Chapter IV · The Return

For more than two years the high command of the Southwest Pacific had anticipated the promised return to the Philippines. That objective had governed nearly all of the planning and most of the earlier invasions. Now the day had arrived. Plans had been made and troops and cargo were aboard ships. The fleets of the Pacific Ocean Areas and the Southwest Pacific Area were about to join forces in a mighty assault against the Philippines.

The Convoy Forms

That part of the VII Amphibious Force which carried the 24th Infantry Division and the Sixth Army Service Command assembled at the harbor of Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea. In this force were over 470 ships, ranging in size from small rocket-launching craft to 5,000-man troopships, loaded and now waiting for the message to weigh anchor and head for the Far Shore, as Leyte was designated. They were scheduled to pick up that part of the force which was carrying the 1st Cavalry Division from Manus Island and then rendezvous with the III Amphibious Force.

XXIV Corps Afloat

In the early morning hours of 13 September the headquarters of XXIV Corps at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii, was awake and active. Breakfast was served at 0330, and all men who had been informed the day before that they were to embark for an unknown shore shouldered their barracks bags and carried them to waiting trucks. By 0700 the men had been loaded on the trucks, which took them to the narrow-gauge Oahu railroad. In flat cars they traveled some twenty miles to Honolulu Harbor. The usual seeming delays followed, but eventually the hot, tired, and perspiring headquarters men boarded the George F. Clymer and were assigned bunks. The Clymer was but one unit of a large convoy that stretched toward the horizon in every direction. At 1115 on 15 September the convoy got under way for a destination believed to be Yap. As the ships departed, word was received that the Yap operation had been canceled and that Leyte was to be their destination. For the men on board, life fell into the monotonous routine common to all transports. Reading, card and dice games, eating, sleeping, and interminable “bull sessions” helped to pass the time.

Composition of the Convoy

After forming, the convoy proceeded toward the target. At this time a disquieting report was received from the meteorologists on board the ships: a typhoon was headed toward the Leyte Gulf area. Such a disturbance could be fatal to the expedition. A severe storm did in fact lash the gulf area from 14 through 17 October, but it gradually abated and the morning of A Day, 20 October, was clear. This favorable weather augured well for a successful landing.

Softening the Target

Early Strikes

On 4 September the first aerial reconnaissance flights were made over Leyte. During the period 9–14 September, Admiral Mitscher launched a large-scale, carrier-based air assault against the Japanese air defenses in the Philippine Islands in order to protect the Palau and Morotai landings. On 9 September aircraft from the carriers attacked airdromes and installations in the Mindanao area, destroying 60 aircraft on the ground and 8 in the air. On 12 September the attack was directed against the Visayan Islands. Of an estimated air strength of 225 aircraft in the sector, 125 were destroyed on the ground and 75 in the air. During the night of 12 September the Japanese flew in reinforcements from Luzon. A Third Fleet strike on 13 September against the reinforced air strength destroyed an estimated 135 aircraft on the ground and 81 in the air. On the 14th, the Third Fleet planes encountered no enemy air opposition but destroyed from 10 to 15 aircraft on the ground. The air strength which the enemy had conserved for an anticipated American invasion was thus decimated. About 500, or approximately 57 percent of the 884 aircraft believed to be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed. This successful knocking out of the Japanese air strength in the Philippine Islands was an important factor in the decision to speed up the landing at Leyte by two months.

On 21 September Central Pacific carrier-based aircraft directed their attention to the Luzon area. In spite of their vigorous defense of the Luzon airfields, the Japanese lost an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground. These included not only combat aircraft but also reconnaissance, transport, and training planes. The remaining air strength in the area was estimated to be 350 aircraft, of which 10 percent were in Mindanao, 20 percent in the Visayan Islands, and 70 percent in Luzon.

Air and Naval Action in the Formosa Area

On the evening of 13 October the American heavy cruiser Canberra was torpedoed eighty-five miles off Formosa. Admiral Halsey kept his forces in the area another day in order to afford protection to the Canberra. Attacks, therefore, continued against enemy aircraft, airfields, and installations. By this time, Japanese reinforcements had arrived. On the evening of 14 October an aerial torpedo hit the heavy cruiser Houston.

Admiral Halsey decided to capitalize on the damage inflicted on the two cruisers. He ordered two task groups, which included the battleships, to retire eastward out of sight; he sent another of the task groups to conduct intermittent air raids against northern Luzon; and he assigned the remaining task group to protect the crippled Canberra and Houston. Halsey instructed this last task group to send out messages in the clear begging piteously for assistance. He hoped that by this ruse, which he called the “Lure of the Streamlined Bait,” the Japanese fleet would be led to believe that this task group was all that remained of the task force and would therefore sweep down for the kill. The two task groups which had retired eastward would then appear and engage the enemy. The Japanese swallowed the bait and dispatched destroyers and cruisers toward the “crippled” American force. Unfortunately, their search planes uncovered the two task forces off Formosa, and the Japanese surface ships hastily withdrew.

Realignment of Air Support

The carrier force of the Seventh Fleet was to bear the brunt of the tactical air support. By the afternoon and night of 17 October the weather had cleared, and flying conditions were perfect as the carriers moved into their operation areas the following morning. The force was divided into three units: one unit operated in the southern part of Leyte Gulf to protect the landings at Panaon Strait; another operated near the entrance to the gulf in order to support the landings of the Southern Attack Force at Dulag; and the last operated southeast of Samar Island to support the landings of the Northern Attack Force at Tacloban.

Japanese Plan of Defense

The air blows on the Philippines served as a warning that the Americans were ready to return to the Islands—an event long expected by the Japanese. By the end of June 1944, the Japanese military situation had considerably worsened. The outer circle of Japan’s perimeter had been pierced and the impetus of the American drive showed no signs of slackening. (Map 4)

The Japanese strategy was simple. Japan wished to remain in the war, and to do so she must at all costs keep open the lines of communication to the sources of her raw materials in the Netherlands Indies.

The Philippine Islands were under the jurisdiction of the Southern Army, whose command organization was extremely complex. (Chart 3) The supreme commander was Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi. There were four area armies in the Southern Army: the 2d Area Army occupied Netherlands New Guinea, thence west to Timor; the 7th Area Army was at Singapore; the Burma Area Army was at Rangoon; and the 14th Area Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, was in the Philippines with its headquarters at Manila. The Southern Army also had two air armies and three garrison armies: the 3d Air Army in Singapore; the 4th Air Army, consisting of two air divisions in the Philippines and one air division in western New Guinea; and a garrison army stationed in Thailand, another in French Indochina, and a third in Borneo. The commander of the 14th Area Army maintained a staff liaison with the 4th Air Army but otherwise had no control over it.

MAP 4 C. A. Frost

SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC

Mid-October 1944

Chart 3—Japanese Army Organization of Major Units for the Leyte Operation

Plans for the 14th Area Army

The Japanese occupation troops of the Philippine Islands had grown soft and had “no particular will to fight.” In the spring of 1944, there were only minor units available to set up an organized defense.

Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax.

GEN. TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA

LT. GEN. SOSAKU SUZUKI

The Suzu Plan

On 17 August General Suzuki issued the Suzu orders for the defense of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao by the 35th Army. The 100th Division was to protect the Davao area on Mindanao while the 16th Division would defend Leyte. Most of the 30th Division and two infantry battalions were made mobile units which could be rushed to annihilate the American force wherever it landed. However, if the Americans landed simultaneously on Davao and Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division was to be sent to Davao and the other mobile units would go to Leyte.

Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, commanding the 16th Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro.

In October the 4th Air Army issued a plan for anticipated operations. In co-operation with the Army and the Navy, the 4th Air Army would attempt to destroy the American forces when they struck the Philippines. The Army air force in concert with the naval air units would try to destroy carrier-based planes and air bases. In operations against the American fleet, the Army and Navy air units were to have “a unified and tactful commitment.” If the naval air units could not co-operate the Army air force was to venture a surprise attack with a few planes. Dusk, night, and dawn attacks were to be made against Allied air bases and all means exerted to foil Allied attempts to establish advance bases in the Philippines. The main strength of the fighter units was to move into the central and southern Philippines in order to destroy the principal American landing force. The mission of the Japanese 4th Air Army, operating from Mindanao, Celebes, and northern Borneo, would be restricted to checking the current attempts on the part of the Americans to establish bases on Halmahera and western New Guinea and the destruction of the planes there. For this purpose the Japanese air force would use bases in the southern Philippines.

Japanese Navy Plans

Securing the Channel Approaches

Landings of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion

As Company D was moving along the coast of Suluan Island, naval fire blasted away at the extreme northwest coast of Dinagat Island. At 0900 the first assault waves of the 6th Rangers, minus Companies D and B, started for the beach. Although coral reefs approximately one hundred yards offshore grounded the boats so that the men had to wade the remainder of the distance, the companies were all ashore by 1230. No Japanese were on the island and the troops accomplished their mission, the erection of a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the movement of the main portion of the convoy.

PATROL OF COMPANY F, 6TH RANGERS, at Desolation Point (above), and investigating a native village on Dinagat Island (below).

Mine Sweeping

Underwater Demolition Teams

The naval plans for the amphibious phase of the operation contemplated the use of seven underwater demolition teams—three to cover the northern coast beaches and four to cover the southern beaches. The teams, starting A minus 2 (18 October), were to locate underwater obstructions and detonate mines. On 18 and 19 October the underwater demolition teams made a reconnaissance of the landing areas, accompanied by destroyers which bombarded the shores. The two days’ reconnaissance disclosed no underwater obstacles or mines in the vicinity of the proposed landing beaches.

The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf

Naval plans called for bombardment of the enemy-held shores on A minus 2 (18 October), but because the water areas had not been completely swept for mines by that time, ships could not reach the bombardment area. On A minus 1, bombardment was chiefly for the purpose of providing effective support and coverage for the underwater demolition teams. However, many of the defenses and installations of the enemy on or near the landing beaches, including buildings and supply dumps, were neutralized or destroyed.

Through the night of 19–20 October, destroyers near the shore continued to shell the Japanese forces on land. The American forces were safely within Leyte Gulf—A Day had arrived.