, sometimes, to have been conceived of as a constituent part of the jury; it was a combination of business-witnesses and community-witnesses who tried the case,—the former supplying to the others their more exact information, just as the hundreders, or those from another county, did in the cases before noticed. But in time the jury and the witnesses came to be sharply discriminated. Two or three cases in the reign of Edward III. show this. In 1337, 1338 and 1349, we are told that they are charged differently; the charge to the jury is to tell the truth (a lour ascient) to the best of their knowledge, while that to the witnesses is to tell the truth and loyally inform the inquest, without saying anything about their knowledge (sans lour scient); 'for the witnesses,' says Thorpe, C. J., in 1349, 'should say nothing but what they know as certain, i. e., what they see and hear.' … By the Statute of York (12 Edw. II. c. 2), in 1318, it was provided that while process should still issue to the witnesses as before, yet the taking of the inquest should not be delayed by their absence. In this shape the matter ran on for a century or two. By 1472 (Y. B. 12 Edw. IV. 4, 9), we find a change. It is said, with the assent of all the judges, that process for the witnesses will not issue unless asked for. As late, certainly, as 1489 (Y. B. 5 H. VII. 8), we find witnesses to deeds still summoned with the jury. I know of no later case. In 1549-1550 Brooke, afterwards Chief Justice of the Common Bench, argues as if this practice was still known: 'When the witnesses … are joined to the inquest,' etc.; and I do not observe anything in his Abridgment, published in 1568, ten years after his death, to indicate that it was not a recognized part of the law during all his time. It may, however, well have been long obsolescent. Coke (Inst. 6 b.) says of it, early in the seventeenth century, 'and such process against witnesses is vanished;' but when or how he does not say. We may reasonably surmise, if it did not become infrequent as the practice grew, in the fifteenth century, of calling witnesses to testify to the jury in open court, that, at any rate, it must have soon disappeared when that practice came to be attended with the right, recognized, if not first granted, in the statute of 1562-1563 (5 Eliz. c. 9, s. 6), to have legal process against all sorts of witnesses."

James B. Thayer, in Harvard Law Review, volume 5, pages 302-5, also in Sel. Cas. Ev. pages 771-773.

"After the period reached in the passage above quoted, the old strictness as to the summoning of attesting witnesses still continued under the new system. As the history of the matter was forgotten, new reasons were invented, and the rule was extended to all sorts of writings."

J. B. Thayer, Select Cases on Evidence, page 773.

{1961}

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1215 (ante). Courts following the King.

"Another point which ought not to be forgotten in relation to the King's Court is its migratory character. The early kings of England were the greatest landowners in the country, and besides their landed estates they had rights over nearly every important town in England, which could be exercised only on the spot. They were continually travelling about from place to place, either to consume in kind part of their revenues, or to hunt or to fight. Wherever they went the great officers of their court, and in particular the chancellor with his clerks, and the various justices had to follow them. The pleas, so the phrase went, 'followed the person of the king,' and the machinery of justice went with them."

Sir J. F. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, volume 1, page 87.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1215. Magna Charta.

"With regard to the administration of justice, besides prohibiting all denials or delays of it, it fixed the court of Common Pleas at Westminster, that the suitors might no longer be harassed with following the King's person in all his progresses; and at the same time brought the trial of issues borne to the very doors of the freeholders by directing assizes to be taken in the proper counties, and establishing annual circuits. It also corrected some abuses then incident to the trials by wager of law and of battle; directing the regular awarding of inquest for life or member; prohibited the King's inferior ministers from holding pleas of the crown, or trying any criminal charge, whereby many forfeitures might otherwise have unjustly accrued to the exchequer: and regulated the time and place of holding the inferior tribunals of justice, the county court, sheriff's tourn, and court leet. … And, lastly (which alone would have merited the title that it bears, of the great charter,) it protected every individual of the nation in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty and his property, unless declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."

Owen Flintoff, Laws of England, page 184.

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1215.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1216. Distinction between Common and Statute Law now begins.

"The Chancellors, during this reign [John 1199-1216], did nothing to be entitled to the gratitude of posterity, and were not unworthy of the master whom they served. The guardians of law were the feudal barons, assisted by some enlightened churchmen, and by their efforts the doctrine of resistance to lawless tyranny was fully established in England, and the rights of all classes of the people were defined and consolidated. We here reach a remarkable era in our constitutional history: National councils had met from the most remote times; but to the end of this reign their acts not being preserved are supposed to form a part of the lex non scripta, or common law. Now begins the distinction between common and statute law, and henceforth we can distinctly trace the changes which our juridical system has undergone. These changes were generally introduced by the Chancellor for the time being."

Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors, volume 1, page 115.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1216-1272. Henry de Bracton.

"It is curious that, in the most disturbed period of this turbulent reign, when ignorance seemed to be thickening and the human intellect to decline, there was written and given to the world the best treatise upon law of which England could boast, till the publication of Blackstone's Commentaries, in the middle of the eighteenth century. It would have been very gratifying to me if this work could have been ascribed with certainty to any of the Chancellors whose lives have been noticed. The author, usually styled Henry de Bracton, has gone by the name of Brycton, Britton, Briton, Breton, and Brets; and some have doubted whether all these names are not imaginary. From the elegance of his style, and the familiar knowledge he displays of the Roman law, I cannot doubt that he was an ecclesiastic who had addicted himself to the study of jurisprudence; and as he was likely to gain advancement from his extraordinary proficiency, he may have been one of those whom I have commemorated, although I must confess that he rather speaks the language likely to come from a disappointed practitioner rather than of a Chancellor who had been himself in the habit of making Judges. For comprehensiveness, for lucid arrangement, for logical precision, this author was unrivalled during many ages. Littleton's work on Tenures, which illustrated the reign of Edward IV., approaches Bracton; but how barbarous are, in comparison, the commentaries of Lord Coke, and the law treatises of Hale and of Hawkins!"

Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors, volume 1, page 139.

For opposite view

See 9 American Bar Association Report, p. 193.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1217. Dower.

"The additional provision made in the edition of 1217 to the provisions of the earlier issues of the Charter in respect of widow's rights fixed the law of dower on the basis on which it still rests. The general rule of law still is that the widow is entitled for her life to a third part of the lands of which her husband was seized for an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage. At the present day there are means provided which are almost universally adopted, of barring or defeating the widow's claim. The general rule of law, however, remains the same. The history of the law of dower deserves a short notice, which may conveniently find a place here. It seems to be in outline as follows. Tacitus noticed the contrast of Teutonic custom and Roman law, in that it was not the wife who conferred a dowry on the husband, but the husband on the wife. By early Teutonic custom, besides the bride-price, or price paid by the intending husband to the family of the bride, it seems to have been usual for the husband to make gifts of lands or chattels to the bride herself. These appear to have taken two forms. In some cases the husband or his father executed before marriage an instrument called 'libellum dotis,' specifying the nature and extent of the property to be given to the wife. … Another and apparently among the Anglo-Saxons a commoner form of dower is the 'morning gift.' This was the gift which on the morning following the wedding the husband gave to the wife, and might consist either of land or chattels. … By the law as stated by Glanvil the man was bound to endow the woman 'tempore desponsationis ad ostium ecclesiae.' The dower might be specified or not. If not specified it was the third part of the freehold which the husband possessed at the time of betrothal. If more than a third part was named, the dower was after the husband's death cut down to a third. A gift of less would however be a satisfaction of dower. It was sometimes permitted to increase the dower when the freehold available at the time of betrothal was small, by giving the wife a third part or less of subsequent acquisitions. This however must have been expressly granted at the time of betrothal. {1962} A woman could never claim more than had been granted 'ad ostium ecclesiae.' Dower too might be granted to a woman out of chattels personal, and in this case she would be entitled to a third part. In process of time however, this species of dower ceased to be regarded as legal, and was expressly denied to be law in the time of Henry IV. A trace of it still remains in the expression in the marriage service, 'with all my worldly goods I thee endow.'"

Kenelm E. Digby, History of the Law of Real Property, pages 126-128 (4th edition).

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1258. Provisions of Oxford; no Writs except de Cursu.

"The writ had originally no connection whatever with the relief sought, it had been a general direction to do right to the plaintiff, or as the case might be, but, long before the time now referred to, this had been changed. … It appears that even after the writ obtained by the plaintiff had come to be connected with the remedy sought for, … a writ to suit each case was framed and issued, but the Provisions of Oxford (1258) expressly forbade the Chancellor to frame new writs without the consent of the King and his Council. It followed that there were certain writs, each applicable to a particular state of circumstances and leading to a particular judgment, which could be purchased by an intending plaintiff. These writs were described as writs 'de cursu,' and additions to their number were made from time to time by direction of the King, of his Council or of Parliament."

D. M. Kerly, History of Equity, page 9.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1258. Sale of Judicial Offices.

"The Norman Kings, who were ingenious adepts in realizing profit in every opportunity, commenced the sale of Judicial Offices. The Plantagenets followed their example. In Madox, chap. II., and in the 'Cottoni Posthuma, may be found innumerable instances of the purchase of the Chancellorship, and accurate details of the amount of the consideration monies. … What was bought must, of course, be sold, and justice became henceforth a marketable commodity. … The Courts of Law became a huckster's shop; every sort of produce, in the absence of money, was bartered for 'justice.'"

J. Parke, History of English Chancery, page 23.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1265. Disappearance of the Office of Chief Justiciary.

"Towards the end of this reign [Henry III.] the office of Chief Justiciary, which had often been found so dangerous to the Crown, fell into disuse. Hugh le Despenser, in the 49th of Henry III., was the last who bore the title. The hearing of common actions being fixed at Westminster by Magna Charta, the Aula Regia was gradually subdivided and certain Judges were assigned to hear criminal cases before the King himself, wheresoever he might be, in England. These formed the Court of King's Bench. They were called 'Justitiarii ad placita coram Rege,' and the one who was to preside 'Capitalis Justiciarius.' He was inferior in rank to the Chancellor, and had a salary of only one hundred marks a year, while the Chancellor had generally 500. Henceforth the Chancellor, in rank, power, and emolument, was the first magistrate under the Crown, and looked up to as the great head of the profession of the law."

Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors, volume 1, pages 139-140.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1275. Statute of Westminster the First; Improvement of the Law.

"He [Robert Burnel] presided at the Parliament which met in May, 1275, and passed the 'Statute of Westminster the First,' deserving the name of a Code rather than an Act of Parliament. From this chiefly, Edward I. has obtained the name of 'the English Justinian'—absurdly enough, as the Roman Emperor merely caused a compilation to be made of existing laws,—whereas the object now was to correct abuses, to supply defects, and to remodel the administration of justice. Edward deserves infinite praise for the sanction he gave to the undertaking; and from the observations he had made in France, Sicily, and the East, he may, like Napoleon, have been personally useful in the consultations for the formation of the new Code,—but the execution of the plan must have been left to others professionally skilled in jurisprudence, and the chief merit of it may safely be ascribed to Lord Chancellor Burnel, who brought it forward in Parliament. The statute is methodically divided into fifty-one chapters. … It provides for freedom of popular elections, then a mutter of much moment, as sheriffs, coroners, and conservators of the peace were still chosen by the free holders in the county court, and attempts had been made unduly to influence the elections of knights of the shire, almost from the time when the order was instituted. … It amends the criminal law, putting the crime of rape on the footing to which it has been lately restored, as a most grievous but not a capital offence. It embraces the subject of 'Procedure' both in civil and criminal matters, introducing many regulations with a view to render it cheaper, more simple, and more expeditious. … As long as Burnel continued in office the improvement of the law rapidly advanced,—there having been passed in the sixth year of the King's reign the 'Statute of Gloucester;' in the seventh year of the King's reign the 'Statute of Mortmain;' in the thirteenth year of the King's reign the 'Statute of Westminster the Second,' the 'Statute of Winchester,' and the 'Statute of Circumspecte agatis;' and in the eighteenth year of the King's reign the 'Statute of Quo Warranto,' and the 'Statute of Quia Emptores.' With the exception of the establishment of estates tail, which proved such an obstacle to the alienation of land till defeated by the fiction of Fines and Common Recoveries,—these laws were in a spirit of enlightened legislation, and admirably accommodated the law to the changed circumstances of the social system,—which ought to be the object of every wise legislation."

Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors, volume 1, pages 143-146.

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1275-1295, and 1279.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1278. Foundation of Costs at Common Law.

"The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I c. i, is the foundation of the common law jurisdiction as to costs, and by that statute it was enacted that in any action where the plaintiff recovered damages, he should also recover costs. … By the Judicature Act, 1875, O. L. V., the Legislature gave a direct authority to all the judges of the Courts constituted under the Judicature Act, and vested in them a discretion which was to guide and determine them, according to the circumstances of each case, in the disposition of costs."

Sydney Hastings, Treatise on Torts, page 379.

{1963}

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1285. Statute of Westminster II.; Writs in Consimili Casu.

"The inadequacy of the common form writs to meet every case was, to some extent, remedied by the 24th Chapter of the Statute of Westminster II., which, after providing for one or two particular cases to meet which no writ existed, provides further that 'whensoever from henceforth it shall fortune in Chancery that in one case a writ is found, and, in like case falling under like law is found none, the clerks of the Chancery shall agree in making a writ or shall adjourn the Plaintiffs until the next Parliament, and the cases shall be written in which they cannot agree, and be referred until the next Parliament; and, by consent of the men learned in the Law a writ shall be made, that it may not happen, that the King's Court should fail in ministering justice unto Complainants.' … The words of the statute give no power to make a completely new departure; writs are to be framed to fit cases similar to, but not identical with, cases falling within existing writs, and the examples given in the statute itself are cases of extension of remedies against a successor in title of the raiser of a nuisance, and for the successor in title of a person who had been disseised of his common. Moreover the form of the writ was debated upon before, and its sufficiency determined by the judges, not by its framers, and they were, as English judges have always been, devoted adherents to precedent. In the course of centuries, by taking certain writs as starting points, and accumulating successive variations upon them, the judges added great areas to our common law, and many of its most famous branches, assumpsit, and trover and conversion for instance, were developed in this way, but the expansion of the Common Law was the work of the 15th and subsequent centuries, when, under the stress of eager rivalry with the growing equitable jurisdiction of the Chancery, the judges strove, not only by admitting and developing actions upon the case, but also by the use of fictitious actions, following the example of the Roman Praetor, to supply the deficiencies of their system."

D. M. Kerly, History of Equity, pages 10-11.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1285. Writ of Elegit.

The Writ of Elegit "is a judicial writ given by the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I., c. 18, either upon a judgment for a debt, or damages; or upon the forfeiture of a recognizance taken in the king's court. By the common law a man could only have satisfaction of goods, chattels, and the present profits of lands, by the … writs of 'fieri facias,' or 'levari facias;' but not the possession of the lands themselves; which was a natural consequence of the feudal principles, which prohibited the alienation, and of course the encumbering of the fief with the debts of the owner. … The statute therefore granted this writ (called an 'elegit,' because it is in the choice or the election of the plaintiff whether he will sue out this writ or one of the former), by which the defendant's goods and chattels are not sold, but only appraised; and all of them (except oxen and beasts of the plough) are delivered to the plaintiff, at such reasonable appraisement and price, in part of satisfaction of his debt. If the goods are not sufficient, then the moiety or one-half of his freehold lands, which he had at the time of the judgment given, whether held in his own name, or by any other in trust for him, are also to be delivered to the plaintiff; to hold, till out of the rents and profits thereof the debt be levied, or till the defendant's interest be expired; as till the death of the defendant, if he be tenant for life or in tail."

Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries, book 3, chapter 27.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1290. Progress of the Common Law Right of Alienation.

"The statute of Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I., finally and permanently established the free right of alienation by the sub-vassal, without the lord's consent; … and it declared, that the grantee should not hold the land of his immediate feoffor, but of the chief lord of the fee, of whom the grantor himself held it. … The power of involuntary alienation, by rendering the land answerable by attachment for debt, was created by the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 18, which granted the elegit; and by the statutes merchant or staple, of 13 Edw. I., and 27 Edw. III., which gave the extent. These provisions were called for by the growing commercial spirit of the nation. To these we may add the statute of 1 Edw. III., taking away the forfeiture or alienation by the king's tenants in capite, and substituting a reasonable fine in its place; … and this gives us a condensed view of the progress of the common law right of alienation from a state of servitude to freedom."

J. Kent, Commentaries, part 6, lecture 67.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1292. Fleta.

"Fleta, so called from its composition in the Fleet prison by one of the justices imprisoned by Edward I., is believed to have been written about the year 1292, and is nothing but an abbreviation of Bracton, and the work called 'Britton,' which was composed between the years 1290 and 1300, is of the same character, except that it is written in the vernacular language, French, while Granvil, Bracton and Fleta are written in Latin."