THIRD CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 2)

These are the fixed principles and regulations by one or all of which our navigation and commerce can only be promoted, and must never be deviated from, when adopted in favor of any one nation whatever—unless it be in return for some special advantage granted to us by any particular nation as an equivalent. Hitherto, our Government has proceeded to distinguish foreign ships, only by making them pay greater tonnage and duties than our own. If circumstances required it, and the time is judged a seasonable one, I shall be willing to proceed further.

Let us examine what advantages we enjoy in consequence of any commercial treaties we have already formed, for the propositions before us are proposed to affect only those nations with whom we have no treaties. We have commercial treaties with Prussia, Sweden, France, and Holland, and in the dominions of neither of those powers have our ships or the produce of this country (except in the single article of our oil in France) been admitted on any more favorable terms than the ships or produce of any other nation; and for this obvious reason, because our treaties only ensure the advantages they may grant to the most favored nation; and, being circumstanced in such a manner as not judging it for their interest to distinguish any one by its favors, we are left only in the enjoyment of a trade with them on the terms common to all other nations. This being the case, I would not give one farthing to have like treaties formed with every other nation, for they have not been, and never can be, of any service to us; if we expect to derive any advantage from commercial treaties, we must stipulate for some certain good, for some other good which we may grant them in return.

Mr. Clark differed from many members who had spoken before him, in the view they took of the subject; he conceived it ought to be considered in a political light. We had many wrongs to complain of, and we should endeavor to obtain redress. The English have violated our treaty, just after it was ratified, by taking away our negroes, and since by holding our posts; they have also set the savages on our backs, and have not they let loose the Algerines upon us? Shall we sit still and bear it? How can we help it? it is asked. They will retaliate, we are told. How retaliate? Will they refuse to sell us their manufactures? He remembered that, even in old times, a non-importation agreement made them repeal their stamp act. We have surely as well now as we had then a right not to buy their goods; we don't want to cram our provisions down their throats, or to force them to buy our lumber. During the non-importation agreement, we did not perish with cold; we found, even then, that among ourselves we could make wherewith to clothe ourselves; we are surely as able to do it now. We then gained our point; we should now be much more powerful with the same weapon: many of her manufacturers are already starving for want of employment. We should add greatly to their distress, and soon bring the Government to their senses, and they will be glad to enter into a commercial treaty with us.

The balance of trade with Great Britain is much against us; and by carrying to Portugal and Spain what we send to them, we should receive cash in return. France will not always be in a storm, and a supply of the manufactured articles we want may soon be received from that quarter.

He did not see to what purpose calculations three hours long had been brought forward. It was very well for merchants to calculate in their counting houses; but he conceived the Legislature should determine the question upon political considerations. He concluded by remarking, that he believed by this time the committee must pretty clearly see that he was in favor of the resolutions.

Mr. Parker considered the resolutions on the table as indefinite and unintelligible. If revenue is the object, we should remember the remark of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of taxation, two and two do not always make four, but sometimes only one. He thought there was a jarring in the third resolution, which contradicted the first. The leading clause of the first resolution, which has occasioned so long a debate, is in these words: "That the interest of the United States would be promoted by further restrictions and higher duties, in certain cases, on the manufactures and navigation of foreign nations employed in the commerce of the United States, than those now imposed." The third resolution which Mr. P. referred to, is in these words: "That the duty on vessels belonging to the nations having commercial treaties with the United States, ought to be reduced to —— per ton." The resolutions meant either too much, or nothing. He would move to amend the first resolution, but that he hoped it would be altogether cast aside.

Mr. S. Smith (of Maryland) rose and apologized to the committee for presuming to intrude upon them a second time by the delivery of his sentiments. He said that a personal attack had been made yesterday upon him in that House. It had met him out of doors, and had gone into the world. After he had done speaking yesterday, a member had risen, and held forth as a fundamental observation, that "gentlemen possessing capitals of their own were in favor of the propositions; but that dealers upon credit were against them." When this remark was made, as he had but just sat down from delivering his negative to the resolutions, he could not help thinking himself aimed at as one of those dealers upon credit. [Here the member referred to rose, and solemnly declared that a personal allusion to Mr. Smith had never entered his mind.] Mr. S. went on to observe, that the whole assertion was erroneous. The merchants of America are men of liberal sentiments—more so, he believed, than merchants of any other part of the world. They are not to be biased by the petty motives of interest, in prejudice to the public interest of their country. The gentleman whom he referred to had spoke of an alarming British influence in some of the commercial cities of America. He had alleged that merchants, by their connection with Britain, would be under its influence; but there was no such thing. In this country, merchants studied the constitution, and were attached to it. In other countries, they minded only profit. As a reflection had been thrown on merchants who dealt upon credit, he should take leave to observe that credit was a very good thing. As to himself, he had before the war began, acquired, by his industry, as much property as placed him beyond the necessity of credit. By the war he was reduced to nothing. After the peace, he again began as he set out at first. By the same industry and the same talents, he had once more acquired independence. By the British buccaneers, he had lost as much, since the present war began, as the gentleman to whom he rose in reply, would think a tolerable fortune for dividing among his sons; yet he could still spare time from his business for the service of his country.

The question was then taken to postpone the subject to the first Monday in March next; and it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 51, nays 47, as follows:

Yeas.—Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, Thomas Blount, Thomas P. Carnes, Gabriel Christie, Abraham Clark, Isaac Coles, Henry Dearborn, George Dent, William Findlay, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Nicholas Gilman, Christopher Greenup, Andrew Gregg, William B. Grove, George Hancock, Carter B. Harrison, John Heath, Daniel Heister, John Hunter, William Irvine, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, Alexander Mebane, William Montgomery, Andrew Moore, Peter Muhlenberg, Joseph Neville, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Nathaniel Niles, Alexander D. Orr, Josiah Parker, John Patton, Andrew Pickens, Francis Preston, Robert Rutherford, Thomas Scott, John S. Sherburne, John Smilie, Israel Smith, Thomas Spring, Thomas Tredwell, Philip Van Cortlandt, Abraham Venable, Francis Walker, Benjamin Williams, and Joseph Winston.

Nays.—Fisher Ames, James Armstrong, John Beatty, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Lambert Cadwalader, Thomas Claiborne, David Cobb, Peleg Coffin, Joshua Coit, Jonathan Dayton, Samuel Dexter, Thomas Fitzsimons, Uriah Forrest, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Samuel Griffin, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Samuel Holten, John Wilkes Kittera, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, Francis Malbone, Joseph McDowell, William Vans Murray, Jeremiah Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Zephaniah Swift, Silas Talbot, George Thatcher, Uriah Tracy, Jonathan Trumbull, John E. Van Allen, Peter Van Gaasbeck, Peleg Wadsworth, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Artemas Ward, John Watts, Paine Wingate, and Richard Winn.

Monday, January 20.

Algerine Affairs.

The Committee of Ways and Means, appointed, pursuant to the resolutions of the House, on the communications from the President of the United States relative to Algiers, brought in a report, which was twice read, and referred to the Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union.

Ordered, That it be printed for the use of the members.

The report states that the naval force for the protection of the trade of the United States, shall consist of four ships of forty-four guns each, 18 and 9 pounders, and two of twenty guns each. The aggregate sum wanted for this purpose is estimated at six hundred thousand dollars; to raise which, one per cent. additional duty is proposed to be laid on imported goods now paying seven and one-half per cent.; five per cent. additional on stone, marble, &c.; and on all stone and earthenware, three cents additional; on salt, per bushel, six cents additional, per ton, on all vessels of the United States employed in foreign trade; and twenty-five cents additional, per ton, on all other vessels.

On motion of Mr. Fitzsimons, an addition was made to the Committee of Ways and Means; so that it now consists of a member from every State, who are to make another report respecting the fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States.

Ordered, That Mr. Gilman, Mr. Watts, Mr. Orr, Mr. Patton, Mr. Baldwin, and Mr. Israel Smith, be added to the committee appointed to report to this House the naval force adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs, together with an estimate of the expense, and the ways and means of defraying the same.

Tuesday, January 28.

French Refugees.

A petition of Peter Gauvain and Louis Dubourg, in behalf of the French refugees of Cape François, now at Baltimore, was presented to the House and read, praying that Congress will speedily decide on the memorial of the committee appointed by the Legislature of Maryland, to draw for, and distribute, the moneys granted by that State for the relief of the French emigrants from the Island of St. Domingo.

Mr. Murray moved that it should be referred to the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, along with the report of the select committee upon it. He thought it would be an act of humanity to relieve the persons mentioned in the petition. And if that was improper, he thought that the next greatest act of humanity which could be done, was to relieve them from suspense.

Mr. Clark was of opinion that the matter should be instantly taken up, as the fund for their relief expired on the 2d of February next.

Mr. Hunter, from South Carolina, mentioned a remarkable exertion of benevolence respecting persons of this kind which had taken place in that State. The motion was agreed to, and the House directly resolved itself into a committee on the question.

It was then moved and seconded, that the President be authorized to pay $10,000 of the public money for the use of the refugees, and to negotiate the payment of it, with the Ministry of France.

Mr. Boudinot was convinced, that, by the constitution, the House had a right to give it in the first instance. He considered the committee as too confined, and thought that it should have comprehended all the people of this sort in North America. Many of these people since winter set in, must have perished of cold and want in the streets of Philadelphia, but for the benevolence of some well-disposed people. He urged the committee, in the most pathetic language, to extend immediate and effectual relief.

Mr. S. Smith was confident that Congress would be repaid with thanks by the Republic of France. He said that a supply of powder and ball had been sent from one of the Southern States to St. Domingo, and that the price had been punctually and thankfully repaid. Santhonax and Polverel had been recalled, who were the authors of all the mischief that had happened. The refugees expected to return to their settlements before the first of May, and they would then be very able and very willing to repay the money themselves.

Mr. Smilie recommended the entering into a negotiation with the French Ambassador, for securing payment of what sum should be voted.

Mr. Clark hoped that the motion would instantly pass. In a case of this kind, we were not to be tied up by the constitution. Were Algerines cast upon the mercy of America, in such a situation, he would pay them the same tribute of humanity. The French Ambassador had restricted his services to a particular class of people. It was not the business of the House, whether the refugees at Baltimore were democrats or aristocrats. They were men; and, as such were entitled to compassion and to relief.

Mr. S. Smith, in reply to Mr. Smilie, said, that Mr. Genet, when solicited on behalf of these people, made answer that he was not authorized on the part of the Republic to give them any thing, but sent them $2,000 from himself.

Mr. Smilie replied that Mr. Smith had mistaken him; he did not wish to seek money from Mr. Genet. But he thought it would be singular to give away so large a sum, without endeavoring to secure the approbation of the French Minister, as a step towards repayment.

Mr. Dexter had formerly entertained scruples, but he now approved the motion.

Mr. Nicholas did not approve the motion in its original shape, nor did he like it better for its being now altered into a motion for authorizing the President to pay the money. Mr. N. expressed, in the strongest and most unequivocal language, his compassion for the sufferers; but, as he had not seen a way pointed out of relieving them, agreeably to the constitution, he recommended a shorter one. Out of the liberal compensation which the members of that House received from the country, he thought that the sum wanted might easily be subscribed. He did not know whether the Republic would thank us for helping them; perhaps they might be accounted rebels.

Mr. Fitzsimons proposed a second amendment of the original motion.

Mr. Nicholas replied: If this thing goes down at all, it should be as an act of charity, and marked in giving, that it is going beyond our power, but that, from a knowledge of the universal wish of our constituents, and a sense of our general obligations to France, we have granted the money.

Mr. Scott pressed for the relief in reference to the citizens of Baltimore. If they were invaded by an army, we certainly would assist them; and where is the difference, (added Mr. S.,) whether they be an army of fighters, or an army of eaters. We must relieve them, to be sure.

Mr. S. Smith said that these distressed people were all women and children, except three old men. The boys who were old enough, had been bound apprentices. The men had been enlisted by the advice of Mr. Genet, who said the Republic wanted recruits. He had likewise obtained two ships for five hundred of the refugees who wanted to go to France. Genet was able to do nothing more for them, as the $2,000 that he gave, were out of his own pocket. It had been alleged that there was no precedent for relieving these people. He mentioned two: The Americans in captivity at Algiers had been assisted by the British Consul. Some years ago, the crew of an American vessel had been shipwrecked on the coast of Portugal. They were assisted with the utmost generosity by a private gentleman. In both cases, Congress thankfully repaid the money advanced. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nicholas) had offered his salary, but the idea had not been supported, so that it went for nothing. And are we (said Mr. S.) to stand up here, and tell the world that we dare not perform an act of benevolence? Is this to be the style of an American Congress? The gentleman from Virginia had said that perhaps these people would be considered as traitors by the Republic. Were women and fatherless children to be regarded as traitors? Mr. S. was extremely affected, and apologized more than once to the House for the warmth with which he spoke. He said that himself and several others who had witnessed the scene of distress, were surprised; the gentleman did not feel as they did.

Mr. Madison possessed constitutional scruples. He thought that the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. S. Smith) would not have injured his cause by a greater moderation of language, nor his credit for benevolence by not saying that his sympathy arose chiefly from being an eye-witness.

At last, the Speaker proposed to the committee an amendment, which met the ideas of the members, and the resolution passed, as follows:

Resolved, That a sum not exceeding —— dollars be appropriated for the support of such of the inhabitants of St. Domingo, resident within the United States, as shall be found in want of such support.

That a regular account of the moneys so expended be kept; and that the President of the United States be requested to obtain a credit therefor, in the accounts between the French Republic and the United States.

Ordered, That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill in conformity with the foregoing resolution, and providing for the due application of the moneys aforesaid; and that Mr. Ames, Mr. Tracy, and Mr. Dent, be the said committee.

Thursday, February 6.

War with Algiers.

The resolution being read for building four ships of 44 guns and two ships of 20 guns—

Mr. Madison rose to inquire whether there was in the public stores of the United States, a sufficient quantity of cedar and live oak for building the proposed six vessels? He was answered that there was not. Mr. M. then observed, that it was evident this fleet could not be ready for effective service in the course of the present year. He imagined that there was another resolution, precedent as to the time of voting it, which ought to be before the committee. The resolution to which he alluded, was that assigning a sum of money to buy a cessation of hostilities from the Regency of Algiers. He was of opinion that the project of fitting out an armed squadron was liable to many solid objections. There were two points of light in which this subject might be surveyed. The first of these was, whether the Algerines acted from their own impulse in this matter? In that case, they were known to be in the habit of selling a peace; and, if they are willing to do so, he fancied that it might be purchased for less money than the armament would cost. On the other hand, if they do not act from their own impulse, but upon the instigation of Britain, we may depend upon it that they cannot be bought. Britain will keep them hostile. There is infinitely more danger of a British war from the fitting out of ships than from the resolution on the report of the Secretary of State. The distance which the ships would have to sail is not less than three thousand miles, and their number is too small for a decisive advantage. The combined powers would embrace the equipment of these ships as an excellent opportunity to pick a quarrel with the United States. Mr. M. expressed his doubts with regard to the propriety of this measure, because the expense would be immense, and there was no certainty of reaping any benefit from it.

Mr. Clark was anxious to state his doubts on this subject, that gentlemen, who, by their habits of life, had met with opportunities of better information than he possessed, might correct him where he was wrong. In the first place, the ships would be too small in point of number to be of any kind of importance, amidst the numerous navies of Europe. The distance from any friendly port, where, in case of accidents, they might repair, was likewise very great. It was to be expected that, when they fell in with British ships of war, that the latter would endeavor to search them for prohibited cargoes, and for seamen, because they were in the practice of impressing their own countrymen wherever they could find them. This would produce a quarrel. There was a scheme which occurred to him, and which he judged would be less expensive and more effectual. This was, to hire the Portuguese to cruise against the Algerines. He understood that the Court of Lisbon desired to keep her ships of war in actual service. The British have been in the habit of building frigates for the service of the Algerines, and, as he was informed, mariners, at a distance upon sea could distinguish in what country vessels were built by their construction. Hence it would be difficult for the captain of an American frigate to ascertain at sea a British ship of war from an Algerine. He had an objection to the establishment of a fleet, because, when once it had been commenced, there would be no end of it. We must then have a Secretary of the Navy, and a swarm of other people in office, at a monstrous expense. If we build six ships this year, we should next year find it necessary to build six more, and so on. The combined powers would find a much better pretence for a war by this armament than from the resolutions on the Report of the Secretary. Mr. C. closed his speech, which was heard with great attention, by observing that he rose principally to submit his opinions on this question as hints for those who were better qualified to form a judgment on the subject than himself.

Mr. Baldwin expressed his doubts as to every part of this subject. He had not been able to gain any information that was satisfactory. To block up the Mediterranean was, he believed, impracticable. Bribery alone could purchase security from the Algerines. Spain and Britain had always found this method the cheapest. He had much confidence in the gentleman who had been employed to go as an Envoy to Algiers from this country. He was a thorough man. Mr. B. had yet formed no decided opinion, and could wish to suspend his judgment till he learned the issue of the present application to the Dey. If bribery would not do, he should certainly vote for equipping a fleet.

Mr. Nicholas feared that we were not a match for the Algerines. A small number of sailors were sufficient to navigate one of their ships, and they had a militia to man them who were innumerable. He had not been able to form an exact opinion, but he was afraid that we were not a match for them by sea.

Mr. S. Smith rose chiefly to answer the interrogatories proposed by Mr. Clark, as to what harbors in Europe American ships could retire to for shelter? In an early part of his life, Mr. S. said that he had been in that part of the world, and could assure the House that there was no want of proper harbors to refit or obtain provisions in. The first he mentioned was Toulon; Marseilles, likewise, had a most excellent harbor, and there was no doubt that our vessels would be received there in the most friendly way, as the Algerines had lately declared war against the Republic of France. Spain had, likewise, several excellent ports—Malaga, Cadiz, Barcelona, and Ferrol. In all these the American squadron would be heartily welcome, and meet with all kinds of naval stores in the greatest abundance. Lisbon, also, was a fine harbor, and Oporto would be proper for the same purpose. So that, in case of accident, the armament had nothing to fear from wanting a place of retreat. He had no doubt that our vessels and our sailors would both be much superior to those of the Algerines. Their ships were old and crazy, and were presents made them by the powers with whom they are not at war. The American bottoms must be better; and our fleet will most likely have its station between Oran and Malaga, and, stretching across between those two ports, block up the mouth of the Straits. He adverted to the mistake of Mr. Baldwin, who had said that Spain never attempted to block up the Straits; the proper answer to which was, that Spain had an extensive coast, not less than four or five hundred miles, within the Mediterranean; so that she was quite differently situated, with regard to them, from America. Mr. S. mentioned, as a consolatory circumstance, that our profit was twice as great at present, in commerce, as it was before the war, in spite of all the spoliations committed by Britain, and by Spain; and, if the war continues, the profits will continue to multiply twice as fast as they would otherwise do. As an evidence of this fact, he mentioned the high price of wheat at present in this market, and asked whether any gentleman had heard of a price so high at this season of the year before? A gentleman (Mr. Nicholas) had spoken of an Algerine militia. Why, sir, (said Mr. S.,) I shall set down against them the American militia, and so that account is settled. He estimated that the whole American exports and imports, in round numbers, was twenty millions of dollars each; and that the extra insurance on account of the Algerines, from one end of the year to the other, would not be less than five per cent. to the whole, which was altogether two millions of dollars. From this Mr. S. inferred that it must be the very worst kind of economy to hazard an expense of two millions of dollars of insurance, for the sake of saving the charges of this armament. He did not see it improbable that the Algerines might very soon be on our coast, under the command of British or American renegadoes. It was nothing uncommon, among seamen, for two captains to be in the greatest friendship to-day, and plundering each other's vessels to-morrow. As an example of what Americans, in particular, are capable of doing, he repeated the history of a Mr. Cooper, of Virginia, who, some years ago, fitted out a ship for the express purpose of cruising against American vessels bound from or to the East Indies. He sent a person into the harbor of Algiers to solicit a commission from the Dey, and this envoy had very near been taken prisoner, as the Dey wanted to have made a slave of him. Mr. S. said that Mr. Cooper was known to be a man of courage, of perseverance, and as possessing that species of intellectual resources which qualify an adventurer for bold undertakings. He inferred, from this anecdote, that, if Mr. Cooper, a man of respectable birth and connections, could form such a scheme, what was not to be feared from the common set of seamen? He could not tell where the danger might end; nor did he know whether Philadelphia itself would be in safety. They might speak of their forts as much as they pleased; he knew their force, and did not much value it. The British had gone past them, and what was to hinder the Algerines, or such a man as Mr. Cooper, from getting past them? Were he on the coast of an enemy, he should not have the least scruple of engaging to run a ship by such forts, when there was in view so great a prospect as the plunder of Philadelphia. He strongly pressed the necessity of sending out the proposed fleet as quickly as possible.

Mr. Ames attacked the mover of the resolutions on the Report of the Secretary (Mr. Madison) for not displaying in the affair of the Algerines some part of the spirit which he had exerted on the other occasion. He thought it shameful to buy a peace, and that there could be no security, if we did. He recommended an armament. Portugal had shown herself friendly; and, referring to what Mr. Clark had stated, he was of opinion she would give our ships shelter in her ports. He thought that six stout frigates at the mouth of the Straits would do the business. He went at considerable length into Mr. Madison's resolutions, and condemned, upon various grounds, the arguments and conduct of the gentlemen who supported them. Yesterday, we were told that Britain durst not quarrel with America, and to-day she is represented as ready to do it. Our commerce is on the point of being annihilated, and, unless an armament is fitted out, we may very soon expect the Algerines on the coast of America.

Mr. Giles, in reply, said that Mr. Ames drew inconsistent pictures. One day he represented the American commerce at the summit of prosperity; the next, it was reduced to nothing. In defence of the commercial regulations, he reminded the House that Britain, and not Algiers, was the real object of alarm, and the real source of hostility. It was, therefore, proper to provide remedies against both of these illustrious confederates. Algiers was but the instrument, Britain was the cause. The reliance of Britain upon this instrument plainly showed that she was not equal to a war and a commercial contest. She had, therefore, turned loose the Algerines upon us—a fact which is pretty generally acknowledged on both sides of the House. It is, therefore, in the power of Britain to prevent the progress of these pirates. The commercial restrictions will reduce Britain to difficulty, and she will then, for the sake of friendship with America, be glad to put a stop to the Algerine ravages. Until some measure of this kind has been adopted, Britain, as she has raised up Algiers, will keep her up. The cheapest mode of getting peace will certainly be by embracing the commercial regulations. Mr. G. was averse to the proposal of a fleet. He agreed very much with the gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. Clark,) that it would be a better expedient to hire the fleet of Portugal. He considered the establishment of a maritime force as having a direct tendency to war; whereas, the commercial restrictions had the same tendency to peace. The sending of American armed ships into the midst of the fleets of Europe would certainly produce a quarrel. It had been well remarked, (by Mr. Clark,) that, if an attempt was made to search our ships of war, like our merchantmen, it would infallibly produce a public affront, and consequent hostilities.

Mr. Madison, in reply to some remarks which had fallen from Mr. Smith, respecting the present high price of wheat in the American market, said, that he had been informed of a place where wheat sold for four shillings and sixpence per bushel only, where the dollar passes for six shillings. Mr. M. supposed that Britain could render very essential service to the Algerines, without embarking in a war. She has not embarked in a war to the north-west of the Ohio, but she has done the same thing, in substance, by supplying the Indians with arms, ammunition, and, perhaps, with subsistence. He did not assert that Britain directed the plan of the Indian expeditions, for he had no explicit evidence that they actually did so. In the same way that they gave underhand assistance to the Indians, they would give it to the Algerines, rather than hazard an open war.

The committee now rose, without coming to the question.

Friday, February 7.

John Page, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

Algerine War.

THE NAVAL FORCE.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union. The Chairman read the resolution before the House for equipping a Naval force.

Mr. Madison thought this expedient unlikely to answer the purpose, and liable to many objections. Before the American squadron can be equipped, the truce between Algiers and Portugal must expire. When that expiration shall take place, she either will not renew the truce at all, or she will stipulate that the United States shall be comprehended in it. He would save the money intended for the fleet, and hire the Portuguese ships of war with it, as soon as the truce ends. He wished that the committee might reject the present motion, and when they did so, he would move a resolution, a copy of which he read to the committee. It was in substance:

"That the sum of —— dollars be provided to be employed in such a manner as should be found most effectual for obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers; and failing of this, that the sum should be applied to the end of obtaining protection from some of the European Powers."

Mr. M. considered the armament at present proposed, as quite too small to answer any efficient purpose.

A member here observed, that it would be hazardous to rely on Portugal; because, though the truce might expire in about six months, it would possibly be renewed at the end of that time, or converted into a peace.

Mr. Fitzsimons wished that gentlemen would pay some attention to attested facts, before they so abruptly declare that the six ships proposed by the committee to be built and put into commission, were incompetent to the end for which they were designed. The committee had bestowed considerable time in deliberating upon the best information which could be obtained, before they specified the force requisite to be employed, and they had been satisfied, that what was now proposed would be equal to the end. Here Mr. F. read a different statement of the ships of war in the service of the Regency of Algiers, at different times. One of these shows that in the year 1789, there were nine xebecs, from thirty-six to ten guns, and one ship of forty guns upon the stocks; but that several of the xebecs were laid up or unfit for service. A second estimate of the Algerine maritime force, had been transmitted by Mr. Humphries. He specified four frigates, two xebecs, and one brig. By advices still more recent, the fleet consisted of one vessel of forty-four guns, one of thirty-six, one of twenty-eight, three xebecs, and a brig. Mr. F. observed, that gentlemen had objected to the sending out an American fleet; that they could not always keep together. He reminded them, that from November to March or April, the corsairs of Barbary never go out to sea. There were two months during that time, when they were restrained by their religion from piratical excursions. The committee had been told, that the Portuguese are ready to assist us. There is ground to expect this assistance, but not to depend upon it. Two American frigates, along with the Portuguese vessels, would be fully equal to the task of curbing the Algerines. As to militia, he could not see of what consequence they could be in a naval contest. With regard to expense, he stated a very important fact. The United States import, annually, two millions of bushels of salt from these countries, which the Algerines will cut off from our commerce. The rise on that article must then be at least one dollar per bushel; which is a tax of two millions of dollars at once, or three times the expense of the armament. Probably, however, the loss may extend to four millions of dollars on this single article of salt, in one year only; a sum which would keep up the fleet a long time. We have been trying to buy a peace, but without success; and if we are not able to enforce it, the price of buying it must be so much the higher. As soon as Portugal is left to herself, she will certainly protect us, because it is much for her interest to do so. At present, she cannot, perhaps, from the influence of the combined powers. Mr. F., therefore, recommended an armament in the mean time.

Mr. Smilie objected to this measure, because it was unequal to the task. Britain would assist the Algerines underhandedly, as she did an enemy in another quarter, and would continue to do so. He did not think she was shameless enough to own it, but she would do it.[49]

Mr. Nicholas went on the same ground. He said that Britain had not been content with striking up a truce for Portugal, that the Algerines might be let loose on American commerce, but her Minister at the Court of Lisbon had endeavored to prevent our vessels from obtaining a Portuguese convoy. Not content with insuring a loss to America, she had striven to make that loss immediate. As to the duration of the truce, it could not last long, for the Queen of Portugal had, in fact, broken it already. She had declared that the trade to that country should pass unmolested; to which condition it was not likely that the Algerines would consent. The Portuguese nobility had clamored at the acceptance of a truce. So that, on the whole, it could hardly last long. A naval force was a very expensive affair. The greater part of the immense debt of England had been lavished on her navy. He was against building a navy.

Mr. Swift had been always sensible that the situation of this country was not fit for war. We have a very heavy debt; but still it is better to bear debts than depredations. A gentleman of extensive information (Mr. S. Smith, in yesterday's debate) had stated the rise of insurance as much less than the armament would cost. Britain had always more dependence on her navy, than on the immense sums that she pays to these barbarians. Mr. S. had no doubt that the proposed fleet would have its intended effect. He despaired of either buying a truce or buying an ally. As to the militia of Algiers, they could not be brought into action against frigates. He considered the charge of hiring the Algerines, as an unfounded accusation on the honor of Britain. He could not bring himself to believe that she was capable of a conduct so exceedingly disgraceful. He had no direct evidence to convince. It might be objected to this armament, that it would augment the national debt, and throw too much influence into the hands of the Executive Government. But the same objection might be started against every armament whatever.

Mr. Murray said, the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) yesterday, observed that he was not a little surprised that those who a few days since had appeared so alarmed at the phantom of war, should on this question appear so willing to meet it. He would remark that those gentlemen were alarmed at a shadow which appeared followed by the substance of war, and were unwilling to do any thing that might lead to a war that did not yet exist. But we were now at war with Algiers, and had no choice. They had been at war with the United States ever since the end of the Revolutionary war. The Spaniards and Portuguese kept them within the Mediterranean. Gentlemen who are averse to the report, hold up two substitute measures: one, which was suggested, and has been argued by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) is, that we ought to grant a sum to Portugal for her protection of our trade. The other is, that commercial regulations will accomplish our protection. He liked neither. The last, if permanent, will withdraw all temptation from Great Britain to interpose her good offices. The first is worse; it is subsidizing Portugal at the expense of our own people, and that too without security. Gentlemen would make it the interest of Portugal to make such breaches of truce as would occasionally withdraw protection, and oblige us to subsidize her higher. It would create a disgraceful dependence on a foreign power, and weaken the spirit of our marine; whereas, if you fit out frigates, you employ your money in nourishing the roots of your own industry; you encourage your own ship-building, lumber, and victualling business. He believed, that however true might be the suspicion of British interference in Indian affairs, and he feared it was too true, he did not believe the evidence as to Algerine interference strong enough to induce an argument against the report, under a supposition that as Great Britain had effected the truce, so she would aid Algiers against us. He thought so, because it was not now as much her interest as it was in times of peace. In times of peace, had she let loose the Algerines, her own navigation would have been enabled to carry for us, but now it would be molested by the French. He did not believe nations, more than persons, would do wrong purely out of evil designs, devoid of interest; the greatest villain would not. At present, their ships are liable to attack from the French, and he had it from good authority, that so far were the British from having advantaged themselves if they had been so base, that scarcely a British ship had appeared since in our ports. The ship frigates would be able to blockade the Gut of Gibraltar; the Algerines did not sail in fleets; they wanted plunder, not glory; when they discovered they had to get the first by hard fighting, they would listen to peace, accompanied by money. Spain, it was true, had purchased a peace, but there was an hereditary inveteracy against Spain, and a facility of attacking her shores which we need not fear; so it was her interest to buy a peace when war could bring her nothing but a glory that almost disgraced her armies; as to jealousy of power in the Executive, he hoped to see a proper equipoise in the powers of this Government; but, when proper occasions occurred, he hoped Congress would never refuse the adequate means to enable the Executive to discharge its constitutional duties.

Mr. Goodhue observed, that the committee had carefully looked over the statement of the marine force of Algiers for several years back, and had no reason to doubt that the six vessels would be equal to the purpose intended. There was no ground to suppose Algiers would have more force at present than she had during her war with Portugal. He had no doubt that the Algerines were let loose on the American commerce to prevent supplies going to France, and while the war lasts, we shall not be able to buy a peace. It is said, that the truce was but for a year, and in six months it will expire. He did not wish to depend on that, when the evil is so great. And why depend on Portugal? She is more under the influence of Britain than any other nation in Europe. When Britain has been at the trouble of stipulating a peace for Portugal, will she suffer that nation to assist us? Certainly not. Or is it wise to stand by and depend upon such a resource?

Mr. Madison said, that gentlemen thought so differently on this subject, and advanced arguments against his side of the question of such a different nature, that it was difficult or impossible to give them an answer. He then proceeded to quote the speech of Mr. Goodhue; when that gentleman rose to explain. Mr. M. then proceeded to notice the speeches of Mr. Fitzsimons and Mr. S. Smith. Both of these gentlemen were up more than once to explain, as having been misquoted. In a speech of considerable length, he was not suffered long to proceed without interruptions of explanations. This produced a scene of altercation. One circumstance, however, was mentioned by Mr. Fitzsimons that deserves particular notice. From April to December next, he said, the insurance on American ships from England and the rest of Europe, will not be less than twenty-five per cent. of their value on account of the Algerines.

The House now adjourned, without taking any question.

Tuesday, March 4.

Estimate of Appropriations.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the sums necessary to be appropriated for the service of the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four; and after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said report under consideration, and come to a resolution thereupon; which he delivered in at the Clerk's table, where the same was twice read, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That, for the support of the Military Establishment of the United States, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, there be appropriated a sum of money, not exceeding one million four hundred and fifty-seven thousand nine hundred and thirty-six dollars and one cent; that is to say:

For the pay of the Legion of the United States,$303,684 00

For subsistence,312,567 75

For forage,31,632 00

For clothing,112,000 00

For equipments for the cavalry,7,314 05

For horses for the cavalry,16,000 00

For bounty,5,000 00

For the Hospital Department,20,000 00

For the Ordnance Department,6,715 32

For repairs and articles directed to be made and purchased by the President of the United States,202,783 34

For defensive protection of the frontiers,130,000 00

For the Indian Department,50,000 00

For the Quartermaster's Department,150,000 00

For contingencies of the War Department,30,000 00

And for Invalid Pensions,80,239 55

——————

$1,457,936 01

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Trumbull, and Mr. Gillespie, do prepare and bring in the same.

Thursday, March 6.

Slave Trade.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill to prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the ports of the United States, Mr. Boudinot in the chair.

The two first sections of the bill were agreed to, with one alteration moved by Mr. Trumbull, which was to give the District Court as well as the Circuit Courts cognizance of the offence.

The third section which relates to the penalty &c., it was moved should be struck out. This motion was negatived. It was then moved to insert the word foreign before "ship or vessel;" which was agreed to.

The committee proceeded through the bill, which was reported to the House with sundry amendments; these were agreed to by the House, and the bill ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

Monday, March 10.

Algerine War.

Naval Armament.

Mr. Giles observed, that, from the sense of the House several times manifested on this subject, there remained no doubt but that the bill would pass. In that event, he most earnestly hoped that the success of the measure would, at least, equal the expectations of its advocates. Indeed, he hoped that their expectations would be disappointed and exceeded; for it did not seem to him that even they were very positive as to its full competency to the end proposed. He even wished that every ship could be furnished with the cap of Fortunatus and the shield of Hercules; for he was persuaded that, in the present state of things, some magical influence would be found essential to enable them to effect their undertaking. He observed, that, at present, the wisdom or folly of the proposed measure was mere matter of opinion; that the passage of the bill will furnish futurity with a complete experiment of its true character.

He intended to offer his reasons against the passage of the bill, not with a hope of making proselytes, but as a testimony of the real motives which influenced his opposition. With this view, he should only mention some of the general impressions produced on his mind by this subject, without fatiguing the House with minute exemplifications of them.

The subject had presented itself to him in two points of view—1st, as affording a protection to our commerce against the Algerine depredations; 2d, as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment.

He could not help premising that, in the course of discussion, the advocates of the bill had censured its opponents with a want of disposition for the protection of commerce, whilst they claimed a monopoly of all good intention towards this object. He did not mean to derogate from the good intention of the favorers of the bill, but he believed its opponents possessed as pure a zeal for the protection and due encouragement of commerce as its advocates. It is not a question whether commerce is, or is not, to be protected; but whether the plan proposed be the most effectual and the least exceptionable that can be devised for that purpose? The difference of opinion does not consist in the end to be produced, but in the means proposed to effect the end.

The first objection he should make to the bill would be, the obvious inadequacy of the means contemplated to effect the end proposed by them. The object proposed is an effectual resistance, not only to the whole present naval force of Algiers, but to their whole naval ability. The bill contains, in itself, essentially a declaration of war. Our calculations, therefore, should be extended to the utmost limit of the naval ability of the hostile nation. The means to be employed consist of four frigates of forty-four guns each, and two ships of thirty-six guns each. To decide with propriety upon the objection, this force should be compared with the naval ability of Algiers. He did not mean to go into a minute history of Algiers. He should only observe, in general, that it was a populous country; that it had furnished at one time one hundred thousand fighting men; that its power at this day was as great as at any preceding period; that they were a warlike people, accustomed to naval enterprises and desperate in naval engagements; that, for some time past, they had been subsidized for peace by almost every European nation. He could not help concluding, from these circumstances, that the naval ability of the nation either was or might, without any uncommon exertions, he rendered superior to four forty-four gun frigates and two thirty-six gun ships, the force contemplated by the bill; and, if the conclusions were just, the bill is unwise.

Mr. G. proceeded to consider the bill as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment. He said there was a clause in the bill authorizing the President to suspend all proceedings in the equipment of the armament, in case of a peace with Algiers, which gave him some consolation; but it did not altogether relieve his apprehensions from this operation of the measure, because he knew that a permanent naval establishment was a favorite policy with some gentlemen, and because the argument had been urged in favor of the present bill.

He observed that a permanent naval establishment could be recommended to the United States but from one or both of the following considerations: either upon the principle of entering into a competition for naval power with the Powers of Europe; or as affording security to the collection of our own revenue.

He thought the question of a permanent naval establishment was one of the most important which could be presented to the consideration of the House, and that the most serious consequences were necessarily connected with it. In the first place, he viewed the establishment of a navy as a complete dereliction of the policy of discharging the principal of the public debt. History does not afford an instance of a nation which continued to increase their navy and decrease their debt at the same time. It is an operation exceeding the ability of any nation. The naval competition of the Powers in Europe has produced oppression to their subjects and ruin to themselves. The ruin of the French Monarchy, he believed, might be ascribed very much to that cause. A navy is the most expensive of all means of defence, and the tyranny of governments consists in the expensiveness of their machinery. The expensiveness of the French Monarchy is the true cause of its destruction. The navy of France furnished the principal item of that expense. The navy produced expense, the expense exceeded the revenue, new contributions became necessary, the people saw the tyranny, and destroyed the tyrant. The same effect, by the same policy, will probably be produced in great Great Britain. The Government is not yet destroyed, but the people are oppressed, liberty is banished. The extensiveness of the Government is the true ground of the oppression of the people. The King, the Nobility, the Priesthood, the Army, and, above all, the Navy.

All this machinery lessens the number of the productive and increases the number of unproductive hands of the nation in Great Britain. The operation has been extended so far that the poor rates alone probably afforded a greater tax per capita than the whole taxes paid in the United States. He was astonished with these fatal examples before our eyes, that there should be any gentlemen who would wish to enter into this fashionable system of politics. He said the United States had already progressed full far enough into this system; for, exclusively of the ordinary expense of the Civil List, a debt had been funded upon principles of duration. An army had been raised, at an immense expense, and now there was a proposition for a navy. He observed that, for several years past, the appropriations for the support of the Military Establishment had exceeded a million of dollars per annum—from one million to one million and a half annually. He believed that, if the expense had been foreseen, there would have been more active efforts to have avoided it. It was a policy, at this day, very generally condemned; yet we are now to exhibit a counterpart of this policy upon the ocean, with this aggravation—that it will commence with greater certain expense, and with a more uncertain object. The system of governing by debts he conceived the most refined system of tyranny. It seems to have been a contrivance devised by politicians to succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both systems were tyrannical, but the objects of their tyranny were different. The system of feuds operated upon the person of the individual—the system of debts operates upon the pockets of the individual. In the feudal system, the tenant often received some indulgence and lenity from the martial generosity which generally characterized the lord. The lord was gratified with the acknowledgment of the tenant that he was a slave, and the rendition of a peppercorn as an evidence of it. The product of the tenant's labor was left for his own support. The system of debts affords no such indulgences. Its true policy is to devise objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the people in the least visible mode. It boasts not of economizing in calls upon the people for contributions. It boasts not of economizing in the objects of expenditure. It consults the obedience, and not the happiness of the people. There is no device which facilitates the system of expense and debts so much as a navy. And he declared, from that consideration, he should value his liberty at a lower price than he now did, if the policy of a permanent Naval Establishment should obtain in the United States.

Mr. W. Smith remarked, that though it was not probable any proselytes were to be expected at this late period of the business, and after so ample a discussion as the question had received in its different stages, yet he considered it necessary to make a reply to some of the various objections which had just been made to the passing of the bill. Many of those objections appeared to him totally inapplicable to the subject, which he should pass over in silence. If it were the design of the House to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy, merely for the idle purposes of vain parade, there would be force in some of the objections; but, as this was not the case, and as the measure was a measure not of choice, but of necessity, extorted by the pressure of unavoidable events, he did not feel their force in any respect. The question was, simply, whether our commerce required protection against the Algerine corsairs, and whether this was the best mode of protection. The first part of the question was admitted on all sides. For himself, he had always considered the second equally clear. But in the course of the discussion, various difficulties had been started against the mode of protection, and various substitutes had been proposed, as offering a remedy more prompt, more effectual, and less expensive. He would first consider the proposed substitutes for a naval armament, and then answer the objections to it. The substitutes were: 1st. To purchase a peace of the Algerines. 2d. To depend on Portugal breaking her truce with Algiers, and shutting up their cruisers within the Straits. 3d. To pass commercial regulations against Great Britain. 4th. To subsidize other nations to protect our commerce.

To these several substitutes, he might, in a few words, object that the first was impracticable, the second precarious, the third inoperative, and the fourth dishonorable.

Mr. S. next reviewed the principal objections to the bill. These were, he said, 1st. That the force contemplated was incompetent. 2d. That sending an armed force on the ocean would be the means of involving us in a war with some of the maritime powers. 3d. That we had no friendly ports in Europe, which our frigates could resort to for supplies or refitment. 4th. That the expense would exceed the object to be protected. 5th. That our trade would be deprived of the seamen required to man the frigates. 6th. That it was now so late in the season we could not protect our vessels the ensuing summer, and that some favorable events might occur before the frigates could be equipped, which would render them unnecessary. 7th. That this was the beginning of a Naval Establishment, which would hereafter involve this country in immense debts and maritime wars.

[To the arguments against a Naval Establishment, Mr. Smith answered:]

The dangers resulting from a large Navy Establishment, and the immense debts they have created in other countries, had been depicted, and the House had been warned against such evils. How a bill providing six frigates, which were to exist only during the war with Algiers, could excite an apprehension of a large and permanent navy, and an enormous debt, Mr. S. said he was at a loss to discover. The clause which authorized the President, in the event of a peace with the Regency of Algiers, to discontinue the armament, was a complete answer to all the reasoning which had been indulged on the subject of navies and debts. Admitting there had been no such clause, he did not feel the weight or applicability of the reasoning.

This country is peculiarly fitted for a navy: abounding in all kinds of naval resources, we have within ourselves those means which other maritime nations were obliged to obtain from abroad. The nature of our situation, and the navigating disposition of a considerable proportion of our citizens, evince still more the propriety of some Naval Establishment. Perhaps the country is not yet mature for such an establishment, to any great extent; but he believed the period was not far distant, when it would be. Sweden, with a population not greater than that of the United States, and with more slender resources, maintained a large navy. He saw no reason why the United States, with an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable national resources, might not, without ruin, do as much, or why the equipment of a squadron, inferior to that of any of the petty nations of Italy, should involve us in an insupportable expense.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 50, nays 39, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Fisher Ames, John Beatty, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Lambert Cadwalader, David Cobb, Peleg Coffin, Joshua Coit, Henry Dearborn, George Dent, Samuel Dexter, Thomas Fitzsimons, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Samuel Griffin, George Hancock, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Samuel Holten, John Wilkes Kittera, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, William Lyman, Francis Malbone, Peter Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, Josiah Parker, Thomas Scott, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Thomas Sprigg, Zephaniah Swift, Silas Talbot, George Thatcher, Uriah Tracy, Jonathan Trumbull, John E. Van Allen, Peter Van Gaasbeck, Peleg Wadsworth, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Artemas Ward, John Watts, and Richard Winn.

Nays.—Messrs. Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, Thomas Blount, Thomas P. Carnes, Gabriel Christie, Thomas Claiborne, Isaac Coles, William Findlay, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Christopher Greenup, William Barry Grove, Carter B. Harrison, John Heath, Daniel Heister, John Hunter, William Irvine, Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, Joseph McDowell, Alexander Mebane, William Montgomery, Andrew Moore, Joseph Neville, Anthony New, John Nichols, Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Francis Preston, John Smilie, Israel Smith, Thomas Tredwell, Philip Van Cortlandt, Abraham Venable, Francis Walker, Benjamin Williams, Paine Wingate, and Joseph Winston.

Thursday, March 27.

Sequestration of British Debts.

Mr. Dayton submitted the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That provision ought to be made, by law, for the sequestration of all the debts due from the citizens of the United States to the subjects of the King of Great Britain.

"Resolved, That provision ought, in like manner, to be made for securing the payment of all such debts into the Treasury of the United States, there to be held as a pledge for the indemnification of such of the citizens of the said States as shall have suffered from the ships of war, privateers, or from any person, or description of persons, acting under the commission of authority of the British King, in contravention of the law of nations, and in violation of the rights of neutrality."

Ordered, That the said resolutions be committed to a Committee of the whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into said committee.

Mr. Dayton then rose in support of his propositions. When he brought them forward he did not accompany them (he said) with many observations, because he was then laboring under indisposition. The same cause would render him very concise now.

The injuries and insults we have suffered from Great Britain, he conceived, need not be dwelt upon. They are well known, and it is universally acknowledged that we ought to adopt such measures as would screen us from a repetition of them, and secure to us reparation. The resolutions he had brought forward he intended as part of that system of defence and preservation, other portions of which had already received the sanction of the House. These resolutions, he conceived, would not be the least efficient part of that system.

He believed that, when the conduct of Great Britain is reviewed, it would be found that it is treating their subjects with great lenity to speak of sequestration only; we should be warranted in confiscating, for they have subjected our property to condemnation, without an appearance of an intention to indemnify.

As to restitution of the property of which we have been plundered on the high seas, it is impossible. It is condemned, sold, and scattered, and no hope can be entertained that they intend to indemnify our suffering citizens. If it had been their intention to indemnify, their Court, in explanation of the instruction of the 6th of November, would not have given orders to condemn vessels detained in suspense in the West Indies until that elucidation was received.

Since, then, restitution is impossible, and not a shadow of hope exists that indemnification will be granted; we have only to determine whether we shall give up the property of which we have been plundered, or claim it with effect—claim it, and enforce the claim, by showing that we have the means of retaliation within our power.

After the proceedings of the British towards us, he believed, we should have been warranted in confiscating the property now proposed to be sequestered, without negotiation. This would have been meting to them as they meted to us. If sequestration is hostility, as he had heard it called, what, he asked, is condemnation? Besides, they have impressed American citizens into their service. We have reason to believe, (he concluded by remarking,) from the negotiation of our Minister with Lord Grenville, from private information on the tables of Congress, and from the conduct of some of their officers high in command, that to make war on us is part of their system.

Mr. S. Smith said he always had wished for peace, as the first desideratum. With this view, agreeably to the wise recommendation of the President, he agreed to those measures calculated to put the country in a posture of defence. This was the best mode of securing peace. With the same view, he proposed an embargo to be laid, which would have drawn to our ports the remainder of our maritime possessions, and have left them no longer within the grasp of a nation whose only rule of right is the measure of her power. He still wished, as long as a shadow of hope exists, to secure the blessings of peace. With the resolutions now offered, he was of opinion that we might yet have peace; but, without them, we shall certainly have war. They will arrest twenty millions of dollars in our hands, as a fund to reimburse the three or four millions which we have been stripped of by that piratical nation, Great Britain, according to the instructions of that king of sea robbers—that leviathan, which aims at swallowing all that floats on the ocean—that monster, whose only law is power, and who neither respects the rights of nations nor the property of individuals! This character the nation he had mentioned had long deserved. Many proofs might be cited in support of the assertion. He would only refer to their conduct at St. Eustatia, when they robbed their allies, the Dutch, and their generals and admirals turned vendue-masters, and conducted the plundering, to collect rewards for their exploits. Is it from such a nation (he asked) that we are to hope for justice? They know not what justice is. It is said that they showed their love of justice when they so liberally compensated the Tories after their war with us. Though they despise traitors, yet self-interest will lead them to reward the treachery, to encourage a principle which may again be useful to them. Self-interest, then, and not justice, actuated them on that as on every other occasion.

Let us pass the resolutions, then send an envoy to Great Britain, and we shall have peace. We shall then be able to speak to them of their interest. But if war should be the inevitable issue, Americans, he was sure, would meet it like men, rather than submit to insult and suffer the honor of the country to be prostrated.

If we were able, while in infancy as a nation, to assert our rights, will it be said, that, now we have arrived at a state of manhood, we shall fear them? No! our young men burn for an opportunity to defend the liberty, rights, and property of their country. They will step out as one, and meet the event like men.

He read a quotation from Vattel, to show that a nation has a right to pay her citizens for losses inflicted by another nation, contrary to right, by confiscating the property belonging to the citizens of that nation. The tie of interest, he concluded by remarking, is the strongest tie we have upon Great Britain. Let us pass the resolutions, and that nation will never again give us cause to pass similar ones. The people out of doors will say that we have done right. The nations of Europe will rejoice to see this power, which is committing depredations on all nations, humbled. The resolutions, he observed, do not regard the property in the funds. To touch this is not one of the means of retaliation warranted by the law of nations. Public contracts should be sacred.

Mr. Boudinot said, he had not intended to take part in the debate at this early stage of it; but what had fallen from the member last up, convinced him that the House should not go into a consideration of the subject at this time. It should be considered with coolness, and all passions put out of the question.

No doubt we have a right to make reprisals, as the Legislature has a right to declare war; but he doubted whether the United States, in their present situation, would find it their interest to go into such measures. The authority read from Vattel by the member last up, he observed, made against that member's opinion. Vattel expressly says that reprisals should not be made on property intrusted to public faith. The debts of British subjects here are in that predicament. He had heard that gentleman, not long since, with pleasure, expatiate with warmth on the advantages of credit, especially to this country. Should that credit be destroyed (he asked) by destroying the confidence of foreigners in our faith? But, even if this retaliation is lawful, will it be the interest of the citizens, or rather of the Government, to take such a step at the present time? We have no doubt been cruelly treated; but we have made proper application for redress, and received an answer? We should first send a special envoy and insist on an immediate answer. This would be the mode of securing peace; at least, it offers the best chance of securing it.

The aggressions on our commerce made by Great Britain are no doubt enough to rouse any American's feelings; but the Legislature ought not to be swayed by passions; they should discuss the subject calmly and deliberately. He hoped the committee would rise and allow time, at least, to take the necessary measures of defence; for, could the Legislature justify to their constituents this step of retaliation, should immediate hostilities, warlike hostilities, be the consequence? To justify a measure of this kind time should be given for the defensive system adopted to be carried into operation.

Mr. Mercer next spoke. He owned the measures proposed appeared to him great and momentous, and, had he any powers of declamation, he should think it improper to give loose to them on a question of this kind. We should weigh well our interest, examine carefully the situation in which we stand, and determine calmly where we shall place our next step. The proposition is, to arrest, not to confiscate, the debts due to British subjects. From his recollection of the positions established by the best jurisprudence writers, no doubt remained in his mind that we have a clear right to secure to ourselves reparation in that way, and, in our predicament, confiscation even would be warranted, and by a point as firmly established as any principle which has the general practice of nations for a basis.

One of the latest writers on national law (Binkershoek) is of opinion that debts are property, as well as any thing else, and sees no reason why they should not, as well as other kinds of property, be seized to secure indemnity for injuries. This is the opinion of Wolfius, of Vattel, Grotius, and of his commentators. He could go on with a long list of authorities, and refer to actual treaties to show that it has been the practice of nations. Having established the right, he proceeded to consider the expediency of the propositions. Gentlemen, he hoped, did not wish that we should make a solemn declaration of war before we acted. This is no longer the custom among nations. It would be a pompous display of candor which no longer exists. Have any nations in the present European war, premised their operations by a declaration? No; their first step was to do all the injury in their power to their enemies. Then, we having taken what steps will best tend to our security, and give us the best hold of our enemy, let us not, however, lose sight of a settlement by negotiation. Let us show mankind that peace is our first wish. When we are thus prepared, let us step forward to an amicable negotiation. Let us call on the Executive to send forward some proper person to the Court of Great Britain, to assure them that we have a high sense of the injury done us; that we have it in our power to resent it, but wish to see the difference settled by receiving an indemnification. We shall thus make it their interest as well as duty to allow it. This he conceived to be the line of conduct we should adopt if we wished to preserve the Western Hemisphere from the scourges that desolate the Old World. By some such measure as that proposed, we should make their motives for peace more weighty, and we should give assurances of our amicable disposition, by showing that all we wish is a just compensation.

In a matter of this kind he was sensible of the danger of precipitation. The best mode of arresting the property proposed should be calmly weighed. He believed that something like the proposition made by Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, before the House resolved itself into a committee—a stop to all transfers of British property—would be proper as a preliminary step.

He concluded with some observations on the respect which nations, however weak, will command from their superiors in strength, by showing that they will not suffer imposition, by joining heart and hand in defence of their rights. This spirit, he was sure, animates Americans, and now their power is better able to keep pace with that spirit than when we humbled that nation. At that time we were in our infancy—an infancy by no means thriving under the trammels of the mother country—and, when they turned us adrift, and began their hostile spoliations, they carried with them all our means of defence; but now, thank Providence, we have spirit and power to defend ourselves. If the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) would modify his proposition, and make the term thirty days, it should have his assent in preference to that now before the committee.

Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) said, that the proposition he had read before the House went into committee was in the nature of an embargo on debts, securing them from transfer until the necessity of sequestering them more plainly appeared. The proposition did not then appear to meet the wishes of the House. When the committee should rise he would again bring it forward. The question now before the committee is, whether they will agree to a sequestration of British debts. He wished this object had not been coupled with the indemnification to our own citizens, because it is fairer to decide each question upon its own merits. That part of the resolutions which contemplates an indemnification may give a weight to the first part which it might not intrinsically deserve.

He made some observations on the propriety of cool deliberation on the present important subject. The passions should be banished, and calm reason more than ever courted. It requires all the wisdom of the Legislative body now to combine our national honor with our national safety. He had doubts on the propriety of the resolutions proposed, but acknowledged that the arguments used in their favor had great weight in his mind. If the situation of this country be compared with that of other commercial nations, the propriety of something like the present resolutions would appear more evident. When other commercial nations wish to quarrel with us, their navies enable them to seize our vessels, and we cannot retaliate in the same way. Then we must fly to such means of retaliation as are in our power. If they take our property of one description, and we cannot lay our hands upon the same kind, we must take any of theirs within our reach. This reasoning has, no doubt, great force; but the sacredness with which the modern usages of nations has shielded debts is a great bar to our proceeding in the present case. Contracts between individuals are now considered as out of the reach of governments, and it is the modern usage not to meddle with them. In the beginning of our late war, debts were not confiscated. The State of South Carolina, though certainly not wanting provocation, while confiscating all other property, left debts untouched, under the idea that private contracts are sacred. But this, in a case of war, and urgent necessity, might be overlooked; but if we are not in a state of war, perhaps meddling with private contracts might provoke it. Credit is certainly important to this country. We should consider how far the operation of the resolutions proposed would give a shock to it. Besides, they might have a tendency to involve us in future wars. We shall yet long be under the necessity of receiving certain supplies from Europe, and shall have debtors among us for those supplies. These debtors may at any time, when the burden weighs heavy, think of easing it by fomenting dissensions with the foreign creditor nation, in expectation that a confiscation of the debts may be an effect. It is true that, in such a case, they will not be exonerated. But it cannot be supposed that the government to whom the debts would be transferred could prosecute the recovery of them with as much ardor as an individual.

The gentleman last up had relied on the authority of ancient and foreign jurists. Some among this class of writers warrant putting prisoners to death—a principle which modern custom has put a stop to. They also, it is true, warrant the confiscation of debts; but Burlamaqui says this is not the practice of modern nations. None, or very few trifling examples can be cited, he believed, of a departure from this principle, in modern times, among nations where commerce is cherished. This country depends on commerce, and credit is one of the means by which it flourishes; we should, then, not endeavor to weaken it. If we are once over the barrier, by trifling extensions of the principle we may be carried to immoderate lengths, indeed. Some persons who are in favor of sequestering private debts, speak with horror of touching the public funds. For his part, he did not see much difference between confiscating private and public debts. The object is the injury of an enemy, and to retaliate for injuries. Again: if we go to war with Great Britain, it is probable we shall be involved with her allies, then will it be said, that we shall confiscate what the Dutch lent us at a time of distress or since the peace. The Dutch have bought largely in our funds. The same principle will lead us to lay our hands upon that property. It will be difficult to draw a line, if we admit the principle.

Under these impressions, if called upon to give his vote, he should now feel much embarrassment. It had been said that the adoption of the present resolutions would be a means of obliging Great Britain to do us justice; that it would strike a terror among the subjects of that country, and make them clamorous for peace. It might, he feared, have a very different effect exasperate them, and unite the people with the Government against us. Some further forbearance on our part may separate them. It will convince the people of Great Britain that we really wish for peace, and then, if war is the issue, the impression will be severely felt by that Government. We shall render the Administration very unpopular, and hasten its dismission for one more friendly to this country. He was of opinion this crisis was fast approaching.

He concluded by again adverting to his propositions for preventing the transfer of British debts, which he hoped would be considered as a sufficient provision in the present exigency, and would give time to deliberate on further measures, and to watch the course of events in Europe, which, he believed, would have great influence upon the conduct of Great Britain towards us, and probably bring forward the change in the Administration of Great Britain.

The committee now rose and reported progress.

Friday, March 28.

Sequestration of British Debts.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and took up Mr. Dayton's resolutions for the sequestration of debts due to British subjects.

Mr. Giles commenced his remarks by observing, that he had intended to have given a silent vote upon this question before the committee, and probably should not have altered that intention, if it had not been from the solicitous requests expressed yesterday by several gentlemen in the opposition, that the favorers of the proposed measure should furnish the committee with the reasons upon which it was founded. Although it appeared to him to be rather unreasonable that some gentlemen should be expected, not only to possess reasons for their own opinions, but to furnish reasons for others; and, although he did not conceive that the favorers of the measure were under any obligation to disclose the reasons inducing it, provided they thought proper to hazard its fate upon a silent vote, yet he was willing to indulge the gentlemen with presenting to them the general course of reflection which the subject had produced in his mind, and which had strongly suggested its propriety. He had, however, a more powerful inducement to disclosing his opinion, since the subject has become matter of discussion and its propriety doubted.

The measure is deemed a bold one, and pregnant with the most serious consequences; in all such cases, he was desirous that his responsibility to the United States in general, and to his immediate constituents in particular, would at all times be tested by the real motives which should influence his conduct.

Several gentlemen in the opposition had earnestly admonished the committee against the indulgence of their passions upon this subject, and recommended the exercise of cool and deliberate reasoning. He should not pretend to say how far such an admonition was necessary, or justified by the temper of the committee, but he believed it applied as strongly to the gentlemen who suggested the caution, as to those to whom it was addressed; and he hoped, in the course of the future discussion, the gentlemen would show an example in themselves of the precepts they had prescribed to others.

As to himself, Mr. G. declared that, impressed with the awfulness of the present crisis, he had never reflected upon a subject with more coolness; and, if he understood his own situation, his mind was never in a state more susceptible of conviction.

The proposed measure is expected to eventuate in a final explanation of the relative state of things between the United States and Great Britain. It will probably result, therefore, in an open hostility, with the usual appeal to arms, or in a peace, with all the rights of neutrality attached to it. For this purpose, the resolution proposes a sequestration of the debts due to the subjects of Great Britain, to be held as a pledge for the indemnification of the losses sustained by American citizens under the orders of the British King, in contravention of the laws of nations, and violation of every rule of morality and justice. In the course of debate, this subject seems to have resolved itself into two questions. First, as it respects the right of one nation to sequester the property of the individuals of another in any possible case. Second, the policy of exercising this right at this time, under the existing circumstances of the United States.

He presumed that a state of things might exist between two nations in which reprisal would not only become the right but the duty to the nation sustaining the wrong. This happens where one nation, without cause, forcibly seizes upon the effects of another, or of its citizens, and withholds them without restitution or compensation, and when the nation, whose effects shall be so seized and detained, shall possess no other means of indemnification. The right of reprisal in the injured nation, in such a case, grows out of its injury sustained, and its inability to redress itself in any other way.

The duty of the injured nation to make reprisals, is founded on self-preservation; and in case of the losses of its citizens, upon the promise of the protection of property sacredly made by the nation to its individual members.

This he believed to be the doctrine of the laws of morality and reason, and he knew it to be the doctrine of the laws of nations, which were, in fact, nothing more than the laws of morality and reason systematized and reduced to writing.

Believing this principle to be a just one, he would apply it to the existing state of things between the United States and Great Britain. Almost as soon as Great Britain had taken part in the iniquitous war against France, the Executive of the United States manifested their regard for peace, by proclaiming their existing state of neutrality, and recommending to their citizens, not only the observance of neutrality, but of impartial neutrality—although the partiality of the American people for the cause of France was well known—although, at that moment, their affections for the French nation were addressed by the most honorable and powerful considerations that ever existed between two nations. The peculiar similarity between the existing French cause and that which had just given birth to American liberty and independence; the material agency which the French nation had exerted in bringing about that event; and the existing principles of Government here, the product of the Revolution, which are the great object of attack by the combination against France.

A pure and laudable regard for peace, and a detestation of war, however, had overcome all these sensations, and produced a neutrality, which he believed, on the part of the United States, had been rigidly observed; at least, he was sure, that such was the intention of Government. In this state of things, Great Britain commenced an attack upon this state of neutrality, which it was certainly her interest to preserve, and which she ought to have deemed a favor to obtain. Great Britain continued to keep possession of posts upon the acknowledged territory of the United States, to carry on a contraband trade with our savage enemy. She, shortly after our proclaimed neutrality, proceeded to interrupt our lawful trade with our allies. She seized, condemned, and sanctioned the complete transfer of the property of American citizens to her own subjects; and, as if there could be no limits to her iniquity and resentment, she has contrived to open upon our Eastern frontiers a barbarous enemy to aid in making depredations upon our commerce.

These acts constitute injuries which amount to war, and they are infinitely aggravated, both by the perfidy which attended the execution of some of them, and the total want of provocation for the commission of any of them.

If, then, Great Britain shall have committed acts towards the United States which furnish just cause of war, the United States possess the right, consistently with the laws of nations, to exercise any act towards Great Britain which would be justifiable in a state of war. The United States having received the injuries, are authorized to select such measures and means as they may deem the most expedient for self-preservation and indemnification. Reprisal is within their power. All other means of redress are without their power. In such a state of things, reprisal is a right—reprisal is a duty. An objection, more plausible than solid, has been made to this course of reasoning, that the individuals who will be the immediate objects of the reprisal, have not been the immediate agents of the aggression. The laws of nations state, that the property of individuals is as much a subject of reprisal as the property of the aggressing nation; but, as the nation is the immediate agent in the wrong, the individual who sustains an injury thereby, becomes entitled to recompense from his nation. The nation which commits the wrong, by this process, will ultimately sustain the loss. Hence, in the present case, the innocent and unsuspecting victims of the United States, have received losses from the lawless aggressions of Great Britain, and the question is, whether they shall finally sustain those losses, without any clear claim of indemnification upon the Government of the United States? or, whether the losses shall be transferred to British subjects, who will thereby possess the clearest claim for recompense from the British Government? He thought the laws of God, the laws of morality, the laws of reason, the laws of nations, would all pronounce that the British Government which had done the wrong, should afford the recompense.

Mr. G. said, that if the losses were to be ultimately borne by the individual subjects of Great Britain, the remedy would seem to be a harsh one; but, even in that case, the only alternatives left to the United States would be to say whether their own citizens, to whom they have promised protection, should finally sustain the losses, or the British subjects, to whom they have promised no protection. But the situation of the individuals who may be the subjects of reprisal, is greatly meliorated, by the consideration of their just claim to recompense from their own Government, which he had no doubt but they would ultimately obtain, if they were put into a situation to demand it; but if they should ultimately be denied justice, it would be a consolation to reflect, that it was the injustice of their own Government, not of the United States.

He observed, that a reprisal in the way proposed, stood upon the same ground as the invasion of the property in every other case did, and was justified upon the same principle, to wit, self-preservation. He presumed, if there existed an acknowledged state of war, letters of marque and reprisal, commissions to privateers, &c., would be deemed justifiable and expedient, and that no discrimination would be made between the property of individuals and the property of the nation; yet the invasion of the rights of property in that case would be as palpable as in the case of the reprisal proposed, with this aggravation; that, in that case, the individual sustaining the loss would not be entitled to ultimate recompense from the Government—in the case proposed, he would be entitled to recompense. He observed, that the British nation had not discovered this delicate discrimination between national and individual property, in their late instructions given to their privateers and ships of war, although they had sustained no wrong; and he thought their conduct an example in point for the United States, who had received the injury and committed none.

A gentleman (Mr. Smith, of South Carolina) yesterday attempted to make a distinction between vessels at sea and other property; although he acknowledged that, at the first blush, he could discern no distinction in principle.

Mr. G. said, that every species of property stood on the same principle—the promise made by the Government to afford protection to all property—the same rights are attached to every species of property, and the Government is bound to afford an equal security to all. A sentence read yesterday, by a gentleman, (Mr. S. Smith), from a writer upon the laws of nations, clearly shows the right of a nation to make reprisal upon all the effects of individuals of an aggressing nation indiscriminately, except stock in the public funds; which has been exempted, under the idea of its being a pledge in the hands of Government; the withholding of which would be a breach of public faith. He believed that the practice and policy of some nations might have given rise to this distinction, but he doubted whether the practice had been uniform and universal, and he was clear that there was no rational distinction in principle. The idea that the public funds are a pledge in the hands of Government, and ought not, therefore, to be touched, is equally applicable to every other species of property. In the case of contracts between individuals, the Government guarantees the performance upon the refusal of one party to pay, or comply. In the case of lands or personal chattels, the Government guarantees the exclusive enjoyment to the proprietor; it would be equally a violation of faith for the Government to deny its obligation in the one case as in the other, and nothing could justify an invasion of the rights of property, in any case, but self-preservation—the first of all rights, and the highest of all duties.

He positively denied that any pre-eminence was due to one species of property over another. He said, however, that this discussion was not immediately necessary, as the resolution under consideration did not embrace the stock in the funds of the United States.

Mr. G. observed, that it had been said, and repeated in the committee, that the proposed measure was war. He denied that the measure in itself was war, or that it furnished a just cause of war. He believed, however, that it was problematical whether it would eventuate in peace or war; indeed, he remarked, that the crisis of affairs is already such, that, whether the measure be adopted or not, he viewed war as a probable event, peace as a possible event; but the point he contended for was, that if the aggressions towards the United States be sufficient to justify reprisal, the exercise of the right does not furnish a just cause of war. The exercise of a right by one nation can never involve the absurd consequence of giving another nation the right to exercise a wrong. He said, that gentlemen on one side of this question seemed to act upon an imaginary, instead of the real, state of things. He was not, therefore, astonished at hearing the committee cautioned against the violation of neutrality. He did not conceive that the present state of things between the United States and Great Britain would justify the use of the term neutrality. Neutrality is a term used to signify the relation in which two nations stand towards each other. Neutrality, therefore, requires parties—either party may destroy the relation between the parties. It therefore appeared absurd to him to say that Great Britain was in a state of depredation and war towards the United States, and the United States in a state of neutrality towards Great Britain. It has been said, that the United States have not abandoned their neutrality; this is true, but it is no evidence that neutrality exists. Great Britain has abandoned it for them.