SECOND CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 4)

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanying his report stating the amount of the subscriptions to the loans proposed by the act making provision for the public debt, as well in the debts of the respective States as in the domestic debt of the United States, and of the parts which remain unsubscribed, together with such measures as are, in his opinion, expedient to be taken on the subject, pursuant to an order of this House of the 1st of November last; which were read, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

The Fishery Bill

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

Mr. Page said no man in this House was more heartily disposed to encourage the fisheries of the United States than he was; nor could any one more sincerely wish to encourage the bold, active, and enterprising adventurers in that branch of our commerce to persevere in it, than he did; being sensible of the importance of their traffic in peace, and of their defence of their country and annoyance of their enemies in war. But, sir, (said Mr. P.,) I much doubt whether Congress can give that encouragement to the fisheries to which they are entitled, and which policy would lead the General Government to give, were it not restricted by the constitution. I consider, sir, the constitution as intended to remedy the defects of the Confederation to a certain degree; so far only as would secure the independence and general welfare of the Confederated States, without endangering the sovereignty and independence of the individual States. Congress, therefore, was authorized to pay the debts of the Union, and to regulate commerce, partly for that purpose, and partly to prevent improper and dangerous commercial combinations, jealousies, and altercations between the States. But Congress was not intrusted with any regulation of exports which could admit of an interposition which might be dictated by partiality; nor was Congress permitted to lay any tax which could by any possibility operate unequally on the States in general. It is said, indeed, that, if a drawback be not allowed on the salt used in salting fish, there will be, in fact, a duty on the exportation of the fish. But to this I think it may be replied, that the constitution guards the exports of each State against the possibility of a partial restriction by Congress, or even by the States themselves; that Congress cannot lay a duty on the exportation of rice, indigo, tobacco, &c., or any other article exported from any State, because this might be done to the injury of the State where such duty would operate, and to the advantage and aggrandizement of some particular States, its competitors more favored by the General Government, or possessing more influence in the debates of Congress; and that the States are also individually restrained from laying such duties without the consent of Congress, to prevent acts which might produce jealousies, commercial combinations, and, perhaps, at length, civil dissensions. That this restriction, if it be intended to prevent partiality, therefore, cannot extend to authorize drawbacks, which may be productive of partial preferences and their consequent jealousies; that if drawbacks be granted at all, they ought to be universally extended to every article which is or can be exported from any of the States, having in its composition a dutiable ingredient; that hence, ships and other vessels, &c., should have drawbacks on the sails, cordage, iron, &c.; but it may also be said that, as to the duty on salt, that is amply repaid to the merchant by the price annexed to his fish; the sums laid out in salt and fish together form a capital on which he takes care to have a sufficient profit. Those merchants employed in this traffic, if allowed a drawback, would have a preference to other merchants, who import largely, pay heavy duties, and have no other advantage than the usual advance on their goods. The exporter of any article, with a drawback, must have an advantage over his fellow-citizens, who purchase through necessity many dutiable articles, and are obliged to consume them, without any other benefit than the use of them. I mention this because it has been said (by Mr. Ames) that, having made the men of Marblehead pay for salt, they have a right to demand the money expended in that salt on the exportation of their fish; for it would be as reasonable for the man who had ate his fish on which his salt was expended, or who had used any other article for which he had paid a duty, to claim of Congress a return of his money expended therein, as the exporter of fish. The only difference is, that, if both were paid the exact sum so expended by them, the exporter of fish would get twice paid. The purchaser or consumer of his fish would pay him for his salt therein, as if it were substantial fish, and the State for it as mere salt. Here, then, is a field for partiality, discontent, and complaints, which the constitution wisely guards against. It cannot, therefore, be to any purpose to tell us that a bounty, or allowance, as it is now called, is preferable to a drawback, as there is not so great room for fraud in the one as in the other; nor can it be of importance to show that the fishermen have not the profits to which they are entitled. That their services in the last war deserve rewards, &c., their country shared with them the glory of their gallant behavior; but they alone received the rewards they aimed at. The twelve hundred ships they took were a compensation for services and a reward for those exploits. It is true, they annoyed the enemy; it is certain their prizes sometimes fed, armed, and clothed our armies; but it is not said that they did not receive payment for furnishing those things.

But here we are asked, Is it not of great consequence to the United States to employ those bold, skilful seamen in our service, that we may enjoy the commercial advantage they give us in peace, and their powerful assistance in war? To this I reply, that it ought first to be proved that Congress has the power and authority to give them the encouragement demanded; and even if Congress have that power, it ought to be shown that it can be extended to the benefit of the sailors of some of the States, and not to those of every State. It may be said that Congress may with as much propriety give bounties to our hunters in the Western country, to raise up a nursery of soldiers as a barrier against the Indians, and to promote the fur trade, as to give drawbacks and bounties to the fishermen of the Eastern States, with a view to encourage fisheries, and to raise a nursery of seamen for their defence against enemies who may invade our Eastern frontiers. Indeed, if defence be the object in view, we might as well give bounties to sturdy landsmen to be in readiness and constant training for war.

Indeed, sir, I confess I am not altogether convinced, that, if Congress have this power, it ought to be thus exerted; because it is not clear to me that those fishermen would not be more profitable to the United States, if they were cultivating the lands which now lie waste, and raising families, which would be of ten times more value than their fisheries. A nursery of virtuous families, which will produce soldiers, sailors, husbandmen, and statesmen, must be preferable to a mere nursery of sailors, who generally live single, and often perish at sea. I always look upon the loss of a crew to an infant Republic as the loss almost of a new State.

I speak of this question, however, as a citizen of the United States, as a member of this House. Were I to discuss it as a citizen of Massachusetts, and in their Legislature, I should say, as the State is nearly filled with inhabitants, and our fishermen increase our commerce in peace, protect us in war, and, indeed, even enrich us by their prizes, it is our interest to encourage them to the utmost, and to prevent their going into the service of other countries. I might, therefore, as a member of the Legislature of that State, do all in my power to procure bounties for them, and indeed for all the sailors belonging to that State; but I should not think of applying to Congress for their assistance; not only because I doubt their right to afford it, but because I should look upon it as in some degree derogatory to the sovereignty and independence of the State. I should look upon such an interference of Congress as a step towards swallowing up the powers of the State Governments, and as consolidating the different States into one Government, which the wise and virtuous in every State always protested against as dangerous to their liberties; the fear of which consolidation prevented many good men from voting for the adoption of the new Government.

The framers of the constitution guarded so much against a possibility of such partial preferences as might be given, if Congress had the right to grant them, that, even to encourage learning and useful arts, the granting of patents is the extent of their power. And surely nothing could be less dangerous to the sovereignty or interests of the individual States than the encouragement which might be given to ingenious inventors or promoters of valuable inventions in the arts and sciences. The encouragement which the General Government might give to the fine arts, to commerce, to manufactures, and agriculture, might, if judiciously applied, redound to the honor of Congress, and the splendor, magnificence, and real advantage of the United States; but the wise framers of our constitution saw that, if Congress had the power of exerting what has been called a royal munificence for these purposes, Congress might, like many royal benefactors, misplace their munificence; might elevate sycophants, and be inattentive to men unfriendly to the views of Government; might reward the ingenuity of the citizens of one State, and neglect a much greater genius of another. A citizen of a powerful State, it might be said, was attended to, whilst that of one of less weight in the Federal scale was totally neglected. It is not sufficient to remove these objections, to say, as some gentlemen have said, that Congress is incapable of partiality or absurdities, and that they are as far from committing them as my colleagues or myself. I tell them the constitution was formed on a supposition of human frailty, and to restrain abuses of mistaken powers. The constitution has been said by some one to be, like answers of the oracles of old, capable of various and opposite constructions; that it has been ingeniously contrived, like some of them, to suit two events—a republican or a monarchical issue. I will not pretend to say that this is not, in some instances, too just an observation; nor will I undertake to deny that it was not the intention of some of the Convention that such ambiguities might be in their constitution, to correspond with the critical and ambiguous state of the American mind respecting government; but I will boldly affirm, that, whatever the theories of that day might lead some to think respecting the application of monarchical principles to the Government of the United States, no one can, at this day, pretend that they are applicable to their circumstances, their dispositions, or interests, or even are agreeable to the wishes of the people. Even before the adoption of the constitution, when the rights of men had not been so thoroughly investigated as they since have been, it must be remembered that whole States, and large and respectable minorities in other States complained of and objected to the aristocratical and monarchical features of the new Government. In vain did the friends of the new Government—friends of order, of union, or of liberty—contend that the powers granted by the constitution which appeared so alarming were such as would never be exerted but when all good men would acknowledge the necessity of exercising them, and that, indeed, they would be explained or restrained by some future amendments. The sagacious and eloquent Henry shook his head at such promises, sighed and submitted to the will of the majority—a small one indeed—but foretold, from his knowledge of the human heart, what would be done and said in justification of every measure which might extend the power of Congress.

Is it politic and wise, then, Mr. Chairman, to exert the power contended for, even if it be authorized by the constitution? May not the interferences of Congress in the business of regulating the trade of the Eastern States, excite, if not envy on account of a supposed partiality, a jealousy lest Congress undertake to intermeddle in the commercial regulations of other States? May not Congress with equal propriety, undertake to regulate the tobacco, the rice, and indigo trade, as well as that of the fisheries? If they intermeddle in the business of sailors, why not in that of manufacturers and farmers? Where, I may ask with my colleague, may they not go on in their zeal, and, I may add, in their laudable pursuit, of promoting the general welfare—and how totally may they be mistaken? If jealousy of rival States, instead of mutual satisfaction and pleasure—if distrust and suspicion of Congress, instead of confidence in their measures, be the consequence—how will the Union be promoted, or the General Government secured? However virtuously disposed the present members may be, (and I am ready to applaud their honest intentions,) let them consider, sir, that they had better suppress their patriotic emotions, than give a pretext for their successors to abuse the powers which they now wish to exert for the public good. I know they will quote the opinion of as wise and virtuous a citizen as is in the United States. I know his patriotism, and know well his true Republican principles; but, sir, with the freedom of a fellow-citizen, I take the liberty of saying, that his honest zeal, like that of the friends of the bill, has led him into a mistake.[43] That able statesman and virtuous citizen, like the eloquent advocates of the bill, has considered the acts now quoted as a full sanction for the one before the committee. But I am of opinion, that those acts had better be repealed than give a sanction to the enacting of a law which goes to the establishing of bounties, or drawbacks, or by whatever other name they are called, which may be used to the partial encouragement of any branch of trade or employment whatsoever. I shall therefore vote against the bill before us, and, to get rid of it shall vote for striking out of it the first section, according to the motion now before the committee. As a member of this House, I shall think it my duty to protect the fisheries, and every other branch of our commerce, the fisherman as well as every other citizen, as far as may be within my ability; but I am not permitted, as a member of Congress, I humbly conceive, to select the fisheries and fishermen as objects of more consequence than any other branches of trade, or persons employed in them, lest Congress should not only show a mistaken attachment, or, even if judiciously placed, excite jealousies and discontents between the States, and distrust, destructive of their weight and influence. My constant wish has been to see Congress confined to such acts as would form a more perfect union, promote the general welfare, ensure domestic tranquillity, and engage the confidence of our fellow-citizens.

My wish is, that the members of Congress would leave their respective States in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege they held before their adoption of the new constitution, which can be exercised without prejudice to the General Government. Let the Legislatures of the different States encourage, as far as in their power, the commerce, agriculture, or manufactures of their respective States? and let Congress, as far as can be consistent with the most steady impartiality, patronize their patriotic exertions, by wise regulations of their commerce with foreign nations, such as may open as full an intercourse with those nations as the States may desire. The emulation of the sister States in commerce, manufactures, or agriculture, would lead to the early establishment of that branch of either to which each State might be best adapted. This rivalship could produce no jealousy, no general national discontent in the States, no localities in Congress. Virginia would not attempt to rival Massachusetts in her fisheries or carrying business, nor will South Carolina and Georgia rival the manufactories of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Each State may rejoice to see its sister States enjoying the advantages with which Heaven has blessed them; and Congress, if confined to subjects which admit not of local considerations, may debate with temper and decide with unbiased judgment. I confess I have wished that Congress possessed the power that the friends of the bill tell us we do possess, and tell us we have exerted; but, on examining the constitution with a view to my wish, I found reason to think, not only that Congress has not that power, but that it ought not to possess it, unless the constitution was intended to establish a consolidated Government on the ruin of the State Legislatures; but this, I conceive, cannot be the case, because the constitution guarantees to the States their respective Republican Governments. The general powers of Congress, no doubt, ought to be (as they are) adequate to the purpose of forming a more perfect union than subsisted under the Confederation, to establish justice, &c.; but, as they are bound to guarantee to the States their respective Republican forms of Government, I cannot conceive how any of these powers can be employed, consistently with the ends for which they were given, in diminishing the power and sovereignty of the State Legislatures. How Congress can interfere in the regulations respecting the merchants and their sailors at Marblehead with more propriety than with those at Philadelphia, Norfolk, or Charleston, I cannot conceive; nor how this interference could take place without alarming those States, I know not. Viewing the bill before us in this light, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote against it, and, as I said before, to get rid of it, shall vote to strike out the first section, according to the motion now before the committee.

The question on striking out the first section was taken, and negatived—32 to 26.

Wednesday, February 8.

A message was received from the President of the United States, together with a statement of certain articles of expense, which have occurred in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and for which no provision is made by law. [The expense alluded to was incurred for the relief of a number of American sailors, impressed in England to serve on board the British navy.] The message and accompanying papers were referred to a select committee, to examine and report.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, accompanying certain communications with the Executive of Virginia relative to the existing temporary defensive protection of the exposed frontiers of that State, pursuant to the orders of the President of the United States; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. White, from the committee appointed, presented a bill providing for the settlement of the claims of persons under particular circumstances barred by the limitations heretofore established; which was read twice and committed.

Mr. Benson, from the committee to whom was referred the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Comfort Sands, and others, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The Cod Fisheries.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

On a motion to strike out the words "bounty now allowed," and insert allowance now made, &c.—

Mr. Giles observed, that he conceived the vote of yesterday against striking out the first section, was a decision in favor of the policy of granting Governmental aid to the fisheries; the inquiry of to-day will be on what terms this aid shall be granted? He felt but little regret at the decision of yesterday, because he had himself previously contemplated some reasons, not unimportant, to justify that decision, and others had been suggested by several gentlemen in the course of the debate. The principles of this policy, he thought, however, might be combated by reasons of at least equal, and as far as he was able to judge, of paramount importance; but as he admitted considerable weight in the reasons on each side of the question, he was not particularly tenacious of the preference which his own opinion suggested. When he first mentioned his doubts respecting the principle of the bill, it was with diffidence, and those doubts in some measure arose from an idea that the bill contained a direct bounty upon occupation; upon a more minute examination, he thought the term bounty unnecessarily introduced into the bill, and that the object of it could be answered without the use of terms, which might hereafter be deemed to contain a decision upon the general principle of the constitutional right to grant bounties; it was to avoid any thing which might wear the appearance of such a decision, that induced him to make the present motion.

He proceeded to remark, that as great a difference of opinion often existed respecting the precise meaning of the terms used, as the consequences which flow from them after attaining such precision of meaning; and it is of importance to the present discussion that an accurate definition of the terms used in the bill, and those proposed to be used, should be had. The avowed object of the bill is not to increase, but to transmute the sum, or a portion thereof, now allowed to the fisheries in lieu of the drawback upon salt, from the merchant who is now supposed to receive the sole benefit, to the fishermen really employed in the fishing vessels. This is a mere chimerical project, but if it be admitted that this is the object to be effected by the bill, the term bounty is improperly applied.

A gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Ames,) who rests the defence of this bill almost solely upon this position, that those who receive the benefit intended by it, are of right entitled to such benefit in consideration of a previous advancement in value, and that this bill contains a mere permission to them to retain their own, has at the same time declared, that he thought the term bounty the most proper and technical, to convey this idea. In this, the gentleman appears to have deviated from his usual accuracy. A bounty is the granting a benefit without a correspondent return in value; a drawback is the retaking of something in consideration of a previous advancement; this is always founded upon a consideration previously received—that is a grant of favor ex mero motu. But the great characteristic distinction between bounties and drawbacks as they essentially relate to the administration of this Government consists in the governmental objects to which they may severally be applied: drawbacks are necessarily confined to commercial regulations; bounties may be extended to every possible object of Government, and may pervade the whole minutiæ of police. They may not only be extended to commerce, but to learning, agriculture, manufactures, and even the sacredness of religion will be found too feeble to furnish complete protection from their influence. The people of the United States have always been scrupulously tenacious of a constitutional security for the most free and equal exercises of this right, but through the medium of bounties, even this right may be invaded, and the only security against such invasion must be governmental discretion. The same characteristic distinction will attend that species of bounty which may incidentally result from commercial regulations; and direct bounties upon occupation founded upon the broad basis of discretionary right. The specification in the constitution of the right to regulate commerce, may possibly in some cases give rise to this indirect species of bounty, not from any right in the constitution to grant bounties, but as the necessary result from the specified right to make commercial regulations; and this specification can be the only foundation of justification to this indirect species of bounty; but there is no specification in the constitution of a right to regulate learning, or agriculture, manufactures, or religion, and so far as the sense of the constitution can be collected, it rather forbids than authorizes the exercise of that right.

Arguments used to deduce any given authority from the term general welfare, abstractedly from the specification of some particular authority, are dangerous in the extreme to rights constitutionally reserved, and ought ever to be viewed with great caution and suspicion. They serve directly to show that this Government is not only consolidated in all its parts, but that it is a consolidated Government of unlimited discretion; that it contains no constitutional limitation or restriction. If any given authority be inferred from the term general welfare in the abstract, any other authority is equally deducible from it, because the term is applicable to every possible object of Government, and differs only in degree, as to the several Governmental objects.

He could not see the force of the novel and curious distinction taken by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) between general welfare and particular welfare; for every particular welfare, however minute, may be in a degree for the general welfare, and if the decision respecting the existence of this distinction, have no other limitation than Congressional discretion, it is equally destructive of all constitutional restraint. Gentlemen who have advocated this principle of construction, appear startled at some consequences suggested to result from it, and have denied that they have made the admission of such consequences. This is true, nor have those in reply so asserted, but they have taken up the principles of construction furnished by its advocates, and made the application of it to the consequences which they themselves infer; and if the principle be admitted, it is undeniable that the conclusions drawn from it will necessarily follow in their utmost latitude.

A gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Barnwell) confidently spoke of the inherent rights of this Government; this is a new source of authority, and totally inapplicable to this Government. If there be inherent rights in governments at all, they must belong to governments growing out of a state of society, and not to a government deriving all its authorities by charter from previously existing governments, or the people of those governments. In such a government, the exercise of every authority not contained in the instrument, or deducible from it by a fair and candid construction, is an unjustifiable assumption and usurpation. He did not mean to analyze this subject further at this time, and had been led into these general remarks, because the impatience of the committee to have the question upon striking out the section had caused him to refrain from delivering these sentiments at that time.

He would remark further, that bounties in all countries and at all times, have been the effect of favoritism; they have only served to divert the current of industry from its natural channel, into one less advantageous or productive; and in fact, they are nothing more than governmental thefts committed upon the rights of one part of the community, and an unmerited governmental munificence to the other. In this country, and under this Government, they present an aspect peculiarly dreadful and deformed.

To contemplate the subjects upon which bounties are to operate in the United States, the nature of the Government to dispense them, the State preferences which now do and will for ever, more or less, continue to exist, the impossibility of an equal operation of bounties throughout the United States, upon any subject whatever, should be considered; and one of these two effects will necessarily follow the exercise of them; either the very existence of the Government will be destroyed, or its administration must be radically changed, it must be converted into the most complex system of tyranny and favoritism.

He observed, that it is not unfrequent at this time to hear of an Eastern and Southern interest, and he had for some time silently and indignantly seen, or thought he saw, attempts by this means to influence the deliberations of this House upon almost every important question. So far as he was the insulted object of these attempts, he felt that contempt for their authors, which appeared to him to be the correspondent tribute to the impurity of their designs; yet he thought that this had been the most formidable and effectual ministerial machine which had been yet used in the administration of Government. But one great mischief he apprehended from establishing the principle of the unrestrained right to grant bounties, will be, that it will make the difference of interest between Eastern and Southern, so far as they differ in their respective States of manufacture and agriculture, real, which is now only ideal. It will make that party real, which is now artificial. The jealousies and suspicions arising from party, will then have a substantial foundation, which now have no foundation in fact, but are ingeniously stimulated by a few, for the purpose of effecting particular objects; as long as the Government shall be administered liberally and impartially, as long as the principle of reciprocal demand and supply between East and South shall remain inviolate, so long there can exist no essential distinct interest between them; but the instant bounties or governmental preferences are granted to occupation, that instant is created a separate and distinct interest, not wholly between East and South, but between the manufacturer and the cultivator of the soil. There will still exist a community of agricultural interests throughout the United States, and he hoped the time was not far distant, when a common sympathy will be felt by the whole of that class of the community. For these reasons, he hoped the motion would prevail.

The bill having been gone through with, and amended, the committee rose and reported it with amendments which the House immediately took into consideration and adopted. The bill was then further amended and the House adjourned.

Thursday, February 9.

The Cod Fisheries.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein," together with the amendments thereto, was read the third time; and the question being put that the same do pass, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 38, nays 21, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, Samuel Livermore, James Madison, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg Nathaniel Niles, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

Nays.—Messrs. John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John Brown, William B. Giles, William Barry Grove, Daniel Heister, Philip Key, Nathaniel Macon, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, John Steele, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.

Resolved, That the title of the said bill be, "An act concerning certain fisheries of the United States, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

Mr. Laurance presented a petition from the tanners and curriers of the city of New York, praying relief from the hardships they labor under, in consequence of the exportation of tanners' bark. Referred to a select committee.

Wednesday, February 22.

Indemnity to Gen. Greene's Estate.

On a motion made and seconded, that the House do come to the following resolution:

"Whereas the late Major General Nathaniel Greene, on the eighth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, the more effectually to procure rations, and supplies for the Southern Army of the United States, became bound as surety for John Banks & Company to Newcomen & Collet, merchants in Charleston, for the payment of eight thousand seven hundred and forty-three pounds fifteen shillings and sixpence, sterling money, being the condition of said bond:

"And whereas, on the first day of May, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-six, the balance of principal and interest of said bond, being then eight thousand six hundred and eighty-eight pounds six shillings sterling, was paid by the said General Greene: Therefore,

"Resolved, That the United States shall indemnify the estate of the said General Greene for the said sum last mentioned, and the interest thereof: Provided, The Executors of the said General Greene shall account for a sum, being about two thousand pounds, be the same more or less, received of John Ferrie, one of the partners of the said Banks & Company, to be in part of the indemnification aforesaid; and also shall make over, for the use of the United States, all mortgages, bonds, covenants, or other counter-securities whatsoever, now due, which were obtained by the said General Greene in his lifetime, from the said Banks & Company on account of his being surety for them as aforesaid, to be sued for in the name of the said executors, for the use of the United States:"

Ordered, That the said resolution be committed to a Committee of the whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the said resolution; and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.

Saturday, March 10.

Courtesies to France.

On a motion made and seconded, that the House do come to the following resolution:

"Resolved, That this House hath received, with sentiments of high satisfaction, the notification of the King of the French, of his acceptance of the constitution presented to him in the name of the Nation; and that the President of the United States be requested, in his answer to the said notification, to express the sincere participation of the House in the interests of the French Nation, on this great and important event; and their wish that the wisdom and magnanimity displayed in the formation and acceptance of the constitution, may be rewarded by the most perfect attainment of its object, the permanent happiness of so great a people."

It was moved and seconded that the said motion be committed. And on the question for commitment, it passed in the negative—yeas 17, nays 35.

And then debate arising on the said motion, a division thereof was called for. Whereupon,

The question being put, that the House do agree to the first part of the said motion, in the words following:

"Resolved, That this House has received, with sentiments of high satisfaction, the notification of the King of the French, of his acceptance of the constitution presented to him in the name of the Nation: And that the President of the United States be requested, in his answer to the said notification, to express the sincere participation of the House in the interests of the French Nation, on this great and important event:"

It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 50, nays 2, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, William B. Giles, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Heister, James Hillhouse, Israel Jacobs, Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, William Vans Murray, Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Theodore Sedgwick, Joshua Seney, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Thomas Sumter, George Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Artemas Ward, Anthony Wayne, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.

Nays.—Robert Barnwell and Egbert Benson.

On the question, that the House do agree to the second part of the said motion, in the words following:

"And their wish that the wisdom and magnanimity displayed in the formation and acceptance of the constitution, may be rewarded by the most perfect attainment of its object, the permanent happiness of so great a people:"

It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 35, nays 16.

Ordered, That Mr. Tucker, Mr. Madison, Mr. Mercer, Mr. Vining, and Mr. Page, be appointed a committee to wait on the President of the United States, with the said resolution.

Saturday, March 24.

Establishment of a Mint.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of the United States." The following amendment being under consideration, viz:

"In the tenth section, strike out the words, 'Or representation of the head of the President of the United States for the time being, with an inscription, which shall express the initial or first letter of his Christian or first name, and his surname at length, the succession of the Presidency numerically,' and, in lieu thereof, insert, 'Emblematic of Liberty,' with an inscription of the word Liberty."

Mr. Page, in support of this motion said, that it had been a practice in monarchies to exhibit the figures or heads of their kings upon their coins, either to hand down, in the ignorant ages in which this practice was introduced, a kind of chronological account of their kings, or to show to whom the coin belonged. We have all read, that the Jews paid tribute to the Romans, by means of a coin on which was the head of their Cæsar. Now as we have no occasion for this aid to history, nor any pretence to call the money of the United States the money of our Presidents, there can be no sort of necessity for adopting the idea of the Senate. I second the motion, therefore, for the amendment proposed; and the more readily because I am certain it will be more agreeable to the citizens of the United States, to see the head of Liberty on their coin, than the heads of Presidents. However well pleased they might be with the head of the great man now their President, they may have no great reason to be pleased with some of his successors; as to him, they have his busts, his pictures every where; historians are daily celebrating his fame, and Congress have voted him a monument. A further compliment they need not pay him, especially when it may be said, that no Republic has paid such a compliment to its Chief Magistrate; and when indeed it would be viewed by the world as a stamp of royalty on our coins: would wound the feelings of many friends, and gratify our enemies.

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion also, and affirmed that the Romans did not put the heads of their Consuls on their money; that Julius Cæsar wished to have his on the Roman coin, but only ventured to cause the figure of an elephant to be impressed thereon; that by a pun on the Carthaginian name of that animal, which sounded like the name of Cæsar, he might be said to be on the coin. He thought the amendment consistent with Republican principles, and therefore approved of it.

Mr. Livermore ridiculed, with an uncommon degree of humor, the idea that it could be of any consequence to the United States whether the head of Liberty were on their coins or not; the President was a very good emblem of Liberty; but what an emblematical figure might be, he could not tell. A ghost had been said to be in the shape of the sound of a drum, and so might Liberty for aught he knew; but how the President's head being on our coins could affect the liberty of the people, was incomprehensible to him. He hoped, therefore, that the amendment would be rejected.

Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, agreed with Mr. Livermore in opinion; adding, that the President representing the people of the United States, might with great propriety represent them on their coins. He denied that Republics did not place the images of their Chief Magistrates on their coins; and said, he was surprised that a member who so much admired the French and their new constitution, should be so averse to a practice they have established; the head of their King is by their constitution put upon their money. Besides, it was strange that for a circumstance so trivial we should lose time in debating, and risk the loss of an important bill.

The said amendment was again read, and a division of the question thereon called for: Whereupon,

The question being taken, that the House do agree to the first part of the said amendment, for striking out the words "or representation of the head of the President of the United States for the time being, with an inscription, which shall express the initial or first letter of his Christian or first name, and his surname at length, the succession of the Presidency numerically:"—it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 22.

And then the question being taken that the House do agree to the second part of the said amendment, for inserting, in lieu of the words stricken out, the words, "Emblematic of liberty, with an inscription of the word Liberty:"—it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 42, nays 6.

Monday, March 26.

Establishment of a Mint.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate disagree to the amendment proposed by this House to the bill entitled "An act establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of the United States;" and agree to the amendment proposed by this House to the bill entitled "An act supplemental to the act for making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States."

It was moved that the House should recede from their amendment to the bill entitled "An act establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of the United States."

Mr. Livermore supported the motion. He said, he did not conceive it possible that and friend to the President of the United States, the Chief Magistrate, that great and good man, would have refused to pay every tribute of respect which was justly due to him. We have now a favorable opportunity of complimenting him, without any shadow of flattery, and without any expense. But, instead of this, what is proposed? An emblematical figure of Liberty. But what is this liberty which some appear to be so fond of? He had no idea of such liberty as appears to possess the minds of some gentlemen. It is little better than the liberty of savages—a relinquishment of all law that contradicts or thwarts their passions or desires. His idea of liberty was that which arose from law and justice, which secured every man in his proper and social rights. Some gentlemen may think a bear broke loose from his chain a fit emblem of liberty; others may devise a different emblem; but he could not conceive that any of them would be applicable to the situation of the United States, which justly boasted of being always free. If any idea of an emblem is necessary, he thought it might be applied to the head of the President of the United States. The present occasion affords the best opportunity of doing honor to the man we love; instead of which, we offer him an affront. He could not reconcile this conduct to propriety or consistency; for, while it is proposed to raise a monument to the memory of the President, which will cost fifty thousand guineas, a proposition to honor him in a more effectual manner, and in a way which will be satisfactory to the people, without any expense, and with perfect security to their liberties, is objected to. He hoped the House would recede.

Mr. Mercer replied to Mr. Livermore with some degree of asperity. He observed that there was a rule in the British House of Commons that the name of the King should never be mentioned in any debate. He thought some such rule might be introduced with advantage into this House. In the course of his remarks, to show that the circumstance of having the President's head stamped on the coin could not be justly considered as doing him an honor, he said, that persons of no better character than a Nero, a Caligula, or a Heliogabalus, may enjoy it as well as a Trajan, &c.

Mr. Seney animadverted with severity on the remarks offered by Mr. Livermore, and on the conduct of the Senate; particularly in returning the bill with a negative to the amendment of the House, within a period that left them no time to deliberate on the reasons which might have influenced the House.

Mr. Giles opposed the motion for receding. He adverted to the ideas which are connected with the subject in European countries. The President's head will not designate the Government. There is to be but one head; but does not our Government consist of three parts? Is there any other head proposed to be on the coin but the President's? He said this circumstance was of a piece with the first act of the Senate. It had a near affinity to titles, that darling child of the Senate, which has been put to nurse, with an intention that it shall be announced at some future period in due form.

Mr. Benson said, he supposed he should be extremely disorderly were he to mention the motives which influenced the Senate in their discussions. He knew not what they were, nor was it of importance that he should. He then observed, that plain pieces of metal will not answer for money; some impression is necessary to guard against counterfeits. The Senate have determined what the device shall be; but the House, by their amendment, have left the matter entirely to the judgment of the artist, who may form such an emblem as suits his fancy. Mr. B. ridiculed the idea of the people's being enslaved by their Presidents, and much less by his image on their coin.

Mr. Page replied that he was sorry to find that some gentlemen endeavored to ridicule Republican cautions. He thought it both indelicate and inconsistent with their situations, as well as highly impolitic. He confessed that, as long as the people were sensible of the blessings of liberty, and had their eyes open to watch encroachments, they would not be enslaved; but if they should ever shut them, or become inattentive to their interests and the true principles of a free government, they, like other nations, might lose their liberties; that it was the duty of the members of that House to keep the eyes of their constituents open, and to watch over their liberties. It was therefore unbecoming a member to treat with levity and to ridicule any sentiment which had that tendency. For his part, he thought it the peculiar duty of the Representative of a free people to put them upon their guard against any thing which could possibly endanger their liberties. That with this view he warned his constituents of the danger, not merely of imitating the flattery and almost idolatrous practice of Monarchies with respect to the honor paid to their Kings, by impressing their images and names on their coins, but he wished to add as few incentives as possible to competitors for the President's place. He warned his country against the cabals, the corruption, and animosities, which might be excited by the intrigues of ambitious men, animated with the hope of handing their names down to the latest ages on the medals of their country. But this indiscriminate honor is unworthy of the President's acceptance. A Nero, a Caligula, a Heliogabalus, it has been observed, (by Mr. Mercer,) may enjoy it as well as a Trajan. To apply it to the present Chief Magistrate, alone, would be less exceptionable. But this would be highly improper; for, if he should pass an act for this purpose, it might blast his reputation. I am of opinion that the Senate knew his delicacy would not permit him to pass such a one. They have therefore extended the compliment to all his successors. We are under obligations to the great man now our President; but a lover of liberty and friend to the rights of man would be cautious how he showed his sense of that obligation. As a friend to the President, I am unwilling to offer him a compliment which, if accepted, might damn his reputation. Were I in his place, I would cut off my hand rather than it should sign the act as it now stands. Were I his greatest enemy, I should wish him to pass it as it was passed by the Senate. Sir, I am as much his friend as the member from New Hampshire, and have shown, at proper times and places, that I was so. I am too sensible of the honor our President has acquired to suppose that an unbecoming compliment can in any degree contribute to its increase. I hope, therefore, the amendment which the House has made will not be receded from.

The question being now put, that this House doth recede from the said amendment, it passed in the negative—yeas 24, nays 32, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, John W. Kittera, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore, Theodore Sedgwick, William Smith, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

Nays.—John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John Brown, Abraham Clark, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, William Barry Grove, Daniel Heister, Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell, Richard Bland Lee, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore, William Vans Murray, Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, John Steele, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, John Vining, Alexander White, and Hugh Williamson.

Resolved, That this House doth adhere to the said amendment.

Ordered, That the Clerk of this House do acquaint the Senate therewith.

Tuesday, March 27.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendment adhered to by this House to the bill entitled "An act establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of the United States."

Wednesday, April 4.

General Nathaniel Greene.

The House proceeded to consider the resolution reported from the Committee of the whole House on the 24th of February last, to indemnify the estate of the late General Nathaniel Greene for a certain suretyship entered into by the said Nathaniel Greene, in his lifetime, on the public behalf. Whereupon, the said resolution being read at the Clerk's table, as follows:

"Whereas, the late Major General Nathaniel Greene, on the 8th day of April, 1783, the more effectually to procure rations and supplies for the Southern Army of the United States, became bound as surety for John Banks & Co., to Newcomen & Collet, merchants in Charleston, for the payment of £8,743 15s. 6d., sterling money, being the condition of the said bond:

"And whereas, on the 1st of May, 1786, the balance of principal and interest of said bond, being then £8,688 6s. sterling, was paid by the said General Greene. Therefore,

"Resolved, That the United States shall indemnify the estate of the said General Greene for the said sum last mentioned, and the interest thereof, or for such sum as, upon due investigation by the officers of the Treasury of the transactions between John Banks & Co., with Messrs. Newcomen & Collet, in which General Greene was security for said Banks & Co., it shall appear that neither General Greene nor his executors shall have received any payment or compensation for: Provided, The executors of the said General Greene shall account for a sum being about £2,000, be the same more or less, recovered by John Ferrie, one of the partners of the said John Banks & Co., to be in part of the indemnification aforesaid; and also shall make over for the use of the United States, all mortgages, bonds, covenants, or other counter-securities whatsoever, now due, which were obtained by the said General Greene, in his lifetime, from the said Banks & Co., on account of his being surety for them as aforesaid, to be sued for in the name of the said executors, for the use of the United States."

The previous question thereon was called for by five members, to wit: "Shall the main question, to agree to the said resolution, be now put?" And on the previous question, "Shall the main question be now put?" it was resolved in the affirmative. And then the main question, "That the House do agree to the said resolution?" being put, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 29, nays 26, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Heister, Philip Key, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, Samuel Livermore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Theodore Sedgwick, Upton Sheridine, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, George Thatcher, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Francis Willis.

Nays.—John Baptist Ashe, Elias Boudinot, John Brown, Abraham Clark, William B. Giles, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, William Barry Grove, James Hillhouse, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, Nathaniel Macon, Andrew Moore, Nathaniel Niles, Joshua Seney, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, John Steele, Jonathan Sturges, Thomas Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Artemas Ward, Alexander White, and Hugh Williamson.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolution, and that Mr. Livermore, Mr. Page, and Mr. Barnwell, do prepare and bring in the same.

Thursday, April 5.

Apportionment Bill.

A message was received from the President of the United States returning to the House the bill passed by the two Houses entitled "An act for an Apportionment of Representatives among the several States according to the first Enumeration," and presented to the President for his approbation on Monday, the 26th of March; to which bill the President having made objections, the said objections were read, and ordered to be entered at large on the Journal, as follows:

"United States, April 5, 1792."

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

"I have maturely considered the act passed by the two Houses entitled 'An act for an Apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first Enumeration;' and I return it to your House, wherein it originated, with the following objections:

"First. The constitution has prescribed that Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers; and there is no one proportion or divisor which, applied to the respective numbers of the States, will yield the number and allotment of Representatives proposed by the bill.

"Second. The constitution has also provided that the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand; which restriction is, by the context, and by fair and obvious construction, to be applied to the separate and respective numbers of the States; and the bill has allotted to eight of the States more than one for every thirty thousand.

"G. WASHINGTON."

Resolved, That to-morrow be assigned for the reconsideration of the said bill, in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of the United States.

Friday, April 6.

Apportionment Bill.

The House proceeded to reconsider the bill passed by the two Houses entitled "An act for an Apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first Enumeration," which was presented for approbation on Monday, the 26th of March, and returned by the President yesterday, with objections.

The said bill was read, and is as follows:

"An act for an Appointment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first Enumeration.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, from and after the 3d day of March, in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three, the House of Representatives shall be composed of one hundred and twenty members, elected within the several States, according to the following apportionment, that is to say: Within the State of New Hampshire, five; within the State of Massachusetts, sixteen; within the State of Vermont, three; within the State of Rhode Island, two; within the State of Connecticut, eight; within the State of New York, eleven: within the State of New Jersey, six; within the State of Pennsylvania, fourteen; within the State of Delaware, two; within the State of Maryland, nine; within the State of Virginia, twenty-one; within the State of Kentucky, two; within the State of North Carolina, twelve; within the State of South Carolina, seven; and within the State of Georgia, two.

"JONATHAN TRUMBULL, "Speaker of the House of Representatives. "JOHN ADAMS, "Vice President U. S. and President of Senate."

The President's objections were also read; and, after debate on the subject-matter of the said bill, the question "That the House, on reconsideration, do agree to pass the bill," was determined in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and passed in the negative—yeas 23, nays 33, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Egbert Benson, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Thomas Hartley, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Niles, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, John Steele, George Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

Nays.—John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell, John Brown, William Findlay, William B. Giles, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Wm. Barry Grove, Daniel Heister, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Richard Bland Lee, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.

And so the bill was rejected, two-thirds of the House not agreeing to pass the same.

Monday, April 9.

Apportionment Bill.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for an Apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first Enumeration; at the ratio of one for every —— thousand persons, in the respective States.

Mr. Giles observed, that, although this subject has been heretofore thoroughly discussed, and the minds of gentlemen probably fatigued with the discussion, yet he could not help trespassing upon the patience of the committee, by mentioning some of the principal reasons which would influence his vote against the motion, and in favor of that ratio which will afford the greatest number of Representatives authorized by the constitution. He was induced to do this from an opinion that, in the usual course of things, arguments will have an effect upon the public mind in some measure proportioned to their own solidity, and the purity of the motives which actuate them. That the compound of these qualities form a common standard, by which all arguments would and ought to be measured by the great majority of the people; and he had no objections to submitting his reasons to the application of this common standard; he meant, however, to confine himself to general remarks, and not to fatigue the committee unnecessarily with minute exemplification of them.

He proceeded by observing, that the expression in the constitution induced and justified the general expectation among the people of the United States, that one Representative for every thirty thousand persons was secured to them by the constitution; that a definitive certainty in the number of Representatives, as well as the manner of procuring them, is, in its nature, of constitutional and not of legislative provision, and affords a reason against varying the ratio mentioned in the constitution, although that ratio be expressed in terms of latitude; that Congress had confirmed the general expectation in the public mind by the proposed amendments to the constitution, and had at least given a solemn opinion in favor of the ratio of one to thirty thousand, until the number of Representatives should amount to one hundred, after acquiring which number by that rule only, a qualified discretion is admitted; that the opinions of the great bulk of the people of America were in favor of an increased representation, at least as far as the utmost limits prescribed by the constitution; that this circumstance was evidenced by the conventions which adopted the constitution; that it was further evidenced by the several Legislatures which adopted the proposed amendments before alluded to; that it was still further evidenced by the number of Representatives in the respective State Legislatures; that this last circumstance is rendered peculiarly forcible by a comparative view of the objects of legislation chartered to the Government of the United States, and those retained to the State Governments. The objects of legislation chartered to the Government of the United States, are wholly national and important; the objects of legislation retained to the State Governments are comparatively local and subaltern: those peculiarly prompt temptation and invite corruption—these offer no inducements to either. In the Government of the United States, the constituents of the Representative body are complex and diversified; in the State Governments they are comparatively simple and assimilated. That a sympathy with the feelings of the people should characterize this branch of the Government; wisdom is the expected characteristic of the Senate; and despatch of the Executive.

To the inequality of representation relatively to States suggested to result from the application of this rule, Mr. G. replied that the inequality complained of is rather ideal than real; that to determine how far this consideration really ought to exist among States, it is right and proper to ascertain the whole comparative Government: and the issue of this inquiry will be, that those States in whose favor the rule is said to operate, possess the least governmental influence in the Senate, proportioned to numbers; and that the casual gain here is no equivalent for the certain loss there. As far, therefore, as the governmental influence of States in relation to numbers is to operate, it will furnish a motive of preferment for the rule he contended for.

It has been said (continued Mr. G.) that the representation of the States in the Senate is strictly defined by the constitution, and that therefore the consideration of the relative influence of the States, then, should not be resorted to as an argument in the apportionment of Representatives to this House. But, it should be observed, that the rule contended for, though not so strictly defined, is equally within the pale of the constitution; and the most extended use to be made of this consideration is, to manifest the impropriety of resorting to the pretended inequality among States, as a conclusive argument to vary that ratio of representation for this House which is admitted to be the most proper, upon its intrinsic merits, and when viewed without a reference to that consideration. This particular subject suggests a peculiar equity and propriety, in taking into consideration the comparative governmental influence of the States in the Senate, proportioned to numbers; because, it is in consequence of a representation by States, there, that they gain this unequal influence: and nothing more is contended for by this rule than a representation of the people through the medium of the several States, here. The rule of representation is not the cause of the present inequality, as far as it may appear to exist; it is a mere contingent circumstance, depending upon arbitrary facts and numbers, which cannot be rendered subservient to any general rule. It should also be remarked, that most of the States supposed to be favored by the operation of this rule, have, heretofore, been unequally represented in the extreme; and from the extent and rapid population of these States, it may be concluded, with certainty, that previously to the expiration of the present apportionment, the real inequality of representation in this House, as well as in the Senate, will continue to bear particularly hard upon them. Perfect equality is unattainable; and the proposed ratio is, in the principle, equally subject with any other to all the inconveniences which it is intended to remedy.

The inconveniences of the rule he contended for, in their utmost extent, can never be very great, because the same rule is applied in the same manner to the respective States; and the most extended scope for its unequal operation must be confined to the casual result of the fractional numbers within the several States. In reflecting upon this argument of inequality of representation in relation to States, an idea had presented itself to his mind which seemed to him both novel and important; and that is, that a quality exists in the Government, from its peculiar organization which enables a minority of constituents, through the medium of a majority of Representatives, to give law to a majority of constituents, absolutely against the will of their minority of Representatives. This quality of the Government arises from the State representations in the Senate; and it exists not merely in speculation or idea—it has been sensibly felt in practice, and there is a real tendency in the Government to make it still more so. The very bill now under consideration will probably furnish one strong evidence of its efficacy in practice; it would have passed very differently from the present proposition, if it had not met with this unnatural check; and I am concerned, said he, to remark, that almost in every important measure of the Government, the minority of the people of the Union had given law to the majority of the people, against their consent, as far as this can be evidenced through the medium of their Representatives. This, it is to be feared, is a radical evil in the Government, and its magnitude would be in a great measure proportioned to the extension of the objects of legislation by this Government. If the people be the only legal source of governmental authority, and this right of individuals be equal, this is certainly a heterodox principle in the Government. He would not pretend to say, however, that this was a cancer upon the body politic too inveterate and vital to admit of a cure; but he conceived it to be a sore of that sort which it would be unwise to irritate or tamper with: and he conceived, also, the present proposition not to be without its irritating qualities.

Mr. G. then proceeded to consider, upon general principles, of increasing the representation in this House to the full extent authorized by the constitution, and particularly with a view to the necessity of establishing, in this branch of the Government, a permanent sympathy with the landed interest. He observed, that all Representative Governments appeared to possess a natural tendency from Republicanism to Monarchy; that, great inequalities in the distribution of wealth among individuals, consequent upon the progress of all governments, appeared to be the cause of their political evolutions; that no competent remedy against this evil had been heretofore discovered, or at least practically applied by any Government; that perhaps this great political light may first shine forth through the medium of the American constitutions, and serve, as some others have previously done, to illumine not only the American, but the European world.

The peculiar circumstances of the United States, however, since the late Revolution, and in the infancy of the American Governments, favored extremely this natural principle of the growing inequality in the distribution of wealth amongst individuals. An extensive, unexhausted, fertile country furnished full scope for agriculture, the plenty and cheapness of provisions and rude materials for manufactures, and an unshackled commerce for the merchant; and to these were added the blessings of peace, and laws securing to the individual the exclusive possession of the fruits of his own industry, however abundant. There were intrinsic circumstances; there was a contingent one. A public debt—the price of the Revolution itself and its consequent blessings—had been incurred, and, from the imbecility of the then existing Confederacy, and other causes, was depreciated considerably below its nominal value; but it was then in small masses, and not very unequally spread amongst the individuals throughout the whole United States. The Government of the United States, instead of managing this contingent circumstance with caution, and declaring so in its ministration, seized upon it with its fiscal arrangement, and applied it as the most powerful machine to stimulate this growing inequality in the distribution of wealth—a principle perhaps too much favored by other existing causes. The Government, not satisfied with the debts contracted by the former Confederacy, assumed the payment of a great proportion of the debts contracted by the respective State Governments, and established funds for paying the interest of the whole. This measure produced two effects, not very desirable amongst individuals. It gathered these scattered debts, at a very inferior price, from the hands of the many, and placed them in the hands of the few; and it stimulates the value of them. Thus collected into greater masses, beyond all calculation, by the artificial application of fiscal mechanism, it produced a variety of serious effects with respect to the Government. In opposition to the agricultural or republican, it enlisted a great moneyed interest in the United States, who, having embarked their fortunes with the Government, would go all lengths with its Administration, whether right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, by rendering the debt but partially redeemable, passing perpetual tax laws, and mortgaging their products to the payment of the interest of this perpetually-existing debt. It gave the Executive a qualified control over the best moneyed resources of the United States, not contemplated by the constitution, nor founded in wisdom. It gave rise to an unauthorized incorporation of the moneyed interest, and placed it as far as possible from the reach of future Legislative influence. It established the doctrine that one systematic financier was better able to originate money bills and tax the people of the United States, than the whole collected wisdom of their Representatives, with the aid of a reciprocity of feeling. It gave rise to the idea of a Sinking Fund, without limitation as to amount, to be placed in the hands of a few trustees, and there to be protected from Legislative control by all the sanctions and securities annexed to private property. In short, it established the doctrine that all authority could be more safely intrusted to, and better executed by a few, than by many; and, in pursuance of this idea, made more continual drafts of authority from the Representative branch of the Government, and placed it in the hands of the Executive; lessening, by this mechanism of administration, the constitutional influence of the people in the Government, and fundamentally changing its native genius and original principle. He (Mr. G.) knew of no competent remedy against the abominable evils to be apprehended from the future operation of these unhallowed principles, but a permanent establishment of the candid or Republican interest in this House; and the best chance of effecting this great object he conceived to be a full representation of the people. His alarms respecting these fashionable, energetic principles were greatly increased by a perspective view of some of the proposed measures of Government. He saw systems introduced to carve out of the common rights of one part of the community privileges, monopolies, exclusive rights, &c., for the benefit of another, with no other view, in his opinion, but to create nurseries of immediate dependants upon the Government, whose interest will always stimulate them to support its measures, however iniquitous and tyrannical, and, indeed, the very emoluments which will compose the price of their attachment to the Government will grow out of a tyrannical violation of the rights of others. He would forbear to mention a variety of other circumstances, to prove that principles having a tendency to change the very nature of the Government, have pervaded even the minutest ramifications of its fiscal arrangements, nor would he dwell upon the undue influence to be apprehended from moneyed foreigners, who had become adventurers in the funds, nor the various avenues opened to facilitate the operation of corruption. He would merely remark, that, acting under impressions produced by these considerations, and strengthened by others not less pertinent and important, suggested by a number of gentlemen, in the course of the discussion of this subject, and believing that a full representation of the people will furnish the only chance of remedy for the existing, and a competent protection against future evils, he should feel himself criminal if by his vote he should give up a single Representative authorized by the constitution. The same impressions would have induced him to have voted for the proposition which gave one hundred and twenty members, had it not been for a conscientious and paramount regard for the preservation of the constitution. The difference of the position of the members throughout the United States, which would have been assumed by the difference in the manner of making the apportionment, never amounted to the minimum of a consideration with him against the proposition; for he felt a conviction that the agricultural or equalizing interest was nearly the same throughout all parts of the United States; and he hoped that the increased representation would furnish strong testimonies of the truth of the position. He would remark, generally, the Government of America was now in a state of puberty, that is, at this time. She is to assume a fixed character, and he thought it in some degree rested upon the vote now to be given, whether she would preserve the simplicity, chastity, and purity of her native representation and Republicanism, in which alone the true dignity and greatness of her character must consist; or whether she will, so early in youth, prostitute herself to the venal and borrowed artifices and corruptions of a stale and pampered Monarchy? Whatever his own opinions or suspicions may be respecting the tendency of the present Administration, and whatever may be the discussion of to-day, he should still preserve a hope that the increased representation, supported by the enlightened spirit of the people at large, will form an effectual resistance to the pressure of the whole vices of the Administration, and may yet establish the Government upon a broad, permanent, and Republican basis.

When Mr. Giles had concluded, the committee rose, and reported an amendment, viz: to fill up the blank with the word "thirty-three;" which was carried in the affirmative—yeas 34, nays 30, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Heister, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

Nays.—John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John Brown, William Findlay, William B. Giles, Samuel Griffin, William Barry Grove, Philip Key, John Laurance, Richard Bland Lee, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, John Steele, Samuel Sterrett, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.

Ordered, That the said bill, together with the amendments, be engrossed and read the third time to-morrow.

Friday, April 20.

Publication of the Debates.

Before the House proceeded to the order of the day—

Mr. Gerry said, that the circumstance of a publication which had made its appearance that morning induced him to rise for the purpose of bringing forward a proposition respecting a full and impartial publication of the debates of that House. Every gentleman, he believed, would agree with him that, from a publication of this kind, the citizens of the United States would derive such information respecting the proceedings of the Legislature, and the principles on which the laws are grounded, as must be productive of the most salutary effects, and attach the people more strongly to the General Government; but the ex parte publications can have no other tendency than to misrepresent their proceedings, and alienate the affections of the citizens. He therefore moved the following resolution:

"Whereas an impartial publication of the Debates of Congress stating accurately their Legislative measures, and the reasons urged for and against them, is a desirable object, inasmuch as it may aid the Executive in administering the Government, the Judiciary in expounding the laws, the Governments and citizens of the several States in forming a judgment of the conduct of their respective Representatives, and Congress themselves in revising and amending their Legislative proceedings: And whereas, from the want of proper arrangements, such publication has not been accomplished—

"Resolved, That —— persons, of good reputation, and skilled in the art of stenography, be, at the next session, appointed by ballot, to take and publish, impartially and accurately, the Legislative subjects which may be submitted to the consideration of the House, and the debates thereon of the members respectively; that the persons so to be appointed be considered as officers of the House, and provided for accordingly; that they be severally qualified by oath to a faithful discharge of the trust; and that such regulations shall be prescribed, as may be necessary to protect them in attaining the salutary objects of their appointment."

This, Mr. G. said, was a subject which ought no longer to be overlooked. Whilst Congress sat at New York, great uneasiness had been occasioned in the House by the mode in which the debates were published. Sometimes members were introduced as uttering arguments directly the reverse of what they had advanced. At other times, the substance of the arguments, as published, wore an aspect widely different from what they had when offered in debate. In some instances, their arguments were so garbled that they themselves were unable to recognize them in print; in others, they were disfigured with grammatical errors, and rendered totally unintelligible; and on many occasions, the arguments on one side of the question only were published.

Such were the effects produced by this mode of publication that a gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Burke) brought forward a motion for correcting those evils, which was debated for some time. After the subject had been two or three times under discussion, the House was informed that there was a probability of care being taken in future to correct the errors; and thus the matter was passed over.

Mr. G. then mentioned a circumstance which he had learned from a gentleman who had declared he could prove it on oath before the House, if called upon, viz: that, having asked one of those persons who at that time published the debates, "how he could think of publishing them so inaccurately?" the answer was, "that he was under a necessity of obliging his employers." Hence, he concluded that there must have been a corrupt faction who influenced that short-hand writer.

When Congress first came to this city, the debates were published pretty accurately; and so they were this session, in some of the papers, but, in others, the case was otherwise; and he himself, as well as other gentlemen, had been under a necessity of publicly contradicting them in print. In some of the debates, the answer to an argument was published before the argument itself made its appearance; on other occasions, they were published very fully on one side of the question, whilst nothing appeared on the other. Every gentleman, he believed, would admit that this was a true state of the business; and it was well known that, on many important occasions, no debates had been published at all.

The want of regularity in the publication was, he supposed, owing, in some measure, to the want of proper encouragement, as the printers of newspapers would not probably find their account in allowing a sufficient compensation to induce short-hand writers to devote their whole time to the business.

Mr. G. then read from the American Daily Advertiser (of Friday last) the following passage:

"A warm debate hereupon took place, during the course of which one gentleman, who strenuously supported the motion, was several times interrupted. Apprehensions were expressed of dangerous consequences, in case his speech should appear in print; and an honorable member, who opposed the motion, (Mr. Gerry,) declared that the manner in which the Debates of Congress had been published, and the business conducted, during the present session, had a direct tendency to bring about a dissolution of the Union.

"As the honorable gentleman did not further explain himself, we are at a loss to determine whether he meant to tax the publishers of the debates with inaccuracy in stating them wrong,——or imprudence, in stating them right, and freely publishing whatever sentiments any member of that House may think proper to express, in the constitutional exercise of the freedom of debate. But, certain we are, that he could not mean to stigmatize them as actuated by partiality, undue influence, or sinister motives of any kind."

Here, said Mr. G., an idea was held up that the gentleman who had spoken first (Mr. Mercer) was interrupted. But it is not said that I was interrupted too. I was interrupted as often as he. The House can determine whether I have ever taken any measure to prevent a free and candid publication of the debates. On the contrary, I have always endeavored to obtain it; and I will still proceed to accomplish it as far as possible. I think neither this House nor any of its members ought to be subject to publications of this kind. If they are, they will be obliged either to enter into paper wars with printers, or to relinquish the public good. It is incumbent on the House to take measures to prevent misrepresentation. I therefore submit to the House the resolution which I have read; and I hope that, if the proposition itself appears worthy of their attention, they will take it into consideration; or, if it wants any amendment, they will refer it to a committee; for I think the subject ought not to be any longer neglected.

Mr. Mercer.—I second the motion; and I think the publication which the honorable gentleman has read to the House contains but a fair statement of facts. The gentleman, in the course of the former debate, made some very strange allusions to what was said by me, which were wholly unauthorized. I consider it as a primary object in this Government that we should on this floor be at all times free to express our sentiments of the Government, without involving the Government itself. I consider such a measure as is now contemplated to be well worthy the serious attention of the House. We are at a distance from our constituents; and it is a misfortune that we are withdrawn from their inspection, by being placed in a part of the Union where it is not easy to compare our circumstances and conduct in private life with the motives which may be supposed to influence our political conduct. Our constituents ought to be acquainted with our proceedings here; and it is only from a full and accurate publication of the debates of this House that they can obtain any satisfactory information on this subject.

Mr. Gerry said, that the paragraph he had read did not contain a full statement of facts, as the apprehensions he had expressed were only in case the arguments should go "unanswered."

Mr. Giles made, and Mr. W. Smith seconded, a motion for referring the resolution to a select committee, to report such regulation as they may think necessary for the publication of the debates. An additional reason for the reference was, that some alteration in the wording appeared necessary, to (Mr. Smith,) so far as respects the Judiciary, &c.

Mr. Boudinot objected to the commitment, as he thought it a subject of considerable consequence, and there would not be time to take it up during the present session, the House having already outsat the time which the other branch of the Legislature had proposed for the adjournment. This was his only objection; otherwise, he was far from being opposed to the measure.

Mr. Giles thought the consequence of letting the matter lie over till next session would be, that it would die away, and nothing would be done. Unless some steps be taken during the present session, no persons would come forward as candidates at the commencement of the next. But if a committee report on the subject, the House may determine what steps are to be taken, and the people will be prepared accordingly.

The question being taken on the commitment, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 27, nays, 22.

Ordered, That the said motion be committed to Mr. Gerry, Mr. Mercer, Mr. Lee, Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina,) and Mr. Kittera.

Tuesday, May 8.

A message was received from the Senate, notifying the House that the Senate, having completed the Legislative business before them, are now about to adjourn. Whereupon,

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that this House, having completed the business before them, are now about to adjourn until the first Monday in November next, and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

The Clerk accordingly went with the said message; and, being returned,

The Speaker adjourned the House, to meet on the first Monday in November next.