FOURTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 9)

He said he would take leave to explain the 13th article which relates to the East India trade, and which it has been said gives such solid advantage as to counterbalance all the evils arising out of the Treaty. He had taken some pains to inform himself on this subject, and he had found that the Americans, in common with all other nations, traded to the British and other ports of India, and were every where received with that sort of kindness which grows out of the interest that the vender has in selling his goods for ready money, and to a great profit; that our trade is so much the interest of the India Company, and of all its officers and factors, as well as of the private traders residing there; that it was ridiculous to suppose the India Company would prevent it; and, if they should, what would be the evil? Little or none; for there were other ports, belonging either to other European powers or to the natives, in the neighborhood of all the English ports, who would receive us with open arms, and supply us for our silver, on terms equal, or nearly so. He then stated that our ships could now carry from one port in India to another, to China, or to Europe; an employment that had been found very lucrative. Under the Treaty they must proceed with whatever they purchase in an English port direct to America. The article says, His Majesty consents to your trade to India, and this is called a boon. It appeared to him just as ridiculous as if his Majesty had said, he consented to our going to Great Britain to purchase its manufactures.

To enumerate the many faults he found with the Treaty, as well of omission as commission, would take up too much of their precious time; yet he trusted he should be excused for taking a short view of its leading features.

When the envoy was sent to Great Britain, he was principally to demand restitution for the cruel depredations committed on our commerce. We find that object attended to so vaguely that our best-informed men seem doubtful whether much will ever be recovered under the Treaty; they find that in every instance the loser must first pursue his remedy through their tedious and expensive Courts. We find, that by fair construction, we have acknowledged ourselves to have been the infractors of the Treaty of Peace; for what was the ground on which some of the States placed legal impediments to the recovery of British debts? Why, that Lord Dorchester had refused to deliver up or pay for the negroes which, by that Treaty, ought to have been restored, and which slaves would have assisted their masters by their labor to pay those debts; yet we see no mention of them in the Treaty; and we find, to our surprise, men, since this Treaty, defending the construction lately put on the Treaty of Peace by the British, and which had never before been heard of; thus acquiescing in the charge of our being the first aggressors. But this only relates to our honor, and of course can be of little consequence to a nation whose rule of conduct is to submit to every thing, provided, that on the whole account, there appears to be a balance of profit in its favor.

After having thus formed his opinion relative to the Treaty, his next inquiry was, is the Treaty constitutional? On that point he had held himself open to conviction, and waited its discussion. He had not heard any gentleman declare it unconstitutional, except one, (Mr. Page,) who seemed to give his opinion as if he still doubted; and having carefully considered the subject, he was now of opinion that there was nothing directly repugnant to the constitution in the instrument. He then inquired whether, under the existing state of things, the Treaty ought to be rejected? whether it contained stipulations so extremely injurious to the United States as ought to induce the House of Representatives to reject a compact made by the other branches of the Government? In the ten first articles, which are permanent, he found some objections. The third article, which, like many others, cannot be well understood, seems to say that goods imported in British bottoms to the ports of the Lakes, shall pay extra duty. If this be a true construction, it will then be necessary to repeal our restraining duties, to make the Treaty by law consistent with the constitution, which requires that all duties shall be equal. The tenth article ties our hands against sequestration, a power which ought not to be exercised, except on some very extraordinary occasions; yet it was a power which, considering our relative situation to Great Britain, it was imprudent to part with; still, on fair consideration, he did not find that there was sufficient cause, on the account, to reject the Treaty, in the situation we are now placed. The residue will expire in two or three years.

Tuesday, April 26.

Execution of British Treaty.

Mr. Dwight Foster observed, that as the subject before the committee had been minutely discussed, it was not to be expected any new arguments, either on the one side or the other, would be adduced. Hitherto, he had been silent—though silent, he had not been inattentive—he had listened with candor to every thing which had been offered; he had formed his opinion upon serious deliberation, and was ready to give it whenever the question should be taken.

When the resolution requesting the President to lay before the House a copy of the instructions, correspondence, and other documents relative to this Treaty, was under consideration, Mr. F. observed, that he had intended to have expressed his sentiments on the subject; but the great length of time which was spent in that discussion, and the extreme impatience discovered by many members to have the question taken, induced him, as it might several others, to be content with expressing a silent vote, as he did with the minority, on that occasion. This he was the more willing to do, as it was then well known that the Treaty itself would be before the House; that some appropriations would be requisite, on their part, to carry it into effect; and, it was not to be doubted but every gentleman who wished to express his opinion would have an opportunity. The time had now arrived, and several days had been spent already, he believed not unprofitably, in deliberating on an instrument which had been the cause of great agitation in the United States.

He was heretofore one of those who considered the negotiation as advisable; it appeared to him the only means by which the horrors of war were to be avoided. He therefore rejoiced when the President appointed an Envoy for the purpose of negotiation; nor did he yet find any reason to apprehend the measure was injudicious. Far otherwise. He believed it was right, proper, and advisable; and that the result would prove highly advantageous and fortunate for our country. He further said, that he had critically examined the various articles of the Treaty; that he had weighed the arguments for and against them, jointly and severally; that he had considered them all with the attention their importance required; and though, in some instances, we might have wished an extension of advantages on our side, he was bound, in conscience, to declare that he thought the Treaty as beneficial to us as we had a right to expect.

The right of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, is a principle clearly defined by the constitution. Not a single power delegated by the constitution to any one branch of the Government is defined in terms more explicit, or less liable to be misunderstood, than those which define the Treaty-making power of the United States; and, during the whole course of the former and present debates, Mr. F. observed, he had not been able to raise a doubt in his own mind on the subject. The Treaty under consideration had been duly made and ratified by the proper authority, constituted for this purpose by the people of the United States; as such it was now before the committee and demanded their serious attention and respect. The subject was allowed by all to be of importance. To him it appeared more momentous than any other which, at any time since the establishment of the Government, had engrossed the attention of Congress. He viewed it not as a question of peace or war only, but as involving questions of far greater magnitude. He meant the present unexampled prosperity of this country, our political happiness, our excellent constitution, and probably, in its consequences, the existence of the national Government.

Mr. Kitchell said, he could throw no new light upon the subject under discussion; he wished only to express a few ideas which would lead him to support the resolution in its present form. He did not believe the Treaty to be that box of Pandora, which was to scatter evils of every kind upon the land. He believed there were stipulations in favor of the United States, as well as in favor of Great Britain; and when the Ministers of the two nations enter into contract, it must be expected that stipulations will be agreed to on each side which will not appear perfectly satisfactory to either, as certain concessions must be made on both sides.

He would mention only the probable consequences of rejecting the Treaty. The disposition of the two nations towards each other at the time of entering into negotiation was well known. The spoliations and injuries done to the American vessels had wound up American resentment to the highest pitch. Happily for America, Britain saw cause to change her system of aggression. He believed, with some other gentlemen, that Britain had not only formed the plan of crushing the rising liberties of France, but also of extending her views to America; but, from a reverse of fortune, she found it necessary to employ all her resources against France. There was another thing, the people of England were clamorous on account of the injuries done to the vessels of America; they were seen to be unjust, and were publicly reprobated. These circumstances were favorable to our negotiation, and he believed they could at no time have got a better Treaty, than at the time the present was agreed upon.

He said, they had only three alternatives. Either to give aid to the Treaty, continue to bear the insults of Great Britain, or else to determine resolutely on the dernier resort, war.

Mr. Griswold said, that in his opinion, the extensive view which the committee were taking of the merits of the Treaty with Great Britain was unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States; that he did not believe any part of the Treaty-making power had been delegated to the House of Representatives; and that the committee might with as much propriety examine the merits of the constitution itself, for the purpose of deciding whether they would execute it or not, as to examine the Treaty in the manner which had been adopted in the committee. He had, on a former occasion, delivered his opinions on that subject, and he would not attempt to repeat them; but since the committee had thought proper to take an extensive view of the merits of the Treaty, he would follow the example which had been set him, and submit a few observations upon that subject—more particularly as he believed that no discussion would prove injurious to that instrument. He should not, however, attempt to take a very extensive view of the subject, as gentlemen who had preceded him had exhausted almost every part of the subject and left little to be said at that period of the debate.

Mr. G. said the Treaty embraced three great objects:

1. The execution of those parts of the Treaty of 1783, which remained unexecuted.

2. The settlement of disputes.

3. Stipulations for regulating the commercial and other intercourse between the two nations.

He said that it would be agreed on every side of the House that these objects were important; and if they had been justly and fairly secured by the stipulations of the Treaty, it would not be said that the committee ought to feel dissatisfied with that instrument. He believed that this was really the case, and that the United States had no just cause to complain of the terms therein contained.

Several objections, however, had been made to that part of the Treaty which provided for the execution of the Treaty of 1783. It had been said that this Treaty did not provide for every part of the Treaty of Peace which remained unexecuted; and that conditions were annexed to the execution of those parts of that Treaty which had been provided for highly injurious to the interest of the United States. He said, if those objections were well founded, they formed a very serious objection to the present Treaty: but he could not find them by comparing or examining the two Treaties. The only article of the Treaty of Peace which it was said had been violated by the British Government, and was not provided for by the present Treaty, was that which respected the negroes and other property of the American inhabitants. He said he would not detain the committee with many remarks on this part of the subject, as it had been very fully and ably explained by gentlemen who had gone before him: he only mentioned it for the purpose of reading that part of the journal of Mr. Adams, one of the American negotiators of the peace, which immediately related to this subject. The same journal had been already read by different gentlemen, in detached parts, but he wished to bring the whole journal at one view before the committee. He said, however, that he ought to repeat what had been already said on the floor, that the article in question did not want any exterior aid to assist the committee with an explanation. The words of the article were certain and explicit; they declared that the evacuation should be made "without carrying away any negroes or other property belonging to the American inhabitants;" and as it was universally agreed that the negroes who had been carried away consisted either of those who had fled from their masters during the war, on a promise of emancipation, or of those who had been taken as plunder in the period of hostility, no doubt could exist but that in all those cases the property in the negroes was changed; that they were no longer the property of American inhabitants, and of course it was no violation of the Treaty to carry them away. And whatever might have since been said on that subject, he was convinced that the American Commissioners, at the close of the negotiation, had no idea of including in the Treaty of Peace a stipulation to secure a restoration of negroes then in the possession of the British army. To evince this fact, he said he would now read the journal he had before alluded to. [He read some paragraphs from that journal.]

Mr. G. said that it appeared, from the journal he had read, on what ground the negotiation respecting the negroes stood. The British agent claimed a restitution of confiscated estates. To rebut this demand, the American Commissioners, among other things, claimed compensation for negroes and other property which had been taken as plunder in different periods of the war. Finding, however, that no agreement could be obtained on these contested points, they were all relinquished as impracticable; and the claim for negroes, which had been made for no other purpose than to rebut the claim for confiscated estates, was given up of course, and, at the moment of signing the Treaty, the article in question was inserted—not to secure a restitution of property which had been changed by the events of the war, but to secure by stipulation, that the evacuations should be made without any destruction, or carrying away property really belonging to the American inhabitants. He said that it had always been a matter of surprise to him that any gentleman had put a different construction on this article; and he thought the parties had done wisely in excluding from the present Treaty a claim which did not possess even the shadow of justice.

Mr. Gallatin said he would not follow some of the gentlemen who had preceded him, by dwelling upon the discretion of the Legislature—a question which had already been the subject of their deliberation, and been decided by a solemn vote. Gentlemen who had been in the minority on that question might give any construction they pleased to the declaratory resolution of the House; they might again repeat that, to refuse to carry the Treaty into effect, was a breach of the public faith, which they conceived as being pledged by the President and Senate. This had been the ground on which a difference of opinion had existed since the beginning of the discussion. It was because the House thought the faith of the nation could not, on those subjects submitted to the power of Congress, be pledged by any constituted authority other than the Legislature, that they had resolved that, in all such cases, it was their right and duty to consider the expediency of carrying a Treaty into effect. If the House thought the faith of the nation already pledged, they could not claim any discretion; there would be no room left to deliberate upon the expediency of the thing. The resolution now under consideration was merely "that it was expedient to carry the British Treaty into effect," and not whether they were bound by national faith to do it. He would, therefore, consider the question of expediency alone; and, thinking as he did, that the House had full discretion on the subject, he conceived that there was as much responsibility in deciding in the affirmative as in rejecting the resolution; that they would be equally answerable for the consequences that might follow from either.

It was, however, true that there was a great difference between the situation of this country in the year 1794, when a negotiator was appointed, and that in which we were at present; and that consequences would follow the refusal to carry into effect the Treaty in its present stage, which would not have attended a refusal to negotiate, and enter into such a Treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumed before them a different and more complex shape than when before the negotiator, the Senate, or the President. The Treaty, in itself, and abstractedly considered, might be injurious; it might be such an instrument as, in the opinion of the House, ought not to have been adopted by the Executive; and yet, such as it was, they might think it expedient, under the present circumstances, to carry it into effect. He would, therefore, first take a view of the provisions of the Treaty itself, and in the next place, supposing it injurious, consider, in case it was not carried into effect, what would be the natural consequences of such refusal.

The provisions of the Treaty relate either to the adjustment of past differences or to the future intercourse of the two nations. The differences now existing between Great Britain and this country arose either from the non-execution of some articles of the Treaty of Peace, or from the effects of the present European war. The complaints of Britain in relation to the Treaty of 1783 were confined to the legal impediments thrown by the several States in the way of the recovery of British debts. The late Treaty had provided adequate remedy on that subject; the United States were bound to make full and complete compensation for any losses arising from that source, and every ground of complaint on the part of Great Britain was removed.

Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America had a right to expect that equal attention should be paid to her claims arising from infractions of the Treaty of Peace, viz: compensation for the negroes carried away by the British; restoration of the Western posts, and indemnification for their detention.

On the subject of the first claim, which had been objected to as groundless, he would observe, that he was not satisfied that the construction given by the British Government to that article of the Treaty was justified even by the letter of the article. That construction rested on the supposition that slaves came under the general denomination of booty, and were alienated the moment they fell in the possession of an enemy, so that all those who were in the hands of the British when the Treaty of Peace was signed, must be considered as British, and not American property, and were not included in the article. It would however appear by recurring to Vattel, when speaking of the right of postliminium, that slaves were not considered as part of the booty which was alienated by the act of capture, and that they were ranked rather with real property, to the profits of which only the captors were entitled. Be that as it may, there was no doubt that the construction given by America was that which had been understood by the parties at the time of making the Treaty. The journals of Mr. Adams, quoted by a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Coit) proved this fully; for when he says that the insertion of this article was alone worth the journey of Mr. Laurens from London, can it be supposed that he would have laid so much stress on a clause which, according to the new construction now attempted to be given, meant only that the British would commit no new act of hostility? would not carry away slaves at that time in possession of Americans? Congress had recognized that construction by adopting the resolution which had been already quoted, and which was introduced upon the motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and it had not been denied that the British Ministry, during Mr. Adams's embassy, had also agreed to it.

But when our negotiator had, for the sake of peace, waived that claim; when he had also abandoned the right which America had to demand an indemnification for the detention of the posts, although he had conceded the right of a similar nature, which Great Britain had for the detention of debt; when he had thus given up every thing which might be supposed to be of a doubtful nature, it might have been hoped that our last claim—a claim on which there was not and there never had been any dispute—the Western posts should have been restored according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace. Upon what ground the British had insisted, and our negotiator conceded, that this late restitution should be saddled with new conditions, which made no part of the original contract, Mr. G. was at a loss to know. British traders were all allowed, by the new Treaty, to remain within the posts without becoming citizens of the United States, and to carry on trade and commerce with the Indians living within our boundaries, without being subject to any control from our Government. In vain was it said, that if that clause had not been inserted we would have found it our interest to effect it by our own laws. Of this we were alone competent judges; if that condition was harmless at present, it was not possible to foresee whether, under future circumstances, it would not prove highly injurious; and, whether harmless or not, it was not less a permanent and new condition imposed upon us. But the fact was, that by the introduction of that clause, by obliging us to keep within our jurisdiction, as British subjects, the very men who had been the instruments used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our frontiers,—by obliging us to suffer those men to continue their commerce with Indians living in our territory, uncontrolled by those regulations, which we had thought necessary, in order to restrain our own citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great Britain had preserved her full influence with the Indian nations; by a restoration of the posts under that condition, we had lost the greatest advantage that was expected from their possession, viz: future security against the Indians. In the same manner had the British preserved the commercial advantages which resulted from the occupancy of these posts, by stipulating as a permanent condition a free passage for their goods across our portages, without paying any duty.

The remaining provisions of the Treaty had no connection with past differences; they made no part of the Convention which had been the avowed object of Mr. Jay's mission; they applied solely to the future intercourse of the two nations as relating to commerce and navigation; and had they been entirely omitted, our differences would have been nevertheless adjusted. It was agreed on all hands, that so far as related to our commerce with Great Britain, we wanted no Treaty. The intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties, was more immediately necessary to England, and her own interest was a sufficient pledge of her granting us at all times a perfect liberty of commerce to her European ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in order to obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and some general security in our navigation.

The twelfth and thirteenth articles had been obtained by our negotiator with a view to the first object. The twelfth article, however, which related to our intercourse with the West Indies, was found, upon examination, to be accompanied by a restriction of such a nature, that what had been granted by Great Britain as a favor, was rejected by the Senate as highly injurious. The thirteenth article, which related to the East Indies, and remained part of the Treaty, was, like the twelfth, conferring a favor limited by restrictions, and so far as he could depend upon the opinion of the best-informed judges on that subject, those restrictions put the trade in a more disadvantageous situation than it was before the Treaty. As the West India article had declared that we should not re-export any produce of those islands to Europe, so the East India article, at the same time it granted us the privilege, which we enjoyed before, and which we enjoyed because it was the interest of the East India Company to grant it to us, that of being admitted in the British seaports there, had forbidden our carrying any articles from thence to any place except to America; which regulation amounted to a total prohibition to export East India articles to China, or to obtain freights back to Europe; and, upon the whole, he could not help thinking, from what had fallen on that floor, and what he had heard elsewhere from gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the East India commerce had been as generally understood in America as the West India trade, that so much boasted of article would have met the same fate in the Senate with the twelfth article.

During the American war, in the year 1780, so fully convinced were the neutral nations of the necessity of introducing that doctrine of free bottom making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portugal, who was in a state of vassalage to, and a mere appendage of Great Britain, had united in order to establish the principle, and had formed for that purpose the alliance known by the name of the Armed Neutrality. All the belligerent powers, except England, had recognized and agreed to the doctrine. England itself had been obliged, in some measure, to give for a while a tacit acquiescence. America had completely, at the time, admitted the principle, although they were then at war, [Mr. G. quoted on this subject the Journals of Congress of the year 1780, page 210, and of the year 1781, page 80,] and it had been introduced in every other Treaty we had concluded since our existence as a nation. Since the year 1780, every nation, so far as his knowledge went, had refused to enter into a Treaty of Commerce with England, unless that provision was inserted. Russia, for that reason, would not renew their Treaty, which had expired in 1786, although he believed that, during the present war, and in order to answer the ends of the war, they had formed a temporary convention, which he had not seen, but which, perhaps, did not include that provision. England had consented to it in their Treaty with France in 1788, and we were the first neutral nation who abandoned the common cause, gave up the claim, and, by a positive declaration inserted in our Treaty, had recognized the contrary doctrine. It had been said, that under the present circumstances, it could not be expected that Great Britain would give up the point: perhaps so; but the objection was not, that our negotiator had not been able to obtain that doctrine, but that he had consented to enter into a Treaty of Commerce (which we did not want, and which had no connection with an adjustment of our differences with Great Britain) without the principle contended for making part of that Treaty. Unless we could obtain security for our navigation, we wanted no Treaty; and the only provision which could give us that security, should have been the sine qua non of a Treaty. On the contrary, we had disgusted all the other neutral nations of Europe, without whose concert and assistance there was but little hope that we should ever obtain that point, and we had taught Great Britain that we were disposed to form the most intimate connections with her, even at the expense of recognizing the principle the most fatal to the liberty of commerce, and to the security of our navigation.

Mr. G. was not going to enter into a discussion of the immorality of sequestering private property. What could be more immoral than war? or the plundering of the high seas legalized under the name of privateering? Yet self-defence justified the first, and the necessity of the case might, at least in some instances, and where it was the only practicable mode of warfare left to a nation, apologize even for the last. In the same manner the power of sequestration might be resorted to, as the last weapon of self-defence, rather than to seek redress by an appeal to arms. It was the last peace-measure that could be taken by a nation; but the Treaty, by declaring that in case of national differences it should not be resorted to, had deprived us of the power of judging of its propriety, had rendered it an act of hostility, and had effectually taken off that restraint which a fear of its exercise laid upon Great Britain.

Thus it appeared that, by the Treaty, we had promised full compensation to England for every possible claim they might have against us, that we had abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we had consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new conditions and restrictions never before contemplated. That, after having obtained, by those concessions, an adjustment of past differences, we had entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those objects, which had heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations; and that, by that Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, we had obtained no commercial advantage which we did not enjoy before; we had obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we had parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of self-defence, which was calculated to give us any security.

From the review he had taken of the Treaty, and the opinions he had expressed, Mr. G. said, it was hardly necessary for him to add that he looked upon the instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and that he earnestly wished it never had been made; but whether, in its present stage, the House ought to refuse to carry it into effect, and what would be the probable consequences of a refusal, was a question which required the most serious attention, and which he would now attempt to investigate.

Should the Treaty be finally defeated, either new negotiations would be more successful, or Great Britain would refuse to make a new arrangement, and leave things in the situation in which they were, or war would be the consequence. Mr. G. said that he would, in the course of his observations, make some remarks on the last supposition; he did not think that the first would be very probable at present, and he was of opinion that, under the present circumstances, and until some change took place in our own or in the relative political situation of the European nations, it was to be apprehended that, in such a case, new negotiations would either be rejected or prove unsuccessful. Such an event would have perhaps followed a rejection of the Treaty even by the Senate or by the President. After the negotiator employed by the United States had once affixed his signature, it must have become very problematical, unless he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he had made would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a new Treaty. He conceived that the hopes of obtaining better conditions, by a new negotiation, were much less in the present stage of the business than they had been when the Treaty was in its inchoate form before the Executive; and in order to have a just idea of the consequences of a rejection at present, he would contemplate them upon that supposition which appeared to him most probable, viz: that no new Treaty would take place for a certain period of time.

As he was not sensible that a single commercial advantage had been obtained by the Treaty, he could not mention the loss of any, as a mischief that would attend its rejection. If, however, the East India article was supposed to be beneficial, it must, on the other hand, be conceded that we had enjoyed every benefit arising from it for a number of years, without Treaty, and consequently, because it was the interest of the East India Company that we should enjoy them; and that it was not probable that circumstances would so far change there, during the short period to which that article was limited, as to induce that Company to adopt a different policy towards us.

But it was said that war must be the consequence of our delaying to carry the Treaty into effect. Did the gentlemen mean that, if we rejected the Treaty, if we did not accept the reparation there given to us, in order to obtain redress, we had no alternative left but war? If we must go to war in order to obtain reparation for insults and spoliations on our trade, we must do it, even if we carry the present Treaty into effect; for the Treaty gives us no reparation for the aggressions committed since it was ratified, has not produced a discontinuance of those acts of hostility, and gives us no security that they shall be discontinued. But the argument of those gentlemen, who supposed that America must go to war, applied to a final rejection of the Treaty, and not to a delay. He did not propose to refuse the reparation offered by the Treaty, and to put up with the aggressions committed; he had agreed that that reparation, such as it was, was a valuable article of the Treaty; he had agreed that, under the present circumstances, a greater evil would follow a total rejection than an acquiescence to the Treaty. The only measure which had been mentioned in preference to the one now under discussion, was a suspension, a postponement whilst the present spoliations continued, in hopes to obtain for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they would cease.

But, was it meant to insinuate that it was the final intention of those who pretended to wish only for a postponement, to involve this country in a war? There was no period of the present European war at which it would not have been weak and wicked to adopt such measures as must involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake of self-defence; but, at this time, to think of it, would fall but little short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to the idea; and it might, at least, have been recollected that war could not be declared except by Congress, and that two of the branches of Government were sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of that kind.

But to the cry of war, the alarmists did not fail to add that of confusion; and they had declared, even on this floor, that if the resolution was not adopted, Government would be dissolved. Government dissolved in case a postponement took place! This idea was too absurd to deserve a direct answer. But he would ask those gentlemen, by whom the Government was to be dissolved? Certainly not by those who would vote against the resolution; for, although they were not, perhaps, fortunate enough to have obtained the confidence of the gentleman who voted against them, still, it must be agreed, that those who succeeded in their wishes, who defeated a measure they disliked, would not wish to destroy that Government, which they held, so far, in their hands, as to be able to carry their own measures. For them to dissolve the Government would be to dissolve their own power. By whom, then, he would ask again, was the Government to be dissolved? The gentlemen must answer, by themselves, or they must declare that they meant nothing but to alarm. Was it really the language of those men, who professed to be, who distinguished themselves by the self-assumed appellation of friends to order, that if they did not succeed in all their measures, they would overset the Government? And had all their professions been only a veil to hide their love of power? a pretence to cover their ambition? Did they mean, that the first event which would put an end to their own authority should be the last act of Government? As to himself, he did not believe that they had such an intention; he had too good an opinion of their patriotism to permit himself to admit such an idea for a single moment; but he thought himself justifiable in entertaining a belief, that some amongst them, in order to carry a favorite, and what they thought to be an advantageous measure, meant to spread an alarm, which they did not feel; and he had no doubt that many had contracted such a habit of carrying every measure of Government as they pleased, that they really thought that every thing must be thrown into confusion the moment they were thwarted in a matter of importance. He hoped that experience would, in future, cure their fears. But, at all events, be the wishes and intentions of the members of this House what they may, it was not in their power to dissolve the Government. The people of the United States, from one end of the continent to the other, were strongly attached to their constitution; they would restrain and punish the excesses of any party, of any set of men in the Government, who would be guilty of the attempt; and on them he would rest as a full security against every endeavor to destroy our Union, our constitution, or our Government.

But, although he was not afraid of a dissolution, he felt how highly desirable a more general union of sentiment would be; he felt the importance of an agreement of opinion between the different branches of Government, and even between the members of the same branch. He would sacrifice much to obtain that object; it had been one of the most urging motives with him to be in favor, not of a rejection, but only of a suspension, of a delay. But even as a matter of opinion, it was difficult to say which mode of proceeding, in this House, would best accord with the general sentiments of the people. So far as related to the petitions before them, the number of signatures against the Treaty exceeded, at the moment he was speaking, the number of those in favor of the Treaty.

True it was, that an alarm which had produced a combination, had lately taken place amongst the merchants of this and some other seaports. What effect it would have, and how successful they would eventually be, in spreading this alarm amongst the people at large, he could not tell; but there were circumstances accompanying their petition, which, in his opinion, much diminished the weight they otherwise might have had. They had, undoubtedly, a right to petition upon every public measure, where they thought themselves interested, and their petitions would deserve equal regard, with those of their fellow-citizens throughout the United States. But on this occasion, in order to create an alarm, in order to induce the people to join them, in order to force the House to pass the laws relative to the Treaty, they had formed a dangerous combination, and affected to cease insuring vessels, purchasing produce, and transacting any business. A gentleman from New York (Mr. Williams) had been so much alarmed himself, that he had predicted a fall in the price of every kind of produce, and seems, indeed, to have supposed, that the clamors of a few individuals here would either put an end to, or satisfy the wants of those nations which depended on us for supplies of provisions. Yet, it had so happened, and it was a complete proof that the whole was only an alarm, that whilst they were debating, the price of flour, which was of very dull sale two weeks ago, had risen in equal proportion with the supposed fears of the purchasers.

He could not help considering the cry of war, the threats of a dissolution of Government, and the present alarm, as designed for the same purpose, that of making an impression on the fears of this House. It was through the fear of being involved in a war, that the negotiation with Great Britain had originated; under the impression of fear, the Treaty had been negotiated and signed; a fear of the same danger, that of war, had promoted its ratification; and now, every imaginary mischief which could alarm our fears, was conjured up, in order to deprive us of that discretion, which this House thought they had a right to exercise, and in order to force us to carry the Treaty into effect.

The Son of the Marquis Lafayette.

Mr. Livingston, Chairman of the committee for carrying into effect a resolution respecting the son of the Marquis Lafayette, reported that he had arrived in this country; that he had received the patronage of the President of the United States; that he was in New Jersey for education, and to show that he had no occasion for pecuniary assistance, the committee subjoin a well-written, affecting letter to the Chairman of the committee, in answer to one from him, expressive of his gratitude for the kind attention shown to him by the Legislature of the United States, by the President, and to every person to whom he was made known; that he had no wants; that he was as happy as he could be; that if he should in future have occasion for assistance, he would apply to Congress, who had been so kind and attentive to his welfare.[77]

Thursday, April 28.

Execution of British Treaty.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union; when, the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect being under consideration——

Mr. Preston rose and spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman, I voted for the question yesterday, for the first time since this discussion began. I was then prepared to give my opinion, but, since the House has thought proper to devote another day to this important subject, I will take the liberty to offer my sentiments, and claim the indulgence of the committee for this purpose. I make this claim for their indulgence with the more confidence, as I have heretofore occupied but little of the time of the House on any occasion, and as I mean to be short on the present—not intending to take that comprehensive view of the subject which many gentlemen have done who have preceded me. With this apology I will proceed, conceiving, however that no apology is necessary on this or any other occasion where our duty impels us to come forward. But I must confess it has been painful to me to hear the recriminations that have taken place on this occasion. I had hoped, on a subject so important, on which it is said the peace and happiness of this our common country rests—whose welfare must be equally dear to all—that temperance and calmness would have marked our deliberations; that all our efforts would have been made to enlighten the minds and convince the judgments of each other, instead of lessening one another in our estimation, and that of our constituents, by dishonorable imputations, and which, I trust, every member would spurn. As to myself, Mr. Chairman, I stand here regardless of any imputations that ill-nature may cast upon me in this House, or abuse which may be conferred without doors. I shall not be deterred from pronouncing that opinion which my best reflections have enabled me to form.

Sir, in considering this subject, I had hoped every information possessed by any of the departments of Government would have been freely afforded us; and I cannot but lament that the President, by a too strict adherence to what he has supposed to be his constitutional duty, refused the request of this House for certain papers, which request seemed to me not only proper, but innocent—proper, because they might have afforded information that would reconcile many of the objections entertained of the Treaty, and finally produce its adoption; it was innocent, because, if there was no unfair procedure respecting this business, why not publish the transaction to the world—at all events to the Representatives of the people, who, it is acknowledged by all, were not only to act on the Treaty in some way, but were intrusted with the management of some of the dearest rights of their fellow-countrymen? If, then, the people confide in us such important concerns, might not the Executive have reposed some degree of confidence, and complied with a request so decorously and respectfully made? But he has told us his duty forbids it. We are then reduced to the necessity to judge of the thing from the face of it, without the wished-for information. And I must confess it has always presented such a hideous and deformed aspect to my mind, that I have ever disliked it—which, together with the unfriendly sentiments of my constituents to it, has produced my prejudices. But I had determined, as the President and Senate had ratified it, and many approved it, to keep my mind open for every information the subject was capable of. As, then, none has been offered to operate a change of my opinion, and as the most likely source is shut against us, my prejudices, instead of being lessened, have become firmly fixed in the opposition.

But we are told the British committed no infraction of the Treaty of 1783, by withholding the posts; for we, having thrown legal impediments in the way of the recovery of their debts, became the first infractors thereof, whereby they were left free to comply or not. Let us, for a moment, inquire into this fact. By the 4th article of that Treaty, creditors on either side were to meet with no legal impediment to the recovery of their debts. By the 7th article of the same Treaty, His Majesty was, with all convenient speed, to withdraw his armies and garrisons from every post and place. Now, sir, on comparing these articles, can it be presumed by any one that the latter stipulation was to remain unexecuted until the creditors recovered their debts? Was it to remain as a pledge for the performance of the other? No one can entertain the idea for a moment. Suppose the creditors had gone on in the collection of their debts without interruption, would it be said that the stipulations of the 7th article would be suspended until all the creditors were wholly satisfied? It is absurd, particularly when we reflect that the commissioners who negotiated that Treaty must have contemplated the recovery of those debts by lawsuits; therefore, if the latter clause was intended to coerce the former, we would certainly not have had the insertion of the words "with all convenient speed," which implies an early compliance. If the opposite construction was just, I would venture to say, the British Government would never have agreed to surrender the posts, but in consequence of such concessions as it now gets; for it would have the advantages of the fur trade, and the faith of this country pledged for the payment of the debts, which were accumulating by interest. This was a pleasing situation; but what was the situation of the British debtors? Deprived of their negroes, which were to be returned by the Treaty; deprived of the advantages of the trade with the Indians, whereby they might be enabling themselves to discharge those debts; harassed and worn down with taxation, to support the Indian wars excited by their creditors. In this situation of things, was it not natural for them to look around for security or indemnity against these evils; and would any thing more naturally present itself, than withholding the payment of the money to the very cause of these evils? None, sir; and I cannot conceive it so dishonorable as some gentlemen pretend to view it.

But, sir, I will endeavor to show that the laws which were enacted by States for prohibiting the recovery of the British debts, were not an infraction of the Treaty of 1783. By the little book, which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) says is so precious, and which he hopes will be preserved for some time to come, we find that Mr. Jefferson has, in consequence of complaints from the British Minister, respecting the impediments to the recovery of British debts, inquired into the facts, in those States where the complaints originated; the result of these inquiries was, that though there were State laws prohibiting, yet a number of gentlemen, of the first abilities and great integrity,—generally professional characters, and who have been engaged in proceedings of this kind,—certify, that wherever attempts were made to recover these debts, they have met with no more obstruction than other creditors. Besides, those gentlemen were generally of opinion that, on the final ratification of the Treaty of 1783, it repealed all laws at variance with it. If, then, it had such a powerful attribute as to repeal former laws, it follows as a consequence, that subsequent laws opposing it were mere nullities. These opinions were cited the other day by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick,) and relied on. I hope they will have their due weight on the application now to be made of them. So that, on the whole, it does appear to me the British creditor had nothing more to struggle with than other creditors had, except the well-founded prejudices imbibed by our countrymen against that nation, which, though the laws might in some measure correct, they could never eradicate. That these prejudices have produced irregularities in many instances and delay of collections, I have no doubt; but from the nature of things it is well known no foresight or protection could guard against it. Indeed, they might have been expected, for can it be supposed that men would stand calmly and see their families reduced to penury and want by an unrelenting British creditor, who had aided to impair the very means of his debtor to pay, and whose Government was by their acts daily increasing the evils, by exciting the Indians to war against us, whereby our citizens were borne down with burdens to defend themselves? I say, would not such reflections, with ruin before our eyes, produce a degree of irritation in the most calm amongst us? I owe none of these debts, I never did, and I never will, if I can help it. I spurn the idea of involving my country in a debt of an incalculable amount, when millions of them never received any benefit thereby. It is wrong, it is unjust. I again repeat, that it does appear to me, on an impartial view of this subject, that the United States are not chargeable with the first infraction of the Treaty of 1783, and that therefore, we are not bound now to enter into a compact which appears to me to be warranted neither by the principles of reciprocity nor justice.

But I undertake to say, and with some confidence too, that Great Britain committed the first infraction of that Treaty, by withholding the posts, and also carrying away the negroes, which she had expressly stipulated to give up; and, to my astonishment, it is now contended that the taking away the negroes was not a violation of the Treaty, as they came into their possession by the rights of war, and being deemed property were vested in the captors. Admit, for a moment, they were that kind of property, and they became as much the property of their captors as any they had possessed themselves of in the same way, what then? Certainly, that it followed of course, they had a right to dispose of them in any way they chose, either to emancipate them, retain them in slavery for their own use, or return them to their original owners. Which of these alternatives have they elected to do? [Here he read the following sentence from the Treaty of 1783.] "And His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies," &c., &c. Now, sir, was not the carrying away the negroes a violation of this article? All America once thought so. No other construction ever entered the head of man till this Treaty appeared; owners so construed it, and in virtue thereof made demands. Congress, and even "Camillus," once thought so, and so they declared it in the most solemn manner. And so it would be construed by all descriptions of people, from the schoolboy to the Senator, to use the expression of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Cooper,) had our minds remained in the same state they were in a dozen years ago. Sir, if there be modern constructions of the constitution, I will venture to say there is the same of Treaties. But another clause of the same article justifies my construction, to wit: the leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein. Gentlemen will hardly say this means fortifications garrisoned by American soldiery; this would be absurd, for it is pretty well known that American artillery guarded itself better than British Treaties did. Was not this artillery, which had fallen into the hands of the enemy, a vested property, till the chances of war or the Treaty had made a disposal thereof? Unquestionably it was. Were not the archives, records, deeds, &c., which had also fallen into the hands of the enemy, their property? There can be no doubt of it. Yet we find these things stipulated to be given up.

If, then, they chose to yield one species of property, might they not another? But, it is said, the negroes were not our property at the time of signing the Treaty; so neither did the archives, records, &c., belong to the States—they were the property of the enemy; but certainly the British Minister had as much right to stipulate for the return of the one as for the other, and he has in as explicit terms. This must have been the understanding of the commissioners who negotiated that Treaty, although one of them has been traced to his slumbers, the evening before the sealing the Treaty, for a different construction. So that, in this instance, the British have certainly committed the first infraction, by carrying off the negroes. And is it not extraordinary that, notwithstanding this, no claim is made for them, and yet we are bound to pay the British debts, when the very means of doing it are taken from the debtor by the creditor? Sir, this is a serious oppression, and though not of a very great magnitude, will nevertheless be felt in an interesting manner, and if submitted to will be so under much disquietude.

But the rejection of the Treaty is tremendously alarming, indeed. War, and war's alarms, are echoed on all sides. We shall be attacked on one side by savage barbarity; up the Mediterranean by Algerine cruelty; our commerce prostrated, and our cities laid under contribution by the British. In short, the dogs of war let loose on us, and America, once happy America, will become the scene of bloodshed and desolation. Great God! What man is there here that can be wicked enough to involve his country in such incalculable miseries? Who has firmness enough to meet so foul a deed? Particularly when we reflect on the dreadful act we are about to do, that will produce such scenes of horror and devastation! namely, refuse to accept a bargain derogatory to our national honor! This, sir, is to produce the dreadful catastrophe. But the measure of woe is not yet filled. There will be disunion; and American citizens will become American enemies, imbruing their hands in each other's blood. Civil wars will rend our happy country. Heavens! What a shock to suffering humanity here will be! And all about some commercial regulations and political differences with a foreign nation, who, I believe, in principle, is our inveterate enemy.

Mr. Chairman, I am one who, though I have but little confidence in the British Government, yet I cannot believe that she, or any other nation on earth, is so arrogant, and lost to every principle of humanity, as to go into such dreadful excesses, because we will not enter into a contract that will suit her interest. I fear war as much as any man, when a pretext is given; but can it be seriously said a rejection of this Treaty is a cause of war? I cannot believe that such can possibly be the event.

As to disunion, it is idle to talk of it; for I do believe if, instead of a minority of this House, every man in it were to return home full of spleen and disappointment, and were to use every exertion, every artifice in their power, to bring about a disunion, they would fail in so traitorous an attempt. The people, sir, would scoff them, would turn them out of office, and place therein more deserving characters.

As then, Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that war or disunion will be the result of a rejection of the Treaty, and as I think it is one from which we ought to withhold our assent, I must give it my negative. And if, in this, time shall prove me wrong, I shall lament the error with the greatest sincerity, but I shall have the pleasing consolation to know it was an error of the head, and not of the heart.

When Mr. Preston had taken his seat—

Mr. Ames rose, and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I entertain the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my strength will hold me out to speak a few minutes.

In my judgment, a right decision will depend more on the temper and manner with which we may prevail on ourselves to contemplate the subject, than upon the development of any profound political principles, or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If we should succeed to neutralize our inclinations, we should find less difficulty than we have to apprehend in surmounting all our objections.

The suggestion, a few days ago, that the House manifested symptoms of heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought to create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to ourselves, and to the occasion. Let us not affect to deny the existence and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling into the debate, when, from the very structure of our nature, we ought to anticipate the circumstance as a probability, and when we are admonished by the evidence of our senses that it is a fact.

How can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to the House, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no guide respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears.

Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability and effect; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been left unexplored? It has been ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and when that attempt failed, to awaken the sensibilities that would require none. Every prejudice and feeling have been summoned to listen to some particular style of address; and yet we seem to believe, and to consider a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence but that of unbiased reason.

It would be strange that a subject which has roused in turn all the passions of the country, should be discussed without the interference of any of our own. We are men, and, therefore, not exempt from those passions; as citizens and Representatives, we feel the interest that must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to agitate strong passions: we are not disinterested, it is impossible we should be dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may becloud the judgment, and, for a time, pervert the understanding; but the public sensibility and our own, has sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation to the debate. The public attention has been quickened to mark the progress of the discussion, and its judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impressions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our result will, I hope, on that account, be the safer and more mature, as well as more accordant with that of the nation. The only constant agents in political affairs are the passions of men—shall we complain of our nature? Shall we say that man ought to have been made otherwise? It is right already, because He, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it so; and because thus made, and thus acting, the cause of truth and the public good is the more surely promoted.

But an attempt has been made to produce an influence of a nature more stubborn and more unfriendly to truth. It is very unfairly pretended that the constitutional right of this House is at stake, and to be asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We hear it said that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against the design to nullify this assembly, and to make it a cypher in the Government. That the President and Senate, the numerous meetings in the cities, and the influence of the general alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion and terror, to force the Treaty down our throats, though we loathe it, and in spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.

It is necessary to pause here and inquire, whether suggestions of this kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabric, and pernicious in all their influences? They oppose an obstacle in the path of inquiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely insurmountable. They will not yield to argument; for, as they were not reasoned up, they cannot be reasoned down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in truth's way, and built of materials that are indestructible. While this remains, it is in vain to argue; it is in vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into the sea. For, I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they would not hold him for a blockhead that should hope to prevail in an argument whose scope and object it is to mortify the self-love of the expected proselyte? I ask, further, when such attempts have been made, have they not failed of success? The indignant heart repels a conviction that is believed to debase it.

The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, or more constant in its action, than what is called in French, l'esprit de corps, or the self-love of an assembly; that jealous affection which a body of men is always found to bear towards its own prerogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion. Why should we urge an unmeaning censure, or yield to groundless fears that truth and duty will be abandoned, because men in a public assembly are still men, and feel that spirit of corps which is one of the laws of their nature? Still less should we despond or complain, if we reflect that this very spirit is a guardian instinct that watches over the life of this assembly. It cherishes the principle of self-preservation; and, without its existence, and its existence with all the strength we see it possess, the privileges of the Representatives of the people, and immediately the liberties of the people, would not be guarded, as they are, with a vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing constancy and courage.

If the consequences, most unfairly attributed to the vote in the affirmative, were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive, I should think it a reproach to be found even moderate in my zeal to assert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and, whenever they shall be in real danger, the present occasion affords proof that there will be no want of advocates and champions.

Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and when once roused, so difficult to pacify, that, if we could prove the alarm was groundless, the prejudice against the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to negative a measure which was lately believed by ourselves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others, to encroach upon the powers of the House. Principles that bear a remote affinity with usurpation on those powers will be rejected, not merely as errors, but as wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a post where it is possible they may be wounded, and be inflamed by the slightest suspicion of an assault.

While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless; it may be heard with the ceremony of attention, and lavish its own resources, and the patience it wearies, to no manner of purpose. The ears may be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and every pass to the understanding guarded.

Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of the House can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing.

I cannot press this topic too far—I cannot address myself with too much emphasis to the magnanimity and candor of those who sit here, to suspect their own feelings, and while they do, to examine the grounds of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our persuasion, that this body has an interest in one side of the question more than the other, before we attempt to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we form our creed more from inclination than evidence.

Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of supposition and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this House; that the addresses which have been made with such variety of forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and deception, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness and simplicity.

It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us to struggle for our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortation to reject the proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to surrender them for ever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand, if the House will not concur in the measure to execute the Treaty, what other course shall we take? How many ways of proceeding lie open before us?

In the nature of things there are but three—we are either to make the Treaty—to observe it—or break it. It would be absurd to say we will do neither. If I may repeat a phrase, already so much abused, we are under coercion to do one of them, and we have no power, by the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the consequences of a choice.

By refusing to act, we choose. The Treaty will be broken, and fall to the ground. Where is the fitness, then, of replying to those who urge upon this House the topics of duty and policy, that they attempt to force the Treaty down, and to compel this assembly to renounce its discretion, and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and passive instrument in the hands of the Treaty-making power? In case we reject the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty of action, we gain no safer shelter than before, from the consequences of the decision. Indeed, they are not to be evaded. It is neither just nor manly to complain that the Treaty-making power has produced this coercion to act. It is not the art or the despotism of that power, it is the nature of things that compels. Shall we, dreading to become the blind instruments of power, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere sounds of imposture? Yet that word, that empty word, coercion, has given scope to an eloquence that, one would imagine, could not be tired, and did not choose to be quieted.

Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives that are before us, and we shall scarcely fail to see, in still stronger lights, the futility of our apprehensions for the power and liberty of the House.

If, as some have suggested, the thing called a Treaty is incomplete, if it has no binding force or obligation, the first question is, Will this House complete the instrument, and by concurring, impart to it that force which it wants?

The doctrine has been avowed, that the Treaty, though formally ratified by the Executive power of both nations, though published as a law for our own, by the President's Proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly no way distinguishable in point of authority or obligation from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many, precisely for the reason that, in the contention of power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms, as well as the fair interpretation of our own resolutions, (Mr. Blount's.) We declare that the Treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the President and Senate, and not in this House. Need I say that we fly in the face of that resolution when we pretend that the acts of that power are not valid until we have concurred in them? It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring contradiction and to claim a share in a power which we, at the same time, disclaim as exclusively vested in other departments.

What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the President and Senate with foreign nations are Treaties, without our agency, and yet those compacts want all power and obligation until they are sanctioned by our concurrence? It is not my design in this place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and, if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation.

But, say those who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous phrases, have we no discretion? And, if we have, are we not to make use of it in judging of the expediency or inexpediency of the Treaty? Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of duty.

If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not in making appropriations for the Treaty, but in the resolution itself, (Mr. Blount's.) Let us examine it more nearly. A Treaty is a bargain between nations binding in good faith; and what makes a bargain? The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that the Treaty power is not in this House; this House has no share in contracting, and is not a party; of consequence, the President and Senate alone may make a Treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, however, say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expediency of Treaties—that is the constitutional province of our discretion. Be it so—what follows? Treaties when adjudged by us to be inexpedient, fall to the ground, and the public faith is not hurt. This, incredible and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount of it, in plainer language, is this—the President and Senate are to make national bargains, and this House has nothing to do in making them. But bad bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable consequence, do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called a Treaty, is made, its binding force does not depend upon the making, but upon our opinion that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be known and declared only by ourselves, when sitting in our Legislative capacity, the Treaty, though ratified, and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung up in suspense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the bargain, and it falls, though, as we say, our faith does not. We approve a bargain as expedient, and it stands firm, and binds the nation. Yet, even in this latter case, its force is plainly not derived from the ratification by the Treaty-making power, but from our approbation. Who will trace these inferences, and pretend that we may have no share, according to the argument, in the Treaty-making power? These opinions, nevertheless, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perseverance. Is it possible that any man can be hardy enough to avow them, and their ridiculous consequences?

Let me hasten to suppose the Treaty is considered as already made, and then the alternative is fairly presented to the mind, whether we will observe the Treaty, or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question.

If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course is obvious. Whatever is stipulated to be done by the nation, must be complied with. Our agency, if it should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And I do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of conduct for the Legislature as for the Courts of Law.

I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the coercion, so much dreaded and declaimed against, appears at length to be no more than the authority of principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen complain that we are forced to act in this way, we are forced to swallow the Treaty. It is very true, unless we claim the liberty of abuse, the right to act as we ought not. There is but one way open for us, the laws of morality and good faith have fenced up every other. What sort of liberty is that which we presume to exercise against the authority of those laws! It is for tyrants to complain that principles are restraints, and that they have no liberty so long as their despotism has limits.

The consequences of refusing to make provision for the Treaty are not all to be foreseen. By rejecting, vast interests are committed to the sport of the winds, chance becomes the arbiter of events, and it is forbidden to human foresight to count their number, or measure their extent. Before we resolve to leap into this abyss, so dark and so profound, it becomes us to pause and reflect upon such of the dangers as are obvious and inevitable. If this assembly should be wrought into a temper to defy these consequences, it is vain, it is deceptive, to pretend that we can escape them. It is worse than weakness to say, that as to public faith our vote has already settled the question. Another tribunal than our own is already erected. The public opinion, not merely of our own country, but of the enlightened world, will pronounce judgment that we cannot resist, that we dare not even affect to despise.

Well may I urge it to men who know the worth of character, that it is no trivial calamity to have it contested. Refusing to do what the Treaty stipulates shall be done, opens the controversy. Even if we should stand justified at last, a character that is vindicated is something worse than it stood before, unquestioned and unquestionable. Like the plaintiff in an action of slander, we recover a reputation disfigured by invective, and even tarnished by too much handling. In the combat for the honor of the nation, it may receive some wounds, which, though they should heal, will leave some scars. I need not say, for surely the feelings of every bosom have anticipated, that we cannot guard this sense of national honor, this ever-living fire, which alone keeps patriotism warm in the heart, with a sensibility too vigilant and jealous. If, by executing the Treaty, there is no possibility of dishonor, and if by rejecting there is some foundation for doubt and for reproach, it is not for me to measure, it is for your own feelings to estimate the vast distance that divides the one side of the alternative from the other. If, therefore, we should enter on the examination of the question of duty and obligation with some feelings of prepossession, I do not hesitate to say, they are such as we ought to have; it is an after inquiry to determine whether they are such as ought finally to be resisted.

To expatiate on the value of public faith, may pass with some men for declamation; to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge, can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement? Can any thing tend more to make men think themselves mean, or degrade to a lower point their estimation of virtue and their standard of action? It would not merely demoralize mankind, it tends to break all the ligaments of society, to dissolve that mysterious charm which attracts individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense of shame and disgust.

What is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent preference because they are greener? No, sir; this is not the character of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of society, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see not the array of force and terror, but the venerable image of our country's honor. Every good citizen makes that honor his own, and cherishes it not only as precious but as sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defence, and is conscious that he gains protection while he gives it. For what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a State renounces the principles that constitute their security? Or, if his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country odious to the eyes of strangers and dishonored in his own? Could he look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent? The sense of having one would die within him; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He would be a banished man in his native land.

I see no exception to the respect that is paid among nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of politics—the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians that a whiff of tobacco-smoke or a string of beads gives not merely binding force, but sanctity, to Treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise or too just to disown and annul its obligation. Thus, we see neither the ignorance of savages, nor the principles of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows; if the victims of justice could live again, collect together, and form a society, they would, however loth, soon find themselves obliged to make justice—that justice under which they fell—the fundamental law of their State. They would perceive it was their interest to make others respect, and they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the obligations of good faith.

The refusal of the posts (inevitable, if we reject the Treaty) is a measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences. From great causes we are to look for great effects. A plain and obvious one will be, the price of the Western lands will fall. Settlers will not choose to fix their habitation on a field of battle. Those who talk so much of the interests of the United States, should calculate how deeply it will be affected by rejecting the Treaty—how vast a tract of wild land will almost cease to be property. This loss, let it be observed, will fall upon a fund expressly devoted to sink the National Debt. What then are we called upon to do? However the form of the vote and the protestations of many may disguise the proceeding, our resolution is in substance (and it deserves to wear the title of a resolution) to prevent the sale of the Western lands and the discharge of the public debt.

Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contrasted by any one? Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war till the negotiation with Britain was far advanced, and then the state of hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they are not. We ought not, however, to expect that neighboring nations, highly irritated against each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages. The traders will gain an influence, and will abuse it; and who is ignorant that their passions are easily raised, and hardly restrained from violence. Their situation will oblige them to choose between this country and Great Britain, in case the Treaty should be rejected. They will not be our friends, and at the same time the friends of our enemies.

But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this point? Certainly the very men who charged the Indian war on the detention of the posts will call for no other proof than the recital of their own speeches. It is remembered with what emphasis—with what acrimony—they expatiated on the burden of taxes, and the drain of blood and treasure into the Western country, in consequence of Britain's holding the posts. "Until the posts are restored," they exclaimed, "the Treasury and the frontiers must bleed."

If any, against all these proofs, should maintain that the peace with the Indians will be stable without the posts, to them I will urge another reply. From arguments calculated to produce conviction, I will appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask whether it is not already planted there? I resort especially to the convictions of the Western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no Treaty, the settlers will remain in security? Can they take it upon them to say that an Indian peace, under these circumstances, will prove firm. No, sir; it will not be peace, but a sword; it will be no better than a lure to draw victims within the reach of the tomahawk.

On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words for them—if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal—I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance it should reach every log-house beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, Wake from your false security! Your cruel dangers—your more cruel apprehensions—are soon to be renewed; the wounds, yet unhealed, are to be torn open again. In the day-time, your path through the woods will be ambushed; the darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father: the blood of your sons shall fatten your corn-field! You are a mother: the war-whoop shall wake the sleep of the cradle!

On this subject you need not suspect any deception on your feelings. It is a spectacle of horror which cannot be overdrawn. If you have nature in your hearts, it will speak a language compared with which all I have said or can say will be poor and frigid.

Will it be whispered that the Treaty has made me a new champion for the protection of the frontiers? It is known that my voice, as well as my vote, have been uniformly given in conformity with the ideas I have expressed. Protection is the right of the frontier: it is our duty to give it.

Who will accuse me of wandering out of the subject? Who will say that I exaggerate the tendencies of our measures? Will any one answer by a sneer, that all this is idle preaching? Will any one deny that we are bound—and I would hope to good purpose—by the most solemn sanctions of duty for the vote we give? Are despots alone to be reproached for unfeeling indifference to the tears and blood of their subjects? Are Republicans irresponsible? Have the principles on which you ground the reproach upon Cabinets and Kings no practical influence—no binding force? Are they merely themes of idle declamation, introduced to decorate the morality of a newspaper essay, or to furnish pretty topics of harangue from the windows of that State-house? I trust it is neither too presumptuous, nor too late to ask, can you put the dearest interest of society at risk without guilt, and without remorse?

It is vain to offer as an excuse, that public men are not to be reproached for the evils that may happen to ensue from their measures. This is very true, where they are unforeseen or inevitable. Those I have depicted are not unforeseen; they are so far from inevitable, we are going to bring them into being by our vote. We choose the consequences, and become as justly answerable for them as for the measure that we know will produce them.

By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires—we bind the victims. This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans whom our decision will make; to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake; to our country; and I do not deem it too serious to say, to conscience, and to God—we are answerable; and if duty be any thing more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our country.

There is no mistake in this case; there can be none. Experience has already been the prophet of events, and the cries of our future victims have already reached us. The Western inhabitants are not a silent and uncomplaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues from the shade of their wilderness. It exclaims that while one hand is held up to reject this Treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination to the scenes that will open. It is no great effort of the imagination to conceive, that events so near are already begun. I can fancy that I listen to the yells of savage vengeance, and the shrieks of torture. Already they seem to sigh in the west wind; already they mingle with every echo from the mountains.

Are the posts to remain for ever in the possession of Great Britain? Let those who reject them, when the Treaty offers them to our hands, say, if they choose, they are of no importance. If they are, will they take them by force? The argument I am urging would then come to a point. To use force, is war. To talk of Treaty again, is too absurd. Posts and redress must come from voluntary good will, Treaty, or war.

Such a state of things will exist, if we should long avoid war, as will be worse than war. Peace without security, accumulation of injury without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, contempt for ourselves, intestine discord and anarchy. Worse than this need not be apprehended, for if worse could happen, anarchy would bring it. Is this the peace gentlemen undertake, with such fearless confidence, to maintain? Is this the station of American dignity, which the high-spirited champions of our national independence and honor could endure; nay, which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for the country? What is there in the Treaty that could humble us so low? Are they the men to swallow their resentments, who so lately were choking with them? If in the case contemplated by them, it should be peace, I do not hesitate to declare it ought not to be peace.

Let me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready to respond on this prospect, by presenting another, which it is yet in our power to realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country without some desire for its continuance, without some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess, have preserved it? Will he not feel some dread that a change of system will reverse the scene? The well-grounded fears of our citizens in 1794 were removed by the Treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly inevitable, and would not this adjustment have been considered at that day as a happy escape from the calamity? The great interest, and the general desire of our people, was, to enjoy the advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented, affords America that inestimable security. The causes of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negotiation, after the end of the European war. This was gaining every thing, because it confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are gaining every thing. This alone would justify the engagements of the Government. For, when the fiery vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentered in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm. This Treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded at the same time the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it, the vivid colors will grow pale; it will be a baleful meteor, portending tempest and war.

Let us not hesitate, then, to agree to the appropriation to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and diffuse the spirit of confidence and enterprise that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement is wonderful, and, some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast, and, if peace and good government should be preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success. The rewards of exertion go to augment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed wheat, and is sown again to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of prosperity: and in this progress, what seems to be fiction, is found to fall short of experience.

Friday, April 29.

Execution of British Treaty.

Mr. Dayton (the Speaker) declared that he did by no means intend to follow the gentlemen who had conceived it advisable to enter into a discussion of the merits of the Treaty, article by article.

To those, he said, who regarded this second Treaty with Great Britain with disagreeable sensations—to those who believed that it did not contain in it such terms as the United States had reason to expect, and even a right to demand—to all those whose indignation had been excited at the unwarrantable outrages committed by that nation upon the rights of our neutral powers, who had seen their high-handed acts with astonishment, and the whole conduct of their administration towards this country with abhorrence—to those whose attachment for the French, nobly struggling for their liberties, was sincere, and who ardently wished that their revolution might terminate in the establishment of a good and stable government:—to all of this description, he could, with propriety, address himself, and say, that he harmonized with them in opinion, and that his feelings were in perfect unison with theirs. But if, he said, there should be found in that assembly one member, whose affection for any other nation exceeded that which he entertained for this, whose Representative he was—if there could even be found a single man whose hatred to any other country was greater than his love for America—him, he should consider as his enemy, hostile to the interests of the people who sent him there, utterly unqualified to judge rightly of their concerns, and a betrayer of the trust reposed in him. But, Mr. D. said, he could not believe it possible, that there were any such amongst them, and he was convinced that every one must see and feel the necessity of divesting himself of all his hatred, all his prejudices, and even all attachments that were in the least degree inconsistent with an unbiased deliberation and decision. The good and the prosperity of the people of the United States ought to be the primary object. It was that alone which their Representatives were delegated and commissioned more immediately to promote, and who would deny that it was intimately connected with, and involved in the vote they were about to give?