Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 48)

See NEW JERSEY.

Before this time, William Penn had become the principal owner of the West Jersey interest. Not long afterwards (1681), by surrendering a claim which his father held against the British government, Penn procured from King Charles II. a much greater proprietary domain, on the western side of the Delaware, being no less than the vast tract, 40,000 square miles in extent, which received the name of Pennsylvania. To his title from the king he added a deed of purchase from the Indians. Penn's scheme of colonization was very liberally framed, and it was conducted with marked success. Philadelphia, first laid out in 1683, had 2,000 inhabitants in 1685, and Pennsylvania at large had 8,000. Penn himself did not find peace or happiness in his position as a princely proprietor; but he founded a great and prosperous commonwealth on noble lines.

See PENNSYLVANIA.

In order to possess one bank of the Delaware River and Bay to the sea, William Penn, after securing his grant from the king, bought additionally from the Duke of York the claims of the latter to that strip of territory which the Swedes had settled on and struggled for with the Dutch, and which took an independent political form in later days as the State of Delaware. The Delaware "territories," as they were called, never accepted their dependent relationship to Pennsylvania, and as early as 1702 it was found necessary to concede them a separate legislature, though they continued under Penn's proprietary government.

See DELAWARE.

Adjoining Penn's province on the south was the domain of another great proprietor, Lord Baltimore, whose title deed, from the same royal source as that of Penn, but prior in time by half a century, gave rise to conflicts which troubled the whole life of the peaceful Friend. The first Lord Baltimore (George Calvert) received from James I. in 1632 a patent which gave him territory on the northerly side of the Potomac River, stretching to the Delaware Bay and River and to the 40th parallel of north latitude. By its terms it did undoubtedly take in Delaware and part of Pennsylvania; but the intervening occupation by the Swedes and Dutch, the English conquest, and the royal grant to the Duke of York, confused the title. The controversy was not settled until 1761-7, when "Mason and Dixon's line" was run as the accepted boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania. The lords proprietary of Maryland had been in conflict long before Penn's time with their neighbors at the south, in Virginia, and had many difficulties to encounter and many troubles in their undertaking to found a state. The powers they had received with their grant from the king were the largest that royalty could concede to a subject, and gave to their province the character of a palatine principality. But they exercised their substantial sovereignty with an admirable moderation. They were Catholics, and the early settlers in Maryland were largely though not wholly of that faith. But they introduced a policy of tolerance which was strange at the time to every other part of the New World except Rhode Island, and made their province free to all religions. Numerous Puritans entered it, especially from Virginia, where they were unwelcome; and these, it can hardly be denied, made ill returns for the tolerant hospitality they received. During the time of the Civil War, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate in England, the Maryland Puritans were hostile, not only to the proprietary government, but to its tolerant principles, and used the ascendancy which they frequently gained in a spirit that does not compare favorably with that of their adversaries. Subsequently the ascendancy of the Puritans gave way to that of the Anglican Church, without restoring the toleration which Catholicism in power had established—a rare instance in history—and which Protestantism in power had suppressed.

See MARYLAND.

Beyond the Virginia plantations, in the South, the coasts to which Raleigh had sent his first colonists, and to which the virgin queen had intended to give her name, waited long for settlement. The first durable colony within that territory which took its name in time from a less worthy sovereign was planted in 1653, at Albemarle, on the Chowan River, by a small company of dissenters from Virginia. {3168} In 1665 a considerable party of emigrants from the Barbadoes, headed by a wealthy planter of that island, Sir John Yeamans, established themselves on Cape Fear River, near its mouth, in the district which was afterwards called Clarendon. Two years before this time, in 1663, King Charles II. had discharged some part of his heavy obligations to his loyal supporters by granting that whole section of the American continent which lies between the 31st and 36th parallels of latitude to a company of courtiers, including Clarendon, Monk, Shaftesbury, and others, and the province was named Carolina. It was divided into two great counties, Albemarle and Clarendon, and these corresponded somewhat nearly to the North Carolina and South Carolina of the present day. In 1670 the lords proprietors sent out a colony under William Sayle, which settled first at Port Royal; but Sayle died soon after landing, and the colonists were induced to migrate northwards to the Ashley River, where Sir John Yeamans met them with a considerable part of his Clarendon colony, and became the head of the united settlements. There they founded "Old Charleston," and, after a few years, shifting the site to the confluence of the Ashley and the Cooper, they began the building of the present city of Charleston. This became the nucleus of the subsequently distinct colony of South Carolina, as Albemarle did of that of North Carolina. The division was made in 1729, when the rights of the Proprietors were bought by the Crown, and the Carolinas became crown colonies. Until that time, the southern colony had made far greater progress than its northern twin. It had received a considerable immigration of Huguenots from France and of Scotch-Irish from the north of Ireland, as well as of English, and Charleston was becoming an important port, especially frequented by buccaneers. But after the displacement of the proprietary government, North Carolina began quickly to receive more than its share of the Scotch-Irish immigration and no small number of Highland Scotch. The colony was developed almost wholly in the agricultural direction, with few and small towns. Slavery was introduced at an early day, and rooted itself in the industrial system, as it did in that of all the southern settlements.

See NORTH CAROLINA and SOUTH CAROLINA.

The last of the "Thirteen Colonies" to come into existence was the colony of Georgia, founded so late as 1733 by General James Oglethorpe. It occupied territory too close in neighborhood to the Spaniards of Florida to be attractive to settlers in the 17th century. Its colonization was undertaken by General Oglethorpe primarily as a philanthropic enterprise for the benefit of unfortunate English debtors, who were released from prison and permitted to emigrate under his care; but secondarily to strengthen the defence of the English colonies against the Spaniards. He obtained his grant from George II. "in trust for the poor," and the colony was governed by trustees until 1752, when it was surrendered to the crown. The first emigrants left England in the fall of 1732, and early in the next year Savannah was laid out by Oglethorpe in person. His scheme of colonization proved highly attractive, not only in England but on the continent, and numbers of Protestant Germans came over to become part of the original population of Georgia. At the outset, slavery was strictly prohibited; but the settlers thought themselves grievously oppressed by the denial of slaves, and their discontent became so great that in 1749 the trustees rescinded the prohibition.

See GEORGIA.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1620-1776. Constitutional relations of the colonies to the English Crown and Parliament. The working of the leaven of independence in New England Puritanism.

The history of the development of the question between England and her colonies, as to their constitutional relations to one another, "falls naturally into two periods: first, from the beginning of English colonization in America to the Revolution of 1688; second, from 1688 to the Declaration of Independence. … Passing now to the history of the first period, it is to be observed that the leading institution in the English government at that time was the King in Council. … But in the 17th century, owing to a combination of very strong political and religious forces, the struggle between the King in Parliament and the King in Council was … opened and pushed with vigor. It continued with alternations of success, but on the whole with results favorable to Parliament, till 1688. Then the King in Parliament finally gained the ascendancy, and this result was so secured by statute as never afterwards to be seriously called in question. The supremacy of Parliament was established by a series of royal concessions. The parliamentary party viewed these as compromises between Parliament and king. This gave color to the theory of social contract, which was now given new impulse and form by the parliamentarian writers of the 16th and 17th centuries. … It naturally follows from what has been said that the administration of colonial affairs previous to 1688 was in the hands of the King in Council. Such was the fact. The enterprises of discovery were fitted out under the patronage of the crown; the territories discovered or visited were taken possession of in its name; and grants of land, of rights of government and trade, were made to actual settlers by the kings. Every colonial charter is a proof of this. As the king was by the theory of English law feudal proprietor of England, so he became proprietor of colonial territory, though that territory was granted out in socage, one of the freest forms of English tenure. Certain superficial distinctions were introduced in the form of colonial governments, as royal, proprietary, and charter; but they all emanated from the crown. Its supremacy extended around and beneath them all. The fact that they were established by grant is proof of this, even though there had been no subsequent acts to enforce the control. They were colonies of the English crown; their inhabitants were its subjects. The true doctrine of sovereignty and allegiance necessitates this conclusion. … Parliament passed few statutes affecting the colonies. Yet, not to mention others, there were five such of very great importance which fall within this period: the Act of Supremacy (I Eliz. cap. I), and the four Navigation acts. In all these the colonies were expressly mentioned. But the relative position of crown and Parliament is illustrated by the fact that when in 1624 the Council was proceeding to annul the third Virginia charter, the House tried to interfere but was warned off—because the business concerned only the king and his advisers. {3169} Moreover there was no lack of precedents for the extension not only of common law but of royal ordinances and statute law outside of the original realm of England. … Such in outline was the status of English colonial law previous to 1688. It was in the process of formation and adaptation to the new empire. There were ample precedents for the exercise of the rights of British sovereignty in America, but those rights had not yet been called into the fullest operation. Their legitimacy however was in general fully acknowledged by the colonists. They had been allowed great liberty in establishing their governments, erecting courts, levying taxes, organizing and calling out their militia for defence against the Indians. Colonial society had been allowed to develop freely in all lines and the product was far different from anything which existed in the mother country. It was democratic rather than aristocratic; it was also extremely particularistic, and too remote from England to feel much interest in the general concerns of the empire. In this divergence of social organization and interests, as between the colonies and the mother country, lay the germ which might develop into resistance on the part of the plantations, if at any time England should attempt to enforce her rightful supremacy over them. But as yet there was too little of the spirit of union among the colonists to make possible any combined action. Also those dynasties whose government had been most arbitrary in England, the Tudors and Stuarts, had, till the reign of James II, treated the colonies with great leniency. But the statements just made do not cover the whole ground. They describe the attitude of the colonies in general toward the mother country, but they do not describe the special conditions which prevailed in New England. If we wish to know how the theory of colonial independence originated, we must look in that direction. The American revolution cannot be explained without reference to the political character and tendencies of Puritanism. … Puritanism then was a political as well as a religious movement. On the one hand its doctrines contained a strong democratic leaven; on the other they contained principles which might lead to the separation of church and state. How the former tendency worked itself out in New England is familiar; how the latter failed of accomplishment there is equally well known. The Puritans of Massachusetts were not opposed to the union of church and state or to the employment of the secular power to enforce religious conformity. … What they were opposed to was every other form of state church except their own. … In order to maintain her peculiar system, Massachusetts had to be on her guard against all interference from outside. … The Massachusetts charter was brought over to this country. A few years later the Plymouth company was dissolved, and representation of the colony in England, except by such agents as she might send, ceased. The terms of the charter were very liberal; but like all the others it was a royal grant, and expressly stated that the inhabitants of the colony were to be subjects of England and were to enjoy all the liberties and immunities of such, as if they were in the realm of England. The oaths of supremacy and allegiance were to be administered to all who should go to the colony. The company was made a 'body corporate and politic' and was given ample powers of government; but its laws, statutes, and ordinances were not to be contrary to the laws of England. The admission of freemen was left in the hands of the corporation. How did the Puritan oligarchy make use of this charter for serving the purposes of their government? In a word, they interpreted the expression 'body corporate and politic' to mean an independent state, and virtually abandoned all legal connection with England except an empty acknowledgment of allegiance. The oath of allegiance was not administered, but instead an oath of fidelity to the government of Massachusetts. An ecclesiastical system wholly different from that of England was established. Only those were admitted to political rights, made freemen, who were members of a Congregational church. … The colony also exercised full legislative and judicial powers, and denied the right of appeal both practically and theoretically. The proof of this is most direct and convincing. To illustrate: in 1646 the General Court refused to permit the appeal of Dr. Child and others who, as Presbyterians, desired to lay before Parliament the wrongs they suffered in Massachusetts. Not only was the right denied, but the petitioners were prevented by force from carrying their case to England. The same course was pursued in reference to appeals in ordinary judicial cases. During the discussion of the affair just mentioned it was boldly affirmed in the General Court that subjects were bound by English laws only so long as they lived in England; that neither statutes nor royal ordinances were in force beyond the seas. A little later than this both the magistrates and the elders were called upon to give their views on the legal relations between the colony and England. Both agreed that by their charter they 'had absolute power of government'; that their government was perfect and sufficient in all its parts, not needing the help of any superior to make it complete. They acknowledged that they had received the charter from England, and 'depended upon that state for protection and immunities as freeborn Englishmen'; but the duties which were correlative to those immunities, and which are necessary to a true conception of allegiance, were not mentioned. This position was consistently maintained by the Puritans of Massachusetts as long as they remained in power. In their correspondence with the home government and its officials between 1664 and 1684 the right of appeal was always denied. Its exercise was never allowed. If we add to this the further statements that Massachusetts coined money; strove to enlarge the bounds of her patent, not only without consulting the king, but in defiance of his absolute prohibition; taxed English imports; and, without the consent of the home government, entered the New England confederation, some notion can be formed of the degree of independence claimed and exercised by that colony. The exercise of this independence however did not make it legal. It only illustrates the fact that the roots of the American revolution extend back into the times of which we are speaking. … It was to be expected that England would interfere to bring Massachusetts within the bounds of constitutional dependence. Complaints against the colony, on the part of Gorges and of those who had been banished by the Puritans, began very early. {3170} These led to 'quo warranto' proceedings for the recall of the charter in 1635. But civil strife at home compelled the government of Charles I to abandon the project. Then came the period of the Commonwealth, when the views of the English government were so fully in harmony with those of the New England leaders that the practical independence of the colony was ignored. … From the restoration dates the beginning of a more comprehensive colonial policy." With the fall of the Massachusetts charter, in 1684, "closes the first stage in the development of the idea of colonial independence. The struggle between the Puritans of Massachusetts and the crown is the most significant fact in American history previous to 1760. The Puritans were defeated; the authority of England was reasserted. … But for our purpose the important result is that the Puritans left behind them an armory full of precedents and arguments in favor of colonial independence. They had constructed the American theory on that subject. That was the chief permanent result of their experiment. They had from first to last adhered to the theory which expediency taught them to adopt. They taught the colonists how to resist the exercise of the ecclesiastical and judicial supremacy of the crown. If now at any time in the future the Americans should consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the English government, the Puritan spirit and theory would be likely to appear. Such was the aspect of affairs at the close of the first period of colonial history. After the revolution of 1688, Parliament assumes more and more the control of American concerns. Statutes on those subjects multiply. The administration of the colonies becomes a branch of the ministerial government of Great Britain. The development of an imperial as distinguished from an insular policy is begun. The interference of England in colonial affairs became more frequent and the control asserted more extensive than heretofore. … The attitude of the colonists during this period was one of passive rather than active resistance. Parliamentary restrictions were so far evaded as not to be burdensome. … The records show that the burden of opinion in the colonies was jealousy of all government, so far as it operated as a restraint. The interference of government, whether colonial or imperial, was welcomed by the colonists, when it could be used for the advancement of their private or local interests; when larger objects were aimed at, it was if possible ignored or resisted. … The political condition of the colonies was for the first time clearly revealed during the French and Indian war. The history of Germany can furnish no more vivid spectacle of the evils of particularism than does that struggle. … The condition of anarchy and helplessness revealed by the war was such as to convince all the servants of the crown in America that active parliamentary interference was necessary, if the colonies were to be defended and retained as an integral part of the British empire. The fact that the British government, within a reasonable time after the close of the war, proceeded to put this suggestion into execution, implies nothing arbitrary or unreasonable. It had the undoubted constitutional right to do so; and so far as could be seen at the time, expediency prompted in the same direction. But during the century since the Puritan oligarchy of Massachusetts yielded to the supremacy of the crown, the theory of social contract had been fully developed. It had formulated the needs of the opposition in all the European countries to the system of absolutism. It was the theory of government very generally held by the Puritans in both England and America. … This theory, as soon as it was understood, would naturally find general acceptance in the colonies. … The American revolution, as truly as the French, was the outgrowth of the doctrine of natural rights and social contract. By this I mean simply that the doctrine in question formed the theoretical basis of both movements. So far as the American revolution is concerned the proof of this statement is contained in the writings of the patriot leaders at the time, the various state papers that were issued, and the doctrine that was held respecting the right of imperial taxation. No man contributed so much to bringing about the revolution as Samuel Adams; and his mind was saturated with the theory of social contract. He made it the basis of all his reasonings. … The reason why New England became the leader of the movement clearly appears. The process of development through which the colonies passed was a natural, and therefore a necessary one. It was slow and obscure, and therefore could not be clearly recognized at the time. But that it was nevertheless revolutionary becomes evident when we compare the views and aims of the colonists with the constitution of the British empire. When the two systems came into collision the colonists adopted a theory which was 'in the air' at the time, but one under which no government can be successfully carried on. When they came to erect a government of their own, they had to abandon it. It is not claimed that the doctrine of natural rights ever found such general acceptance in America as in France. The character of the people and the absence of a despotic government prevented that. But that the American revolution cannot be explained without assigning it a prominent place is evident. It is not intended to convey the impression that the colonists had no grievances. There were causes for complaint, but they were doubtless greatly exaggerated. A mind filled with the democratic theories of the times, and with the loose notions concerning sovereignty and allegiance which then prevailed, could easily imagine that Parliament, unless resisted, would establish a despotic government in America."

Professor H. L. Osgood, England and the Colonies (Political Science Quarterly, September, 1887).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1651-1672. The Navigation Acts and the colonies. Spirit and objects of the English restrictive commercial system.

To the Act of Navigation, passed in 1651 (see NAVIGATION LAWS) is due a change in the relations of the colonies to the mother-country. "Henceforth they were regarded mainly as feeders to its carrying-trade, as consumers of its manufactures, as factories for the distribution of its capital, and, in a word, as mere commercial appendages of what was now the great commercial power. Dominion became subordinate to trade. … Beginning … with the re-enactment of the Navigation Act after the Restoration, we find that the new system which is to regulate colonial trade and define the relations of the colonies to the parent, is contained in three Acts of Parliament. {3171} First, in the re-enactment itself of the Act of Navigation in 1660; secondly, in an act, passed in 1663, entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of trade'; and, thirdly, in an act, passed in 1672, and entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing the plantation trade.' … The three acts which created the system, were all passed in the reign of Charles II.; the others followed rapidly, and in great numbers, for a century, until the failure of the attempt to transform this system of trade into one of trade and revenue, by means of what is known as the Stamp Act. St. John's Navigation Act was reenacted in 1660, under Charles II., as the first-fruits of the Restoration. This act forbade importation into or exportation out of the colonies, save what came and went in English ships, and its object was, to shut the doors of the colonies against foreign trade. In 1663 another step was taken, and an act was passed with the object, openly avowed in its fifth section, of keeping the colonies in 'a firmer dependence' upon England, and of making that kingdom the staple, or place of distribution, not only of colonial produce, 'but also of the commodities of other countries and places, for the supplying of them.' To effect this, the Act of 1663 went beyond that of 1660, and exacted, that no European products or manufactures should be imported into any colony, except what had been actually laden and shipped in an English port, and carried 'directly thence' to the importing colony. This act forced the colonists to get such supplies as they could not themselves furnish in England only, and thus not only could none but mariners of whom three fourths were English transport merchandise to and from the colonies, but the colonists themselves were not suffered to go anywhere but to England for that which they could not get at home. … This position of factor between the colonies and foreign markets was a lucrative one. But the spirit of trade is such, that it regards much as only a stepping-stone to more, and the next enactment concerning colonial trade, or that of 1672, betrays this characteristic. The existing factorage was maintained only between the colonial and foreign trade; it had no place in intercolonial traffic. … As this intercolonial trade developed, it attracted the observation of the English merchants, who at last demanded the control of it. In compliance with this demand, an act was passed in 1672, subjecting any enumerated commodity to a duty specified in the statute—and thus was destroyed the freedom, and, to a great extent, the incentive of intercolonial traffic. This act was well entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing of the plantation trade.' History is silent respecting the fisheries, but it has been very outspoken concerning its effect on the plantations. The effect was this: if Rhode Island wished to be supplied by Massachusetts with one of the enumerated commodities, and Massachusetts desired to furnish Rhode Island with that commodity, the delivery of the goods could not be made by the producer to the consumer, but the article would have to be sent to England first, and landed there, and then be sent back from England to Rhode Island before the consumer could touch it. A line drawn from Boston, in Massachusetts, to Bristol, in England, and thence back to Newport, in Rhode Island, will show the course which such article must take, if sold by Massachusetts to Rhode Island, before the demands of English commerce were satisfied; it will in all probability likewise show the least angle with the longest sides ever subtended on the chart of trade. Should, however, the parties to the transaction desire to avoid the risk and delay incident to this phenomenal voyage, they could do so by paying the certain rates and duties prescribed by this statute."

E. G. Scott, The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the English Colonies of America, chapter 8 (with corrections by the author).

"Unfortunately there does not exist any history of the commerce of the American colonies, from the Commonwealth to 1774, as affected by navigation laws, acts of trade, and revenue measures. No one who has read the 29 acts which comprise this legislation will recommend their perusal to another; for, apart from their volume, the construction of these acts is difficult,—difficult even to trained lawyers like John Adams, whose business it was to advise clients in respect to them. Nor have special students, like Bancroft, stated their effect with exact precision."

M. Chamberlain, The Revolution Impending: Critical Essay (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6), page 64.

ALSO IN: G. L. Beer, The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies (Columbia College Studies, volume 3, number 2).

W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, chapter 7 (volume 1).

J. E. T. Rogers, Economic Interpretation of History, chapter 15.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1690. The First American Congress. King William's War.

"After the accession [in England, A. D. 1689] of William and Mary, hostilities were declared between France and England, which extended to America; and thus began the first inter-colonial war [commonly known in American history as King William's War]. The French soon planned an invasion of Boston and New York. … On the 8th of February, 1690, a war-party, who had come stealthily from Canada, entered the open gates of the town of Schenectady, when it was snowing, and broke the stillness of midnight with the terrible yell and whoop of the savages. Men, women, and children, for two hours, were mercilessly butchered. Their dwellings were burned. The whole town was sacked. … The intelligence flew through the colonies. … Schenectady was the Fort Sumter of that day. The event had a political effect. It shamed the factions in New York at least into a truce. It roused a spirit of patriotism. The governor of Massachusetts urged, in letters to other colonies, the necessity for immediate action to provide for the common defence. … The General Court [of Massachusetts], in view of organizing a joint effort of the colonies, proposed to hold a congress. The call for a meeting is dated the 19th of March, 1690. It relates, that their majesties' subjects had been invaded by the French and Indians; that many of the colonists had been barbarously murdered, and were in danger of greater mischiefs; and it proposed, as a measure of prevention, that the neighboring colonies, and Virginia, Maryland, and the parts adjacent, should be invited to meet at New York, and conclude on suitable methods for assisting each other for the safety of the whole land. The governor of New York was desired to transmit this invitation to the southern colonies. Such was the first call for a general congress in America. {3172} It is free from narrowness. It is liberal in its spirit, simple in its terms, and comprehensive in its object. … The call elicited from several colonies interesting replies. Governor Hinckley, of Plymouth, entered with zeal into the measure, and, though the General Court was not in session, appointed a commissioner. The Quaker-governor of Rhode Island, Henry Bull, replied in an excellent spirit. … Though the time was too short to convene the assembly for the appointment of commissioners, he promised the aid of that colony to the utmost of its ability to resist the French and Indians. The head of the convention of Maryland wrote, that it was the design of the assembly to send arms and men to aid in the general defence. … President Bacon, of Virginia, replied, that the proposition would require the action of the assembly, and that nothing would be done until the arrival of the daily expected governor. The replies to the invitation were cordial. The commissioners of four colonies [Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New York] met at New York. … The deliberations led to a unanimous result. On the 1st of May, an agreement was signed by the delegates, in behalf of the five colonies [including Maryland under its promise], to raise a force of 855 men for the strengthening of Albany, and, 'by the help of Almighty God, subduing the French and Indian enemies.' It was agreed, that the lieutenant-governor of New York should name the commander of this force; that it should not be employed on any other service without the consent of the five colonies; and that the officers should be required to preserve among their men good order, punish vice, keep the Sabbath, and maintain the worship of God. No proposition appears to have been entertained for a permanent organization. … Efforts were made to obtain additional aid from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. … I need only state, as the result of this congress, that it was resolved to attempt the reduction of Canada by two lines of attack,—one to conquer Acadia, and then to move on Quebec; and the other, by the route of Lake Champlain, to assault Montreal. The New England forces under Sir William Phips, assigned to the first route, captured Acadia and Port Royal, and sailed for Quebec, in the expectation of being aided by the other forces who marched by the Champlain route. But they, under Fitz-John Winthrop, with the title of major, were not successful. Leisler [see NEW YORK: A. D. 1689-1691], with characteristic rashness, accused the commander of treachery; while the officers charged the commissary, Jacob Milborne, of New York, with inefficiency in procuring supplies. The failure of Winthrop occasioned the retreat of Phips."

R. Frothingham, The Rise of the Republic of the United States, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: Doc. History of New York, volume 2 (Leisler's administration).

Documents relating to Colonial History of New York, volume 3.

See, also, CANADA: A. D. 1689-1690.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1696-1697. The Board of Trade for the Supervision of the Colonies. Plans of Colonial Union by Penn and others.

"The king attempted a more efficient method of administering the colonies; and, in May 1696, a Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, consisting of the chancellor, the president of the privy council, the keeper of the privy seal, the two secretaries of state, and eight special commissioners, was called into being. To William Blathwayte, who had drafted the new charter of Massachusetts, John Locke, and the rest of the commission, instructions were given by the crown 'to inquire into the means of making the colonies most useful and beneficial to England; into the staples and manufactures which may be encouraged there, and the means of diverting them from trades which May prove prejudicial to England; to examine into and weigh the acts of the assemblies; to set down the usefulness or mischief of them to the crown, the kingdom, or the plantations themselves; to require an account of all the moneys given for public uses by the assemblies of the plantations, and how the same are employed.' The administration of the several provinces had their unity in the person of the king, whose duties with regard to them were transacted through one of the secretaries of state; but the Board of Trade was the organ of inquiries and the centre of colonial information. Every law of a provincial legislature, except in some of the charter governments, if it escaped the veto of the royal governor, might be arrested by the unfavorable opinion of the law officer of the crown, or by the adverse report of the Board of Trade. Its rejection could come only from the king in council. … The Board of Trade was hardly constituted before it was summoned to plan unity in the military efforts of the provinces; and Locke with his associates despaired, on beholding them 'crumbled into little governments, disunited in interests, in an ill posture and much worse disposition to afford assistance to each other for the future.' The Board, in 1697, 'after considering with their utmost care,' could only recommend the appointment of 'a captain-general of all the forces and all the militia of all the provinces on the continent of North America, with power to levy and command them for their defence, under such limitations and instructions as to his majesty should seem best.' … With excellent sagacity—for true humanity perfects the judgment—William Penn matured a plan of a permanent union, by a national representation of the American States. On the 8th day of February 1697, he delivered his project for an annual 'congress,' as he termed it, of two delegates from each province. … But the ministry adopted neither the military dictatorship of Locke and his associates, nor the peaceful congress of William Penn."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), part 3, chapter 4 (volume 2).

The following is the Plan of Union drafted by Penn: "A Briefe and Plaine Scheam how the English Colonists in the North parts of America, viz.: Boston, Connecticut, Road Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Carolina may be made more usefull to the Crowne, and one another's peace and safty with an universall concurrence. 1st. That the severall Colonies before mentioned do meet once a year, and oftener if need be, during the war, and at least once in two years in times of peace by their stated and appointed Deputies, to debate and resolve of such measures as are most adviseable for their better understanding, and the public tranquility and safety. {3173} 2d. That in order to it two persons well qualified for sence, sobriety and substance be appointed by each Province, as their Representatives or Deputies, which in the whole make the Congress to consist of twenty persons. 3d. That the King's Commissioner for that purpose specially appointed shall have the chaire and preside in the said Congresse. 4th. That they shall meet as near as conveniently may be to the most centrall Colony for use of the Deputies. 5th. Since that may in all probability, be New York both because it is near the Center of the Colonies and for that it is a Frontier and in the King's nomination, the Governor of that Colony may therefore also be the King's High Commissioner during the Session after the manner of Scotland. 6th. That their business shall be to hear and adjust all matters of Complaint or difference between Province and Province. As, 1st, where persons quit their own Province and goe to another, that they may avoid their just debts, tho they be able to pay them, 2nd, where offenders fly Justice, or Justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the Provinces that entertaine them, 3dly, to prevent or cure injuries in point of Commerce, 4th, to consider of ways and means to support the union and safety of these Provinces against the public enemies. In which Congresse the Quotas of men and charges will be much easier, and more equally sett, then it is possible for any establishment made here to do; for the Provinces, knowing their own condition and one another's, can debate that matter with more freedome and satisfaction and better adjust and ballance their affairs in all respects for their common safty. 7ly. That in times of war the King's High Commissioner shall be generall or chief Commander of the severall Quotas upon service against a common enemy as he shall be advised, for the good and benefit of the whole."

H. W. Preston, Documents illustrative of American History, page 146.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1696-1749. Growing despotism of the English mercantile policy. Systematic suppression of colonial manufactures.

"By the erection, in 1696, of a new Standing Council, or Board of Trade, under the denomination of 'The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,' the interests of British commerce and the affairs of Colonial trade and government were confided to that body, which thenceforward became the repository of all official intelligence upon those subjects, and the medium of communication with the several governors and assemblies of the Colonies. Yearly reports of the state of the Provinces were required from the governors, in answer to queries addressed to them by the Board. An Act of Parliament of the same year still further restricted commercial intercourse, by limiting trade between England and her Colonies to English, Irish and Colonial built vessels, and by prohibiting Colonial produce from going to the ports of Ireland or Scotland. … The feeble attempts of the Colonists to make a portion of their own clothing from their abundant materials had not been unnoticed in England. Three years after—the Board of Trade having received complaints from English merchants and manufacturers, that the wool and woolen manufactures of Ireland and the North American plantations began to be exported to foreign markets formerly supplied by England—an Act passed the British Parliament, … dictated by that sleepless vigilance which guarded the staple manufacture of England. It prohibited the exportation of any wool or woolen manufacture from Ireland, except to certain ports in England; but, by way of compensation, virtually surrendered to Ireland the linen manufacture, then little regarded in comparison with the woolen interests. In reference to the Colonies, it was enacted that 'After the first day of December, 1699, no wool, woolfels, yarn, cloth, or woolen manufactures of the English plantations in America shall be shipped in any of the said English plantations, or otherwise loaden, in order to be transported thence to any place whatsoever, under the penalty of forfeiting ship and cargo, and £500 for each offence.' … A letter from New England to the Board of Trade [in 1715] … reiterates the necessity of employing the New England people in producing naval stores, to turn them from manufactures. … The discouragement of American manufactures, from this time, became the settled and avowed policy of the government, and, three years later, the Bill prohibiting the erection of forges and iron mills was introduced, and declared that the erecting of Manufactories in the Colonies 'tends to lessen their dependence upon Great Britain.' … The company of Feltmakers, in London, petitioned Parliament, in February, 1731, to prohibit the exportation of hats from the American Colonies, representing that foreign markets were almost altogether supplied from thence, and not a few sent to Great Britain. The petition was referred to a special committee, who reported that, in New York and New England, beaver hats were manufactured to the number, it was estimated, of 10,000 yearly. … The exports were to the Southern plantations, the West Indies, and Ireland. In consequence of this evidence, and that furnished by the Board of Trade in the same session, an act was passed (5 George II. c. 22) that 'no hats or felts, dyed or undyed, finished or unfinished, shall be put on board any vessel in any place within any of the British plantations; nor be laden upon any horse or other carriage to the intent to be exported from thence to any other plantation, or to any other place whatever, upon forfeiture thereof, and the offender shall likewise pay £500 for every such offence.' … This severe and stringent law continued in force in the Colonies until the Revolution. It aimed at the prostration of one of the oldest and, on account of the abundance and cheapness of beavers and other furs, one of the most profitable branches of industry."

J. L. Bishop, History of American Manufactures, volume 1, chapter 14.

In 1749 an act of Parliament was passed "to encourage the importation of pig and bar iron from his majesty's colonies in America, and to prevent the erection of any mill or other engine for slitting or rolling of iron, or any plateing forge to work with a tilt hammer, or any furnace for making steel in any of the said colonies." "Pig iron was allowed to be imported free to all parts of the kingdom, so as to secure cheap bar iron. But bar iron could not be imported at any port but London, and carried no further than ten miles from that city. This clause was intended to aid the owners of woods. In order to protect the nail trade, all slitting-mills in the colonies were ordered to be destroyed."

J. B. Pearse, Concise History of the Iron Manufacture of the American Colonies, page 121.

ALSO IN: W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, volume 2.

G. L. Beer, Commercial Policy of England toward the Colonies (Col. Col. Studies, volume 3).

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763 and 1764.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:A. D. 1704-1729. The first colonial newspapers.

See PRINTING AND PRESS: A. D. 1704-1729.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1748-1754. First collisions with the French in the Ohio Valley.

"As the year 1750 approached, there came upon the colonies two changes, destined to lead to a new political life. In the first place, the colonies at last began to overrun the mountain barrier which had hemmed them in on the west, and thus to invite another and more desperate struggle with the French. The first settlement made west of the mountains was on a branch of the Kanawha (1748); in the same season several adventurous Virginians hunted and made land-claims in Kentucky and Tennessee. Before the close of the following year (1749) there had been formed the Ohio Company, composed of wealthy Virginians, among whom were two brothers of Washington. King George granted them 500,000 acres, on which they were to plant 100 families and build and maintain a fort. The first attempt to explore the region of the Ohio brought the English and the French traders into conflict; and troops were not long in following, on both sides.

See OHIO VALLEY: A. D. 1748-1754.

At the same time the home government was awaking to the fact that the colonies were not under strict control. In 1750 the Administration began to consider means of stopping unlawful trade."

R. G. Thwaites, The Colonies, 1492-1750 (Epochs of American History), chapter 14, section 130.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1749-1755. Unsettled boundary disputes of England and France. Preludes of the last French War.

See NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755; CANADA: A. D. 1750-1753; 1755; and OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1754.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1750-1753. The eve of the great French war. Attitude of the colonies.

"The quarrel in which the French and English now engaged was exclusively a colonial one. The possession and defence of the Americans had already cost, over and over again, a larger sum than the whole produce of their trade would have produced. The English had the mortification of observing that the colonists claimed an the security of Englishmen against attack, and repudiated their obligation to take a share of the burdens which their defence occasioned. Were they attacked by the French,—they were Englishmen, and had a right to the ægis which that name throws over all subjects of the crown; were they called upon for a subscription in aid of the war,—they were men who would not submit to be taxed without their own consent; were they taken at their word, and requested through their own assemblies to tax themselves,—they sometimes refused, and sometimes doled out a minute supply, taking care to mix up with their money bill some infringement on the royal prerogative, which rendered it impossible, except under severe exigency of the public service, for the governor to accept the terms offered. … The action of the colonies at this crisis was in accordance with their invariable policy. As soon as they perceived that the French meditated a war of aggression in America, a chorus of complaint and apprehension came at once from the colonists. Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, and Clinton, Governor of New York, had convened an assembly at Albany during the last year of the last war, to concert measures for uniting an the colonies for common defence; Massachusetts and the other New England States were, of course, anxious that the union should be carried out. They were the barrier between the Canadas and the southern colonies, and if any attack was made they must bear the brunt of it. … The Congress of Albany, and especially the Legislature of Massachusetts, advocated the erection of a line of detached forts which might be so arranged as to overawe the French frontier, and defend the New England colonies from attack. … It was all in vain; every colony, with the exception of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and South Carolina, refused to contribute one farthing towards the expense. … Even in 1753, when the French were actually on the Ohio, and Washington had brought back certain intelligence of their intentions and views, the Virginians refused supplies to Dinwiddie because they declared themselves 'easy on account of the French.' When at last the French had actually established themselves in fortified posts at Niagara, at Le Bœuf, and at Venango, when Contrecœur had driven a colonial officer out of a post which he held on the forks of the Monongahela, when Fort du Quesne had arisen on the ruins of an English stockade, they could no longer close their eyes to the danger which was actually within the boundaries of their State. They granted £10,000 of their currency; but Dinwiddie wrote home that the bill was so clogged with encroachments on the prerogative, that he would not have given his assent had not the public service rendered the supply imperatively necessary."

Viscount Bury, Exodus of the Western Nations, volume 2, chapter 7.

"The attitude of these various colonies towards each other is hardly conceivable to an American of the present time. They had no political tie except a common allegiance to the British Crown. Communication between them was difficult and slow, by rough roads traced often through primeval forests. Between some of them there was less of sympathy than of jealousy kindled by conflicting interests or perpetual disputes concerning boundaries. The patriotism of the colonist was bounded by the lines of his government, except in the compact and kindred colonies of New England, which were socially united, though politically distinct. The country of the New Yorker was New York, and the country of the Virginian was Virginia. The New England colonies had once confederated; but, kindred as they were, they had long ago dropped apart. … Nor was it this segregation only that unfitted them for war. They were all subject to popular legislatures, through whom alone money and men could be raised; and these elective bodies were sometimes factious and selfish, and not always either far-sighted or reasonable. Moreover, they were in a state of ceaseless friction with their governors, who represented the king, or, what was worse, the feudal proprietary. These disputes, though varying in intensity, were found everywhere except in the two small colonies which chose their own governors; and they were premonitions of the movement towards independence which ended in the war of Revolution. The occasion of difference mattered little. Active or latent, the quarrel was always present. … Divided in government; divided in origin, feelings, and principles; jealous of each other, jealous of the Crown; the people at war with the executive, and, by the fermentation of internal politics, blinded to an outward danger that seemed remote and vague,—such were the conditions under which the British colonies drifted into a war that was to decide the fate of the continent."

F. Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, chapter 1 (volume 1).

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1754. The Congress at Albany and its Plans of Union. Franklin's account.

"In 1754, war with France being again apprehended, a congress of commissioners from the different colonies was, by an order of the Lords of Trade, to be assembled at Albany, there to confer with the chiefs of the Six Nations concerning the means of defending both their country and ours. Governor Hamilton [of Pennsylvania], having received this order, acquainted the House with it, requesting they would furnish proper presents for the Indians, to be given on this occasion; and naming the speaker (Mr. Norris) and myself to join Mr. Thomas Penn and Mr. Secretary Peters as commissioners to act for Pennsylvania. (The House approved the nomination, and provided the goods for the present, and tho' they did not much like treating out of the provinces;) and we met the other commissioners at Albany about the middle of June. In our way thither, I projected and drew a plan for the union of all the colonies under one government, so far as might be necessary for defense, and other important general purposes. As we passed thro' New York, I had there shown my project to Mr. James Alexander and Mr. Kennedy, two gentlemen of great knowledge in public affairs, and, being fortified by their approbation, I ventured to lay it before the Congress. It then appeared that several of the commissioners had formed plans of the same kind. A previous question was first taken, whether a union should be established, which passed in the affirmative unanimously. A committee was then appointed, one member from each colony, to consider the several plans and report. Mine happened to be preferred, and, with a few amendments, was accordingly reported. … The debates upon it in Congress went on daily, hand in hand with the Indian business. Many objections and difficulties were started, but at length they were all overcome, and the plan was unanimously agreed to, and copies ordered to be transmitted to the Board of Trade and to the assemblies of the several provinces. Its fate was singular: the assemblies did not adopt it, as they all thought there was too much 'prerogative' in it, and in England it was judged to have too much of the 'democratic.' The Board of Trade therefore did not approve of it, nor recommend it for the approbation of his majesty; but another scheme was formed, supposed to answer the same purpose better, whereby the governors of the provinces, with some members of their respective councils, were to meet and order the raising of troops, building of forts, etc., and to draw on the treasury of Great Britain for the expense, which was afterwards to be refunded by an act of Parliament laying a tax on America. … The different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan makes me suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides the water if it had been adopted. The colonies, so united, would have been sufficiently strong to have defended themselves; there would then have been no need of troops from England; of course, the subsequent pretence for taxing America, and the bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided."

B. Franklin, Autobiography (edited by John Bigelow) volume 1, pages 308-310.

"When the members assembled at the Court House in Albany on the 19th of June, it was found that Pennsylvania, was not alone in appointing a distinguished citizen to represent her. On the roll of the congress were the names of Lieutenant-governor De Lancey, of New York, who presided; and from the same province William Smith, the historian, and the future Sir William Johnson, not yet made a baronet. From the proprietary provinces of Pennsylvania and Maryland were the well known officials, John Penn, grandson of the founder; Richard Peters; and Benjamin Tasker. From the province of New Hampshire were her future governor, Meshech Weare, and Theodore Atkinson; and from the province of Massachusetts Bay, the late Lieutenant-governor, Thomas Hutchinson, Colonel John Chandler, of Worcester, and Oliver Partridge, a man of commanding influence in western Massachusetts. Lastly, the two colonies which had so tenaciously preserved their charter governments through the vicissitudes of more than a century,—Connecticut and Rhode Island,—had acceded to the repeated solicitations of the home government, and with unfeigned reluctance, we may be sure, had sent as representatives men of such wide experience in their colonial concerns as Roger Wolcott, Jr., and Stephen Hopkins, 'America,' says Mr. Bancroft, 'had never seen an assembly so venerable for the states that were represented, or for the great and able men who composed it.' They were detained in this hospitable old Dutch town for more than three weeks. … Franklin's plan … was not approved by a single one of the colonial assemblies before which it was brought; and … no action was ever taken on it in England. Yet there is no contribution to constructive statesmanship preceding the year 1776, which had a profounder effect on the subsequent growth and development of the idea of American nationality. Even in the amended form in which it was 'approved' by the congress, it was, says a recent writer, 'in advance of the Articles [of Confederation] in its national spirit, and served as the prototype of the constitution itself.'"

W. E. Foster, Stephen Hopkins: a Rhode Island Statesman, chapter 6 (part 1).

The Plan of Union, as adopted by the Congress at Albany, was accompanied by a "Representation of the Present State of the Colonies." The following is the full text of the Representation, followed by that of the Plan of Union:

"That His Majesty's Title to the Northern Continent of America, appears to be founded on the Discovery thereof first made, and the Possession thereof first taken in 1497, under a Commission from Henry the VIIth, of England, to Sebastian Cabot. That the French have possessed themselves of several Parts of this Continent, which by Treaties, have been ceded and confirmed to them: That the Rights of the English to the whole Sea Coast, from Georgia, on the South, to the River St. Lawrence, on the North, excepting the Island of Cape-Breton, in the Bay of St. Lawrence, remains plain and indisputable. {3176} That all the Lands or Countries Westward from the Atlantic Ocean to the South Sea, between 48 and 34 Degrees of North Latitude, were expressly included in the Grant of King James the First, to divers of his Subjects, so long since, as the Year 1606, and afterwards confirmed in 1620; and under this Grant, the Colony of Virginia claims an Extent as far West as to the South Sea; and the antient Colonies of the Massachusetts-Bay and Connecticut, were by their respective Charters, made to extend to the said South Sea; so that not only the Right to the Sea Coast, but to all the Inland Countries, from Sea to Sea, have at all Times been asserted by the Crown of England. That the Province of Nova Scotia or Accadia, hath known and determinate Bounds, by the original Grant from King James the First; and that there is abundant Evidence of the same, [and of the Knowledge] which the French had of these Bounds, while they were in Possession of it; and that these Bounds being thus known, the said Province by the Treaty of Utrecht, according to its antient Limits, was ceded to Great-Britain, and remained in Possession thereof, until the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, by which it was confirmed; but by said Treaty it is stipulated, That the Bounds of the said Province shall be determined by Commissioners, &c. That by the Treaty of Utrecht, the Country of the Five Cantons of the Iroquoise, is expressly acknowledged to be under the Dominion of the Crown of Great-Britain. That the Lake Champlain, formerly called Lake Iroquoise, and the Country Southward of it, as far as the Dutch or English Settlements, the Lake Ontario, Erie, and all the Countries adjacent, have by all antient Authors, French and English, been allowed to belong to the Five Cantons or Nations; and the whole of those Countries, long before the said Treaty of Utrecht, were by the said Nations, put under the Protection of the Crown of Great-Britain. That by the Treaty of Utrecht, there is a Reserve to the French, a Liberty of frequenting the Countries of the Five Nations, and other Indians in Friendship with Great-Britain, for the Sake of Commerce; as there is also to the English, a Liberty of frequenting the Countries of those in Friendship with France, for the same Purpose. That after the Treaty of Utrecht, the French built several Fortresses in the Country of the Five Nations, and a very strong one at a Place called Crown-Point, to the South of the Lake Champlain. That the French Court have evidently, since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, made this Northern Continent more than ever, the Object of its Attention. That the French have most unjustly taken Possession of a Part of the Province of Nova-Scotia; and in the River St. John's, and other Parts of said Province, they have built strong Fortresses; and from this River they will have, during the Winter and Spring Season, a much easier Communication between France and Canada, than they have heretofore had, and will be furnished with a Harbour more commodiously situated for the Annoying the British Colonies by Privateers and Men of War, than Louisbourg itself. That they have taken Possession of, and begun a Settlement at the Head of the River Kennebeck, within the Bounds of the Province of Main, the most convenient Situation for affording Support, and a safe Retreat, to the Eastern Indians, in any of their Attempts upon the Governments of New England. That it appears by the Information of the Natives, the French have been making Preparations for another Settlement, at a Place called Cohass, on Connecticut River, near the Head thereof, where 'tis but about ten Miles distant from a Branch of Merrimack River; and from whence, there is a very near and easy Communication with the Abnekais Indians, who are settled on the River St. Francois, about forty Miles from the River St. Lawrence; and it is certain, the Inhabitants of New-Hampshire, in which Province this Cohass is supposed to lie, have been interrupted and impeded by the French Indians, from making any Settlement there. That since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, the French have increased the Number of their Forts in the Country of the great Lakes, and on the Rivers which run into the Mississippi, and are securing a Communication between the two Colonies of Louisiana and Canada, and at the same Time, putting themselves into a Capacity of annoying the Southern British Colonies, and preventing any further Settlements of His Majesty's Dominions. That they have been gradually increasing their Troops in America, transporting them in their Ships of War, which return to France with a bare Complement of Men, leaving the rest in their Colonies; and by this Means, they are less observed by the Powers of Europe, than they would be, if Transports as usual heretofore, were provided for this Purpose. That they have taken Prisoners diverse of His Majesty's Subjects, trading in the Country of the Iroquoise, and other inland Parts, and plundered such Prisoners of several Thousand Pounds Sterling; and they are continually exciting the Indians to destroy or make Prisoners the Inhabitants of the Frontiers of the British Colonies; which Prisoners are carried to Canada, and a Price equal to what Slaves are sold in the Plantations, is demanded for their Redemption and Release. That they are continually drawing off the Indians from the British Interest, and have lately perswaded one Half of the Onondago Tribe, with many from the other Nations along with them, to remove to a Place called Oswegachie, on the River Cadaracqui, where they have built them a Church and Fort; and many of the Senecas, the most numerous Nation, appear to be wavering, and rather inclined to the French. And it is a melancholy Consideration, that not more than 150 Men of all the several Nations, have attended this Treaty, altho' they had Notice, that all the Governments would be here by their Commissioners, and that a large Present would be given. That it is the evident Design of the French to surround the British Colonies, to fortify themselves on the Back thereof, to take and keep Possession of the Heads of all the important Rivers, to draw over the Indians to their Interest, and with the Help of such Indians, added to such Forces as are already arrived, and may be hereafter sent from Europe, to be in a Capacity of making a general Attack upon the several Governments; and if at the same Time, a strong Naval Force be sent from France, there is the utmost Danger, that the whole Continent will be subjected to that Crown: And that the Danger of such a Naval Force is not merely imaginary, may be argued from past Experience. For had it not been by the most extraordinary Interposition of Heaven, every Sea Port Town on the Continent, in the Year 1746, might have been ravaged and destroyed, by the Squadron under the Command of the Duke D'Anville, notwithstanding the then declining State of the French, and the very flourishing State of the British Navy, and the further Advantage accruing to the English, from the Possession of Cape-Breton. {3177} That the French find by Experience, they are able to make greater and more secure Advantages upon their Neighbours, in Peace than in War. What they unjustly possessed themselves of, after the Peace of Utrecht, they now pretend they have a Right to hold, by Virtue of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, until the true Boundary between the English and French be settled by Commissioners; but their Conquests made during War, they have been obliged to restore. That the French Affairs relative to this Continent, are under one Direction, and constantly regarded by the Crown and Ministry, who are not insensible how great a Stride they would make towards an Universal Monarchy, if the British Colonies were added to their Dominions, and consequently the whole Trade of North-America engrossed by them. That the said Colonies being in a divided, disunited State, there has never been any joint Exertion of their Force, or Council, to repel or defeat the Measures of the French; and particular Colonies are unable and unwilling to maintain the Cause of the whole. That there has been a very great Neglect of the Affairs of the Iroquoise, as they are commonly called, the Indians of the Six Nations, and their Friendship and Alliance has been improved to private Purposes, for the Sake of the Trade with them, and the Purchase or Acquisition of their Lands, more than the Public Services. That they are supplied with Rum by the Traders, in vast and almost incredible Quantities; the Laws of the Colonies now in Force, being insufficient to restrain the Supply. And the Indians of every Nation, are frequently drunk, and abused in their Trade, and their Affections thereby alienated from the English; they often wound and murder one another in their Liquor, and to avoid Revenge, fly to the French; and perhaps more have been lost by these Means than by the French Artifice. That Purchases of Land from the Indians by private Persons, for small trifling Considerations, have been the Cause of great Uneasiness and Discontents; and if the Indians are not in fact imposed on and injured, yet they are apt to think they have been; and indeed, they appear not fit to be entrusted at Large, with the Sale of their own Lands: And the Laws of some of the Colonies, which make such Sales void, unless the Allowance of the Government be first obtained, seem to be well founded. That the Granting or Patenting vast Tracts of Land to private Persons or Companies, without Conditions of speedy Settlements, has tended to prevent the Strengthening the Frontiers of the particular Colony where such Tracts lie, and been Prejudicial to the rest. That it seems absolutely necessary, that speedy and effectual Measures be taken, to secure the Colonies from the Slavery they are threatened with: that any farther Advances of the French should be prevented; and the Encroachments already made, removed. That the Indians in Alliance or Friendship with the English, be constantly regarded under some wise Direction or Superintendency. That Endeavours be used for the Recovery of those Indians who are lately gone over to the French, and for securing those that remain. That some discreet Person or Persons be appointed to reside constantly among each Nation of Indians; such Person to have no Concern in Trade, and duly to communicate all Advices to the Superintendents. That the Trade with the said Indians be well regulated, and made subservient to the Public Interest, more than to private Gain. That there be Forts built for the Security of each Nation, and the better carrying on the Trade with them. That warlike Vessels be provided, sufficient to maintain His Majesty's Right to a free Navigation on the several Lakes. That all future Purchases of Lands from the Indians be void, unless made by the Government where such Lands lie, and from the Indians in a Body, in their public Councils. That the Patentees or Possessors of large unsettled Territories, be enjoined to cause them to be settled in a reasonable Time, on Pain of Forfeiture. That the Complaints of the Indians, relative to any Grants or Possessions of their Lands, fraudulently obtained, be inquired into, and all Injuries redressed. That the Bounds of those Colonies which extend to the South Seas, be contracted and limited by the Alleghenny or Apalachian Mountains; and that Measures be taken, for settling from time to time, Colonies of His Majesty's Protestant Subjects, Westward of said Mountains, in convenient Cantons, to be assigned for that Purpose. And finally, that there be an Union of His Majesty's several Governments on the Continent, that so their Councils, Treasure, and Strength, may be employed in due Proportion, against their common Enemy."

The Plan of Union, adopted on the 10th of July, was as follows:

"Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New-Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual Defence and Security, and for the Extending the British Settlements in North-America. That humble Application be made for an Act of the Parliament of Great-Britain, by Virtue of which One General Government may be formed in America, including all the said Colonies; within and under which Government, each Colony may retain its present Constitution, except in the Particulars wherein a Change may be directed by the said Act, as hereafter follows. That the said General Government be administered by a President General, to be appointed and supported by the Crown; and a Grand Council, to be chosen by the Representatives of the People of the several Colonies, met in their respective Assemblies. That within Months after the Passing of such Act, the House of Representatives in the several Assemblies, that happen to be sitting within that Time, or that shall be especially for that Purpose convened, may and shall chuse Members for the Grand Council, in the following Proportions; that is to say: Massachusetts-Bay, 7; New-Hampshire, 2; Connecticut, 5; Rhode-Island, 2; New-York, 4; New-Jersey, 3; Pennsylvania, 6; Maryland, 4; Virginia, 7, North-Carolina, 4; South Carolina, 4: = 48. Who shall meet for the first Time at the City of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, being called by the President General, as soon as conveniently may be, after his Appointment. That there shall be a new Election of Members for the Grand Council every three Years; and on the Death or Resignation of any Member, his Place shall be supplied by a new Choice, at the next Sitting of the Assembly of the Colony he represented. {3178} That after the first three Years, when the Proportion of Money arising out of each Colony to the General Treasury, can be known, the Number of Members to be chosen for each Colony, shall from time to time, in all ensuing Elections, be regulated by that Proportion (yet so as that the Number to be chosen by any one Province, be not more than seven, nor less than two). That the Grand Council shall meet once in every Year, and oftener if Occasion require, at such Time and Place as they shall adjourn to at the last preceding Meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the President General on any Emergency; he having first obtained in writing, the Consent of seven of the Members to such Call, and sent due and timely Notice to the whole. That the Grand Council have Power to chuse their Speaker, and shall neither be dissolved, prorogued, nor continue sitting longer than six Weeks at one Time, without their own Consent, or the special Command of the Crown. That the Members of the Grand Council shall be allowed for their Service, Ten Shillings Sterling per Diem, during their Session and Journey to and from the Place of Meeting, twenty Miles to be reckoned a Day's Journey. That the Assent of the President General be requisite to all Acts of the Grand Council; and that it be his Office and Duty to cause them to be carried into Execution. That the President General, with the Advice of the Grand Council, hold or direct all Indian Treaties, in which the general Interest or Welfare of the Colonies may be concerned; and to make Peace or declare War with Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge necessary for regulating all Indian Trade. That they make all Purchases from Indians for the Crown, of the Lands now not within the Bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their Bounds, when some of them are reduced to more convenient Dimensions. That they make new Settlements on such Purchases, by granting Lands in the King's Name, reserving a Quit-Rent to the Crown for the Use of the General Treasury. That they make Laws for regulating and governing such new Settlements, 'till the Crown shall think fit to form them into particular Governments. That they may raise and pay Soldiers, and build Forts for the Defence of any of the Colonies, and equip Vessels of Force to guard the Coast, and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes, or great Rivers; but they shall not impress Men in any Colony, without the Consent of its Legislature. That for those Purposes, they have Power to make Laws, and lay and levy such general Duties, Imposts, or Taxes, as to themselves appear most equal and just, considering the Ability and other Circumstances of the Inhabitants in the several Colonies, and such as may be collected with the least Inconvenience to the People; rather discouraging Luxury, than loading industry with unnecessary Burthens. That they may appoint a general Treasurer and a particular Treasurer in each Government, when necessary; and from time to time, may order the Sums in the Treasuries of each Government, into the General Treasury, or draw on them for special Payments, as they find most convenient; yet no Money to issue, but by joint Orders of the President General and Grand Council, except where Sums have been appropriated to particular Purposes, and the President General is previously impowered by an Act, to draw for such Sums. That the general Accounts shall be yearly settled, and reported to the several Assemblies. That a Quorum of the Grand Council, impowered to act with the President General, do consist of Twenty-five Members; among whom there shall be one or more from a Majority of the Colonies. That the Laws made by them for the Purposes aforesaid, shall not be repugnant, but as near as may be agreeable, to the Laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the King in Council, for Approbation, as soon as may be, after their passing; and if not disapproved within three Years after Presentation, to remain in Force. That in Case of the Death of the President General, the Speaker of the Grand Council for the Time being, shall succeed, and be vested with the same Power and Authorities, and continue 'till the King's Pleasure be known. That all Military Commission Officers, whether for Land or Sea Service, to act under this General Constitution, be nominated by the President General, but the Approbation of the Grand Council is to be obtained, before they receive their Commissions. And all Civil Officers are to be nominated by the Grand Council, and to receive the President General's Approbation, before they officiate. But in Case of Vacancy, by Death or Removal of any Officer, Civil or Military, under this Constitution, the Governor of the Provinces in which such Vacancy happens, may appoint, 'till the Pleasure of the President General and Grand Council can be known. That the particular Military as well as Civil Establishments in each Colony, remain in their present State, this General Constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden Emergencies, any Colony may defend itself, and lay the Accounts of Expense thence arisen, before the President General and Grand Council, who may allow and order Payment of the same, as far as they judge such Accounts just and reasonable."

Stephen Hopkins, A True Representation of the Plan formed at Albany in 1754, for uniting all the British Northern Colonies; with introduction and notes by S. S. Rider (Rhode Island Historical Tracts, Number 9).

ALSO IN: Proceedings of Commissioners at Albany (Doc. Hist. of New York, volume 2, pages 545-617).

T. C. Haliburton, Rule and Misrule of the English in America, pages 253-258.

J. R. Brodhead, editor, Documents relative to Colonial History of New York, volume 6, pages 853-905.

Journal of Congress at Albany in 1754 (Massachusetts Historical Society Collection, series 3, volume 5).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1755. Demand of the royal governors in America for taxation of the colonies by act of Parliament.

At the congress of American governors which General Braddock convened at Alexandria, in April, 1755, on his first arrival in America as commander-in-chief of the British forces, "Braddock directed their attention, first of all, to the subject of a colonial revenue, on which his instructions commanded him to insist, and his anger kindled 'that no such fund was already established.' The governors present, recapitulating their strifes with their assemblies, made answer: 'Such a fund can never be established in the colonies without the aid of parliament. Having found it impracticable to obtain in their respective governments the proportion expected by his majesty toward defraying the expense of his service in North America, they are unanimously of opinion that it should be proposed to his majesty's ministers to find out some method of compelling them to do it, and of assessing the several governments in proportion to their respective abilities.' {3179} This imposing document Braddock sent forthwith to the ministry, himself urging the necessity of laying some tax throughout his majesty's dominions in North America. … I have had in my hands vast masses of correspondence, including letters from servants of the crown in every royal colony in America; from civilians, as well as from Braddock and Dunbar and Gage; from Delancey and Sharpe, as well as from Dinwiddie and Shirley; and all were of the same tenor. The British ministry heard one general clamor from men in office for taxation by act of parliament. … In England, the government was more and more inclined to enforce the permanent authority of Great Britain."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last Revision), volume 2, pages. 416-417.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1755-1760. The French and Indian War, known in Europe as the Seven Years War: The English conquest of Canada.

See CANADA: A. D. 1750-1773, to 1760; NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755; 1755; OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754, to 1755; CAPE BRETON ISLAND: A. D. 1758-1760;

also, for an account of the accompanying Cherokee War.

See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1759-1761.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1760-1775. Crown, Parliament and Colonies. The English theory and the American theory of their relations.

"The people of every colony were subject to two jurisdictions, one local and one general, that must be adjusted to each other. To effect such adjustment caused no little friction; and the Colonies and the Mother Country got on peaceably as long as they did, only because neither one pushed its theory of colonial relations to an extreme, each yielding something to the other and thus effecting a compromise. The Colonies held that the dominion which the Cabots discovered in America belonged to the King, rather than to the Kingdom, of England. Englishmen adventuring into this dominion to plant colonies were entitled to all the privileges of free-born Englishmen at home; trial by jury, habeas corpus, and exemption from taxes that their own representatives had not voted. The British Empire was not one dominion, but several dominions. Everyone of these dominions had, or should have, its own legislature to enact laws for its government. The Colonies were not one dominion, but 13 dominions; and in everyone the legislature was as supreme as Parliament was in England. Parliament, therefore, had nothing more to do with Massachusetts or Virginia than the legislatures of those colonies had to do with England. The King, who alone had a voice in the matter, had, in their charters, guaranteed to the Colonies the common law so far as this was applicable to their condition, and he was now powerless to withdraw what he had thus conceded. Such, in outline, was the American theory of colonial relations. Still, no one pretended that this theory had ever been fully carried out in practice. It must also be said that it did not appear fully formed at once, but grew up gradually. The British theory was that Englishmen continued Englishmen when they emigrated to the American dominions of the King; that the power of Parliament, to which they were subject in the old home, followed them to the new one; and that Parliament could yield them more or fewer powers of self-government for a time, and then withdraw them. It was also claimed that the Colonies were already represented in the House of Commons; since the several members of that body did not represent particular districts or constituencies, but the whole British Empire. Besides, it was asserted that the Colonies themselves had repeatedly acknowledged the authority of Parliament by submitting to its legislation. Still no one pretended that this theory had ever been fully carried out."

B. A. Hinsdale, The American Government, sections 92-93.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, pages 30-32.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1761. Enforcement of revenue laws in Massachusetts. The Writs of Assistance and Otis' speech.

"Immediately after the conquest of Canada was completed, rumors were widely circulated … that the charters would be taken away, and the colonies reduced to royal governments. The officers of the customs began at once to enforce with strictness all the acts of parliament regulating the trade of the colonies, several of which had been suspended, or become obsolete, and thus had never been executed at all. The good will of the colonists or their legislatures, was no longer wanted in the prosecution of the war; and the commissioners of the customs were permitted and directed to enforce the obnoxious acts. Governor Bernard [of Massachusetts], who was always a supporter of the royal prerogative, entered fully into these views, and shewed by his opinion, his appointments and his confidential advisers, that his object would be, to extend the power of the government to any limits, which the ministry might authorize. The first demonstration of the new course intended to be pursued, was the arrival of an order in Council to carry into effect the Acts of trade, and to apply to the supreme judicature of the Province [Massachusetts], for Writs of Assistance, to be granted to the officers of the customs. In a case of this importance there can be no doubt, that Mr. Paxton, who was at the head of the customs in Boston, consulted with the Government and all the crown officers, as to the best course to be taken. The result was, that he directed his deputy at Salem, Mr. Cockle, in November, 1760, to petition the Superior Court, then sitting in that town, for 'writs of assistance.' Stephen Sewall who was the Chief Justice, expressed great doubt of the legality of such a writ, and of the authority of the Court to grant it. None of the other judges said a word in favour of it; but as the application was on the part of the Crown, it could not be dismissed without a hearing, which after consultation was fixed for the next term of the Court, to be held in February, 1761, at Boston, when the question was ordered to be argued. In the interval, Chief Justice Sewall died, and Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson was made his successor, thereby uniting in his person, the office of Lieutenant Governor with the emoluments of the commander of the castle, a member of the Council, Judge of Probate and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court! … The mercantile part of the community was in a state of great anxiety as to the result of this question. The officers of the Customs called upon Otis for his official assistance, as Advocate General, to argue their cause. {3180} But, as he believed these writs to be illegal and tyrannical, be refused. He would not prostitute his office to the support of an oppressive act; and with true delicacy and dignity, being unwilling to retain a station, in which he might be expected or called upon to argue in support of such odious measures, he resigned it though the situation was very lucrative, and if filled by an incumbent with a compliant spirit, led to the highest favours of government. The merchants of Salem and Boston, applied to Mr. Pratt to undertake their cause, who was also solicited to engage on the other side; but he declined taking any part, being about to leave Boston for New York, of which province he had been appointed Chief Justice. They also applied to Otis and Thacher, who engaged to make their defence, and probably both of them without fees, though very great ones were offered. The language of Otis was, 'in such a cause, I despise all fees.' … The trial took place in the Council Chamber of the Old Town House, in Boston. … The judges were five in number, including Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson, who presided as Chief Justice. The room was filled with all the officers of government, and the principal citizens, to hear the arguments in a cause that inspired the deepest solicitude. The case was opened by Mr. Gridley, who argued it with much learning, ingenuity, and dignity, urging every point and authority; that could be found after the most diligent search, in favour of the Custom house petition; making all his reasoning depend on this consideration—'if the parliament of Great Britain is the sovereign legislator of the British Empire.' He was followed by Mr. Thacher on the opposite side, whose reasoning was ingenious and able, delivered in a tone of great mildness and moderation. 'But,' in the language of President Adams, 'Otis was a flame of fire; with a promptitude of classical allusions, a depth of research, a rapid summary of historical events and dates, a profusion of legal authorities, a prophetic glance of his eyes into futurity, and a rapid torrent of impetuous eloquence, he hurried away all before him. American Independence was then and there born. The seeds of patriots and heroes, to defend the 'Non sine Diis animosus infans'; to defend the vigorous youth, were then and there sown. Every man of an immense crowded audience appeared to me to go away as I did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there, was the first scene of the first act of opposition, to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there, the child Independence was born. In fifteen years, i. e. in 1776, he grew up to manhood and declared himself free.' 'There were no stenographers in those days,' to give a complete report of this momentous harangue. How gladly would be exchanged for it, a few hundred verbose speeches on some of the miserable, transient topics of the day, that are circulated in worthless profusion. Yet on this occasion, 'the seeds were sown,' and though some of them doubtless fell by the wayside or on stony places, others fell on good ground, and sprang up and increased and brought forth in due season, thirty, sixty and an hundred fold. … After the close of his argument, the Court adjourned for consideration, and at the close of the term, Chief Justice Hutchinson pronounced the opinion: 'The Court has considered the subject of writs of assistance, find can see no foundation for such a writ; but as the practice in England is not known, it has been thought best to continue the question to the next term, that in the meantime opportunity may be given to know the result.' No cause in the annals of colonial jurisprudence had hitherto excited more public interest; and none had given rise to such powerful argument. … An epoch in public affairs may be dated from this trial. Political parties became more distinctly formed, and their several adherents were more marked and decided. The nature of ultra-marine jurisdiction began to be closely examined; the question respecting raising a revenue fully discussed. The right of the British parliament to impose taxes was openly denied. 'Taxation without representation is tyranny,' was the maxim, that was the guide and watch word of all the friends of liberty. The crown officers and their followers adopted openly the pretensions of the British ministry and parliament, and considering their power to be irresistible, appealed to the selfishness of those who might be expectants of patronage, and to the fears of all quiet and timid minds, to adopt a blind submission, as the only safe or reasonable alternative. Otis took the side of his country, and as has been shewn, under circumstances that made his decision irrevocable. He was transferred at once from the ranks of private life, not merely to take the side, but to be the guide and leader of his country, in opposition to the designs of the British ministry. 'Although' says President Adams, 'Mr. Otis had never before interfered in public affairs, his exertions on this single occasion secured him a commanding popularity with the friends of their country, and the terror and vengeance of her enemies; neither of which ever deserted him.' His popularity was instantaneous, and universal; and the public were impatient for the approaching election, when they could make him a representative of Boston."

W. Tudor, Life of James Otis, chapters 5-7.

See also, MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1761.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763. The Treaty of Paris. Acquisition of Florida and Eastern Louisiana (as well as Canada) by Great Britain.

See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763. The King's proclamation excluding settlers from the Western territory lately acquired from France.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763. General effects, economically and politically, of the English trade regulations.

"Economically the general results of the trade regulations were important. Robert Giffen has repeatedly pointed out how difficult it is, even with modern comparatively accurate methods, to obtain reliable results from the use of export and import statistics. This difficulty is immeasurably enhanced when we have to rely on the meagre figures of a century and a half ago. For we neither know how these statistics were taken, nor at all how accurate they are; while their inadequacy becomes clearly evident when we consider the large amount of smuggling carried on both in England and the colonies. One general proposition, however, can be formulated from the examination of these statistics, and that is the balance of trade between England and the colonies was unfavorable to the latter. And this was an inherent consequence of the mercantile system, by which England regulated these commercial relations. {3181} The colonies were unable to pay England for her manufactures entirely in raw materials, and the residue was paid in coin obtained from the favorable trade with Spain, Portugal, and the West Indies. All metal had to be sent to England; it was, as De Foe says, 'snatched up for returns to England in specie.' An important consequence followed from this continuous drain of specie. The colonies could with difficulty retain coin, and hence were forced either to fall back on barter, or to issue paper money. … While, on the one hand, the acts of trade and navigation are partially responsible for many sad passages in the fiscal history of the colonies, on the other hand they conduced to the development of a most important colonial industry. This industry was ship-building, for which the colonies were especially adapted on account of the cheapness of lumber. In developing this natural fitness, the protection afforded to English and colonial shipping by the Navigation Acts was an important factor. As a rule England did not discriminate against colonial and in favor of English ships, although the colonies frequently attempted by legislation to secure advantages for their own shipping. As a result of this policy ship building and the carrying trade increased rapidly, especially in the New England colonies. … So important did this industry become that in 1724 the ship carpenters of the Thames complained to the King, 'that their trade was hurt and their workmen emigrated since so many vessels were built in New England.' Massachusetts built ships not only for England, but also for European countries, and for the West Indies. … Politically the commercial regulations were not so important. Up to 1763 only slight political importance attaches to the system, for only in a negative way did it affect the political ideas of the colonists. The colonies were peopled by men of varied race and religion, who had little common consciousness of rights and wrongs and few common political ideals. The centrifugal forces among them were strong. Among centripetal forces, such as a common sovereign and a common system of private law, must be reckoned the fact that their commerce was regulated by a system which, as a rule, was uniform for all the colonies. When the acts of trade worked to their advantage, the colonists reaped common benefits; when they inflicted hardships, the colonists made common complaint. Moreover, the fact that England was unable to enforce certain of her acts, especially the Molasses Act, caused contempt for parliamentary authority. The continued and, by the very nature of things, the necessary violation of this law lead to a questioning of its sanction, while the open favoritism shown in it towards the West India colonies naturally aroused disaffection in those of the continent. The colonial system, as it was administered before 1763, contributed but slightly in bringing about the revolution of 1776. As Mr. Ramsay has said, 'if no other grievances had been superadded to what existed in 1763, they would have been soon forgotten, for their pressure was neither great, nor universal. It was only when the fundamental basis of the acts was changed from one of commercial monopoly to one of revenue, that the acts became of vital political importance."

G. L. Beer, The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies (Columbia College Studies in History, etc., volume 3, number 2), chapter 7, section 2.