Part 2 — CHAPTER IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (continued 41)

TARENTUM.

Tarentum (or Taras), the most important of the ancient Greek cities in Italy, "lay at the northern corner of the great gulf which still bears its name. It had an excellent harbour, almost land-locked. On its eastern horn stood the city. Its form was triangular; one side being washed by the open sea, the other by the waters of the harbour, while the base or land side was protected by a line of strong fortifications. Thus advantageously posted for commerce the city grew apace. She possessed an opulent middle class; and the poorer citizens found an easy subsistence in the abundant supply of fish which the gulf afforded. These native fishermen were always ready to man the navy of the state. But they made indifferent soldiers. Therefore when any peril of war threatened the state, it was the practice of the government to hire foreign captains, soldiers of fortune, who were often kings or princes, to bring an army for their defence. … The origin of Lacedæmonian Tarentum is veiled in fable. The warriors of Sparta (so runs the well-known legend) went forth to the second Messenian war under a vow not to see their homes till they had conquered the enemy. They were long absent, and their wives sought paramours among the slaves and others who had not gone out to war. When the warriors returned, they found a large body of youth grown up from this adulterous intercourse. These youths (the Parthenii as they were called), disdaining subjection, quitted their native land under the command of Phalantus, one of their own body, and founded the colony of Tarentum."

H. G. Liddell, History of Rome, book 3, chapter 25 (volume 1).

See, also, SIRIS.

TARENTUM: B. C. 282-275. Alliance with Pyrrhus and war with Rome.

See ROME: B. C. 282-275.

TARENTUM: B. C. 212. Betrayed to Hannibal.

See PUNIC WARS: THE SECOND.

TARENTUM, Treaty of.

The treaty in which Octavius and Antony extended their triumvirate to a second term of five years; negotiated at Tarentum, B. C. 37.

C. Merivale, History of the Romans, chapter 27.

TARGOWITZ, Confederates of.

See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792.

TARIFA: A. D. 1291. Taken by the Christians from the Moors.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1273-1460.

—————TARIFF LEGISLATION AND CONVENTIONS: Start————

TARIFF: (The Netherlands): 15th Century. Early Free Trade and Reciprocity.

In the Netherlands, at the close of a short war with the English, in 1437, "the import of raw wool was entirely relieved from the payment of even the ordinary customs. … And this was then their notion of protection,—to be allowed to buy what they liked where they liked, to live at peace with their neighbours, and to be let alone. Four hundred years have passed and gone since the Netherlands persuaded their rulers to take off all duty on raw wool, and to permit half-finished clothes to be brought into their country in order that they might be dyed and taken out again duty free; yet we live in the midst of tariffs whose aim it is to hinder the importation of the raw material by prohibitory duties and to prevent competition in every kind of fabric by so-called protecting ones! And in England, also, at the period in question, the suicidal spirit of commercial envy had seized hold of the government, and in every parliament some fresh evidence was afforded of the jealousy with which foreign skill and competition were viewed. {3064} But the Dutch held on the tenour of their discerning and sagacious way without waiting for reciprocity or resenting its reverse. If the English would not admit their cloths, that was no reason why they should cheat themselves of the advantage of English and Irish wool. If not cloths, there was doubtless something else that they would buy from them. Among other articles, there was salt, which they had acquired a peculiar skill in refining; and there was an extensive carrying trade in the produce of the Northern countries, and in various costly luxuries, which the English obtained from remoter regions generally through them. In 1496, when Philip (father of the Emperor Charles V.) assumed the government of the Netherlands, as Duke of Brabant, he "presented to the senates of the leading cities the draught of a commercial treaty with England, conceived in a wise and liberal spirit, and eminently fitted to advance the real welfare of both countries. Their assent was gladly given. … Nor did they over-estimate the value of the new compact, which long went by the name of 'The Grand Treaty of Commerce.' Its provisions were, in all respects, reciprocal, and enabled every kind of merchandise to be freely imported from either country by the citizens of the other. The entire liberty of fishing on each other's coast was confirmed; measures were prescribed for the suppression of piracy; and property saved from wrecks, when none of the crew survived, 'was vested in the local authorities in trust for the proper owners, should they appear to claim it within a year and a day. … The industrial policy of the Dutch was founded on ideas wholly and essentially different from that of the kingdoms around them. 'The freedom of traffic had ever been greater with them than amongst any of their neighbours;' and its different results began to appear. Not only were strangers of every race and creed sure of an asylum in Holland, but of a welcome; and singular pains were taken to induce those whose skill enabled them to contribute to the wealth of the state to settle permanently in the great towns."

W. T. McCullagh, Industrial History of Free Nations, volume 2, pages 110-111, 150-151, 266-267.

TARIFF: (Venice): 15-17th Centuries. Beginning of systematic exclusion and monopoly.

See VENICE: 15-17TH CENTURIES.

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1651-1672. The Navigation Laws and their effect on the American colonies.

See NAVIGATION LAWS: A. D. 1651; and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1651-1672.

TARIFF: (France): A. D. 1664-1667. The System of Colbert.

Colbert, the great minister of Louis XIV., was the first among statesmen who had an economic system, "settled, complete and consistent in all its parts; and it is to the eternal honor of his name that he made it triumph in spite of obstacles of every kind. Although this system was far from being irreproachable in all its parts, it was an immense progress at the time of its appearance; and we have had nothing since then which can be compared with it, for breadth and penetration. … It was … the need of restoring order in the finances which gave rise to the attempts at amelioration made by Colbert. This illustrious minister soon comprehended that the surest way to increase public fortune was to favor private fortune, and to open to production the broadest and freest ways. … One of the first acts of his ministry, the reestablishment of the taxes on a uniform basis, is an homage rendered to true principles; and one cannot doubt that all the others would have been in conformity with this glorious precedent, if the science of wealth had been, at that time, as advanced as it is to-day. Colbert would certainly have carried out in France what Mr. Huskisson had begun in England at the time of his sudden death. … The edict of September, 1664, reduced the import and export duties on merchandise to suitable limits, and suppressed the most onerous. 'It is our intention,' said the king, 'to make known to all our governors and intendants in what consideration we hold at present everything that may concern commerce. … As the most solid and most essential means for the reestablishment of commerce are the diminution and the regulation of the duties which are levied on all commodities, we have arranged to reduce all these duties to one single import and one export duty, and also to diminish these considerably, in order to encourage navigation, reestablish the ancient manufactures, banish idleness.' … At the same time Colbert prohibited the seizure for the tailles (villein-tax) [see TAILLE AND GABELLE] of beds, clothes, bread, horses and cattle serving for labor; or the tools by which artisans and manual laborers gained their livelihood. The register of the survey of lands was revised, so that property should be taxed only in proportion to its value and the actual extent of the land. The great highways of the kingdom and all the rivers were then guarded by armies of receivers of tolls, who stopped merchandise on its passage and burdened its transportation with a multitude of abusive charges, to say nothing of the delays and exactions of every kind. An edict was issued ordering the investigation of these degrading charges; and most of them were abolished or reduced to just limits. … The lease of Customs duties being about to expire, Colbert improved this occasion to revise the tariff; and although this fatal measure has since been considered as the finest monument of his administration, we think we should present it in its true aspect, which seems to us to have been invariably misapprehended. Colbert's aim in revising the customs was to make them a means of protection for national manufactures, in the place of a simple financial resource, as they formerly were. Most articles of foreign manufacture had duties imposed upon them, so as to secure to similar French merchandise the home market. At the same time, Colbert spared neither sacrifices nor encouragement to give activity to the manufacturing spirit in our country. He caused the most skilful workmen of every kind to come from abroad; and he subjected manufactures to a severe discipline, that they should not lose their vigilance, relying on the tariffs. Heavy fines were inflicted on the manufacturers of an article recognized as inferior in quality to what it should be. For the first offence, the products of the delinquents were attached to a stake, with a carcan and the name of the manufacturer; in case of a second offence, the manufacturer himself was fastened to it. These draconian rigors would have led to results entirely contrary to those Colbert expected, if his enlightened solicitude had not tempered by other measures what was cruel in them. {3065} Thus, he appointed inspectors of the manufactures, who often directed the workmen into the best way, and brought them information of the newest processes, purchased from foreign manufacturers, or secretly obtained at great expense. Colbert was far from attaching to the customs the idea of exclusive and blind protection that has ever been attributed to them since his ministry. He knew very well that these tariffs would engender reprisals, and that, while encouraging manufactures, they would seriously hinder commerce. Moreover, all his efforts tended to weaken their evil effects. His instructions to consuls and ambassadors testify strongly to his prepossessions in this regard. … The more one studies the administrative acts of this great minister, the more one is convinced of his lofty sense of justice; and of the liberal tendencies of his system, which has hitherto been generally extolled as hostile to the principle of commercial liberty. In vain the Italians have hailed it by the name of 'Colbertism,' to designate the exclusive system invented by themselves and honored by the Spanish: Colbert never approved the sacrifice of the greater part of his fellow citizens to a few privileged ones, nor the creation of endless monopolies for the profit of certain branches of industry. We may reproach him with having been excessively inclined to make regulations, but not with having enfeoffed France to a few spinners of wool and cotton. He had himself summed up in a few words his system in the memorial he presented to the king: 'To reduce export duties on provisions and manufactures of the kingdom; to diminish import duties on everything which is of use in manufactures; and to repel the products of foreign manufactures, by raising the duties.' Such was the spirit of his first tariff, published in September, 1664. He had especially aimed at facilitating the supply of raw materials in France, and promoting the interests of her home trade by the abolition of provincial barriers, and by the establishment of lines of customs-houses at the extreme frontiers. … The only reproach that can be justly made against him is the abuse of the protective instrument he had just created, by increasing in the tariff of 1667 the exclusive measures directed against foreign manufactures in that of 1664. It was no longer then a question of manufactures, but of war, namely, with Holland; and this war broke out in 1672. … From the same epoch date the first wars of commercial reprisals between France and England, hostilities which were to cost both nations so much blood and so many tears. Manufactures were then seen to prosper and agriculture to languish in France under the influence of this system."

J. A. Blanqui, History of Political Economy in Europe, chapter 26.

ALSO IN, H. Martin, History of France: The Age of Louis XIV., volume 1, chapter 2.

J. B. Perkins, France under the Regency, chapter 4.

See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 1661-1683.

TARIFF: (Pennsylvania): A. D. 1785. Beginning of "Protection" in Pennsylvania.

"Before the Revolution Pennsylvania had always been slow to impose burdens on trade. While Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina were raising considerable sums from imposts, Pennsylvania commerce was free from restrictions. In 1780, however, the need of revenue overcame the predilection of the Quakers for free trade and they decided 'that considerable sums can be raised by a small impost on goods and merchandise imported into this state without burdening commerce.' Accordingly, low duties were laid on wines, liquors, molasses, sugar, cocoa and tea, with 1 per cent. on all other imports. In 1782 the duties were doubled and the revenue was appropriated to the defence of commerce on the Delaware river and bay. This was done at the request of the merchants who wished to have their interests protected and 'signified their willingness to submit to a further impost on the importation of goods for that purpose.' When peace came, however, the merchants at once represented it as detrimental to the interests of the state to continue the duties, and they were repealed. In 1784 low duties were again imposed, and later in the same year increased. Early in 1785 more careful provisions were made for their collection. September 20, came the important act 'to encourage and protect the manufactures of this state by laying additional duties on certain manufactures which interfere with them.' … More than forty of the articles which Pennsylvania had begun to make were taxed at high specific rates. Coaches and carriages, paid £10 to £20; clocks, 30s.; scythes, 15s. per dozen; beer, ale and porter, 6d. per gallon; soap or candles, 1d. per pound; shoes and boots, 1s. to 6s. per pair; cordage and ropes, 8s. 4d. per hundred weight; and so on. The ten per cent. schedule included manufactures of iron and steel, hats, clothing, books and papers, whips, canes, musical instruments and jewelry. … The Pennsylvania act is of importance because it shows the nature of commodities which the country was then producing, as well as because it formed the basis of the tariff of 1789."

W. Hill, First Stages of the Tariff Policy of the United States, pages 53-54.

The preamble of the Pennsylvania act of 1785 set forth its reasons as follows: "Whereas, divers useful and beneficial arts and manufactures have been gradually introduced into Pennsylvania, and the same have at length risen to a very considerable extent and perfection, insomuch that in the late war between the United States of America and Great Britain, when the importation of European goods was much interrupted, and often very difficult and uncertain, the artizans and mechanics of this state were able to supply in the hours of need, not only large quantities of weapons and other implements, but also ammunition and clothing, without which the war could not have been carried on, whereby their oppressed country was greatly assisted and relieved. And whereas, although the fabrics and manufactures of Europe, and other foreign parts, imported into this country in times of peace, may be afforded at cheaper rates than they can be made here, yet good policy and a regard to the wellbeing of divers useful and industrious citizens, who are employed in the making of like goods, in this state, demand of us that moderate duties be laid on certain fabrics and manufactures imported, which do most interfere with, and which (if no relief be given) will undermine and destroy the useful manufactures of the like kind in this country, for this purpose. Be it enacted" &c.

Pennsylvania Laws, 1785.

The duties enacted, which were additional to the then existing impost of 2½ per cent., were generally specific, but ad valorem on some commodities as on British steel, 10 per cent.; earthen ware, the same; glass and glass-ware, 2½ per cent.; linens the same. Looked at in the light of recent American tariffs, they would hardly be recognized as "protective" in their character; but the protective purpose was plainly enough declared.

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TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1789-1791. The first tariff enactment. Hamilton's Report on Manufactures. The "American System" proposed.

"The immediate necessity of raising some ready money led to the passage of a tariff bill at the first session of Congress. It was prepared and carried through the House chiefly by Madison; and its contents, no less than the general tone of the debate in which it was discussed, showed a decided leaning towards the protective system. But this legislation was temporary, and was at the time known to be so. The permanent system of the country was left for subsequent and more leisurely development. When at last Congress felt able to give the subject due attention, it applied as usual to Hamilton to furnish information and opinions. A topic so important and so congenial to his tastes called forth his best exertions. A series of extensive investigations conducted by every feasible kind of inquiry and research, both in foreign parts and in the United States, furnished the material for his reflections. He took abundant time to digest as well as to collect the great mass of information thus acquired, and it was not until nearly two years had elapsed since the order for the report was passed that he sent in the document to the House of Representatives. … The inferences and arguments constituted as able a presentation of the protectionist theory as has ever been made. … It is, however, an incorrect construction of that report to regard it as a vindication of the general or abstract doctrine of protection. Hamilton was very far from assuming any such position; protection always and everywhere was not his theory; protection was not his ideal principle of commercial regulation. … So far from entertaining any predilection for protection in the abstract, it would seem that in a perfect commercial world he would have expected to find free trade the prevalent custom. … If free trade were the rule of the whole commercial world, Hamilton was not prepared to say that the United States would find it for her interest to be singular. But such were not the premises from which he had to draw a conclusion. … The report of Hamilton determined the policy of the country. For good or for evil protection was resorted to, with the avowed purpose of encouraging domestic manufacturing as well as of raising a revenue. … The principles upon which Hamilton based his tariff were not quite those of pure protection, but constituted what was known as the 'American System'; a system which has been believed in by former generations with a warmth of conviction not easy to withstand."

J. T. Morse, Jr., Life of Alexander Hamilton, chapter 11.

Hamilton's celebrated report opens with an elaborate argument to prove the desirability of manufacturing industries in the country, and then proceeds: "A full view having now been taken of the inducements to the promotion of manufactures in the United States, accompanied with an examination of the principal objections which are commonly urged in opposition, it is proper, in the next place, to consider the means by which it may be effected, as introductory to a specification of the objects which in the present state of things appear the most fit to be encouraged, and of the particular measures which it may be advisable to adopt in respect to each. In order to a better judgment of the means proper to be resorted to by the United States, it will be of use to advert to those which have been employed with success in other countries. The principle of these are:

I. Protecting duties, or duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged. Duties of this nature evidently amount to a virtual bounty on the domestic fabrics, since by enhancing the charges on foreign articles they enable the national manufacturers to undersell all their foreign competitors. The propriety of this species of encouragement need not be dwelt upon, as it is not only a clear result from the numerous topics which have been suggested, but is sanctioned by the laws of the United States in a variety of instances; it has the additional recommendation of being a resource of revenue. Indeed, all the duties imposed on imported articles, though with an exclusive view to revenue, have the effect in contemplation; and, except where they fall on raw materials, wear a beneficent aspect towards the manufacturers of the country.

II. Prohibitions of rival articles, or duties equivalent to prohibitions. This is another and an efficacious mean of encouraging manufactures; but in general it is only fit to be employed when a manufacture has made such a progress, and is in so many hands, as to insure a due competition and an adequate supply on reasonable terms. Of duties equivalent to prohibitions there are examples in the laws of the United States; and there are other cases to which the principle may be advantageously extended, but they are not numerous. Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing nations, a similar policy on the part of the United States, in every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of endeavoring to secure to their own citizens a reciprocity of advantages.

III. Prohibitions of the exportation of materials of manufactures. The desire of securing a cheap and plentiful supply for the national workmen; and, where the article is either peculiar to the country, or of peculiar quality there, the jealousy of enabling foreign workmen to rival those of the nation with its own materials, are the leading motives to this species of regulation. It ought not to be affirmed that it is in no instance proper, but it is certainly one which ought to be adopted with great circumspection and only in very plain cases.

IV. Pecuniary bounties. This has been found one of the most efficacious means of encouraging manufactures, and it is, in some views, the best, though it has not yet been practiced upon the government of the United States,—unless the allowance on the exportation of dried and pickled fish and salted meat could be considered as a bounty—and though it is less favored by public opinion than some other modes. Its advantages are these:

1. It is a species of encouragement more positive and direct than any other, and for that very reason has a more immediate tendency to stimulate and uphold new enterprises, increasing the chances of profit, and diminishing the risks of loss in the first attempts.

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2. It avoids the inconvenience of a temporary augmentation of price, which is incident to some other modes, or it produces it to a less degree, either by making no addition to the charges on the rival foreign article, as in the case of protecting duties, or by making a smaller addition. The first happens when the fund for the bounty is derived from a different object (which may or may not increase the price of some other article according to the nature of that object); the second when the fund is derived from the same or a similar object of foreign manufacture. One per cent. duty on the foreign article, converted into a bounty on the domestic, will have an equal effect with a duty of 2% exclusive of such bounty; and the price of the foreign commodity is liable to be raised in the one case in the proportion of 1%, in the other in that of 2%. Indeed, the bounty when drawn from another source, is calculated to promote a reduction of price, because, without laying any new charge on the foreign article, it serves to introduce a competition with it, and to increase the total quantity of the article in the market.

3. Bounties have not, like high protecting duties, a tendency to produce scarcity. An increase of price is not always the immediate, though where the progress of a domestic manufacture does not counteract a rise, it is commonly the ultimate effect of an additional duty. In the interval between the laying of the duty and a proportional increase of price, it may discourage importation by interfering with the profits to be expected from the sale of the article.

4. Bounties are sometimes not only the best, but the only proper expedient for uniting the encouragement of a new object of agriculture with that of a new object of manufacture. It is the interest of the farmer to have the production of the raw material promoted by counteracting the interference of the foreign material of the same kind. It is the interest of the manufacturer to have the material abundant and cheap. If prior to the domestic production of the material in sufficient quantity to supply the manufacturer on good terms, a duty be laid upon the importation of it from abroad, with a view to promote the raising of it at home, the interest both of the farmer and manufacturer will be disserved. By either destroying the requisite supply, or raising the price of the article beyond what can be afforded to be given for it by the conductor of an infant manufacture, it is abandoned or fails; and there being no domestic manufactories to create a demand for the raw material which is raised by the farmer, it is in vain that the competition of the like foreign article may have been destroyed. It cannot escape notice that a duty upon the importation of an article can no otherwise aid the domestic production of it than by giving the latter greater advantages in the home market. It can have no influence upon the advantageous sale of the article produced in foreign markets, no tendency, therefore, to promote its exportation. The true way to conciliate these two interests is to lay a duty on foreign manufactures of the material, the growth of which is desired to be encouraged, and to apply the produce of that duty by way of bounty either upon the production of the material itself, or upon its manufacture at home, or upon both. In this disposition of the thing the manufacturer commences his enterprise under every advantage which is attainable as to quantity or price of the raw material. And the farmer, if the bounty be immediately to him, is enabled by it to enter into a successful competition with the foreign material. … There is a degree of prejudice against bounties, from an appearance of giving away the public money without an immediate consideration, and from a supposition that they serve to enrich particular classes at the expense of the community. But neither of these sources of dislike will bear a serious examination. There is no purpose to which public money can be more beneficially applied than to the acquisition of a new and useful branch of industry, no consideration more valuable than a permanent addition to the general stock of productive labor. As to the second source of objection, it equally lies against other modes of encouragement, which are admitted to be eligible. As often as a duty upon a foreign article makes an addition to its price, it causes an extra expense to the community for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A bounty does no more. But it is the interest of the society in each case to submit to a temporary expense, which is more than compensated by an increase of industry and wealth, by an augmentation of resources and independence, and by the circumstance of eventual cheapness, which has been noticed in another place. It would deserve attention, however, in the employment of this species of encouragement in the United States, as a reason for moderating the degree of it in the instances in which it might be deemed eligible, that the great distance of this country from Europe imposes very heavy charges on all the fabrics which are brought from thence, amounting from 15% to 30% on their value according to their bulk. …

V. Premiums. These are of a nature allied to bounties, though distinguishable from them in some important features. Bounties are applicable to the whole quantity of an article produced or manufactured or exported, and involve a correspondent expense. Premiums serve to reward some particular excellence or superiority, some extraordinary exertion or skill, and are dispensed only in a small number of cases. But their effect is to stimulate general effort. …

VI. The exemption of the materials of manufactures from duty. The policy of that exemption, as a general rule, particularly in reference to new establishments, is obvious. …

VII. Drawbacks of the duties which are imposed on the materials of manufactures. It has already been observed as a general rule, that duties on those materials ought, with certain exceptions, to be forborne. Of these exceptions, three cases occur which may serve as examples. One where the material is itself an object of general or extensive consumption, and a fit and productive source of revenue. Another where a manufacture of a simpler kind, the competition of which with a like domestic article is desired to be restrained, partakes of the nature of a raw material from being capable by a further process to be converted into a manufacture of a different kind, the introduction or growth of which is desired to be encouraged. A third where the material itself is the production of the country, and in sufficient abundance to furnish a cheap and plentiful supply to the national manufacturers. … Where duties on the materials of manufactures are not laid for the purpose of preventing a competition with some domestic production, the same reasons which recommend, as a general rule, the exemption of those materials from duties, would recommend, as a like general rule, the allowance of drawbacks in favor of the manufacturer. …

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VIII. The encouragement of new inventions and discoveries at home, and of the introduction into the United States of such as may have been made in other countries; particularly those which relate to machinery. This is among the most useful and unexceptionable of the aids which can be given to manufactures. The usual means of that encouragement are pecuniary rewards, and, for a time, exclusive privileges. …

IX. Judicious regulations for the inspection of manufactured commodities. This is not among the least important of the means by which the prosperity of manufactures may be promoted. It is indeed in many cases one of the most essential. Contributing to prevent frauds upon consumers at home and exporters to foreign countries, to improve the quality and preserve the character of the national manufactures; it cannot fail to aid the expeditious and advantageous sale of them, and to serve as a guard against successful competition from other quarters. …

X. The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to place—is a point of considerable moment to trade in general and to manufactures in particular, by rendering more easy the purchase of raw materials and provisions, and the payment for manufactured supplies. A general circulation of bank paper, which is to be expected from the institution lately established, will be a most valuable means to this end. …

XI. The facilitating of the transportation of commodities. Improvements favoring this object intimately concern all the domestic interests of a community; but they may, without impropriety, be mentioned as having an important relation to manufactures. …

The foregoing are the principal of the means by which the growth of manufactures is ordinarily promoted. It is, however, not merely necessary that the measures of government which have a direct view to manufactures should be calculated to assist and protect them; but that those which only collaterally affect them, in the general course of the administration, should be guarded from any peculiar tendency to injure them. There are certain species of taxes which are apt to be oppressive to different parts of the community, and, among other ill effects, have a very unfriendly aspect towards manufactures. All poll or capitation taxes are of this nature. They either proceed according to a fixed rate, which operates unequally and injuriously to the industrious poor; or they vest a discretion in certain officers to make estimates and assessments, which are necessarily vague, conjectural, and liable to abuse. … All such taxes (including all taxes on occupations) which proceed according to the amount of capital supposed to be employed in a business, or of profits supposed to be made in it, are unavoidably hurtful to industry."

A. Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Works, volume 3).

ALSO IN: State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff.

R. W. Thompson, History of Protective Tariff Laws, chapters 6-7.

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1815-1828. The Corn Laws and Provision Laws. The sliding-scale.

During the Napoleonic wars in Europe there was a prolonged period of scarcity, approaching to famine, in Great Britain. There were scant harvests at home and supplies from abroad were cut off by the "Continental system" of Napoleon. "In 1801 wheat was 115 shillings and 11 pence per quarter; from 1801 to 1818 the price averaged 84s.; whilst in the 20 years ending 1874, it averaged only 52s. per quarter. … The cry of starvation was everywhere heard amongst the working classes, and tradesmen of all kinds suffered severely; whilst the only well-to-do people were the Farmers and the Landlords. As soon as the war was over, and our ports were opened for the reception of foreign grain, prices came down rapidly. Then the Landlords took alarm, and appealed to Parliament to resist the importation of foreign grain, which they asserted, would be the ruin of the English Farmers. They insisted that in this country, the costs of cultivation were extremely heavy, as compared with those of foreign producers of grain, and that therefore the British Farmer must receive protection in order to prevent his ruin. Hence a Parliament, composed mostly of Landlords, proceeded, in 1815, to enact the Corn Law, which excluded foreign wheat, except at high rates of duty, until the market price should reach 80s. per quarter; and other kinds of grain, until there was a proportionate elevation in prices. The discussions in Parliament on this question made a great impression, and led to a wide-spread sympathy, and to the belief that there was need of a measure, which, according to its advocates, would preserve our Agriculture from ruin, and be at the same time a provision against famine. But by many thoughtful and patriotic people this law was viewed with intense dislike, and was characterised as an atrocious fraud. The fact was, that … when rents ought either to have been lowered, or the methods of cultivation improved, the Corn Law was passed by the Landlords in order to keep out foreign corn and to maintain high rents; and many of the common people saw, or thought they saw, what would be the effect; for whilst the legislature was engaged in the discussion of the question, the people of London became riotous, and the walls were chalked with invectives such as 'Bread or Blood,' 'Guy Fawkes for ever,' etc. A loaf, steeped in blood, was placed on Carlton House, (now the Tory Club House.) The houses of some of the most unpopular of the promoters of the measure were attacked by the mob. At Lord Eldon's house the iron railings were torn up, whilst every pane of glass and many articles of furniture were broken and destroyed, and it was facetiously remarked that at last his lordship kept open house. The military were called out, and two persons were killed; the Houses of Parliament were guarded by soldiers, and, indeed, the whole of London appeared to be in possession of the Army. In various parts of the country similar disturbances prevailed. … Large popular meetings were held at Spa Fields, in London, public meetings were also held at Birmingham, and in many other parts of the kingdom. … In some of the towns and populous localities, the operatives having in view a large aggregate meeting to be held on St. Peter's field in Manchester, submitted themselves to marching discipline. … Regardless, however, of the public demonstrations of dislike to the Corn and Provision Laws, the Legislature persisted in upholding the most stringent provisions thereof until the year 1828, when the duties on the importation of grain were adjusted by a sliding scale, in accordance with the average prices in the English market. {3069} The following abstract may serve to denote the provisions of the amended Law;—When the average price of wheat was 36 shillings the duty was 50 shillings 8 pence per qr.; when 46s. the duty was 40s. 8d. per. qr.; when 56s. it was 30s. 8d. per qr.; when 62s. it was 24s. 8d. per qr.; when 72s. it was 2s. 8d. per qr.; and when 73s. it was 1s. per qr. It was soon found that as a means of protection to the British Farmer, the operation of the sliding scale of duties was scarcely less effective, by deterring imports of grain, than the previous law, which absolutely excluded wheat until it reached 80s. per quarter. The Act certainly provided that foreign grain might at any time be imported, and be held in bond till the duty was paid; a provision under which it was expected to be stored until the price should be high, and the duty low; but the expenses attendant upon warehousing and preserving it from injury by keeping, were usually looked upon as an undesirable or even dangerous investment of a merchant's capital. … Agricultural protection, as exhibited by the Corn Law, would, however, have been very incomplete without the addition of the Provision Laws. By these Laws the importation of Foreign Cattle and foreign meat were strictly prohibited. Butter and Lard were indeed allowed to be imported, but they were not to be used as food, and in order to provide against any infraction of the law, the officers at the Custom Houses were employed to 'spoil' these articles on their arrival, by smearing them with a tarred stick. They could then be used only as grease for wheels, or for the smearing of sheep. With bread purposely made dear, with the import of cattle and of flesh meat prohibited, and with lard and butter wilfully reduced from articles of food to grease for wheels, there is no difficulty in accounting for the frequent murmurs of discontent, and for the starvation among the poorer classes in every part of the Kingdom. Soup kitchens were opened almost every winter, and coals and clothing gratuitously distributed in many places; but such palliatives were regarded with derision by all who understood the true causes of the evil. Such help was scorned, and a cry for justice was raised; scarcity was said to be created by Act of Parliament, in order to be mitigated by philanthropy."

H. Ashworth, Recollections of Richard Cobden, chapter 1.

ALSO IN D. Ricardo, On Protection to Agriculture (Works, pages 459-498).

J. E. T. Rogers, The Economic Interpretation of History, chapters 17-18.

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1816-1824. The beginning of the protective policy (the "American System").

"The return of peace at the beginning of 1815 brought the manufacturers face to face with a serious danger. War had been their harvest time. Favored by double duties and abnormal conditions their industry had attained a marvelous though not always safe development. … By limitation, the double duties were to expire one year after the conclusion of peace, and unless Congress intervened promptly and effectually their individual ruin was certain. … As new industries sprang up, petitions were promptly laid before Congress praying for new duties, for the permanence of the war duties, and for certain prohibitions. … In laying before Congress the treaty of peace, February, 1815, Madison called attention to the 'unparalleled maturity' attained by manufactures, and 'anxiously recommended this source of national independence and wealth to the prompt and constant guardianship of Congress.' … To Dallas, Secretary of the Treasury, the manufacturers had already turned. Six days after the treaty of peace was ratified, the House, February 23, 1815, called upon Dallas to report a general tariff bill at the next session of Congress. … In his annual report in December, 1815, Dallas had proposed the extension of the double duties until June 30, 1816, in order to give time for the elaboration of a new tariff bill; and after some discussion Congress agreed to this plan. February 13 he transmitted his reply to the resolutions of the previous February, closing with a carefully prepared schedule of new tariff rates. This, after being worked over in the Ways and Means Committee, was embodied in a bill and introduced into the House March 12, by Lowndes of South Carolina. Debate began March 20, and continued till April 8, when the bill was finally passed by a vote of 88 to 54. April 20 it passed the Senate with some amendments, and April 27 received the approval of Madison. … The features of Dallas' proposed tariff were the enlarging of the ad valorem list from three groups at 12½, 15, and 20 per cent to eight groups at 7½, 15, 20, 22, 28, 30, and 33 1/3 per cent; the increase of specific duties by about 42 per cent; and, most important of all, in the article of coarse cottons, the insertion of a minimum, by which, as far as the custom-house was concerned, no quality was to be regarded as costing less than 25 cents per square yard. Except in the case of coarse cottons the new rates on articles which it was desired to protect fell slightly below the double rates of the war. Three positions were brought out in debate—two extremes, seeking the formulation of economic reasons for and against the policy of protection, and a middle party, composed mainly of men indifferent to manufacturing as such, but accepting the establishment of manufactures as one of the chief results of the war. … The two extremes, however, were far from taking the positions assumed later by extreme protectionism and extreme laissez-faire. … Only a few articles occasioned any discussion, and these were items like sugar, cottons, and woolens, which had been reduced in the Ways and Means Committee from the rates proposed by Dallas. Dallas had fixed the duty on cottons at 33 1/3 per cent, which was reduced to 30 per cent in Lowndes' bill. Clay moved to restore the original rate. … Later Webster proposed a sliding scale on cottons, the rate to be 30 per cent for two years, then 25 per cent for two more, and then 20 per cent. Clay moved to amend by making the first period three years and the second one year. … Lowndes assented to the motion. … Dallas proposed 28 per cent on woolens. The committee reduced this to 25 per cent, and following the example set in the case of cottons, Lowndes moved that after two years the rate be fixed at 20 per cent. … After some debate the first period was made three years, and Lowndes' amendment agreed to. The tariff of 1816 was a substantial victory for the manufacturers. … But … in its working out the tariff of 1816 proved a bitter disappointment to the manufacturing interest. The causes, however, were widely varied. … {3070} Yet it would be easy to exaggerate the distresses of the country. The years from 1816 to 1820 especially, were years of depression and hard times, but the steady growth of the country was hardly interrupted. In the main the tariff did not fail of its legitimate object. For the most part the new manufactures were conserved. … More and more there was a growing impatience with the tariff of 1816, and a tendency to lay the bad times upon its shoulders. … March 22, 1820, Baldwin of Pennsylvania, chairman of the newly created Committee on Manufactures, introduced a tariff bill embodying the general demand of the protected interests. … The bill passed the House by a vote of 90 to 69; it was defeated in the Senate by one vote."

O. L. Elliott, The Tariff Controversy, 1789-1833 (Leland Stanford Junior University Monographs No.1), pages 163-211.

"The revision of the Tariff, with a view to the protection of home industry, and to the establishment of what was then called, 'The American System,' was one of the large subjects before Congress at the session of 1823-24, and was the regular commencement of the heated debates on that question which afterwards ripened into a serious difficulty between the federal government and some of the southern States. … Revenue the object, protection the incident, had been the rule in the earlier tariffs: now that rule was sought to be reversed, and to make protection the object of the law, and revenue the incident. … Mr. Clay, the leader in the proposed revision, and the champion of the American System, expressly placed the proposed augmentation of duties on this ground. … Mr. Webster was the leading speaker on the other side, and disputed the universality of the distress which had been described; claiming exemption from it in New England; denied the assumed cause for it where it did exist, and attributed it to over expansion and collapse of the paper system, as in Great Britain, after the long suspension of the Bank of England; denied the necessity for increased protection to manufactures, and its inadequacy, if granted, to the relief of the country where distress prevailed. … The bill was carried in the House, after a protracted contest of ten weeks, by the lean majority of five—107 to 102-only two members absent, and the voting so zealous that several members were brought in upon their sick couches. In the Senate the bill encountered a strenuous resistance. … The bill … was carried by the small majority of four votes—25 to 21. … An increased protection to the products of several States, as lead in Missouri and Illinois, hemp in Kentucky, iron in Pennsylvania, wool in Ohio and New York, commanded many votes for the bill; and the impending presidential election had its influence in its favor. Two of the candidates, Messrs. Adams and Clay, were avowedly for it; General Jackson, who voted for the bill, was for it, as tending to give a home supply of the articles necessary in time of war, and as raising revenue to pay the public debt."

T. H. Benton, Thirty Years' View, volume 1, chapter 13.

ALSO IN A. B. Hart, Formation of the Union, sections 122 and 132 (chapters 11-12).

A. Walker, Science of Wealth, page 116.

F. W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, pages 68-76.

A. S. Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1789-1860, book 3, chapter 3.

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1828. The "Bill of Abominations." New England changes front.

"In 1828 came another tariff bill, so bad and so extreme in many respects that it was called the 'bill of abominations.' It originated in the agitation of the woollen manufacturers which had started the year before, and for this bill Mr. Webster spoke and voted. He changed his ground on this important question absolutely and entirely, and made no pretence of doing anything else. The speech which he made on this occasion is a celebrated one, but it is so solely on account of the startling change of position which it announced. … A few lines from the speech give the marrow of the whole matter. Mr. Webster said: 'New England, sir, has not been a leader in this policy. … The opinion of New England up to 1824 was founded in the conviction that, on the whole, it was wisest and best, both for herself and others, that manufactures should make haste slowly. … When, at the commencement of the late war, duties were doubled, we were told that we should find a mitigation of the weight of taxation in the new aid and succor which would be thus afforded to our own manufacturing labor. Like arguments were urged, and prevailed, but not by the aid of New England votes, when the tariff was afterwards arranged at the close of the war in 1816. Finally, after a winter's deliberation, the act of 1824 received the sanction of both Houses of Congress and settled the policy of the country. … What, then, was New England to do? Was she to hold out forever against the course of the government, and see herself losing on one side and yet make no effort to sustain herself on the other? No, sir. Nothing was left to New England but to conform herself to the will of others. Nothing was left to her but to consider that the government had fixed and determined its own policy, and that policy was protection.' … Opinion in New England changed for good and sufficient business reasons, and Mr. Webster changed with it. Free trade had commended itself to him as an abstract principle, and he had sustained and defended it as in the interest of commercial New England. But when the weight of interest in New England shifted from free trade to protection Mr. Webster followed, it."

H. C. Lodge, Daniel Webster, chapter 6.

"There was force in Webster's assertion, in reply to Hayne, that New England, after protesting against the tariff as long as she could, had conformed to a policy forced upon the country by others, and had embarked her capital in manufacturing. October 23, 1826, the Boston woollen manufacturers petitioned Congress for more protection. … This appeal of the woollen manufacturers brought out new demands from other quarters. Especially the wool-growers came forward. … May 14, 1827, the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts called a convention of wool growers and manufacturers. The convention met at Harrisburg, July 30, 1827. It was found necessary to enlarge the scope of the convention in order to make allies of interests which would otherwise become hostile. The convention went on the plan of favoring protection on everything which asked for it. The result was that iron, steel, glass, wool, woollens, hemp, and flax were recommended for protection. Louisiana was not represented, and so sugar was left out. {3071} It was voted to discourage the importation of foreign spirits and the distillation of spirits from foreign products, by way of protection to Western whiskey. … When the 20th Congress met, the tariff was the absorbing question. Popular interest had become engaged in it, and parties were to form on it, but it perplexed the politicians greatly. … The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish special interests was an economic monstrosity. … May 19, 1828, the bill became a law. The duty on wool costing less than 10 cents per pound was 15 per cent., on other wool 20 per cent. and 30 per cent. That on woollens was 40 per cent. for a year, then 45 per cent., there being four minima, 50 cents, $1.00, $2.50, $4.00. All which cost over $4.00 were to be taxed 45 per cent. for a year, then 50 per cent. … The process of rolling iron had not yet been introduced into this country. It was argued that rolled iron was not as good as forged, and this was made the ground for raising the tax on rolled iron from $30.00 to $37.00 per ton, while the tax on forged iron was raised from $18.00 to $22.40. Rolled iron was cheaper and was available for a great number of uses. The tax, in this case, 'countervailed' an improvement in the arts, and robbed the American people of their share in the advantage of a new industrial achievement. The tax on steel was raised from $20.00 to $30.00 per ton; that on hemp from $35.00 to $45.00 per ton; that on molasses from 5 cents to 10 cents per gallon; that on flax from nothing to $35.00 per ton. The tax on sugar, salt, and glass remained unchanged, and that on tea also, save by a differential tonnage duty. Coffee was classified and the tax reduced. The tax on wine, by a separate act, was reduced one half or more. This was the 'tariff of abominations,' so called on account of the number of especially monstrous provisions which it contained."

W. G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson as a Public Man, chapter 9.

"The tariff of 1828 … was the work of politicians and manufacturers; and was commenced for the benefit of the woollen interest, and upon a bill chiefly designed to favor that branch of manufacturing industry. But, like all other bills of the kind, it required help from other interests to get itself along."

T. H. Benton, Thirty Years' View, volume 1, chapters 34.

J. Schouler, History of the United States, chapter 12, section 2 (volume 3).

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1832. Clay's delusive act to diminish revenue.

President Jackson, in his message of December, 1831, "invited attention to the fact that the public debt would be extinguished before the expiration of his term, and that, therefore, 'a modification of the tariff, which shall produce a reduction of the revenue to the wants of the government,' was very advisable. He added that, in justice to the interests of the merchant as well as the manufacturer, the reduction should be prospective, and that the duties should be adjusted with a view 'to the counteraction of foreign policy, so far as it may be injurious to our national interests.' This meant a revenue tariff with incidental retaliation. He had thus arrived at a sensible plan to avoid the accumulation of a surplus. Clay took the matter in hand in the Senate, or rather in Congress. … He recognized the necessity of reducing the revenue, but he would reduce the revenue without reducing protective duties. The 'American System' should not suffer. It must, therefore, not be done in the manner proposed by Jackson. He insisted upon confining the reduction to duties on articles not coming into competition with American products. … Instead of abolishing protective duties he would rather reduce the revenue by making some of them prohibitory. … When objection was made that this would be a defiance of the South, of the President, and of the whole administration party, he replied, as Adams reports, that 'to preserve, maintain and strengthen the American System, he would defy the South, the President and the devil.' He introduced a resolution in the Senate, 'that the existing duties upon articles imported from foreign countries, and not coming into competition with similar articles made or produced within the United States, ought to be forthwith abolished, except the duties upon wines and silks, and that those ought to be reduced; and that the Committee on Finance be instructed to report a bill accordingly.'" After long debate Clay's" tariff resolution was adopted, and in June, 1832, a bill substantially in accord with it passed both houses, known as the tariff act of 1832. It reduced or abolished the duties on many of the unprotected articles, but left the protective system without material change. As a reduction of the revenue it effected very little. … The reduction proposed by Clay, according to his own estimate, was not over seven millions; the reduction really effected by the new tariff law scarcely exceeded three millions. Clay had saved the American System at the expense of the very object contemplated by the measure. It was extremely short-sighted statesmanship. The surplus was as threatening as ever, and the dissatisfaction in the South grew from day to day."

C. Schurz, Life of Henry Clay, chapter 13 (volume 1).

ALSO IN H. Clay, Life, Correspondence and Speeches (Colton edition), volume 5, pages 416-428.

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1833. The Southern opposition to protection. Nullification in South Carolina. The compromise tariff.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1828-1833.

TARIFF: (Germany): A. D. 1833. The Zollverein.

"The German Customs Union (Deutsche Zollverein) is an association of states, having for its declared object to secure freedom of trade and commerce between the contracting states, and a common interest in the customs revenue. The terms of the union are expressed in the treaty between Prussia and the other states, dated 22d March, 1833, which may be regarded as the basis of the association. The states now [1844] forming the union are Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Nassau, the Thuringian states, Frankfort, Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Luxemburg. The population of these, with the exception of the three last mentioned states, was, in 1839, 26,858,886. Including these three states, which have since joined the union, the present population cannot be less than twenty-seven millions and a half. The German powers which have not joined the union are Austria, with twelve millions of German subjects, and Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein, the two Mecklenburgs, and the Hanse Towns, whose united population is about three millions more. {3072} The inhabitants of Germany are, therefore, divided in the proportions of twenty-seven and a half within, to fifteen without, the sphere of the Zollverein. The treaty provides in the thirty-eighth article, for the admission of other German states, and the thirty-ninth article for the making of treaties with foreign states, but these latter are not admissible into the union. … The declared principle of the league—namely, the commercial and financial union of the German states—is not only one to which no foreign power has any right to object, but is excellent in itself; and is, in fact, the establishment of free trade among the associated states. … But it is not merely to its avowed principle that the league owes its successful accomplishment. There are other motives which have entered largely into the causes of its existence. In the first place, it has given practical effect to that vehement desire for national unity which so generally pervades the German mind. … Then, it so happened that this general desire for union fell in exactly with the policy of Prussia—a power which has not failed to seize so favourable an opportunity of extending her political influence, and occupying a position which, though of nominal equality, has in reality secured her predominance among the German states. To these inducements we regret to be obliged to add another—namely, the prevalent opinion in Germany that their manufacturing industry ought to be protected against foreign competition, and that the tariff of the Zollverein ought to be used as an instrument for the exclusion of foreign manufactures from the German market. … Although the Congress of Vienna had established a new Germanic confederation, (Deutsche Bund) and a federative diet charged with the maintenance of peace at home and abroad, yet it was soon perceived and felt that the kind of union obtained by means of this confederation was more formal than real. … The late King of Prussia was one of the first to perceive, that, in order to unite Germany in reality, something more cogent than the federative diet was indispensable. He found his own power rather weakened than strengthened by the addition of the Rhenish provinces, so long as they remained separated, not only by distance, but by the customs-barriers of intervening states, from his ancient territories. He accordingly effected, in 1829, a convention with those states, by which he became the farmer of their customs-revenues, and so removed the barriers between Eastern and Western Prussia. Some years, however, previous to this, the Prussian Government had deemed it expedient to comply with the demands of the manufacturers (especially those in the Rhenish provinces) for protection against foreign goods, which, since the peace, had begun to make their appearance; and on the 26th May, 1818, a new Prussian Tariff had been issued, which was designed to afford a moderate protection to the home industry, and which may be regarded as the groundwork of the present Tariff of the Zollverein. … But the proceedings of Prussia were considered in a hostile light by the manufacturers of the South. They formed a counteracting association in 1819 which numbered from five to six thousand members, had its headquarters in Nuremberg, and agents in all the principal towns, and published a weekly newspaper devoted to the cause. They addressed the Diet, the German courts, and the Congress at Vienna in 1820, in favor of a general customs-union. They so far succeeded that, in 1826, the small Thuringian States, occupying the central portion of Germany, with one or two others, formed themselves into a customs-union, under the name of the Mittel-Verein; and within the two succeeding years a more important union was accomplished, consisting of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, with their small enclosed states; the Tariff of which union is stated to have been as high, or very nearly so, as that of Prussia. Thus Germany contained three separate customs-associations, with separate Tariffs, and it became obviously desirable to unite these conflicting interests. Prussia made overtures to the other unions, but was for a long time unsuccessful; they objecting principally to the high scale of Prussian duties on colonial produce. At last, however, all obstacles were removed, (principally, as Dr. List states, through the exertions of Baron von Cotta, the eminent publisher, and proprietor of the Allgemeine Zeitung,) and on the 22d of March, 1833, the treaty was signed by which, for the first time, Germany was knit together in anything like a binding national confederation. Between that date and the present, the league has been enlarged by the accession of other states; but, as we have already mentioned, Hanover and some other northern states have hitherto refused to join it. Hanover formed a distinct union with three neighbouring states, viz.: Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Oldenburg, which assumed the title of the North-western League; but the two former having subsequently seceded from it and joined the Zollverein, the North-western League has been reduced to Hanover and Oldenburg only. The Hanse towns, Mecklenburg, and Holstein, are not yet members of any customs-union. The revenues of the Zollverein are divided among the contracting states according to the population of each state respectively."

Edinburgh Review, January, 1844 (volume 79, page 108).

ALSO IN G. Krause, The Growth of German Unity, chapter 10.

F. List. National System of Political Economy, book 4, chapter 4.

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1836-1839. Beginning of the Anti-Corn-Law agitation.

"Cobden was in no sense the original projector of an organized body for throwing off the burden of the corn duties. In 1836 an Anti-Corn-Law Association had been formed in London; its principal members were the parliamentary radicals, Grote, Molesworth, Joseph Hume, and Mr. Roebuck. But this group, notwithstanding their acuteness, their logical penetration, and the soundness of their ideas, were in that, as in so many other matters, stricken with impotence. Their gifts of reasoning were admirable, but they had no gifts for popular organization. … It was not until a body of men in Manchester were moved to take the matter in hand, that any serious attempt was made to inform and arouse the country. The price of wheat had risen to seventy-seven shillings in the August of 1838; there was every prospect of a wet harvesting; the revenue was declining; deficit was becoming a familiar word; pauperism was increasing; and the manufacturing population of Lancashire were finding it impossible to support themselves, because the landlords, and the legislation of a generation of landlords before them, insisted on keeping the first necessity of life at an artificially high rate. … {3073} In October, 1838, a band of seven men met at a hotel in Manchester, and formed a new Anti-Corn Law Association. They were speedily joined by others, including Cobden, who from this moment began to take a prominent part in all counsel and action. That critical moment had arrived, which comes in the history of every successful movement, when a section arises within the party, which refuses from that day forward either to postpone or to compromise. The feeling among the older men was to stop short in their demands at some modification of the existing duty. … The more energetic members protested against these faltering voices. … The meeting was adjourned, to the great chagrin of the President, and when the members assembled a week later, Cobden drew from his pocket a draft petition which he and his allies had prepared in the interval, and which after a discussion of many hours was adopted by an almost unanimous vote. The preamble laid all the stress on the alleged facts of foreign competition, in words which never fail to be heard in times of bad trade. It recited how the existing laws prevented the British manufacturer from exchanging the produce of his labour for the corn of other countries, and so enabled his foreign rivals to purchase their food at one half of the price at which it was sold in the English market; and finally the prayer of the petition called for the repeal of all laws relating to the importation of foreign corn and other foreign articles of subsistence, and implored the House to carry out to the fullest extent, both as affects manufactures and agriculture, the true and peaceful principles of free-trade. In the following month, January, 1839, the Anti-Com-Law Association showed that it was in earnest in the intention to agitate, by proceeding to raise a subscription of an effective sum of money. Cobden threw out one of those expressions which catch men's minds in moments when they are already ripe for action. 'Let us,' he said, 'invest part of our property, in order to save the rest from confiscation.' Within a month £6,000 had been raised, the first instalment of many scores of thousands still to come. A great banquet was given to some of the parliamentary supporters of Free Trade; more money was subscribed, convictions became clearer and purpose waxed more resolute. On the day after the banquet, at a meeting of delegates from other towns, Cobden brought forward a scheme for united action among the various associations throughout the country. This was the germ of what ultimately became the League."

J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, chapter 6 (volume 1).

ALSO IN W. Robertson, Life and Times of John Bright, chapters 8 and 11-14.

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1842. Peel's modification of the Corn Laws. His sliding-scale. His Tariff reductions. The first great step towards Free-Trade.

The Whig administration under Lord Melbourne gave way in August, in 1841, to one formed by Sir Robert Peel. On the opening of the session in February, 1842, "The Queen's Speech recommended Parliament to consider the state of the laws affecting the importation of corn and other commodities. It announced the beginning of a revolution which few persons in England thought possible, although it was to be completed in little more than ten years. On the 9th of February Peel moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Corn Laws. His speech, which lasted nearly three hours, was necessarily dull, and his proposal was equally offensive to the country gentlemen and to the Anti-Corn Law League. It amounted merely to an improvement of the sliding-scale which had been devised by the Duke of Wellington's Cabinet [See above: A. D. 1815-1828], and was based on the axiom that the British farmer, taking one year with another, could not make a profit by growing corn if foreign corn were admitted at a price of less than 70s. a quarter. By a calculation of prices extending over a long term of years, Peel had satisfied himself that a price of 56s. a quarter would remunerate the British farmer. He proposed to modify the sliding-scale accordingly. … Peel retained the minimum duty of 1s. when corn was selling at 73s. the quarter; he fixed a maximum duty of 20s. when corn was selling at from 50s. to 51s. the quarter, and he so altered the graduation in the increase of duty as to diminish the inducement to hold grain back when it became dear. … So general was the dissatisfaction with Peel's Corn Law that Russell ventured once more to place before the House his alternative of a fixed 8s. duty. He was defeated by a majority of upwards of 120 votes. Two days later Mr. Villiers made his annual motion for the total repeal of the Corn Laws, and was beaten by more than four votes to one. The murmurs of Peel's own supporters were easily overborne, and the Bill was carried through the House of Commons after a month spent in debates. As soon as it had passed, and the estimates for the army and navy had been voted, Peel produced what was really his Budget, nominally Mr. Goulburn's. … In every one of the last five years there had been a deficit. … Peel therefore resolved to impose an income tax." He also raised the duty on Irish spirits and on exports of coal, besides making some changes in the stamp duties. "With these and with the income tax he calculated that he would have a surplus of £1,900,000. Peel was thus able to propose a reduction of the tariff upon uniform and comprehensive principles. He proposed to limit import duties to a maximum of 5 per cent. upon the value of raw materials, of 12 per cent. upon the value of goods partly manufactured, and of 20 per cent. upon the value of goods wholly manufactured. Out of the 1,200 articles then comprised in the tariff, 750 were more or less affected by the application of these rules, yet so trivial was the revenue raised from most of them that the total loss was computed at only £270,000 a year. Peel reduced the duty on coffee; he reduced the duty on foreign and almost entirely abolished the duty on Canadian timber. Cattle and pigs, meat of all descriptions, cheese and butter, which had hitherto been subject to a prohibitory duty, he proposed to admit at a comparatively low rate. He also diminished the duty upon stage coaches. So extensive a change in our system of national finance had never before been effected at one stroke. … Immense was the excitement caused by the statement of the Budget. … Every part of Peel's scheme was debated with the utmost energy. … He procured the ratification of all his measures subject to some slight amendments, and at the cost of a whole session spent in discussing them. Little or nothing else was accomplished by Parliament in this year. Peel had returned to power as the Champion of protection. His first great achievement was the extension of the freedom of trade."

F. G. Montague, Life of Sir Robert Peel, chapter 8.

{3074}

"Notwithstanding the objections which free traders might raise, the Budget of 1842 proved the first great advance in the direction of free trade. It did not remove the shackles under which trade was struggling, but it relaxed the fastenings and lightened the load."

S. Walpole, History of England from 1815, chapter 18 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: S. Walpole, Life of Sir Robert Peel, volume 3, chapter 5.

J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, volume 1, chapter 11.

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1842. An Act to provide a necessary increase of revenue, with incidental protection.

"There had been a lull in tariff legislation for ten years. The free-trade party had been ascendant; and amendment of the law, save in the slight ways mentioned, had been impossible. During the decade, a financial tornado had swept over the country; the United States bank had ceased to be; the experiment of keeping the government deposits with the State banks had been tried, and had failed; the government had kept them several years without authority, but finally a bill had been passed which authorized keeping them in that manner. The time had now nearly come for reducing the duties [by the gradual scaling down provided for in the Compromise tariff act of 1833] to their lowest point. Manufactures were drying up at the root. A material augmentation of the national revenue from some source had become necessary. … Whatever difference of opinion existed respecting the necessity of additional protection to manufacturers, some expedient, it was universally conceded, must be adopted to increase the public revenue. As no one favored direct taxation, a revision of the tariff was the only mode of enriching the treasury. … The committee on manufactures did not report to the House until the last of March, 1842. … The leading provisions of the bill reported by the committee were the following:

1. A general ad valorem duty of 30 per cent, with few exceptions, where the duty was on that principle.

2. A discrimination was made for the security of certain interests requiring it by specific duties, in some instances below, in others above, the rate of the general ad valorem duty.

3. As a general principle, the duty on the articles subject to discrimination was made at the rate at which it was in 1840, after the deduction of four-tenths of the excess on 20 per cent by the Act of 1833. …

The subject was discussed at great length by the House, although the time was drawing near for making the last reduction under the compromise law of [1833]. Something must be done. Accordingly, Fillmore, chairman of the committee of ways and means, reported a bill to extend the existing tariff laws until the 1st day of August, 1842, which was immediately passed by the House; but the Senate amended the bill by adding a proviso that nothing therein contained should suspend the operation of the Distribution law,—a law passed at the extra session of the preceding year, distributing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the States. … In the debate on this bill the proviso became a prominent topic of discussion. The distribution Act contained a proviso, that, if at any time the duties under the compromise tariff should be raised, the distribution should cease, and be suspended until the cause of the suspension were removed. … Those who were in favor of high protective duties desired the removal of the proviso of the distribution Act in order that the tariff might be raised without interfering with distribution. The House having rejected an amendment proposing to strike out the proviso which prohibited the suspension of the distribution law, the bill was passed by the House, and afterward by the Senate, but vetoed by the President. Another tariff bill was introduced by Mr. Fillmore, drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury,—to which, however, the committee added a proviso that the … proceeds of the public lands should be distributed, notwithstanding the increase of duties,—which passed both Houses after a short debate. This contained a revision of a considerable number of duties, and was also vetoed by the President. Impelled by the necessity of providing additional revenue, a bill was rapidly pushed through Congress, similar to that previously passed, with the omission of the proviso requiring distribution, and further modified by admitting free of duty tea and coffee growing east of the Cape of Good Hope, imported in American vessels. This bill was approved by the President. A separate bill was then passed, repealing the proviso of the distribution Act, and allowing the distribution to take place, notwithstanding the increase of duties; but the bill was retained by the President and defeated. Thus ended a long and bitter controversy, in which public sentiment expanded, and hardened against the chief Executive of the nation. … That tariff remained without change during the next four years."

A. S. Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1789-1860, book 3, chapter 6.

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1845-1846. The Repeal of the Corn Laws. Dissolution of the League.

"The Anti-Corn-Law agitation was one of those movements which, being founded on right principles, and in harmony with the interest of the masses, was sure to gather fresh strength by any event affecting the supply of food. It was popular to attempt to reverse a policy which aimed almost exclusively to benefit one class of society. … The economic theorists had the mass of the people with them. Their gatherings were becoming more and more enthusiastic. And even amidst Conservative landowners there were not a few enlightened and liberal minds who had already, silently at least, espoused the new ideas. No change certainly could be expected to be made so long as bread was cheap and labour abundant. But when a deficient harvest and a blight in the potato crop crippled the resources of the people and raised grain to famine prices, the voice of the League acquired greater power and influence. Hitherto they had received hundreds of pounds. Now, thousands were sent in to support the agitation. A quarter of a million was readily contributed. Nor were the contributors Lancashire mill-owners exclusively. Among them were merchants and bankers, men of heart and men of mind, the poor labourer and the peer of the realm. The fervid oratory of Bright, the demonstrative and argumentative reasoning of Cobden, the more popular appeals of Fox, Rawlins, and other platform speakers, filled the newspaper press, and were eagerly read. {3075} And when Parliament dissolved in August 1845, even Sir Robert Peel showed some slight symptoms of a conviction that the days of the corn laws were numbered. Every day, in truth, brought home to his mind a stronger need for action, and as the ravages of the potato disease progressed, he saw that all further resistance would be absolutely dangerous. A cabinet council was held on October 31 of that year to consult as to what was to be done, and at an adjourned meeting on November 5 Sir Robert Peel intimated his intention to issue an order in council remitting the duty on grain in bond to one shilling, and opening the ports for the admission of all species of grain at a smaller rate of duty until a day to be named in the order; to call Parliament together on the 27th inst., in order to ask for an indemnity, and a sanction of the order by law; and to submit to Parliament immediately after the recess a modification of the existing law, including the admission at a nominal duty of Indian corn and of British colonial corn. A serious difference of opinion, however, was found to exist in the cabinet on the question brought before them, the only ministers supporting such measures being the Earl of Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Nor was it easy to induce the other members to listen to reason. And though at a subsequent meeting, held on November 28, Sir Robert Peel so far secured a majority in his favour, it was evident that the cabinet was too divided to justify him in bringing forward his measures, and he decided upon resigning office. His resolution to that effect having been communicated to the Queen, her Majesty summoned Lord John Russell to form a cabinet, and, to smooth his path, Sir Robert Peel, with characteristic frankness, sent a memorandum to her Majesty embodying a promise to give him his support. But Lord John Russell failed in his efforts, and the Queen had no alternative but to recall Sir Robert Peel, and give him full power to carry out his measures. It was under such circumstances that Parliament was called for January 22, 1846, and on January 27 the Government plan was propounded before a crowded House. It was not an immediate repeal of the corn laws that Sir Robert Peel recommended. He proposed a temporary protection for three years, till February 1, 1849, imposing a scale during that time ranging from 4s. when the price of wheat should be 50s. per quarter and upward, and 10s. when the price should be under 48s. per quarter, providing, however, that after that period all grain should be admitted at the uniform duty of 1s. per quarter. The measure, as might have been expected, was received in a very different manner by the political parties in both Houses of Parliament. There was treason in the Conservative camp, it was said, and keen and bitter was the opposition offered to the chief of the party. For twelve nights speaker after speaker indulged in personal recriminations. They recalled to Sir Robert Peel's memory the speeches he had made in defence of the corn laws. And as to his assertion that he had changed his mind, they denied his right to do so. … The passing of the measure was, however, more than certain, and after a debate of twelve nights' duration on Mr. Miles's amendment, the Government obtained a majority of 97, 337 having voted for the motion and 240 against it. And from that evening the corn law may be said to have expired. Not a day too soon, certainly, when we consider the straitened resources of the country as regards the first article of food, caused not only by the bad crop of grain, but by the serious loss of the potato crop, especially in Ireland."

L. Levi, History of British Commerce, part 4, chapter 4.

"On the 2nd of July the League was 'conditionally dissolved,' by the unanimous vote of a great meeting of the leaders at Manchester. … Mr. Cobden here joyfully closed his seven years' task, which he had prosecuted at the expense of health, fortune, domestic comfort, and the sacrifice of his own tastes in every way. … Mr. Cobden had sacrificed at least £20,000 in the cause. The country now, at the call of the other chief Leaguers, presented him with above £80,000—not only for the purpose of acknowledging his sacrifices, but also to set him free for life for the political service of his country."

H. Martineau, History of the Thirty Years' Peace, book 6, chapter 15 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: W. C. Taylor, Life and Times of Sir Robert Peel, volume 3, chapters 8-10.

J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, volume 1, chapters 15-16.

M. M. Trumbull, The Free Trade Struggle in England.

A. Bisset, Notes on the Anti-Corn Law Struggle.

Debate upon the Corn Laws in Session 1846.

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1846-1861. Lowered duties and the disputed effects.

"In 1846 was passed what we will call the 'Walker tariff,' from Robert J. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury. It reduced the duties on imports down to about the standard of the 'Compromise' of 1833. It discriminated, however, as the Compromise did not, between goods that could be produced at home and those that could not. It approached, in short, more nearly than any other, in its principles and details, to the Hamilton tariff, although the general rate of duties was higher. From that time up to 1857 there was a regular and large increase in the amount of dutiable goods imported, bringing in a larger revenue to the government. The surplus in the treasury accumulated, and large sums were expended by the government in buying up its own bonds at a high premium, for the sake of emptying the treasury. Under these circumstances the 'tariff of 1857' was passed, decidedly lowering the rates of duties and largely increasing the free list. The financial crisis of that year diminished the imports, and the revenue fell off $22,000,000. It rallied, however, the next two years, but owing to the large increase of the free list, not quite up to the old point."

A. L. Perry, Elements of Political Economy, page 464.

"The free-traders consider the tariff of 1846 to be a conclusive proof of the beneficial effect of low duties. They challenge a comparison of the years of its operation, between 1846 and 1857, with any other equal period in the history of the country. Manufacturing, they say, was not forced by a hot-house process to produce high-priced goods for popular consumption, but was gradually encouraged and developed on a healthful and self-sustaining basis, not to be shaken as a reed in the wind by every change in the financial world. Commerce, as they point out, made great advances, and our carrying trade grew so rapidly that in ten years from the day the tariff of 1846 was passed our tonnage exceeded the tonnage of England. The free-traders refer with especial emphasis to what they term the symmetrical development of all the great interests of the country under this liberal tariff. {3076} Manufactures were not stimulated at the expense of the commercial interest. Both were developed in harmony, while agriculture, the indispensable basis of all, was never more flourishing. The farmers and planters at no other period of our history were in receipt of such good prices, steadily paid to them in gold coin, for their surplus product, which they could send to the domestic market over our own railways and to the foreign market in our own ships. Assertions as to the progress of manufactures in the period under discussion are denied by the protectionists. While admitting the general correctness of the free-trader's statements as to the prosperous condition of the country, they call attention to the fact that directly after the enactment of the tariff of 1846 the great famine occurred in Ireland, followed in the ensuing years by short crops in Europe. The prosperity which came to the American agriculturist was therefore from causes beyond the sea and not at home,—causes which were transient, indeed almost accidental. Moreover an exceptional condition of affairs existed in the United States in consequence of our large acquisition of territory from Mexico at the close of the war and the subsequent and almost immediate discovery of gold in California. A new and extended field of trade was thus opened in which we had the monopoly, and an enormous surplus of money was speedily created from the products of the rich mines on the Pacific coast. At the same time Europe was in convulsion from the revolutions of 1848, and production was materially hindered over a large part of the Continent. This disturbance had scarcely subsided when three leading nations of Europe, England, France, and Russia, engaged in the wasteful and expensive war of the Crimea. The struggle began in 1853 and ended in 1856, and during those years it increased consumption and decreased production abroad, and totally closed the grain-fields of Russia from any competition with the United States. The protectionists therefore hold that the boasted prosperity of the country under the tariff of 1846 was abnormal in origin and in character. … The protectionists maintain that from 1846 to 1857 the United States would have enjoyed prosperity under any form of tariff, but that the moment the exceptional conditions in Europe and in America came to an end, the country was plunged headlong into a disaster [the financial crisis of 1857] from which the conservative force of a protective tariff would in large part have saved it. … The free-traders, as an answer to this arraignment of their tariff policy, seek to charge responsibility for the financial disasters to the hasty and inconsiderate changes made in the tariff in 1857, for which both parties were in large degree if not indeed equally answerable."

J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, chapter 9.

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1846-1879. Total abandonment of Protection and Navigation Laws. The perfected tariff of Free Trade.

"With the fall of the principle of the protection in corn may be said to have practically fallen the principle of protection in this country altogether. That principle was a little complicated in regard to the sugar duties and to the navigation laws. The sugar produced in the West Indian colonies was allowed to enter this country at rates of duty much lower than those imposed upon the sugar grown in foreign lands. The abolition of slavery in our colonies had made labour there somewhat costly and difficult to obtain continuously, and the impression was that if the duties on foreign sugar were reduced, it would tend to enable those countries which still maintained the slave trade to compete at great advantage with the sugar grown in our colonies by that free labour to establish which England had but just paid so large a pecuniary fine. Therefore, the question of Free Trade became involved with that of free labour; at least, so it seemed to the eyes of many a man who was not inclined to support the protective principle in itself. When it was put to him, whether he was willing to push the Free Trade principle so far as to allow countries growing sugar by slave labour to drive our free grown sugar out of the market, he was often inclined to give way before this mode of putting the question, and to imagine that there really was a collision between Free Trade and free labour. Therefore a certain sentimental plea came in to aid the Protectionists in regard to the sugar duties. Many of the old anti-slavery party found themselves deceived by this fallacy, and inclined to join the agitation against the reduction of the duty on foreign sugar. On the other hand, it was made tolerably clear that the labour was not so scarce or so dear in the colonies as had been represented, and that colonial sugar grown by free labour really suffered from no inconvenience except the fact that it was still manufactured on the most crude, old fashioned, and uneconomical methods. Besides, the time had gone by when the majority of the English people could be convinced that a lesson on the beauty of freedom was to be conveyed to foreign sugar-growers and slave-owners by the means of a tax upon the products of their plantations. Therefore, after a long and somewhat eager struggle, the principle of Free Trade was allowed to prevail in regard to sugar. The duties on sugar were made equal. The growth of the sugar plantations was admitted on the same terms into this country, without any reference either to the soil from which it had sprung or to the conditions under which it was grown."

J. McCarthy, The Epoch of Reform, chapter 12.

"The contest on the Navigation Laws [finally repealed in 1849-see NAVIGATION LAWS: A. D. 1849] was the last pitched battle fought by the Protectionist party. Their resistance grew fainter and fainter, and a few occasional skirmishes just reminded the world that such a party still existed. Three years afterwards their leaders came into power. In February, 1852, the Earl of Derby became Prime Minister, and Mr. Disraeli Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. The Free-traders, alarmed at the possibility of some at·tempt to reverse the policy of commercial freedom which had been adopted, took the earliest opportunity of questioning those Ministers in Parliament on the subject. The discreet reply was that the Government did not intend to propose any return to the policy of protection during the present Session, nor at any future time, unless a great majority of members favourable to that policy should be returned to Parliament. But far from this proving to be the case, the general election which immediately ensued reinstated a Liberal Government, and the work of stripping off the few rags of protection that still hung on went rapidly forward. {3077} On the 18th of April, 1853, Mr. Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, made his financial statement in an able and luminous speech. Such was the admirable order in which he marshalled his topics, and the transparent lucidity with which he treated them, that although his address occupied five hours in the delivery, and although it bristled with figures and statistics, he never for a moment lost the attention or fatigued the minds of his hearers. Mr. Gladstone's financial scheme included, among other reforms, the reduction or total remission of imposts on 133 articles. In this way, our tariff underwent rapid simplification. Each subsequent year was marked by a similar elimination of protective impediments to free commercial intercourse with other countries. In 1860, butter, cheese, &c., were admitted duty free; in 1869, the small nominal duty that had been left on corn was abolished; in 1874, sugar was relieved from the remnant of duty that had survived from previous reductions. It would be superfluous, as well as tedious, to enter upon a detailed reference to the various minor reforms through which we advanced towards, and finally reached, our present free-trade tariff. In fact, all the great battles had been fought and won by the close of the year 1849, and the struggle was then virtually over. … Is our present tariff one from which every shred and vestige of protection have been discarded? Is it truly and thoroughly a free-trade tariff? That these questions must be answered in the affirmative it is easy to prove in the most conclusive manner. We raise about £20,000,000 of our annual revenue by means of customs' duties on the foreign commodities which we import, and this fact is sometimes adduced by the advocates for protection, without any explanation, leaving their readers to infer that ours is not, as it really is, a free-trade tariff. That such an inference is totally erroneous will presently be made manifest beyond all question. We now levy import duties on only fifteen articles. Subjoined is a list of them, and to each is appended the amount of duty levied on it during the financial year ending 1st of April, 1879.

Not produced in England: Tobacco, £8,589,681; Tea, 4,169,233; Wine, 1,469,710; Dried Fruit, 509,234; Coffee, 212,002; Chicory, 66,739; Chocolate and Cocoa, 44,671; Total, £15,061,270.

Produced also in England: Spirits, £5,336,058; Plate (Silver and Gold). 5,853; Beer, 3,814; Vinegar, 671; Playing Cards, 522; Pickles. 17; Malt. 6; Spruce, 3; Total, £5,346,944.

Total of both £20,408,214. It will be seen by the above figures that £15,000,000, or three-fourths of the total sum levied, is levied on articles which we do not and cannot produce in England. It is clear, therefore, that this portion of the import duties cannot by any possibility be said to afford the slightest protection to native industry.' Every shilling's worth which we consume of those articles comes from abroad, and every shilling extra that the consumer pays for them in consequence of the duty goes to the revenue. So much for that portion of the £20,400,000 import duties. As to the £5,336,000 levied on foreign spirits, it consists of import duties which are only the exact counterpart of the excise duties, levied internally on the produce of the British distillers. The foreign article is placed on precisely the same footing as the native article. Both have to pay the same duty of about 10s. per gallon on spirits of the same strength. It would of course be an absurd stultification to admit foreign spirits duty-free while the English producer was burdened with a tax of 10s. per gallon; but by making the excise duty and the customs' duty precisely the same, equality is established, and no protection or preference whatever is enjoyed by the native distiller. The excise duty levied in the aforesaid year ending April, 1879, on spirits the produce of British distilleries, was no less than £14,855,000. The trifling amounts raised on plate, beer, vinegar, &c., are explained in the same way. They also act as a mere counterpoise to the excise duties levied on the British producers of the same articles, and thus afford to the latter no protection whatever against foreign competition. It is evident, therefore, that our tariff does not retain within it one solitary shred of protection."