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Leyte

Chapter I · The Strategic Plan

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The primary purpose of the Leyte Campaign was to establish an air and logistical base in the Leyte area in order to support operations in the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area and particularly to nullify Japanese strength in Luzon. Leyte is one of the Visayan Islands, which constitute the geographical heart of the Philippines. It was hoped that the fertile Leyte Valley, broad and flat, could be utilized for major airfields and base sites from which large-scale operations could be launched against the rest of the Philippines.

Preliminary Discussion

Leyte occupies a commanding position in the Philippine Islands. Because of its central location, its repossession by the United States would not only divide the Japanese forces in the Philippines but would also provide an excellent anchorage in Leyte Gulf, together with sites for bases and airfields from which land-based aircraft could bomb all parts of the Philippines, the coast of China, and Formosa. To an even greater extent than Mindanao, Leyte could be made into an excellent springboard from which to launch subsequent operations against the Japanese in Formosa or in the rest of the Philippines.

As to the feasibility of bypassing present objectives and choosing new ones, including the Japanese home islands, the two commanders were not in complete agreement. MacArthur pronounced the concept “utterly unsound,” since the available shipping was limited to a seven-division lift and there was insufficient air support. Nimitz thought that no decision should be made until after further developments.

The proposals disturbed General MacArthur, who concluded his message to the Joint Chiefs with the following peroration:

It is my opinion that purely military considerations demand the reoccupation of the Philippines in order to cut the enemy’s communications to the south and to secure a base for our further advance. Even if this were not the case and unless military factors demanded another line of action it would in my opinion be necessary to reoccupy the Philippines.

The Philippines is American Territory where our unsupported forces were destroyed by the enemy. Practically all of the 17,000,000 Filipinos remain loyal to the United States and are undergoing the greatest privation and suffering because we have not been able to support or succor them. We have a great national obligation to discharge.

CONFERENCE AT PEARL HARBOR brings together (left to right) General Douglas MacArthur, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral William D. Leahy and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
CONFERENCE AT PEARL HARBOR brings together (left to right) General Douglas MacArthur, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral William D. Leahy and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

CONFERENCE AT PEARL HARBOR brings together (left to right) General Douglas MacArthur, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral William D. Leahy and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that none of the currently selected objectives could be bypassed. They continued, however, to search for means by which the tempo of the war in the Pacific might be accelerated.

Strong efforts were already under way to accelerate operations in the Pacific. A shortage of shipping appeared to be the bottleneck which halted all attempts to speed up the operational target dates. General MacArthur at Brisbane had been directing the whole of his planning toward the reoccupation of the Philippine Islands, and on 10 July had issued a plan for all operations into the archipelago. According to this plan the conquest of the Islands was to be accomplished in four major phases.

Both Washington and Brisbane recognized that the operations in the Leyte-Surigao area were necessary in order to provide air bases, depot areas, and a fleet anchorage for any future advance whether in the Philippines, against Formosa, or by a direct route into the Japanese homeland. Consequently, the planners never seriously entertained any idea of bypassing this area, although they continued to probe for means which would accelerate the target date.

Plans Agreed Upon

Concurrently with the issuance of this directive, momentous events were taking place in the Pacific. Admiral Halsey was in command of scheduled operations against the Palau Islands. On 7 and 8 September aircraft from his carriers struck at Yap and the Palau Islands, against which Admiral Nimitz had scheduled operations, and for the next two days bombed Mindanao. On the 12th and 14th the bombers hit the central Philippines in support of the operations against the Palau Islands and Morotai.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Philippine Municipal Government Reports, Folder 2, App. DD, Guerrilla File 6910.23 (B), Military Intelligence (MI) Library. ↑Note 2 · Louis Morton, “American and Allied Strategy in the Far East,” Military Review, XXIX (December, 1949), 38. ↑Note 3 · The Joint Chiefs of Staff were General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, UNote 4 · Memo, Gen Marshall and Admiral King for President, 30 Mar 42, no sub, and two incls, “Directive to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific OceNote 5 · JCS 287/1, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 8 May 43; CCS 417, Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 2 Dec 43. ↑Note 6 · United States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS], Military Analysis Division, Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command (WashinNote 7 · JCS to CINCSWPA, CM-IN 5137, 12 Mar 44. CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers used in the footnotes of this volume refer to numbers on copies of those meNote 8 · GHQ SWPA, RENO V, 15 Jun 44. ↑Note 9 · Ibid. ↑Note 10 · Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, CM-OUT 50007, 13 Jun 44. ↑Note 11 · Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 15058, 18 Jun 44. ↑Note 12 · Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, CM-IN 2926, 4 Jul 44. ↑Note 13 · Rad cited n. 11. ↑Note 14 · Rad cited n. 12. ↑Note 15 · Rad cited n. 11. ↑Note 16 · Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 55718, 24 Jun 44. ↑Note 17 · William F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York, 1947), pp. 194–99. ↑Note 18 · Ibid., p. 195. ↑Note 19 · Information was furnished by Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR, 22 January 1951, who stated that Roosevelt had related the incident to him. LNote 20 · Interv with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH. ↑Note 21 · Memo, COMINCH for CofS, 9 Aug 44, OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1–17–43). ↑Note 22 · Interv with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH. See also, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), pp. 247–52. In answer to Note 23 · GHQ SWPA, MUSKETEER Plan, 10 Jul 44. ↑Note 24 · Rad, JPS to Staff Planners of CINCPOA and CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 71483, 27 Jul 44. ↑Note 25 · Tel conf, Washington and Brisbane, 7 Aug 44, WD-TC 797. ↑Note 26 · Tel conf, Washington and Brisbane, 10 Aug 44, WD-TC 809. ↑Note 27 · Ibid. ↑Note 28 · Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 24770, 27 Aug 44. ↑Note 29 · Min, JCS 171st Mtg, 1 Sep 44. ↑Note 30 · Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, CM-OUT 27648, 8 Sep 44. ↑Note 31 · Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 13120, 14 Sep 44. ↑Note 32 · Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CINCSWPA, and COMINCH, CM-IN 12893, 13 Sep 44. ↑Note 33 · Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 12893, 14 Sep 44. ↑Note 34 · Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Washington, 1945),Note 35 · Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CINCPOA, and Com3dFlt, CM-IN 12636, 14 Sep 44. ↑Note 36 · Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA, CINCPOA, and Com3dFlt, 15 Sep 44, OCTAGON 31-A, CofS CM-OUT Log, 15 Sep 44; Biennial Report, p. 71, cited n. 34; GenerNote 37 · Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CM-IN 17744, 15 Sep 44. ↑Note 38 · Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA et al., CM-OUT 40792, 3 Oct 44. ↑Note 39 · Behind the decision to go into Leyte lay a series of strategically significant victories, which had followed a staggering initial reverse. ANote 40 · In 1942 and 1943 the Allied forces had halted the Japanese at Papua and Guadalcanal and started to push them back. On 8 May 1943 the Joint CNote 41 · Although no specific islands were named in the Strategic Plan, the Philippine Archipelago, because of its strategic position and long possesNote 42 · By the spring of 1944 the operations in the Pacific were going so well that the successes had exceeded even the most optimistic hopes of anyNote 43 · In his planning, General MacArthur recognized that the Leyte operation, his most ambitious to date, would require “massed carrier-based air Note 44 · By June 1944 General MacArthur’s forces had pushed up the New Guinea coast to the island of Biak, about nine hundred nautical miles southeasNote 45 · On 18 June General MacArthur replied to the query of the Joint Chiefs,11 and on 4 July Admiral Nimitz made known his opinions.12 On the advaNote 46 · With respect to bypassing objectives prior to the seizure of Formosa, MacArthur thought it would be “unsound” to bypass the Philippines and Note 47 · Moreover, if the United States should deliberately bypass the Philippines, leaving our prisoners, nationals, and loyal Filipinos in enemy haNote 48 · In reply, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, cautioned MacArthur to “be careful not to let personal feelings and Philippine politicNote 49 · Admiral William F. Halsey, the commander of the Third Fleet, and his staff, when they heard of the proposal, were enthusiastic about the posNote 50 · In the latter days of July, General Marshall invited General MacArthur to visit Pearl Harbor in order to confer with Admiral Nimitz on futurNote 51 · Although Mac Arthur had been given no intimation that strategy was going to be discussed, he launched into a long talk on the necessity of tNote 52 · Admiral Nimitz reported to Admiral King that the conferences “were quite satisfactory. The general trend of the discussion ... was along theNote 53 · There was no strong disagreement between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Leahy said, “I personally was convinced that they togNote 54 · The initial phase envisaged footholds in the southern and central Philippines for the establishment of bases and airfields from which subseqNote 55 · On 26 July the Joint Chiefs agreed that the primary purpose of the occupation of the Leyte-Mindanao area was to establish air forces there iNote 56 · In furtherance of this directive, planning officers from Washington met with General MacArthur and his staff in Brisbane in the early part oNote 57 · The planners from Washington, however, felt that there was sufficient assault shipping in the Pacific without using the same craft for both Note 58 · The determination of the target date was dependent upon the availability of assault shipping and the desire of General MacArthur to have eacNote 59 · On 27 August General MacArthur furnished General Marshall a timetable for future operations by his forces. On 15 September a division and a Note 60 · On 1 September 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 171st meeting reviewed the situation in the Pacific. The time had come when it was neNote 61 · Accordingly, on 8 September, the two commanders were given the following missions: General MacArthur, after conducting the necessary prelimiNote 62 · Admiral Halsey advised Admiral Nimitz that, as a result of the strikes, few serviceable planes in the Philippines were left to the Japanese,Note 63 · When this message was received, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were attending a conference in Quebec. The recommendations were transmitted to Note 64 · The message reached MacArthur’s headquarters at Hollandia, on New Guinea, while MacArthur was en route to Morotai and observing radio silencNote 65 · General Marshall received this answer at Quebec on 15 September while he, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and General Arnold were at a formal dNote 66 · Later that evening, as he was on his way to his quarters after the dinner, General Marshall received this message: “Subject to completion ofNote 67 · On 3 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General MacArthur to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944, the date originally set for the entra
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