Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 37)

H. R. Clinton, The War in the Peninsula, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: General Vane (Marquis of Londonderry), Story of the Peninsular War, chapter 8.

SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (August-January). Wellington's first campaign. Convention of Cintra. Evacuation of Portugal by the French. Napoleon in the field. Sir John Moore's advance into Spain. His retreat. His repulse of Soult at Corunna. His death.

"Sir Arthur Wellesley's division comprised 9,000 men. Another corps, under Sir John Moore, which had just arrived from the Baltic, numbered 11,000 men. These two detachments were to co-operate. But their united efforts were to be directed by Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, two generals whose exploits were better known in the private records of the Horse Guards than in the annals of their country. … Sir Arthur Wellesley landed his troops at Figuiera, a difficult task on an iron coast. On the 7th of August, major-general Spencer's corps joined the army. With 10,000 British and 5,000 Portuguese, Sir Arthur Wellesley then prepared to march towards Lisbon. On the 17th he defeated at Roliça the French under Laborde. On the 20th he was at Vimiero, having been joined by General Anstruther and General Acland with their corps. He had now an army of 17,000 men. Junot had joined Laborde and Loison at Torres Vedras, and their united force was about 14,000 men, of whom 1,600 were cavalry. Early in the morning of the 21st, the French attacked the British in their position. Sir Harry Burrard had arrived on the night of the 20th, but did not land. The principal attack on the British was on the centre and left; the sea being in their rear. The attack was repulsed. Kellermann then attacked with the French reserve, and he also was driven back. Junot's left wing and centre were discomfited. The road of Torres Vedras, the shortest road to Lisbon, was uncovered. When the action was nearly over, Sir Harry Burrard had landed. In a private letter, Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote, 'The French got a terrible beating on the 21st. {3003} They did not lose less, I believe, than 4,000 men, and they would have been entirely destroyed, if Sir H. Burrard had not prevented me from pursuing them. Indeed, since the arrival of the great generals, we appear to have been palsied, and everything has gone on wrong.' Sir John Moore arrived with his corps on the 21st, and his troops were nearly all landed when hostilities were suspended by the Convention of Cintra for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Sir Arthur writes to Lord Castlereagh, 'Although my name is affixed to this instrument, I beg that you will not believe that I negotiated it, that I approve of it, or that I had any hand in wording it.' On the 5th of September, he writes, 'It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home and resume the duties of my office.' Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley were all recalled home. Sir John Moore remained at Lisbon, having been appointed to command the army. A Court of Inquiry was ordered on the subject of 'the late transactions in Portugal.' Wellesley had to bear much before the publicity of those proceedings was to set him right in public opinion. The Inquiry ended in a formal disapprobation of the armistice and convention on the part of the king being communicated to Sir How Dalrymple. Neither of the two 'great generals' was again employed. One advantage was gained by the Convention. The Russian fleet in the Tagus was delivered up to the British. Sir John Moore, late in October, began his march into Spain, 'to co-operate,' as his instructions set forth, 'with the Spanish armies in the expulsion of the French.' He was to lead the British forces in Portugal; and to be joined by Sir David Baird, with 10,000 men to be landed at Corunna. Instead of finding Spanish armies to co-operate with, he learned that the French had routed and dispersed them. Napoleon had himself come to command his troops; and had arrived at Bayonne on the 3rd of November. Moore was separated from Baird by a wide tract of country. He had been led by false information to divide his own army. He remained for some time at Salamanca, inactive and uncertain. Madrid was soon in the hands of the French. Moore made a forward movement against the advanced corps of Soult; and then, learning that the French armies were gathering all around him, he determined to retreat. Sir David Baird had previously joined him. Moore had abandoned all hopes of defending Portugal, and had directed his march towards Corunna. He commenced his retreat from Sahagun on the evening of the 24th of December. During this retreat, the retiring army constantly turned upon the pursuers, always defeating them, and on one occasion capturing General Lefebvre. The winter had set in with terrible severity; the sufferings of the troops were excessive; disorganization, the common consequence of a retreat, added to their danger. Moore saved his army from destruction by an overwhelming force when he carried it across the Esla, effectually destroying the bridge by which they passed the swollen stream. But Moore could not save his men from their own excesses, which made enemies of the inhabitants of every place through which they passed. At Lugo, on the 7th of January, 1809, the British general halted his exhausted troops, determined to give battle to Soult, to whom Napoleon had given up the pursuit of the English army, having received despatches which indicated that war with Austria was close at hand. Soult declined the conflict; and on the British marched to Corunna. On the 11th, when they had ascended the heights from which Corunna was visible, there were no transports in the bay. The troops met with a kind reception in the town; and their general applied himself to make his position as strong as possible, to resist the enemy that was approaching. On the evening of the 14th the transports arrived. The sick and wounded were got on board; and a great part of the artillery. Fourteen thousand British remained to fight, if their embarkation were molested. The battle of Corunna began at two o'clock on the 16th of January. Soult had 20,000 veterans, with numerous field-guns; and he had planted a formidable battery on the rocks, commanding the valley and the lower ridge of hills. Columns of French infantry descended from the higher ridge; and there was soon a close trial of strength between the combatants. From the lower ridge Moore beheld the 42nd and 50th driving the enemy before them through the village of Elvina. He sent a battalion of the guards to support them; but through a misconception the 42nd retired. Moore immediately dashed into the fight; exclaimed 'Forty-second, remember Egypt,' and sent them back to the village. The British held their ground or drove off their assailants; and victory was certain under the skilful direction of the heroic commander, when he was dashed to the earth by a shot from the rock battery. Sir David Baird, the second in command, had also fallen. Moore was carried into Corunna; and endured several hours of extreme torture before he yielded up his great spirit. The command had devolved upon General Hope, who thought that his first duty was now to embark the troops. … When the sufferers in Moore's campaign came home the hospitals were filled with wounded and sick; and some of the troops brought back a pestilential fever."

C. Knight, Crown History of England, chapter 57 (abridgment of chapter 28, volume 7, of Popular History of England).

ALSO IN: General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, books 2-4 (volume 1).

J. M. Wilson, Memoirs of the Duke of Wellington, volume 1, chapters 13-16.

Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, volume 4.

G. R. Gleig, General Sir John Moore (Eminent British Military Commanders, volume 3).

Baron Jomini, Life of Napoleon, chapter 13 (volume 2).

Duke de Rovigo, Memoirs, volume 2, part 2, chapters 2-3.

General Foy, History of the War in the Peninsula, volume 2, part 2.

SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (December-March). The siege of Saragossa.

"When Moore was pursued by Napoleon, the Duke of Infantado, who had rallied 20,000 men in New Castile after the fall of Madrid, formed the Quixotic design of re-taking the capital. Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, utterly crushed his force at Ucles on the 13th January, 1809, where 1,500 Spaniards were slain, and 9,000 men and all the stores and artillery were taken. The French, in retaliation for the Spaniards having hanged some soldiers who had been captured, murdered many of the prisoners in cold blood, and perpetrated infamous atrocities on the inhabitants of Ucles. {3004} The Spaniards, however, showed their extraordinary valour behind walls in their second defence of Saragossa, the siege of which [abandoned the previous August, after a fierce struggle] was renewed by 35,000 French under Marshals Moncey and Mortier, on the 20th December, 1808. The city was defended by Palafox, who had retired into it after his defeat at Tudela. The second siege of this renowned city—though the defence eventually proved unsuccessful—crowns with everlasting glory the Spanish War of Independence. … 'The citizens gave up their goods, their houses, and their bodies to the war, and, mingling with the peasants and soldiers, formed one mighty garrison suited to the vast fortress they had formed. For doors and windows were built up, house-fronts loopholed, internal communications opened, streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building was a separate fortification: there was no weak point—there could be none in a city which was all fortress, where the space covered by houses was the measure of the ramparts' (Napier). All the trees outside the walls were cut down, the houses destroyed, and the materials carried into the town. … The public magazines were provisioned for six months, and all the conventual communities and the inhabitants had large private stores. Nearly 3,000 artillerymen and sappers, and 30,000 men of the regular army, had taken refuge in the city, and at least 20,000 citizens and fugitive peasants were fit for arms. The popular leaders had recourse to all the aid which superstition could give them: denunciations of the wrath of Heaven were hurled on those who were suspected of wavering, and the clergy readily recounted stories of miracles to encourage the faithful. Saragossa was 'believed to be invincible through the protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had chosen it for the seat of her peculiar worship. … An appearance in the sky, which at other times might have passed unremembered, and perhaps unnoticed, had given strong confirmation to the popular faith. About a month before the commencement of the first siege, a white cloud appeared at noon, and gradually assumed the form of a palm-tree; the sky being in all other parts clear, except that a few specks of fleecy cloud hovered about the larger one. It was first observed over the church of N. Senora del Portillo, and moving from thence till it seemed to be immediately above that of the pillar, continued in the same form about half an hour, and then dispersed. The inhabitants were in a state of such excitement that crowds joined in the acclamation of the first beholder, who cried out, "A miracle!"—and after the defeat of the besiegers had confirmed the omen, a miracle it was universally pronounced to have been, the people proclaiming with exultation that the Virgin had by this token prefigured the victory she had given them, and promised Zaragoza her protection as long as the world should endure' (Southey). … At daybreak on the 21st December, General Suchet carried the works on the Monte Torrero; but Count Gazan de la Peyrière—a general highly distinguished in the Swiss and Italian campaigns—failed in his attack upon the suburbs on the left bank of the Ebro, and the confidence of the Spaniards in their leaders was restored. Three days later the town was completely invested, the siege operations being directed by General La Coste. On the 30th December, the trenches being completed, the town was summoned to surrender, and the example of Madrid was referred to; but Palafox replied proudly, 'If Madrid has surrendered, Madrid has been sold: Saragossa will neither be sold nor surrendered.' Marshal Moncey being recalled to Madrid, Junot took command of his corps. The besieged attempted several sallies, which were repulsed; and after a heavy bombardment, the St. Joseph convent was carried by the French on the 11th January, 1809. The Spanish leaders maintained the courage of their countrymen by proclaiming a forged despatch narrating the defeat of Napoleon. The guerrilla bands began to gather in round the French, and their condition was becoming perilous. But the command had now been taken by the invincible Marshal Lannes, Duke of Montebello (who had been detained by a long illness); the approaches were steadily pushed on, the breaches in the walls became wider, and on the 29th the French rushed forward and took possession of the ramparts. 'Thus the walls of Zaragoza went to the ground; but Zaragoza remained erect, and as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at her naked strength. The regular defences had crumbled, but the popular resistance was instantly called with all its terrors into action; and as if fortune had resolved to mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science should cease, the chief engineers on both sides [La Coste and San Genis] were simultaneously slain' (Napier). … The Junta was in no degree cowed: they resolved on resistance to the last extremity, and a row of gibbets was raised for any who should dare to propose surrender. Additional barricades were constructed, and alarm-bells were rung to summon the citizens to the threatened points. As each house was in itself a fort which had to be separately attacked, mining now was had recourse to. In this art the skill of the French was unquestioned, and room after room and house after house was carried. But still the constancy of the besieged was unshaken, and the French soldiers began to murmur at their excessive toil. From so many of the women and children being huddled together in the cellars of the city, for safety from the shells and cannon-balls, a pestilence arose, and slowly spread from the besieged to the besiegers. 'The strong and the weak, the daring soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it alike; and such was the predisposition to disease, that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the beginning of February the daily deaths were from four to five hundred;—the living were unable to bury the dead; and thousands of carcases, scattered about the streets and courtyards, or piled in heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their own corruption, or be licked up by the flames of burning houses as the defence became concentrated' (Napier). On the 18th February a great assault took place, and so much of the town was carried that further resistance was hopeless. Terms of capitulation were offered by the besieged, but were rejected by Lannes, and on the 19th the heavy guns opened from the batteries on the left bank of the Ebro, to sweep the houses on the quays. On the 20th, when all the great leaders were dead or prostrated with fever, and none but the soldier-priest Ric remained to lead the diminished and of heroes, Saragossa surrendered,—at discretion, according to the French: on honourable terms, according to the Spaniards. {3005} Such was the close of one of the most heroic defences in the history of the world. If any conditions were really accepted, they were ill observed by the victors: the churches were plundered, and many of the clergy and monks were put to death. … The other strongholds in Aragon, one after another, surrendered to the French before the end of March. In Catalonia the French, under General Gouvion St. Cyr, had met with equal success. With 30,000 men St. Cyr had taken Rosas after a month's siege—which was prolonged by the presence of that brilliant naval commander, Lord Cochrane (afterwards Earl of Dundonald), with an English frigate in the harbour—in December, 1808, had routed Reding at Cardadeu, had relieved Barcelona (where General Duhesme was shut up with 8,000 Frenchmen), and had again, on the 21st December, routed Reding at Molinos del Hey, where all the Spanish stores, including 30,000 muskets from England, were taken. In the spring of 1809 Reding made another attempt to achieve the independence of the north-east, and moved to relieve Saragossa; but on the 17th February he was met by St. Cyr at Igualada, where Reding himself was killed and his army was dispersed. The siege of Gerona alone in the north-east of Spain remained to be undertaken."

H. R. Clinton, The War in the Peninsula, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: C. M. Yonge, Book of Golden Deeds, page 365.

R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, chapter 18 (volume 3).

Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 5, chapters 2-3 (volume 1).

Baron de Marbot, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 40.

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (February-June). The war in Aragon. Siege of Gerona.

"This decisive victory [of Igualada] terminated the regular war in Catalonia; and St. Cyr, retiring to Vich, commenced preparations for the siege of Gerona. The undertaking was for some time delayed by the discord of St. Cyr and Verdier; but in the beginning of May they appeared before the town, and on the 1st of June the investment was completed. But the prowess of the Spaniards nowhere appeared to greater advantage than in the defence of their walled towns: it was not till 12th August, after 37 days of open trenches, and two unsuccessful assaults, that the French possessed themselves of the fort of Monjuich, which commands the town: yet the gallant governor, Alvarez, still held out, and the safe arrival of a convoy sent by Blake reanimated the spirit of the garrison. The grand assault of the lower town was given (September 17); but the French were repulsed from the breach with the loss of 1,600 men; and St. Cyr, despairing of carrying the place by force, converted the siege into a blockade. The capture of three successive convoys, sent by Blake for their relief, reduced the besieged at last to extremity; famine and pestilence devastated the city; but it was not till the inhabitants were reduced to the necessity of eating hair that the place was yielded (December 12) to Augereau, who had superseded St. Cyr in the command. A more memorable resistance is not on record; but the heroic Alvarez, to the eternal disgrace of Augereau, was immured in a dungeon at Figueras, where he soon afterwards died. Junot, in the mean time, had been taken ill, and was succeeded in the command in Aragon by Suchet, a young general whose talents and success gave him a brilliant career in the later years of the empire. His first essay, however, was unfortunate; for the indefatigable Blake, encouraged by the retreat of St. Cyr towards the Pyrenees, had again advanced with 12,000 men; and an action ensued (May 23) at Alcaniz, in which the French, seized with a panic, fled in confusion from the field. This unwonted success emboldened Blake to approach Saragossa; but the discipline and manœuvres of the French asserted their wonted superiority in the plains; the Spaniards were routed close to Saragossa (June 16), and more decisively at Belchite the next day. The army of Blake was entirely dispersed; and all regular resistance ceased in Aragon, as it had done in Catalonia, after the fall of Gerona."

Epitome of Alison's History of Europe, sections 566-567.

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (February-July). Wellington again in the English command. The French advance into Portugal checked. Passage of the Douro by the English. Battle of Talavera.

"Napoleon, before Moore's corps had actually left Corunna, conceived the war at an end, and, in issuing instructions to his marshals, anticipated, with no unreasonable confidence, the complete subjugation of the Peninsula. Excepting, indeed, some isolated districts in the east, the only parts now in possession of the Spaniards or their allies were Andalusia, which had been saved by the precipitate recall of Napoleon to the north; and Portugal, which, still in arms against the French, was nominally occupied by a British corps of 10,000 men, left there under Sir John Cradock at the time of General Moore's departure with the bulk of the army for Spain. The proceedings of the French marshals for the recovery of the entire Peninsula were speedily arranged. Lannes took the direction of the siege of Saragossa, where the Spaniards, fighting as usual with admirable constancy from behind stone walls, were holding two French corps at bay. Lefebvre drove one Spanish army into the recesses of the Sierra Morena, and Victor chased another into the fastnesses of Murcia. Meantime Soult, after recoiling awhile from the dying blows of Moore, had promptly occupied Gallicia upon the departure of the English, and was preparing to cross the Portuguese frontier on his work of conquest. In aid of this design it was concerted that while the last-named marshal advanced from the north, Victor, by way of Elvas, and Lapisse by way of Almeida, should converge together upon Portugal, and that when the English at Lisbon had been driven to their ships the several corps should unite for the final subjugation of the Peninsula by the occupation of Andalusia. Accordingly, leaving Ney to maintain the ground already won, Soult descended with 30,000 men upon the Douro, and by the end of March was in secure possession of Oporto. Had he continued his advance, it is not impossible that the campaign might have had the termination he desired; but at this point he waited for intelligence of the English in his front and of Victor and Lapisse on his flank. His caution saved Portugal, for, while he still hesitated on the brink of the Douro, there again arrived in the Tagus that renowned commander before whose genius the fortunes not only of the marshals, but of their imperial master, were finally to fail. England was now at the commencement of her greatest war. {3006} The system of small expeditions and insignificant diversions, though not yet conclusively abandoned, was soon superseded by the glories of a visible contest: and in a short time it was known and felt by a great majority of the nation, that on the field of the Peninsula England was fairly pitted against France. … At the commencement of the year 1809, when the prospects of Spanish independence were at their very gloomiest point, the British Cabinet had proposed and concluded a comprehensive treaty of alliance with the Provisional Administration of Spain; and it was now resolved that the contest in the Peninsula should be continued on a scale more effectual than before, and that the principal, instead of the secondary, part should be borne by England. … England’s colonial requirements left her little to show against the myriads of the continent. It was calculated at the time that 60,000 British soldiers might have been made disposable for the Peninsular service, but at no period of the war was such a force ever actually collected under the standards of Wellington, while Napoleon could maintain his 300,000 warriors in Spain, without materially disabling the arms of the Empire on the Danube or the Rhine. We had allies, it is true, in the troops of the country; but these at first were little better than refractory recruits, requiring all the accessories of discipline, equipment, and organisation; jealous of all foreigners, even as friends, and not unreasonably suspicious of supporters who could always find in their ships a refuge which was denied to themselves. But above all these difficulties was that arising from the inexperience of the Government in continental warfare. … When, however, with these ambiguous prospects, the Government did at length resolve on the systematic prosecution of the Peninsular war, the eyes of the nation were at once instinctively turned on Sir Arthur Wellesley as the general to conduct it. … He stoutly declared his opinion that Portugal was tenable against the French, even if actual possessors of Spain, and that it offered ample opportunities of influencing the great result of the war. With these views he recommended that the Portuguese army should be organised at its full strength; that it should be in part taken into British pay and under the direction of British officers, and that a force of not less than 30,000 English troops should be despatched to keep this army together. … Such was the prestige already attached to Wellesley’s name that his arrival in the Tagus changed every feature of the scene. No longer suspicious of our intentions, the Portuguese Government gave prompt effect to the suggestions of the English commander. … The command-in-chief of the native army was intrusted to an English officer of great distinction, General Beresford; and no time was lost in once more testing the efficacy of the British arms. … Of the Spanish armies we need only say that they had been repeatedly routed with invariable certainty and more or less disgrace, though Cuesta still held a nominal force together in the valley of the Tagus. There were, therefore, two courses open to the British commander: —either to repel the menaced advance of Soult by marching on Oporto, or to effect a junction with Cuesta, and try the result of a demonstration against Madrid. The latter of these plans was wisely postponed for the moment, and, preference having been decisively given to the former, the troops, at once commenced their march upon the Douro. The British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley’s command amounted at this time to about 20,000 men, to which about 15,000 Portuguese, in a respectable state of organisation, were added by the exertions of Beresford. Of these about 24,000 were now led against Soult, who, though not inferior in strength, no sooner ascertained the advance of the English commander, than he arranged for a retreat by detaching Loison with 6,000 men to dislodge a Portuguese post from his left rear. Sir Arthur’s intention was to envelope, if possible, the French corps by pushing forward a strong force upon its left, and thus intercepting its retreat toward Ney’s position, while the main body assaulted Soult in his quarters at Oporto. The former of these operations he intrusted to Beresford, the latter he directed in person. On the 12th of May the troops reached the southern bank of the Douro; the waters of’ which, 800 yards in width, rolled between them and their adversaries. … Availing himself of' a point where the river by a bend in its course was not easily visible from the town, Sir Arthur determined on transporting, if possible, a few troops to the northern bank, and occupying an unfinished stone building, which he perceived was capable of affording temporary cover. The means were soon supplied by the activity of Colonel Waters—an officer whose habitual audacity rendered him one of the heroes of this memorable war. Crossing in a skiff to the opposite bank, he returned with two or three boats, and in a few minutes a company of the Buffs was established in the building. Reinforcements quickly followed, but not without discovery. The alarm was given, and presently the edifice was enveloped by the eager battalions of the French. The British, however, held their ground; a passage was effected at other points during the struggle; the French, after an ineffectual resistance, were fain to abandon the city in precipitation, and Sir Arthur, after his unexampled feat of arms, sat down that evening to the dinner which had been prepared for Soult. … This brilliant operation being effected, Sir Arthur was now at liberty to turn to the main project of the campaign—that to which, in fact, the attack upon Soult had been subsidiary—the defeat of Victor in Estremadura. … Cuesta would take no advice, and insisted on the adoption of his own schemes with such obstinacy, that Sir Arthur was compelled to frame his plans accordingly. Instead, therefore, of circumventing Victor as he had intended, be advanced into Spain at the beginning of July, to effect a junction with Cuesta and feel his way towards Madrid. The armies, when united, formed a mass of 78,000 combatants; but of these 56,000 were Spanish, and for the brunt of war Sir Arthur could only reckon on his 22,000 British troops, Beresford’s Portuguese having been despatched to the north of Portugal. On the other side, Victor’s force had been strengthened by the succours which Joseph Bonaparte, alarmed for the safety of Madrid, had hastily concentrated at Toledo; and when the two armies at length confronted each other at Talavera, it was found that 55,000 excellent French troops were arrayed against Sir Arthur and his ally, while nearly as many more were descending from the north on the line of the British communications along the valley of the Tagus. {3007} On the 28th of July the British commander, after making the best dispositions in his power, received the attack of the French, directed by Joseph Bonaparte in person, with Victor and Jourdan at his side, and after an engagement of great severity, in which the Spaniards were virtually inactive, he remained master of the field against double his numbers, having repulsed the enemy at all points with heavy loss, and having captured several hundred prisoners and 17 pieces of cannon in this the first great pitched battle between the French and English in the Peninsula. In this well fought field of Talavera, the French had thrown, for the first time, their whole disposable force upon the British army without success; and Sir Arthur Wellesley inferred, with a justifiable confidence, that the relative superiority of his troops to those of the Emperor was practically decided. Jomini, the French military historian, confesses almost as much; and the opinions of Napoleon himself, as visible in his correspondence, underwent from that moment a serious change."

Memoir of Wellington, from "The Times" of September 15-16, 1852.

ALSO IN: R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, chapters 22-24 (volumes 3-4).

Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 62 (volume 13).

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (August-November). Battles of Almonacid, Puerto de Baños, Ocana, and Alba de Tormes.

Soon after Wellington's unfruitful victory at Talavera, "Venegas had advanced as far as Aranjuez, and was besieging Toledo; but the retreat of the British having set the French armies at liberty, he was attacked and defeated after a sharp action at Almonacid (August 11) by Dessoles and Sebastiani; and Sir Robert Wilson, who had approached Madrid with 6,000 Spaniards and Portuguese, was encountered and driven back by Ney (August 8) at Puerto de Banos. The British at length, after lying a month at Deleitosa, were compelled, by the scandalous failure of the Spanish authorities to furnish them with supplies or provisions, to cross the mountains and fix their headquarters at Badajos, after an angry correspondence between Wellesley and Cuesta, who soon after was removed from his command. A gleam of success at Tamanes, where Marchand was routed with loss (October 24) by Romana's army under the Duke del Parque, encouraged the Spaniards to make another effort for the recovery of Madrid; and an army of 50,000 men, including 7,000 horse and 60 pieces of cannon, advanced for this purpose from the Sierra Morena, under General Areizaga. The battle was fought (November 12) at Ocana, near Aranjuez; but though the Spaniards behaved with considerable spirit, the miserable incapacity of their commander counterbalanced all their efforts, and an unparalleled rout was the result. Pursued over the wide plains of Castile by the French cavalry, 20,000 prisoners were taken, with all the guns and stores: the wreck was complete and irretrievable; and the defeat of the Duke del Parque (November 25) at Alba de Tormes, dispersed the last force which could be called a Spanish army. It was evident from these events that Portugal was the only basis from which the deliverance of the Peninsula could be effected."

Epitome of Alison's History of Europe, section 576 (chapter 62, volume 13 of complete work).

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (August-December). Wellington's difficulties. His retreat into Portugal.

"In the course of the 29th, the army was reinforced by the arrival of a troop of horse-artillery, and a brigade of light troops from Lisbon, under General Crawford. Under the circumstances of his situation, however, it was impossible for Sir Arthur Wellesley to follow up his victory. The position he occupied was still one of extreme peril. A powerful enemy was advancing on his rear; and no reliance could be placed for the supply of his army, either on the promises of the Spanish General, or of the Junta. The army of Vanegas, which, in obedience to the orders of the Supreme Junta, had advanced from Madrilejos, was engaged, during the 28th and 29th, in endeavouring to dislodge the French garrison from Toledo. His advance pushed on during the night to the neighbourhood of Madrid, and took prisoners some patroles of the enemy. Vanegas, however no sooner learned from the prisoners that Joseph and Sebastiani were approaching, than he … desisted from any further offensive operations. The intelligence that Vanegas had failed in executing the part allotted to him, was speedily followed by information that Soult had with facility driven the Spaniards from the passes leading from Salamanca to Placentia. It was in consequence arranged between the Generals, that the British army should immediately march to attack Soult, and that Cuesta should remain in the position of Talavera, to protect this movement from any operation of Victor. The wounded likewise were to be left in charge of Cuesta. … On the morning of the 3rd of August, the British accordingly commenced their march on Oropesa. On his arrival there, Sir Arthur Wellesley received intelligence that Soult was already at Naval Moral. … Shortly after, a courier arrived from Cuesta, announcing, that, as the enemy were stated to be advancing on his flank, and as it was ascertained that the corps of Ney and Mortier had been united under Soult, he had determined on quitting his position, and joining the British army at Oropesa. This movement was executed the same night; and nearly the whole of the British wounded were left unprotected in the town of Talavera. The conduct of Cuesta, in this precipitate retreat, is altogether indefensible. … In quitting the position of Talavera, Cuesta had abandoned the only situation in which the advance of Victor on the British rear could be resisted with any prospect of success. … The whole calculations of Sir Arthur Wellesley were at once overthrown. … Sir Arthur determined to throw his army across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobisbo. … Cuesta … followed the British in their retreat to the bridge of Arzobisbo, and leaving the Duke del Albuquerque with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to defend it, he withdrew the remainder of his army to Paraleda de Garben. The French, however, having taken post on the opposite side of the river, soon succeeded in discovering a ford by which they crossed, and surprising the Spaniards, drove them at once from the works, with the loss of 30 pieces of cannon. After this, Cuesta with his whole force fell back on Deleytosa, while the British moved to Xaraicejo. … Vanegas … remained with his army in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. On the 5th of August, he succeeded in gaining a decided advantage over an advanced division of the enemy. … {3008} Harassed by inconsistent orders, Vanegas was unfortunately induced again to advance, and give battle to the corps of Sebastiani at Almonacid. This engagement, though many of the Spanish troops behaved with great gallantry, terminated in the complete defeat of the army of Vanegas. It was driven to the Sierra Morena, with the loss of all its baggage and artillery. With this action terminated the campaign which had been undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The British army at Xaraicejo, still served as a shield to the southern provinces, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (whom the gratitude of his country had now ennobled,) [raising him to the peerage as Baron Duke of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera] considered it of importance to maintain the position he then occupied. But the total failure of supplies rendered this impossible, and about the 20th of August he fell back through Merida on Badajos, in the neighbourhood of which he established his army. At this period all operations in concert ceased between the English and Spanish armies. The Supreme Junta complained bitterly of the retreat of the former, which left the road to Seville and Cadiz open to the enemy, while the Marquis Wellesley, then ambassador in Spain, made strong representations of the privations to which the British army had been exposed, by the inattention and neglect of the authorities. In the correspondence which ensued, it appeared that the measure of retreat had been forced on Lord Wellington, by the absolute impossibility of supporting his army in the ground he occupied. … The year had closed in Spain triumphantly for the French arms, as it had commenced. The Spanish armies had sustained a series of unparalleled defeats. The British had retired into Portugal; and the efforts of Lord Wellington, were for the present, limited to the defence of that kingdom."

T. Hamilton, Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns, chapters 7 and 9.

ALSO IN: R. Waite, Life of the Duke of Wellington, chapter 6.

Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 8, chapters 7-9, book 9 (volume 2).

SPAIN: A. D. 1809-1810 (October-September). The Lines of Torres Vedras.

"Since Austria had laid down arms by signing the peace of Vienna, and had thus proved the inefficiency of England's last allies—since among the sovereigns of the Continent Napoleon boasted none but courtiers or subjects, Wellington saw that all the resources and all the efforts of his gigantic power would be turned against the only country which still struggled for the liberty of Europe. What could Spain achieve with her bands of insurgents and her defeated armies, albeit so persevering? or the small English army effect against so formidable an adversary, aided by the combined forces of so many nations? But during the very time when the world looked upon all as lost, and Napoleon's proudest enemies were growing weak, Wellington never despaired of the cause he had embraced. Far from allowing himself to be cast down by the magnitude or the imminence of the danger, he derived from that very circumstance, not only the resolution of fighting to the last extremity, but also the energy to conceive and to execute a project which will continue to be the admiration of the world, and an everlasting lesson to nations oppressed by foreign rule. He had always thought that some day, sooner or later, the whole of Europe would rise against Napoleon's tyranny, provided that an opportunity for such a rising were afforded to it by a prolonged resistance in certain points. The end to aim at therefore was, in his opinion, not so much to drive the French out of the Peninsula, as the tacticians of the central junta wildly fancied, but rather to keep the contest there alive at any cost, until the moment should arrive for so inevitable and universal a revolt. In view of the new invasion pouring into Spain, he could not dream of undertaking any offensive operations against the French. Even if conducted with genius, they would have rapidly exhausted his very limited forces. His small army … could not have lasted a month amidst the large masses of French troops then in Spain. He therefore resolved to entrench it in strong positions, rendered still more formidable by every resource of defensive warfare, where he might defy superiority in numbers and the risk of surprise, where he could also obtain supplies by sea, and whence if necessary he might embark in case of disaster; where, also, he might take advantage of the distances and the difficulties of communication which were so rapidly exhausting our troops, by creating around us a desert in which we should find it impossible to live. To stand out under these restricted but vigorously conceived conditions, and to resist with indomitable obstinacy until Europe, ashamed to let him succumb, should come to his succour, was the only course which afforded Wellington some chance of success in view of the feeble means at his disposal; and such, with equal firmness and decision, was the one he now adopted. The necessity which suggested it to him in no wise diminishes the merit or originality of an operation which was, one may say, without precedent in military history. The position he was seeking for he found in the environs of Lisbon, in the peninsula formed by the Tagus at its entrance to the sea. Protected on almost every side either by the ocean or the river, which at this point is nearly as wide as an inland sea, this peninsula was accessible only on the north where it joined the mainland. There, however, the prolongation of the Sierra d'Estrella presented a series of rugged heights, craggy precipices and deep ravines filled with torrents, forming a true natural barrier, the strength of which had already struck more than one military observer. … Wellington was the first who conceived and executed the project of transforming the whole peninsula into a colossal fortress, of more than a hundred miles in circumference. He desired that this fortress should be composed of three concentric enclosures, defended by cannon, and large enough to contain not only his army and the Portuguese allies—comprising the regular troops, the militia and Ordenanzas—but the whole available population of the Southern provinces of Portugal, with their harvests, their cattle and their provisions, so that the country surrounding Lisbon should offer no resource whatever to the invaders. He at the same time secured his retreat by means of a spacious and fortified port, in which, should any untoward accident occur, the English army and even the Portuguese troops might embark in safety. {3009} This immense citadel extended to the north from Zizembre and the heights of Torres Vedras, which protected its front, as far as Alemquer; thence to the east by Sobral and Alvera it followed the counterforts of the Estrella which overhang the Tagus, and extended to Lisbon, where it was covered alike by the mouth of the river and by the ocean. … From the beginning of the month of October, 1809, with the aid of Colonel Fletcher of the Engineers, he had employed thousands of workmen and peasants, without intermission, in throwing up intrenchments, constructing redoubts, and forming sluices for inundating the plain."

P. Lanfrey, Life of Napoleon I., volume 4, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: W. H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington, volume 2, chapters 9-12.

General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 11, chapter 8 (volume 2).

SPAIN: A D. 1810. Revolt of the Argentine provinces.

See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: A. D. 1806-1820.

SPAIN: A D. 1810-1812. The French advance into Portugal. Their recoil from the Lines of Torres Vedras.

"By the spring of 1810, the French armies in Spain numbered fully 350,000 men, and Napoleon had intended to cross the Pyrenees, at the head of this enormous force. His marriage, however, or more probably the innumerable toils and cares of Empire prevented him from carrying out his purpose; and this was one of the capital mistakes of his life, for his presence was necessary on the scene of events. He still despised the insurrection of Spain; he held Wellington cheap as a 'Sepoy general'; strange as it may appear, he was wholly ignorant of the existence of the Lines of Torres Vedras, and he persisted in maintaining that the only real enemy in the Peninsula was the British army, which he estimated at 25,000 men. He gave Masséna 70,000, with orders 'to drive the English into the sea'; and at the same time, he sent a great army to subdue Andalusia and the South, false to his art in thus dividing his forces. A contest followed renowned in history, and big with memorable results for Europe. Massena took the fortresses on the northeast of Portugal, and by the close of September had entered Beira; he met a bloody reverse at Busaco [September 27], but he succeeded in turning Wellington's flank, and he advanced, in high heart, from Coimbra, on Lisbon. To his amazement, however, the impregnable lines, a gigantic obstacle utterly unforeseen, rose before him, and brought the invaders to a stand, and the 'spoiled child of victory,' daring as he was, after vain efforts to find a vulnerable point, recoiled from before the invincible rampart, baffled and indignant, but as yet hopeful. Massena, with admirable skill, now chose a formidable position near the Tagus, and held the British commander in check. … But Wellington, with wise, if stern, forethought, had wasted the adjoining region with fire and sword; Napoleon, meditating a new war, was unable to despatch a regiment from France; Soult, ordered to move from Andalusia to the aid of his colleague, paused and hung back; and Massena, his army literally starved out, and strengthened by a small detachment only, was at last reluctantly forced to retreat. The movement began in March, 1811; it was conducted with no ordinary skill; but Wellington had attained his object and the French general re-entered Spain with the wreck only of a once noble force. Massena, however, would not confess defeat; having restored and largely increased his army, he attacked Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro, and possibly only missed a victory, owing to the jealousies of inferior men. This, nevertheless, was his last effort; he was superseded in his command by Napoleon, unjust in this instance to his best lieutenant, and Wellington's conduct of the war had been completely justified. Torres Vedras permanently arrested Napoleon's march of conquest; the French never entered Portugal again. … Meantime, the never-ceasing insurrection of Spain continued to waste the Imperial forces, and surrounded them, as it were, with a circle of fire. It was all in vain that another great army was struck down in the field at Ocana; that Suchet invaded and held Valencia; that Soult ravaged Andalusia; that Victor besieged Cadiz. The resistance of the nation became more intense than ever; Saguntum, which had defied Hannibal, Girona, Tortosa, and, above all, Tarragona, defended their walls to the last; and not a village from Asturias to Granada acknowledged Joseph at Madrid, as its lawful king. … After Fuentes de Onoro the contest in Spain had languished in 1811, though Marmont and Soult missed a great chance of assailing Wellington, with very superior numbers. In the following year the British commander pounced on Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, the keys of Spain from the Portuguese frontier, completely deceiving the distant Emperor, who would direct operations from Paris; and he defeated Marmont in a great battle, at Salamanca, beside the Tormes, which threw open to him the gates of Madrid. Yet, in an effort made against the communications of the French, the object he steadily kept in view, he was baffled by the resistance of Burgos, and before long he was in retreat on Portugal, having just escaped from a great French army, so various were the fortunes of this most instructive war."

W. O'C. Morris, Napoleon, chapters 10-11.

ALSO IN: G. Hooper, Wellington, chapter 7.

J. H. Stocqueler, Life of Wellington, volume 1, chapters 4-10.

General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, volumes 2-3.

R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, volumes 4-5.

A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and Empire, book 42 (volume 4).

General Sir J. T. Jones, Journal of the Sieges in Spain, volume 1.

SPAIN: A. D. 1810-1821. Revolt and achievement of independence in Venezuela and New Granada.

See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1810-1819.

A. D. 1810-1825. Revolt and independence of Mexico.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1810-1819; and 1820-1826.

SPAIN: A. D. 1812 (June-August). Wellington's victory at Salamanca. Abandonment of Madrid by King Joseph.

"In the month of May, 1812, that rupture took place [between Napoleon and Alexander I. of Russia] which was to determine, by its issue, whether Europe should acknowledge one master; and Napoleon, too confident in his own fortunes, put himself at the head of his armies and marched on Moscow. The war in Spain, which had hitherto occupied the first place in public attention, became from that hour, as far as France was concerned, a matter of minor consideration. Whatever effective battalions were at the disposal of the war-minister, were forwarded to the Vistula; while to recruit the regiments in Spain, depôts were formed in the south, out of which, from time to time, a body of conscripts were equipped and dispatched to reinforce the French armies. {3010} Lord Wellington's army consisted of 60,000 men, Portuguese and Spaniards included. Of these, 10,000 infantry, with about 1,200 cavalry, were cantoned on the Tagus at Almarez; while the commander-in-chief, with the remainder, prepared to operate, on the north of that river, against Marmont. The capture of the redoubts at Almarez had, in some degree, isolated the French marshal; and, although he was at the head of 50,000 veterans, Lord Wellington felt himself in a condition to cope with him. At the same time Lord Wellington had to observe Soult, who, commanding the army of the south, was around Seville and Cordova with 58,000 men—while Suchet held the eastern provinces with 50,000 excellent troops—Souham was in the north with 10,000—and the army of the centre, probably 15,000 more, was disposed around the capital, and kept open the communications between the detached corps. On the other hand, there were on foot no Spanish armies deserving of the name. Bands of guerrillas moved, indeed, hither and thither, rendering the communications between the French armies and their depots exceedingly insecure; but throughout the north, and west, and centre of Spain, there was no single corps in arms of any military respectability. In the east, Generals Lacy and Sarsfield were at the head of corps which did good service, and occupied Suchet pretty well; while D'Eroles, more bold than prudent, committed himself at Rhonda with General Rourke, in a combat which ended in his total defeat and the dispersion of his troops. Yet were the French far from being masters of the country. Few fortified towns, Cadiz and Alicante excepted, continued to display the standard of independence, but every Sierra and mountain range swarmed with the enemies of oppression, out of whom an army, formidable from its numbers, if not for its discipline, might at any moment be formed. But it had never entered into the counsels of the allies to furnish a nucleus round which such an army might be gathered. … Meanwhile, the commander-in-chief, after having given his army a few weeks' repose, … broke up from his cantonments, and advanced in the direction of Salamanca. On the 17th of June his divisions crossed the Tormes, by the fords above and below the town, and, finding no force in the field competent to resist them, marched direct upon the capital of the province." Salamanca was taken on the 27th of June, after a siege of ten days, and a series of manœuvres—a great game of tactics between the opposing commanders—ensued, which occupied their armies without any serious collision, until the 22d of July, when the decisive battle of Salamanca was fought. "The dispositions of the French, though masterly against one less self-collected, had been, throughout the day, in Wellington's opinion, full of hazard. They aimed at too much—and, manœuvring to throw themselves in force upon the English right, risked, as the event proved fatally, the weakening of their own right and centre. Lord Wellington saw that filing constantly in one direction disconnected the divisions of Marmont's army, and left an interval where he might strike to advantage. … It was the first mistake that Marmont had made, and Wellington never permitted him to retrieve it. Lord Wellington had dined amid the ranks of the third division, and Packenham, its frank and chivalrous leader, was one of those who shared his simple and soldier-like meal. To him the commander-in-chief gave his orders, somewhat in the following words: 'Do you see those fellows on the hill, Packenham? Throw your division into columns of battalions —at them directly—and drive them to the devil.' Instantly the division was formed—and the order executed admirably. … By this magnificent operation, the whole of the enemy's left was destroyed. Upward of 3,000 prisoners remained in the hands of the victors, while the rest, broken and dispirited, fell back in utter confusion upon the reserves, whom they swept away with them in their flight. Meanwhile, in the centre, a fiercer contest was going on. … Marmont, … struck down by the explosion of a shell, was carried off the field early in the battle, with a broken arm and two severe wounds in the side. The command then devolved upon Clausel, who did all that man in his situation could do to retrieve the fortune of the day. … But Lord Wellington was not to be arrested in his success, nor could his troops be restrained in their career of victory. … Seven thousand prisoners, two eagles, with a number of cannon and other trophies, remained in the hands of the English: 10,000 men, in addition, either died on the field or were disabled by wounds; whereas the loss on the part of the allies amounted to scarcely 5,000 men. … After this disaster, Clausel continued his retreat by forced marches. … Meanwhile, Joseph, ignorant of the result of the late battle, was on his way, with 20,000 men, to join Marmont, and had arrived at the neighbourhood of Arevolo before the intelligence of that officer's defeat was communicated to him. He directed his columns instantly toward Segovia. … On the 7th of August the British army moved; … while Joseph, retreating with precipitation, left the passes of the Guadarama open, and returned to Madrid, where the confusion was now extreme. … Lord Wellington's march was conducted with all the celerity and good order which distinguished every movement of his now magnificent army. On the 7th, he entered Segovia. … On the 12th [he] entered Madrid in triumph. … The city exhibited the appearance of a carnival, and the festivities were kept up till the dawn of the 13th came in. … Immediately the new constitution was proclaimed; Don Carlos D'Espana was appointed governor of the city, and the people, still rejoicing, yet restrained from excesses of every sort, returned to their usual employments."

General Vane (Marquess of Londonderry), Story of the Peninsular War, chapter 30.

ALSO IN: General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 18 (volume 4).

Lieutenant Colonel Williams, Life, and Times of Wellington, volume 1, pages 275-290.

{3011}

SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814. Final campaigns of the Peninsular War. Expulsion of the French.

"The south and centre of Spain … seemed clear of enemies, but the hold of the French was as yet shaken only, not broken; for in fact though Wellington's march had forced his enemies in two directions (Clausel, with the remainder of Marmont's army, having retired north, while the king withdrew south-east), such were their numbers that each division became the centre of an army as powerful as his own. … Of the two armies against which Wellington had to contend by far the largest was the army of Soult, and the king, on the south-east. On the other hand, Clausel's forces were beaten and retreating, so that it appeared to the general better to leave a detachment under Hill to cover Madrid, while he himself repaired with the bulk of his army to strike a final blow at Clausel by the capture of Burgos, intending to return at once and with his whole combined forces fight a great battle with Soult and the king before the capital. … The resistance offered by Burgos and the deficiency of proper artillery proved greater obstacles than had been expected. The delay thus caused allowed the French to recover. … As Soult began to draw towards Madrid from Valencia, thus threatening the safety of Hill, there was no course left but to summon that general northward, and to make a combined retreat towards Salamanca and Portugal. … This was the last of Wellington's retreats. Events in Europe lessened the power of his enemies; while fighting for his very existence on the main continent of Europe, Napoleon could not but regard the war in Spain as a very secondary concern, and a great many old and valuable soldiers were withdrawn. The jealousy which existed between Joseph and the generals, and the dislike of the great generals to take upon themselves the Spanish war, threw it into inferior hands for some little while, and there is little more to chronicle than a succession of hard-won victories. … A vigorous insurrection had arisen all along the northern provinces; and it was this more than anything else which decided Wellington's course of action. While leaving troops to occupy the attention of the French in the valley of the Tagus, he intended to march northwards, … connect himself with the northern insurgents, and directly threaten the communications with France. … As he had expected, the French had to fall back before him; he compelled them to evacuate Burgos and attempt to defend the Ebro. Their position there was turned, and they had again to fall back into the basin of Vittoria. This is the plain of the river Zadora, which forms in its course almost a right angle at the south-west corner of the plain, which it thus surrounds on two sides. Across the plain and through Vittoria runs the high road to France, the only one in the neighbourhood sufficiently large to allow of the retreat of the French army, encumbered with all its stores and baggage, and the accumulated wealth of some years of occupation of Spain. While Wellington forced the passage of the river in front south of the great bend, and drove the enemy back to the town of Vittoria, Graham beyond the town closed this road. The beaten enemy had to retreat as best he could towards Salvatierra, leaving behind all the artillery, stores, baggage, and equipments [June 21, 1813]. The offensive armies of France had now to assume the defensive and to guard their own frontier. Before advancing to attack them in the mountains, Wellington undertook the blockade of Pampeluna and the siege of St. Sebastian. It was impossible for the French any longer to regard diplomatic or dynastic niceties. Joseph was superseded, and the defence of France intrusted to Soult, with whom the king had hopelessly quarrelled. He proved himself worthy of the charge. A series of terrible battles was fought in the Pyrenees, but one by one his positions were forced. With fearful bloodshed, St. Sebastian was taken, the Bidasoa was crossed (October 7), the battle of the Nivelle fought and won (November 10), and at length, in February, the lower Adour was passed, Bayonne invested, and Soult obliged to withdraw towards the east. But by this time events on the other side of France had changed the appearance of the war. … Napoleon was being constantly driven backward upon the east. The effect could not but be felt by the southern army, and Soult deserves great credit for the skill with which he still held at bay the victorious English. He was however defeated at Orthes (February 27), lost Bordeaux (March 8), and was finally driven eastward towards Toulouse, intending to act in union with Suchet, whose army in Catalonia was as yet unbeaten. On the heights upon the east of Toulouse, for Wellington had brought his army across the Garonne, was fought, with somewhat doubtful result, the great battle of Toulouse [April 10]. The victory has been claimed by both parties; the aim of the English general was however won, the Garonne was passed, the French position taken, Toulouse evacuated and occupied by the victors. The triumph such as it was had cost the victors 7,000 or 8,000 men, a loss of life which might have been spared, for Napoleon had already abdicated, and the battle was entirely useless."

J. F. Bright, History of England, period 3, pages. 1317-1321.

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapters 76-77 (volume 16).

Count Miot de Melito, Memoirs, chapters 33-34.

General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the! Peninsula, volumes 4-5.

SPAIN: A. D. 1813. Possession of West Florida taken by the United States.

See FLORIDA: A. D. 1810-1813.

SPAIN: A. D. 1813-1814 (December-May). Restoration of Ferdinand and despotic government. Abolition of the Cortes. Re-establishment of the Inquisition. Hostility of the people to freedom.

"The troops of the allies in Catalonia were paralyzed, when just about to take their last measures against Suchet, and, as they hoped, drive out the last of the French from Spain. An envoy arrived from the captive Ferdinand, with the news that Ferdinand and Napoleon had made a treaty, and that the Spaniards might not fight the French any more, nor permit the English to do so on their soil. Ferdinand had been a prisoner at Valençay for five years and a half; and during that time he had, by his own account, known nothing of what was doing in Spain, but from the French newspapers. The notion uppermost in his little mind at this time appears to have been that the Cortes and the liberal party in Spain were 'Jacobins and infidels,' and that it was all-important that he should return, to restore absolutism and the Inquisition. In sending to Spain the treaty he had made with Napoleon, he took no notice whatever of the Cortes, but addressed himself solely to the Regency: and with them, his business was to consult whether he should adhere to the treaty or break through it;— which he might easily do on the plea that it was an extorted act, agreed to under deficient knowledge of the state of Spain. Thus crooked was the policy, even at the moment of restoration, of the foolish prince who seems to have had no ability for any thing but mean and petty intrigue. The terms of the treaty might easily be anticipated from the circumstances under which it was made. {3012} Napoleon wanted to shake out the British from his southwestern quarter; he was in great need of the veteran French troops who were prisoners in Spain: and he had no longer any hope of restoring his brother Joseph. The treaty of December, 1813, therefore provided that Ferdinand and his successors should be recognised as monarchs of Spain and of the Indies: that the territory of Spain should be what it had been before the war—the French giving up any hold they had there: that Ferdinand should maintain the integrity of this territory, clearing it completely of the British: that France and Spain should ally themselves to maintain their maritime rights against England: that all the Spaniards who had adhered to King Joseph should be reinstated in whatever they had enjoyed under him: that all prisoners on both sides should immediately be sent home: and that Joseph and his wife should receive large annuities from Spain. The General of the Spanish forces in Catalonia, Copons, was in so much haste to conclude a separate armistice for himself, with Suchet, without any regard to his British comrades, that the Cortes had to act with the utmost rapidity to prevent it. Since the Cortes had invested themselves with executive, as well as legislative power, the Regency had become a mere show: and now, when the Cortes instantly quashed the treaty, the Regency followed the example. On the 8th of January, the Regency let his Majesty know how much he was beloved and desired; but also, how impossible it was to ratify any act done by him while in a state of captivity. As Napoleon could not get back his troops from Spain in this way, he tried another. He released some of Ferdinand's chief officers, and sent them to him, with advocates of his own, to arrange about an end to the war, and exchanging prisoners; and General Palafox, one of the late captives, went to Madrid, where, however, he met with no better success than his predecessor. By that time (the end of January) it was settled that the Spanish treaty, whatever it might be, was to be framed under the sanction of the Allies, at the Congress of Chatillon. With the hope of paralyzing the Spanish forces by division, Napoleon sent Ferdinand back to Spain. He went through Catalonia, and arrived in his own dominions on the 24th of March. … These intrigues and negotiations caused extreme vexation to Wellington. They suddenly stopped every attempt to expel the French from Catalonia, and threatened to bring into the field against him all the prisoners he had left behind him in Spain: and there was no saying how the winding-up of the war might be delayed or injured by the political quarrels which were sure to break out whenever Ferdinand and the Cortes came into collision. … He therefore lost no time: and the war was over before Ferdinand entered Madrid. It was on the 14th of May that he entered Madrid, his carriage drawn by the populace. As he went through the city on foot, to show his confidence, the people cheered him. They were aware of some suspicious arrests, but were willing to hope that they were merely precautionary. Then followed the complete restoration of the religious orders to the predominance which had been found intolerable before; the abolition of the Cortes; and the re-establishment of the Inquisition. The Constitution had been rejected by the King before his entry into Madrid. In a few weeks, the whole country was distracted with discontent and fear; and, in a few months, the prisons of Madrid were so overflowing with state prisoners—ninety being arrested on one September night—that convents were made into prisons for the safe-keeping of the King's enemies. Patriots were driven into the mountains, and became banditti, while Ferdinand was making arrests right and left, coercing the press, and ceremoniously conveying to the great square, to be there burned in ignominy, the registers of the proceedings of the late Cortes."

H. Martineau, History of England, 1800-1815, book 2, chapter 6.

"Ferdinand was a person of narrow mind, and his heart seems to have been incapable of generous feeling; but he was not a wicked man, nor would he have been a bad King if he had met with wise ministers, and had ruled over an enlightened people. On the two important subjects of civil and religious freedom he and the great body of the nation were in perfect sympathy,—both, upon both subjects, imbued with error to the core; and the popular feeling in both cases outran his. The word Liberty ('Libertad') appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance of the Hall of the Cortes in Madrid. The people of their own impulse hurried thither to remove it. … The Stone of the Constitution, as it was called, was everywhere removed. … The people at Seville deposed all the existing authorities, elected others in their stead to all the offices which had existed under the old system, and then required those authorities to re-establish the Inquisition. In reestablishing that accursed tribunal by a formal act of government, in suppressing the freedom of the press, which had been abused to its own destruction, and in continuing to govern not merely as an absolute monarch, but as a despotic one, Ferdinand undoubtedly complied with the wishes of the Spanish nation. … But, in his treatment of the more conspicuous persons among the 'Liberales,' whom he condemned to strict and long imprisonment, many of them for life, he brought upon himself an indelible reproach."

R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, chapter 46 (volume 6).

SPAIN: A. D. 1814-1827. The Constitution of 1812. Abrogated by Ferdinand. Restored by the Revolution of 1820. Intervention of the Holy Alliance. Absolutism and bigotry reinstated by the arms of France.

"During the war and the captivity of Ferdinand, the Cortès had, in March 1812 established a new Constitution, by which the royal authority was reduced to little more than a name. … Ferdinand VII., after his return, immediately applied himself to restore the ancient regime in all its unmitigated bigotry and exclusiveness. He issued decrees, in May, 1814, by which all Liberals and Free·masons, and all adherents of the Cortès, and of the officers appointed by them, were either compelled to fly, or subjected to imprisonment, or at least deposed. All national property was wrested from the purchasers of it, not only without compensation, but fines were even imposed upon the holders. All dissolved convents were re-established. The Inquisition was restored, and Mir Capillo, Bishop of Almeria, appointed Grand Inquisitor, who acted with fanatical severity, and is said to have incarcerated 50,000 persons for their opinions, many of whom were subjected to torture. … Ten thousand persons are computed to have fled into France. The kingdom was governed by a Camarilla, consisting of the King's favourites, selected from the lowest and most worthless of the courtiers. … The French invasion of Spain had occasioned a revolution in Spanish America.

See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: A. D. 1806-1820; COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1810-1819; MEXICO: A. D. 1810-1819, and 1820-1826; CHILE: A. D. 1810-1818; PERU: A. D. 1820-18261.

{3013}

The loss of the American colonies, and a bad system of rural economy, by which agriculture was neglected in favour of sheep-breeding, had reduced Spain to great poverty. This state of things naturally affected the finances; the troops were left unpaid, and broke out into constant mutinies. A successful insurrection of this kind, led by Colonels Quiroga and Riego, occurred in 1820. Mina, who had distinguished himself as a guerilla leader, but, having compromised himself in a previous mutiny, had been compelled to fly into France, now recrossed the Pyrenees to aid the movement. The Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed at Saragossa; and the cowardly Ferdinand … was also obliged to proclaim it at Madrid, March 8th 1820. The Cortès was convened in July, when Ferdinand opened the Assembly with an hypocritical speech; remarkable for its exaggeration of Liberal sentiments. The Cortès immediately proceeded again to dissolve the convents, and even to seize the tithes of the secular clergy, on the pretext that the money was required for the necessities of the State. The Inquisition was once more abolished, the freedom of the press ordained, the right of meeting and forming clubs restored. … The Spanish revolutionists were divided into three parties: the Decamisados, answering to the French 'Sans-culottes'; the Communeros, who were for a moderate constitutional system; and the Anilleros, known by the symbol of a ring; who, dreading the interference of the Holy Alliance, endeavoured to conciliate the people with the crown. On the whole, the insurgents used their victory with moderation, and, with the exception of some few victims of revenge, contented themselves with depriving their opponents, the Serviles, of their places and emoluments. … The revolution, though originated by the soldiery, was adopted by the more educated class of citizens. On the other hand, the clergy and the peasantry were bitterly opposed to it. In the summer of 1821, guerilla bands were organised in the provinces in the cause of Church and King, and obtained the name of 'Armies of the Faith.' … In these civil disturbances dreadful atrocities were committed on both sides. … The French Government, with the ulterior design of interfering in Spanish affairs, seized the pretext of this disorder to place a cordon of troops on the Pyrenees; to which the Spaniards opposed an army of observation. Ferdinand, relying on the Army of the Faith, and on his Foreign Minister, Martinez de la Rosa, a Moderado, thought he might venture on a coup d'etat before the appearance of the French; but his guards were worsted in a street fight, July 7th 1822. … Ferdinand was now base enough to applaud and thank the victors, to dismiss the Moderados from the Ministry, and to replace them by Exaltados, or Radicals. This state of things had attracted the attention of the Holy Alliance. In October 1822, the three northern monarchs assembled in congress at Verona, to adopt some resolution respecting Spain. …

See VERONA: THE CONGRESS OF.

They addressed a note to the Spaniards requiring the restoration of absolutism. … In the spring, the French army of observation, which had been increased to 100,000 men, was placed under the command of the Duke of Angoulême." The Spanish troops "were few and ill disciplined; while in Old Castile stood guerilla bands, under the priest Merino, ready to aid the French invasion. An attempt on the part of Ferdinand to dismiss his Liberal ministry induced the ministers and the Cortès to remove him to Seville (March, 20th 1823), whither the Cortès were to follow. The Duke of Angoulême addressed a proclamation to the Spaniards from Bayonne, April 2nd, in which he told them that he did not enter Spain as an enemy, but to liberate the captive King, and, in conjunction with the friends of order, to re-establish the altar and the throne. The French crossed the Bidassoa, April 7th. The only serious resistance which they experienced was from Mina [in Catalonia]. Ballasteros [in Navarre] was not strong enough to oppose them, while the traitor O'Donnell [commanding a reserve in New Castile] entered into negociations with the enemy, and opened to them the road to the capital. Ballasteros was compelled to retire into Valencia, and the French entered Madrid, May 23rd. A Regency … was now instituted till the King should be rescued. … A French corps was despatched … against Seville, where the Cortès had reopened their sittings; but on the advance of the French they retired to Cadiz, June 12th, taking with them the King, whom they declared of unsound mind, and a provisional Regency was appointed." The French advanced and laid siege to Cadiz, which capitulated October 1st, after a bombardment, the Cortès escaping by sea. Mina, in Catalonia, gave up resistance in November. "The Duke of Angoulême returned to Paris before the end of the year, but Spain continued to be occupied by an army of 40,000 French. The first act of Ferdinand after his release was to publish a proclamation, October 1st, revoking all that had been done since March 7th 1820. The Inquisition, indeed, was not restored; but the vengeance exercised by the secular tribunals was so atrocious that the Duke of Angoulême issued an order prohibiting arrests not sanctioned by the French commander: an act, however, which on the principle of non-interference was disavowed by the French Government. … It is computed that 40,000 Constitutionalists, chiefly of the educated classes, were thrown into prison. The French remained in Spain till 1827. M. Zea Bermudez, the new Minister, endeavoured to rule with moderation. But he was opposed on all sides. … His most dangerous enemy was the Apostolic Junta, erected in 1824 for the purpose of carrying out to its full extent, and independently of the Ministry, the victory of bigotry and absolutism." In 1825, Bermudez was driven to resign. "The Junta … in the spring of 1827 excited in Catalonia an insurrection of the Serviles. The insurgents styled themselves Aggraviados (aggrieved persons), because the King did not restore the Inquisition, and because he sometimes listened to his half Liberal ministers, or to the French and English ambassadors, instead of suffering the Junta to rule uncontrolled. The history of the revolt is obscure. … The object seems to have been to dethrone Ferdinand in favour of his brother Carlos." The insurrection was suppressed, "the province disarmed, and many persons executed."

T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 8 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: E. Blaquiere, Historical Review of the Spanish Revolution.

F. A. de Châteaubriand, Memoirs: Congress of Verona, volume 1.

S. Walpole, History of England, chapter 9 (volume 2).

Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1815-1852, chapters 7, and 11-12.

{3014}

SPAIN: A. D. 1815. The Allies in France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY-NOVEMBER).

SPAIN: A. D. 1815. Accession to the Holy Alliance.

See HOLY ALLIANCE.

SPAIN: A. D. 1818. Chile lost to the Spanish crown.

See CHILE: A. D. 1810-1818.

SPAIN: A. D. 1821. Mexican independence practically gained. Iturbide's empire.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1820-1826.

SPAIN: A. D. 1822-1823. The Congress of Verona. French intervention approved.

See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.

SPAIN: A. D. 1824. Peruvian independence won at Ayacucho.

See PERU: A. D. 1820-1826.

SPAIN: A. D. 1833. Accession of Isabella II.

SPAIN: A. D. 1833-1846. The civil war of Carlists and Christinos. Abdication of Christina. Regency of Espartero. Revolution of 1843. Accession of Queen Isabella. Louis Philippe and his Spanish marriages.

"The eyes of King Ferdinand VII. were scarcely closed, September 29th, 1833, when the Apostolic party—whose strength lay in the north of Spain, and especially in Navarre and the Basque provinces —proclaimed his brother, Don Carlos, king under the title of Charles V. In order to offer a successful resistance to the Carlists, who were fighting for absolutism and priestcraft, there was no other course for the regent, Maria Christina, than to throw herself into the arms of the liberal party. So the seven years' war between Carlists and Christinos, from a war of succession, became a strife of principles and a war of citizens. At the outset, owing to the skill of General Zumalacarreguy, to whom the Christinos could oppose no leader of equal ability, the Carlists had the advantage in the field. Don Carlos threatened the Spanish frontiers from Portugal, where he had been living in exile with his dear nephew, Don Miguel. In this strait, Christina applied to England and France, and between those two states and Spain and Portugal was concluded the quadruple alliance of April 22d, 1834, the aim of which was to uphold the constitutional thrones of Isabella and Maria da Gloria, and to drive out the two pretenders, Carlos and Miguel. In that year both pretenders, who enjoyed to a high degree the favor of the Pope and the Eastern powers, had to leave Portugal. Carlos reached England on an English ship in June, but fled again in July, and, after an adventurous journey through France, appeared suddenly in Navarre, to inspire his followers with courage by the royal presence. The war was conducted with passion and cruelty on both sides. After the death of Zumalacarreguy at the siege of Bilbao, June 14th, 1835, the Christinos, who were superior in point of numbers, seemed to have the advantage. … The turning-point was reached when the command of the Christino army was committed to Espartero. In 1836 he defeated the Carlists in the murderous battle of Luchana. In 1837, when Carlos advanced into the neighborhood of Madrid, he hastened to the succor of the capital, and compelled him to retreat. To these losses were added disunion in the Carlist camp. The utterly incapable, dependent pretender was the tool of his Camarilla, which made excellence in the catechism a more important requisite for the chief command than military science, and which deposed the most capable generals to put its own creatures in command. The new commander-in-chief, Guergué, said, bluntly, to Carlos, 'We, the blockheads and ignoramuses, have yet to conduct your Majesty to Madrid; and whoever does not belong in that category is a traitor.' This Apostolic hero was defeated several times by Espartero in 1838, and the enthusiasm of the northern provinces gradually cooled down. He was deposed, and the chief command intrusted to the cunning Maroto. … As he [Maroto] did not succeed in winning victories over Espartero, who overmatched him, he concluded, instead, August 31st, 1839, the treaty of Vergara, in accordance with which he went over to the Christinos, with his army, and by that means obtained full amnesty, and the confirmation of the privileges of Navarre and the Basque provinces. After this, Don Carlos's cause was hopelessly lost. He fled, in September, to France, with many of his followers, and was compelled to pass six years in Bourges under police supervision. In 1845, after he had resigned his claims in favor of his eldest son, the Duke of Montemolin, he received permission to depart, and went to Italy. He died in Trieste, March 10th, 1855. His followers, under Cabrera, carried on the war for some time longer in Catalonia. But they, too, were overcome by Espartero, and in July, 1840, they fled, about 8,000 strong, to France, where they were put under surveillance. The civil war was at an end, but the strife of principles continued. Espartero, who had been made Duke of Victory (Vittoria), was the most important and popular personage in Spain, with whom the regent, as well as everybody else, had to reckon. In the mean time Christina had contrived to alienate the respect and affection of the Spaniards, both by her private life and her political conduct. Her liberal paroxysms were not serious, and gave way, as soon as the momentary need was past, to the most opposite tendency. … In 1836 the Progressists apprehended a reaction, and sought to anticipate it. Insurrections were organized in the larger cities, and the constitution of 1812 was made the programme of the revolt. … Soldiers of the guard forced their way into the palace, and compelled [Christina] to accept the constitution of 1812. A constitutional assembly undertook a revision of this, and therefrom resulted the new constitution of 1837. Christina swore to it, but hoped, by controlling the elections, to bring the Moderados into the Cortes and the ministry. When she succeeded in this, in 1840, she issued a municipal ordinance placing the appointment of the municipal authorities in the hands of the administration. This occasioned riots in Madrid and other cities; and when Christina commissioned Espartero, who was just returning victorious, to suppress the revolt in Madrid, he refused to constitute himself the tool of an unpopular policy. But he was the only man who could hold in check the revolution which threatened to break out on all sides; and so, September 16th, 1840, he had to be named minister president. … Under such circumstances the regency had but little charm for Christina, and there were, moreover, other causes working with these to the same result. {3015} Soon after the death of her husband, she had bestowed her favor on a young lifeguardsman named Munoz, made him her chamberlain, and been secretly married to him. This union soon published itself in a rich blessing of offspring, but it was not until the year 1844 that her public marriage with Munoz, and his elevation to the rank of duke (of Rianzares) and grandee of Spain took place. Having by this course of life forfeited the fame of an honest woman, and exposed herself to all sorts of attacks, she preferred to leave the country. October 12th, she abdicated the regency, and journeyed to France. May 8th, 1841, the newly elected Cortes named Espartero regent of Spain, and guardian of Queen Isabella and her sister, the Infanta Luisa Fernanda. … Since he knew how actively Christina, supported by Louis Philippe, was working against him with gold and influence, he entered into closer relations with England, whereupon his envious foes and rivals accused him of the sale of Spanish commercial interests to England. Because he quieted rebellious Barcelona by a bombardment in 1842, he was accused of tyranny. In 1843 new insurrections broke out in the south; Colonel Prim hastened to Catalonia, and set himself at the head of the soldiers whom Christina's agents had won over by a liberal use of money; Espartero's deadliest foe, General Narvaez, landed in Valencia, and marched into Madrid at the head of the troops. Espartero, against whom Progressists and Moderados had conspired together, found himself forsaken, and embarked at Cadiz, July 26th 1843, for England, whence he did not dare to return to his own country until 1848. In November, 1843, the thirteen-year-old Isabella was declared of age. She assumed the government, made Narvaez, now Duke of Valencia, minister president, and recalled her mother. Thereby gate and doors were opened to the French influence, and the game of intrigue and reaction recommenced. In 1845 the constitution of 1837 was altered in the interests of absolutism. … In order to secure to his house a lasting influence in Spain, and acquire for it the reversion of the Spanish throne, Louis Philippe, in concert with Christina, effected, October 16th, 1846, the marriage of Isabella with her kinsman Francis of Assis, and of the Infanta Luisa with the Duke of Montpensier, his own youngest son. (At first his plan was to marry Isabella also to one of his sons, the Duke of Aumale, but he abandoned it on account of the energetic protest of the Palmerston cabinet, and, instead, chose for Isabella, in Francis of Assis, the person who, by reason of his mental and physical weakness, would be least likely to stand in the way of his son Montpensier.) This secretly negotiated marriage cost Louis Philippe the friendship of the English cabinet."

W. Müller, Political History of Modern Times, section 9.

ALSO IN: W. Bollaert, The Wars of Succession in Portugal and Spain, 1826 to 1840, volume 2.

C. F. Henningsen, A Twelve Months' Campaign with Zumalacarregui.

Sir H. L. Bulwer (Lord Dalling), Life of Palmerston, volume 3, chapter 7.

C. A. Fyffe, History of Modern Europe, volume 2, chapter 6.

SPAIN: A. D. 1845-1860. Cuba in danger from the United States. Filibustering movements. The Ostend Manifesto.

See CUBA: A. D. 1845-1860.

SPAIN: A. D. 1861. Allied intervention in Mexico.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1861-1867.

SPAIN: A. D. 1866. War with Peru. Repulse from Callao.

See PERU: A. D. 1826-1876.

SPAIN: A. D. 1866-1873. Vices and misgovernment of Isabella. Revolution of 1868. Flight of the Queen. Constitution of 1869. Religious toleration. Candidates for the vacant throne. Election of Amadeo of Italy. Unfriendliness of the nation to him. His abdication.

"In January, 1866, occurred an insurrection headed by General Prim, a leading officer of the army, which, failing, caused his temporary exile. In June there originated in the barrack of San Gil, a few hundred yards from the palace, a more serious revolt, which extended over a great part of Madrid. In October of the same year the Ministry, in a public proclamation, alleged as a justification for an autocratic exercise of power, that 'revolutionary tendencies constituted an imposing organism with dangerous pretensions; that a rebellion adverse to the fundamental institutions of the country and the dynasty of Isabella, such as had never been seen in Spain, had obtained possession of important municipalities, and triumphed in the deputations from all the provinces,' and that it was necessary to dissolve the municipalities and renew the provisional deputations. … By this arbitrary assumption Spain was under as complete a despotism as existed in the neighboring empire of Morocco. The dissatisfaction at such maladministration, such abuses in the government, and the thinly disguised immoralities of the Queen, soon found expression in audible murmurs and severe criticism. These verbal protests were followed by machinations for the overthrow or control of a sovereign subject to ambitious priests and a venal coterie. Two exiles, Marshal Serrano and Marshal Prim, united with Admiral Topete at Cadiz, and began a revolution which soon had the sympathy and co-operation of a large part of the army and the navy. A provisional revolutionary junta of forty-one persons—a few others, notably Sagasta and Martos, were afterwards added —was appointed, which signed decrees and orders having the force and effect of laws. In less than a month Francisco Serrano was authorized by the junta to form a temporary ministry to rule the country until the Cortes should meet. The defeat of the royal troops near Alcolea prevented the return of Isabella to Madrid, and on September 30, 1868, she fled across the border into France. … With the flight of the Queen vanished for a time the parliamentary monarchy, and, despite her impotent proclamations from France, and offers of amnesty, a provisional government was at once established. A decree of the Government to take inventories of 'all the libraries, collections of manuscripts, works of art, or objects of historical value—a measure necessary to make useful and available these treasures, and to prevent spoliation and transfer —was peacefully executed except at Burgos. Here, under instigation of the priests and aided by them, a mob assembled, broke down the doors of the cathedral, assassinated the Governor, wounded the chief of police, and expelled those engaged in making the required examination and inventory. This outbreak, attributed to a clerical and Carlist conspiracy, awakened opposition and horror. A strong pressure was created for the immediate establishment of freedom of worship. {3016} The atrocious butchery at Burgos aroused the inhabitants of the capital. The Nuncio was so imperilled by the excited populace that the diplomatic corps interposed for the safety and protection of their colleague. Marshal Serrano quieted the angry multitude gathered at his residence by saying that the Government had prepared the project of a constitution to be submitted to the Constitutional Assembly, one of whose first articles was liberty of worship. On February 12, 1869, the Constitutional Cortes convoked by the Provisional Government, assembled with unusual pomp and ceremony and with striking demonstrations of popular enthusiasm. … The Republicans, among whom the eloquent Castelar was influential, were a compact phalanx, and to them the independent Progresistas, led by General Prim, made overtures which were accepted. On Sunday June 5, 1869, the Constitution was promulgated. … While recognizing the provinces and endowing them with important functions, the Cortes rejected the plan of a federal republic, and adhered to the monarchical form of government as corresponding with and a concession to Spanish traditions, and as most likely to secure a larger measure of the liberal principles of the revolution. The Constitution, the legitimate outgrowth of that popular uprising, recognized the natural and inherent rights of man, and established an elective monarchy. … Congress was chosen by universal suffrage. The provincial assemblies and the municipal authorities were elected by the people of their respective localities. The ancient privileges of the aristocracy were annulled, and the equality of all men before the law was recognized. … The Clerical party claimed the continued maintenance of the Roman Catholic Church and the exclusion of all other worship, but the country had outgrown such intolerance. … The Catholic form of faith was retained in the organic law as the religion of the State, but a larger liberty of worship was secured to the people. In Article XXI. the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion was declared the State religion, and the obligation to maintain its worship and ministers was imposed. Foreigners were granted toleration for public and private worship under the limitations of the universal rules of morals and right, and Spaniards, even, professing another than the Catholic religion were to have the like toleration. … Spain quietly passed from the anomalous condition of a provisional into a regular constitutional government, the title of Provisional Government having been changed to that of Executive Power. In June a regency was established, and Serrano was chosen by a vote of 193 to 45. From June 16, 1869, the date of Prim's first cabinet, until December 27, 1870, when he was shot [as he rode through the street, by assassins, who escaped], he had four separate ministries besides several changes of individual ministers; and this instability is characteristic of Spanish politics. … For the vacant throne some Spaniards turned to the Duke of Montpensier; some to the Court of Portugal, and in default thereof to the house of Savoy. … At the moment of greatest embarrassment, the candidature of Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, was proposed [—a proposal which led to the Franco-German war: see FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (JUNE-JULY)]. … Leopold's declension was a welcome relief. His candidacy being removed, the strife for the throne became fiercer. On November 3, 1870, General Prim announced to the Cortes the Duke of Aosta, son of Victor Emmanuel, as the Ministerial candidate for the crown. Castelar impetuously denounced the attempt to put a foreigner over Spaniards. On the 15th, Amadeo was elected king, receiving on a vote by ballot a majority of seventy-one of those present and a majority of eighteen in a full house. … The choice excited no enthusiasm, elicited no applause, nor was a viva given by the multitude outside the building where the Cortes had made a sovereign. Thirty thousand troops, discreetly posted in principal thoroughfares, prevented any hostile demonstration, and the leading Republicans, Figueras, Castelar, and Piyy Margall, advised against any acts of violence. Many journals condemned the Cortes. Grandees, protested, placards caricatured and ridiculed. … Nevertheless, Zorrilla went to Italy to make the formal tender of the crown, and on January 2, 1871, the prince reached Madrid and took the prescribed oaths of office in the presence of the regent, the Cortes, and the diplomatic corps. The ceremony was brief and simple. The reception by the populace was respectful and cold. The Provisional Government resigned, and a new ministry was appointed, embracing such men as, Serrano, Martos, Moret, Sagasta, and Zorrilla. … Amadeo never had the friendship of the Carlists nor of the simon-pure Monarchists. The dynasty was offensive to the adherents of Don Carlos and of Alfonso, and to the Republicans, who were opposed to any king. … Becoming [after two years] convinced that the Opposition was irreconcilable, that factions were inevitable, that a stable ministry was impossible, Amadeo, resolved on the singular course of abdicating the royal authority, and returning to the nation the powers with which he had been intrusted;" and this abdication he performed on the 11th of February, 1873.

J. L. M. Curry, Constitutional Government in Spain, chapters 3-4.

ALSO IN: J. A. Harrison, Spain, chapters 27-28.

SPAIN: A. D. 1873-1885. Reign of Alphonso XII., son of Queen Isabella.

On the abdication of King Amadeo, "a republic was declared by the Cortes, and the gifted and eminent statesman, Castelar, strove to give it a constitutional and conservative character. But during the disorders of the last few years the Basque provinces of Navarre and Biscay had been in a ferment excited by the Carlists. The grandson of the Don Carlos who had troubled Spain from 1833 to 1839 appeared in those provinces which were still favourable to his cause, and this ardent young champion of divine right of course received the support of French legitimists. On the other hand, the doctrines of the Paris Commune had found in the south of Spain many adherents, who desired that their country should form a federation of provincial republics. Malaga, Seville, Cadiz, Cartagena, and Valencia revolted, and were reduced only after sharp fighting. A group of generals then determined to offer the crown to Alphonso, the young son of Isabella II, in whose favour she had abdicated in 1868. Castelar, the moderate republican statesman, reluctantly consented, and young Alphonso XII, on landing in Spain, 1874, received the support of most republicans and Carlists, disgusted by the excesses of their extreme partisans. {3017} His generals gradually hemmed in the Carlists along the north coast by battles near Bilbao and Irun; and when the rebels shot a German subject Prince Bismarck sent German ships to aid the Alphonsists. These in the spring of 1876 forced Don Carlos and most of his supporters to cross the French frontier. The Madrid Government now determined to put an end to the fueros or local privileges of the Basque provinces, which they had misused in openly preparing this revolt. So Biscay and Navarre henceforth contributed to the general war expenses of Spain, and their conscripts were incorporated with the regular army of Spain. Thus the last municipal and provincial privileges of the old Kingdom of Navarre vanished, and national unity became more complete in Spain, as in every other country of Europe except Austria and Turkey. The Basque provinces resisted the change which placed them on a level with the rest of Spain, and have not yet become reconciled to the Madrid Government. The young King, Alphonso XII, had many other difficulties to meet. The government was disorganised, the treasury empty, and the country nearly ruined; but he had a trusty adviser in Canovas del Castillo, a man of great prudence and talent, who, whether prime minister or out of office, has really held power in his hands. He succeeded in unifying the public debt, and by lowering its rate of interest he averted State bankruptcy. He also strove to free the administration from the habits of bribe-taking which had long enfeebled and disgraced it; but in this he met with less success, as also in striving for purity of parliamentary election. … The Senate is composed of (1) nobles, (2) deputies elected by the corporations and wealthy classes, and (3) of life senators appointed by the crown. The Chamber of Deputies is elected by universal suffrage, one deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants. The king or either House of Parliament has the right of proposing laws. In 1883 King Alphonso paid a visit to Berlin, and was made honorary colonel of a Uhlan regiment. For this he was hooted and threatened by the Parisians on his visit to the French capital; and this reception increased the coldness of Spain toward the French, who had aggrieved their southern neighbour by designs on Morocco. The good understanding between Spain and Germany was over-clouded by a dispute about the Caroline Islands in the Pacific, which Spain rightly regarded as her own. This aggravated an illness of Alphonso, who died suddenly (November 25, 1885). His young widow, as queen-regent for her infant child, has hitherto [1889] succeeded with marvellous tact."