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Leyte

Chapter V · A Day: 20 October 1944

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Bombardment of the Shores of Leyte

The waters of Leyte Gulf were glassy calm as the convoys bearing the assault forces steamed into their appointed positions off the shores of Leyte in the very early morning hours of 20 October 1944.

Gray smoke plumes are rising from the shores. Battleship Mississippi is now working on the northern beaches. She is joined by the Maryland whose fire has apparently caused a large shore explosion. Jap ack-ack is fired at spotting planes but the performance is weak.

CONVOY OFF LEYTE at dawn on A Day.
CONVOY OFF LEYTE at dawn on A Day.

CONVOY OFF LEYTE at dawn on A Day.

X Corps Goes Ashore

Missions of Sixth Army Summarized

1st Cavalry Division

LANDING BEACHES. White Beach is in the foreground, with Red Beach, bounded by the Palo River, beyond.
LANDING BEACHES. White Beach is in the foreground, with Red Beach, bounded by the Palo River, beyond.

LANDING BEACHES. White Beach is in the foreground, with Red Beach, bounded by the Palo River, beyond.

X CORPS LANDINGS
X CORPS LANDINGS

MAP 5 C. A. Frost

X CORPS LANDINGS

20 October 1944

The 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry was to land north of the 2d Squadron on the northern end of White Beach, which at this point coincided with the narrow neck of land connecting the Cataisan Peninsula to the rest of the island, and then go directly north to secure the entire peninsula and the airstrip. On its left the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was to land on the right flank of White Beach, push inland, capture San Jose and a bridge across the Burayan River northwest of the town, and seize a beachhead line a thousand yards west of Highway 1 and three thousand yards from White Beach. The Cataisan Peninsula would then be sealed off.

TROOPS OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION wade through a swamp to their A-Day objective.
TROOPS OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION wade through a swamp to their A-Day objective.

TROOPS OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION wade through a swamp to their A-Day objective.

From the beach a single deeply rutted and muddy exit road ran south to the Palo River, where it turned westward to Highway 1. The river was just north of the town of Palo and roughly paralleled Highway 2, which ran in a northwesterly direction from Palo into the interior, between the hills dominating this entrance to Leyte Valley.

Among the vessels hit by Japanese artillery were four LST’s, one of which was set on fire. Of the five remaining, two were driven away and three did not get in until much later. The enemy fired upon the retiring LST’s, which carried with them the artillery and most of the tanks. The commanding officer of Headquarters Company and the division quartermaster, together with the latter’s executive officer, were wounded. Many of the division headquarters personnel were killed or wounded.

Company I was able to advance, but Company K ran into a defensive position of five pillboxes along a stream about seventy-five yards from the beach. It successfully stormed these pillboxes with rifles, BAR’s, and hand grenades. The 3d Battalion then halted for reorganization. Company L, the reserve company, moved into the line south of Company K to close the gap between the 19th and 34th Infantry Regiments, a gap created when part of the 34th landed too far north.

By 1215 the 34th Infantry had cleared the beach area of the enemy, and the 3d Battalion was ready to advance across an open swamp to a line of trees 150 yards away. A preparatory concentration by 81-mm. mortars, tanks, and heavy machine guns was first laid down. At 1230 the 3d Battalion moved in. Although the going was rough and the mud waist deep, the troops reached the trees at 1300 and waited for the mortars and machine guns to arrive. The 3d Battalion then pushed on an additional 250 yards.

The 34th Infantry established contact with the 1st Cavalry Division on the right and the 19th Infantry on the left. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, remained in the beachhead area.

To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed at the planned spot.

Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make contact with the rest of the company until the following day.

The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had come in under intense fire in which several boats were hit, and numerous casualties occurred. The battalion landed 300 yards north of its selected area, moved in 200 yards, and then made a left, oblique turn in order to reach its predetermined assembly area. Company B suffered several casualties when it ran into strong rifle and pillbox fire, which pinned it down. The company was ordered to break off fighting and move to the northern edge of the Japanese positions. Lt. Col. Frederick R. Zierath, the commanding officer of the battalion, ordered the self-propelled guns to be brought up. They successfully neutralized the pillbox and a supporting position behind it. Company C, landing on the left flank of the battalion, was immediately pinned down by hostile fire. Zierath ordered it to disengage and proceed to the designated assembly area. Company A, which was split by enemy fire, regrouped inland and reached the assembly area just ahead of Company C.

The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, arrived at the beach just as the 1st Battalion was bypassing the initial resistance. By noon its first defense was formed around the beachhead. At 1245 Company E, with a rocket launcher, silenced a 75-mm. gun which had been firing on the LST’s. In its advance the company located two more 75-mm. guns which had been abandoned. Company G relieved Company E and prepared to move along the beach road southwest toward Palo. As the point started to move out at 1300 it was attacked by approximately a platoon from the 33d Infantry Regiment which attempted to retake the gun positions. The Japanese were repulsed by rifle fire, leaving eleven dead.

75-MM. M8 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS move in to support the infantrymen in their advance from the beach.
75-MM. M8 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS move in to support the infantrymen in their advance from the beach.

75-MM. M8 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS move in to support the infantrymen in their advance from the beach.

At 1430 Company G, in resuming its advance, ran at once into a series of mutually supporting pillboxes about 500 yards inland, where the beach road turns to meet Highway 1. A stiff rifle fire fight followed, in which the Americans suffered fifteen casualties. Since darkness was approaching, the battalion broke off the action and dug in along the road for the night.

While the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was proceeding cautiously forward the 1st Battalion was working toward Hill 522. This hill, which rose directly from the river’s edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep.

During the preliminary bombardments the Navy had delivered some of its heaviest blows on the hill, and the bombardment was continued by Battery B of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion and Battery A of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry sent reconnaissance parties to locate a northern route to the hill. The plan had been to move inland from the extreme south of the beachhead, but that area was still in Japanese hands. At 1430, when scouts reported finding a covered route on the northern side of the hill, the 1st Battalion immediately moved out in a column of companies. The column had barely started when Company A, in the lead, was held up by enemy fire from the five pillboxes. The remainder of the battalion moved north around Company A, and, skirting the woods, attacked Hill 522 from the northeast, with Company C on the right and Company B on the left.

MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN C. SIBERT
MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN C. SIBERT

MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN C. SIBERT

(left), X Corps commander, confers with Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, commander of the 24th Division, at a forward command post.

The men, although tired from the day’s activity and strain, made steady progress up the slope. As the troops moved upward, American mortars started to shell the crest of the hill. It was thought that this was artillery fire and a request was made that it be lifted. It came, however, from the chemical mortars. After a short delay the firing ceased. At dusk Company B reached the first crest of the hill and was halted by fire from two enemy bunkers. The company thereupon dug in.

At the same time scouts from Company C reached the central and highest crest of the hill and espied about two platoons of Japanese coming up the other side. They shouted for the remainder of the company to hurry. Company C got to the top of the hill barely ahead of the Japanese, and a sharp engagement took place in which about fifty Japanese were killed. Company C held the highest crest of the hill. During this attack, 1st Lt. Dallas Dick was struck in the leg and his carbine was shot from his hands, but he continued to command his unit until his evacuation forty-eight hours later.

During the night the Japanese made frequent but unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate the company area and in the darkness they carried away their dead and wounded. During the action to secure Hill 522, fourteen men of the 1st Battalion were killed and ninety-five wounded; thirty of the latter eventually rejoined their units. General Irving, who had assumed command of the 24th Division ashore at 1420, later said that if Hill 522 had not been secured when it was, the Americans might have suffered a thousand casualties in the assault.

By the end of A Day, the division had crossed Highway 1 and established physical contact with the 1st Cavalry Division on its right flank. In spite of strong opposition on its left flank, the 24th Division had secured Hill 522, which dominated the route into the interior and overlooked the town of Palo, the entrance point into Leyte Valley. Furthermore, the X Corps had now secured a firm beachhead area averaging a mile in depth and extending over five miles from the tip of the Cataisan Peninsula to the vicinity of Palo, and had captured the important Tacloban airstrip on the Cataisan Peninsula.

XXIV Corps Goes Ashore

While the X Corps was engaged in seizing a beachhead and capturing the Tacloban airfield, the XXIV Corps was carrying out its mission more than fourteen miles to the south. (Map 6) It was to land in the Dulag-San Jose area and establish a beachhead between Dulag and Tanauan. The Dulag airstrip was the primary objective. The 7th and 96th Divisions—the 7th on the left (south) and the 96th on the right (north)—made the landings. The most prominent terrain feature near the shore line is a short, finger-like hill range between the mouth of the Labiranan River and the village of Pikas. Ranging from 400 feet at its southern extremity, known as Labiranan Head, to 1400 feet at Catmon Hill, southeast of Pikas, this hill mass dominates the surrounding plain for miles around. (The entire hill mass will hereafter be referred to as Catmon Hill.)

96th Infantry Division

In the early morning hours of 20 October the Southern Attack Force moved to a location off the shores of Leyte near the town of Dulag. The 96th Division was to land with regiments abreast in the area between the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose—the 382d Infantry on the left (south) and the 383d Infantry on the right (north). The southern half of the division’s beachhead area was designated Blue Beaches 1 and 2, and the northern half was known as Orange Beaches 1 and 2. The beaches had an average length of about 525 yards. The northern extremity of Orange Beach was about ten miles from the southernmost beach of the 24th Division in the X Corps sector.

XXIV CORPS LANDINGS
XXIV CORPS LANDINGS

MAP 6 R. Johnstone

XXIV CORPS LANDINGS

20 October 1944

When the landing craft were within 100 yards of the shore, the LCI’s fired into the interior and to each side of the landing beaches. Thereupon the amphibian tanks began to fire directly beyond the beaches, in front of the advancing assault forces. The 382d Infantry under Col. Macey L. Dill landed at 0950 on Blue Beach, and the 383d Infantry under Col. Edwin T. May landed ten minutes later on Orange Beach.

The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, pushed northwest through the barrio of San Jose, which was on the beach, and along the marshy ground and swamps on the south bank of the Labiranan River for 2,200 yards. It crossed the river at 1610. Company C placed a roadblock at the point where Highway 1 crossed the Labiranan River. After advancing 400 yards farther northwest the battalion ran into fire from elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment. At 1900 the battalion, still under enemy fire, dug in for the night. At the close of the day’s action it was at the base of Labiranan Head in a position which would permit an attack to be launched on that terrain feature from the west.

As heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on the beach, the 382d Infantry also landed with two battalions abreast—the 2d Battalion to the right (north) at Blue Beach 2 and the 3d Battalion to the left (south) at Blue Beach 1. The 2d Battalion, though momentarily stopped by debris on the shore, was able to advance quickly and by 1025 had penetrated 300 yards inland. This gain was increased to 700 yards by 1115. The battalion crossed Highway 1 before it encountered the first defensive positions of the 9th Infantry Regiment, a series of zigzag deserted trenches roughly paralleling the beach. Although the 2d Battalion met no enemy opposition, the intense heat and the swampy ground made progress slow. At 1630, when the battalion formed a perimeter for the night, it had pushed inland approximately 2,500 yards.

BEACH AREA as seen from Hill 120.
BEACH AREA as seen from Hill 120.

BEACH AREA as seen from Hill 120.

The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had been in floating reserve, landed on Blue Beach 1 and moved to the foot of Hill 120 to support the 3d Battalion. Immediately beyond the hill there was a small meadow rimmed by a deep swamp. The enemy fired upon the hill throughout the day but could not dislodge the 3d Battalion. This steady fire and the presence of the swamp limited the A-Day advance of the 3d Battalion to 1,300 yards inland from the landing beach.

Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley arrived ashore at 1750, and at 1800 he assumed command of the 96th Infantry Division. The three light artillery battalions of the division had landed and were in position by 1800.

7th Infantry Division

The 7th Division was to land on Violet and Yellow Beaches. Violet Beach extended 785 yards north from the northern edge of Dulag. The northern half of Yellow Beach, called Yellow Beach 2, which was south of Violet Beach and contiguous to it, was 400 yards long. Between the northern and southern halves of Yellow Beach was a swamp. The southern half of Yellow Beach, Yellow Beach 1, was approximately 425 yards in length and was located south of Dulag and north of the Daguitan River mouth.

The 7th Division was to go ashore between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers with regiments abreast—the 32d Infantry on the right (north) and the 184th Infantry on the left (south); the 17th Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, was in reserve. The principal A-Day objectives were the barrio of Dulag and its airstrip. The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, was to swing south and secure the bridge and the crossing of the Daguitan River at Dao and the crossing of the Talisay River.

The 32d Infantry, under Col. Marc J. Logie, was to land on the northern and southern portions of Violet Beach, drive into the interior, and protect the right flank of the division. The 184th Infantry, commanded by Col. Curtis D. O’Sullivan, was to land on Yellow Beach 1 and Yellow Beach 2 and then drive inland, directing its main effort toward an early seizure of the airfield west of Dulag. It was also to seize and secure the crossings of the Daguitan River.

Companies L and K of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine guns and antitank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped its forward movement. In the space of fifteen minutes two officers and six men of the 3d Battalion were killed, and one officer and eighteen men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 1030, three were sent to support Company L and two to support Company K. The latter two were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With two tanks remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 1345. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the two companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without further casualties.

The 17th Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, was kept in 7th Division reserve. The 3d Battalion of the 17th had come ashore at 1500 on the southern end of Yellow Beach. The battalion pushed west and south through light opposition, seizing the bridge over the Daguitan River at Dao, and by 2100 had established a bridgehead south of the river and made contact with the 184th Infantry on the right. At the end of the first day’s fighting the 7th Division had gained possession of the Leyte shore in its zone and penetrated inland 600 yards on the right and nearly 2,300 yards on the left. It had also reached the edge of the Dulag airstrip. By nightfall the XXIV Corps had established a firm beachhead line extending along the coast from San Jose on the north to just below Dao on the south.

Seventy miles to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division, which was detailed to land in the vicinity of Panaon Strait on 20 October at 0930, half an hour before the launching of the great offensive, and to secure control of that entrance to Sogod Bay, successfully accomplished its mission. It encountered no Japanese.

LT. GEN. WALTER KRUEGER AND COL. RUPERTO K. KANGLEON of the guerrilla forces head for the beach (above). Krueger talks with men of the 7th Division on the beach near Dulag (below).
LT. GEN. WALTER KRUEGER AND COL. RUPERTO K. KANGLEON of the guerrilla forces head for the beach (above). Krueger talks with men of the 7th Division on the beach near Dulag (below).

LT. GEN. WALTER KRUEGER AND COL. RUPERTO K. KANGLEON of the guerrilla forces head for the beach (above). Krueger talks with men of the 7th Division on the beach near Dulag (below).

Illustration from Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Most of the 16th Division had withdrawn during the naval and air bombardment which took place just prior to the landing. The immediate invasion of the troops after this pounding enabled the Americans to secure most of the coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup and return. As a consequence, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to fight a delaying action. The meeting with the enemy in force was yet to come.

Bringing in Supplies

While the assault forces were securing the beaches of Leyte, supplies were being poured in to support the operation. Within an hour after the first assault wave hit the hostile shores, rations, equipment, and other supplies were being rushed to the beaches. Each man going ashore carried a change of clothing in his pack, two days’ supply of emergency rations, one day’s supply of D rations, and two filled canteens, in addition to his gas mask, weapons, and ammunition.

The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target area. Ships’ companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of unloading.

As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the landing beaches.

UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT DULAG on A Day (above), and (below) general view of the beach area on 22 October 1944.
UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT DULAG on A Day (above), and (below) general view of the beach area on 22 October 1944.

UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT DULAG on A Day (above), and (below) general view of the beach area on 22 October 1944.

Illustration from Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

During the day a total of 107,450 tons of supplies and equipment were discharged over the beaches of the Sixth Army. Although the beaches in some instances were extremely congested, steps had been initiated to relieve the situation.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · CTF 79 Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, 13 Nov 44. (All naval records cited are in the Office of Naval Records and Library.) ↑Note 2 · COMBATDIV4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44. ↑Note 3 · Tarbuck Rpt. ↑Note 4 · COMBATDIV 4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44. ↑Note 5 · COMINCH P-008, pp. 2–8. ↑Note 6 · Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11 Nov 44. ↑Note 7 · CTG 77.4 (Com Escort Carrier Group), Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, 30 Apr 45, Part 2, pp. 9, 10. ↑Note 8 · CTF 78 Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. ↑Note 9 · 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. Unless otherwise stated all records of tactical units are in DRB AGO. ↑Note 10 · Tarbuck Rpt. ↑Note 11 · 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑Note 12 · GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44. ↑Note 13 · Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. ↑Note 14 · CTF 77 Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. ↑Note 15 · CTF 78 Opns Plan 101–44, 3 Oct 44. ↑Note 16 · 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. ↑Note 17 · 1st Cav Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44. ↑Note 18 · Unless otherwise stated the material on the 1st Cavalry Division is taken from 1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44, and 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt LeytNote 19 · 7th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2–4. ↑Note 20 · Ibid. ↑Note 21 · 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. ↑Note 22 · 1st Cav Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑Note 23 · 12th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–2. ↑Note 24 · 5th Cav S-3 Periodic Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 25 · 8th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑Note 26 · 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19. ↑Note 27 · 1st Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3, 1st Cav Div Arty Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 28 · 1st Cav Div Msgs to X Corps, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 29 · Unless otherwise stated information in this subsection is taken from 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2–10, and 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 30 · X Corps FO 1, 30 Sep 44. ↑Note 31 · Ibid. ↑Note 32 · Ibid. ↑Note 33 · 19th Inf Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑Note 34 · 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑Note 35 · 34th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 36 · Private Robinson was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. ↑Note 37 · 19th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 38 · 35th Army Opns, p. 27. ↑Note 39 · CTF 79 Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, Encl A, 13 Nov 44. ↑Note 40 · 383d Inf Regt FO 6A, App. A, 30 Sep 44. ↑Note 41 · CTG 79.2 Opns Rpt, Ser 0032, 4 Nov 44. ↑Note 42 · 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑Note 43 · Ibid. ↑Note 44 · 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 45 · 382d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑Note 46 · 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 33–37. ↑Note 47 · Unless otherwise stated, the part of this subsection dealing with the 7th Infantry Division is taken from the following: 7th Inf Div Opns RpNote 48 · 776th Amph Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑Note 49 · 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 50 · 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑Note 51 · 184th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑Note 52 · 184th Inf Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑Note 53 · Rad, GHQ SWPA to CG Sixth Army, Sixth Army G-3 Rear Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑Note 54 · Extracted Report of Landing on Leyte in the Philippine Islands by an Australian Officer Attached to the Northern Assault Force Landing at ReNote 55 · 2d ESB Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑Note 56 · Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Engr Rpt, p. 232. ↑Note 57 · Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt, p. 218. ↑Note 58 · Ltr, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and Jnl File. ↑Note 59 · CTU 78.1.7 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 2. ↑Note 60 · Ltr, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and Jnl File. ↑Note 61 · CTU 78.2.1 and 78.2.3 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 3. ↑Note 62 · Lts, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and Jnl File. ↑Note 63 · Maj F. W. Doyle to Brig Gen L. J. Whitlock, Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn, 4 Nov 44, GHQ G-4 Jnl, AGO KCRC. ↑Note 64 · 2d ESB Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑Note 65 · Maj Doyle to Gen Whitlock, Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn, 4 Nov 44, GHQ G-4 Jnl. ↑Note 66 · 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, Supplementary Annex, p. 3. ↑Note 67 · 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 73. ↑Note 68 · Rpt of Sup Off to CO Funston, 23 Oct 44, in CO USS Frederick Funston Opns Rpt, Ser 0101, 31 Oct 44. The boat crews and beach parties had beeNote 69 · Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11 Nov 44. ↑Note 70 · 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 73–75. ↑Note 71 · CTG 79.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 15. ↑Note 72 · 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt. ↑Note 73 · CTG 71.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 15. ↑Note 74 · 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt. ↑Note 75 · 1140th Engr Const Gp Shore Party Opns Rpt Leyte. ↑Note 76 · The New York Times, October 20, 1944. ↑Note 77 · There were three stages of the naval gunfire support: the pre-A-Day bombardment, A-Day bombardment, and close supporting missions to be deliNote 78 · At 0600 on A Day, 20 October, the battleships assigned to the Southern Attack Force opened fire on the beaches. A lone Japanese plane appearNote 79 · Battleships move inshore and renew their constant thunder. Helldivers and Avengers from our CVE’s are heading toward the shore....3Note 80 · At 0900 the battleships ceased their fire and the cruisers and destroyers moved in closer to the shore to deliver their scheduled bombardmenNote 81 · At 0850 gunfire was suspended in the vicinity of Catmon Hill, the most prominent coastal terrain feature near Dulag, in order to allow an aiNote 82 · The principal bombing and strafing targets were revetments, dispersal areas, supply dumps, and bivouac areas, together with aircraft on islaNote 83 · At 0900 the cruisers commenced bombarding the beaches. They were joined at 0930 by the destroyers. At 0945 the cruisers and destroyers lifteNote 84 · At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP’s were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and movNote 85 · Hours earlier reveille had sounded on board the transports and the troops had dressed by the red lights in the holds where they were quarterNote 86 · The Sixth Army had been ordered to seize and establish beachheads in the Dulag and Tacloban areas and to secure the airfields in order to prNote 87 · The northernmost unit of X Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, was to land in the vicinity of San Jose (also called San Ricardo and San Jose RiNote 88 · White Beach had a fairly good landing surface of white coral sand, but even at high tide it was suitable only for shallow-draft landing crafNote 89 · The roar of many guns could be heard as the 1st Cavalry Division prepared to disembark into landing boats, which were to rendezvous at the lNote 90 · The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, was to land on White Beach with brigades abreast—the 1st Brigade on the lefNote 91 · Flanked by rocket and gunboat LCI’s, and preceded by amphibian tanks, the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments, which formed the 1st Brigade, and Note 92 · Both squadrons landed on schedule, with only slight opposition, and immediately began to execute their assignments. The 2d Squadron, within Note 93 · The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, landed in amphibian tractors on the north end of White Beach a few minutes after initial assault waves of theNote 94 · The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments landed on White Beach without incident at exactly 1000. Immediately beyond the narrow landing beach was aNote 95 · The first elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Cavalry Brigade, the corps reserve, moved to White Beach at 1040, and by 1130 the entire Note 96 · At 1400 General Mudge assumed command ashore of the 1st Cavalry Division and by 1630 had established the divisional command post at San JoseNote 97 · 24th Infantry Division29Note 98 · In the southern part of the X Corps zone, to the left of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division (less the 21st Infantry), undeNote 99 · The 24th Division was to occupy Palo, advance with regiments abreast into the interior in a northwesterly direction,31 occupy the Capoocan-CNote 100 · The assaulting forces, having been transferred to landing craft, met at the line of departure 5,000 yards from shore. After grouping, they dNote 101 · The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinnedNote 102 · The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, passed through the 3d Battalion, crossed Highway 1 at 1550, and dug in for the night 100 yards west of the Note 103 · Company L, on the right, met little opposition on landing, established contact with the 34th Infantry, and reached the initial phase line 50Note 104 · During the next few hours platoons and squads fought independently. The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, drove into the interior about 500 yardsNote 105 · The 9th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, was guarding the Catmon Hill area while the 20th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, was dNote 106 · Immediately northwest of Dulag and just off the beach was a swamp,39 and along the coast were coconut groves interspersed with rice fields. Note 107 · The order to “land the landing force” of the 96th Division came at 0845, and LVT’s immediately began to spill out of the LST’s and head for Note 108 · The 383d Infantry landed with two battalions abreast—the 2d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. By 1045 both battalionNote 109 · The 3d Battalion, which had been held afloat in regimental reserve, came ashore at 1045. It mopped up in the rear of the 1st and 2d BattalioNote 110 · The amphibian tractors carrying the 3d Battalion, 382d Infantry, were held up by the tank barriers of coconut logs and debris on the beach, Note 111 · At the end of the day, despite the swampy terrain and the harassing fire of the Japanese, the 382d Infantry had advanced approximately 2,500Note 112 · At 1630 the assault forces of the 96th Division consolidated their positions and set up defense perimeters for the night. During the day theNote 113 · Concurrently with the landings of the 96th Division, the 7th Division, on the left, was establishing a beachhead in its zone of action just Note 114 · After the landing waves had formed at the line of departure, the landing craft started for the beaches, preceded by the 776th Amphibian TankNote 115 · The 2d Battalion landed on the edge of a cemetery in which were small groups of the enemy very much alive. By 1100 these were subdued by rifNote 116 · Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heNote 117 · The 184th Infantry landed at 1000, two battalions abreast—the 1st on the southern half of Yellow Beach and the 3d on the northern half. TheyNote 118 · Thus at the end of A Day the Sixth Army had succeeded in landing assault forces all along the eastern coast of Leyte and was in control of PNote 119 · The LSM’s were used to very good advantage in the unloading of the APA’s and AKA’s. Vehicles and supplies could be loaded on them without diNote 120 · At the beach, the Army took over the cargo and moved the supplies to prearranged dumps. On the northern beaches in the X Corps sector, the ANote 121 · The beachhead areas at which the supplies were unloaded varied in quality and depth. Most of the beaches on which the 7th and 96th DivisionsNote 122 · LST’s approaching Red Beach were under intense enemy fire. Four of them received direct hits.58 Nearly all of the LST’s were grounded 100 toNote 123 · The shore parties on both Red and White Beaches (X Corps sector) did not land early enough to effect a proper organization before the cargo Note 124 · The strong resistance of the Japanese and the difficult terrain limited the depth of the 24th Division’s beachhead and prevented the establiNote 125 · The diversion of the 24th Division’s LST’s to the beaches of the 1st Cavalry Division naturally strained the facilities of the beach and shoNote 126 · When Leyte was substituted for Yap as the target, it had been decided that the 96th Division should unload troops and supplies at Leyte as rNote 127 · There was no general unloading on the beach in the XXIV Corps area until the late afternoon of A Day, when water, rations, and ammunition weNote 128 · Loose cargo piled up on the beaches faster than it could be taken to the dump sites.70 A deep swamp, 250 yards inland and parallel to Blue BNote 129 · In the Dulag area, the organization of the shore party and its operations were well co-ordinated.71 In the initial phase the 7th Division emNote 130 · In the wake of the initial assault waves, the engineer troops landed and began at once to clear the beaches, prepare dump sites, and build aNote 131 · Within four hours the 7th Division’s shore party was prepared to start full-scale operations, and two hours later began to issue supplies toNote 132 · News of the success of the American forces in establishing a beachhead on Leyte—the first foothold in the Philippine Islands—was joyfully re
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