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Leyte

Chapter XXII · Leyte Is Liberated

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The Eighth Army Assumes Control

On 26 December, General Eichelberger assumed control of all combat units in the Leyte-Samar area. It was not until the first part of January 1945 that the American troops secured the west coast of Leyte. Thereafter only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained.

Assembly of Japanese Forces

On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding the 14th Area Army, notified General Suzuki, the 35th Army commander, that he had written off the Leyte Campaign as a loss; henceforward the 35th Army on Leyte would be self-sustaining and self-supporting, the units on Leyte would be transferred to other areas, and, finally, the units on the island would be assembled at a point from which raiding operations could be conducted. Since these orders were ambiguous and apparently contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the message be repeated but he never received an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part of December, he sent his chief of staff to Manila for further clarification of the orders. The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way of Cebu, in late January, but he was unable to obtain any further information for General Suzuki.

In the meantime, the leaderless 102d Division, with a strength of approximately 2,000 men, crossed Highway 2 north of Libongao and reached the southern area of Matagob about 24 December. The troops failed to contact the 35th Army and after remaining for a short time at Matagob moved to the vicinity of Villaba.

The units that arrived on the west coast were much understrength and very poorly equipped. All artillery had been lost. There were only five to ten machine guns per regiment in addition to individual weapons. Each man had an average of sixty rounds of ammunition and several hand grenades.

On the 30th of December, General Yamashita sent the following message to General Suzuki:

General Suzuki took steps to make the force on Leyte self-supporting. In January 1945, he established two principles for his troops. First, the troops were to utilize as much of the local food and material as possible and plant sweet potatoes and Indian corn. Second, all provisions in the area outside of the operation base were to be purchased. The execution of the first part of his first precept worked reasonably well but the constant American air raids and mopping-up operations prevented the Japanese from being too successful in planting and harvesting the corn and potatoes. They were also not very fortunate in purchasing supplies from outside the area, although some supplies were obtained each time the men could pass through the American protective screen.

The Japanese arrived on the western shores of Leyte at the end of the harvest season. They secured large quantities of provisions which the Filipinos had stored and also a great number of coconuts and sweet potatoes. The soldiers used the carabaos of the island as meat and obtained salt from sea water. For vegetables, the army’s chief reliance was upon wild ferns, tokay grass, and wild spinach.

The Mop-up

During the XXIV Corps phase, the 11th Airborne Division encountered an enemy force well dug in on the southern slopes of Mt. Majunag, five miles northwest of Burauen. After much bitter hand-to-hand fighting the Japanese were destroyed. The 96th Division engaged in extensive patrolling, relieved the 11th Airborne Division, and relieved the X Corps of all tactical responsibility east of the mountains. The 7th Division sent out numerous patrols in the southern part of the island, and sent out a reinforced battalion that destroyed all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. The 77th Division, which operated in the northwestern part of the island, cleared up many pockets of enemy resistance.

In the X Corps phase, the island of Samar was cleared of Japanese troops. The Americal Division, advance elements of which arrived on 24 January, extensively patrolled both the islands of Leyte and Samar.

The Japanese Withdrawal

General Suzuki had plans drawn up showing the order of precedence by which the units on Leyte were to be withdrawn and their destinations. All available landing barges on Leyte and additional vessels from Cebu and other areas would be used. The order of the proposed withdrawal and the destinations of the units were as follows:

1st Division northern Cebu and later to Negros

41st and 77th Infantry Regiments Mindanao

102d Division Visayan area

26th Division Bacolod sector of Negros

Takahashi Detachment northern Cebu

Units of the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade northern Cebu

On the morning of 12 January, four launches arrived at Abijao to begin evacuation of the 1st Division. The Americans attacked and damaged the vessels, but three were repaired. By 2300, with the embarkation of the first party, composed of elements of the 49th Infantry and Division Headquarters, the evacuation got under way. This group left Abijao at 0130 on 13 January and reached Tabogon, in northern Cebu, about 0730. At about the same time, the remnants of the 57th Infantry reached Cebu. The rest of 1st Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry Regiment, and part of the 1st Transport Regiment left Leyte on the 18th, and on the 20th the rest of the 49th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division Transport quitted the island.

The Road Ends

Table 4—U. S. Army Battle Casualties at Leyte, 20 October 1944–8 May 1945

Source: Reports of the Commanding Generals, Eighth U. S. Army, Inclosure 1, and Sixth U. S. Army, on the Leyte-Samar Operation, p. 155.

In the plan for the defeat of Japan the objective sought in reconquering the Philippines was not only to liberate the Filipinos but also to cut off the Japanese from the rich empire that they had acquired in the Netherlands Indies, and at the same time to establish a base for the final assault on the enemy’s homeland. As early as 1942 Allied submarines had begun to gnaw at the lifeline between Japan and its new empire, rich in rubber, tin, rice, and, above all, in oil, without which Japan could not remain in the war. By the fall of 1944 the submarines had virtually cut this lifeline, which ran past the Philippines. The loss of the Philippines to the Allies would finally sever it.

Table 5—Sixth Army Battle Casualties by Arm or Service, 20 October-25 December 1944

Arm or Service Killed Wounded and Injured Missing in Action Total

Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent

Infantry 2,380 82.42 7,749 78.61 85 52.80 10,214 79.14

Engineer 132 4.58 762 7.73 46 28.57 940 7.28

Medical 100 3.47 375 3.80 8 4.97 483 3.74

Field Artillery 96 3.33 328 3.33 5 3.11 429 3.32

Coast Artillery 47 1.59 248 2.52 1 .62 296 2.30

Ordnance 45 1.56 100 1.01 1 .62 146 1.13

Quartermaster 41 1.42 67 .68 9 5.59 117 .91

Signal 12 .42 76 .77 0 .00 88 .68

Transportation 7 .24 73 .74 1 .62 81 .63

Chemical Warfare 13 .45 44 .45 0 .00 57 .44

Military Police 13 .45 27 .27 4 2.48 44 .34

Chaplain 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00

Miscellaneous 2 .07 9 .09 1 .62 12 .09

Total 2,888 100.00 9,858 100.00 161 100.00 12,907 100.00

Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December 1944, p. 155.

The object of the Leyte Campaign had been to force an entry into the Philippines and establish a solid base for their reconquest. It had accomplished this object, though the base had not been secured and developed as promptly or as effectively as the planners had anticipated. The construction program on the island had been a disappointment. Leyte never became a major air base. But the campaign had other and more important effects that had not been foreseen when it was launched. In their determination to make Leyte the decisive battle of the Philippines, the Japanese had committed the major portions of their fleet and air force in a vain attempt to stay the American advance. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf the Japanese Navy suffered irreparable damage—all of the carriers were lost and most of the capital ships were sunk or damaged. The air force was now almost completely dependent upon the suicidal kamikaze pilot. Finally, the dispatch of reinforcements and supplies to Leyte had seriously crippled the defenses of Luzon—the strategic heart of the Philippine Archipelago.

Three years of hard fighting over jungle trails had finally brought the U. S. forces back to the Philippines. Ahead lay months of weary struggle but ultimate victory was no longer in doubt.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Eighth Army FO 8, 20 Dec 44. ↑Note 2 · Quoted in Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84. ↑Note 3 · See M. Hamlin Cannon and Robert Ross Smith, Luzon and the Southern Philippines, a forthcoming volume in this series. ↑Note 4 · 35th Army Opns, p. 119. ↑Note 5 · Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 32. ↑Note 6 · 35th Army Opns, pp. 115–16. ↑Note 7 · Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 29. ↑Note 8 · Ibid., p. 30. ↑Note 9 · 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and Cebu, App., p. 3; Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp. 29Note 10 · Msg, Gen Yamashita to Gen Suzuki, 1535, 30 Dec 44. Translation of HS-23A, file of 35th Army Headquarters documents held by former Maj. TakahNote 11 · 35th Army Opns, pp. 120–24. ↑Note 12 · Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑Note 13 · Ibid., p. 9. ↑Note 14 · Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. Unless otherwise cited, this subsection is based upon this operations report, pp. 1–18. ↑Note 15 · Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7–17. ↑Note 16 · Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34. ↑Note 17 · 35th Army Opns, pp. 118, 127. ↑Note 18 · Ibid., pp. 127–28. ↑Note 19 · 10th I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV, Opns of Japanese 1st Division on Leyte, pp. 19–20. ↑Note 20 · Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34. ↑Note 21 · 10th I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV, Opns of Japanese 1st Division on Leyte, pp. 21–22. ↑Note 22 · Ibid., p. 21. ↑Note 23 · During his travels, General Suzuki composed two poems which he presented to his “dear brother Tomochika,” One of these, entitled “A FarewellNote 24 · Strength Accounting Br, AGO, STM-30, 1 Feb 45. These figures must be treated with caution as they include, in addition to those who had actuNote 25 · Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84. ↑Note 26 · Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑Note 27 · Ibid., p. 16. ↑Note 28 · Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York, 1950), p. 181. ↑Note 29 · Estimated. ↑Note 30 · 35th Army Opns, p. 126. ↑Note 31 · 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog of Gen Tomochika, pp. 9–10. ↑Note 32 · Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, Interrog of Gen Tomochika, p. 7. ↑Note 33 · See Cannon and Smith, Luzon and the Southern Philippines. ↑Note 34 · U. S. Military Commission, U. S. Army Forces Western Pacific, United States of America vs Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of General YamashitaNote 35 · The decision of General Yamashita to abandon the Leyte operation followed a series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th of December, he canNote 36 · In the meantime, General Suzuki interpreted his orders to mean that units of the 35th Army would assemble at a common point at which they coNote 37 · The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it Note 38 · The units continued to straggle westward towards the selected area. By 1 January, most of them had taken up positions in the Balanac sector,Note 39 · The 102d Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of forty to fifty deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats thNote 40 · General Suzuki was “entirely displeased” with the reaction of Fukue and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situaNote 41 · Sixty days have already elapsed since the American forces invaded Leyte Island, during which period the Thirty-fifth Army, under the forcefuNote 42 · In conclusion, “although there was not enough food to increase the fighting power of the Army, no one died of starvation and some units storNote 43 · By the end of December, most of the enemy troops were in northwest Leyte, west of Highway 2 and north of Palompon. Another large enemy conceNote 44 · The mop-up of any operation is dangerous, difficult, and unglamorous, but it is highly essential. The activities of the 7th Division on LeytNote 45 · Eight divisions were engaged in mopping up for varying lengths of time on Leyte, but only an outline of their activities will be attempted hNote 46 · During the Eighth Army Area Command phase, the constant searching out of isolated groups of enemy soldiers continued. In addition to the AmeNote 47 · At the time that General Suzuki made his plans for the units of the 35th Army on Leyte to become self-sufficient, he felt that there were toNote 48 · General Suzuki and 35th Army Headquarters would leave Leyte about the same time as the 26th Division. The 16th Division, the 68th IndependenNote 49 · When these plans were announced Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, the commanding general of the 1st Division, suggested that as the 1st Division had Note 50 · Between the 13th and 20th of January the three launches, each carrying about seventy men, made four round trips. After the second trip, the Note 51 · The number of men from the 1st Division evacuated to Cebu was estimated to be as follows: 1st Division Headquarters, 73; 1st Infantry RegimeNote 52 · From 20 January on, the remaining Japanese forces stayed in the Villaba sector, hoping that succor would come. On 20 January General TomochiNote 53 · The liberation of Leyte had been accomplished at no slight cost. During the peak month, January 1945, there were 257,766 American Army, inclNote 54 · It is impossible, with data now available to determine with any degree of exactitude the number of Japanese who participated in the campaignNote 55 · Organization Total Killed Wounded Missing Total 15,584 3,504 11,991 89 Sixth Army Troops 961 141 831 317 Eighth Army Troops 404 61 340 3 X CNote 56 · The Japanese historians of the Leyte operation estimate that the total strength of their army ground troops was 70,000 men.32 General TomochNote 57 · The Americans had established an air base in the midst of the Japanese-held Philippine Islands—a base within medium bomber range of Luzon, tNote 58 · Every soldier must expect to sacrifice his life in War, Only then has his duty been done; Be thankful that you can die at the front, Rather Note 59 · Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp. 34—39. ↑
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