Note 13 — Chapter I · The Strategic Plan

With respect to bypassing objectives prior to the seizure of Formosa, MacArthur thought it would be “unsound” to bypass the Philippines and launch an attack across the Pacific directly against Formosa—an attack which would have the benefit of no appreciable land-based air support and which would be based upon the Hawaiian Islands, 5,100 miles away. In his opinion it was essential to occupy Luzon and establish land-based aircraft thereon before making any move against Formosa.13 Nimitz stated that in a series of informal discussions between his and MacArthur’s planning officers, the latter anticipated the seizure in early September of Morotai Island, 300 statute miles southeast of Mindanao. This was to be followed in late October by a limited occupation of the Sarangani Bay area on Mindanao, which was to be used primarily as a base for short-range aircraft. The major operation was to be the occupation of Leyte about 15 November. Nimitz thought that this timing was “optimistic.” He felt that the critical and decisive nature of the Leyte operation required “practically all available covering and striking forces, fire support forces, and all available assault shipping.” If successful, however, the Americans would achieve air supremacy over the Philippines. Therefore, since the inclusion of the Leyte operation with that of Mindanao would expedite subsequent operations, Nimitz considered it “advisable.”14